


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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION.

Second Edition

Gerald E. Caiden

School of Public Administration
University of Southern California

Palisades Publishers
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Preface

The first edition of this book was published as *The Dynamics of Public Administration: Guidelines to Current Transformations in Theory and Practice*. It was written at the close of the 1960s when public administration in the United States was struggling through a difficult time. Academically, the field was being disowned by some prestigious universities for what seemed the more promising intellectual field of policy studies. Professionally, the Great Society programs of President Lyndon Johnson had transformed the emphasis in public administration from the management of things to the management of people, but practitioners were still attempting to administer the new like the old amid a turbulent and threatening environment. Intellectually, the younger scholars in the discipline were disappointed, if not disillusioned, with their legacy and they were seeking to push both theory and practice in new directions more in accord with the times. I wrote the book to reassure my students that the discipline of public administration was a worthwhile and challenging study and that they would make an important contribution if they understood the real issues beneath the turmoil.

After the book went out of print, I received many requests

to update it. As far as I was concerned, my original purpose had been fulfilled. Public administration had survived the crisis in better shape. It had regained its academic prestige. Its practitioners had recovered their sense of purpose. The younger scholars and their disciples had made their point. Preoccupied with other matters, I lacked the time, resources, and inclination and besides I was living outside the United States. After I returned, I was diverted to other tasks. Ten years passed. Still pressures to revise the original book persisted. By then I realized that a new book was warranted. But instead of a totally different volume, I decided to revise the original.

Like the original edition, this revised version is not intended to cover the whole field in depth. Topics treated extensively in existing texts (and now there are ten times the number than when I first wrote) and specialized studies are mentioned only briefly. No good reason exists to reproduce or duplicate them. This limited term of reference precludes a comprehensive reshaping of existing knowledge within a new theory of public administration, although several elements that would compose a new framework for the discipline are represented. This book is designed to be read alongside established texts and used as a foundation on which to build further.

I direct this work to the serious, intelligent reader. It has already been tried out in draft form on my colleagues and students at the School of Public Administration, University of Southern California, who have helped me iron out the creases. I thank them for their guidance and want to mention in particular Jim Ruckle for his help on third sector organizations, Naomi Caiden for simplifying the current flood of budget reform proposals, and Lynn Sipe for providing bibliographical materials.

The binding theme in this revised edition is the same as was intended in the first, namely, the constant change that continuously reshapes the scope of public administration in response to societal dynamics, and the persistent need for the discipline of public administration to keep abreast of current events and shifts of emphasis in the practitioner's world.

Public administration is what public administrators do and what they do is determined by tradition and innovation. All too often students get bogged down in the knowledge of administrative routines, laws, procedures, forms, and memoranda essential

for an understanding of the traditional aspects of managing public affairs. They should be aware that there is another side—creative, ever-changing, enterprising, and dynamic—that is equally important. If they persist with their studies, one day they will be responsible for routinizing innovation and revitalizing routine. I wish them every success. The world certainly needs their input.

G.E.C.

Los Angeles, California

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1

The Discipline Of Public Administration

FOR CONVENIENCE HUMAN knowledge is divided into specializations. As advances are made so the specialities are revised and reorganized, sometimes so rapidly that keeping track of the latest reshuffling is a difficult task. This has been particularly true of the social sciences over the past century, but with public affairs overshadowing private matters and government assuming greater importance in social arrangements there has been increasing recognition of a new specialization focusing on the emergence of Big Government and the development of the administrative state. This new discipline of public administration is concerned with the conduct of public affairs and the management of the public's business. It includes anything that can be construed as the community's response to social problems which require collective not individual resolution through some form of public intervention outside social convention and the private marketplace.

Although its subject matter has existed since the dawn of civilization, no other discipline seems to have so much trouble justifying itself to itself and to the world at large. It is assaulted from all sides by those who wish that it did not exist at all and

believe that humanity would be better off without it and others who claim that it is part of something else, of some other discipline, and believe that it has no right to exist intellectually as a self-contained, separate identity. It has yet to develop a solid theoretical foundation. It is plagued by vagueness, indefiniteness, looseness and imprecision. Its theorists and its practitioners barely relate to one another. Universal agreement is rare; wide differences of opinion exist over meaning, approaches, study methods, identity and boundary limitations. Its students often find it dull, the texts unreal, the debates pointless, the controversies meaningless, the theories inoperable and the practical training worthless. In short, it suffers from a loss of conceptual direction. Not surprisingly, it exhibits an academic inferiority complex, long "regarded as a somewhat secondary subject of study, characterized by a rather narrow emphasis upon technique and arid structural detail rather than a more elevated intellectual content."¹

Actually, public administration should not be so self-conscious. It is a young discipline, barely a century old. In that time, it has come a long way and it does not need to apologize for any lack of progress. Like the distinguished discipline of medicine, it has a broad social purpose indispensable to modern civilization, is expanding in many different directions in a booming field of study, and incidentally is becoming more publicly known. It is founded on an oath of allegiance to public service, backed by a stringent code of professional ethics enforced by sanctions, which is itself rooted in a philosophy of the public interest. It is professional in every respect—special training, unique skills, dedicated career service, distinct body of knowledge—and covers proliferating professions concerned with the health of society. Its practice is an art; its study is a science. It distinguishes between theory and practice, and between study and application. It borrows from and lends to other disciplines, some of which overlap in subject matter. Indeed, these parallels between the disciplines have led some scholars and practitioners to fashion public administration in the image of medical science.²

Undoubtedly, public administration belongs to the family of administrative systems, and its way of getting things done can be

compared and contrasted to the way nonpublic administration systems get things done, just as different public administration systems and mixed public-private systems can be compared and contrasted. Simplified, the distinguishing features stem from differences in the ultimate objectives, which define the administrative system (policy making or functional analysis), the nature of the parts that constitute the system (structural analysis), the relationships between the system's parts (behavioral analysis), and the system and its environment (ecological analysis). The case for treating public administration systems separately rests on the possibility of distinguishing them from other administrative systems by function, structure, behavior, and ecology. If the past century has proved anything at all, it is that public administration can be distinguished in these respects and in view of its increasing scope it may well swallow other administrative studies.

THE MEANING OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

In all societies, there are social problems that do not respond adequately to individual initiatives. Effective remedial action requires the organized efforts of the whole community. Such collective problems range from child-rearing, food gathering, and protection from wild beasts in primitive societies to urban blight, carcinogens and delinquency in contemporary organizational societies. How people organize themselves as a *public*, as a collectivity in which they recognize mutual obligations and duties, to handle their common problems and achieve common goals constitutes the subject matter of public administration. Once people recognize they can do better by pooling their resources and working together in the common or general interest instead of relying on personal abilities alone, even though some individual advantages may have to be sacrificed to share in communal benefits, they have to be organized as a collectivity and their common or mutual concerns have to be managed in some fashion, though not necessarily in any elaborate or complicated way.

The recognition of the supremacy of certain collective needs

over individual self-interest is common among all animals. Some species go to extraordinary lengths to sacrifice individual interests and individuals in the collective interest. Others barely recognize any social conventions at all, yet they have survived millions of years despite environmental changes that could have extinguished them. They, like the human species until relatively recently, have not developed elaborate or complicated systems of collective organization and management. The human species alone has. It has shown a remarkable facility for adapting itself from the simplest forms to the most complicated, from libertarian individualism to collectivist conformity, and to combining every conceivable variation between. Possibly no other living species has demonstrated such remarkable facility but then no other has perceived collective needs of a higher order beyond mere survival through environmental adaptation, collective security, and reproduction. No other has sought to master its environment through its innate creativity, willingness to take risks and experiment, investment in common property, and ability to reason. No other seems so gifted to learn: once something is known to the human species, rarely does it have to be rediscovered. Consequently it alone among living creatures has been able to construct increasingly sophisticated social institutions to serve its collective interests.

Even the simplest societies have rather elaborate ways of getting things done that they want done. Nomadic tribes that wander through desert or forest, for instance, have ways of protecting themselves against the elements, wild beasts and other tribes that cross their path. They have ways of settling disputes, of containing potentially violent conflicts, of dealing with deviants and villains, of deciding between rivals, of teaching duties and obligations to the young, of looking after those who cannot fend for themselves. They have ways of dividing the work that has to be done, of allocating resources among different social functions, of maintaining productivity, of measuring and accounting for social products, of distributing communal wealth, and of reconciling all to their allotted portion. They have ways of passing on tradition, of changing set ways, of providing leadership, and of ensuring obedience. They have ways of working off anger, frustration

and surplus energy, of providing rest and relaxation, of promoting jollity, and of meeting spiritual needs. Often many of these activities are combined and their performance is so natural, logical and obvious that they seem not to be organized at all. But they have been carefully and cleverly designed to meet social needs and they work tolerably well.

More complex societies require more complicated arrangements to accomplish the same things. Every dimension of scale is transformed. Extended families are surpassed by tribes, nations and eventually the world society. Caves and tents are replaced by personal structures, individual landholdings, fortifications and elaborate public buildings. Axeheads and arrows give way to plows, firearms, engines, manufactures and artificial compounds. Soothsayers are eclipsed by priests, professionals, scientists and welfare workers. Different social institutions develop in different ways and assume responsibility for different collective purposes. Their achievements depend increasingly on their administrative capacity, that is, their ability to mobilize social resources, to organize them efficiently, and to improve the outcomes for the effective fulfillment of such social purposes as group survival, personal security, economic well-being and socialization. It requires considerable administrative capacity to rule great empires, build large cities, construct massive public works, wage continental wars, and deliver social services equitably to a scattered population.

Many societies around the world at different times have demonstrated such administrative capacity. Historical reconstructions reveal that much contemporary administration can be traced back thousands of years and today's novel inventions have many historical parallels. Codes of public law, bureaucratic organizations, complex budgeting and accounting systems, tax administration, public works supervision, symbols of authority, executive privilege and merit systems of appointment to public office predate writing and written records. Somehow, societies have learned instinctively to conduct their public business in much the same way from one age to another, from one continent to another. There have been amazing similarities in the administration of

public affairs that could not have known of one another's existence. Where they did, pains were taken to incorporate proven practices. Administrative continuity has linked civilizations. Thus ancient Chinese administrative arrangements are still found in modern China and other parts of Asia and in adapted form among European countries which came into contact with Chinese culture, while ancient Roman law is still embodied in contemporary public administrative law.

The institutionalization of administrative capacity for collective purposes is the foundation of public administration. Such arrangements have existed in all societies. They can be identified, compared and contrasted. Certain recognized authorities—chieftains, priests, warlords—rule on public matters, that is, matters of concern to the collectivity as a whole and subject to public means of enforcement. Public administration refers to the implementation of pronouncements made by recognized public authorities, the organization of enforcement machinery to ensure public conformity, and relations between the public and public officials appointed to further collective interests. It includes the organization of public affairs, social purposes and collective decision-making, the management of public institutions, public offices and public property, and the administration of the public by officials, covering attitudes and behavior as well as actions. As such it covers a host of different things—actions that both direct and assist the public at the same time, functions of specially designated people who look after or take charge of others, and services organized for the benefit of all who take advantage of them, and reciprocal obligations and duties. To confound the situation further, throughout much of history, public and private matters have not been distinguished but deliberately fused as for instance where public officials have been expected to use their private resources to advance the public interest or where public officials in satisfying collective needs have also expected to enhance their private interest. To this day, the distinction has not been definitely resolved.

Modern public administration dates from endeavors to separate public from private and to insist that public institutions, offices and property should be devoted solely to advancing the

general welfare or the public interest. Public administration should not be considered administration of the public but administration for the public. This idea is not new. It was expressed in the code of Hammurabi, in Confucianism and in the funeral oration of Pericles. It is best represented by Cicero in *De Officiis*.

Those whom nature has endowed with the capacity for administering public affairs should put aside all hesitation and take a hand in directing the government; for in no other way can a government be administered or greatness of spirit be made manifest. Those who mean to take charge of the affairs of government should not fail to remember two of Plato's rules: first to keep the good of the people clearly in view that regardless of their own interests they will make their every action conform to that; second, to care for the welfare of the whole body politic and not in serving the interests of some one party to betray the rest. For the administration of the government, like the office of a trustee, must be conducted for the benefit of those entrusted to one's care, not of those to whom it is entrusted.

It can be found in the public ethics of the ancient empires of China, India, Mesopotamia, Greece and Rome and it seems to be a common thread throughout history. Public administrators were expected to work in the common interest, to advance the general welfare, not to exploit their offices solely for personal gain. They had obligations to the ruled. This contrasted to the immoral and ruthless exploitation of people by selfish rulers for whom public administration was nothing more than the private administration of the public weal. The history of the modern administrative state is no less than the transformation of the private administration of the public weal to the public administration of the public interest in Western nation-states.

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The genesis of modern public administration is to be found in the organization of the king's household in a country where the

crown had many rival contenders and where the church assumed responsibility for social services. Household officials could be divided into two groups: one responsible for personal services to the monarch and the other, distinguishable by education, special skills, and superior functions, responsible for the administration of the king's lands, his finances, justice, and the raising of armies. Amenable to the crown's will and dependent upon its pleasure, the latter group exercised delegated powers. They were drawn from the educated classes—the bourgeois and the clerics—and enjoyed, in practice, permanent tenure and a certain amount of discretion. They gained their positions through patronage and purchase, in return for which they kept the fees and perquisites of office. Over the course of time they often developed proprietary claims to their positions. Their business was to make the monarch the richest and most powerful person in the country, although they also made use of their powers for their own ends. The aims of the king were to dominate the royal household, have full control over officials, and enlarge the power of the crown.

As the monarch grew more successful against rivals, government by the king in person merged into government under the king, exercised in his name. He employed more officials, who regarded the authority delegated to them as their inheritable freehold. They filled vacancies by cooptation, and in this way produced self-perpetuating family dynasties of nobles in such profit-making enterprises as farming taxes, billeting of troops, contracting supplies and communications, and placing relatives and friends in sinecures. Gradually, crown administration and finances became separated from the management of the king's household, and the complex duties of state were consolidated into compartments headed by ad hoc bodies of officials who emphasized collective leadership. In this way a greater measure of uniformity was produced at the center. Field administration still remained largely autonomous. National administration at this stage was confused, cumbersome, and slow.

The scope of government depended on the king's will and inclination, and the extent to which he could persuade his rivals among the clergy, nobles, and burghers to accept his authority. Decision making was centered on the king's court, but depended

on local enforcement. Public services were small, confined to law and order, regulatory activities, and selected public works. Even warfare was limited to small armies, which equipped themselves and fed off the land. Administrative methods were rather crude, with a premium on ritual. Technological aids were simple. Governmental functions were integrated with other societal institutions and barely consolidated internally into specialized areas.

The eighteenth century heralded the age of reason, with the scientific challenge to religion and the application of scientific thought to human society. This created a favorable climate of opinion for the reorganization of the machinery of government to meet the challenge of rural displacement, industrialism, technological advances, large scale warfare, and middle class professionalism. The divine right of kings was one of the first victims. Kings in some countries were deposed altogether by republicans, or their absolute powers were strictly regulated and controlled by the aristocrats and/or middle class. The king's household either disappeared altogether or was more closely defined. Persistent threats to the polity from within and without forced the central authorities to extend their influence over local administration. Previously contracted services were now directly assumed by the central authorities. The nation-state began to establish its own educational system in competition with the church and to seek competent staff outside traditional sources. Antiquated methods and procedures were exposed and more efficient methods and techniques substituted.

Governments needed bigger armies; better weapons; surer supplies; more money; different forms of taxation; new organizations for the administration of social services; better policing and more inspectors; greater coordination, uniformity, and standardization; and higher efficiency. Moreover, the people demanded better communications and postal facilities; relief from poverty, oppression, distress, and insecurity; and equality before the law, with the abolition of legal disabilities and ancient privileges. The French Revolution advanced the causes of liberty, equality, and fraternity against the suppression, inequality and social cleavage that had been embodied and epitomized in the administration of absolute monarchy. New social classes and changes in social struc-

ture brought demands for participation in government and the employment of more businesslike methods in public administration.

In response, the increasing range of public services was consolidated into related specialties such as war, finance, foreign affairs, navy, colonies, trade, interior, and justice. Proprietary positions were reduced or abolished as sinecures and perquisites were eliminated. Professional public servants introduced budgeting techniques, proper accounting, and auditing practices. Field administration was taken out of the hands of the aristocracy and placed under career officials who were appointed by the central administration or transferred to local self-governments. Working methods were overhauled, statistics were introduced, and record keeping was expanded. New kinds of organization were established, with elaborate rules and regulations. New public buildings were constructed to house the expanding governmental activities and the increase in scale of operations, particularly in the military field, where conscripted armies up to one million strong were equipped, trained, and accommodated by the national government. Power and authority passed to leading politicians and top-ranking officials drawn from the elite social classes. Collective leadership was continued only in matters of the highest importance as leaders became specialized. Boards and councils were superseded by departments headed by ministers, and duties and responsibilities were clearly defined among authorities; within the departments, clear chains of command and accountability were established. New administrative structures formed separate ministries or were attached to existing ministries. Field services were made more dependent on the central administration through their consolidation into a ministry responsible for internal affairs or through the creation of new regional units of the central administration.

The increase of governmental administration was accompanied by an equally impressive growth of legislation. The king and his officials no longer were above the law, free to act however they pleased. They were now subject to the law like any other individual and more so, since the law laid down detailed instructions as to what could or could not be done by officials in the perfor-

mance of their duties. A great body of public law grew up, and special bodies were created to adjudicate between aggrieved persons and public officials as representatives of the impersonal power of the nation-state. New laws governed the consolidated fund into which all revenues were deposited and out of which all expenditures were paid, but only on the agreement of the people's representatives and the finance minister. Officials who handled public money were required to pay sureties, take oaths, and give other guarantees, so that effective action could be taken against corrupt practices. High standards of conduct and efficiency were ensured by elaborate rules and instructions and by the enforcement of severe penalties for offenses and misconduct. In return, public officials—because of their specialized skill and knowledge, standing, authority, and importance—were guaranteed permanent tenure and granted pensions on retirement. Government service was made into a full-time career by the prohibition of outside employment and restrictions on outside interests.

Throughout the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century, these trends were intensified as the state apparatus was transformed into the administrative state as government functions and activities multiplied. As kings and aristocrats gave way to representative chambers and to political leaders responsible and responsive to the public, so the idea grew that government should use the public bureaucracy to tackle social problems, advance the welfare of the nation, and transform society according to some vision of the Good Society where social harmony would prevail and social distress would be alleviated. Accordingly, the powers of government were enlarged and the public bureaucracy expanded. Political and administrative careers were separated with merit systems ruling entry and advancement in the public service, which was no longer service to the rulers but service to the ruled.

THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Life would be unbearable without some form of public protection from threats to personal safety and well being and without access to such public amenities as parks and recreational facilities,

schools, libraries and museums. Private business could not be conducted without publicly accepted currencies, measures and laws, and without access to postal services, ports and harbors, and public utilities (water, gas, electricity, telecommunications and transportation). Cities would be unbearable without publicly maintained streets and sewers, fire and police protection, and garbage collection. All these publicly provided goods and services are incontestably within the domain of public administration. Additional public activities that may be included vary in time and place according to ideology, technology, economy, and social organization. Ideas differ widely and change frequently. Some cultures prefer to leave as much as possible to private initiatives while others prefer to collectivize as much as possible. Furthermore, some matters that might a century ago have been considered private, such as city growth, international sport, environmental pollution and industrial relations, are now subject to public intervention and regulation, while some matters that were once considered public are now private as personal rights and areas of privacy come to be defined, enlarged and protected by law. The actual configuration of public administration is in a constant state of flux; it is never the same from one moment to another simply because perceptions change incessantly and with them the boundaries of public administration.

The scope of public administration has varied considerably in history with no apparent connection from one part of the world to another. With the emergence of an international society and a new world order as a result of modern technology and world trade, it seems that the latest cycle has worldwide effect and that is to enlarge the public arena and with it the extent of public intervention. Indeed contemporary civilization would be inconceivable without a large measure of public administration. Its growing pervasiveness in daily life is evident in the proliferation of public laws, the universal extension of the public sector of the economy, the wider accessibility of public goods and services, the increase in public capital and investments, the growth of public employment and public professions, and the spread of compulsory taxes.

Recently in several countries there has been a reaction to this trend in the conduct of human affairs but whether this marks the peaking of the current cycle or merely a temporary pause before the trend is resumed remains to be seen. Some people believe that if the cycle is not soon reversed, we will all become enslaved to a leviathan that will order all our affairs, while others hope that further extensions will eliminate selfish private interests that exploit the common weal and bring the Good Society nearer, which for them means a more rational and responsive ordering of communal actions toward societal goals. The rest of us are inclined to wait and see, although we are likely to be influenced by a general prejudice we have acquired against public administration.

ADVERSE IMAGE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The term "public administration" usually evokes adverse images of officiousness, red tape, regimentation, and corruption. Everyone has favorite tales to tell about officialdom. No human institution is perfect and even in the best run organizations mistakes occur. But how representative are the anecdotes? The lampooning of public officials is an international sport. The public seeks someone to blame for all the things that are wrong in the world and public officials are an obvious target. Unfortunately officials learn to live with criticism and often fail to distinguish between just and unjust complaints. The public always remains on the outside; it does not really comprehend what goes on within public administration. It expects perfection. New levels of achievement become new minimum expectations. Possibly people are more impatient with officialdom and when it comes to comparing public and private performance, they may well have different standards.

Behind deep-seated prejudices against public administration probably lies a resentment of the communal authority it represents, an inhibiting authority backed ultimately by coercive power which obliges them to obey laws, pay taxes, obtain licenses and

subject themselves to all manner of inconveniences. Whereas they are conscious of the personal costs, they are less aware of the benefits they receive, some of which they rarely have cause to question. As taxpayers, for instance, they probably prefer to keep the money for themselves than to contribute to the education of other people's children or to the welfare of less fortunate folks or to stockpiles of weapons or to subsidies for private businesses. Public administration can never quite justify itself or prove its worth because myth is preferred to fact.

THE PECULIARITIES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

This general prejudice against public administration is not its only peculiarity. Public administration is different from other social institutions in several respects. First, *it is unavoidable*. Other relationships can be made or broken at will. One does not have to pray or buy a particular brand of merchandise or join any clubs or donate to any charities. These are all voluntary activities. But public administration cannot be evaded. The public's will must be done. Leaving a country will not help as official permission is needed to enter another country or face deportation. Nor is death a remedy. One must continue to fulfill one's public duties until officially dead as indicated on a death certificate.

Second, *it expects obedience*. After all, it has a legal monopoly of coercive power. For other organizations to enforce their will legally, they must employ the machinery of public administration—the law courts, police system, prisons, and militia. Most governments try to avoid the use of repression and only at times of crisis do they employ their ultimate powers to imprison people, draft the young, seize private property, and force people to work. Other legal institutions have to earn their support. If they intimidate, it means that public authorities are accomplices or ineffectual.

Third, *it has priority*. Unless communal activities are performed well, other activities are jeopardized. Breakdowns in public services bring normal life to a halt, as is readily evidenced

whenever city police, firefighters and garbage collectors strike or public utilities fail. The absence of public emergency services leaves people at the mercy of natural elements and animal and human predators. In crisis, people look to public authorities for quick and sure response. Because it has priority, public administration accepts the moral responsibility of being present at all times with sufficient reserves to meet most contingencies. This, in turn, impels it to demand high safety margins, more than enough to be certain, something that the community may not be able to afford.

Fourth, *it has exceptional size*. In order to serve all those who require public goods and services, public administration contains the largest single multipurpose organizations outside multinational corporations and universal churches. In many countries, the administrative state is the largest single landowner, investor, employer, consumer, entrepreneur and publisher. While it can take advantage of the economies of scale (standardization, routinization, specialization, capitalization and professionalism), it also experiences the disadvantages of size and complexity (regimentation, red tape, circumlocution, officiousness and indifference) which, in the absence of competition, political control, self-corrective devices, and public watchdogs, could be wasteful, time-consuming, ineffective, and alienating.

Fifth, *its top management is political*. It is governed by politics not business acumen or social enlightenment or scientific precision. Everything about it is subject to political principles, promises and expediencies. Few other social institutions are so vulnerable to political pressure. All actions are open to political debate, scrutiny and investigation. Every detail "has to be thought about in terms of possible public agitation, investigation, or judgment."³ Public administrators work in a political fishbowl.

Sixth, *its performance is extraordinarily difficult to measure*, because it is so political and its objectives—peace, security, health, education, justice, prosperity, safety, liberty, equality—are not susceptible to objective measurements. Just what constitutes adequate performance or satisfactory performance of any public activity? Opinions will probably differ according to expectations

and personal values. Will peace be better served by a vast deterrent strike force or disarmament? Is the community better served by a park or subsidized fine arts? Should more babies be saved to live short lives of deprivation, misery and starvation?

Seventh, *more is expected of public administration*. Dual standards exist. The public expects more of public administration. Public officials should be guardians of the public interest, trustees of public property, paragons of virtue. Public morality should be above reproach, an example to younger generations. People should be treated fairly, equitably and with consistency. The law should apply to all. Discrimination should be minimized. Public business should be conducted in the open. Public officials should be optimistic and encouraging; they should evidence faith in a brighter future, demonstrate leadership and generally behave more responsibly than other people. In short, if public administration is not different, then it should be.

THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFICATION

If public administration is unique in these ways, how can public administration be identified? Five approaches have been tried, none of them entirely satisfactory. The first is *the identification of governmental administration*. All governments conduct certain activities such as external relations, defense, internal law and order, public works, social welfare, and taxation. In addition, there are activities that governments usually perform as monopoly services—postal services, immigration controls, quarantine, currency, and weights and measures. Beyond this point, there is no agreement. Some governments provide extensive public services and run large-scale public enterprises that elsewhere do not exist at all or remain in private hands. Most of the world's airlines, railroads, telecommunications, public utilities, and social services are government-owned, but in the United States of America they are largely privately owned, though subject to extensive public control.

Further, some governments prefer to contract out many of their activities to private business and other social organizations;

that is, they finance the activities and provide guidelines, but leave the details to the contractors. In the United States, space research and weapons production are carried out by contractors under the direction of superintending government agencies, whereas the same activities in the Soviet Union and Australia are directly administered by public authorities.

Thus, to identify public administration by the nature of government activities alone or the extent of governmental administration means that it must take a different shape from one country to another, from one society to another, from one age to another and that it would exclude other politically directed communal activities that are not performed by government agencies and other public concerns susceptible to governmental decisions. A more universal and lasting definition would have to go beyond government to focus on intrinsically public functions, and hence beyond the administrative state into the province of anthropology and sociology and unfamiliar organizational frameworks.

A second approach at delineation is *the identification of public organizations, grounded in public law, financed by public money, and staffed by career public servants*. These would be truly public authorities under political control. Government departments (or ministries) would be obvious candidates as would be regulatory agencies, administrative tribunals, local governments, and public corporations financed by the public exchequer and staffed by career officials. But, in many countries, the government has joined with other social organizations in mixed enterprises to provide a host of community services, notable examples being British Petroleum and COMSAT. Governments have also contracted out large areas of public administration to other organizations which have no other business, particularly in the defense and aerospace industries, and they subsidize other organizations (such as loan guarantors, aircraft manufacturers, and community developers) to keep them in existence as otherwise the government would be obligated to take over their activities. In countries where public administration is rudimentary and unreliable, governments prefer that nongovernmental bodies provide communal services and use them as instruments of public policy. Thus, public administration is not synonymous with government organizations

because public administration covers all social organizations that execute public policy and public laws and is concerned also with government regulated private organizations and quasi autonomous non-governmental organizations (QANGOs).

A third approach is the study of *publicly oriented administrative attitudes*. Public administration would be distinguished by executives who exhibited publicly oriented attitudes such as concern for social goals and values, awareness of public opinion, evidence of justice, fairness, equity, humaneness, openness, and respect for public accountability, responsiveness and representation. Inward looking attitudes, such as concern for private advantage, discounting of social costs and disrespect for public laws would be excluded. Unfortunately, these different sets of attitudes are not clearly distinguishable and coexist in the same organization. Some private entrepreneurs are obsessed with profits while others are public spirited. Some public enterprises are totally inward looking while others are not. Some voluntary associations are more responsive to community needs than uncaring, overbearing and punitive public agencies. Public administration has no monopoly of community concern.

A fourth approach, and the most common, is to identify public administration according to *unique features of the processes employed in activating public policy*, such as the nature of political controls and public accountability, the machinery of government, public policy making, public finance, public personnel management, public enterprises, national planning, local government administration, law enforcement, and so forth, and to pick out *significant differences in operating styles* between public and private organizations. Presumably should all organizations adopt the same or similar processes, the uniqueness of public administration would disappear. Indeed management science treats management as a universal and minimizes distinctions between public and private organizations. To be distinctive public administration would have to maximize the distinctions and possibly distort perspectives.

A fifth, and most recent, approach concentrates not on the delivery of public goods and services, not on the management

side, but on their public nature, their *publicness*, on the public side of public administration. It seeks a meaning separate from advocacy of the public interest, absence of profit motive, and acceptance of public accountability and political control. According to Robert Biller, any organization which cannot obtain accurate and predictive information because its environment is too turbulent is a public organization, irrespective of its legal forms, functions, activities and other distinguishing characteristics.⁴ As most contemporary social organizations fit this definition of public, public administration would cover all public administration in contemporary society, although Robert Denhardt would prefer to focus on public organization committed to the democratization of social relationships.⁵ For him, public administration should concentrate on democratic public administration as opposed to autocratic public administration, participative management not hierarchical management.

The only common element among these five approaches is that they seem to agree that there are publicly organized communal activities subject to political direction which operate according to notions of publicness. Otherwise public administration can be as wide or narrow as anyone wants it to be. In the words of Wallace Sayre, "Public administration is ultimately a problem in political theory."⁶ It can include all forms of public organization and public policy making. It can be slimmed to the delivery of public goods and services through the machinery of government. It can be reduced still further to the mechanics of management in identifiable government organizations. Textbook writers are forced to provide their own personal definitions and as can be expected there are wide variations. Their scope ranges from applied social science to formal descriptions of public management techniques, from political behavior to routine bureaucratic processes, from the national impacts of international bodies to the internal networks of specific public agencies. Because American writers dominate, most descriptions are based on the American political system and assume the distinction between church and state and between the civil and the military, the separation of powers, the primacy of the executive in conducting governmental

operations, the presuppositions of the organizational society, the administrative state and a democratic polity, and a federal constitution. Some descriptions are meaningless outside the American context and others are too narrow for a universal discipline.

THE IDENTITY CRISIS

Is there any point to seeking a universally valid meaning of public administration? Harold Stein believes that administrative situations are so unique, so inherently disorderly that "public administration is a field in which everyman is his own codifier and categorizer, and the categories adopted must be looked on as relatively evanescent."⁷ Frederick Mosher is also inclined to doubt the worth of the effort. Any definition "would be either so encompassing as to call forth the wrath or ridicule of others, or so limiting as to stultify its own disciples. . . . It is more an area of interest than a discipline, more a focus than a separate science."⁸ Unless it were grounded in ordered and tested premises and hypotheses, it could decline into mere dilettantism. This point also worries Robert Parker who sees the significance of the term "public administration" not so much as academic or scientific but vocational giving "practicing administrators a sense of community" and "educators a focus around which to organize . . . professional preparation."⁹

In contrast, Martin Landau believes there is a discipline of public administration and it is important to "locate its center and clarify its principal points of reference."¹⁰ Unless such categorization occurs, the study of human behavior will be a mass of confusion, defeating any attempt "to group together, to classify certain activities, to make sense of them, and thereby, to impose a measure of order."¹¹ Because public administration has neglected its definition, "the profession does not exhibit continuity in research, a rigorous methodology, or paradigms, theorems and theoretical systems."¹² A common unifying center must be established for systematic and disciplined inquiry. He rejects efforts to

base the discipline on concrete institutions, public policy, government and executive. He would center public administration on decision-making. In this, he was following Herbert Simon¹³ and Dwight Waldo,¹⁴ both of whom saw public administration as one type of rational human cooperation calculated to realize given goals, in this case, the maximum realization of public goals, which gives a special public quality to governmental functions.

Until consensus is reached on boundaries and a central core, Waldo warns that public administration will remain "a subject matter in search of a discipline" and suffer "an identity crisis, having enormously expanded its periphery without retaining or creating a unifying center."¹⁵ His interim solution is for public administration to act as a profession or rather "a collection of related professions," like medicine which is guided by no single theory but draws from many medical sciences. Just as medical schools train practitioners to use different disciplines, so public administration assembles knowledge from different disciplines to prepare practitioners for careers in public service.¹⁶ But the younger scholars whom Waldo brought together in 1968 at the Minnowbrook conference center of Syracuse University to work out a new public administration more in keeping with the times disagree. They think that this professional view of the discipline has made it arid and largely irrelevant, basing it on "past problems or instant responses to present 'establishment' problem definitions."¹⁷ It has retreated from concern with social progress to an apolitical value free pseudo scientism which rationalizes the bureaucratic state and administrative rule in the service of existing power elites. What is needed is reformatory zeal, an injection of progressive political values on behalf of the victims of the bureaucratic state, a reshaping of administrative instruments "to make them less bureaucratic, authoritarian, dehumanizing and oppressive for those who work in them and, by extension, for those who come into contact with them."¹⁸

Vincent Ostrom, like the young Turks, also believes that the discipline has to be reformulated if it is to regain its credence and overcome an intellectual crisis. He suggests that the theory of

bureaucracy should be replaced as the central concept with the theory of *public goods* used by political economists in conceptualizing the problem of collective action.

Public agencies are not viewed simply as bureaucratic units which perform those services which someone at the top instructs them to perform. Rather, public agencies are viewed as means for allocating decision-making capabilities in order to provide public goods and services responsive to the preferences of individuals in different social contexts.¹⁹

Public administration should focus on the outputs of public agencies, the different decision-making arrangements or structures that determine those outputs, the nature of public choice in deciding between alternative arrangements, and the conditions under which public choice is exercised. For a proper exercise of public choice, bureaucratic administration should be replaced by democratic administration.

Since the mid 1970s, the lines have been drawn between those, like Martin Landau and Vincent Ostrom, who see public administration as a distinct field or discipline within the social sciences, with core interests and boundaries even if these are hazy and overlap with other disciplines, and those, like Dwight Waldo and George Frederickson, who believe that public administration is an interdisciplinary field, drawing on any relevant discipline needed to prepare students for public service or to understand public problems or to improve governmental administration and public sector performance. The former believe that theory and method should be developed to advance systematically an identifiable body of knowledge, whereas the latter believe that public administration is so rich with themes and perspectives that there is little need for a single theory. No theory could comprehend all its activities.

Public administration is *not* a social science or a discipline but is an application of social science (and other science) to public problems. It is a subject matter, a profession, and a field. Public admin-

istration bridges the disciplines and, therefore, takes relevant parts of the discipline and applies them to public problems.²⁰

But both sides agree that they focus on *res publica* (the public domain), the public arena, public problems, communal goals, collective purposes and societal objectives and both agree that such things deserve independent study and thought. What ruins their further agreement is that the subject matter is not constant.

A CONSTANT STATE OF FLUX

The field of public administration is being continually transformed. Traditional assumptions are frequently shattered by contemporary happenings. Now, more than at any other time in human history, public administration is in ferment. The subject matter is exploding in all directions. Communal activities subject to political direction are expanding fast in response to contemporary needs. New types of public organization are being created. New techniques and processes for improving the performance of public service delivery are being discovered and adopted. The sheer size of public budgets and public employment continually presents problems. Public laws multiply, as do the individual's contacts with public administration. Naturally, the academic study tries to keep pace; as it adapts itself to the changing nature of the subject matter, it must experience shifts in emphasis.

Until the 1940s, the dominant trend in public administration was the search for scientific principles that could be applied to all administration. This was achieved by separating the political from the administrative in government, concentrating almost exclusively on the administrative, deducing general principles from successful practice, and expounding those principles as universal precepts or laws. This search was rather abruptly interrupted by the obvious political nature of public administration, the demonstrable interrelationship between administration and its environment, the intellectual challenge to the validity of the principles approach, and the disillusionment that students schooled in the

ideal and desirable experienced when they encountered actual practice.

Now, instead of teaching students to accommodate themselves to given administrative systems, students are made aware that those systems have to adjust to changing circumstances. They are encouraged to see themselves as change agents, to be proactive not reactive, with officials "expected to take risks on behalf of their clients or their moral values, to shift agency resources to help the powerless, and to fight against orders that are unjust."²¹ In place of universal standard precepts, students are instructed that all answers are circumstantial, that the range of available answers is too narrow to suit all circumstances, and that finding acceptable answers requires creative thought in discovering new alternatives and careful judgment in selecting from existing alternatives. The object of the discipline of public administration to them is to improve the human condition; the rest is all commentary. They do not concern themselves overly whether public administration is or should be a discipline in its own right or how it is or should be differentiated from other disciplines or what does or should compose its central core or where its boundaries are or should be drawn. These debating points they leave to their instructors to resolve. As far as they are concerned, public administration exists, it deserves to be studied, and its study should eventually result in better practice.

NOTES

1. W.J. Siffin, "The New Public Administration—Its Study in the United States," *Public Administration* (London), 34, 1956, p. 362.
2. See D. Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration," in J. C. Charlesworth, ed., *Theory and Practice of Public Administration*, Monograph 8, American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1968, p. 10.
3. P. M. Appleby, *Big Democracy*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945, p. 7.
4. R. P. Biller, "Some Implications of Adaptation Capacity for Organizational and Political Development," in F. Marini, (ed.), *Toward a New Public Administration*. San Francisco: Chandler, 1971, pp. 103–105.
5. R. B. Denhardt, "Toward a Critical Theory of Public Organization," *Public Administration Review*, Vol 41, 1981, pp. 628–635.
6. W. Sayre, "Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 18, 1958, p. 105.

7. H. Stein, *Public Administration and Policy Development: A Case Book*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1952, p. xxv.
8. F. C. Mosher, "Research in Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 16, 1956, p. 177.
9. R. S. Parker, "The End of Public Administration," *Public Administration* (Sydney), Vol. 34, 1965, p. 103.
10. M. Landau, "The Concept of Decision-Making in the 'Field' of Public Administration," in S. Mailick and E. H. Van Ness (eds.), *Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962, p. 2.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
13. H. A. Simon, *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1947.
14. D. Waldo, *Ideas and Issues in Public Administration*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953; D. Waldo, "Administrative Theory in the United States: A Survey and Prospect," *Political Studies* Vol. 2, 1954, pp. 70-86; D. Waldo, *The Study of Public Administration*. New York: Random House, 1955; D. Waldo, *Perspectives on Administration*. University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1956.
15. D. Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration," p. 5.
16. D. Waldo, "Education for Public Administration in the Seventies," in F. Mosher (ed.), *American Public Administration*, University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1975, p. 185.
17. T. LaPorte, "The Study of Public Organization," in F. Marini (ed.), *Toward a New Public Administration: The Minnowbrook Perspective*, San Francisco: Chandler, 1971, p. 21.
18. P. Savage, "Dismantling the Administrative State: Paradigm Reformulation in Public Administration," *Political Studies*, Vol. 22, 1974, p. 153.
19. V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, "Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration," *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 37, 1971, pp. 207; later expanded in V. Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration*, University, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1973.
20. H. G. Frederickson, "The Lineage of New Public Administration," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 8, 1976, p. 152.
21. H.E. McCurdy, *Public Administration: A Synthesis*, Menlo Park, Calif.: Cummings Publishing Company, 1977, p. 353.

2 The Study Of Public Administration

THE RECOGNITION OF public administration as a distinct field of study is less than a century old. At first it was subsumed within the mother disciplines of history, law, and political science. Then in the first half of the twentieth century management science laid claims to it. But already by the Great Depression it had outgrown any subsidiary status as more and more activities were heaped on the administrative state. Although the growth rate of the public sector may be slowing, there seems to be no end to the demands being placed on it, seemingly everything from medical research to consumer protection, from storing food surpluses to alleviating poverty, from space exploration to offshore drilling.

The continuing expansion of public administration is readily explainable. People look to government more to fulfill their rising expectations. Other social institutions which might fit the bill are declining in influence. The growing complexity of the world order and modern living require more public organization. Modern technology aids government in its extension of authority and power. And the public in whose name public administration is

conducted demands better public services and higher quality performance.

WHY STUDY PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION?

Nothing is preordained in the growth of public administration, nor is there inevitability about its continued expansion. But as it grows, the public bureaucracy poses a serious challenge to other political mechanisms and raises the real possibility that its administrative elite could usurp effective political power. This possibility of bureaucratic rule is reason enough to justify the study of public administration. But there are better reasons. Public administration intrudes so much into daily life that the prudent would benefit by knowing something about it to cope better in their dealings with officialdom. Ignorance leaves people totally dependent on public administrators, not a particularly desirable state of affairs for both public administrators and their clients. The existence of a knowledgeable body of public opinion constitutes a safeguard against possible bureaucratic excesses and a corrective influence on public maladministration. As more people find employment in the public sector, they are obliged to learn more about their work environment and to improve their occupational skills.

Besides satisfying intellectual curiosity, what else should students expect from their studies of public administration? After all, when medical students complete their courses successfully, they qualify as medical practitioners. But this is not true of students of public administration who do not necessarily qualify as public administrators. Much depends on whether their courses are academically or vocationally oriented. Academic teaching stresses the importance of passing on the accumulated knowledge of the discipline and different ways of thinking about it and uses management techniques mainly as research tools or illustrations of theoretical points. Vocational training, in contrast, teaches specific managerial techniques and aims at producing better practitioners or at fitting people into specific vocational slots.

At the introductory level, the teaching of public administration is designed to question personal attitudes about public affairs, to encourage interest in contemporary administrative issues, and to provide guidance where further detailed information can be obtained. Introductory teaching seeks:

- a. To stress the ability to write effectively—that is, clearly, precisely, and concisely
- b. To develop intellectual, research, and practical tools
- c. To acquaint students with the literature of the subject and with ways to find new writing when their formal courses are completed
- d. To promote an awareness of the importance of public administration, its operations, traditions, practices, and embodied values and trends
- e. To link the discipline to other disciplines, show the connections between them, and compare and contrast their different approaches
- f. To emphasize realism, the pragmatic-empirical foundation of the subject matter, and the dynamic nature of administration
- g. To educate for intelligent citizenship, to promote increased participation in public affairs, to create a better understanding of the national culture and dominant social values, and to develop future public leaders
- h. To prepare students for public employment by encouragement and inspiration, guidance in the values of the administrative culture, acculturation, simulation, and acquaintance with public administration (through projects or guest instructors)

Further, but more questionably, such teaching seeks:

- a. To project values, promote reforms, and stimulate creativity
- b. To channel students to understaffed public authorities
- c. To present blueprints for administrative action

All these goals seem demanding, but they are encompassed in the whole range of teaching methods now available. Students get to

know something about their own national administrative culture and other selected countries, the history of the administrative state, the nature of the public sector, main schools of administrative theory, public policy making, public finance, public personnel management, administrative law and research methods. When set a problem in public administration, they should be capable of knowing where to get relevant information but any other practical skills would have to be acquired in specially vocational training sessions and internships.

For more advanced students, coverage gives way to depth, courses are more specialized, and techniques and skills are given more prominence. They are expected to find their own way in the literature and to apply what is relevant to individual projects, which are more problem-oriented. They have more contacts with public administrators and usually the number of ancillary subjects (such as political science, economics, accounting, sociology and history) is reduced. Their courses are designed to widen horizons, to cultivate creativity, to encourage a scientific approach, to search for rational guidelines, and to promote vitality and diversity in developing the discipline. They are expected to grapple with complicated sets of concepts, to comprehend the essence of the administrative process, to be aware of current trends, and to make an original contribution. Their major research interests can be classified as follows:

- a. Documentation—collection of data and compilation of bibliographies
- b. Methodology—improvement of research techniques
- c. Theory—hypothesizing and model-building
- d. Empiricism—case studies, problem-solving, translating theory into practice and vice-versa
- e. Behavior—analysis of administration in action
- f. Boundary crossing—investigation of interdisciplinary links
- g. Consultation—exchange of information and advising practitioners

Teaching and research bring faculty and students together as well as theorists and practitioners in a joint enterprise to advance the state of the art.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DISCIPLINE

Although public administration is as old as civilized society, the modern discipline of public administration has only emerged with the development of Big Government and the contemporary administrative state. Yet it is important to note that almost all prominent figures in human history and all the great books devote space to the conduct of public affairs and reflect on the nature of public organization. But scattered thoughts do not constitute a discipline, which in the case of public administration is dated from the establishment of the first professorial chairs, the publication of the first textbooks and journals, and the formation of professional societies over the past two hundred years. The term "public administration" began to creep into European languages during the seventeenth century to distinguish between the absolute monarch's conduct of public affairs and the management of his private household. The contemporary discipline arose at the same time from the bureaucratization of the nation-state following the separation of church from state and from the superimposition of government over all other social institutions.

The first systematic studies in modern public administration were designed to prepare public officials to run the absolutist state smoothly and efficiently so that it would prevail over the landed aristocracy and provincial towns. They were largely descriptive accounts of the formal machinery of government, the work of public servants, and the code of conduct expected of public officials. They were known on the European continent as the *cameral sciences*, the term then given to all knowledge deemed necessary for the governance of an absolutist state by trained professional experts skilled in management or bureaucracy, i.e. rule "by salaried, book-learned, disinterested, propertyless bureau people."

Salaried, so they strive to maintain and increase the number of salaried; book-learned, living in the printed, not the real world; without cause to support, for they belong to no class of citizens that constitute the State, they are a class in their own right—the clerical caste; without property, so they are unaffected by its fluctuations. Come rain or sunshine, let taxes rise or fall, let ancient

rights be destroyed or preserved, it makes no difference to them. They draw their salaries from the Treasury and write, write, write, in silence, in their offices behind closed doors, unknown, unnoticed, unpraised; and bring up their children to be just as useful writing machines.¹

But the arrogant usurpation of power by officials and other defects of bureaucratism were offensive and led to a reaction against the rule of the bureaucrat in favor of the rule of law.

Following the English (1648), American (1776), and French (1789) Revolutions, there came the gradual recognition of rights of the individual against the state and the protection of those rights by special systems of law. Despotic and arbitrary government gave way to bureaucratic administration of public laws which determined the relations between public administration and the public. Aspirants to high public office needed to be well versed in administrative law. The content of administrative law courses was broadened to cover nonjuridical matter pertaining to the administration of public affairs. Codes of actual and desirable administrative practices became an integral part of legal theory. Law faculties assumed major responsibility for the study of public administration, with emphasis predominantly descriptive, although comparative analysis was taught in legal theory and administrative jurisprudence. Not until after World War II was public administration separated from law. In the meantime, the European administrative law tradition had been exported to African and Asian colonies, Latin America, Turkey, and Japan, where it still remains strong, as it does throughout Europe including the communist regimes.

In the English speaking countries, the scope of governmental administration was narrower than in Europe. It was less centralized, bureaucratized and legally oriented, and public administration was considered more of a pragmatic art, relying more on voluntarism and the gentlemanly amateur.

Theirs has been a liberal view. It has trusted the democracy and distrusted the expert. It has placed confidence in reserved power and not in concentrated power. It has believed in improvisation

and self-reliance. It has trusted character and honour more than technique.²

Public officials went straight into their chosen profession without undertaking special preparation. But when with the enlargement of government, the need for public administration studies became more apparent, the British and American approaches differed. In Britain, the older universities and official circles resisted formal studies. It was left to newer institutes of higher education, oriented to the social sciences, such as the liberal University of Manchester and the Fabian-based London School of Economics and Political Science, to pioneer public administration studies, and to professionally-minded public servants to encourage the exchange of ideas through the Royal Institute of Public Administration. Their purpose was not to train public servants but "to study public administration in the light of history and of the social sciences,"³ upholding the ethic of community service. Indeed, "ethics were rated as important as science."⁴ Their objective was a civilizing resolution of public problems. As such, it could not be confined within any academic, professional or vocational boundaries. It was crossdisciplinary or multidisciplinary, though its academic home was in political science. British Commonwealth countries followed suit. Today the British approach still remains largely descriptive and analytical, freely interpreting public administration to include anything of relevance to the administration of public affairs that might help policy makers, public administrators, and administrative reformers.

AN AMERICAN DISCIPLINE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The modern discipline of public administration is very much an American invention, staking out an early claim for independence from law and politics. From the outset, it never considered itself part of the theory of law nor the theory of society. Instead, it focused on the operational defects of governmental administration. Growing out of concern about public corruption and scandal,

the early public administration "was pragmatic, problem-oriented, sustained by faith in progress, efficiency, democratic government, and what we now call meritocracy. . . . It was a reform movement, directed against clear and present evils that rational and well-intentioned people could correct."⁵ As the reformers could not derive much benefit from foreign reform movements because of differing political environments, they had to study the facts of American public administration, examine how it worked, evaluate its good and bad points, and propose workable and politically acceptable solutions. Theirs was a political movement intent on achieving administrative reform through influence rather than the direct exercise of power that would have necessitated their association with partisan political machines on which they blamed much public maladministration.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Mugwumps,⁶ later joined by the Progressives, worked for better government, that is, moral, economic, efficient, effective government, and provided the reform impetus, bypassing the established party machines in favor of public education. They nurtured the embryo discipline of American public administration, first outlined conceptually by Woodrow Wilson, a young academic who was a leading member of the National Civil Service Reform League.⁷ His objective was to convince the civil service reform movement to expand its efforts to improve the organization and methods of government administration as well as public personnel. Civil service reform was but a prelude to cleansing official life and making it more businesslike. He claimed that administration should be outside politics. It was a science of means not ends, of the execution of public law not the law itself. Its study had been neglected by English-speaking peoples because of their concern to curb executive power rather than perfect executive methods, to control rather than energize government, "to render government just and moderate than to make it facile, well-ordered, and effective." What was needed was an American science of administration to ensure healthy government and improve ways of conducting governmental business.

Although Wilson pointed the way, it was Frank Goodnow, a professor of administrative law at Columbia University, who

earned the title of "father of American public administration" for his drive to gain disciplinary recognition for public administration, his original contributions to American administrative law and practice, and his pioneering efforts in establishing special research institutes for public administration. Goodnow, another Progressive academic, also argued for an extensive overhaul of the American system of government.⁸ He drew a functional distinction between politics and administration, the former having to do with the policies or expressions of national will, the latter with the execution of these policies. He believed that political control was too strong in the United States; it subverted the popular will to partisan interests and undermined efficient administration. Direct democracy should be strengthened and nonpartisan administrative functions, which he carefully designated, should be depoliticized. He hoped to improve the quality of public business by replacing the spoils system with nonpartisan bureaucracies. He was sure a division between political control and administrative execution existed and could be used to delineate depoliticized officialdom from partisan politicians.

The civil service reform movement had been groping in this direction. The removal of immoral spoilsmen, corrupt politicians, aggressive entrepreneurs, and lazy party functionaries from public office would not ensure that public administration would be conducted with greater efficiency or economy. The structures and processes were still antiquated, and moral men with inadequate knowledge and skills were no more qualified to run large-scale public services than immoral men. What was needed were impartial investigations into the facts of public administration. Several voluntary groups were formed by citizens interested in better government to educate public opinion on municipal administration and to assist objective research into public administration. However, they had only a marginal impact on administrative reform until the New York Bureau of Municipal Research was founded in 1906 to promote efficient and economical municipal government and the scientific study of municipal administration.

Early success against Tammany Hall gained the New York Bureau of Municipal Research widespread attention. It was em-

ployed by various public authorities in other areas to carry out research and to undertake administrative reforms designed to improve governmental economy and efficiency through reorganization, rational allocation of activities, depoliticization, merit systems, budgets, audits, and new organizational forms. The Bureau became the model for similar research organizations in major cities and its director, Frederick Cleveland, was chairman of President Taft's Commission on Economy and Efficiency whose report was also to serve as a model for American administrative reformers. The Bureau began to produce handbooks and manuals of administrative practice, and in 1911 it established a Training School for Public Service to train professionals in the study and administration of public business. The Bureau published *Municipal Research* "to promote the application of scientific principles to government." These activities were the first of their kind in the United States and in contrast with foreign studies, were practitioner rather than academically oriented.

THE ERA OF SCIENTISM

The Municipal Research Bureau was applying scientific method to governmental administrative process just as Frederick Winslow Taylor was doing in the business world. Instead of unrelentless exploitation without regard to social costs, there would be morality, discipline, rationality and scientism. Organizations would be managed scientifically. All would benefit from higher productivity achieved through critical observation and the systematic application of the results. This "conscious application of the law inherent in the practice of successful management"⁹ was universally applicable wherever work was performed. Its principles arrived at inductively from observing people at work could "be studied as a technical question irrespective of the purpose of the enterprise, the personnel composing it, or any constitutional, political or social theory underlying its creation."¹⁰ Taylor forecast that eventually the management of human organization would resemble mechanical engineering resting on well

recognized, clearly defined and fixed principles. Public managers should be trained in the application of such universal rules and techniques and the quality of public management measured by the extent to which the principles were observed.

One of the first tests of the applicability of scientific management in public administration occurred when the Taft Commission on Economy and Efficiency undertook the first comprehensive investigation of federal administration. Its recommendations closely followed scientific management principles, but little was done about them. Meanwhile, similar public inquiries and numerous private research groups mushroomed. The search for facts was accompanied by the growth of specialized libraries in public administration, bill-drafting services, and the proliferation of public administration studies at the universities. In 1913, the American Political Science Association acknowledged the university's role in training students for public service and the need for more practical emphasis in teaching political science and economics.

A marked feature of the research movement was the attempt to avoid undesirable publicity, unconstructive muckracking, partisan politics, personal considerations, and political campaigns. It worked through self-enlightenment, citizen education, and influence. Another feature was the narrowing of concepts and objectives to scientific management principles and virtually exclusive preoccupation with management processes and structures. The message was clear: effective public business could be attained by following the principles and practices of effective private business. Government should be reconstructed as if it were a private business. It should contain a strong executive with full administrative powers, a watchdog legislature, an independent auditor, unifunctional administrative units, a standard all-inclusive budget, and a merit civil service. Mastery of the scientific laws on which these proposals were based was to constitute the American discipline of public administration between the world wars.

The scarcity of teaching materials was not overcome until the mid 1920s. Early attempts to provide textbooks were cut short by World War I, but after 1917 the deficiency was soon remedied by the Municipal Research Bureau of New York and a new research

bureau modeled on it which was established with its encouragement in Washington, D.C. in 1916, the Institute for Government Research (later in 1927 to be part of the Brookings Institution), also "an association of citizens for cooperating with public officials in the scientific study of government with a view to promoting efficiency and economy in its operations and advancing the science of administration." The New York Bureau, renamed the National Institute of Public Administration in 1921 when Luther Gulick became director of the bureau and its training school, continued to emphasize municipal affairs, although it made frequent forays into other levels of government. It concentrated on general principles and methods and issued several texts on personnel administration, public budgeting, police administration, and health administration, as well as the first bibliography in public administration. Its spirit was that of scientism—to discover the laws that govern people and society through the same techniques that discover the laws that govern atoms. More progress could be achieved "through an application of the scientific spirit, through impartial research, through the testing of ideas, and the discovery of principles of administration than through any program of political reform which mankind has yet adopted."¹¹ This approach eventually led to the collection of essays on administrative science, *Papers on the Science of Administration* (published by the Institute in 1937), for the use of the President's Committee on Administrative Management, and is now considered the highest point that the scientific management principles approach reached in the study of American public administration.

Like Gulick, William Willoughby, the director of the Institute for Government Research, had also embarked on an ambitious publications and training program. Again, he was interested in ideal guiding norms, the range of available alternatives, the measurement of the practice against the ideal, and ways of bringing the actual and the ideal together. He was not concerned with the political implications of analysis, and he persistently and dogmatically proposed changes in the American system of government based on the scientific principles. He departed from Taylor and Gulick by enthroning the legislature rather than the executive.

Otherwise, he spent much of his time formulating and elaborating the scientific principles according to which public administration should be reconstructed. The doctrine of his and the other research institutes has been summarized as follows:

1. The politics-administration doctrine was assumed both as a self-evident truth and as a desirable goal; administration was perceived as a self-contained world of its own; with its own separate values, rules, and methods.
2. Organization theory was stated in "scientific management" terms; that is, it was seen largely as a problem in organization technology—the necessities of hierarchy, the uses of staff agencies, a limited span of control, subdivision of work by such "scientific" principles as purpose, process, place, or clientele.
3. The executive budget was emphasized as an instrument of rationality, of coordination, planning, and control.
4. Personnel management was stressed as an additional element of rationality (jobs were to be described "scientifically," employees were to be selected, paid, advanced by "scientific" methods).
5. A "neutral" or "impartial" career service was required to insure competence, expertise, rationality.
6. A body of administrative law was needed to prescribe standards of due process in administrative conduct.¹²

Public administrators were taught to commit this doctrine to heart.

The research institutes did not have the field to themselves. During the 1920s several universities established schools of public administration and citizenship or expanded studies of public administration within political science. At the University of Chicago, Leonard White produced the first textbook on American public administration, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (New York: Crowell-Collier-MacMillan, 1926), which evidenced less enthusiasm for basic principles and scientific management and endeavored to take into account the political environment of public administration. White went further in *The City Manager* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), which

questioned the separation of politics from administration and the applicability of universal principles. Further doubts about the validity of the principles approach were raised by the onset of the Depression, when the divergence between theory and practice, ideal and reality, could not be denied. The principles approach seemed inappropriate for the most pressing issues of the day in American public administration. Many textbook maxims were inapplicable, contradictory, unrealizable, and invalid. With severe cuts in research grants, many research bureaus disappeared, and those that struggled on switched to empirical problem solving.

RECONCILIATION WITH POLITICS

The first to realize the impact of the New Deal on the study and practice of public administration was Luther Gulick.¹³ To him, the government had become the "super-holding company" of American economic life. It would be required to assume greater responsibilities and functions, create planning mechanisms, redistribute powers, specialize, professionalize, and reorganize. Politics and administration could not be separated; administration could not be taken out of politics, and politics could not be taken out of administration. Further doubts about the politics-administration dichotomy were expressed by Leonard White's colleagues at Chicago who charged that public administration had been conceived too narrowly and that the separation between politics and administration had made public administration detached and unreal.¹⁴ Public administration involved more than a mere study of techniques and general principles; it was the "state in action," as broad as government itself. Good administrators participated in public policy making, and they were organizational politicians.¹⁵ The political nature of public administration was more important than the scientific analysis of administrative structures.

The clash between scientific analysis and politics in public administration was highlighted by President Franklin Roosevelt's attempts between 1936 and 1941 to reorganize the federal machinery of government, whose ramshackle structure was an obvious target for reform. Previous inquiries had been fruitless. Roosevelt

appointed a Committee on Administrative Management to review the federal administrative apparatus and advise on the principles of a reorganization. Briefly, all that the committee did was to apply traditional scientific management orthodoxy through the principles approach and make a few concessions to the constitutional setting, dominant political values, and democratic processes.¹⁶ Roosevelt could hardly reject a report that followed his known wishes and exaggerated central bureaucratic leadership at the expense of congressional supervision. In contrast, a Brookings Institution report for Congress put Congress at the head of executive power and viewed the President as a general manager responsible to Congress through strong independent audit.

Despite much common agreement in the two reports, their respective supporters attacked each other and challenged the other's intellectual honesty, political impartiality, and administrative principles. The reorganization issue was caught up in the political fight between the President and Congress. The scientific principles of the President's committee were eroded by political considerations. Politics, not administrative science, had triumphed.

The episode of the President's committee divided public administration scholars. Those who were struck by the similarities with business administration and were deeply committed to scientific management theory believed that, although public administration worked in a political context, the similarities were more important than the differences. Those who were convinced that the differences were more important and were critical of the principles approach believed the political environment to be the determining factor. The former preferred general model building and theorizing; the latter returned to empiricism and political concerns. Possibly more than any other event, World War II demonstrated that general administrative principles, derived from business or scientific analysis, had limited applicability in public administration. Its size, functions, growth rate, and composition depended on the societal requirements of the political system and reflected political ideology, constitutional arrangements, and communal expectations.

POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION

The reconciliation with politics during the 1940s did not occur without a struggle. During that time the study of public administration was in disarray. It could not adjust itself properly to the transformation that was taking place in the practice of public administration, and no administrative philosopher with the status of a John Maynard Keynes in economics emerged to reshape the discipline in line with current events. After an initial backlash reaction to Big Government,¹⁷ several developments took place which pushed the study of public administration in several directions. The management principles approach to public administration was savagely criticized. The principles were not scientific but normative, embodying questionable values. They were not universal, but culture-bound. They were not grounded in evidence but based on misplaced corporate analogies and autocratic assumptions. For every principle, there was an equally plausible and acceptable contradictory principle. According to Herbert Simon, they were only criteria for describing and diagnosing administrative situations, and they suffered from superficiality, oversimplification, and lack of realism.¹⁸ Until the principles became truly scientific, public administration could not be recognized as a science. It was impossible to exclude normative considerations from administrative problems, to separate ends from means in government, to develop a science of man, and to base principles on limited culture-bound experience without recourse to comparative study.¹⁹

The assumption of rational efficiency was superseded by concepts of social efficiency, quality of government, political ends, and public wants. The study of public administration should not be concerned "chiefly with the most successful exploitation of manpower, money and materials in the service of any master, for any purpose, subject only to the direction of politics." Instead such study should be concerned with "the process of social change and the means for making such changes best serve the ends of a more truly democratic society."²⁰ The problem of democratizing the

organization of authority was tackled philosophically,²¹ ideologically,²² and pragmatically.²³ The aim was to blend Big Government with democratic mores, to humanize large-scale organizations, to improve the morale of hard-pressed staffs, and to evolve a new management ideology emphasizing democratic values.

The politics-administration dichotomy, like the "proverbs" of administration, was irreparably damaged. It was described as "misleading," "a fetish," "a stereotype," and the term "politics" was replaced by "policy," which denoted something more positive and less partisan and deceitful. The new theorists argued that the public bureaucracy had always had an important policy-making role and that policy formulation was inextricably interwoven with managerial functions. Case studies were produced to show that no distinction could be made in practice.²⁴ The old dichotomy was buried in postwar textbooks²⁵ which admitted the political nature of public administration, the political role of administrators, and the existence of bureaucratic power.

The prewar philosophical bases of the discipline were further irreparably damaged by Dwight Waldo's assessment of American public administration theory,²⁶ which he found wanting in many ways. He questioned the validity of the principles approach, the heavy stress on formal organization, the scientific adequacy of factual research without reference to values, and the meaning of "efficiency and economy" in the pyramid of values. He refuted the theoretical worth of much that then constituted the core of the discipline, without providing a new core or constructive proposals about where the discipline should head. Written with "a certain animus toward, even contempt for, the literature of Public Administration,"²⁷ it constituted an indictment of public administration theory from which it has yet to recover.

The rejection of past theory brought about a reassertion of pragmatism in its teaching and new beginnings in the search for more adequate theory. The pragmatic bent of the discipline had been evident ever since it had established itself as professional training for public managers and the founding of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University (directed by William Mosher who brought with him from New

York much of the training staff of the National Institute of Public Administration) and the School of Public Administration at the University of Southern California (directed by Emery Olson and John Pfiffner) was further proof of this trend. It had been reinforced when in-service training and better preservice education were encouraged by the Public Administration Clearing House, directed by Louis Brownlow, and the Public Administration Service, established by a concentration of several public professional associations at 1313 East 60th Street, near the University of Chicago. But it was the New Deal and the advent of Big Government in the United States that brought a decided upsurge in interest across the country in quality public service education and training and the academic concern with public policy issues. In 1939, the American Society for Public Administration was founded by the leading schools, training institutes and professional associations to foster interaction between practitioners and academics, provide a forum for public management issues and to bring together the public service professions.

The impetus was accelerated by World War II which had permanently changed America's role in the world and the scope and nature of the public sector. The war had taken many academics from the classroom into policy formulation and public management and back again to cope with large numbers of veterans seeking education and training to prepare them for worthwhile careers. Both sides of the lectern were more concerned with good practice than good theory. They wanted to deal with the real world—policy problems in defense, foreign assistance, economic growth, scientific research and urban expansion; managerial problems in running large-scale public organizations; operational problems in delivering public services; and practical problems encountered in implementing specific programs. Imitating instructional methods in law and business schools, public administration embarked on case studies to illustrate the practical nature of the discipline.²⁸

On the theoretical front, there was a flurry of new ideas from both within and without the discipline. In Big Government, public administrators were formulators as well as implementors of public policy. For Paul Appleby, a practitioner turned academic, public

administration was "policy making subject to still other and various policy makers."²⁹ Herbert Simon, while agreeing that public administration should prescribe for public policy, also argued that the search for a pure science of administration should be pursued side by side, this time based on "a thorough grounding in social psychology"³⁰ and a value free rigorous behavioralist approach. His personal contribution was to switch from doing to deciding, distinguishing between decisions leading to the selection of ends (value judgments) and decisions implementing ends (factual judgments) capable of empirical validation. Robert Dahl emphasized the need to study certain aspects of human behavior in public organizations and normative considerations in public administration problems, and added a further dimension which had hitherto been largely neglected, namely "the relationship between public administration and its social setting. As long as the study of public administration is not comparative, claims for 'a science of public administration' sound rather hollow."³¹

From outside the discipline, social and behavioral scientists were investigating public organizations for empirical verification of their ideas. With the translation of Max Weber's conceptualization of bureaucracy, American sociologists used bureaucratic analysis to transform management theory into organization theory inclusive of public organizations. Economists applied post-Keynesian theories to American public finance. Political scientists transposed pluralism and structural-functionalism. Seemingly, everyone thought they had something to contribute to the study of *res publica*, i.e., the public domain.

THE CENTRIFUGAL STUDY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Before the study of public administration in the United States was thrown in disarray in the 1940s, it was at least on an identifiable route. Since then it has been pursuing many different paths at the same time. If anything, it is more confused now than it was then, for so much has happened so quickly since. Nobody has been able

to assimilate everything that has occurred, let alone code, classify, and arrange the centrifugal forces in a coherent unifying framework. Innovations have followed too closely on one another, and the discipline lost much of its cohesion; nobody yet has appeared capable of restoring any semblance of order. Dwight Waldo has come closest to keeping track of things and reminding everyone of their common links. However, some definite trends can be identified.

1. Internationalism

Before World War II, European, British, and American studies kept much apart, with little exchange of ideas or transnational review. Although they still go their own ways, the barriers have been breached and there is more interchange among them. In addition, greater depth has been provided by contributions from the rest of the world which have concentrated on the administrative problems of poor countries. Interchange has been fostered by the International Institute of Administrative Science and the Public Administration Department of the United Nations Organization and their various offshoots.

2. Wider horizons

A universal feature in the postwar years has been the rapid acceleration of the size and scope of public administration. In these circumstances, the study of the discipline has had to raise its sights beyond housekeeping functions and to encompass the functional transformation taking place and the enhanced role of public administration in meeting societal needs. Attention must now be focused on the prominence of the military; the extension of quasi-autonomous public authorities, mixed enterprises and government contracting; and public financing of science and technology. Other areas deserving recognition are shifting lines of authority between different levels of government; the great growth of public financing and public employment and their impact on the private sector;

and the repercussions on individual liberty, particularly the need for citizen redress against maladministration and unwarranted interference with privacy.

3. A new realism

Having cast off the proverbs of public administration, the study has looked anew at its subject matter and sees it for what it is, not what it purports to be, or what it should be. The assumption behind the case study approach is that administrative actions must be viewed in context as part of the totality of human behavior, and administrative situations as part of the wider social system. This is similar to behavioralism, but employs literary talents rather than scientific methods. Behavioralism itself first came to public administration through Herbert Simon and later from sociologists and psychologists working in related fields.³² Few behavioralist studies in public administration have been exported in exchange, except in bureaucratic theory.³³ Rather than accept things at their face value or reproduce official self-images, the new realism goes behind the scenes and attempts to describe what really goes on and to test the findings scientifically.

4. From process to results

Postwar public administration still devotes much attention to the general administration processes outlined in Luther Gulick's 1937 POSDCORB formula, representing *planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting*. Emphasis has since switched to decision making, a process first analyzed in detail by Herbert Simon, then public policy making, thanks to Paul Appleby, forecasting, and eventually public sector productivity.

5. More sophisticated theory

After Herbert Simon and Dwight Waldo virtually destroyed prewar public administration theory, the return to realism was

an attempt to start over again with more realistic theory. The first attempt was based on the rediscovery of Max Weber's analysis of bureaucracy which has since become the starting point of much theoretical exploration in public administration. The idolization of bureaucratic authority brought a reaction in the late 1960s by younger scholars who wanted a new public administration based on democratic, egalitarian values. Their criticism promoted more liberal analysis of American public organizations.

6. Cultural breakthrough

Although much public administration theory is culture-bound, the study of comparative public and development administration, a field virtually unknown before the war, broke through cultural barriers and stimulated much original thinking. The impetus came from Great Power competition, international humanitarianism, and appeals for help from poor countries and newly independent states. New perspectives were badly needed, and Fred Riggs and the Comparative Administration Group of the American Society of Public Administration pioneered a new administrative vocabulary to describe different societal typologies, administrative cultures, and administrative systems. The result has been a questioning of the traditional framework of public administration and Western egocentricity.

Despite these trends, no new synthesis is in sight. An adequate science of public administration is as elusive as it has ever been, and a fundamental and comprehensive theory is still missing. Public administration has yet to prove it is a theoretical or practical science. The most disturbing features are the neglect of much of the study outside the United States and the failure to bridge the gap between theorists and practitioners in the United States. The former challenges the status of the study as a universal discipline; the latter challenges its right to exist at all. If it is really true that practitioners can get along well without any help from the theorists, and the theorists can exist without reference to practice, something is radically wrong. Reciprocity is not lacking, but until

it increases, the study may continue to wander aimlessly in all directions. Perhaps the quickest way of recapturing direction is to concentrate on the probable rather than the possible and to look at the obvious rather than search for the obscure.

The following chapters are concerned with the nature of these postwar developments in the American study of public administration and the transformations that have since taken place in both theory and practice. Before turning to these exciting happenings, it is necessary to remember that much of the past was not abandoned overnight or at all and that the overreaction of postwar disillusionment with the principles approach and the politics-administration dichotomy has since been corrected a little by the rediscovery and reworking of valuable material bequeathed by the pioneers. The reformist drive behind the study of public administration still persists, although it is somewhat disguised under new academic approaches. People want to improve public administration and hope that they will derive practical benefit from its study as well as intellectual stimulation. The scientific bent is much more sophisticated than the early principles approach, with more scientific hardware available and a greater variety of relevant scientific techniques. Organization theory has expanded in its search for universal principles, but it remains separate from public administration, and little cross-fertilization has taken place. Lastly, the study of public administration for the most part has continued uneasily as a branch of political science, less concerned with the inner workings of public bureaucracies and more with public policy than it was in its formative years.

NOTES

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3 Public Policy Making

PUBLIC POLICY MAKING—the determination of the general direction of publicly resolved societal issues—is the most important area of public administration. It determines the scope of government and the extent of public organization. It includes the most crucial and fundamental questions that face any society—its very survival as a society, its composition, its institutions, and its public controls. Although humanity has within its grasp all that it has longed for, the majority of people still live much as their ancestors used to do, in the same wretched, diseased, illiterate, half-starved condition. The contrasts are obvious. We send sterilized instruments into space but we cannot keep our streets clean. One part of the world has large food surpluses while another goes hungry. Such contrasts are the end product of public policy making.

Public administrators must be mindful not only where they stand in all this, but also where they are heading and where perhaps they should be heading, and where they are taking the rest of us. They cannot confine themselves to administrative process and technique for they are in the thick of public policy making and the search for politically acceptable values and policy consensus.

In any fair view of the facts of administrative life the establishment of policy consensus and the search for politically acceptable values is a highest priority endeavor. To abandon this process as something essentially arbitrary and capricious beyond, above, or below reason, is as fatal to significant inquiry in politics as in ethics. Only an empty manipulation of logical concepts can result from this evisceration of the subject. A meaningful study of administration cannot shy away from values . . . The view of administration as sheerly instrumental, or even largely instrumental, must be rejected as empirically untenable and ethically unwarranted.¹

The reemergence of public policy concerns in public administration is due partly to the fear of putting administrative technicians in politically sensitive positions, and partly to increasing social demands for better public policy making. People have always turned instinctively to leaders, political or otherwise, who they believed knew what to do and could issue practical instructions promptly. Today, even greater importance is attached to decisions and decision makers, simply because so much more is at stake. In the past, crucial decisions took considerable time and organization to implement, and recall was possible before the process was far advanced. Today mass media and bureaucratization promote instant action beyond recall. The kind of epoch making decisions being made in the public arena is of quite a different order than that encountered in contemporary administrative theory.

Insufficient attention has been given to distinguishing public policy making from decision making in general and governmental decision making in particular. Most observers have glibly assumed that public policy is the outputs of government and public administration the means of effecting governmental outputs. Public policy is what government does rather than the processes by which it makes decisions. But what governments intend to do or say may be different from what is done and ignores actual outcomes, both intended and unintended. This approach does not take into account the extent to which governments work through other social institutions, especially in pluralist societies where nongovernmental bodies contribute to the resolution of societal

issues and shape society and in the absence of governmental involvement, they determine public policy. To avoid equating public policy with governmental policy, its study should be extended outside government and public administration to include all socially binding directives, whatever the source, that affect the public.

Public policy making is never easy: it requires a high sense of responsibility and a willingness to take the initiative as well as to assume risks. There are many other difficulties as well—complete information is unobtainable; the evidence is rarely conclusive; different interests urge different courses of action; outcomes are unknown; feedback is sporadic; the processes are not properly understood, not even by major participants. Important decisions are made but rarely does anyone know why or how they are determined. Few have been able to penetrate the process in depth and the prospect becomes more difficult as public policy making becomes more complicated in the modern administrative state. Understanding the process is, however, only a prelude to better public policy making.

THE COMPLICATED WORLD OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING

As society has grown from the small group to the tribe, to the nation and now to the international order so the public arena has come to include everybody. There is no escape from other people's decisions. Nothing is sacred anymore; even one's most intimate thoughts can be revealed if society so deems. This enlargement of the public arena has vastly complicated public policy making simply because of the sheer volume of public business and the ceaseless flow of public decisions that have to be made without adequate investigation, analysis and forethought. Furthermore, the kinds of issues that have to be considered have never been experienced before in human history.

There are no guidelines for dealing with the challenges presented by total war, population explosion, galloping technology, rising expectations and future shock. Often there are no known solutions or nobody can agree on any solution. Yet policy vacuums

have to be filled, if only by default of responsible, regular channels. Where once local chiefs consulted with their medicine men, soothsayers and prophets, modern leaders have their astrologers, self-proclaimed experts and fanatics. They also have much more sophisticated public policy making supports both within and without government.

In simple societies a few people can decide everything and know most things that happen, but in more complex societies, decision making is shared, delegated, and institutionalized in routine channels. Public policy making is a concern of different institutional elites and their entourages. No matter what links may exist between them (such as common ancestry or tribal identity or political affiliation), their different interests, functions and clientele will divide them and make them compete. Within each sphere of competence, public policy making is further complicated by professional rivalry and conflicting opinions. As power is diffused, not concentrated, problems that fall outside defined channels or straddle them require the cooperation of many diverse interests which may not even recognize that a problem exists. Multidimensional problems may require for solution the use of coercion to overcome narrow selfish interests unwilling to assume responsibility for common problems. In contemporary society, that usually means that government has to assume leadership for tackling multidimensional problems and to impose its will over self-interested groups.

INCREASING DEPENDENCE ON BUREAUCRATIC INFRASTRUCTURES

When the scope of government was limited in pre-industrial societies, political rulers were their own public policy makers. The expansion of government has overloaded the political rulers and forced them to rely increasingly on enlarged bureaucratic infrastructures ready to engage in public policy planning in their spheres of competence. In post-industrial society, political rulers have largely delegated policy planning and implementation. They rely on bureaucratic infrastructures to undertake such activities,

while they concentrate on policy selection. Even so, their background and experience may not qualify them to choose between alternative policies suggested by bureaucratic infrastructures in highly specialized technical and professional fields such as weapons systems, environmental controls, social service administration, and computer hardware. Yehezkel Dror warns that the quality of public leaders may not keep up with the more difficult problems or new policy knowledge, "so that either public policy will lag more and more behind what it should or could be or politicians will influence policy making less."² Most of them are less influential because they are less qualified. The vacuum is being filled by public servants.

Although many public policy decisions are still made in the political arena, most policy planning and implementation take place in the bureaucratic arena. Because of its strategic position, functional expertise, and associated policy planning and implementing mechanisms, the public bureaucracy may come to dominate public policy making in multidimensional problems and technical areas as it already does in national security, internal order, economic development and social welfare programs involving large sums of public money. Senior officials are at the center of public policy making. They are indispensable, according to Wallace Sayre, in "the assemblage of information, the discovery of alternatives, the analytical appraisal of these choices, the synthesis of risks and opportunities into innovative yet realistic recommendations, [and] the process of bargaining and accommodation which transforms proposals into accepted policies. . . ."³ This move from the political arena to the bureaucratic infrastructure, from open forums such as mass media, party conferences, and legislatures to closed forums, such as committee meetings, bureaucratic conferences, and confidential memoranda raises questions about public accountability and responsibility and public participation in public policy making.

Before the advent of Big Government, the public sector was relatively confined in scope and area, and the public bureaucracy had many rivals in the public arena. It was truly subordinate to political institutions; its world was much narrower, with fewer

outside contacts, less understanding of causal relationships, fewer societal repercussions, and less concern with mass media and public opinion. With Big Government potential rivals to the public bureaucracy are either dependent on it or so intertwined in public processes that their autonomy is greatly reduced. It is problematic whether political institutions are able to subordinate the public bureaucracy as they once could. Yet it has taken some time for public administration to acknowledge the key role of public bureaucracy in public policy making and to concern itself with placing effective limitations and controls on bureaucratic power.

DESTROYING THE MYTH OF BUREAUCRATIC SUBORDINATION

As has been pointed out, the study of American public administration between the two world wars assumed a strict dichotomy between politics and administration and the subordination of public administrators to political representatives. The ideal was a depoliticized, professional, morally irreproachable and efficient public bureaucracy. The preoccupation was with economic and efficient management of government agencies. Public administration was perceived as an instrument connecting the rulers and the ruled. Decisions flowed downward from the rulers, to be executed by career officials within the formal governmental structure, while information flowed upward from the ruled, to be assimilated by career politicians. By concentrating largely on the formalities of public business, the social dynamics of inner workings of public bureaucracy were neglected.

This strictly managerial approach to public administration did not go unchallenged. Leonard White, for one, had been troubled in the 1920s when trying to fit his knowledge about the workings of public administration into a theoretical framework that ignored bureaucratic behavior. Although his study of the city manager clearly showed the political dilemmas inherent in the position, he still believed that politics and administration should be separated.⁴ The New Deal challenged such a notion. Luther Gulick quickly recognized that the division between policy and

administration would be replaced with the division between policy veto and policy planning and execution.⁵ It had proven impossible to take politics out of administration and administration out of politics. Political and administrative acts were seamless webs of discretion and action. The only reason for insisting on a theoretical separation was to emphasize a beneficial division of labor.

John Gaus went much further, recognizing that public administration was not just the managerial aspects of enforcing the law and discharging governmental responsibilities but the "state in action." The politics-administration dichotomy had made the study of public administration "detached and unreal, . . . giving too little weight to the propulsions, policies and attitudes which run throughout government."⁶ Public administration was a human activity, complex and often unpredictable and as a tool of government and a servant of the community would grow and change as society changed. Generalizations were hazardous because government agencies varied so much. Public administration was not blind obedience to the master's dictates or the pursuit of mechanical business efficiency. Its objective was "the good life," humane, warm, progressive, and protective of individual rights. The good administrator was a political participant in public policy making.

Pendleton Herring had already provided proof of official involvement in public policy making and partisan politics in his investigation of the relationships between pressure groups and federal officials.⁷ He had found that officials had weighed pressure groups against the general interest and unrepresented interests. Officials could not be shielded from partisan politics. They often identified the general interest as that of the special interests of their clients. He concluded that the machinery of government could not be rationalized according to any a priori scheme as it was shaped by conflict and controversy. There could be little doubt that public officials had an active political role in public administration from regulation to conflict resolution, from planning to public opinion formation. Herring's testimony was further strengthened when during World War II academics became part of the public bureaucracy and discovered for themselves the inseparability of

politics and administration and the public policy making role of the public official.

Public administration was more than a tool for implementing political ideas: it was an integral part of those ideas and was tied to people's search for a sense of security, of belonging, and their reliance on governmental action for the realization of basic human desires in an impersonal, disorganized world.⁸ What distinguished public administration was its *publicness*. Public decisions in contrast to private decisions were the outcome of complex political processes both within and without the public bureaucracy. This political element separated public from other kinds of administration.

Already by the end of World War II, politics had been replaced by policy in the language of American public administration. Paul Appleby had long maintained that public policy making was found throughout public administration, which as government in action, was a political process seeking consensus or an approximation of the public interest. "He invited a reorientation away from the universal principles and mere efficiencies and toward the more exciting policy-formation processes operative amid the American democracy's pluralistic forces."⁹

This change in approach was reflected in postwar textbooks in public administration which, in contrast to the first texts issued before the Great Depression, now showed how political in practice was public administration and how the study of public policy was an integral part of the study of public administration, so much that the definitions of the subject were revised to reflect its new policy orientation as the following examples show:

Public administration consists of all those operations having for their purpose the fulfillment or enforcement of public policy.¹⁰

Public administration may be defined as the coordination of individual and group efforts to carry out public policy.¹¹

As a study, public administration examines every aspect of government's efforts to discharge the laws and to give effect to public policy.¹²

The only standout against this redefinition of public administration as the study of public policy was Herbert Simon who warned that it would range as wide as governmental problems and would eventually become applied social science.¹³

PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES

John Dewey first conceived the idea that public policy could be studied systematically. In *Logic*, he drew attention to the experimental nature of policy measures. They represented plans of action selected from alternatives and had observable consequences that could serve as validation tests. They either worked or they did not and some other policy was improvised without "careful, selective, continual observation of conditions" that would promote definiteness.¹⁴ Dewey's idea was taken up by Harold Lasswell, an experimental political scientist, who first broached the idea of policy sciences not as a separate discipline but, like public administration, a field of study that would draw on relevant knowledge from other disciplines.¹⁵ The policy sciences would "study the process of deciding or choosing and evaluate the relevance of available knowledge for the solution of particular problems" and would focus on the five intellectual tasks performed in problem solving—"clarification of goals; description of trends; analysis of conditions; projection of future developments; and invention, evaluation, and selection of alternatives."¹⁶

Response to Lasswell's advocacy of policy sciences was weak. The complex problems of public policy in the 1950s were left to public authorities and whomever they choose to consult. Slowly the number of policy-oriented specialists increased and special public policy analysis organizations, both public and private, were established, and these trends were accelerated in the turbulent 1960s and several new journals were created to cater to the new public profession of policy analyst and to bridge the gap between policy scientists and policy makers. In public administration, policy studies became more popular but as these early studies were largely descriptive, it was often difficult to build on them. Gradually researchers began to generalize and theorize about the

process of public policy making itself, using models developed in other fields. As Herbert Simon had forecast, policy studies were borrowing from all social sciences and it was envisaged that policy analysis might eventually integrate the social sciences.¹⁷

The academic promise of policy studies was reinforced by several institutional factors. The federal government, committed in the mid-1960s to the Great Society, was short of professional policy analysts capable of evaluating existing programs, devising alternative programs, and thinking creatively about feasible solutions to pressing societal problems. It was willing to finance efforts to develop such policy making capacity. Several leading universities responded to the government's need by establishing new institutes for the study of public policy and the training of professional policy analysts separate from public administration. Indeed the 1970s witnessed a boom in public policy studies accompanied by a flood of publications dealing with public policy and a multiplication of policy research organizations in and around Washington D.C. and some state capitols. Presumably, little of this would have occurred if policy studies had nothing new or significant to contribute. That they had was evident in the successful career transition of policy advocates such as Daniel Moynihan and Henry Kissinger, the operationalization of new policy analysis techniques (such as systems theory, program evaluation, social indicators, cost effectiveness and cybernetics) and their incorporation into public management, and the reorientation of social sciences from pure to applied research and socially relevant issues.

THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC POLICY STUDIES

Public policy studies are making and are likely to continue to make a noticeable impact on public policy making in the United States as more knowledge is gained, interest in scientific approaches to societal problems spreads, and social scientists delve into applied public policy. The following constitute the most promising areas for public policy studies.

Public participation

Seemingly, public policy making is too important to be left to political leaders, their advisers, organized interests and mass media gurus. They cannot possibly keep abreast of all the things about which they should know. They are not necessarily qualified to decide on the issues before them. They are too prone to perpetuate past formulas that proved successful than seek better alternatives that might have become available in the meantime. In short, they need all the help they can get from responsible, concerned and qualified persons of good standing in the community. Public policy should be everyone's concern and all who believe that they have something worthwhile to contribute should do so as a civic duty. But what society needs more than anything else are contributions based on disinterest, objectivity, reason, truth, thorough research and fair reasonableness. People who show potential to make such contributions should be encouraged to participate in public policy making.

Policy framework

New knowledge enables checklists to be constructed of all the factors that potential policy makers should consider including goals, values, sources, actors, environmental influences, and strategies, and so on. The checklists provide a basis for empirical testing, theoretical constructs, and validation. What is now a mysterious art may eventually have a scientific foundation. Future policy makers may eventually be able to locate themselves within existing knowledge and spot relevant landmarks and paths that should make their job much easier than current muddling through unknown territory.

Policy strategies

Much early work in public policy making was narrowly conceived, overgeneralized and unsophisticated. Their strategies

did not take into account sufficiently the complexity of policy making in turbulent times and assumed too much about the efficacy of bureaucratic instruments and political process. Later work refers to several complexities that have to be examined before a strategy can be proposed. What exactly is the problem for which a feasible policy is sought? How does the problem and its possible solutions dovetail with other problems and their possible solutions? Whose interests are affected? Which combination of interests will be satisfied by this or that policy? Which would constitute the public interest? How much would have to be compromised to keep future options open or to pay off past and expected future favors? Consideration of such questions may defer obvious strategies. Indeed, the best policy may be no new action at all if solutions involve discontinuity in the problem area, and omit the existing power structure and innovative instruments for policy implementation.

Clarification of public interest

Public problems are rarely solved; they merely change shape. Problems apparently settled in one area merely intensify them in others. What is considered better is relative to the concept of the public interest, which presumably is the abstraction of the idea of the Good Society as perceived by individuals. Public policy studies help to clarify what people mean by the public interest. They also reveal the underlying value premises of policy makers, different interpretations of public ethics, and conflicting conceptions of the role of public servants as instruments, guardians, conflict resolvers, interest articulators, and social engineers.

Further institutionalization of public policy making capacity

Several studies mention the inadequacy of existing structure in coping with contemporary problems and institutional obstacles to better policy making.¹⁸ Their suggestions, many of which have been acted upon, include the establishment of independent policy

research institutes and institutes for the future (which would explore long-range policy implications by generating realistic pictures of future states), the creation of new policy-making units, the redesign of organizations around major programs and problems, the measurement and evaluation of existing policies, policy planning, innovative budgeting systems and relaxation of censorship and official secrets laws that prevent nonparticipants from knowing public policies made in their name.

Policy content and evaluation

The study of public policy making processes has invariably been based on actual policies. But whereas early studies investigated the power plays, participants, and policy actors to explain policy variables, later studies have examined the policy content in determining the actors, their relationships and the strategies, and the outcomes as influencing the social system and objectives. Together they have contributed to better public policy making and better public policies.

A new profession of public analysts

Outstanding public figures have demonstrated that it is possible to transfer between problem areas, to apply similar policy making techniques in both public and private sectors, and to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Independently, several universities and policy research institutes conceived the idea that policy analysis should be institutionalized and professionalized to fill the obvious gap between theory and practice and to create a reservoir of trained policy analysts able to devise and evaluate policy, policy making processes and techniques, and policy needs to the community. Policy analysts are specialists in policy making knowledge, employed basically on emerging problems and improving public policies and on public policy making capacity in general. According to Arnold Meltsner who has examined the various roles they assume and the ways in which their priorities are affected by the people they advise and their bureaucratic

environment, their job is to provide information and advice about the consequences of choosing different policies.¹⁹

Policy studies have recently attracted a new wave of socially aware students anxious to improve the world around them by changing public policies and the institutions and influences that shape them. Concerned scholars find that in many new areas there is a policy vacuum waiting to be filled by creative minds and trained intelligence, and a widening gap between what could be done and what is being done by practitioners steeped in outmoded bureaucratic management values. They find encouragement in the reformist tradition of American public administration and its continuing belief in bettering society through democratic public administration. The problem is to reach the professional politician and the professional bureaucrat, whose routes into public policy have rarely brought them in touch with the new knowledge, and which, to the detriment of all, they may never properly understand.

THEORIES OF PUBLIC POLICY MAKING

The new wave of public policy studies has enabled several scholars to construct models of public policy making and to postulate theories of public policy making for the United States. Three major schools of theory in particular have attracted considerable attention and influenced public policy makers. One centers around the work of Herbert Simon, another around Charles Lindblom, and the third around a group of public choice theorists. Each concerns not only how public policy making is done but how it should be done.

1. Simon's decision-making models

Early in the debate over the future of public administration studies immediately after World War II, Herbert Simon urged scholars to concentrate on the behavior of those who made deci-

sions in the public arena and the processes by which they defined public policy.²⁰ A scientifically relevant description of an organization should designate for all persons in it the decisions they made and just what influences affected their decisions. He noted that decisions contained varying degrees of factual (administrative, pertaining to means) and value (policy, pertaining to objectives) judgments. Ideally they should be separated and allocated between representatives and administrators according to their relative importance and the degree to which the ethical issues were controversial. In this, he was merely echoing past attempts to distinguish administrative matters from political matters. His point of departure was to emphasize correct decisions as well as right ways of doing things; the one could not be divorced from the other. Efficient decision making was not the attainment of absolute perfection or the ruthless pursuit of mechanical efficiency in means, but that choice of alternatives that produced the largest results for the given application of resources.

For Simon, the ideal was unattainable perfect rationality, by which all objectives would be defined and arranged according to priority, all possible alternative strategies would be listed together with their consequences, and comparative evaluation taken of the strategies and their consequences, so that the maximum results would be forthcoming from the resources employed in terms of opportunity costs. In practice, however, he recognized that complete information was unobtainable, people were not exclusively rational beings, and both the objectives and the consequences in public policy were not susceptible to quantitative measurement or even approximate evaluations. In addition to objective rationality, there was also subjective, conscious, deliberate, organizational, and personal rationality. He expected that empirical studies would reveal how people actually made decisions and what most influenced them.

During the 1950s when more empirical evidence about how decisions were actually made began to accumulate, Simon dropped the notion of optimal rational choice altogether and opted for bounded rationality and a satisficing model of decision making—that is, people accepted what was good enough or satisfying to

them and did not search for all possible alternatives. Their expectations limited their search, and they adopted the most satisfying perceived alternative. The satisficing model was a better description of reality than the maximizing model.

From this, Simon went on to break down the decision making process into intelligence (searching the environment for conditions calling for decision); design (inventing, developing, and analyzing possible courses of action); and choice (selecting a course of action), execution being indistinguishable from making more detailed policy. Decisions occurred along a continuum between programmed and nonprogrammed decisions. Programmed decisions were repetitive and routine, for which a definite routine had been worked out so that they were not treated anew every time. Nonprogrammed decisions that were novel, unstructured, and consequential, for which there was "no cut and dried method for handling the problem because it hasn't arisen before, or because its precise nature and structure are elusive or complex, or because it is so important that it deserved a custom-tailored treatment."²¹ Different techniques were used for handling the programmed and the nonprogrammed aspects of decision making. Programmed decision were traditionally handled by habit, operating routine (bureaucratized habit), and organizational structure, while non-programmed decisions were traditionally handled by personnel skills (judgment, intuition, creativity), improvisation, and sensitized administrators freed from routine.

By 1960 Simon had identified three major models of decision making relevant to policy studies, namely, (a) nonprogrammed decision making based on instinct, judgment, intuition, and other extra-rational factors, (b) pure-rationality optimal decision making, and (c) satisficing decision making. In the 1960s, he added the maze model of decision making: problem solvers followed different sets of paths, some of which led to a payoff solution, others merely to additional sets of paths.

Such theories have had an important practical impact on public policy and administration. In public sector planning, the optimal model has been replaced by the satisficing model. In public

finance, decision making theory eventually led to cost benefit analysis of public projects, new techniques for budgeting, innovative public policy planning aids, the mechanization of programmed decisions, and the incorporation of scientific management tools in public administration. All these practical benefits can be traced back to Simon's original theory of rational choice, his search to enhance rationality in human choice, his view of the function of the organization as binding or limiting the exercise of individual discretion within it, and his conceptualization of authority as being zoned.

Simon's theories have enjoyed greater success in the private sector for several reasons. They are more appropriate to the behavior of business corporations than public service agencies. Private organizations have more limited objectives; they can define their goals more neatly; they maintain more closed decision making styles and are less influenced by social considerations. His examples have tended to be drawn increasingly from the private sector. This continuing faith in applied behavioral research and quantitative measurement placed him on the margins of public administration. His model of administrative man seemed altogether too simplistic, rational, narrow and instrumental for senior public policymakers and more suitable for junior public managers, planners and technocrats working within well defined public programs already well depoliticized, routinized and technically stagnant. "Indeed, his picture of an organization tends to become one of a sluggish and rigid system maintained in a state of equilibrium, which will only change its course under strong pressures, and even then will innovate rather little."²²

2. Lindblom's incrementalism

Viewing public policy making as a composite of all individual decisions made within government agencies led inevitably to a highly fragmented, complex, consensual and incremental model similar to that suggested by pluralistic interest group liberals to explain the American political system. They maintained that within

a framework of widely shared social values, different interests competed to shape public policy which was the product or outcome or resultant of the interplay between them. Essentially, this was the free market model of liberal economics transferred to the democratic polity: the pursuit of individual self interests would through policy competition make for the general public interest. The free play of interest group politics would produce optimal public policy. In this, the government's role was to ensure access to the most effectively organized, and to ratify "the agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders and their claims."²³

If the pluralist model of public policy making appeared to be Simon's individual decision making writ large, any further resemblance stopped there. Comprehensive rationality clearly implied totalitarianism. Bounded rationality seemed more apposite but for complex problems even that was not realistic. Prescribed functions and constraints restricted public agencies to relatively few alternatives, most of them familiar from past controversies, and forced them to make limited successive changes only.²⁴ This model of successive limited comparisons or marginal incrementalism, described by Charles Lindblom as "muddling through," seemed to be a more accurate theory of how public agencies actually behaved. "Democracies change their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy does not move in leaps and bounds." Therefore, it was realistic, prudent, relevant, rational, for public policy makers to ignore politically unacceptable policies and to simplify matters by concentrating on only incremental changes in existing policies. Such incrementalism was a more acceptable and effective way of adjusting a wide variety of interests than central imposition. It avoided serious lasting mistakes.

Lindblom went as far as to say that muddling through was not only the way public agencies in democratic pluralism made policy but it was the way they should make policy. It was the best possible way. In this he was supported by other interest group liberals who dominated policy studies in the 1960s and elevated it, according to Theodore Lowi, to a new public philosophy, "from an hypothesis about political behavior to an ideology about how

the democratic system ought to work." Marginal incrementalism was simpler than comprehensive rationality. It justified public policy makers concentrating only on "the obvious, interesting, high-probability, near-term consequences."²⁵ It was "serial, remedial, ameliorative." It reinforced democratic pluralism and the multiplication, decentralization and deconcentration of decision points.

On the other hand, Lowi argues, marginal incrementalism destroys the electoral accountability of those who make policy. It maintains structures of privilege, and it reinforces conservatism. It is protective of the status quo and justifies bureaucratic inertia. It ignores unorganized interests and an overriding public interest while accommodating selfish interests detrimental to the public interest and mutual compacts of interested parties to defraud unrepresented interests. It assumes general satisfaction with existing policies and their implementation. A more serious academic criticism is that incrementalism is only a partial explanation of public policy making. It does not account for nonincremental changes which are common, not rare, nor does it properly accommodate crucial decisions in unpredictable areas of public policy such as defense, foreign affairs, public safety and social regulation. It does not allow enough for social innovation or redesigning approaches where policies are unsatisfactory or improving existing public policy making capacity.

In analyzing the Cuban missile crisis, Graham Allison used three different models—*rational policy* similar to Simon's comprehensive rationality theory, *organizational process* similar to Lindblom's mutual adjustment and incremental theory, and *bureaucratic politics* which view policies not as decisions of rational actors of organizational outputs but as outcomes of bargaining games. Bureaucratic politics are "collages composed of individual acts, outcomes of minor and major games, and foul-ups," in which "the essence of a responsible official's task is to induce others to see that what needs to be done is what their own appraisal of their own responsibilities requires them to do in their own interests." Each model is partial. They concentrate on different classes of variables and therefore produce different explanations. "Adequate

synthesis would require a typology of decisions and actions, some of which are more amenable to treatment in terms of one model and some to another."²⁶

Amitai Etzioni agrees with Allison's conclusion. He suggests combining the comprehensive rationality model with incrementalism in a mixed scanning approach. Public policy makers would scan the decision area and incremental strategies would focus on areas requiring more detailed examination. "Incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, and contextualizing rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer-run alternatives."²⁷ Likewise, Yehezkel Dror has constructed an optimum public policy making model in which he fuses nonprogrammed decision making and economic rationality to limit the search for alternatives once diminishing returns set in. His prescriptive-preferable model also includes some clarification of values, objectives and decision criteria, conscious effort to consider new alternatives, and preliminary investigation of expected payoffs and risks.²⁸ Although both Etzioni and Dror call for a continued search for public policy making models combining realism and idealism, few have so ventured.

3. Public choice

Were public policy makers being more rational when they followed Simon's model of comprehensive rationality or Lindblom's model of successive limited comparison? Could they get the best of both worlds by employing Etzioni's mixed scanning approach or Dror's prescriptive-preferable approach? Clearly, as John Pfiffner was quick to point out, there were several types of rationality to be found in administrative behavior.²⁹ Paul Diesing has identified five distinct types. One set relates to the rationality of organizations (functional rationality) which contain social rationality, legal rationality and political rationality. Another relates to the rationality of decisions (structural rationality) which contain technical rationality and economic rationality. Of these political rationality is paramount as "the solution of

political problems makes possible an attack on any other problem, while a serious political deficiency can prevent or undo all other problem solving."³⁰ Whereas nonpolitical decisions are reached by considering the merits of solutions, in political decision action is not based on merit but on who makes proposals and who opposes them. While compromise in the former is irrational, it is always rational in the latter. When Herbert Simon highlighted the importance of correct decisions over correct arrangements, he had shifted public administration from structural to functional rationality. Where decision-making theorists had concentrated on technical rationality, public policy theorists had shifted to political and economic rationality.

Public policy making is of a higher order than organizational decision making and involves many different organizations, interests unrepresented in organizational competition, and choices between competing ends through alternative means. All this sounds highly familiar and, of course, it is. Economists have been dealing with just such issues for decades, and a new style of political economist concerned with problems of public goods and services began in the 1960s to offer their ideas on how public policy making should be conducted. Scholars interested in the application of economic analysis to nonmarket decision-making were brought together initially by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock and later by the Public Choice Society.

The public choice theorists objected to pluralistic interest group liberals and incrementalists who believed that the public interest was the outcome of the interplay among competing organized interests, that optimality would be achieved by the pursuit of special interests and that government should act only as a benign recording referee. Good processes did not necessarily produce good outcomes. The ease of muddling through had failed to serve the public interest by ignoring the needs of "the other America."³¹ Interest group competition suffered from the same kind of imperfections and limitations as the market system. While it might service private goods it failed to meet public needs, and resulted in what John Galbraith had described as private affluence and public squalor.³² Anthony Downs argues that democratic

governments underbudget because people are more aware of the benefits gained from private sector transactions than they are of remote and uncertain government benefits.³³ They tend to favor the former over the latter in many ways to the public detriment. They resent paying for collective benefits, exaggerate government costs compared with private costs, and downplay potential benefits from preventative measures. In short, people are reluctant to yield their private resources to the government and the government refrains from providing needed collective benefits.³⁴ Thus, government services or collective benefits or public goods should not be treated as if they are purely private goods which can be provided under competitive market conditions.³⁵ People will not act to advance common or group objectives unless coerced or separate incentives are offered them on condition they bear the costs.³⁶ Public goods are different; they are not "subject to exchange, and market price cannot be used as an appropriate measure of user preference."³⁷

Although governments are obliged to see that public goods are available, they do not have to provide them directly themselves, at least not through insensitive, error prone monopolistic bureaucracies which deny consumer choice between competing delivery systems. Traditional public administration theory viewed the existence of more than one public agency in the same delivery system as being wasteful duplication and inefficient. In fact, overlapping jurisdictions may be more socially efficacious and "a combination of user taxes, service charges, intergovernmental transfers of funds, and voucher systems may evoke some of the characteristics of market arrangements among public service agencies."³⁸

Public choice theorists are with the pluralist interest group liberals in supporting decentralization, deconcentration, and fragmentation. They openly advocate competition within the public sector and the search for alternative public service delivery systems to monolithic public bureaucracies. In this, they open a new vista in public policy making. Public policies need not be achieved solely through public agencies. They might be implemented through government intervention in the private marketplace and what

Charles Schultze describes as "the public use of the private interest." Incentives designed to modify the behavior of private producers and consumers might turn public goals into private interests. Traditional command-and-control techniques of public regulation might be replaced with market-like instruments for collective action.³⁹

The public choice approach clearly presents a different model of public policy making, one that opens a new perspective on the public sector and public administration quite distinct from the decision-making models and the incrementalist approach. Whereas the other two approaches fail to distinguish public administration and public organization from other kinds of societal arrangements, the public choice theorists define an autonomous province. To them, public administration is concerned with the delivery of public goods⁴⁰ and the tradeoffs between public and private goods. The boundary lines are fairly precise and can be arrived at by employing economic analysis. The core, too, is well defined, namely, public sector agencies operating under nonmarket conditions. And a distinctive methodological approach can be employed—the political economy of public organizations.⁴¹ For these reasons, they are likely to have growing influence on public policy and administration.

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4 Politics and Administration

MANY DIFFERENT PARTIES are involved in public policy making, not the least of which are public officials, for "public organizations are not merely important actors in a policy process; often their goals, myths, processes, procedures, or domain controversies in effect 'make' policy."¹ Because most public policy making is the modification of existing policies as they are implemented, anybody with any kind of responsibility within public administration is a policymaker. Public administrators shape public policy when allocating values, making decisions, raising resources, mobilizing support, distributing benefits, organizing clients, making alliances and coalitions, and blocking and opposing rivals. Who these people are, where they came from, how they think, how they see themselves, obviously influence what they consider important, what policies they frame and what decisions they take or refrain from taking.

Yet until recently, the ideal in the study of public administration has been political neutrality. Public servants were not supposed to interject their own views in their work, act in a partisan political manner or involve themselves in public political activities. British civil servants were informed by an official inquiry that

There are spheres of activity legitimately open to the ordinary citizen in which the Civil Servant can play no part, or only a limited part. He is not to indulge in political or party controversy, lest by so doing he should appear no longer the disinterested adviser of Ministers of able impartiality to execute their policy. He is bound to maintain a proper reticence in discussing public affairs and more particularly those with which his own Department is concerned. And lastly, his position clearly imposes upon him restrictions in matters of commerce and business from which the ordinary citizen is free.²

It was explained to their American counterparts that

The Hatch Act is designed to prevent those subject to it from assuming general political leadership or from becoming prominently identified with any political movement, party or faction or with the success or failure of any candidate for election to public office . . . Any political activity that is prohibited in the case of an employee acting independently is also prohibited in the case of an employee acting in open or secret cooperation with others . . . Political activity, in fact, regardless of the methods or means used by the employee, constitutes the violation.³

In practice, because of their strategic position between political leaders and the public, senior public administrators have always been influential political actors. Neither political leaders nor the public have viewed them as mere ciphers, instruments or catalysts. Historically they have been considered a personal extension of the rulers. Only in advanced administrative states has a different conception been advanced. In them, responsible political leaders are supposed to put aside their personal and party ambitions, rule in the general public interest, and ensure that their decisions are executed in a rational, universal, egalitarian and impersonal manner through a neutral or depoliticized bureaucracy. So well have Western scholars promoted this depoliticized model that few can be found to defend a politicized bureaucracy. Yet, despite heavy propaganda for over a century, the depoliticized model has not been very successful. Even in Western democracies, practice is at variance with the lip service paid to the ideal. Only

parts of their public bureaucracies have been depoliticized. Nowhere else has administration been separated from politics.

THE IDEAL OF DEPOLITICIZED ADMINISTRATION

Depoliticization has been the theme of the great bulk of literature on public administration. If the public bureaucracy is not depoliticized, then it should be. In this, it has been following European notions that public servants should not engage in politics but engage in impartial administration. In the words of Max Weber, the eminent sociologist and theoretician of bureaucracy:

. . . The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This holds even if the order appears wrong to him and if, despite the civil servant's remonstrances, the authority insists on the order. Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces.⁴

Similar sentiments have been enacted into law and administrative practice and extolled in public administration texts for nearly two hundred years, ever since the following public-service ideology was expounded during the French Revolution:

- a. Public administration is a machine for the implementation of the general will, as conceived by the representatives of the people. Government is a public trust to be used in the general interest and not for the benefit of particular sectional interests.
- b. Public officials are servants of the public, not vice versa.
- c. Public officials should be the embodiment of all public virtues—they should be hard-working, honest, impartial, wise, sincere, just, and trustworthy. Official conduct should be beyond reproach.
- d. Public officials should obey their superiors and subordi-

nate their personal interests, unless objection is based on conscientious grounds, whereupon they should leave public office before publicly declaring their opposition to governmental policy.

- e. Public officials should perform their duties efficiently and economically.
- f. Appointment to public office should be on the basis of merit of person and not on the privilege of class.
- g. Public officials should be subjected to the law in the same way as other people.

These ideas suited the political climate of nineteenth century Europe where absolute monarchy was collapsing or conceding to revolutionary movements. The need for strong centralized executive government was apparent, and weak legislatures were an ineffective counterweight. Real power was passing to various combinations of upper and middle class blocs that expected and exacted obedience and respect. Rational administration was being extended as state activities expanded. Reformed and revitalized public bureaucracies retained the respect of the public. The public service continued as a high-prestige career, attractive to upper and middle class power blocs, as well as to aspiring social classes for whom new opportunities were available with increased physical and occupational mobility, higher literacy, wider civil liberties, and greater accessibility to public office. The concept of nonpartisan bureaucracy was further aided by a strong administrative law system, professionalization of technical services, middle class dominance of the public professions, and close affinity between political and official elites. These in turn smoothed the way toward equality before the law, standardized public services, exclusion of public officials from political activities, bureaucratic self-government under political direction, and a reduction of official corruption and misuse of discretionary power.

For the politicians, a partisan public bureaucracy had become a liability. Not all those who sought jobs in government work could be accommodated. In fact, more office seekers were disappointed than satisfied. Political support had to be gained in

ways other than personal patronage. In any event, government work had become sophisticated, complicated, specialized and professional. Its proper performance required highly qualified and competent people. A defective public bureaucracy could cost a country its independence, political stability, social progress and economic well-being. Threats of disastrous consequences forced politicians to ensure competency by instituting merit systems independent of political organizations. This way, they were shielded from the liabilities of patronage and they were guaranteed effective execution of their decisions, while, for their part, public servants were prepared to forego all public political activity in return for security, status, fair employment practices, and protection from public criticism. The public was willing to go along with this compact to get strong, effective and responsible government to secure the safety of the nation and the preservation of the regime. In reaction to the abuses of absolutist regimes, it expected representative governments to rid themselves of waste and immorality in public business and to reduce nepotism, corruption, and patronage.

These depoliticized European bureaucracies have persisted in essence despite social and political revolutions, foreign occupations, violent swings of the political pendulum, economic disasters, and radical transformations of the public domain. Depoliticization has emphasized professionalism, which in turn has stressed rationality, efficiency, and service. It has demanded competence in public employment and has guaranteed permanency, reliability, and continuity in public affairs. Political leaders have been assured of a reliable corps of experts and professionals behind them. The public has been treated to uniform, impartial and competent treatment. Public servants have been offered a rewarding career, secure in tenure and sheltered from political and public criticism.

American visitors to western Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century were impressed by the public bureaucracies they found there. They were orderly, efficient, honest. At home, in contrast, the politicized bureaucracies were disorderly, inefficient, and corrupt. The blame, rightly or wrongly, was put on the spoils system, although it was only one of a number of contributory factors. The simplistic solution of civil service reformers was to

depoliticize American public administration. The Pendleton Act of 1883 became the symbol of an effective stand against public corruption, the spoils system, and party bosses, and since then" . . . the dichotomy between career and noncareer officials has become an immutable and an *essential* feature of our fragmented executive structure."⁵

Simply put, politicians should rule; public officials should do their bidding. Political offices should be filled competitively in the political arena; bureaucratic offices should be filled competitively in the bureaucratic arena. Political officials should be selected on the basis of their political competence; bureaucratic (or public) officials should be selected on the basis of their bureaucratic competence. The separation of political and career routes should be institutionalized by legal or constitutional prohibition on concurrent office holding and interchange. Politicians should be judged by the electorate or their political peers; officials should be judged by their political overseers or their bureaucratic peers. Political office should be of limited tenure and subject to frequent elections; bureaucratic office should be of unlimited tenure, subject to good behavior.

THE REALITY OF FUSION

Although the ideal of depoliticized bureaucracy firmly places government in the hands of professional politicians and minimizes the possibility of bureaucratic rule, it also creates certain difficulties, both ideological and practical. It denies any political role to public officials. It assumes that there is an identifiable distinction between politics and administration and that people consciously act according to the distinction. Indeed it has been instrumental in devising organizational forms in public administration such as the city manager in local government, the public corporation in public enterprise, and the agency (or ministerial department) in central government. Unfortunately, nobody has yet defined either "politics" or "administration" satisfactorily, and no definition has been generally accepted. Nobody has succeeded in identifying

precise boundaries between them, and it is doubtful in the realm of public administration whether any distinction could be made.

The two are fused. Politicians perform administrative duties, and officials assume political responsibilities. Political and administrative content vary with position and personal predilection. Changes in direction and emphasis in public affairs take place at every level within the public bureaucracy and enter the political arena from any point. The importance of a decision does not depend on the status of the initiator or whether it concerns ends or means (if these can be separated) but on its public repercussions and the extent of departure from previous actions. This fusion has long been acknowledged in democratic theory and practice. Political leaders have not accepted any distinction between politics and administration in public affairs, but have accepted responsibility for all matters. They have taken the attitude that if they did not know what their subordinate officials were doing, then they should have known and they remain responsible certainly for rectifying any errors that may have occurred.

There are other difficulties with the concept of the depoliticized bureaucracy. First, it drives internal dissent underground into passive resistance and sabotage. The concept demands that the officials' first and only duty is to their political masters and if they cannot abide in good conscience with their masters' decisions, they should resign. But public officials are often called upon to choose between their duty and their conscience and resignation may be unrealistic given the lack of alternative employment and the possible repercussions of opposing the government.

Second, the concept requires public officials to be second class citizens, denied the rights of other citizens to participate in political activity whether or not their public activities compromise their official activities.

Third, the concept assumes that the political masters will not interfere too deeply in administrative matters even though the public bureaucracy holds the keys to national development and can make or break other social institutions. The fortunes of political leaders are tied closely to bureaucratic performance and with major rewards in the political system going to those who control

the public bureaucracy, it is still tempting to exploit bureaucratic partisanship and politicians devise sophisticated spoils systems in new guise.

Fourth, the concept overlooks the transformation of public policy making within the modern administrative state where the public bureaucracy has replaced the political elite as the main source of policy initiatives. Politicians rarely have the time, knowledge or skill to formulate policy unaided⁶ and public officials, in the words of one British cabinet minister, "are always putting in what they think I should have said and not what I actually decided."⁷ Because public officials can "generate their own power through an ability to give or withhold compliance, advice, and information,"⁸ the bureaucracy has become more politicized and more menacing to political leadership.⁹ Officials now undertake activities that were once the cherished preserve of their political masters and even fight their political battles for them.

Lastly, the concept ignores administrative reality. There can be no return to the passive bureaucracy of the past. The need today is to inject initiative, enterprise and managerial ability into the public bureaucracy to counteract stagnation, mediocrity and inadequate performance. Officials now determine whether government meets current public needs and they sell "new ideas and new methods to the people and then to their representatives."¹⁰ They no longer confine themselves to things that somebody else has decided should be done. They need to cultivate their public relations. They must be adept at building coalitions which provide a political base for their programs. According to Harlan Cleveland, they must not be afraid to advocate new policies if they think the old ones are worn out and they cannot flinch from being identified with the government of which they are part and defending its program in public.¹¹

THE LIVING CONSTITUTION

All countries have some kind of constitution which embodies the formal arrangements of the polity and the prevailing political

ideology. Without belittling the importance of constitutional doctrines, the reality of the state in action—the living constitution—is the way its public bureaucracy operates, or in John Dewey's words, "the State is as its officials are."¹² The machinery of government conditions and is conditioned by the rules of the political game. It is the starting point of political analysis not the plaything of administrative experts. It transforms political decisions into actions and public policies into practices. It filters articulate political demands and distills inarticulate political demands. The efficacy of its operations largely determines the stability, well-being and progress of the polity. Today so many people are caught within its processes as servants or clients that thinking about it occupies much of their time.

The political nature of the machinery of government is best illustrated in new states, where the living constitution is the main instrument through which nationhood is being shaped and societies modernized. In itself, the machinery of government represents rebirth and rejuvenation of pre-colonial polities or the creation of something completely new, above and beyond traditional institutions, and the symbols it uses are designed to reinforce nation building and to promote the integration of diverse peoples into an enduring compact. Government agencies are spearheads of development, promoting progress, strengthening security and stability, improving living standards, and encouraging enterprise and private initiative.

The machinery of government tends to overshadow all other social organizations, which come to depend on it for recognition, support, legal status, financial aid, information, manpower, protection, and guidance. As the administrative state is strengthened in older states, so this situation is becoming more familiar to them, to the point where there is growing resistance to further bureaucratization lest political leaders lose more control over the sprawling apparatus of the state.

Only in bureaucratic polities do officials control themselves and arrange the machinery of government as they like. Elsewhere they are supposed to be subordinate to political leaders and expected to abide by the arrangements laid down for them. They

may influence the political leaders into accepting their recommendations and proposals, but the final say belongs to the politicians. Political motives are likely to predominate, although increasing bureaucratic power may extract concessions. The very size and scope of the machinery of government are determined by the range and frequency of governmental decisions. The number and arrangement of its component organs are politically controversial. They cannot be determined simply by scientific management principles. Efficiency, objectivity, rationality, and other such values embodied in management science are secondary to political ideology, personal ambition, and intensive power play between contending forces.

Similarly, the distribution of functions between levels of government cannot be determined by their functional requisites alone. Overriding factors are the strength of local feeling, the distribution of communal power, attitudes toward centralization or separation of powers, and the charisma and ambition of political representatives at different governmental levels. The allocation of resources between functions is not a matter of sliderule calculations of needs and benefits, but a reflection of political values, communal priorities, and power play between bargainers. Scientific management techniques are advisory aids, not policy determinants.

Even if administrative rationality were to triumph at the program level, the need for political determination would not diminish. There are no absolute boundaries between governmental functions; they overlap and merge into one another. Someone has to settle conflicts of jurisdiction and coordinate and integrate separate aspects of the same problem area when the public officials concerned cannot settle their differences amicably or resolve issues through partisan mutual adjustment. Political leaders have to ensure that the whole apparatus performs according to their expectations and instructions. Their role is to correct abuses and distortions, in Peter Self's words:

Politicians are the ultimate controllers of administrative systems, and one of their chief problems is to maintain and demonstrate

the reality of their control. Control in this sense does not mean simply (or primarily) making sure that policies which have been met are faithfully executed. It has also the converse meaning of so holding the reins of office that the decisions of administrators can always (if necessary) be over-ruled or amended. It means also establishing an atmosphere in which administrators will continually be aware of political guidelines and constraints.¹³

Consequently, the machinery of government will reflect the style of political leadership. People within the government work so closely together that they learn to read one another's minds, to anticipate their reactions and to plan accordingly, to trust one another when absent, and to retire secure in the knowledge that public affairs are in capable hands. Individual dynamism and inspiration are infectious, but so too are sloth and indifference. The contrast in styles between sets of leaders will be reflected administratively in tendencies toward liberalism or autocracy, openness or secrecy, informality or formality, individual or group decision making, showmanship or reticence, action or avoidance of action, economy or extravagance. Subordinates can do much to bolster their superiors, but they can never quite replace them.

Obviously the small group of political leaders at the apex of the structure can handle only a minute portion of their heavy supervisory functions; they are busy people with many distractions. Consequently, they are forced to delegate the bulk of their administrative authority either to contract bodies outside government or to subordinate agents within government. Whatever their preference, they are free to intervene at any time and resume direct responsibility and personal control. Their self-denying ordinance to minimize their intervention in administrative details exists only so long as it is politically profitable: it is revoked the moment it becomes a political liability. Merit civil services, independent statutory authorities, autonomous local governments, and self-governing public enterprises are not exempt. Their special status reflects political consensus on the limits of partisanship at program level. Otherwise, there is great advantage in retaining direct control for the more societal resources commanded by the machin-

ery of government, the greater the political prize in power, services, contracts, positions, and ideological leadership.¹⁴

Few opponents can match the political edge that office bestows; they have to rely on exposing mistakes and cultivating whatever countervailing forces that have not been captured by office holders. For instance, control over information emanating within the governmental apparatus can be used to hide mistakes, corruption, spoils, and bad decisions, to shield the public from bad news or impending crisis, to project favorable images, to deny knowledge to political opponents, and to persuade the public into a desired course of action. Few governments tolerate leaks simply because they lose these political advantages of controlling official information.

THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT

Nowhere is the machinery of government easy to define. At the top, bottom, and sides it shades off into nongovernmental institutions. The situation is further complicated by the crisscross network of informal relations. The whole arrangement is an ever shifting network of alliances and compromises between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. It is a combination of ideology and pragmatism, rationality and emotion, old and new, legal and extralegal. There is a formal facade, easily described, and an informal backing, much of which is known only to participants. Constitutions, laws, ethical codes, organizational structures, accounts, filing systems, and committee reports are accessible to all and are the most publicized. In contrast, interpretations, informal agreements, confidential memoranda, chance meetings, temporary groups, and unstructured sessions, which may have more bearing on what actually happens, are inaccessible and are the least publicized. Short of having all public confidences exposed, an imbalance is unavoidable. Hence, nobody can describe the living constitution fully or accurately; all accounts are personal interpretations.

The central core, however, is identifiable and fairly stable. It is composed of (a) public laws, ranging in importance from a formal constitution to local authority bylaws; (b) public organizations and agencies embracing huge departments of state and subordinate post offices located in retail stores; (c) public officials (both elected and appointed), from chief executives to lighthouse keepers and elevator operators; (d) public property, comprising airports and weapons-testing ranges, as well as light bulbs and paper clips; and (e) public accounts, incorporating finance laws and single-item receipts from public sales. The boundaries are defined differently from one country to another, and the definitions change with every budget, census, stock taking, and annual report. Nevertheless, a broad measure of agreement exists that, whatever they cover, they all belong to the machinery of government. But they are not exclusive to government, for public officials are also members of many nongovernment bodies such as professional associations, religious groups and trade unions and public property is used for nongovernmental purposes, as when halls in government buildings are hired for private functions.

Beyond the core, identification of the limits of the living constitution is virtually impossible. At the apex, the machinery of government shades off into the government itself, the constitutional arrangements, the political system, and the structure of coercive force. In addition, there is mobility between administrative and political careers, best seen in single party regimes where party and public bureaucracy are formally integrated. Even where merit systems separate the careers, public officials resign to take up political office and defeated and retiring politicians secure employment in the public bureaucracy. At the bottom of the machinery of government, bureaucratic structures give way to direct citizen participation, mixed enterprises, copartnership and voluntarism. In traditional societies, where functions are fused and institutions not so well differentiated, the boundaries between government and other institutions are barely discernible. At the side, the public domain merges with the private domain through pressure-group representations, consultative committees, contracted activities, delegated responsibilities, mixed enterprises,

universities, trade unions, collectives, professional societies and the whole area of third sector organizations, which are neither governmental or private. Indeed the area untouched by the machinery of government is shrinking fast as more outside interests seek formal inclusion into the governmental apparatus or access to public policy-making.

Further difficulty in identification is caused by the multiplication of crosscutting informal arrangements which shorten business transactions and give access to influential decisionmakers. For those who can use informality, their way through the governmental maze is smoothed and the system can be made to discriminate in their favor. In poor countries, where the margin between life and death is small, it may be the crucial factor in survival. In this case, those on the outer edge may be prepared to make huge sacrifices to gain access to the influential, who, in turn, may exploit their modicum of power to the full. Elsewhere, it is likely to perpetuate distinctions and work in favor of established interests. The fact that it is confidential or hidden from outsiders denied access to it invites gross distortions of formal intent and paves the way for corruption. On the other hand, it is more flexible than formal arrangements, certainly more accommodating to change, and to this extent more realistic and perhaps more responsive to shifting trends.

Such informal patterns of interaction are aided by small territorial area, ease and frequency of personal contacts, good communications, and a homogeneous society, all of which enable people to cut through bureaucratic ritual by employing personal contacts derived from their upbringing, schooling, military service, private associations, residences, or previous employment. In intensely politicized societies, where a sizable proportion of the population is politically active and belongs to political movements, political parties provide the contacts, introductions, and middlemen. In less politicized societies, religion, race, tribe, caste, lodge affiliation, and overseas military experience may perform the same service. Much contact occurs outside official business hours at house parties, informal gatherings, trade conventions and conferences, religious celebrations, national events, and chance

meetings. In some polities, informal practices may concentrate effective political participation on relatively few key positions, as may be the case in military regimes, while in others they may open up the confined councils of government to wider community participation, as may happen in closely-knit neighborhoods. They do not appear to diminish bureaucratic power but may well strengthen it by limiting political controls.

THE EMERGENCE OF BUREAUCRATIC POWER

The prospect that the public bureaucracy might assume authority in its own right and public officials constitute a ruling class with a monopoly of power was first publicized in the early 1940s by James Burnham.¹⁵ Since then, there can be no hiding the fact that officials are important public policy makers. They have developed autonomous power bases and amassed considerable independent power, more so perhaps in publicly managed societies than pluralistic liberal societies.¹⁶ Modern societies are now too complicated for either traditional or arbitrary rule alone to preserve without continual coercion.¹⁷

Public officials have become major political actors in their own right. This means that politicians have much difficulty keeping control over public agencies and are increasingly vulnerable to bureaucratic threats. To prevail, senior officials do not have to indulge in harmful acts, merely "to fail to come forward with their services."¹⁸

A political appointee who plans to get along without the bureaucracy's help, or to acquire it automatically, or to cease worrying about it as long as civil servants are simply doing what they are told does not recognize the substance of the bureaucracy's power and its capacity to withhold needed services.¹⁹

The bases of this bureaucratic power, besides the weaknesses of other political institutions and low-caliber political leaders, include the following:

- a. *Resources.* Whatever resources a public bureaucracy consumes, the costs should be measured in foregone alternatives. No society ever has enough resources to accomplish a fraction of its objectives. The priority given to the public bureaucracy in resource allocation enables it to lord over dependent institutions and to provide stiff competition to rivals. In all modern societies, it commands an appreciable portion of the community's talent and wealth.
- b. *Expertise.* Many of the functions carried out by the public bureaucracy are monopolistic. The public bureaucracy employs most (if not all) functional experts, who cannot be replaced easily from outside. It contains unique occupations and professions indispensable to quality performance, as well as many experienced administrators peculiar to public employment.
- c. *Legitimate monopoly of instruments of coercive power.* Political leaders depend on the loyalty of the military and the police, for which a price must be paid, usually in the form of special treatment or concessions, to prevent their usurpation of political office.
- d. *Status.* Despite adverse images of the public bureaucracy, the standing of top officials is high in the social structure. Top officials are part of the aristocracy, the power elite, the ruling class, or their equivalents. The social position confers authority—particularly if it is supported by an ideology of public service, responsibility, rationality, credibility, loyalty to the regime, and devotion to the public interest.
- e. *Discretionary powers.* In routine areas, marginal activities, and technical functions, the political leaders maintain only weak supervisory control and delegate freedom of action to the public bureaucracy. Thus, public officials run public enterprises without much political interference. Sometimes, when politicians are reluctant to decide on public issues, they prefer that public officials decide for them, and then they resume responsibility after public reaction is known.

- f. *Confidential information.* The public bureaucracy is a storehouse of state secrets, access to which may be denied both to outsiders and political leaders. Nobody else may have alternative sources of information, in which case their effectiveness in public policy making depends on access to the public bureaucracy's storehouse.
- g. *Strategic position.* As the link between the rulers and the ruled, the public bureaucracy is responsible for the manner in which political orders are carried out and for the conformity of end results with expectations. It may thus be in a position to negate political intentions and distort feedback. The rulers may be misled or deceived by the suppression of complaints, appeals, difficulties, and problems. The political leaders are dependent on the honesty and openness of the public bureaucracy. Otherwise, they may have to rely on strict control, spy systems, and politicization.
- h. *Reputation.* The treatment meted out by the public bureaucracy influences the citizen's perception of the polity, government, and political leaders. It is a major factor in public opinion formation.

Much of this bureaucratic power is latent and apparent only in crises, but there can be little doubt that it grows along with the administrative state and political controls have to be strengthened correspondingly. All of this makes administrative reform more important to keep the power of the public bureaucracy in check and to ensure that the public bureaucracy performs as it should.

THE NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

The living constitution of every society is being reformed continually in response to the changing environment, new ideas and innovations, powerful drives to progress by eradicating observable social ills, and natural inclinations to compare one's own society with somebody else's society. Successful reforms in

the governmental system set in motion a whole series of chain events that lead to reforms in other institutions. These reforms in turn may generate demands for reforms in the administration of public affairs that would change the outcomes or the balance of power or delivery methods or administrative capacity. In this way, every society generates pressures for administrative improvement and demands more and more of its administrative systems, forcing them to change themselves or be changed by external imposition.

No administrative system is perfect, least of all public administrative systems which are political compromises between contending forces and as such not wholly rational, logical, ideal, stable, or satisfactory. There is always room for improvement and therefore a permanent place exists for administrative reform. The need is apparent whenever (a) a public body fails to meet the demands placed on it, that is, things do not get done at all or are done below previous or potential standards of performance, (b) it collapses under extraordinary demands or unexpected events, (c) it cannot adjust to new situations and, being too occupied with the immediate, fails to anticipate future demands, and (d) it does not adopt the most effective methods and is out of touch with the latest developments in its field. But tolerance of maladministration is high. People are so used to what they habitually receive that they can conceive of nothing else or they do not know how to improve matters and accept what is for lack of any alternative. Even when something better comes along, they may not be willing to put in the effort necessary to make the change or to overcome the resistance of vested interests in the status quo. Reform is a difficult process requiring not only recognition of need and formulation of feasible alternatives, but also inspired and skilled advocates willing to overcome the many obstacles encountered and bureaucratic inertia. Even in the most favored circumstances, reform is tricky; most fall to bureaucratic opposition.

In the forefront of administrative reform have been scholars of public administration attracted to the discipline in the expectation that they would uncover better ways of doing things and learn the skills and techniques to improve administrative performance.

The reformist bent to the discipline has never been disguised. Its leading scholars have been active in reform movements and most major texts have had a strong prescriptive element. There is hardly a country where public administration experts have not been called upon to redesign administrative systems and train public officials in the latest state of the art. They have been ardent advocates of reform and propagandists for particular kinds of reform. Yet for all their righteous indignation and creativity, they have not fared too well. Political realities have often defeated them. They have been too threatening to established interests. They have been unable to overcome inertia or win the support of the powerful.

Despite the many rebuffs to administrative reform and reformers, it was not until the 1960s that administrative reform itself became subject to serious concerted study. At that time, newly independent states were complaining bitterly that the administrative systems they had inherited were unsuitable for the ambitious programs of national development on which they wished to embark. They wanted their administrative systems reconstructed speedily. Elsewhere, governments the world over were running into all kinds of difficulty as they tried to operationalize new policies. They were finding existing administrative arrangements somewhat obstructive, being resistant to innovation and unwilling to experiment with new ways of delivering public services. Political dreams were being rudely upset by administrative nightmares. Administrative capacity was unequal to the task. Governments could not deliver what they promised. Bureaucratization on which they had largely relied had been accompanied by several societal dysfunctions and organizational pathologies, particularly a universal crisis in labor discipline and declining productivity.

The need for administrative reform has been universally recognized. As far back as in the 1940s, it was spearheaded by many belligerents whose attempts to grapple with postwar reconstruction required restructuring of their societies and a thoroughgoing overhaul of their machinery of government. Disappointment or disillusionment with administrative performance occurred irrespective of regime and economic structure. Around the globe, institutional supports for administrative reform developed. In

communist regimes, debates raged over how the state should be organized, what place a central bureaucracy had in it, how much independence state enterprises should have in running their affairs, what part the proletariat should play in managing public business, and what provision should be made for the circulation of elites. Complaints were often heard about red tape, bureaucratic indifference, poor quality controls and systemic corruption to get around rigid procedures. All communist regimes embarked on elaborate administrative reform programs to overhaul the state machine, revitalize the communist party, mobilize the masses, and energize the bureaucracy.

In the Western world, many countries instigated comprehensive investigations of their public bureaucracies, all of which collected detailed evidence, commissioned original research, released elaborate findings, and made comprehensive recommendations for change. Few reforms, however, were implemented. Other countries preferred continuing programs of reform, headed by a standing body for the purpose, supported and assisted by several central supervisory bodies, largely concerned with finance, personnel and audit. The reform programs were buttressed by sympathetic professional associations, productivity councils, public interest groups, research bodies, and voluntary associations. These groups were keen to reduce government waste, raise public sector productivity, produce better policies, and improve administrative efficiency. Efforts have been concentrated on redistributing powers and activities between governmental organizations and levels of government, civil service reform, and ensuring greater accountability for public services.

In the rest of the world, administrative reform was handicapped by the very lack of administrative capabilities of poor countries. In them, wholesale transformations of administrative systems were thwarted by political instability, economic scarcity, social conflict, cultural confusion, and administrative incompetence. Often, new leaders promised to tidy up the mess left by their predecessors, and for a time they managed to improve matters, but things gradually sank back to where they once were. They have formally institutionalized reform in various reform bodies,

supervisory agencies, special ministries, prestigious institutes of education and training, expert advisory bodies, model laws, and all manner of exemplary projects, but these made little progress. Of course, there were countries where reform was successful, but there were many more where it was not, despite international efforts to support their administrative systems, to provide special technical assistance, and to conduct crash programs to develop indigenous administrative talent.

These international efforts have not excluded the United States. Indeed, much of the impetus and expertise behind administrative reform have been provided by Americans. American knowhow has been much in demand abroad. At home, administrative reformers have not been quiescent. They have not given up their efforts to transform American public administration. They have maintained their pressures and slowly but surely they have gained ground. Their main thrust in recent decades has been to decentralize, to retreat from federal domination, to push public policy making away from Washington back into the states, local governments, and neighborhood communities, and to abandon altogether or reprivatize various governmental activities where public performance has failed or fallen well below expectations.

American administrative reformers offer five major sets of proposals. *First*, cut down government, public initiatives, public enterprises, and public agencies. Get government out of where it ought not be, cut out unnecessary government programs, reduce the scale of public services, eliminate bureaucratic frills, and freeze or, better still, reduce the level of governmental resources. *Second*, rationalize the machinery of government through reorganization, redistribution and consolidation of similar activities, eliminate small, inefficient and competing units, reduce overlapping and duplication, and generally simplify administrative processes. Revamp the whole intergovernmental system and revitalize sluggish public agencies. *Third*, stop the ever-increasing flow of paperwork and regulations generated by public authorities. Cut down on the resources, time and energy spent on processing paper and release people to occupy themselves more profitably. *Fourth*, end overreliance on bureaucratization. Search for alternative ways

of delivering public services through market mechanisms, non-public organizations, self-help, and self-delivery systems involving direct public participation. *Fifth*, make the public bureaucracy more representative of the people it serves. Abandon unnecessary restrictive entry barriers. Institute fair employment practices. Speed up the employment of the underrepresented through affirmative action. Together, these five sets of proposals have fueled a new public administration reform and revitalization movement that is likely to have greater success than its predecessors.

Administrative reform the world over has run into serious trouble, not because the reforms have been wrong, the strategies incorrect or the reformers unqualified, but simply because there has been insufficient support for administrative reform. While ideas and proposals are legion, it is difficult to get anyone to do something about them. Conception is easier than action, and successful action is comparatively rare. The reformers remain outsiders to the situation they are trying to improve. Even highly prestigious bodies invested with the task of reform discover that administrative systems are extremely conservative and slow to change. Somehow reform is always good in principle but not in practice, or always good for somebody else, never oneself.

The disappointing record of administrative reform can be largely attributed to the confusion that exists in regard to the relation between politics and administration in public administration. Political leaders bemused with the ideal of depoliticization are reluctant to interfere with administrative details. Preoccupied with political matters they rely on their trusted public servants to devise suitable administrative arrangements. The practitioners recognizing their subordinate political position, weigh political values and practicality against administrative values and reform aspirations, and in any clash between political and management objectives they usually decide in favor of the former. They are reluctant to tamper with the machinery of government just to satisfy the demands of administrative scientists. In any event, they are sufficiently powerful to block any reforms which they oppose. Only strong political support for administrative reform can overcome bureaucratic conservatism and there are few political leaders

willing to side with administrative reformers against their bureaucratic advisers for they are fully aware how dependent their own political performance is on the cooperation and support of the public bureaucracy. They cannot afford to antagonize the public bureaucracy and as administrative reform rarely attracts public attention or wins a strong political following, they intervene only when pressured by scandal, obvious bureaucratic bungling and grassroots demands for administrative improvement.

This conflict between politics and administrative rationality is best illustrated in the frustrating history of federal reorganization in the United States. The American constitution is unclear about whether the President or Congress has final responsibility for administrative arrangements. Each argues that it is the final arbiter but rarely has either been disposed to undo the other's handiwork. Consequently the federal machinery of government has grown haphazardly, like a multi-colored patchwork. From time to time, pressures for rationalization, simplification, and economy are accompanied by demands for a thorough review of the executive branch of government by administrative experts, with the expectation that it will be overhauled according to their recommendations. Rarely have such demands been granted and even more rare have expert recommendations been followed. Few presidents have been keen to push administrative reform while Congress has often let action die in committee.

Periodically the proposals of administrative experts are revived, and presidents try to implement them without congressional approval through their wide executive powers, but suspicions of presidential initiatives provoke heated debates in Congress. Successive presidential inquiries since World War II (First Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch 1947-1949, Second Hoover Commission 1953-1955, Price Task Force on Government Organization 1964, Ash Advisory Council on Executive Reorganization 1971 and the Presidential Task Forces 1977) have been less bold in their approach. All have agreed that there is inadequate machinery for the effective development, implementation and coordination of public policy and that too much is centralized in Washington. They have recommended

the enlargement and restructuring of the Executive Office of the President; the consolidation of federal programs and functions into a few major departments; the strengthening of staff offices at the level of the secretary; making a departmentwide (secretary's) presence felt in federal field establishments; upgrading the quality and enlarging the power and discretion of federal field offices at home and abroad; devolving the conduct of federal business increasingly upon state and local authorities and upon private or quasi-public instrumentalities; and reform of the career services and upgrading of public personnel charged at various levels of government with the conduct and control of federal policy.²⁰

Unfortunately they "have ignored the realities of congressional power" and "failed to articulate some of the administrative and policy costs and consequences" of adoption.²¹ Although presidents have slowly moved along these lines, the failure of federal government reorganization to get through the political minefield has resulted, in President Nixon's words, in the hobbling of the president, tangled responsibilities, lack of public accountability, confusion, waste, duplication, fragmented problem-solving, piecemeal and narrow approaches to public policy, policy vacuums, official frustration and disenchantment, and public estrangement and disillusionment with government.²² Thus political leaders must also bear the costs of administrative reform failure.

Studies of governmental reorganizations have revealed how intensely political they have been and how success and failure have been related to internal tensions. They arise from different views about organizational purposes, centripetal and centrifugal drives for control over programs and operations, conflicts of opinion over expansion or maintenance of programs, conflicting aspirations of different specialized groups, interpersonal competition, and clashes between old and new.²³ Reorganizations were produced by many cumulative decisions seeking changes in image, policy, and program. Where they depended on formal study, the nature, composition, methods, and auspices of the study groups significantly conditioned their proposals as well as the likelihood of their success. In short, any tampering with the machinery of government has been recognized by those concerned as being

something much more, which of course it is, namely, an alteration of constitutional arrangements that have evolved in response to social dynamics and an interference with the state in action.

NOTES

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17. See B. Crick, *In Defense of Politics*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962; P. Self, *Administrative Politics and Theories*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973, pp. 169-191.
18. H. Hecló, *A Government of Strangers*, p. 173.
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20. S. K. Bailey, "Managing the Federal Government" in K. Gordon (ed.) *Agenda for the Nation*, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1968, p. 308.
21. S. K. Bailey, "Managing the Federal Government," pp. 308-309.
22. Reorganization Plan Message of March 25, 1971, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Document No. 92-75.
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5 Functional Expertise

THE ENHANCED POLITICAL role of the public bureaucracy is largely the result of its functional expertise. Had it not demonstrated its capacity for assuming additional functions, public leaders would have been forced to search for alternatives to the administrative state. Instead, it has been asked to assume more and more burdens and no real alternative has yet emerged of coping with the complex issues of modern society. It has the power, coverage, resources, organization and professional competence to give it functional superiority. For over a century, the public sector has grown faster than the private sector and private sector fortunes have increasingly come to depend on public sector performance. Although, there has been a perceptible slowing down of public sector expansion in recent years, the administrative state has yet to peak. Adequate alternatives are still lacking.

As Big Government continues, the public bureaucracy can be expected to strengthen further its dynamic role and its deep involvement in the political system as the administrative arm of executive government and a political power in its own right. It will continue to play a basic part in establishing, determining,

and implementing political goals and major policy directives. As in the past, it will adapt to new societal goals, new spheres of activity, and new social needs arising from diversification of the social structure and extension of political participation. It will remain a major instrument of social change and political socialization, entailing new learning roles between citizen and official. It will become, where it has not already done so, the principal channel of economic and social mobility and advancement. These claims can be sustained by a brief review of the functional expertise of public administration.

TRADITIONAL FUNCTIONS

With the possible exception of social security, the fastest growing area in public administration is in the traditional activities that governments have always carried out principally because the nature of the functions has been transformed.

External relations

A century ago, external relations was a relatively simple affair, conducted directly between visiting statesmen or delegated to resident ambassadors who exercised personal diplomacy in the few states that counted in the international arena. The only standing international organization was the International Postal Union. Today, the study of external relations is an academic discipline in its own right, concerned not only with the complicated relations among an ever growing number of sovereign states, but also with the multiplication of international bodies dealing with subjects ranging from international law to civil aviation tariffs, from peace-keeping operations to atomic energy research. Personal diplomacy by the diplomatic corps is diminishing. Embassies are now more concerned with protecting their nationals, gathering information and bolstering trade. Other government agencies have their own representatives abroad dealing with a host of functions requiring foreign contacts. Almost all countries provide

staff for a growing list of international organizations, ranging from the United Nations complex to regional trade treaties.

Internal law and order

Before industrialization, the maintenance of law and order was largely a local affair except for disorders that threatened to get out of hand when the militia would be brought in. Since industrialization civil police forces have grown, with a separate discipline of criminology and law enforcement to cater to their needs. Law courts have been elaborated and differentiated and a separate system of administrative law has been established. Government regulation of social and economic conduct which had relatively small beginnings has emerged as a large business with the multiplication of regulations, uniform standards, legal monopolies, inspection, documentation and the whole paraphernalia of bureaucratic legalism. At the same time, government has assumed responsibility for dealing with emergencies, and in cooperation with private bodies, maintains reserve capacity for handling most contingencies.

Defense

Less than two centuries ago wars were largely fought between small mercenary armies which, except for heavy armor, largely equipped themselves and lived off the land, taking loot as their payment and leaving few battle injured. Since then mass conscripted armies have replaced mercenaries, weapons of fearsome destruction have been produced and total war is conducted around the clock on land, sea, and air, in a variety of new ways, including gases, chemicals, and germs. These transformations in warfare necessitate a permanent war organization, professional military training, supplies and maintenance, weapons research, civil defense, and rehabilitation. The modern military complex is big business, big technology, big investment and big politics. It absorbs the largest single slice of public resources, as much as \$600 billion

altogether in 1981 and fast rising as the armed forces seek to increase their stockpiles of the latest weapons and extend their power and influence in modern society.

Public works

The spectacular public feats of the past—the seven wonders of the world, large-scale irrigation, flood control and drainage schemes, ports and harbors, religious shrines—have been matched in every generation. The past century has witnessed large-scale subway systems under major cities, vast river valley development schemes, networks of superhighways and railroads, public broadcasting services, communication satellites, suspension bridges, airports, undersea exploration, and reforestation. These spectacular public projects should not eclipse the steady advance along a wide sector of traditional public concerns that fill the agenda of local authorities without raising much public attention.

Taxation

Simple forms of taxation have been superseded by elaborate national taxation systems with a growing range of taxes, complicated record systems, and an array of public collectors and inspectors. Nationalized systems have increasingly confined taxation to public authorities and integrated it with economic and social policies. The government is also in the loan business in a big way through its own banking services and loans authorities. It can better estimate taxable capacity and reduce tax seepage, thereby maximizing public resources for community purposes, while continuing to supplement taxation and loans with proceeds from the sale of public lands and the surpluses of public enterprises.

Public welfare

Government has always supplemented private institutions in catering to those unable to look after themselves through no

fault of their own. Such public welfare has since been institutionalized by providing public services for orphans, physically handicapped and insane persons, and war widows. The welfare state concept has since transformed and extended these public welfare services. It is important to note that the original humanitarian motives, however executed, have since been extended to aborigine minorities, who until recent decades were decimated as a subhuman species, and also to social minorities who as second class citizens have been exploited or at least denied full participation in community life.

In each of these traditional functions, public administration possesses an expertise unmatched elsewhere in society. Some are by nature governmental monopolies. Others are shared with other societal institutions, in which case public administration does not have exclusive expertise. In most, there is no ready substitute for officialdom, as alternatives have disappeared or been dismantled altogether and improvisation would take too long or fail through sheer lack of experience, know-how, competence, and public support. In these traditional functions, the government commands respect. It has built up a reputation of competence and fair dealing. No one is quite prepared to see anyone else handle these activities simply because on past performance, they failed in their trust.

NATION BUILDING FUNCTIONS

Nationalism was able to use the traditional functions of government to promote nation building. For instance, the ideology of the militia was transformed from pecuniary gain and military prowess to patriotism and chauvinism when civilian conscripts replaced hired mercenaries. Public works boosted the national image, but the success of nationalism was largely due to other factors. Today many new states are trying to employ public administration for nation-building purposes.

National symbols

Patriotism needs something more than a distinctive flag, a national anthem, a unique coat of arms, and public insignia, but

such symbols are an indispensable beginning. The government impresses these national symbols on the citizenry until the people identify themselves with them. Flags are flown on public buildings; national symbols head all official documents; public officials wear uniforms embossed with national symbols; national symbols are paraded on all public occasions; official languages only are used in the conduct of all public businesses; public buildings, streets, squares, and thoroughfares are named after national heroes; public holidays and ceremonies commemorate national events. Nationalism is particularly impressed on children, youth, public servants, military recruits and naturalized citizens. There are also national prestige projects of variable utility, ranging from national air and shipping lines to hosting international conferences and sports events.

National unity

Public administration norms stress national unity and non-discrimination, universalistic values and the public interest over sectional and partisan interests. The self-image of public servants highlights their role in national unification and integration. By personal example, they remind others of national self-awareness, merely in their attitudes of pride in national accomplishments and faith in the nation's future. As representatives of the state, they signify the unity of the nation, adherence to one government, and support of common objectives.

National socialization

National self-consciousness is awakened early by the education system and by the way certain subjects are taught, particularly history and geography. After school, young adults are further impressed with national consciousness through state-supported youth movements and clubs, and more obviously in full citizen rights, governmental elections, jury service, military service, and various forms of voluntary civic activity. Where the state backs the majority religion to enhance nationalism, religious doctrine may be part of state ideology and religious practices may be

incorporated in law, official ceremonies and public holidays. Similarly where the state backs the dominant culture, it may insist on one language or form of dress. Most states preserve the cultural past in monuments, museums, archives, libraries, and art galleries, and boost national consciousness by encouraging indigenous arts, promoting national theaters, folk-dance groups, art festivals and literary competitions, and subsidizing national celebrities and national exhibitions.

National development

Few countries can improve the quality of life for all citizens through self-sustained growth, equitable distribution of societal products, wide political participation, and individual self-fulfillment without artificial stimulation by public authorities. The government has to ensure that the essential prerequisites for national development are obtained. It must stimulate private enterprise to expand and innovate or fill the gap with public initiatives. It must diversify the economy to prevent overdependence on a few choice products. It must promote greater productivity, higher standards, and prompter action. Public officials, as social change agents, may teach their clientele new cultural styles and, as pace-setters, spearhead modernization by example. For instance, they participate in communal affairs and elections and encourage others to do likewise. They limit the size of their families and extol the virtues of a small family.

Nation building functions are almost taken for granted in older states. They have been performed so successfully even though public administration may no longer be the most competent institution to handle them. Newer states have no option. Societal vacuums must be filled and public administration is best positioned to do so. As in other areas, by the time other institutions are sufficiently mature to assume much of the responsibility, the functional expertise of the public bureaucracy may be uncontestable.

ECONOMIC-MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS

Governments have always reserved certain economic powers to themselves, such as control of the currency supply, the regulation of trade and commerce, and the sale of public lands and monopoly franchises. With the expansion of traditional functions and the assumption of nation-building functions, public authorities have grown more involved in economic matters, if only to assure a ready supply of weapons and limitations on economic exploitation of the defenseless. Their economic role has increased in response to the revolution of rising expectations. People expect the government to do more. They have always looked to it for action in solving community problems; that is what governments are for, and that is what no other societal institutions can do better. Community problems have grown with the agrarian revolution (which displaced people from the land), the industrial revolution (which transformed landless people into an urban proletariat), and urbanization (which brought problems of overcrowding, slums, disease, hard-core poverty, sanitation, transportation, civil disorder, and so on). War technology has assumed a momentum of its own, enlarging the state's economic-management functions as have the rise of collectivist ideologies and the democratization of the political process as the demands of the middle and lower classes have to be considered besides those of elites.

Public enterprise

The government has become a major economic entrepreneur, providing a wide range of economic products and services directly to the consuming public. Besides the direct supply of public goods, public authorities have also taken over the supply of private goods where private enterprise has failed, where supply has become monopolized, where government has decided to compete with private producers in the market place, or where governments have preferred to supply themselves rather than relying on private

enterprise. Anti-capitalist regimes have gone furthest with public enterprise but no modern state lacks a significant public sector.

Economic regulation

Nowhere has the institution of private property been wholly enshrined. Although governments have always intervened to regulate private transactions, property exchanges, master-servant relationships, market prices, and working conditions, the scope and extent of economic regulation has been transformed over the past century in response to trade cycles, monetary fluctuations, infant-industry protection, migration, labor organization, pressure group activity, and a host of other factors, best illustrated from a sectoral breakdown of economic regulation.

(1) Primary industries

A century ago, most people were engaged (as they still are in poor countries) in self-sufficient primary occupations on privately owned land, and their living standards were governed by uncertain yields, subject to violent fluctuations. Since then, industrialization has provided alternative employment, improved productive methods, and opened new markets. In response, governments have intervened in the following ways:

- a. *Land redistribution.* The seizure of private property and the breakup of estates; land nationalization; high property and inheritance taxes; collectivization of farming; encouragement of rural cooperatives; support to small farmers; relocation of industry to rural areas to raise local employment levels; guaranteed tenure.
- b. *Protection.* Restrictions on food imports; sliding scale tariffs; government storage of surplus; government purchase of surplus for distribution; guaranteed markets and prices; public marketing authorities; bulk purchase agreements; agricultural planning; land registration; tenant farmer rights.

- c. *Subsidization*. Irrigation and flood control; drainage; disease prevention; food inspection; research; cheap freight rates; subsidies and price supports; free and cheap loans; losses on government services and community amenities in rural areas.

In these ways, governments have greatly reduced the risks in primary industry, in some cases to the point where private enterprise has been virtually eliminated. Some people have even been paid to keep their land fallow.

(2) Extractive industries

Some governments have reserved to themselves the sole right of exploiting oil, gas and mineral deposits. Elsewhere, they provide survey and mapping services, subsidize exploration, regulate production through quota systems and royalty payments, inspect mining and forestry practices and plants, set prices, and renovate exploited areas (by reforestation and land reclamation).

(3) Public utilities

Because of their importance to the community and their monopolistic features, public utilities are either publicly owned or strictly regulated in most countries. They are not permitted to exploit consumers or reap extraordinary profits. They are obliged to serve all adequately, without discriminating, continuously at reasonable rates.

(4) Secondary industries

In addition to protection, subsidization, labor regulation, and safety precautions, governments have enacted a large body of law governing private corporations and their practices, the quality of merchandise, the nature of advertising, marketing conditions, overseas trade dealings, and permission to operate. Similar arrangements may be in force for secondary industries as apply to primary and extractive industries.

(5) Service industries

Small service industries are probably subject to less regulation than other businesses, but large service industries such as banking, insurance, advertising, commerce, broadcasting, entertainment, and distribution are probably subject to more thorough legal regulatory bodies, inspection, licensing, compulsory government transactions, and incentive schemes.

(6) Labor regulation

Apart from work-place controls, the government protects professional organizations and employee unions (which may be monopsonies), licenses various occupations, provides employment bureaus, vocational training and apprenticeship schemes, and supervises employer-employee relations.

In many respects, the functional expertise developed in all these areas is unique to public administration. It is not easily replaced and once institutionalized, it is usually taken for granted unless performance is really defective. The regulated institutions adapt themselves and experience difficulty in readjusting if the regulations are removed.

Economic planning

Since the Great Depression, economic planning has taken three major forms.

1. *Macrocollectivist planning* involves the detailed planning and control of every aspect of the economy. It requires a large intelligence network, a permanent planning organization, and an enforcement machinery to see that people adhere to the plans. It rejects the market system.

2. *Post-Keynesian adjustment planning*, in contrast, accepts the market system but supplements it through public fiscal policies to maintain effective demand backed by readily available public works programs and other economic ventures to meet fluctuations

in employment and monetary values. Governments control economic movements; they do not determine them. Sophisticated economic policy techniques substitute for detailed planning machinery.

3. *Development planning.* Poor countries which lack the human resources to employ both macrocollective planning and post-Keynesian adjustment planning, steer a course between them by having central planning agencies collect economic intelligence to define national economic goals and devise government investment plans to be effected through public fiscal policies, political regulation and foreign assistance. Such development planning may be little more than a list of current projects in hand or may involve elaborate economic models and strong government controls over business activity.

Taken together, economic-management functions become more impressive as economic life grows more complex and as partisan mutual adjustment—on which the market mechanism depends—becomes increasingly inadequate to cope with contemporary economic problems. The management of the national economy requires a different outlook from the management of a subsystem organization, although the economic techniques may be the same. The differences are best highlighted whenever economists shift from micro to macro level, and from private to public sector.

SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTIONS

Except for the protection of the defenseless, governments used to leave social welfare to other institutions. Social misfortune was considered as divine retribution for sins committed in the past or divine tests of character that would reap just rewards in the hereafter. Unemployment was looked upon as a person's own fault for being work-shy; there was always work around for lively hands. Public charity was meant to be degrading to drive the able-bodied poor to support themselves. These ideas still limit the spread of the welfare state, which developed in response to

the breakdown of social-welfare services provided by other societal institutions and the obvious need for alleviation of poverty in the contemporary society. People could no longer fall back on the land or on employers to meet their needs when unemployed. Private charity could not meet the growing welfare problem resulting from large-scale warfare, heavy seasonal and cyclical unemployment, international trade fluctuations, technological displacement, and natural disasters.

To justify increased governmental concern with social welfare, philosophical justification was found from several different sources. The religious took their stand on the basis of moral improvement, puritanism, humanitarianism, and paternalism. The laissez-faire economic liberals believed that the government was justified in giving everybody a fair chance to compete as individuals. Democratic theorists stressed equal rights, equal consideration, belief in the individual, and the responsible use of power by the majority. Socialists, imbued with the ideas of equality, public ownership and collectivism, thought that the guiding principle for the community of the future should be "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his need." With the merging of these various ideas, the concept of the welfare state recognized social welfare as the responsibility of the state, not the private concern of the individual. Social distress was the fault of society, not the individual. Government should seek to eliminate it by providing a complete package of welfare services and guaranteeing a rising real minimum standard of welfare.

In practical terms, the welfare state carries out social-welfare functions according to a "womb to tomb" policy. Before babies are born, chances of survival are improved by the provision of prenatal clinics, domestic help, and special foods for mothers, who receive a subsidy to cover the costs of pregnancy and confinement. If children are born deformed or otherwise abnormal, the welfare state cares for them in special institutions. All mothers are assisted in the initial stages of child care. Should anything detrimental happen to a child's welfare, the welfare state assumes the role of kindly parent. Should children commit a crime or

otherwise behave offensively, they are not treated as criminals but given special attention to assist them toward normal development. Their health and education are provided by the welfare state, free of charge. As working adults they are guaranteed employment as far as possible and retrained regularly to fill vacancies. They are provided with medical treatment, hospitalization, and convalescence, but should they become disabled, the welfare state will care for them, as it does when they are unemployed. Social diseases—drugs, alcoholism, cigarettes, venereal disease—are attacked as social problems. Nonworkers without other means of support are assisted by the welfare state. When people die, they are buried by the welfare state or their funerals are subsidized.

National health services

Since sickness can strike at any time, people should be able to obtain medical services at any time regardless of their ability to pay. To this end government provides medical services to all who cannot provide for themselves either by subsidizing private practice or directly supplying medical services in government offices and employing medical practitioners as public servants. Included are preventative as well as remedial services, medical research, and even ancillary industries serving the needs of the national health services.

National welfare services

Whereas health services deal with physical and mental well-being, the national welfare services are concerned with those who, although not ill, cannot support themselves or need help in other ways. The services may be delivered at home to needy people, or the needy may be institutionalized. Important categories of the needy include the elderly, orphans, deserted families, the handicapped, the disabled, and unemployables. The welfare services range from home help for pregnant women to burial of the deceased in public cemeteries.

National social security

To assist people through temporary misfortune or to subsidize the costs of national health and welfare services, able-bodied employees and the self-employed are compelled to contribute from their current earnings to national insurance, pension and superannuation schemes to cover unemployment, work disability and retirement.

National education

The government provides a public school system for all children between the ages of five and fifteen, extending the system downward to kindergartens from the age of two and child care centers below that, and upward to high schools, technical colleges, trade schools, universities, research institutes, and comprehensive adult-education courses. The basic school system is universal, free, secular, and nondiscriminatory (that is, unsegregated) to the children, but outside the school system the parents and/or students may have to contribute directly for the services provided. Those capable of benefiting from the courses offered, but unable to afford the direct charges, may be excused the charges, subsidized by scholarships, or lent money repayable at a later date. The education system may extend into mass media, publishing, and other ancillary industries.

Public housing

Where private housing is inadequate or too costly for deserving citizens, the government provides adequate housing at subsidized rents and acts as a good landlord. The housing may include recreational facilities, cultural amenities, and local services.

Special group services

The government caters to those seeking employment, young adults, criminal offenders, social misfits, migrants, war victims

and veterans, lonely people, and victims of natural calamities and crime.

Social welfare functions are among the fastest growing categories of public administration. They employ large numbers of professional workers in large-scale complex organizations. In many areas they coexist with the private sector, so that their functional expertise is not unique.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS

Compared with a century ago, most people enjoy a standard of living far above that ever known before. This achievement has been due to humanity's increasing mastery of the environment and the unmasking of nature's secrets by scientists and engineers. Humanity can virtually do what it wants and is now in a position to explore the heavens, farm the seas, prolong life and eliminate drudgery and communicable disease. Public authorities have always been in the forefront of material development. They have undertaken huge public works. They have encouraged science and technology. They have promoted navigation and discovery. They have stimulated economic development. But the social costs of material progress have not escaped their attention nor the debilitating efforts on the environment itself.

Research and development

Public administration has always been in the vanguard of science and technology. Governments have wanted to master the latest discoveries and advances in knowledge to secure their position. Failure to appreciate the value of new information had led to many a downfall. More practically, governments have promoted military science, particularly research into explosives and weaponry. They have financed voyages of exploration and discovery to extend their dominion. They have sought better farming and manufacturing techniques and improved building, construc-

tion, and engineering skills. Science has brought prestige. Today research and development is very big government business, particularly in rich countries, where substantial sums are spent on military science, medical research, nuclear technology, and space exploration. While much may be contracted out to private enterprise and universities, a considerable part is performed directly in scientific organizations run by governments. Currently governments are conducting research and development in every conceivable area of scientific knowledge, from telecommunications to animal breeding, from oceanography to weather forecasting, from computer technology to neurophysiology. For example, the United States government invests twice as much as private enterprise in research and development and employs over half of the professional scientists and engineers engaged in R & D activities.

Conservation

In the conquest of nature, humanity has destroyed irreplaceable natural beauty, exterminated whole species of animals, created deserts where vegetation once flourished, and polluted its environments with its own waste products. When it has exhausted nature's bounty, it has moved on elsewhere to repeat the process, leaving behind eroded soils, disused mines and land slips, ugly scenic scars, piles of discarded litter, discolored waters, stinking organic sewage and dead animals. The first public reaction has been to protect species of flora and fauna in danger of extinction by prohibiting hunting and designating certain areas as wildlife preserves. Disappearing wildlife has also been preserved in botanical and zoological gardens.

The next step was to set about restoring what had been destroyed. Natural resources had to be harbored through more efficient methods of manufacture and replacement of nonexhaustible resources. Conservation had three aspects—the better utilization of exhaustible natural resources, the reclamation of waste, and the renewal of nonexhaustible resources through reforestation and soil renewal. It soon branched out to include the preservation of historical sites and monuments, nature studies, recreational

facilities, water conservation, and forestry fire protection. It became a general nature protection movement—to preserve rare resources, to protect natural environments, to improve the quality of life for urban dwellers denied esthetic pleasure, peace and quiet, fresh air, and living room.

Urban design

The crowding of people into cities has been accompanied by numerous problems for urban residents and municipal administrators. One conclusion reached by serious students of urbanization was that cities could no longer be allowed to happen. They would have to be planned and designed to reduce the severity of urban problems and to make urban living more pleasant. As town planning could not be considered apart from the suburbs and surroundings, regional planning joined urban planning and later still incorporated satellite town schemes, whereby big cities were deliberately reduced in population by the creation of new self-sufficient planned towns retaining direct rail and road links. Physical planning was finally extended to rural land use and wildlife regions.

Environmental controls

Conservation and land use planning do not halt destruction of the environment. Environmental controls are advocated by those who believe that man lives in a closed system—a spherical surface of fixed diameter with but a few miles in depth, its only exogenous input being the sun's energy. Despite the vastness of water, air and land, the environment is finite. For every gain there is a corresponding loss. Technology has upset the balance of this self-regulating equilibrium. For example, metals and plastics are indissoluble. Man-made poisons accumulate. Carbon in the atmosphere (burnt fossil-fuels) admits radiant heat and keeps convection heat close to the surface, thereby raising temperatures sufficiently to melt the ice caps, raise sea temperatures, and change rainfall patterns. The long-range implications of humanity's

destructive nature helps to focus attention on more immediate concerns, such as air and water pollution, garbage dumps and hazardous spills, contaminated foodstuffs and untested drugs, land slips, unsafe transportation, shoddy goods, unsightly buildings and billboards, traffic jams, and faulty industrial zoning. These problems are being tackled by prohibition, regulation, education, research, engineering projects, and public works programs. Unfortunately, public authorities are some of the worst offenders, particularly in radiation hazards, poison gases, thermal pollution (from nuclear reactors), and untreated sewage disposal.

Environmental control functions, like social welfare functions, are relatively new to public administration, but nonetheless essential in the modern state. Their province is the realm of publicness, the general concern of all unrepresented by partisan political movements, vested interests, sectional pressure groups, and bureaucratic self-protection. In many cases, the dangers are unobtrusive; they are insidious but gradually accumulating until they reach the point of intolerance. A dramatic event—such as the explosion of a “dirty” weapon or bridge collapse or political assassination—will focus immediate attention on the problem and galvanize action. Although the drama subsides, the slow relentless buildup continues until it reaches the tolerance level again, whereupon new public initiatives are taken.

HUMAN RIGHTS FUNCTIONS

Environmental hazards are nondiscriminating: they affect all human beings. Social hazards are discriminatory, as the burden falls unfairly on certain groups in the community—the rural poor, urban slum dwellers, unorganized labor, homosexuals, the elderly, and conscripted youth. Civil rights have assumed a new direction, away from political participation to personal well-being, which takes into account economic and social discrimination, cultural needs, and protection of individual privacy. The restoration of human dignity is becoming institutionalized as a public adminis-

tration function through new devices such as fair employment practices, equal opportunity programs, citizen complaints offices (ombudsman), citizen advice bureaus, legal aid, consumer protection, and the rehabilitation of criminals, alcoholics and drug addicts.

Protection of human rights

The allied powers resolved during World War II that the war would be followed by a lasting peace that would defend and protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals. Since then an international system has developed to define such rights and freedoms, to gain government adherence to universal or regional declarations of human rights, and to give aggrieved persons access to international courts of human rights. Presumably governments that sign declarations expect their public bureaucracies to follow and enforce the declarations. Over the years, such declarations have become quite elaborate. For example, the American Convention on Human Rights to which the United States and nineteen other countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are signatories includes rights to juridical personality, life, humane treatment, freedom from slavery, personal liberty, fair trial, freedom from ex post facto laws, compensation (in the event of miscarriage of justice), privacy, freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and expression, reply, assembly, freedom of association, family, name, nationality, property, freedom of movement and residence, participation in government, equal protection and judicial protection. Although intention and practice may vary, the fact that individual rights are being defined and elaborated will eventually impact on public laws and public practices.

Privacy

Among the rights that are being clarified is that of personal privacy, the area where public administration should not intrude and should protect individuals against government and other institutions. It is the private sphere of life from which a person

has the right to exclude unwanted disturbances. It is the right of individuals to lead their own lives protected against spying, interference with private, family and home life, interference with physical or mental integrity and moral or intellectual freedom, attacks on reputation and honor, disclosure of irrelevant or embarrassing facts, use of name, identity or likeness, interference with correspondence and private communications, and disclosure of information received as a professional confidence. Public administration is being asked to define, respect and enforce such privacy rights. Once again, as with the environmental control function, public bureaucracies are major offenders, particularly in census questionnaires, wiretapping and bugging, and new tools for the manipulation and control of behavior and thought.

Population control

One of the most cherished rights of individuals pertains to life. Declines in mortality without similar decreases in fertility are making for rapid population growth in poor countries. Some governments are trying with the help of public administration to reduce population growth through propaganda campaigns, taxation measures, abortion, and ready availability of contraception. Medical advances are also drawing them into considerations of the prolongation of life through microbionics and transplants and the whole area of mental and physical fitness and the role of the elderly in contemporary society.

As human attention switches from the standard of living to the quality of life, so the human rights functions are likely to assume greater importance. Besides the provision of mass rapid transit systems, outdoor recreational facilities, cultural centers, clean air, water and food, reliable and safe products and drug and chemical controls, which have a strong materialistic nature, governments will have to look more to personal comfort of a more spiritualistic nature concerned with self expression, personal well-being, and inner contentment.

THE IMPACT OF FUNCTIONAL EXPERTISE

The functional expertise now being developed within public administration is truly impressive. No other social institution can compete in scope, depth, and variety. In many communities, no other combination of societal institutions can match the governmental apparatus in quality and quantity of public services. None of the functional expertise is dispensable under present conditions. Somebody has to be knowledgeable in all these areas and it so happens that public administration is deemed the most suitable place for such experts. Further, it is usurping fields that were once the preserve of other social institutions and assuming sole responsibility in many new fields. Not only is its functional expertise growing, but the monopoly element is increasing. Once government has intervened, it is difficult, if not impossible, to exclude it again.

Public administration is fast becoming the predominant employer or contractor of professionals, scientists, and technicians, that is, the new technological intelligentsia. Most new professions are public service professions; their practitioners have no alternative employers or employment. On the other hand, their public employers are just as much dependent on them. They have no alternative source of expertise and must, to some extent, accept the special needs of the new technological intelligentsia, such as more freedom of action, less discipline, fewer organizational restraints, separate and distinctive working conditions, and more self-determination than has been customary in public bureaucracies. There may be greater conflicts between functional expertise and political limitations. There certainly will be conflicts between experts in different fields and between experts who take a narrow or broad view in the same field. Harmony and peace are not to be expected in public administration when experts compete with one another and disagree in their own specialized fields.

The functional expertise of public administration raises the issue of organizational self-perpetuation and public protection against organizational arrogance, especially where public agencies

have a monopoly in providing public goods and services. If there is no alternative to public administration, are governmental organizations immortal? Herbert Kaufman has shown that even when government organizations go out of existence, their functions are reassigned and he pessimistically concluded that government activities tend to go on indefinitely.¹ If he is correct, then large and important areas of daily needs will continue to be dominated by public bureaucracies that are virtual monopolies, insensitive to market influences and often politically independent. For this reason, it is increasingly incumbent on public leaders to ensure that public organizations issue adequate information about themselves, that the public is suitably educated about them, and that special independent watchdog agencies are provided to aid people who claim to have been mistreated by them. Above all, the freedom of mass media must be protected not only from governmental interference and manipulation, but also from undue self-censorship and restraint that secrete much public wrong.²

Even if the accountability of the public bureaucracy is strengthened to be more commensurate with its growing power and knowledge, its responsibilities will remain impressive. Considerable faith and trust is reposed in bureaucratic experts to maintain social harmony and to deal sensibly with a continual stream of social problems that demand immediate response without adequate time for contemplation. In the modern world, governments, that really means their functional experts, have to be able to recognize emerging problems, settle them close to the point of action, inform affected parties and involve them in the decision-making process, minimize formality and irrelevant information, and absorb decisions in institutional frameworks geared to quick responses. Because of inability to divert resources to create new institutional frameworks for new problems at short notice, solutions have to be grafted on what already exists. Public organizations have to be capable of ready improvisation and willingness to assume new responsibilities. Vacuums must be avoided; as soon as one organization moves out of a problem area or fails, another must step in. Resources must be freely available for emergency mobilization (for example, unused capacity), or already committed

resources must be capable of swift transfer and able to satisfy different needs at the same time.

This implies that the multiplication of single purpose public organizations is increasingly hazardous to social welfare. The chances of breakdown are enhanced by overdependence on the performance of individual specialized parts. The risk is diminished in each problem or policy area by the presence of numerous overlapping multifunctional institutions, which provide numerous checks and counterchecks on each other. Such built-in redundancy³ is indispensable in contemporary society. While underemployed capacity and duplication of effort constitute waste in terms of administrative rationality, they are essential safety valves and self-correcting devices in crisis and emergency situations, which are persistent features of a turbulent society.

Bureaucratic elites can tackle only a small proportion of social problems. Centralization only serves to overload them even more and threatens to diminish their effectiveness. Society has to learn to live with its problems. Only high priority problems can be tackled by bureaucratic elites, and they will concentrate only on those problems that *have* to be tackled, that is, where action is unavoidable. They do not get a breathing space to enable them to deal with lesser problems. They should not, therefore, promise to tackle all problems or profess that solutions exist to all problems. Such comforting sentiments and false assurances eventually rebound when it becomes apparent that few social problems get resolved; they merely get transformed.

The situation is not helped by bureaucratic political infighting between functional specializations. Such infighting impedes the free flow of information crucial for complex problem solving. To avoid attack, there is a tendency to cover up mistakes, ridicule critics, and suppress grievances. Consequently legitimate problems may escalate. Everybody's business ends up being nobody's business. Functional experts have to accommodate themselves to openness and to reduce bureaucratic defense mechanisms. What now passes for enhanced administrative capability—the elaboration of administrative infrastructures, the multiplication of senior positions, complicated networks of formal committees, and

lengthy chains of authority, may be dysfunctional. Instead functional experts need to develop new sets of administrative ability as follows:

- a. The ability to recognize new problems that require new solutions rather than modifications of old solutions
- b. The ability to reformulate problems in new terms in order to elicit new responses and initiatives
- c. The ability to turn crisis to advantage; to use deviation and conflict in problem solving to generate self-transformation with minimum alienation
- d. The ability to deal with uncertainty and fluidity and to absorb change, instability, and interdependence
- e. The ability to tolerate deviation, conflict, and confrontation without overreaching or losing sense of proportion
- f. The ability to mobilize resources to meet problems and to engage in interdisciplinary problem solving
- g. The ability to encourage error-correction initiative and creativity, and to learn from mistakes
- h. The ability to learn from experience and uncertainty
- i. The ability to remain human and humane under stress

Right now the emphasis is on strengthening functional expertise within narrow specializations and the perpetuation of tribal warfare among them, whereas the pressing need of the time is for cooperation and working harmony, trust not distrust of one another and the general public whom they serve. It is not always clear today who is the master and who is the servant.⁴

NOTES

1. H. Kaufman, *Are Government Organizations Immortal?* Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institutions, 1976, p. 64.

2. See T. Wicker, *On Press*, New York: The Viking Press, 1978 on such deficiencies as lack of skepticism, unwillingness to look behind official statements and claims, too ready linkage between office and knowledge and ability, and assumption of official virtue (p. 66).
3. M. Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality and the Problems of Duplication and Overlap," *Public Administration Review*, 29, 1969, pp. 346-358.
4. G. Hawker, *Who's Master, Who's Servant?* Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1981.

6 Delivering Public Services

WHEN GOVERNMENTS ASSUME responsibility for a new activity, they have various options open to them. They may contract it out to other social institutions, undertake it within the public bureaucracy or join with other organizations in some form of joint delivery. On the whole, strong governments prefer to centralize performance within the public bureaucracy while weak governments have to contract out until they are able to take over themselves. Bureaucratic aggrandizement usually runs foul eventually of mismanagement and fear of authoritarianism whereupon decentralization and contracting out occur until loss of control and abuse of public trust start another cycle of bureaucratic aggrandizement. The modern administrative state has been through a fairly lengthy period of aggrandizement which seems to be peaking as governments come to recognize its limitations.

THE VARIETY OF DELIVERY SYSTEMS

In deciding whether to provide public goods and services directly themselves or to allow other social organizations to meet

public demands, governments have several types of delivery systems from which to choose.

Voluntarism

People can be encouraged to band together voluntarily to provide community services. Individuals offer their services without regard to compensation, reward or profit. They do so with a good heart; what they lack in skill they make up in enthusiasm. Traditional societies rely on voluntarism to supply a good portion of public goods and services but all societies depend to some extent on voluntarism to meet public needs. The drawback is that what can be offered can also be withdrawn at the donor's convenience. Voluntarism is often uncertain, unreliable, uneven, and altogether too risky for the quality performance required in modern society. Nevertheless it remains a potent force that can be mobilized, particularly in emergencies.

Market place

Community needs may evoke their own supply from private entrepreneurs willing to provide, usually but not invariably in return for some personal gain. The distinguishing feature of the private market place is an exchange or transaction or contractual obligation freely entered into by the parties presumably to their mutual benefit. This way individuals, rather than the community, obtain all manner of personal services, such as medical treatment, security of self and property, and garbage collection. The drawback is that the goods and services have to be highly divisible and capable of being split into discrete units and potential customers have to be excluded from benefiting unless they pay the going price. Demand is determined by the distribution of wealth. The wealthy get what they want because the market attends to their demands first, and those who cannot afford to pay the going price go wanting. But there is no guarantee that any or sufficient supply will be forthcoming whatever the price. Nevertheless, all societies rely on the market place to meet a certain proportion of community needs, to widen competition between public and pro-

vide suppliers, and to even out maldistributions of other delivery systems.

External supplier

Where countries find that they cannot meet certain need from within because they lack the resources, the technical know-how and the experience, they invite outsiders—international agencies, foreign entrepreneurs, and other countries—to fill the domestic vacuum rather than go without. The drawback is the obvious dependency relationship to say nothing of the strings attached and the possibility of sudden interruption in supplies.

Other domestic governments

Public authorities can allow others to deliver public goods and services within their jurisdiction. In federal systems, federal agencies delegate to regional and local governments while regional and local governments call upon federal agencies to deliver public services they can no longer afford to provide. Governments at the same level enter into all kinds of compacts among themselves to share in service delivery and economize on overheads. Where domestic governments enter into such arrangements, intergovernmental relations become quite complicated and unwieldy sometimes quite beyond public comprehension so that responsibility is difficult to identify, accountability is blurred, and those within the delivery system are thwarted by its very complexity.

Public enterprise

Public services are delivered by self-contained public businesses which, like their private counterparts, are expected to cover their costs from sales and make a return on their investments. While they may avoid the rigidities usually associated with public bureaucracies, they may exploit their peculiar governmental status and escape competitive pressures to decline into public liabilities.

Private contractors

Governments avoid the headaches of direct delivery by contracting with private organizations. All they have to do is to look at the bottom line, renegotiate contracts and evaluate performance. Does the public receive better and cheaper service? Is the cost too high? Are excessive profits being made at public expense? Is the public getting fair value?

Third sector organizations

Governments try to avoid both the headaches of public management and the snares of contracting to private entrepreneurs by relying on non-for-profit private or quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations to supply public goods and services.

From this, it can be seen that public goods and services can be delivered through at least seven different systems and many combinations of them. No two countries are likely to choose exactly the same. Their different responses, reflecting differences in circumstances, resources, culture values, social objectives, and political systems, provide contrasting styles of government.

THE QUESTION OF CHOICE

Clearly governments have a wide choice of public service delivery systems. It is useful to examine in some detail the more important determining factors from an administrative perspective.

Lack of alternatives

Where no or too few other social institutions are willing and capable of delivering public goods and services or where the price, politically as well as financially, is too high, governments have no choice other than doing the best they can for themselves. Some newly independent states find that there are no other institutions

available and capable of delivering public services other than the public bureaucracy they have inherited from their former colonial ruler. If they do not want to depend on foreign suppliers, either they must go without or make do with what they have until new institution building succeeds.

Political ideology

A clear preference may exist for delivering public services through certain types of delivery system. The community may be prejudiced either for or against private property, corporate enterprise, economic competition, profiteering, public ownership, collectivism, or planning. It may prefer devolution or bureaucratic aggrandizement on principle, that is, getting as much as possible out of or into the hands of government respectively. It may be persuaded that a particular institution is superior to all others in performance, even if objective research suggests otherwise. Thus people may believe that private enterprise is more efficient and productive than public enterprise or that labor organizations have stronger bargaining power with public agencies than private companies or that multinational corporations are exploitative, patronizing and corrupt.

Maintenance of control

Governments may want to maintain direct control over the details of public service delivery and ensure that public programs conform to their requirements. To rule, a government cannot allow its most cherished powers and functions to be exercised by other social institutions. If too many public goods and services are provided elsewhere, or if too many activities are contracted, the government will not be able to attain or match the knowledge and experience necessary to perform assigned functions, and it will always be dependent on contractors. It may lose control over the contracted activities altogether, without abdicating responsibility for the proper expenditure of public funds. This could be a serious threat to the polity in the fields of weaponry, policing

powers, and taxation. Governments must be capable either of delivering such important public goods and services themselves—which means that they must command the necessary resources and expertise—or adequately supervising those who do—which means that they must possess the necessary legal, budgetary, administrative, and intelligence controls. Contracts give them access to resources and expertise that would otherwise have to be compulsorily annexed, but they also entail adequate control mechanisms if public money is not to be squandered, public policy thwarted, and governments find themselves being told what to do.

Economy

Some delivery systems are more expensive than others. Presumably everybody wants the cheapest public services that can be provided. If others provide identical or better services than estimates indicate public authorities could achieve if they invested in comparable facilities, the extra costs of direct governmental operation would seem wasteful and unwise. But comparative costs alone are not necessarily the deciding factor. Market evaluation may fail to allow adequately for social costs or beneficial spill-over effects, such as investment multipliers or technological breakthroughs. Purely financial considerations may have to be modified further by political overlays, such as preference for a national contractor (“Buy American” or “Buy British”), protection of small business against concentrated economic power, utilization of unused capacity, geographical distribution of contracts, preference to depressed areas, conservation, and redistribution of income.

Quality service

Suppliers must meet expected standards of performance. Governments want assurance that public services will conform to expected standards and that public work will be adequately performed. Two separate considerations are involved. Can the work be done at all? If so, can it be done to expectations? In research and development activities, for example, there is no

guarantee that the work can be done at all, that is, whether a breakthrough will be made or the prototypes will actually work, or certainty which of different approaches to a problem is likely most to succeed. If something is being done for the first time, a price has to be paid for experimentation. Decision is a matter of trust in a team of problem solvers, tried or untested, old or new, conservative or innovative. Should a breakthrough be made, the solution may not be economically practical, politically feasible, or technologically proficient. Getting a job done may not be the only consideration. Strengthening the prestige, image, and standing of the institution doing it, building a reserve of functional expertise for use in emergencies, and improving on existing effectiveness and efficiency, may be equally important.

Perception of time span

Often when governments enter new fields, they do not know whether they will stay, and they are therefore reluctant to commit themselves to permanent arrangements and prefer to live with temporary arrangements. Temporary activities have a habit, however, of hardening into long-term commitments. What was once contracted may be consolidated into a public organization or a temporary public agency may be transformed into a public enterprise or sold off to private bidders.

Size of activity

The task may be beyond the capacity of any nongovernmental organizations to perform without assuming governmental powers themselves (for they may not have the compulsory power, property rights, capital, scope, sanctions or status) or being so underwritten by government that a public agency might just as well undertake it.

Secrecy

In certain activities, such as espionage, weapons research, and nuclear technology an overwhelming need for secrecy pre-

vails. These activities must therefore be performed by institutions of the highest integrity that can be depended to restrict confidential information to authorized persons only.

Time lag

Governments may want instantaneous results or lowest possible lead-in time compatible with good performance. Thus, many governments have their own presses geared to produce printed bills and other public documents for legislators, judges, espionage services, and militia.

Conflicts of interest

Governments may wish to lessen the risk of conflicts of interest and divided loyalties and reduce multiple officeholding.

Choice is rarely accidental. Indeed acrimonious debates usually accompany decisions to alter the mode of public service delivery. Rightist governments favor corporate delivery systems while Leftist governments prefer direct government delivery through public agencies. Rich countries have a wider range of choice than poor countries and can afford to maintain mixed systems with much institutional redundancy.

The discipline of public administration unwittingly concentrates on a limited range of public service delivery systems, especially direct delivery through public bureaucracies as opposed to voluntarism. While it delves into the intricacies of intergovernmental management, it rarely explores in similar detail the equally complex area of public-private interface. Consequently the different public service delivery systems receive uneven treatment in the literature, with some fairly well covered and others barely mentioned. This may tend to exaggerate the known to the detriment of the unknown and predispose people to the familiar against the unfamiliar.

Three important delivery systems that seem not to have been explored as well as they might are selected for further examination.

PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS

All government administration is public enterprise simply because their activities are not undertaken by private enterprise but not all activities in society ignored by private entrepreneurs are public enterprises. The term "public enterprise" is usually confined to all activities that the administrative state has decided to undertake for itself in the absence of private initiatives. In this category fall most business activity in communist bloc countries, the joint British-French production of the Concorde supersonic airplane, the massive river development schemes of the Volta River Project and the Aswan Dam complex in Africa, the construction of the capital cities of Brasilia and Canberra, the nationalization of major industries in the Middle East and Latin America, and even the operation of the World Bank. In the United States, as elsewhere, public enterprise includes all public authorities which undertake massive public works such as ports, dams, parks, freeways, bridges and tunnels and provide essential services such as water, electric power, transportation, insurance and mortgages.

Public business

Many of these activities are self-contained and self-financing. Those that have been deliberately set up as self-contained enterprises are public entrepreneurs who run them as public businesses, often as monopoly suppliers with special privileges as government entities. Governments have preferred this form of delivering for a host of reasons. They have wanted to enrich themselves from the potential profits. They have deposed private entrepreneurs who they felt were not meeting public needs and otherwise falling down on the job. They have been opposed to private property and capitalism as such or opposed to the private ownership of essential industries and reliance on the market system for the supply of basic essentials. They have believed that government should ensure the supply of cheap public utilities, promote education and research, protect native industries, guarantee full employ-

ment and directly supply goods and services where private entrepreneurs were reluctant because of large capital investment, inadequate returns, high risks and long lead-in times. They have assumed economic leadership simply because private enterprise has been absent, deficient, exploitive, and unadventurous. They have felt impelled in the public interest to nationalize cartels and monopolies, confine weapons production and nuclear technology to public authorities, embark on prestigious projects, pioneer technological innovations and prevent the emigration of highly qualified nationals.

All these reasons explain why governments become public entrepreneurs but not why they separate public businesses from the rest of the public bureaucracy. Public businesses are created, in Annmarie Walsh's words, "to escape from obsolescent legal and financial restraints, from incompetence in the civil service, from obsolete jurisdictional boundaries, and from inequitable elections,"¹ to free them from rigid public management controls and unreformed public administration, and to exclude them from considerable legal immunities and privileges enjoyed by government to enable them to compete on fair terms.²

The extent of public entrepreneurship is difficult to measure accurately. Some public enterprises are indistinguishable from nonentrepreneurial activities conducted by public organizations. As they could never return their costs, no attempt is made to charge a fee or levy a fair market price. For example, public housing is provided free or below cost. Entrepreneurial activities are not separated from other activities by organization, budget, staff, and national-income statistics. They take a variety of organizational forms—ministerial departments, public corporations, joint stock companies, river valley authorities, holding companies, intergovernmental agencies, joint enterprises, and representative trusts—some of which are obviously identifiable as public entrepreneurs, others not. Joint and mixed enterprises often act like private entrepreneurs so much so that the real extent of public participation in the form of capital or appointment to the board of directors is hardly known and often a surprise when revealed.³ This is particularly true when their activities in several areas—public transportation, public utilities, scientific research, mass

communications, tourism, banking and insurance, municipal facilities—have direct counterparts in private business, but in others—multipurpose river valley development, survey and exploration—no direct counterpart may exist and therefore no way of knowing how a private business might operate or recompense itself.

The public corporation

The most clearly distinguishable form of public entrepreneur is the public corporation that resembles the private corporation, except that it is incorporated under special statute, and its board of management is appointed by the government. It has been preferred to the agency or ministerial department, whose managerial flexibility has appeared to suffer from rigid central bureaucratic controls, and to the joint stock company, whose management has been too far removed from political control.

The public corporation is alleged to combine the advantages of direct political control and managerial flexibility. Its activities are clearly defined in law, and its budget and staff, property, and supplies kept quite distinct. Its distinguishing factor is the presence of government in management, directly through representatives or indirectly through instructions and political pressures. It is politically guided and, on request, it is expected to subordinate economic considerations to political expediency. At key points—law, management, policy, finance, staff—it is controlled by political considerations. It may find itself part of a Ministry for Public Enterprises (such as the Italian Ministry for State Participations) or subject to ministerial controls in finance, construction, public relations, investment plans, and structural arrangements. It may find its freedom of action circumscribed by other governmental agencies, representative assemblies, and public inquiries, and its operations conducted in a blaze of publicity. Thus political limitations are comprehensive, certainly well beyond the tolerance level for any private entrepreneur. Their presence inhibits entrepreneurial initiative unless special efforts are made to achieve autonomy.

Profitability and social returns

These political limitations are important when considering the profitability of public entrepreneurship. Within any community certain basic needs have to be guaranteed whatever the cost for without them there would be no society or society would quickly degenerate into chaos and anarchy. Their cost is not to be measured so much by the amount of resources spent on their provision as the social conditions that would prevail if they were not met. Thus the cost of peace is the price of war; of health, illness; of education, ignorance. This is not to say that no financial yardsticks can be applied, only that they are often overridden. Private business cannot conduct itself that way; it has to recover costs. On the other hand, private business does not have to think about the opportunity costs of its activities, that is, the alternative benefits to society if the resources spent by private entrepreneurs were spent in some other way.

Public entrepreneurs are compelled by their political mentors to consider alternatives and to justify their level of expenditure and services. Consequently evaluation of public enterprise according to the difference between resources expended and the cash returns is inadequate. The excess of receipts over expenditures does not take into account social costs, capital depreciation, monopoly power and at whose expense the surplus is earned. Presumably really profitable ventures are readily undertaken by private entrepreneurs, leaving public entrepreneurs to largely problematical ventures in which profits are unlikely. Those that could be made profitable in the commercial sense may be deliberately run at a loss for political reasons. The government may prefer uniform, national, egalitarian services to discrimination between consumers. It may force public employers to bear the social costs of employing people whom nobody else is willing to employ or to adopt processes, methods, experiments, and innovations that nobody else is willing to undertake. It may deliberately restrict the monopoly power of public entrepreneurs and force them to provide cheap public services, subsidize political ventures, invest in unprofitable areas to provide employment or act as national carriers, and save foreign currency. On the other

hand profitable public entrepreneurs may not reveal their true costs to the community. They may be sheltered by favorable treasury loans, tax exemptions, free land grants, legal monopoly, or higher protective tariffs.

More important is the efficacy of public entrepreneurs, not only from the internal view of productivity and market response, but also from the external view of opportunity cost, social values, and political responsibility. What is good for a public entrepreneur is not necessarily good for the rest of the community which has to pay the bill. Public entrepreneurs, like their private counterparts, can be wasteful and unresponsive to clientele wishes. But until national accounting systems are further developed, there is no way of calculating such externalities or social costs. On the other hand, elaborate indices now exist by which the internal efficacy of an enterprise, public or private, can be measured, and new measures are being discovered to gauge objectives, results, and optimum means. If health cannot be measured, it is possible to examine the results of the activities undertaken in pursuit of health, such as the effect of drugs, the reduction of communicable disease, the average duration (in days) of annual sickness per person, and the number of medical examinations per person per doctor. Such measures do not possess much significance in themselves until they are compared with other cultures, past experience, and planned estimates. They can be used to evaluate the comparative worth of private and public entrepreneurs. Moreover, they could eventually give much needed information concerning frugality, waste, needless exploitation of human labor, social costs of business, protection and safety, and the quality of workmanship. The construction of more sophisticated measures requires much investment in research and development and imposes on all enterprise considerable accounting burdens for what is for them problematical results.

The idea is growing that there should be a full-time professional unit that would be engaged on the continuous investigation of the performance of public entrepreneurs and whose work could also be applied to private entrepreneurs. Israel's State Comptroller's Office and Britain's National Economic Develop-

ment Council are two bodies that have been working toward that end. One day it may be possible to compare quantitatively the performance of public ownership and private ownership. That day is still a long way off. In the meantime there is serious doubt whether public entrepreneurs get the best of both worlds or the worst for they may incorporate bureaucratic excesses with private irresponsibility, neither optimizing self-interest nor serving the public interest.

PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

Before the advent of the modern administrative state, most governmental functions were performed by other social institutions or contracted out to private entrepreneurs. Governments would arrange with private bankers, noblemen, city merchants, and foreign traders to have a service provided at a certain price, not necessarily in cash terms, but perhaps in return for concessions, monopolies, and land grants and titles. Once the terms were settled, governments had little control over the quality of the services provided or the profits made by the contractors, except in withholding the promised rewards. Where the administrative state is still weak, as in some newly independent countries in Africa and Asia, this situation has barely changed. Even in more sophisticatedly administrative countries, it is still difficult to reduce political spoils in contracting, to prevent excess profits, to ensure quality performance, and to eliminate kickbacks.

The growing capability of the administrative state combined with the acceptance of notions of public interest, public trust, public responsibility and public ethics led most governments to reduce their dependency on other social institutions for delivering public goods and services, to assume more and more activities themselves, to deliver them directly through public agencies, and to reduce the number of contracts they had with private entrepreneurs. These trends, which gave birth to contemporary public administration, tended to downgrade the continuing role played by private contractors in planning, producing and delivering

public goods and services. Yet, there remained good reasons why governments should prefer to contract out certain activities, and recently there has been a discernible return to contracting out as a viable alternative to bureaucratic performance as a means of promoting economy, efficiency, competition, variety, choice and flexibility. Thus in the United States, Westinghouse Corporation ran the Job Corps for the federal government, state computer services have been provided by data processing firms, and municipal snow removal services have been supplied by private contractors. In 1974, the City of South San Francisco went so far as to employ a private firm to deliver a substantial portion of its services and over half its employees were placed under the firm's authority for the duration of the contract. At that time, some bodies other than city governments in California were involved with half the production, one-third of the planning, and three-fifths of the financing of municipal services. "In looking to the future . . . for services characterized by well-developed technologies, more easily measured output, low political saliency, and availability of private firms as producers, the shift is expected to be to private contracts."⁴ City managers attributed the paucity of contracting to private firms in their cities not so much to the inherent advantages of public administration but to tradition and the lack of private firms willing to contract. Presumably, if governments showed greater willingness to contract with private entrepreneurs and made it sufficiently worthwhile for them to do so, more private entrepreneurs would be found willing to deliver public goods and services.⁵

Government contracts with private entrepreneurs constitute a significant segment of the public-private interface, the hazy boundary where government stops and private enterprise takes over. They contribute to the confusion. They take so many different forms and they cover such a diversity of activity that consistent patterns are difficult to discern. Some contracts are spelled out in great detail; others are loosely worded and contain little more than general objectives. Some are public documents accessible to all; others are secret and access confined to a highly select group.

The great bulk are procurement contracts, that is, they are supply purchases from normal commercial outlets involving no

special arrangements by either party. Few are actual service delivery contracts whereby private contractors deliver a public service on behalf of public authorities. Others mix procurement and delivery. Contract lawyers and administrators have not distinguished carefully enough between different purposes and objectives of government contracts. For this reason it is not possible to calculate how much governments contract for delivery, not when it is impossible to ascertain the extent of secret contracting and other subterfuges employed by governments to hide certain activities they perform.

From procurement to delivery contracts

At one time the trend was definitely to minimize private contracting. Socialist and communist regimes were opposed in principle to boosting private contractors for profit. They associated private contracting with profiteering, corruption, waste and public immorality. Their governments preferred to do things for themselves as far as possible and avoided contracting out their activities. But in recent years, the trend has been reversed. Socialist and communist regimes have relaxed their doctrinal opposition to private enterprise and even invited multinational corporations to supply them certain essential commodities and know-how by contract. The inability of many poor countries to construct large public works and run sophisticated public enterprises has forced them to seek assistance wherever they could obtain it, more often than not from international management companies and foreign companies. Elsewhere, the upsurge in government contracting can be attributed to antipathy to bureaucratic aggrandizement, the reluctance of governments to invest heavily in supposedly temporary activities, the need to keep large private employers in business, the sheer superiority of private business management and innovation, and the development of better control mechanisms. Contracting has been expanding from traditional areas such as cleaning and maintenance, weapons development and scientific discovery into new areas like space exploration, telecommunications, transportation, and policy analysis.

One area in particular which has seen an upsurge in private

contracting has been in military procurement and also defense services. Rather than developing large defense establishments of their own, governments have contracted with private entrepreneurs to produce weapons, maintain military bases, manage weapons systems and provide intelligence. This expansion of military contracting has largely been due to the adoption of the concept of the complete weapon system, which includes all related equipment, materials, services, and personnel required for the major element of the system, support systems and subsystems, considered as a single unit and given to a prime contractor or team.

The concept of the complete system differs substantially from the traditional concept of several companies competing for the patronage of several buyers in an open, free market. Instead, there is only one buyer and one prime contractor for an unmarketable product, which requires considerable effort in unpredictable research and development within the bounds of fluctuating defense policies. For example, whereas once the government might contract separately for an airframe and supporting equipment, which would be assembled at one point, the tendency has been to centralize the control of the airframe and its supporting equipment to the one weapon-system contractor who is responsible for its whole operational performance, not just the airframe, engine, or weaponry. Thus, the prime contractor decides how it will organize the project, rather than the government, which may, however, insist on competitive subcontracting. The potential contractor must investigate beforehand the possibilities of industrial integration, teamwork, subcontracting and subsystem competition, and it must also decide whether it will participate cooperatively in research and development, while competing for processing and manufacturing rights.

The United States government, for one, is strongly committed to the partnership between public and private agencies. It believes in the efficacy of private enterprise whose record of technological success has been impressive. An alternative system of public aggrandizement has been politically unacceptable. By retaining control of key points without undertaking the management of the

whole system, the government reduces its risks. Further, the government can call on all the community's resources without confining its choice; it is not committed to any set pattern or pre-arranged framework. It can impose political directions on contractors by incorporating political demands in contracts. Costs may be a secondary consideration, particularly in wartime or when the government itself does not know what it wants but is prepared to accept anything feasible. It is here that the contract system is most vulnerable to abuse.

Contract administration

In theory, the contract system is its own safeguard. If the contract is not fulfilled, the government does not pay and loses nothing. This is possible when the government can refuse to pay until the contract is completed, knows exactly what it wants, and writes into the contract exact specifications. Very often, however, the government has to provide advance capital that it will not be able to reclaim, lend its facilities at nominal or no charge to private entrepreneurs, and write contracts in very vague terms, as nobody knows beforehand what the outcome will be. Moreover, the contract is supposed to be awarded to the lowest tender likely to complete the contract to satisfaction. There may be no competition at all, and no private entrepreneur may be willing to undertake the work without guarantees and concessions. Thus the tenderers may deliberately conspire to defraud the government or to quote inflated prices. The public authorities may have no way of estimating what a reasonable offer should be, what profit markup has been made, who has been prevented from tendering, or how much is intended to be subcontracted or incorporated into nongovernmental contracts.

While public authorities may never block all subterfuges, considerable progress has been made since the 1950s to improve contract management to minimize possible seepage of public funds and to ensure quality performance. Among the improvements are the following:

Review of need

Careful search is made of unused capacity and tests are made of the real life of items before a contract is let. In the past, superficial checks have led to needless contracts that have merely increased stocks of unused material or duplicated existing services. Public authorities only contract what they really need, using the latest scientific management techniques to determine requirements.

Calculation of cost

Prior, independent ascertainment of going market rates and fair estimation of probable costs are made. Commercial items obtainable on the open market are readily calculable, although public authorities have been known to let contracts for identical products above market prices. Further intelligence and investigation may enable a public authority to make a fair estimate of the probable costs and profit margins. It may be able to negotiate lower contract prices or threaten to meet its own needs internally. Thus contractors may be obliged to disclose all necessary information about their tender.

Economies

More economic contract management is obtained through centralization, elimination of subcontracting, and renegotiation. Such management is centralized to reduce internal competition and to obtain the best deal for collective requirements. The contract agency lets a single contract and then distributes the product among several agencies. Subcontracting by the prime contractor is prohibited to prevent possible subcontractors and the prime contractor from adding to their profit margins. Because good contract procedures will not necessarily prevent excessive profits, renegotiation is essential if such profits are to be recovered. Thus Congress established in 1951 a Renegotiation Board to recoup excessive profits on defense and space projects.

Increased competition

The letting agency seeks to extend competition by extensive advertising, propaganda campaigns, splitting contracts among several suppliers beginning with the lowest tenders and working upward until requirements are met, and if necessary, going outside the country altogether. It may insist on competition in subcontracts and enforce antitrust legislation.

Onus on the contractor

Nonnegotiable ceilings are set on costs and profits or profit margins are fixed beforehand. The agreed contract price is final and nonnegotiable. In the event of unforeseen snags, the contractor bears the risk. In addition, a ceiling is set on expenditures in research and development where the results are uncertain.

Incentive contracts

Where it is possible to estimate costs, product performance, reliability, quality and delivery dates, contractors are awarded incentives for superior performance according to a sliding-scale bonus and penalized if they fall below targets. They may also be granted permission to adapt the results for commercial use. Cost reimbursements can be planned with much the same intent. However, the elaborate accounting involved and the complexity of estimates may nullify any savings to the government, and there may be legal complications in paying more than the agreed contract prices or changing the terms of a contract before its completion.

Breaches of contract

The government may protect itself against the mistakes of its own contracting officers and exclude itself from business law, as interpreted by the courts. It may provide an administrative

disputes procedure to bypass the courts without necessarily circumscribing contractors' rights to recover and to challenge unilateral change orders.

Patents and copyrights

Public authorities may reserve all rights to new discoveries made under their contracts.

Cost-reduction programs

Public authorities attempt to standardize their equipment, promote common user services, restrict contract or use of public property, reduce unnecessarily large stocks and multiple storage locations, coordinate requirements of closely related products, improve contract specifications and contract administration, and directly procure items for contractors and subcontractors from existing stocks. They also share contract information and intelligence, limit spare-part clauses, test the real life of short shelf-life items (for example, goods subject to spoilage, deterioration, and obsolescence, dated by the contractor to ensure full use), recoup on sales of surplus products, protect subcontractors against prime contractors, review sole-source claims, delay start of work before contract is signed, evaluate the quality of research and development work, eliminate conflicts of interest, and improve the quality of procurement staff. They may further reduce costs by strictly monitoring kickbacks and other fees or commissions received by politicians, procurement officers, and prime contractors in the award of contracts.

Safeguards against fraud, waste and corruption

Periodic scandals that erupt over contracts have encouraged public authorities to intensify security procedures and fraud detection efforts. Besides employing law enforcement agencies and tax audit squads, they have supplemented internal investigations with public participation through hot lines and complaint bureaus.

Adherence to model procurement codes

Such codes cover ethical standards, statutory guidelines for managing contracts, and judicial remedies for resolving controversies. Various bodies involved with government contracting procurement, and auditing have sought to improve administrative competence and ethical standards by issuing guidelines and generally impressing on practitioners the need to improve contract performance. Among the more notable efforts has been the American Bar Association's Model Procurement Code for State and Local Governments which covers "the statutory principles and policy guidance for managing and controlling the procurement of supplies, services, and construction for public purposes, administrative and judicial remedies for resolution of controversies relating to public contracts, and a set of ethical standards governing public and private participants in the procurement process."

These measures often impose irksome restrictions on private contractors. Their profits are limited and their opportunities for diverting public money and property to private business are diminished. Their freedom in selecting subcontractors is reduced and kickbacks may be eliminated. They are forced to adopt different accounting practices and to accommodate themselves to government intelligence demands. They must permit detailed examinations of their operations and access to trade secrets. Their rights of redress may be impeded. If they do too well financially, they may be penalized in follow-up contracts, but if they do not perform well enough, they may be publicly exposed, and their commercial business may suffer as a result, or they may lose their public business.

Yet it cannot be said that the measures have lived up to expectations. They have certainly proved quite disappointing in the area of defense contracting. This may be because the military are not as cost conscious as their civilian counterparts, or it may be in the very nature of the military function that its contracts tend to be more open-ended. There has been no meaningful competition in most contracts. The U.S. Department of Defense has been unable to challenge the costs claimed by contractors. It has

been consistently overcharged and it has often let unnecessary contracts. Despite the increase of fixed price contracts and incentive contracts, major expenditures have been incurred on cost-reimbursement contracts going to oligopolies (immune from anti-trust laws). Prime contractors have made excess profits compared with business, attributable in part to their cheap use of public property (a "back-door subsidy"), high progress payments (which have enabled them to use public money not their own), reimbursed leased property (again not their own investment), and unduly protective practices of the department in shielding American producers from foreign competitors.

THIRD SECTOR ORGANIZATIONS

Although voluntary nongovernmental organizations and associations have always pursued community purposes, the rise of Big Business and Big Government has rather eclipsed them and study of them has fallen between business administration and public administration to which they do not belong. Rather, they straddle private and public sectors and blur the line between them. Their number is unknown. According to the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, there may be as many as six million voluntary organizations in the United States alone and nonprofit organizations employ one of every ten service workers and one of every six professional workers and they own one ninth of all property.⁶ Not only are they significant, their importance is growing as the public becomes disillusioned with both business and government performance and seeks alternative public organizations. Certainly the third sector consists of a wide variety of organizations, including voluntary associations, nonprofit organizations, professional associations, quasi-public organizations, religious bodies, trade unions, and universities, which have little in common save they are not purely governmental bodies and they are not strictly private, profit-oriented entities.

Yet some are well to the fore in delivering public goods and services and even perform certain functions of government and

many of them have tax exempt status in the United States because they are established for charitable, religious, scientific, literary and educational purposes. They include organizations set up in partnership between the government and business, such as the Professional Standards Review Organization in health care, organizations created by government, such as NASA and AM-TRAK, and privatized organizations, such as COMSAT and the Federal National Mortgage Association.

Functional scope

Theodore Levitt distinguishes between the "old" and "new" third sectors. The old third sector picks up tasks that the public and private sectors are incapable of doing, simply indifferent or just overlooked. Examples would be Alcoholics Anonymous, the American Cancer Society, the Salvation Army and the Boy Scouts. In contrast, the new third sector confronts problems ignored by the public bureaucracy and private business and "exists not so much to supplement what they do as to compel them to do things different or do different things."⁷ Although this distinction is not really helpful (Levitt has in mind only voluntary associations which are only a fraction of the third sector), it does illustrate the wide variety of purpose, motivation and tactics to be found among third sector organizations. Because they may well exhibit goal ambiguity,⁸ loose structure, social responsiveness, and policy innovation uncharacteristic of organizations in the other sectors, Burton Weisbrod identifies this voluntary nonprofit sector as the *major* provider of collective-consumption goods (goods that "enter, positively, the utility function of more than one person simultaneously").⁹ The private sector does not provide collective goods when there is no one to pay for them and the public sector cannot correct this failure in allocation because government "incentives" seldom coincide with current needs for collective goods and the bureaucracy works too slowly. The third sector, being more flexible and adaptable, can respond to new needs for collective goods and services more rapidly and effectively. It does have a history of providing collective services in newly identified areas of need where there has been neither political support for

government involvement nor profit potential for business involvement. According to Waldemar Neilson, third sector organizations teach, care, engage in the search for new knowledge, entertain, preach, and agitate for reforms. "They operate in that large sphere of life which does not center on power and authority or on the production and acquisition of material goods and money."¹⁰

The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs considered the voluntary, nonprofit sector in respect to the following functional areas:

1. Initiating new ideas and processes, especially in human services delivery.
2. Developing public policy, best seen in the work of the Brookings Institution and Common Cause.
3. Supporting minority or local interests, notably the civil rights movement.
4. Providing services that government is constitutionally barred from providing, such as the private, nonprofit National News Council to oversee the news media.
5. Overseeing government to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power and bureaucratic aggrandizement at the expense of voluntarism.
6. Overseeing the market place.
7. Bringing the sectors together.
8. Giving aid abroad, especially where public agencies and multinational corporations are unwelcomed.
9. Furthering active citizenship and altruism.¹¹

Third sector organizations have a crucial role in innovation in areas where public authorities lack knowledge or are afraid to venture. They have been a testing ground for new services and alternative organizational structures.

Innovative role

Once they have demonstrated a new service or structure to be effective and worthwhile, their innovations are often picked up

by government—and sometimes the private sector—and expanded to meet current levels of need better. Indeed, the government often takes over their functions altogether or absorbs them into public service delivery through contracts and grants which undermine their role as buffers between the state and the individual. They are placed in a dilemma.

On the one hand, government money is needed and may even be a matter of life or death for many organizations as the amount of their private funding has advanced slowly or even declined. On the other hand, government money comes with strings attached, however invisible or unintentional they may be. The more an organization depends on government money for survival, the less “private” it is, and the less immune to political processes and priorities.¹²

Nonetheless, they are increasingly seen as instruments of social change. They represent felt needs for social change, draw attention to it and make the public and the government concerned about the problem. They help to bring about a society “in which nobody will any longer be dispossessed or ignored.”¹³

The role of the third sector as an alternative to government in meeting public needs is gaining increasing recognition. As society becomes turbulent and complex, so no single institution—public or private—can be relied on to provide essential services.

Recent tremors in the nation’s governance have strengthened the deeply rooted American conviction that no single institutional structure should exercise a monopoly on filling public needs, that reliance on government alone to fill such needs not only saps the spirit of individual initiative but risks making human values subservient to institutional ones, individual and community purposes subordinate to bureaucratic conveniences or authoritarian dictates.¹⁴

The importance of the third sector’s role as a countervailing force to government, as well as an alternative provider of collective goods is clear. Not only is concentration of power in government dangerous, but given an environment where public sector work stoppages are becoming commonplace, alternative service structures are mandatory. Third sector organizations perform many

diverse roles in the social process. They serve as a countervailing power, an alternative structure, as adaptable systems ready to complement the contributions of the private and public sectors, because they express independent values, directly involve their members, mobilize volunteers, and allow greater managerial freedom.¹⁵ They are likely to assume a large share in the future in the delivery of public goods and services.

NOTES

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7 Public Finance

THE DELIVERY OF public services requires communal resources, particularly money, *public* money. Because the administrative state is delivering more and more public services or is responsible for seeing that they are delivered, so proportionately more financial resources are flowing through the hands of public authorities the world over today than at any other point in human history. In most countries, public expenditures have been increasing at a faster rate than the total available resources so that the public sector has been expanding almost everywhere. Small governments are becoming big while Big Government is becoming bigger. In the Western democracies, government expenditure has grown from one-third of national income in the early 1950s to over one-half in the early 1980s, with average annual increases varying between one-half percent (France, Australia) to one and one-third percent (Scandinavia). In the United States, the average annual increase of one-half percent has been double that of the private sector. The public sector's share of national income doubled between the 1900s and America's entry into World War II, and it has doubled again since to top 40 percent.

Although the processes of public finance may superficially

resemble those of private finance, public authorities work in a vastly different financial environment. For a start, unlike other social institutions, governments can incur large debts and take only token efforts to reduce them. They raise much of their income compulsorily. They spend the bulk of it on communal goods and services that cannot be measured or calculated by the usual financial yardsticks. Because they are expected to use public money for public purposes only, the public in whose name the money is raised and spent, is supposed to be able to obtain details about every transaction and to demand access to the budget and accounts of all public agencies, whereas many private bodies can refuse to disclose any information not required by law. To ensure that public monies are properly used, numerous checks are imposed at every stage. Receipts issued for every transaction are checked and counterchecked, recorded and stored, examined and audited, and public officials may be obliged to replace any missing sums from their own pockets. It is this red tape of financial administration, the rigid procedures, the inflexible guidelines, and the strict attention to detail, so necessary to avoid seepage, diversion and theft, that is largely responsible for the bureaucratic image of public administration.

Public finance is usually considered a dull area of public administration, a province for accounting experts who tend to swamp lay persons with masses of indigestible statistics that confuse rather than enlighten. But for anyone who can master simple arithmetic, public finance is an exciting area for study and is far from revealing its secrets. Under review is a significant portion of a country's national income, encompassing major blocks of public spending on defense, social welfare, public works, and subsidization of private institutions. Public finance is a major determinant of equality through income redistribution and the provision of freely accessible communal products. It is the principal tool of economic policy and national development. It is a laboratory for experiments in measuring the seemingly immeasurable. It is an area in which outsiders have the greatest potential opportunity within public administration for aiding practitioners and in which they have shown the least inclination to assist. It is detrimental

to the public that so few people attempt to understand public finance and master its basic principles.

THE VORACIOUS GOVERNMENT

Despite the rapid increase in public finance, public authorities still complain that they lack sufficient funds to do all they have to do. Where once it was believed that public resources were infinite (public authorities could always expropriate all private resources for public purposes) and public projects finite, now it is realized that public resources are really finite (because of taxpayer's resistance) and it is public projects that may be infinite. Defense, for example, is a bottomless pit. A country can acquire more and more increasingly sophisticated weapons to deploy against any possible combination of potential enemies. Similarly, the needy can never be satisfied as long as they feel deprived and believe they deserve more. Likewise, urban renewal, public amenities, and leisure facilities are other examples of seemingly inexhaustible expenditures. But there is only so much to go around and choices have to be made as to which public needs receive priority. Affluence does not appear to diminish competition for limited resources; it merely enables more demands to be met and it reduces the emotional strain in choosing.

The upward trend, both absolutely and relatively, in public finance over the past century can be attributed to certain distinct factors in contemporary society.

Economic growth

Not only does economic growth require increasing investment in public goods and services which strengthen the economic infrastructure (education, technology, public utilities, social welfare, regulation), but it also enables the community to invest more in public goods and services and to redistribute wealth through government. Public spending increases because there is more available that can be commandeered and there is more that has to be spent

to meet rising public expectations. Nearly a century ago, Adolph Wagner, a German economist, contended that an increase in public spending was a natural consequence of economic growth as countries invested in more sophisticated weapons, industrialization and urbanization would require new forms of public control, and government would be more able to meet certain income elastic demands. Since then, other economists have attributed public expenditure growth to the increasing demand for public goods, greater response of political systems to meeting the demand, and the greater capacity of political systems to raise public monies.

Population growth

More people have to be provided with public goods and services and once people become used to having them available, it is difficult to discontinue them. Those who do not have access want access while those who do have access want more and better public goods and services. More people must be provided shelter and employment, policed, taxed, defended, medically treated, and vaccinated. More elderly people have to be cared for as the population ages. And so it goes. Once a public service is provided, after protracted political struggle, and people become used to having it available, it is hard to discontinue and it assumes a life of its own. Beneficiaries demand more and better services, and nonbeneficiaries demand that existing services be extended to them.

War threats

Fears of being conquered, exterminated, or enslaved have pushed governments to promote defense expenditures, probably the largest single segment of public finance around the world, amounting to at least half trillion dollars at the end of the 1970s, and accounting for the great bulk of public debt. Wars have boosted government expenditures to new heights, increased taxation, and stimulated new public programs. Rarely has the planet been free of warfare between peoples. Wherever fighting has taken

place, those affected have been prepared to make almost any sacrifices, financial and otherwise, to ensure survival. At the time, their political valuations have been transformed to favor public expenditures, and they have never quite returned to previous patterns of expenditure. War in itself reminds people of the need for public goods and promotes greater community awareness, which permits the higher level of taxation incurred in wartime to stick, or at least to remain above prewar levels. New forms of taxation are not easily abandoned, and the debts accumulated in war have to be serviced afterward. War is a great equalizer, and it is during crisis that social ills cannot be denied. In this sense war is a major cause of social progress. It reveals intolerable social deficiencies and strengthens the resolve of all those making sacrifices for the common effort to change things when peace is restored. Lesser crises—riots, natural disasters, horrifying accidents, revolts—have much the same effect, but on a local scale.

Technological innovation

Research and development into sophisticated technology requires investment beyond private sector means. Like huge public investments of the past in irrigation systems, dams, religious shrines, and defense works, current investment programs in space exploration, undersea mining, computers, microbiology and nuclear plants require public financing or massive public underwriting. Initial capital outlays are high. The risks of failure are also high. The possibilities of financial return even if successful are low. As technology becomes more sophisticated, so public subsidization rises.

Democratization

Mass political movements and increased political participation have forced governments to pay closer attention to public needs and the underprivileged. The most significant development has been the pressure for social services, particularly education, health and welfare, extending into redeployment, public housing,

slum clearance, and leisure facilities. The ability to meet new political demands has been aided by economic growth, stable taxation rates (which automatically return a share of private economic growth to the government), vastly improved revenue administration, increased concessions by the wealthy to the public weal, and more efficient disbursement of governmental resources.

None of these factors is likely to disappear suddenly. World peace and disarmament would enable large public funds to be used for other purposes, so would population decline. But it is doubtful whether such released resources would be returned substantially to the private sector. On the other hand, continuing war neurosis and world economic fluctuations are likely to prove stronger counterweights so that public finance will continue to grow, perhaps at a slower rate, given a rising tide against further government expansion, increased taxation and bureaucratic aggrandizement. Two new factors likely to make a greater impact in the future are resistance to taxation and tighter financial controls, both of which would appear to reduce the real rate of expenditure increase in the public sector.

Tax evasion and tax avoidance are as old as taxation itself. Nobody likes to part with hard-earned wealth to a profligate government. Some people are reluctant to part with anything at all while others are only willing to part with some of their wealth if they can see immediate benefit to themselves. Old wealth, i.e. well established wealth, is reluctant to pay its fair share of taxation as is new wealth seeking to preserve new found riches from the tax collector. Both, of course, have much to lose from high taxation, but not only are they wealthy and shrewd enough to know the loopholes, they also know how to benefit from public expenditure on contracts and subsidies. In contrast, middle class resistance to taxation is more a matter of incidence for the middle class bears a disproportionate share of the tax burden. Few can relate what they contribute to government to what they receive from government. Many would prefer to spend their own money their own way, rather than have the state decide for them. Their willingness to permit further taxation constitutes the psychological

measure of tolerable taxation and their hostility to further taxation determines the ceilings or the limit of reasonable taxation. They rarely refuse to pay taxes or hold violent demonstrations. Rather they vote for parties and propositions which promise to curb taxation rates and they cheat more and hide income from tax administrators. While there may be no theoretical limit to what the traffic can bear, a psychological barrier must be overcome to increase taxation rates further.

The other possible limitation to the real rate of expenditure increase in the public sector is the strengthening of checks built into public finance management to ensure that public authorities are not extravagant with public monies and use their funds more efficaciously.

Politically, the most important is the principle of "no taxation without representation," that is, the raising of taxes requires authorization by representative assemblies. But in many countries, legislative control is only a formality; elected representatives cannot alter the government's budget and have no part in determining expenditures. Attempts are being made in them to copy legislatures which do exercise real financial control. They want to be able to alter the executive's budget and vote monies independently of executive demands. They want to question public officials and scrutinize all budget items, either directly through subcommittees or indirectly through independent public auditors. They want to emulate the U.S. Congress, which has taken steps since 1974 to strengthen its constitutional authority over federal finances by enacting new budget procedures, forming new budget committees, establishing a Congressional Budget Office, limiting the ability of the President to impound funds, and generally enabling it to better determine the appropriate level of federal finances, establish budget priorities and evaluate federal programs.

These steps by representative assemblies to improve their control of public finance have been supported by financial managers who have needed little prompting. By reputation, they seem to be conservative, if not parsimonious, scrupulously observant of the notion of trusteeship and personally honest, always suspicious of new proposals and radical departures from set patterns,

constantly revising, overhauling, checking and rechecking. On the whole, their fellow public servants are similarly honest, law abiding, prudent and the financial system is designed to minimize possible seepage. None of this, however, is true where corruption is a way of life and where public office is seen as a means of enhancing personal interests, in which case public accountability is meaningless, controls are a sham and financial management resembles a battlefield between unscrupulous officials and victimized public.

FINANCING GOVERNMENT

Historically, the emphasis on taxation to finance government expenditures is relatively recent. Before the advent of the administrative state, governments relied much more on war booty, the private wealth of rulers, the sale of public land, monopolies, and credit, rather than compulsory levies, and they still do to some extent. For the most part there was not much that could be taxed (most people were too poor) and that which could be taxed could be easily evaded until tax administration was improved with the evolution of the administrative state. If people are reluctant to pay taxes, they may find themselves paying for public administration in other ways far less convenient or effective, as the following techniques for meeting governmental costs indicate.

Debasement of currency

When governments run short of money, they print it or reduce the content of precious metals in it. There have been some spectacular debasements in living memory, most notably that of post World War I Germany, and poor countries still suffer from persistent debasement, with frequent devaluations and the hoarding of hard money (foreign currency) and precious metals. Cash flow problems are usually indicative of more serious financial problems such as chronic inability to balance budgets, to meet obligations on time and to avoid inflationary pressures.

Borrowing credit

Governments have borrowed money from whoever has been willing to lend it to them—other governments, international agencies, foreigners, rich organizations and their own citizens. Rarely is a government not indebted to foreigners, some substantially so that there is little likelihood that their creditors will recover the amounts they lent. Reneging on foreign debts does not endear a government to the international community and makes it more dependent on domestic sources of credit. Huge as most national debts are to the public, they should be compared to other indebtedness in a country, such as those incurred by the private sector and individuals, and to the current level of national income. In the United States, the proportion of public indebtedness has risen from less than one-sixth on the eve of the Great Depression to about one-third in the early 1980s, absorbing about two years of national income, about the same as it did in 1929 and 1945. It could be repaid by printing money (and creating economic havoc) or by raising taxes (and creating political furor) and would only result in the transfer of money from taxpayers to bondholders. Nonetheless, the sheer volume of money required by government in loans each year provides intense competition for private borrowers and determines the prevailing rate of interest, even without the further complications of tax exempt bonds which are fast exceeding one quarter of public indebtedness in the United States.

Taxation

Taxes are paid by individuals for public goods and services. Whereas everyone knows how much he or she contributes, nobody really knows how much they receive in return. Invariably people feel that either they could do better for themselves if they kept the money or they overpay. For them, "the only good tax is one that is paid by someone else."¹ They complain about inadequate levels of public service while searching to avoid tax payments. The perfect tax would raise maximum revenue at lowest

administrative costs, would be simple to understand and operate but difficult to evade, would be just to the taxpayers without adversely affecting their propensity to save, invest, and work, and would act as an economic stabilizer. No such tax exists. Instead, governments adopt a variety of taxes, combining different virtues, but also possessing drawbacks. Because there are so many taxes and taxation administration is so complicated, tax consolidation and simplification are often advocated but governments prefer to keep a wide range of taxes in their arsenal to accomplish different ends.

In tax policy, a theoretical distinction is drawn between direct taxes levied on persons or businesses on the basis of income or wealth, which through progressive rates are egalitarian, and indirect taxes, levied on transactions involving expenditure, which usually do not discriminate between buyers and sellers and are not considered to be egalitarian. The distinction is difficult to apply. Whereas income taxes and estate taxes are obviously indirect, property taxes can be considered a tax on the consumption of immovable property and therefore direct, although they have the characteristics of indirect taxes. Legal payers should be distinguished from economic payers. The taxes are levied on the former, but they are actually paid by the latter. Thus, landlords pass on their property taxes to tenants, and corporations shift their tax burdens to consumers, though the economic payers may not be conscious that they are paying someone else's tax bill.

In comparing tax systems, the respective proportions of direct and indirect taxes, even allowing for inaccurate and imprecise classification, are no real indicators of tax incidence without a further comparison of rates, exemptions, evasion, nature of the economy, employment rate, and political system. In an under-employed economy, direct taxes will be preferred to indirect taxes in order to promote economic growth, whereas in full-employment economies, indirect taxes rather than direct taxes will achieve the same objective. In trade cycles, indirect taxes are more volatile than direct taxes, which act as economic stabilizers. Both kinds tend to be rigid instruments, and tax systems as a whole are difficult to alter, partly because they are so complex, partly be-

cause they are so integrated with economic policy, and partly because nobody really can agree on what should be done and to whom the tax burden should be shifted.

Surpluses on marketable public services

Governments raise money by selling all manner of goods and services, leasing public property, and reselling obsolete equipment.

These four major sources of government income are usually kept distinct and their administration separate. In the past, disbursements were also handled separately but increasingly all proceeds are being consolidated into one fund from which disbursements are made. Not only does consolidated financing provide greater flexibility and freedom in disbursement, it also makes for more orderly, standardized budgeting.

THE BUDGET

A consolidated budget presents a clear picture of all revenues, expenditures, and reserves and provides a coordinated map of public policy. This is true assuming that legislatures do not create autonomous revenue funds designated for specific purposes, that public agencies do not insist on self-financing and that central controls can be maintained which is not the case with local self-governments. The consolidated budget envisages a planned budget assembled, coordinated and standardized by a budget agency which, after political approval, administers it, thereby enabling the agency to perform economic-policy functions, accounting, efficiency audit and personnel control as well. In this form, the consolidated budget can be subjected to regularized procedures.

Estimates

Every year public agencies are required to review their current programs and projects, scrutinize functions continually and esti-

mate likely changes in the foreseeable future. For routine activities, fairly accurate forecasts can be made but for new activities and contemplated investments, educated guesses have to be made. Experienced administrators have a shrewd idea of how much they can request without too many questions being asked, having regard for government policy and economic conditions. Aaron Wildavsky believes that much public budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. Agencies do not reconsider the value of their programs compared to possible alternatives but base one year's budget on the previous year and focus on a narrow range of increases or decreases.² Whether budget makers actually act this way has been subject to debate,³ but there is general agreement that given long term commitments, mandatory programs, standard items and revenue raising limitations, there is not that much room to maneuver in public budgets overall although there might be among agencies and specific items.

Budget planning

Before the estimates of the public agencies are received, the budget agency prepares a preliminary model of its expectations of the final outcome based on its intelligence and compares the submitted estimates against its model. Where they differ widely, negotiations narrow the gap, the agencies being asked to pare down where they can while the budget authority seeks adjustments elsewhere. Disagreements are adjudicated at the political level.

Political authorization

The budget plan and conflicting views are debated at the political level and much of the budget preparation work may have to be redone according to political directives. Practices vary between polities. In Britain, the Chancellor of the Exchequer has a relatively free hand in constructing the budget and Parliament is asked for formal approval only. In coalition governments in Western Europe, the budget is hotly contested in cabinet and it may be varied further in Parliament but once formally approved,

it tends to stick. By contrast, in the United States, the President and Congress struggle continuously and persistently to reconcile their conflicting views of what federal agencies should spend, while in poor countries, the budget is subject to constant renegotiation and no figures stick for long.

Budget management

The management of politically authorized appropriations involves elaborate accounting and auditing, governed by detailed financial rules and instructions and giving rise to much paperwork. A vast army of financial managers keeps track of all financial transactions, including all receipts, however small, to all disbursements, however large. Given the magnitude of the task, it is surprising how well budget management is done as relatively little goes wrong and the public has come to rely on the accuracy of public financial records in many countries.

Post-audit

It would be miraculous if nothing went wrong. To minimize the possibilities of seepage, reliance is placed on an independent audit which covers major items and takes spot checks of minor items to ascertain whether the original estimates were a fair anticipation of actual outcomes and whether any preventable waste, fraud, negligence and other irregularities occurred. The published reports of the auditors usually receive widespread publicity because they reveal errors and faults in budget management and auditors who go beyond financial regularity into management analysis, program evaluation, and policy review can cause political and administrative embarrassment in exposing public maladministration.

In reviewing the budgetary process, several points deserve consideration. First, the budget plan serves a variety of purposes for the different parties involved and they approach it from different perspectives and with different expectations, rarely reconcilable

so that it is bound to be contentious. For instance, the budget is the principal instrument for managing the economy through fiscal policy and national economic planning. It constitutes a plan of public sector products and a design for income redistribution. It reflects dominant political ideologies, party compromises, and electoral promises. It is a management device for improving public administration and policy making. It provides the public with accessible summary information about the economy, new governmental programs, debt management, economic objectives, and resource allocation between public and private sectors.

Second, in contrast to law making, much budget making is confidential. Whereas one can discover the origins of a bill and trace different amendments to their source, the public does not know who frames the estimates or why they are constructed as they are. The in-fighting is not conducted in the legal draftsman's office or on the floor of the legislature, but in numerous closed meetings between budget agency and operating agencies. As Leonard White once wrote,

It would be useful to know to what extent the United States Bureau of the Budget influences substantive policy, if at all; to what extent it overrules, curtails or amplifies agency programs; in what cases it operates without consulting the President; when an agency feels warranted in appealing Bureau decisions to the President (and why and with what success); to what extent the initial recommendations of a budget examiner against a department prevail; what strategy the departments employ to protect their estimates in the Bureau of the Budget and before the appropriations committees; and what means a President employs to protect his budget against attack or sabotage. Those who know these mysteries do not reveal them.⁴

His remarks still ring true almost universally.

Third, the budget plan is rarely complete. It often omits large items of public finance (such as actual defense expenditures, intergovernmental transfers, and public enterprises), fails to distinguish between continuing and new activities, capital investment and working expenses, and one-time only payments and long term commitments. It can also ignore backdoor spending (the ability

of agencies to expend from public debt receipts and revolving funds) and indicate as controllable, items which are not controllable such as social welfare reimbursements and pensions geared to fixed formulas.

Fourth, the annual budget is becoming outdated as it is too short for long range development and too long for rapid economic fluctuations. It requires much repetitive and duplicative work, thereby inflating overhead costs. Classification of expenditures according to means tells little, if anything, about the purposes for which they are being employed. Estimates constructed according to means promote padding and bargaining, rather than planning, economy, and rational measures of functional performance. The budget tends to be too rigid for the administrative flexibility required in a turbulent economic environment. It has already been surpassed by administrative and financial devices that exclude from outside review and control many important budget items—government by contract, trust funds, debt management, defense expenditures, back-door spending, intergovernmental financing, and capital projects.

For these reasons, the search continues for alternatives to the annual budget and improvements in budget making. American public administration has been on the forefront of these endeavors and recent American experience is worth recording in some detail as American innovations sooner or later are copied elsewhere.

BUDGET REFORM

The transformation of public finance during the nineteenth century had lulled people into believing that the problems of large-scale financial management had been solved. So great was the revolution in extractive capacity, so elegant were the principles of nineteenth century political economists, so logical and rational were budgetary reforms, that public administrators thought they knew everything there was to know and the public finance textbooks conveyed this impression. Few stopped to notice that in fact virtually all the nineteenth century principles (consent to

taxation, approval of expenditures through regular budgets, annuality, predictability, and control) had been systematically violated.

In the massive budgets of the twentieth century, accountability had become a fiction. There were no real tests of efficiency: no one could really tell whether or not the public was receiving value for its money. Complexity not simplicity was the rule. Annuality was mortally infringed by outstanding commitments made years in advance. The bulk of expenditures was labeled "uncontrollable" by reputable experts. It was only when governmental ability to mobilize resources became victim of its own success that these matters began to be questioned. To promote government expenditures at a time of economic expansion and for policies largely approved by the public was one thing. To maintain high taxes in a period of potentially severe inflation, in an apparently faltering economy, and confronted by crises with which the government did not know how to cope, was quite another. The public began to object to high taxes, high expenditures and the seemingly "anything goes" attitude that had become prevalent in public finance.

Politicians had become so certain of the ability of government to raise revenues and manage large expenditures as a matter of course that they never ceased to promise more activities, more handouts and improved services, and to go on spending as long as the money was there or at least could eventually be found from somewhere. Public agencies quick to take their cue from politicians promising more and a public expecting more, grabbed whatever they could get and made sure that nothing was returned even if they had to ignore the canons of wise financial management. It was more important to get the job done than worry about the misuse of funds.⁵ Financial controllers made no friends and won over no enemies by performing as they should. On the contrary, faced with massive budgets, they found their task impossible and had to delegate and therefore trust public agencies to police themselves. Everybody was comforted by the thought that the costs could always be passed on. Governments could not go bankrupt.

Inevitably governments fell into deep financial difficulties and had continually to be bailed out. They failed to repay debts on time. And they continued to pile up long range commitments that could not be met from current revenues. Yet budgetary poverty seemed "to breed fiscal dishonesty and budgetary escapism rather than a tightening of the belt and a determination to live within means."⁶ There were no incentives to save, economize or reduce services and staff. Instead, seepage, waste and corruption were systematized and institutionalized. Extravagance not frugality became the norm, and in its wake came official indifference to the public interest, a decline in public responsibility, a deterioration in public ethics, and wholesale abuse of the public purse. People could not be fooled. They knew what was going on. They saw it and participated in it—the sweetheart deals, the deliberate underestimation of costs, the obvious conflicts of interest, the manipulation of grants, subsidies and loans, the rip-offs, the cheating, the frauds, and the unconcern of public officials about it all, their cover-ups, and their failure to act even in the most blatant occurrences. After waiting in vain for action, after their patience had given out, people eventually revolted in the only ways open to them. But their message was clear—control of public finance had to be reestablished.

The need for the recontrol of public finance had been realized by budget reformers for many decades. For them, the most important aspect of budget making was how public agencies put together their estimates in conjunction with the budget authority. Before World War II, such calculations concentrated on line item inputs which classify expenditures according to objects (supplies, travel, salaries, etc). During the war attention switched to program needs and estimates were worked back through an embryonic systems approach. This way public administrators could plan programs and experiment with predictive methods, cost-benefit analysis and operations research. By the end of the war, they could think in terms of objectives, plan different ways of achieving objectives, cost the plans and arrange the costs into multi-year forecasts by program and program components.

1. Planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS)

Program budgeting was enhanced by macroeconomists who demanded longer range projections of government expenditures by program, the use of computers which enabled the calculations to be done, and the application of performance budgeting as a management tool following the successful introduction of cost accounting and work measurement in public finance. Performance budgeting required the conversion of budgets from line items to programs and the development of program measures. These in turn led to defining program objectives, framing alternative programs, evaluating programs, designing multi-year budget forecasts, and choosing the most feasible priority program. This way the budget would be a statement of policy, indicating choices between programmatic alternatives.

Planning. Sustained intelligence and rational methods replace intuition and reduce uncertainty. Budget makers are encouraged to be ends-means oriented, comprehensive and future minded by conceiving budgets in multi-year terms given expected levels of activity. Unfortunately budget makers as planners tend to overcommit themselves to their original design and to overconcentrate on quantifiable measures, forgetting that they live in a political environment in which plans are viewed as political documents, not as embodiments of justice and wisdom. Their plans are blueprints not government commitments. One useful function of planning is the definition of program objectives, and while on the one hand it may stimulate new thinking, it may also reinforce the status quo on the other and block innovation.

Program budgeting. Multi-year program budgets indicate the previous year's actual costs, the current year's estimates, the following year's estimates and estimates for succeeding years, and total estimated costs for the planning period. It identifies future implications of program costs, focuses on objectives and takes into consideration possible alternatives. It does not necessarily guarantee better decision making and it may generate much needless paperwork. Its gravest drawback, however, is that it may stress bureaucratic centralism over partisan mutual adjustment and other diffused bargaining processes.

PPBS involves considerable pioneering work in budget making. It requires new ways of looking at budgets, new ways of designing budgets and a realignment of parties in the budget process. It does not add to action capabilities or reduce political risk taking or improve policy optimization. Is it worthwhile? The United States Government adopted it prematurely in 1968, only to drop it three years later, a victim of confusion, indifference, incompetence and subversion. According to Allen Schick, "PPB died because of inadequate support and leadership with meager resources interested in its behalf. . . . PPB failed to penetrate because the budgeters didn't let it in and the PPB'ers didn't know how to break down the resistance."⁷ Its failure was not inevitable. Better success was recorded by state budget agencies. Schick anticipates that ". . . under a different label and with somewhat different approaches and techniques there eventually will be a return of the aims of PPB."

2. Zero-based budgeting (ZBB)

The U.S. Department of Agriculture first used zero-based budgeting in 1962 when instead of proceeding from a historical base, it reviewed all its programs anew from no base. In 1970, Peter Pyhrr at Texas Instruments developed the idea further as a means of prioritizing budget needs by devising techniques to determine whether or not existing activities were efficient and effective and should be reduced or eliminated. Mutually exclusive alternative ways to perform an activity should be devised together with incremental packages reflecting different levels of effort for each. All packages should then be ranked in order of decreasing benefit and a choice should be made among them according to available funding.⁸

Zero-based budgeting was tried in several states, including Georgia by the then Governor, Jimmy Carter. On becoming President in 1977, he mandated ZBB for all federal agencies as a management process that provoked systematic consideration of all programs and activities in conjunction with the formulation of budget requests and program planning. According to Bulletin

No. 77-9 (April 9, 1977), ZBB was to involve managers at all levels in the budget process, justify resources for existing and new activities, and focus justification in the evaluation of discrete programs or activities of each decision unit. It was also to establish objectives against which accomplishments can be identified and measured, assess alternative methods of accomplishing objectives, analyze the probable effects of different budget amounts or performance levels on achieving objectives, and provide a creditable rationale for relocating resources, especially from old to new activities. Agency budget proposals formulated in this way were then to be submitted for political review. The President would be able to identify proposed changes from the base, make considered changes, and subject any program or agency to full ZBB scrutiny.

In fact, ZBB was never applied as expected but on a much reduced scale. Instead of a new waste-purging method, the fiscal budget came out "just where disembodied incrementalism would tend to."⁹ It did not revolutionize budgeting approaches. Agencies had not been required to abandon their existing modes of decision making. Not long after its introduction, the exercise declined into little more than window dressing. Like PBB before it, ZBB ignored the politics of the budgeting process. "With ZBB, upward of 75 percent of the budget will continue to be uncontrollable under existing law; upward of 95 percent will continue to be de facto uncontrollable."¹⁰ It was abandoned in August 1981 in the first year of the Reagan administration.

3. Legal Limitations

The failure of other budgetary reforms to ensure effective use of public monies and to halt rising public expenditures and taxes has led to various attempts to impose legal and constitutional restraints on public agencies to force economies and contain public expenditures. So far such legal limitations have been largely confined to the United States but they could conceivably spread elsewhere if the American measures succeed. Two innovations in particular should be noted.

(1) Sunset laws

Public concern about the growing costs and increasing complexity of government has induced a search for some means whereby antiquated agencies, outmoded programs and low performing administrations could self-destruct or automatically terminate or fade away. Sunset laws provide that public agencies and programs are assigned a mandatory termination date. They are no longer granted indefinite tenure. Prior to termination, an agency is given the opportunity to justify its continued existence, its claims being subject to a thorough performance audit. If the legislature takes no action, the agency or program concludes on its termination date although the legislature may opt to reinstate or reconstruct it. Sunset reviews are formal periodic reevaluations to determine if a genuine public need is being met, how effectively it is being satisfied, and whether the effort should be terminated because it is no longer needed or has outlived its usefulness or has gone astray.

(2) Fiscal limitations measures

In late 1978, the passage of Proposition 13 in California, a citizens' initiative to limit property tax assessment widely interpreted as a taxpayer's revolt against Big Government and excessive taxation, drew attention to a variety of other fiscal limitation measures that had been introduced in the 1970s to combat rising public expenditures. Some, like Proposition 13, were legal limits on taxation, such as tax cuts, tax rate ceilings, tax limits for selected classes of taxpayers, and indexing of marginal tax rates. Others were limits on expenditure, such as linking total expenditures to national economic indicators, insistence on balanced budgets, and voter approval for tax changes. It was evident that through such measures, the public was indicating that neither elected nor appointed officials could be trusted to lower public expenditures and taxes by themselves; they had to be imposed and institutional limitations devised to ensure automatic compliance. Traditional controls on which the public, politicians and officials had come to rely were not working as they should.

THE CONTINUING DEBATE OVER BUDGET CONTROL

Public suspicion that all was not well in American public finance was certainly confirmed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The public witnessed the near bankruptcy of several large cities, the obvious mismanagement of public funds by several leading states and a running battle over the federal budget between the President and Congress. Sensitive to public opinion, legislators across the country rushed forward with a flurry of bills that they hoped would alleviate public discomfort. During 1981, no less than nineteen bills dealing with various aspects of budget reform emanated from the Senate alone and lengthy hearings on budget reform were held by several congressional committees. Significantly none suggested any radical restructuring of the budget. Instead, the discussion focused on budget enforcement, problems of timing within the budget cycle, and making the budget more inclusive.

Budget enforcement

In contrast to most other budget systems which give the executive absolute control, the American system provides a check on the executive by allowing the legislature to design its own budget albeit in a piecemeal item by item fashion through legislative appropriation committees. The executive has to abide by the legislature's budget but it may refuse to spend appropriated monies. In the early 1970s, the Nixon administration did just this. Rather than spend monies the way Congress had decided, it impounded certain funds and refused to spend them. To enforce the congressional version of the budget, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 provided for two concurrent budget resolutions. The first, reported in mid-April and passed in mid-May, would set targets for total appropriations, outlays, revenues and debt level as well as targets for specific functional items. The second, to be completed by mid-September, would revise and reaffirm the first and include changes in appropriations

required by legislation passed during the year. The intention was to provide a framework of aggregates early in the budget process within which Congress would set policy guidelines and coordinate the congressional budget process. The President would still be able to impound appropriations but only with congressional approval.

In practice, the targets set in the first concurrent budget resolution could be exceeded by appropriation bills. The second concurrent resolution, which was supposed to control the budget, became little more than a formality, merely ratifying what had been done. Presidents continued to defer spending appropriated funds, this time with congressional approval. In effect, neither Congress nor President controls the federal budget and neither needs to act responsibly. As a result, by 1982 the federal budget process was chaotic with serious detrimental consequences to the management of the economy and to control over federal expenditures. Two proposals to alleviate this situation have been suggested. One would entail abandoning the second concurrent resolution altogether and turning the first into a binding commitment on the appropriation committees which would have to keep within the overall ceilings set by Congress itself. The second proposal is to allow the president greater flexibility in deferring appropriations without going through the cumbersome impoundment procedure.

However, neither tackles the more fundamental underlying problem of the separation of powers which makes for irresponsible budgeting and seemingly a permanent upward trend in federal government spending. Congress continues to vote for budget totals and then immediately breach them in votes for specific measures. The reconciliation procedure instead of being a careful review of where reductions could be made by the appropriation committees, is considered to be a continuing appropriations measure in which everything is put in so nobody quite knows what is involved. Why spend so much time on the slow process of considering, modifying and compromising specific legislative proposals when it is easier to attach them to the reconciliation bill? When the President insisted on his own reconciliation bill,

as he did in 1981 to impose reductions in specific programs, it signified that the executive wanted to dictate the budget to Congress, thereby undermining the power of the appropriation committees and raising fears of executive despotism.

Proponents of budget enforcement argue for discipline and consistency in budget making, a more streamlined process in which later decisions fit within the framework of earlier ones. To achieve such coherence, it would be necessary to assert the predominance of earlier decisions and build into the budget process a measure of conflict resolution presently absent. But even they have doubts about the changes in institutional relations that would be involved. They seem to ignore one of the major stumbling blocks to a coherent budget process, namely, the constant need to update budget totals to conform to economic circumstances. Restoration of an annual budget through enforcement of totals set early in the process may be illusory if these totals prove not to be viable.

Timing

One of the visible defects in the budget process is the apparent inability of Congress to meet the deadlines of the budgetary timetable. The fiscal year usually begins before the passage of several appropriations bills. The whole timetable is under pressure. Critics allege that lack of planning and oversight are largely due to time constraints. Annual authorizations, budgeting and appropriations are so time consuming that scarcely has Congress finished one year when it must deal with the next. To deal with undue haste that prevents proper oversight, three major proposals have been suggested. They are a biennial budget, a structured sunset process, and a period in the budget calendar reserved for oversight.

The most radical suggestion is for a biennial budget. The budget would last for two years instead of one and budget making would also be extended over two years. This would save time, effort and money. The quality of legislative work would be improved by the increased time available and the multi-year perspective. The extension of the budget period would allow for greater

discipline and stability in spending. The first year would be taken up by the President's recommendations, the views and estimates of the appropriation committees and the Congressional Budget Office, passage of authorization bills and the completion of the first concurrent resolution. The second year would begin with the President's update of the budget, continue with the passage of appropriations and any emergency authorizations, and end with the second concurrent resolution and reconciliation if necessary. More time would be allowed for each stage of the budget process in a more realistic timetable for the amount of work that has to be done. More importantly, it would not change existing relations between institutions. But what if the mid-term review turns into an entirely new budget? Then the first year would be little more than a formality and Congress would scramble to put two years' work into the second year, thereby negating the time advantage. If budget predictions are already difficult for one year, how much harder will it be to provide accurate expenditure estimates for double that period?

The other two proposals are aimed at strengthening oversight to maintain public confidence in government, to prevent Congress from being overtaken by events, and to ensure that measures are not taken or cuts made without adequate scrutiny. Oversight hearings should be held by the committees and coordinated by one specific committee. All federal programs would be examined thoroughly at least once every ten years. Behind these sunset proposals is the feeling that Congress lacks time for proper oversight. But they do not touch the more crucial problems of conflict management and inclusiveness.

Coverage

Budgets should accurately reflect the volume and nature of financial transactions. If important areas of financial activity are excluded, then they are poor instruments for policymaking. In recent years there has been a growing uneasiness that the figures of the federal budget no longer reflect the time dimensions of federal finances. A significant and increasing portion of total

federal spending falls outside budgetary boundaries, lending a problematical, even fictional, flavor to discussions of budget aggregates or deficits. Proposals have been made to bring excluded areas within the budget, focusing in particular on federal credit activities, off-budget agencies and tax expenditures. Some members of Congress would like a separate credit budget and bring loans and loan guarantees within the federal budget. A proposed Federal Lending Oversight and Control Bill provides for enforceable credit totals as well as control over the levels of individual programs. Another proposed bill would bring the activities of off-budget agencies within the budget, particularly the Federal Finance Bank created in 1973 to assist agency and government guaranteed borrowing. Finally, other bills propose to include tax expenditures, that is, revenue losses that arise from provisions of the tax code that give special or selective tax relief to certain groups of taxpayers. Whereas in 1967 the total revenue loss was about 20 percent of total federal direct outlays, it had risen to 35 percent in 1981 and the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had increased this figure even more. Several bills propose statutory limitations on ceilings and duration of tax expenditures and would require a separate tax expenditure budget.

Taking all these reform proposals together, it is clear that the years ahead promise substantial activity and much innovation in public budgeting in the United States. The need is long overdue and is necessitated by the abuses that have grown within the budget system arising from the separation of powers, intensified rivalry between legislature and executive, and the absence of budgetary discipline in the public sector. As executive dictatorship is not considered superior, much ingenuity will be needed to devise a workable budget system that satisfies both public agencies and the public.

NOTES

1. J. P. Wernette, *Government and Business*. New York: Crowell Collier & Macmillan, 1964, p. 123.

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8 Public Employment

THE MAJOR PORTION of government costs are spent on staffing the public bureaucracy which employs in every country a significant portion of the labor force in a wide range of jobs. For many years, public sector employment has been growing at a faster rate than private sector employment and increasing numbers of newcomers to the labor market can find employment only in the public sector. The previous exclusiveness of public service is no more and fewer distinctions remain between public and private employment. Nonetheless popular images still lag behind the new reality and portray the typical public servant as a rather distant and superior white collar worker who does not work particularly hard. In fact, more typical of contemporary public employees are blue collar workers and professionals found not in office buildings but in supply and repair depots, military camps, scientific laboratories, schools and post offices. Distorted notions are perpetuated by mass media concentration on the world of senior officials who do indeed inhabit offices. But they only constitute the tip of the bureaucratic iceberg, the great bulk of which is indistinguishable from private sector counterparts.

Most academic studies of the public service are also disjointed. They, too, overlook the bulk of public employment where conditions are similar to those obtaining in the private sector. Instead they concentrate on that special portion which does have unique features of personnel administration. This segment consists of seniormost career officials in government service who are a relatively immobile occupation group, prone to inbreeding through specialized career channels based on functional expertise and subject to peculiar codes of conduct to ensure their loyalty and reliability and protect them from victimization. They are important people in the community; they perform important work; they are well connected; they influence the destiny of the nation; they are part of the power elite. They are a special group of people well deserving of separate treatment for they inhabit that exceptional place, the higher reaches of officialdom.

The higher reaches of officialdom, the apex of the public bureaucracy, the commanding heights of public service, vary with the polity, the regime, the public agency, and the work that has to be done. Whitehall, Washington, D.C., Ottawa, Paris, Rome, Canberra, New Delhi, Cairo, Bangkok and Manila are all obviously different places with their own peculiar characteristics, though they all exude their sense of self-importance, exclusiveness, confidentiality, and professional snobbery. The different agencies have their own traditions, working styles, confidences, slang, and in-group loyalty. The different levels of hierarchy have their own tribal customs and rituals marking them off from others. Outsiders never get to know the different symbols of authority and they never can learn to distinguish and discriminate between the subtle distinctions of position. It is a world unto itself, a world in which everything and everyone has its place, a world which lesser public servants aspire to grace one day. It has an atmosphere quite different from that found in the higher reaches of business or the traditional professions.

This world of officialdom, whatever its pretense to self-determination, is full of controls. Senior public servants are hide-bound by all manner of rules, both formal and informal, to limit their freedom of action and their discretion lest they abuse their

public positions for personal gain and fail to pursue the public interest. They are not their own masters. They are, in British parlance, the sovereign's obedient servants, subject to all manner of controls—political, constitutional, legal, judicial, institutional, organizational, administrative, professional, public and self-imposed. They live in a bureaucratic cage where it takes time and effort to learn all the barriers and also how to get around the barriers if need be. After all, they are expected to use their ingenuity and initiative, to advise, warn and guide their political mentors, to provide policy leadership where no one else is willing and to manage economically, efficiently and effectively the great departments of state. They shoulder heavy responsibilities, wield great influence and power, grapple with the most intricate social problems, and find themselves often in the center of action. For them, public service has its intrinsic rewards that keep them wedded to the job and regretful when they can no longer be part of the scene.

A CAREER SERVICE

For most public servants, entry into the higher reaches of officialdom is possible only up the career ladder after long, arduous and highly competitive progression step by step from junior positions. For most but not all because there are other ways of getting to the bureaucratic apex. There are volunteers who offer their services free of charge or at token remuneration and undertake a variety of important tasks. Other highly qualified persons are contracted for set periods either because they do not want to be bound for much longer or they can be compensated at higher rates than paid to career public servants. Some bureaucratic positions are filled by election while others are filled by compulsion when vacancies cannot be filled any other way. The latter is the case with professional positions in remote or inhospitable regions when newly qualified persons are required as part of the qualifying process to take such positions initially. But these alternatives are very much the exception.

Appointment from within is preferred. Individuals offer

themselves freely and accept the conditions of employment offered to them. If dissatisfied, they are not obliged to continue employment, and once they leave, the employing authority has no further obligations, except a continuing pension for past service. The employing authority can determine whom it will employ from rival applicants and is not obliged to accept anyone at all or anyone who is not sufficiently qualified. The successful applicant is guaranteed set conditions of employment and does not have to campaign publicly for reappointment.

The concept of career service is derived from feudalism. Then, masters not only gave employment but they also provided accommodation, education and welfare services. In return, servants gave faithful service and looked after the master's interests as their own. The bond was for life: it could only be broken if the master failed to provide a livelihood or the servant was unfaithful. The same bond was applied by absolute monarchs to their officials as well as personal servants and from them to the modern administrative state. The state provides a lifelong livelihood for its faithful servants but expects in return absolute loyalty, good service and the subordination of all other interests to its own.

This career service concept also persisted in the professions and among paternalistic employers who wanted to foster a reputation for being a good employer and to retain experienced staff. They also retained in practice much greater freedom to hire and fire at will, to discriminate between individual employees and to vary employment conditions as they saw fit. In contrast, public employers found their ability to maneuver increasingly confined by law. They were obligated to offer standardized conditions of employment. Their ability to compete one against another was virtually eliminated. They were subjected to central personnel agencies that ensured the law was followed and did much of the recruiting for them. They were required to follow fair employment practices.

Countries which adopted public service career systems chose between two contrasting systems, open and closed (Table 8-1). The open career system allowed for mobility between public and private sectors. It assumed that all new recruits would be qualified for their jobs on appointment. Further advancement would depend

Table 8-1

OPEN AND CLOSED CAREER SYSTEMS MODELS

Characteristic	Open career system	Closed career system
Tenure	Discretionary	Guaranteed
Structure	Integrated	Differentiated
Classification	Position	Rank
Recruitment	All levels	Base level only
Entry qualifications	Job performance	General education
Salary scales	Short, overlapping	Long, separated
Training	External	Internal on-the-job
Promotion	Open	Closed
Promotion criterion	Most competent	Senior competent
Staff relations	Business like	Paternal
Retirement	Contributory pension	Noncontributory pension

on individual initiative in spotting openings further up the hierarchy and they would prepare themselves accordingly to assume higher level positions. The closed system separated public service careers from the rest of the labor market by recruiting at a young age directly from the education system on the basis of general aptitude and training the youngsters on the job. Higher positions were confined to promotion from the lower ranks and not thrown open to all-comers in open competition.

In contemporary public bureaucracies, both models and variations of them can be found side by side. The closed model suits occupational categories that can only be found in the public sector (departmental classes), such as postal work, tax collection, foreign service, and customs inspection, where recruits cannot obtain prior training and experience outside the public service. The open model suits occupational categories common to both public and private sectors (general classes) where recruits can be expected to have relevant prior training and experience. In practice, it has also been used for departmental classes where it has

not been possible to fill higher level vacancies from below and the closed model has been used for general classes when governments have wanted to distinguish the public service in the labor market.

The confusion between the two models has led to several myths and distortions about public service careers.

1. Public servants should not share the same rights as other employees because they work for the government. Their public responsibilities cut into their political and industrial rights. Their employment conditions are superior (because they are guaranteed tenure and are eligible for favorable pension on retirement). These suppositions may or may not be true; they are used to deny public servants rights available to private employees and to reduce public service remuneration.

2. Public servants should be prohibited from striking because they perform work of crucial importance to national security and well being. Yet the same notion is not applied to private employees who also perform work of national importance and on whom many others depend for their security and comfort.

3. Public servants cannot be dismissed. While public employers try to guarantee tenure, they also reserve the right to dismiss for misconduct and grossly inferior performance (and use it, perhaps not often enough) and to retrench staff whenever there is insufficient work to justify continued employment.

4. Entry should be confined to the young. Young people are supposed to be easier to train and, once employed, public employers can be spared the expense of continued recruitment. Consequently some public services have low age limits, although they make exceptions for special classes of person such as retired military staff and graduates. This ability to restrict entry to the young is more an indication how selective governments can be rather than a job requirement.

5. Security, prestige and superannuation should offset low pay. The job itself is supposed to be its own reward. This argument is merely a poor excuse to exploit relatively vulnerable occupations such as nurses and teachers.

6. All public employees should be covered by the career service concept. This is merely a self-protective measure. Far from

being applicable to general classes, it may have limited application in specialized classes where inbreeding, parochialism and isolation occur.

These myths should not be given much credence.

PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

The career service concept together with legally embodied employment conditions makes public personnel administration distinct if not distinctive. It goes well beyond routine salary administration and incorporates human resources planning, image building, motivation and morale, staff development, performance evaluation, conflict resolution, productivity, safety standards, work-place environment, health facilities, and collective bargaining. The full ramifications of a positive approach to these aspects of public personnel administration have not yet been realized in many public services. They are still steeped in the routine of regulative personnel administration inherited from the early days of the administrative state when public employment was prestigious and competition to enter the public service was fierce. They still scrimp and save on what they consider nonessentials. With a captive work force, they do not feel they have to please or pamper public servants at public expense. In them, parsimony combined with rapid staff expansion, result in overcrowding, makeshift work arrangements, depressing work conditions and festering dissatisfaction.

Whether a public service takes a positive or negative approach to staff administration, the general conditions governing employment are usually the responsibility of a central personnel agency. It enforces public personnel legislation, advises the government on public personnel policy, and coordinates operating agency personnel programs. It also conducts centralized personnel services such as recruitment and training, and possibly negotiates with public employee organizations. Otherwise, the operating agencies would go their separate ways and become empires to themselves, thereby severely restricting interagency transfers. Uniform rules and procedures maintained by a central agency extend servicewide

opportunities, reduce possible inequities between operating agencies, and reduce interagency competition. The central agency also restricts the possibilities of politicization as well as fragmentation. It stands outside the political arena and above operating agency infighting to protect career officials from political victimization and to ensure that governments do not transform the public service into a partisan arm of any particular faction.

The existence of a central personnel agency encourages the centralization of other personnel activities. Governments and employee organizations prefer to deal with one body, not several splinter operating agencies. Uniform classification, to ensure that all public employees are fairly treated, is an obvious candidate for central control. Often the central personnel agency finds itself taking on additional personnel functions, partly because of its centrality, and partly because of economies of scale. Its intimate knowledge of the public service may be utilized in management audits and administrative reform. Its concern with a sizable proportion of the public sector and the labor force as a whole may be enlarged into general employment and labor policies for the government. Even so, the major portion of public personnel administration is undertaken by the operating agencies. As far as public servants are concerned, the operating agencies are their employers. They provide their jobs, work situations, colleagues, and prospects. Although the central personnel agency may recruit them, the operating agencies have the responsibility for keeping them in the public service. They are close to the public servants and know their peculiarities. They can make quick decisions and they can make special arrangements that the central personnel agency cannot.

The organization or personnel administration within employing organs depends on their size, geographical distribution, functions, occupational categories, and volume of personnel work. In small organizations, personnel administration is integrated with general administration and finance, although there might be a designated personnel officer to handle staff grievances, welfare, and training. Other personnel activities are conducted in the general course of events. In larger organizations, personnel work is performed by specialized personnel staff, who divide the work

between them by area. The largest organizations have large personnel sections with elaborate internal arrangements.

Personnel officers in public personnel administration do not have the same discretion as their private counterparts. Instead, they are technicians in work study and salary administration, or training, recruitment and classification specialists. Rarely are they rounded personnel administrators capable of instigating new programs, heading off labor troubles, or developing creative relationships. Too often, they are not organized for positive action, only for routine administration of set laws and procedures.

The brunt of positive personnel work is borne by supervisors, although job descriptions may give no hint of their importance in public personnel administration. The supervisors are the key links between the supervised and personnel administrators, and the main instigators of action. They may be aided by instruction books, in-service training courses, or advice from the personnel specialists, but often they have no formal training or relevant experience in handling people. Thus they have to learn as they go along. Yet their actions have a profound effect on staff retention, working atmosphere, organizational morale, productivity, and the prospects of their charges. They recommend which jobs should be continued or stopped, which vacancies should be abolished or filled, and how the work should be arranged. In classification work, they comment on job descriptions and sift demands for reclassification. In recruitment and promotion, they advise in selection. They conduct training and they discipline subordinates. Their sins of omission will sooner or later appear in staff grievances. Thus investment at supervisory level pays handsome dividends in lessening the load on top management and personnel administrators.

STAFF RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

Public personnel administration is no longer a monopoly of the official side, that is, management, as it was before the nineteenth century. Until then, the official side decided how public

servants should behave and what rights and obligations they had, and it determined all staffing questions. Public servants were prepared to accept unilateral action. During the nineteenth century the expansion of public services brought in new classes of skilled and semi-skilled public servants who demanded the same rights to organize as private employees. The industrial blue-collar public servants in the post office and railroads fought with employing organs and with the help of the labor movement won the right to organize, to be consulted and to negotiate through collective bargaining and arbitration tribunals. White-collar public servants did not follow their example until much later when they, too, formed associations to remedy grievances, promote better employment conditions and obtain industrial rights. Whenever public servants were accorded industrial rights, they showed greater readiness to join employee organizations than private employees as a means of self-protection against arbitrary personnel administration and individual victimization by hostile supervisors.

Unionization has brought the staff side into public personnel administration. The official side has something pushing against it, challenging its decisions and practices, demanding explanations and justifications, exposing its blind spots, confronting it in public. It must keep looking over its shoulder, trying to anticipate the moves of the employee organizations.

As opponents, the official and staff sides can defeat each other's purposes, but as allies, they can mutually benefit. They have many things in common and seek many of the same objectives, namely, a contented efficient public service, fairly treated and well regarded in the polity. If the political masters reject official representations, the staff can enter the political arena and fight for the official proposals, such as changes in legislation and improvements in working conditions. If the official side runs out of ideas, it can tap the staff side, and vice versa. The two sides often work together to quell staff discontent, head off strikes, and quash unofficial staff actions and member revolts. In decisions affecting an individual's career, it may be desirable to have the staff side formally represented to ensure justice and the appearance of fairness.

The overriding advantage of unionization is the ability of public servants to appear in the political arena as a separate pressure group. Realistically, the official side can only participate in the political arena as the mouthpiece of the government. Individual public servants are not inclined to participate actively in politics (even where permitted to do so), and rarely against the government. Employee organizations, however, are not as inhibited. They have little option if they want to be effective. Political parties are not neutral to public services or employee organizations. Some parties are more favorably disposed than others toward public servants, just as employee organizations are more favorably disposed to certain political parties than others. Governments use the public service politically. In depressions, in response to public demand, they reduce employment conditions, and during inflation, they curb pay increases as a signal to private employers to do likewise. They employ women, disabled persons, minority groups, and other persons discriminated against in the labor market, to set an example to all employers. More importantly, only they can grant many of the demands made by public servants and their unions. In response, employee organizations try to influence the votes of their members and to convince political parties that they command the "public service vote."

To reduce the political pressure of public service organizations and to keep the public service out of the political arena, governments provide alternative channels through which public servants and their unions can obtain redress of their grievances. Formal councils, composed equally of representatives from official and staff sides, may be established to discuss all matters of common interest, except perhaps salary increases, and to make recommendations to the government. Simple majority vote may suffice, or unanimity may be required before any proposals are put to the government for action. As the government will have already made its views known through the official side, recommendations and proposals are likely to be implemented. Such joint management bodies may be found at any level of government, and councils at different levels may be formally linked. For salary and other matters involving considerable sums of money, the government

may provide a formal collective bargaining apparatus, replete with mediators and conciliators. It may also agree to resolve outstanding issues through independent arbitration, both official and staff sides being willing to accept the decision of the arbitrator. For matters of crucial concern to individual public servants, their representatives may be formal participants in decision-making processes and on appeal boards.

EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS

Employment conditions between public and private sectors are growing much closer to each other as public authorities extend their occupational coverage and private organizations grow in size and bureaucratize. Staff mobility and interchange are more common. Trade unions insist on uniformity for all members, irrespective of their employer. The principle of comparability, whereby governments seek to maintain parity with private employers, is being extended as quickly as suitable research and negotiating machinery can be established. Yet, public services retain several peculiar features that distinguish them from private employment.

Classification

Every public employee is classified in an elaborate structure of divisions and grades, horizontally based on job importance, quality of intelligence required in the performance of the work, and the administrative content of the job; and vertically based on occupational categories, training requirements, functional specialization, and organizational differentiation. Since too many people are employed to be dealt with individually, it is easier administratively to handle a small number of classes instead. Age, sex, nature of work, qualifications possessed, and seniority (or length of service) have all been employed as criteria for class differentiation, and are still employed within major groupings based on salary or occupation. Classification by salary is fairly simple and presumably reflects the importance of the work and

the person. But salary may be more a reflection of social class (and/or personal influence with patrons), unrelated to the work performed or competence in performing the work.

More sophisticated measures are needed to measure work value and to base salary on work value. For this reason, classifiers prefer occupational categories as defined by professional associations, trade unions, employee organizations and job evaluators. The structuring of classes usually embodies the following concepts: (a) that the public service structure should reflect the education system, which in many countries reflects the social structure; (b) that administrative generalists should head specialized professionals, or that an elite corps of administrators be superimposed at the apex; (c) that occupational classes also found outside the public service should reflect community valuation, as ascertained by pay research data, and that noncomparable occupational classes should be integrated according to comparable job qualifications; and (d) that to prevent abuse, temporary employees should receive only the minimum rates accorded to permanent employees. These concepts assume a greater importance where the divisions, horizontal and vertical, are rigid and separate, for the individual is typed from the very beginning and may be unable to switch jobs or occupational channels after entry.

Recruitment

Public employers are obliged to follow certain principles in recruitment that may not be incumbent on private employers.

Open entry. Public authorities are expected to open their jobs to all qualified persons. For this purpose, they are obliged to notify any potential applicants of vacancies. They may have to advertise vacancies widely throughout the country, undertake extensive recruitment propaganda to offset adverse public images, and maintain close contacts with educational establishments and other potential sources of applicants.

Fair consideration. Public employers must assume that all who apply really want the job, even though the formalities may be so complicated and time-consuming that the best applicants

may already have obtained alternative employment. All applicants are expected to receive fair consideration. All must be processed, and informed about the results. Appeal provisions may also be provided to guarantee fairness.

Legal and other restrictions. Public services are restrictive in their choice. Apart from legal requirements relating to age, sex, nationality, character, education, health and residence, there are job requirements, such as technical qualifications, physical characteristics, and competence, and there are also public service requirements, such as security, behavior pattern, and personal appearance. Elaborate application forms and examinations have to be completed, and behind the scenes much checking of personal records and references takes place before an offer of permanent employment can be made.

Probation. The probationary period gives time to complete formal checking and to see whether newcomers measure up to the job. The recruits' educational qualifications may be no indication of their practical competence. They may not be suitable as public servants because of defects in work habits and personality. The information on the application forms may prove to be false. They may not like the public service at all, or they may dislike their first placement.

Promotion

Promotion mania is not confined to public services; it is characteristic of every bureaucracy. For most public employees, advancement is the only way they can improve their living standards, social status, and self-esteem. But promotion opportunities are not uniform. The horizontal structure of occupational categories prevents more than a very small proportion from gaining promotion beyond the first few steps. The vertical divisional structure may prevent any career switch between occupational categories. Public authorities do not grow at the same rate, and some even decline. Staff known to promoting authorities are likely to receive more favorable consideration than staff not known, which means that head office staff usually receive preference over field staff. Finally,

in many areas of public service, it is virtually impossible to demonstrate on-the-job qualities in higher positions.

Rewards

Before the nineteenth century, the public service was a highly regarded profession. Not only was remuneration at upper levels high even by modern standards, but the opportunities for extra rewards were extensive. In poor countries and totalitarian regimes, public service is still similarly profitable. Elsewhere, egalitarianism, democratization, and scientific management have considerably reduced the comparative rewards of public service, and opportunities for extra rewards have been greatly curtailed, if not ended altogether. Where social status and occupational prestige are measured in terms of material rewards, the public service has declined with the fall in comparative rewards.

The public service still remains particularly attractive to (a) persons, wealthy and nonwealthy, who find public service its own reward, (b) persons who are discriminated against in other employment and (c) qualified persons who for whatever reason cannot find employment elsewhere. Once they have grown used to public service, they are reluctant to leave it. The working atmosphere is congenial. One's colleagues are unpretentious; nobody has to prove anything to anyone else. They are also protective and easy-going. Everybody is fairly secure and employment practices are just. Job related expenses are reimbursed and compensation is adequate to make a decent living. Altogether public service can be comfortable employment.

Critics of public service career systems claim that public employment has been made too comfortable. Public servants are overly sheltered from blasts of economic insecurity that might induce them to do better. In the words of American news commentator David Brinkley, "people get paid whether they produce or not, whether they work hard or not at all. And it's almost unheard of for anyone to get fired. Government pay is higher than civilian (sic) pay for the same work, so are the benefits. And people get raises by just staying on, regardless of merit."¹ While

there are few ways to reward public servants for exceptional performance, it is quite difficult to penalize poor performers. Good employees are often tempted to leave while poor employees who cannot easily find alternative employment, entrench themselves, and are automatically entitled to the same benefits. A levelling down effect occurs. Tenure, instead of freeing public servants from demeaning anxieties about their future so that they can concentrate on doing a good job without fear or favor in furthering the public interest,² produces unadventurous time-servers who do not have to move but merely satisfy the demands of their peers as to acceptable performance. Such dysfunctions of career systems are found in all organizations, public and private, which provide tenure. In short, "the bureaucratic life rewards conspiracy, sycophancy, ideological conformity, caution and class solidarity. It punishes innovation, originality, and the work ethic."³

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM

Around the world, there has been growing concern since the early 1960s with the inability of the modern administrative state to ensure the economic, efficient and effective delivery of public goods and services and the failure of public agencies to attract and retain sufficient quality staff. Many countries have instigated far-ranging public inquiries to discover the underlying reasons and to suggest improvements. Even more have established permanent machinery for the overhaul and reform of their public services. Civil service reform is once more in fashion. This time, the major concern is not so much the replacement of a spoils system with a merit system as the revitalization of existing merit systems to restore faith in public administration and improve the effectiveness of government. The objectives are much the same everywhere. They are (a) to simplify public personnel practices, (b) to improve, strengthen and upgrade professional public management, (c) to widen access to public employment and to promote greater mobility between public and private sectors, (d) to raise public sector

performance, productivity, incentives and attractiveness, and (e) to strengthen public employee rights against discretionary treatment.

If history is any guide, countries copy one another's experiments and ideas and significant shifts in approach in one country are likely to be studied carefully. For this reason, recent reforms in the federal civil service of the United States are worth describing, not because they are superior to anything else (they are probably not) or because they are startlingly innovative (they have already been tried by other public authorities), but because the federal government's pattern has usually been copied by the states and local governments, and foreign governments often send study missions to the United States to discover current American thinking and practice. Further, the surprisingly easy passage of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 constitutes a landmark in American public personnel administration. It incorporated many changes that had already been made by several states and cities, but more important was the strategy of civil service reform adopted by the President and the philosophy behind the reform package.

Throughout his campaign and after, President Carter promised to make civil service reform the centerpiece of his reorganization of the federal bureaucracy. He decided against a new Hoover-type commission of inquiry, preferring instead a task force strategy. He thought that meaningful reform would have to be an ongoing process, involving measured considerations of alternative plans and proposals, consultation and cooptation of interested and affected parties, and minimal dislocation of an administration in action. He requested the U.S. Civil Service Commission and the Office of Management and Budget, the two organizations most closely involved in overhauling federal public personnel arrangements, to work together on the Personnel Management Project. Quickly, nine separate task forces set to work on various facets of civil service reform and within six months their findings were consolidated into a final staff report which contained 125 recommendations.

The staff report was highly critical of the existing civil service system—its bewildering complexity, time-consuming and confusing red tape, its stress on form over substance, its protection of

incompetence, its failure to protect against political assaults and cronyism—which did not allow managers to manage. Among its more radical proposals were the following:

1. Organizing for personnel management—the abolition of the U.S. Civil Service Commission and dividing its functions between an independent administrative agency (Office of Personnel Management headed by a single director appointed by the President) and an independent Merit Protection Board, and the establishment of a Federal Labor Relations Authority;
2. Cutting red tape in personnel management—streamlining the system, decentralizing personnel management authority, allowing greater agency flexibility over personnel;
3. Protecting merit principles and protecting employees—stronger safeguards for merit principles, strong protection for employees against discrimination and victimization;
4. Helping managers manage well—eliminating inhibitory central controls, providing improved management systems, establishing executive development programs, improving performance evaluation;
5. Establishing a Senior Executive Service—creating a new senior executive corps based on rank not position, whose compensation and tenure would be linked to performance;
6. Improving pay and benefit systems—improving comparability, testing a merit pay system;
7. Equal opportunity—setting goals, restricting veterans preference.

Particularly striking were the recommendations for direct executive assumption of personnel policy and management, the creation of a top level management corps rewarded on performance and capable of being shifted between public agencies, decentralization of personnel management, and the enhancement of public employee rights.

This blueprint for reform was well received by the business community, mass media, the management profession, and the federal civil service itself. Objections were raised by employee

organizations and veterans as might be expected, and by defenders of the civil service commission system, representatives of minority groups who felt that equal opportunity provisions did not go far enough, and academic theorists who thought that the adoption of a business model was a retrograde step.

The President threw all his prestige behind the blueprint. He was strongly supported by expert testimony. Expected congressional opposition failed to materialize after some controversial provisions offensive to favored interest groups had been dropped. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 was overwhelmingly approved, presumably because it was long overdue. Among the provisions that went into effect in 1979 were the Senior Executive Service, performance incentives, the protection of whistle-blowers, and greater managerial flexibility. Perhaps, more important for the future than any of these will be the interpretation of the nine merit system principles spelled out in the Act.

- “(1) Recruitment should be from qualified individuals from appropriate sources in an endeavor to achieve a work force from all segments of society, and selection and advancement should be determined solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills, after fair and open competition which assures that all receive equal opportunity.
- (2) All employees and applicants for employment should receive fair and equitable treatment in all aspects of personnel management without regard to political affiliation, race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or handicapping condition, and with proper regard for their privacy and constitutional rights.
- (3) Equal pay should be provided for work of equal value, with appropriate consideration of both national and local rates paid by employers in the private sector, and appropriate incentives and recognition should be provided for excellence in performance.
- (4) All employees should maintain high standards of integrity, conduct, and concern for the public interest.

- (5) The Federal work force should be used efficiently and effectively.
- (6) Employees should be retained on the basis of adequacy of their performance, inadequate performance should be corrected, and employees should be separated who cannot or will not improve their performance to meet required standards.
- (7) Employees should be provided effective education and training in cases in which such education and training would result in better organizational and individual performance.
- (8) Employees should be—
 - (A) protected against arbitrary action, personal favoritism, or coercion for partisan political purposes, and
 - (B) prohibited from using their official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomination for election.
- (9) Employees should be protected against reprisal for the lawful disclosure of information which the employees reasonably believe evidences—
 - (A) a violation of law, or regulation, or
 - (B) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, or an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety."

No doubt in time they will be recast as public administrators endeavor, in the words of the Act, "to provide the people of the United States with a competent, honest, and productive Federal work force reflective of the Nation's diversity, and to improve the quality of public service."

PROFESSIONAL STYLE

High quality performance in public employment requires not only an overhaul of public personnel systems but also a change

in public service attitudes. Several public service professions complain that they are not accorded the same status as the traditional professions. They blame snobbery and income differentials, bureaucratized career structures, lesser academic standing, limited opportunities for private practice, and contrasting practitioner-client relations. They should also blame their lack of true professional style. True as opposed to pseudo- or para-professionals keep up to date with professional doings, know where to look for more expert advice, try to advance the state of the art and assume personal responsibility for community leadership. Lawyers know changes in the law and important court decisions. Tax accountants know the latest tax regulations and what changes are in the offing. Architects know the latest designs and fashions. They keep current by subscribing to the leading journals in their field, consulting with specialists and attending professional meetings at which the latest research and advances are discussed. They believe they are delivering the best professional service available and in their own way contributing to advancing the art. They keep alive the hope that they personally will discover the crucial breakthrough in improving professional performance. They encourage each other to experiment. Their professional bodies expect them to be more than good practitioners—to be good people and good citizens too. This model of professionalism is continually extolled in professional circles.

Such professionalism can also be found throughout public administration—among members of the traditional professions who work in the public sector, the diplomatic corps, and to a lesser extent, the officer class of the armed services, the inner circle of the most senior civil servants, the elite scientists and researchers, and some leaders of the public service professions. But it does not seem to go much beyond that. From what meager evidence exists, few eligible career public servants who claim professional status actually join their professional associations or subscribe to leading professional journals. Few practitioners contribute to the literature and few have ready at hand in their own offices any tangible evidence of the latest professional wisdom. In contrast, no legal office is complete without yards of

shelving containing consolidated statutes and appeal court decisions, and no medical office lacks the latest editions of leading medical texts. Few professional administrators appear to keep abreast of current developments outside their own narrow interests, let alone know about the latest advances in the state of the art or research in progress. Nor do they make much effort to find out even at professional gatherings where learning something new that could be incorporated into practice is rarely the major order of business. On the contrary, the outlook is conservative and parochial, mostly ritualistic approval of current practices rather than critical appraisal of the experimental and innovative. Furthermore, many public professional associations evidence considerable reluctance to make a public stand on current issues. The ultimate unprofessional attitude is the actual discouragement to practitioners to study, experiment and participate actively in community affairs. They have been too concerned instead with the somewhat stuffy attitudes of safe, consolidating bureaucrats who, whatever else they may have excelled at, have not been particularly original thinkers or innovators.

The public professional associations have to assume a more active role in inculcating truly professional attitudes within public administration. Like their counterparts in the traditional professions once did, they have to take the initiative, in intellectualizing their specializations, agreeing on the basic core of knowledge that candidates should know before they practice, encouraging research and experimentation by practitioners, upgrading the quality of their publications, keeping members continually informed of current developments and research, and monitoring the general quality of practitioner performance. All of them originally intended to do such things. Some have achieved commendable success. But in general they have not exercised the kind of leadership that has been required to refurbish public images of public administration and to encourage public administrators to change their own images of their profession and themselves. Their task is to convince the public that the modern breed of public administrator does not exhibit such a safety-first style of decision-making, exact such strictly conformist behavior, or tolerate something less than

quality performance as common stereotypes would have the public believe.

Images do count. They affect the relations between the governors and the governed. They determine how the public views public administration and how public officials view their jobs and their clients. They influence occupational standings, career selection, academic ranking, educational investment, training priorities, and research interests. Businesses know what they do when they invest in projecting the right image for their products and themselves. In a competitive world, images can make all the difference between success and failure. Whether or not it wants to, public administration has to compete for resources and clients. If its performance is damaged by misconceptions, false stereotypes, and outmoded images, then something has to be done to correct matters if performance is to improve. With the world shaping the way it is, this is not the time for complacency.

NOTES

1. Quoted in A. Campbell, "Running Out of Steam?", *Civil Service Journal*, Vol. 18, 1978, p. 5.
2. M. Greenfield, "What is Merit?", *Washington Post*, March 8, 1978.
3. A. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

9 Public Administration Theory

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION HAS yet to develop a systematic body of theory of its own. There are theories *in* public administration, but there are few general theories *of* public administration. Rarely is the term “public administration theory” even employed in the literature of public administration. It evokes memories still of the simplistic normative slogans of administrative reformers against politicization and of the naive administrative proverbs of the scientific management approach to public administration before World War II. The disillusionment with public administration theory following the publication of Simon’s *Administrative Behavior* and Waldo’s *The Administrative State*, the latter summarizing it as “crude, presumptuous, incomplete—wrong in some of its conclusions, naive in its scientific methodology, parochial in its outlook,”¹ has persisted.

Meanwhile, public administrators have borrowed ideas, methods, techniques, and approaches from other disciplines and have applied them, with varying degrees of success, to public administration. People trained in other disciplines have applied

their ideas to the largest and most obvious organizations in society, namely, the military, the public bureaucracy, social service agencies, and public enterprises which are conceptually, institutionally, and functionally within the discipline of public administration. Thus, the use of theory in public administration has actually been expanding.

The abundant theories in public administration deal with things both bigger and smaller than public administration, but not with public administration itself. On the one hand, they deal with all administration, all organized cooperative effort, all social organizations, all human behavior, of which public administration is part; on the other, they deal with unique practices, specific organizations, special administrative case studies, and particular administrative subprocesses that constitute parts of public administration. Few of these theories deal with the nature of public administration itself.

THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THEORISTS

With some notable exceptions, the theorists accept public administration as the major instrument of the administrative state. They take the public sector for granted without much philosophical musing or ideological linkage. They do not believe that government or the state will wither away and with it the public bureaucracy. They do not foresee any marked return to laissez-faire or the abandonment of public enterprise and regulation. They assume public administration will continue much as it is and they are critical of those who forecast the coming death of bureaucracy and who advocate debureaucratization and the abandonment of the administrative state. They are confident that public administration will be around for a long time to come and that it will expand, not contract, as long as the demand for public goods and services remains unsatisfied. Although public administration serves interests and ends beneficent to all members of the community, few theorists attempt to explain what should compose the interests and ends, or how public administration might maximize

those interests and ends. The good life, the good individual, the good community—these most theorists leave to political philosophers.

Most public administration theorists, like their business counterparts, have embraced the philosophy of the organizational society. They believe that human wants can only be satisfied on a large scale by organized human effort and the willingness of individuals to discipline themselves to accept the requirements of cooperative endeavors. Through organizations, humanity will eventually master its environment and fulfill its destiny. People will live the good life, free from hunger, disease, ignorance and poverty. Collectively, they will attain things that they could never achieve by their own unaided individual efforts. In the process, they will transcend personal limitations, find fellowship and better fulfill themselves. To obtain these primary benefits of the organizational society, they have, however, to accept organizational imperatives, accommodate themselves to organizational requirements, and rely on organizations to meet their needs. They must also allow themselves to be managed by organizations or rather by organizational elites held personally responsible and accountable for conducting public business in the public interest.

This vision of the happily managed society in which everything would work to precision with minimal waste, organizations would be run in perfect harmony, the managers would be adequately prepared for their jobs, and the managed quite satisfied with their lot, has been perfected by public administration theorists of every political persuasion. It is almost an apolitical behavioristic managerial creed. Those who embrace it tend to exaggerate the organizational solution to the human predicament. They play down its elitist, conformist, and paternal implications and pull back from the deeper philosophical, moral and political issues involved. Instead, they theorize about the internal technical aspects of managing public organizations, not about the external nontechnical aspects for which they believe themselves ill equipped. In so doing, they justify and reinforce the organizational society and like the Pied Piper of Hamelin they excite people to follow them they know not where.

Public policy makers and administrative practitioners complain that they can find little theoretical guidance relevant to their current concerns. They claim that theorists have in mind some mythical world with which they cannot identify, or they use such abstract and rarified language that they cannot be understood. In response, the theorists complain that the practitioners, steeped in pragmatism, do not make the effort to understand or cannot be bothered with any theorists that do not rationalize what is currently happening in the practice of public administration or what they want to happen. The theorists point to the hasty acclaim given to any idea that appears at first glance to answer practical problems, despite their warnings and strictures. The practitioners rejoin that they go wherever they can for help. The public administration theorists do not do the things that interest them and anyway, apart from "illustrative case materials" and "supplementary model building,"² the theorists have not contributed much of their own. Too little relevant public administration theory exists.

The paucity of public administration theory is readily explainable. There has to be something distinctive to theorize about and until the evolution of the administrative state, public administration was part of something else—law, religion, government. People have to be prepared to theorize about public administration which is dominantly a practitioner's domain, the aim being to get things done with minimal show. Accordingly, public administration should be unobtrusive. In any event, practitioners, as people of action, are not too interested in philosophizing about what they do nor are they too keen to reveal the tricks of the trade.

Only with the development of the social sciences have the ideas and advice of practitioners been subjected to systematic thought and research and then in far too culture bound fashion. Attempts to import foreign concepts have been disastrous, thus reinforcing the predilections toward pragmatic empiricism and improvisation. Probably the most severe obstacle to successful theorizing about public administration is that it has to be based on a theory of the administrative state which in turn has to posit

a plausible theory of the Good Society, and so far nobody has been able to raise his sights high enough or in doing so to gain universal recognition. In the meantime, we have to settle for less.

WHY THEORY?

Settling for less does not mean settling for nothing. Practitioners claim they have no use for theory. They say they can perform just as well, and perhaps even better, without their heads being filled with theory, conceptual frameworks, ideal models, unverifiable hypotheses. There is the real world—of crucial problems that cannot wait, of important social activities that must be carried out without interruption, of political power plays between rival ideologies, values and interests that cannot be ignored, of large scale organizations, large sums of money and large bodies of people that have to be managed, of administrative in-fighting that permits no relaxation, of ceaseless movement that cannot be stopped. Rarely do they have a moment to call their own let alone time to reflect.

Yet, unconsciously, practitioners employ theory, make assumptions, test concepts, verify hypotheses, and evaluate ideas. Human beings are thinking animals, with exceptional capacity to abstract and to absorb and learn from abstractions. An ounce of such applicable theory has been worth tons of needless labor, and to ignore theory altogether, as many practitioners pride themselves on doing, is to reject humanity's intellectuality and its ability to make shortcuts via abstraction for theory is no more than "the shortest way of saying something important. . . ." ³

Theory is an essential tool for the progress of civilization. As the symbolic representation of the real, it enables people to communicate quickly and effectively. It is intellectual shorthand, which saves each generation having to relearn all that has already been discovered. As people learn more and more, their vocabulary expands and their theories change considerably. Theorists who have mixed up their facts or misinterpreted and distorted them

are eventually ignored. Their unreal and untenable theories are abandoned as pure tautology or specialized jargon, dressed up to say the obvious.

In contrast, verifiable theories—stated relationships ordering observable data or experience—have much to offer. First, they tell something meaningful about the real world that can be applied to real-life situations. Second, by ordering otherwise disjointed or overwhelming data, they give perspective to the real world and convey something important to the observer. Third, by revealing a reality that may not be readily self-evident from the facts themselves, they stimulate new ways of looking at familiar things and different actions. This may be especially helpful in problem solving. Fourth, they form a solid base from which further theorizing can take place. Fifth, definite relationships imply the possibility of controlled relationships and prediction. For these reasons, the value of administrative theory cannot be underrated in the organizational society or by those who consider themselves to be professional administrators.

Stephen Bailey believes that:

The objectives of public administration theory are to draw together the insights of the humanities and the validated propositions of the social and behavioral sciences and to apply these insights and propositions to the task of improving the processes of government and aimed at achieving politically legitimated goals by constitutionally mandated means.⁴

Bailey would select from the whole body of human knowledge whatever appears relevant and useful in explaining the nature of public administration, verifiable through observation or experiment and capable of predicting the behavior of public organizations and the people who compose them and come into contact with them. He also has in mind prescription clearly related to the theorist's values, beliefs and background. He wants public administration theories to prescribe what conditions and relationships should exist in public administration. How should government be organized? How should public servants be selected? How

should authority and responsibility be assigned in public agencies? What principles should govern public directions?

Others contend that it is enough to stop at description, to explain what and why things occur, not to intervene and push public administration in any particular direction. They are of a conservative not reformist disposition and their theory is less prescriptive, less dogmatic, less interventionist, and possibly less impactful on practitioners who are not so ready as they used to be to embrace new theories and find difficulty in choosing between the many rival schools of theory.

Before examining and comparing the major schools of administrative theory, it is important to bear in mind that they do share a common theoretical base which consists of four essential constituents. (a) *Postulates* are assumptions that are not directly demonstrable. They are inspirational movers; they drive administrative reformers; they set ideal targets; they indicate possibilities. But if too presumptive, they may frustrate and disappoint when people fail to live up to them. (b) *Definitions* describe terms used in postulates. They may direct attention to the complexity of administration and the need for clarification of terms used in normal speech. Extended, the definitional techniques become theoretical frameworks, typologies, and classifications for empirical study.

(c) *Propositions* indicate logical relationships between concepts derived from postulates and definitions. They indicate what will happen should a certain requirement be met. Much administrative theory is propositional. "If a public authority adopts the merit system, then the quality of its staff will improve" is a typical example. Unfortunately, too few variables may be considered, or, more frequently, what is intended as instrumental is normative, that is, rationalized wishful thinking, based on superficial observation. (d) *Hypotheses* are measurable propositional statements about the relationships between variables. They are operational and the most useful to public administrators. They most help to determine whether a particular theory is (i) *descriptive-explanatory*, concerned with "what" and "why"; (ii) *normative*, concerned with "should" and "good;" (iii) *assumptive*, concerned

with "pre-conditions" and "possibilities;" or (iv) *instrumental*, concerned with "how" and "when."

SCHOOLS OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY

The rapid expansion of administrative theory in recent decades precludes the possibility that justice can be done to all theories and theorists. There are now so many that it is becoming virtually impossible to reach agreement how they should be classified as they no longer fit into any neat tabulation. Possibly the only common element they share is that they concentrate on how people at the apex of social organizations, public and private, get things done. They make certain generalizations about the administrative process.

- a. The process consists of a number of interrelated and interdependent subprocesses, which are means to an end, not ends in themselves. They are habitual institutionalized actions.
- b. The subprocesses are employed by a formally organized group of people working together to attain common goals normally beyond individual accomplishment. Generalizations about the subprocesses are valid for all organizations.
- c. The success of the process is measured in terms of accomplishing common goals, which may be subject to change.
- d. The ability to work through other people is a specialized skill that can be observed, studied, and possibly taught, and is transferable between organizations.
- e. Although the process is intangible and invisible, it is concerned with the ordering of resources, more especially human resources, throughout the organization. It is largely a mental activity.
- f. The process is conditioned by the culture in which it operates, and the skill is shaped by social factors such as education, technical knowledge, law, and communications.

These six propositions are the starting point of most writing about the nature of administrative activity. Beyond this point, they differ and in reviewing different schools of administrative theory, largely following Harold Koontz's classification,⁵ one must keep in mind the story of the six blind men and the elephant. Although all attempt to describe the same object, by touching different aspects they appear to be describing different things.

1. Administrative process school

The administrative process school analyzes the nature of administrative activities and seeks to identify common operating principles that can be generally applied to improve administrative practice. It owes much to Henri Fayol, a French industrialist, who defined the administrative functions as organizing, coordinating, commanding, controlling, and *prevoyance* (a mixture of forecasting and planning). Drawing on his experience, he listed fourteen administrative principles and sixteen administrative rules for the guidance of administrators. Between the world wars, these principles and rules were reformulated and simplified by Lyndall Urwick and others in Britain into the acronym SLOCUS, standing for staff, line, organization, communication and span of control.⁶ They were further redesigned by Luther Gulick in the United States into the more popularized acronym POSDCORB, representing *planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting*, the study of which could reveal universal principles with predictive value based on verifiable experience, applicable in all administration.

The administrative process approach continues to dominate managerial thinking. It deals almost exclusively with the anatomy of formal organization, that is, the division of labor, the vertical (scalar) and horizontal (functional) growth of the organization, structure (e.g., line and staff), and span of control. On the basis of observation, model building, experimentation and validation, general propositions are formulated about each. Although descriptive-explanatory, they are used normatively to tell administrators how they should organize. Public administrators have four sets of such normative principles available to them.

(a) *General theories of administration* apply to all organizations, all administration, all management, irrespective of legal status, functions, objectives, size, composition and other organizational variables. They are predominantly instrumental in nature, addressed largely to bureaucratic elites as a means of running organizations. They discount differences between public administration and business management and aim to eliminate such distinctions. To emphasize the point they rarely use the qualifying terms "public and business," and they draw their examples indiscriminately from all organizations.

(b) *General theories of public administration* discriminate between public and private sector organizations and treat public administration as something distinct and separate by virtue of certain characteristics peculiar to public sector organizations. They focus on operating principles that seem unique or specific to public sector organizations.

(c) *Functional theories of public administration* concentrate on operating principles that distinguish specific government functions or public goods from one another. Thus there are principles of police administration, education administration, health administration, public works administration, fire administration and social welfare administration, based on the peculiar requirements of specific public goods and services or public service professions.

(d) *Process theories of public administration* distinguish between the different processes of public administration and management. Thus there are principles of public personnel administration, public finance, public budgeting, government contracting, and public inventory-keeping. Actually, theory is assumed in them. They are largely practitioners' manuals outlining particular management systems employable in public sector organizations.

The main criticisms of the administrative process school are that its principles are either too generalized to be useful or too elaborate and too couched in jargon to be readily understood; that too little testing of propositions and their assumptions is undertaken; that there are too many principles that need consolidating; and that the scope of administrative activity is defined too narrowly, being too inward-looking and too conscious of bureaucratic elites. From the public administration viewpoint,

considerable doubt exists whether the principles are valid in a political setting, whether administrative problems can be treated purely in process terms, whether the discipline should be wholly concerned with the solution of practical problems and guidelines to administrators and politicians, and whether the principles are related to actual behavior in real-life situations. The administrative process model may be too rational, too formal, too authoritarian, too conformist, too dependent on cosmic constitutionalism (that is, that "oughts" can be derived from facts). At least, it has become more rigorous, more intellectually demanding, closer to the facts, and more meaningful than the naïve principles approach between the world wars, even if it does limit itself to only one aspect of a public administrator's concerns.

2. The empirical school

The empirical school also believes that general principles can emerge from the study of administrative practice, in this case actual case studies rather than idealizations of current practices or hypothetical constructs. By examining experience, administrators learn to appreciate which techniques and principles apply under what circumstances. The empirical school is obviously relevant to public administration in that public agencies are fairly permanent and stable organizations whose circumstances do not vary that much, although when circumstances change past experience may be no guide to coping with new conditions and novel problems. The empirical school has been particularly influential where a strong administrative law tradition has prevailed as in Europe, and where administrative theory has been slow to develop or treated with circumspection among practitioners, as in the British Commonwealth. Its advantage over the administrative process school is its rejection of any administration-policy dichotomy and its refusal to be drawn into theory for theory's sake. It is reluctant to speculate, abstract and generalize. It is more cautionary, down-to-earth, and restricted, altogether less ambitious than the administrative process school which tends to soar to heights that oftentimes scare practitioners.

3. The human behavior school

The human behavior school concentrates on informal organization, that is, how people behave in organizations and how organizations actually work. It describes administration as it really is and applies the findings of the behavioral sciences to administrative theory. In so doing, it explores phenomena ignored by the administrative process and empirical schools, such as communication, conflict, motivation, leadership, status, and social interaction. Once largely concerned with human relations in the work place, it has broadened its horizons to complex social interaction and the human side of organizations. The human relations approach still remains important. However, the idea of treating employees as human beings rather than work hands or human appendages of machinery, has been superseded by sophisticated studies of morale, leadership, communications, and informal relationships in an organizational setting. How to get the best out of workers through the manipulation of human psychology has now been put aside by theorists, who have begun to explore the implications of cultural heritage, the impact of bureaucratization on the individual personality, deviation and conformity in group behavior, generational and sex differences in work roles, and participative management. Gradually the scope of the human behavior school has extended from the early studies of work norms and incentives to applied behavioral science.

The more that is discovered about how organizations work, the more complicated organizations are revealed to be. They seem to have a soul of their own, separate from the people who compose them. They free themselves of external controls, transpose objectives, build external supports to guarantee continued survival and growth, resist innovation, act irrationally and do many other things that contradict the assumptions and expectations of classical organization theory. Moreover, the people who compose them are not interchangeable, unfeeling building blocks capable of being ordered at will. They, too, are more complicated and have their own agendas. They can be forced, controlled and manipulated, but better results can be obtained if they are trusted, encouraged

to contribute voluntarily their utmost, and permitted to control themselves and participate in decisions affecting them.

Despite protests to the contrary, the human behavior school does have normative overtones in favor of humane democracy against impersonal autocracy. Perhaps for this reason, it has not had much impact on public administration, but industrial theorists such as Chris Argyris, Warren Bennis, Robert Golembiewski, Elliott Jaques, Rensis Likert, Douglas McGregor, and Abraham Maslow, who have worked with public sector organizations, have influenced public administrators.

4. The bureaucratic analysis school

The dominant form of public organization in contemporary society is bureaucracy. Although its study dates back to the eighteenth century,⁷ the bureaucratic analysis school is based on the conceptualization of bureaucracy by the German sociologist Max Weber.⁸ For him the organizational society was the culmination of the historical process of rationality and the bureaucratization of social organization. His analysis has come the closest to a common paradigm in administrative science and most subsequent bureaucratic analysis is either an elaboration of Weber's conceptualization or an attempt to operationalize his concepts, in any event, a rounding off of Weber's analysis or a reinterpretation in the light of later developments.

Weber's ideal model of bureaucracy was a conceptual construction of certain administrative characteristics typical of bureaucratic organization arranged logically and consistently. It was not meant to be a description of the typical or average bureaucracy. For Weber, bureaucracy was a control system based on rational rules which regulated the organization's structure and process according to technical knowledge and maximum efficiency. Current literature has since reduced Weber's administrative characteristics to a high degree of specialization, an hierarchical authority structure, impersonal relations, merit system of appointment and promotion, and organizational management. As this form of

organization was superior to others and was indispensable for mass administration, modern society would become increasingly bureaucratized. Weber's predictions have since been realized. Modern society has indeed been bureaucratized and the major form of public administration is the bureaucratic organization. Consequently, bureaucratic analysis has become crucial in the study of public administration.

Contemporary bureaucratic analysis focuses largely on the functional and dysfunctional aspects of bureaucratic administration, bureaucratic behavior, the cultural environment of bureaucracy, bureaucratic power, bureaucratic displacement of goals, categories of bureaucracy, and the bureaucratization of the administrative culture. Much organization theory is really bureaucratic analysis—constructing models of actual bureaucracies, examining bureaucratic roles and bureaucratic behavior, investigating bureaucratic processes, describing the internal world of bureaucracy, viewing bureaucracy from outside and from below, probing the nature of bureaucratic pathologies, and delving into the adaptive nature of bureaucracy to change. Most organization theorists are bureaucratic theorists, using public sector organizations as their source material. Most recent innovative thinking about organizations has been based on public bureaucracies, including the classic studies by Herbert Simon, Philip Selznick, Peter Drucker, Peter Blau, Shmuel Eisenstadt and Michael Crozier, as well as more humorous studies of bureaucracy by Northcote Parkinson, Lawrence Peter and Peter Townsend.

5. The social system school

Not all organizations are bureaucratic. Something more inclusive than Weber's conceptualization is needed. This would appear to be the idea that organizations are systems of mutually dependent variables, first put forward by American industrialist Chester Barnard.⁹ He argued that organizations were elaborate systems of mutual cooperation and dependency whose parts were linked together and adjusted themselves to each other. He identified the parts as the task environment—the individuals who join

together for a mutual purpose, the formal structure, and the informal organization. He further elaborated his ideas why and how the parts interacted and what kept the whole system together, working and surviving.

Barnard's idea of organizations as social systems appeared two decades before general systems theorists sought to create "a universal science using common organizational elements found in all systems. . . ." ¹⁰ Models were borrowed from biology, engineering, cybernetics and sociology to elaborate social exchange theories, develop organizational typologies and explore the nature of both closed and open systems. Although few social systems theorists have worked with public agencies or used source material drawn from public administration, they have brought a wider perspective to xenophobic public agencies and inward looking public administrators. By focusing on the goals of public administration systems and on the part public sector organizations play in achieving them, the social system school has broadened understanding of the relationship between public administration and society. It has been particularly influential in the study of comparative public administration.

6. The decision making school

Chester Barnard also pointed out that organizations were systems of decision making. Organizational action was based on careful calculation and a crucial function of executives was decision making. Following up, Herbert Simon argued in the late 1940s that administrative theory "should be concerned with the processes of decision as well as with the processes of action" and that a general theory of administration should "include principles of organization that will ensure correct decision making just as it must include principles that will ensure effective action."¹¹ At the time Simon's emphasis on correct decisions as well as right ways of doing things did not impress public administrators and virtually single handed he continued his exploration of decision making in organizations, elaborating on various models of decision making process. By the 1960s, his concerns were shared by public

administrators grappling with policy problems, control designs and engineering complexities in space and defense technology. His pathfinding efforts soon spawned many offshoots in policy sciences, public choice theory, management science, forecasting and futurizing.

Models of decision making have taken some researchers into public policy studies and public choice theory and others into budgeting and accounting, program evaluation and productivity measurement. The rapid development of computer technology has changed white collar work, encouraged simulation models and forecasting, and speeded research. Experimentation with new decision techniques (such as critical path scheduling, Program Evaluation Review Technique and stochastic processes) has produced a new breed of managerial technicians. Taken together, the nature of large scale organizational management has been transformed in less than a generation. Public sector organizations have had to adjust accordingly. Public administration has become a much more sophisticated managerial science not in ruthless pursuit of mechanical efficiency in means (as Simon once feared) but in an effort to guide the administrative state on set courses through an increasingly complicated and turbulent environment and to master the complexities of size and growth in the public sector.

7. The mathematics school

It is a short step from system design and computer simulation to mathematical physics and the employment of mathematical models to predict possible outcomes in various situations under conditions of uncertainty. Public sector organizations have heavily invested in this kind of simulation to forecast receipts and expenditures, to plan and construct large scale public works, to keep track of materials being processed, and to locate specific items. Just as physical scientists construct mock-ups and scale models, so management scientists construct mathematical models and theoretical simulations as symbolic representations of the procedures to be studied. Model construction entails identification of significant variables and the relationships between them: specifica-

tion of objectives and the criteria by which objectives may be measured; and listing of restrictions and restraints, including uncertainties, all expressed in explicit and quantitative terms. Models successfully employed in public administration include linear programming, game theory, Monte Carlo methods, queuing theory and dynamic programming. They have reduced rule-by-thumb and other costly trial-and-error methods and they have been successfully used in a variety of public activities.

But the mathematical theorists go further. They believe that administration is a logical process and can be "expressed in terms of mathematical symbols and relationships."¹² If they are right, then the other schools are wrong, and if the other schools are right, then they are wrong. It is unlikely that administration is logical or that it can be reduced to mathematical symbols. Mathematical physics is a useful tool for administrative practitioners, particularly in planning, policy making, management control, and data collection, but it can only be applied to quantifiable data.

8. The integrationist school

Several valiant attempts have been made to simplify administrative theory by reducing the various schools into two, a reductionist administrative process school that would incorporate the empirical, decision-making and mathematical schools and focus on the components of administrative activity, and a holistic administrative system school that would incorporate the rest and examine the context of administrative activity. The integrationist school would like to consolidate them further. One strategy would be amalgamation and consolidation through standard definitions, cross-referencing, indexing and proposition inventories. A start in this direction was made by James March and Herbert Simon in *Organizations* (Wiley, New York, 1958) and continued in James March's encyclopedic *Handbook of Organizations* (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1965). Since then, the task has probably become unmanageable and uneconomic. It would now require substantial resources and active cooperation and participation of the different schools in an enterprise that would probably intensify their rivalry.

A second strategy would be to fuse all schools within an overarching theory, as proposed in the early issues of the *Administrative Science Quarterly*. An ambitious attempt was made by Bertram Gross in *The Managing of Organizations* (Free Press, New York, 1964) but theorists have shown no inclination to accept any such common framework. The closest yet to a grand theory has been general systems theory which includes everything. But what is more or most relevant? It all depends on specific circumstances. In this way, contingency theory is hitched to systems theory. Administrative theory becomes a huge cookbook from which readers can compare recipes and select those that best suit their circumstances. Dwight Waldo suggests it might be entitled *Designing and Managing an Innovative, Efficient, Humane, Adaptive, Organization: A Systems, Structural, Behavioral, Environmental and Contingency Approach*.¹³ He does not believe that "agreement, unification, simplification and systematization lie in the immediate future."¹⁴ Anyhow, a new factor has arisen to throw administrative theory into further confusion, the rise of a counter-culture that challenges the assumptions of all the schools.

THE COUNTER-CULTURE CHALLENGE TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY

Misgivings about the organizational society, bureaucratization and the managerial revolution were not significantly represented in administrative theory until the 1950s when William Whyte questioned whether managers, as sycophantic conformists, should devote themselves to ensuring organizational survival and growth at the expense of their individuality, personality, and sanity.¹⁵ It was a prelude to other serious challenges to the organizational imperative ("whatever is good for man can only be achieved through modern organization—therefore, all behavior must enhance the health of such modern organizations")¹⁶ and the idolization of large scale bureaucracies, that eventually culminated in the 1960s into a revolt against the organizational society and its intellectual heritage. The dissenters, many of whom were grounded

in public administration, objected to organization theory because of its technocratic totalitarianism, its reductive humanism, its progressively subliminal techniques.¹⁷ They further objected to organizational theorists who would justify this new world order in which administration would be reduced merely to the stewardship of resources.¹⁸ They doubt whether the organizational society is unavoidable, whether organizations are indispensable in advancing collective purposes, whether the best form of organization is some variation of a rationally managed structure, and whether the best way to run organizations is through a superimposed managerial elite. Instead they forecast that the organizational society is doomed because it will be unable to survive conditions of scarcity. Large scale organizations will die. Bureaucratic man will be replaced by self actualizing man. Small will be beautiful again.¹⁹ The bureaucratic organization will be replaced by alternatives, more attuned to human needs and values, more adaptable as learning systems.²⁰

What distresses the counter-culture most about contemporary organizational society is the enthronement of managerial elites who are supposed to know best or better. The counter-culture opposes the managerial revolution. It wishes to restore personal responsibility, self-management, individual participation and collective decision making, and to replace totalitarian technocracy and meritocracy with democratic egalitarian and humanistic values. To achieve their aim, the most radical want to do away with the organizational society altogether, to abandon technocracy and bureaucracy, and to get rid of a professional managerial class. The more realistic plea for greater acknowledgement of what is involved in unthinking acceptance of a technocratic culture and for greater recognition of the limits and limitations of organizations and administration. They believe that the post industrial society will be more service-oriented, more people-oriented, more concerned with human needs and requirements, more sensitive, more humane, more responsive to human rather than technocratic values. It will deemphasize bureaucracy and tolerate a wide variety of organizational structures that will exhibit greater adaptability, flexibility and creativity, although some

theorists warn it could go in the opposite direction, into friendly fascism run by the significant people in a new authoritarianism of the Organized Society.²¹

In public administration, the excitement of the counter culture challenge was reflected in the New Public Administration movement of the early 1970s. It took a more radical turn than the operationalization of humanist organization theory by proponents of organization development (OD) and other revitalization techniques in public organizations. The New Public Administration movement advocated a more activist philosophy for American public administrators than the traditional instrumental role. It called for public officials to work for political values similar to those of the counter culture (such as participation, self-management, social equity, responsiveness, choice),²² to design public organizations to incorporate those values and to experiment with new forms of organization that would enhance such values. Thus Orion White suggested the "Dialectical Organization,"²³ and Fred Thayer wanted "*An End to Hierarchy! An End to Competition!*"²⁴ and Robert Simmons and Eugene Dvorin to go *From Amoral to Humane Bureaucracy*²⁵ and beyond to the recognition of Existential Man.²⁶

BACKLOG IN THEORY

Clearly, public administration theorists have gone searching far and wide for new ideas, concepts and models that may have some application. Their search has carried them so far beyond any appropriate boundaries for administrative theory that, according to Alberto Ramos, public administration may "have lost a sense of its specific assignment" and become "a hodgepodge of theoretical rumblings, lacking both force and direction."²⁷ Displacement of concepts has become misplacement, with the result that the field is a confusion of tongues. More importantly, it has lost its bearings to the mystification of both practitioners and students who can no longer relate theory to practice or vice versa. The theorists

insist on going their own separate ways. Independence has its place but it has become license bordering on anarchy, with much theory produced for theory's sake.

Consequently, the whole field is confused. The core concepts need clarification. Where does administration theory stop and organization theory start? Can "administration" and "organization" be defined accurately? Does administrative man exist? How do administrative subprocesses differ between organizational and nonorganizational settings? Can administrative subprocesses be considered apart from administrative objectives? It is not always clear that the theorists themselves recognize that they need to answer these kinds of questions satisfactorily to themselves. They only succeed in adding to the confusion. Perhaps less excusable is failure to explore previous attempts at theory in the same or related areas. Systematic administrative theory may only have developed in the twentieth century, but this is no reason for ignoring or rejecting the random theory that has been accumulated over the centuries, either as folklore or as the wisdom of the past ages. Circumstances may have been transformed, but the administrative predicament seems perennial from generation to generation.

Too much theory still seems obsessed with bureaucracy's search for rationality, legitimacy, stability, order, security, and conformity. Much of this theory also appears as advice to bureaucratic elites on how to maintain their position and still get the most out of the subordinate masses. The theorists tend to look downward and inward, rather than upward and outward, mesmerized with bureaucratic organization and reluctantly conceding that society could be administered in other ways. For the same reason, they tend to look backward rather than forward and to rest on past achievements, not dwell on future challenges, to assume a stable environment in equilibrium, not turbulent environment in the grip of uncontrollable forces. Their approach tends to be static, not dynamic, and consequently increasingly outmoded and irrelevant to practitioners in contemporary society.

Probably the most important priority is to increase awareness generally of the philosophical issues behind problem solving in public administration. In Stephen Bailey's words:

For if history teaches anything, it is that neither Plato's philosopher kings nor Jackson's untutored citizenry can safely manage a free society. Something besides natural or divine law must contain the propensities of the powerful: something beyond the transient prejudices and groupings of the *demos* must determine the end and means of society. Within this framework, public administration theory must attempt to fashion descriptions of reality, postulates of betterment, sophisticated assumptions about the capacities of men and institutions, and workable tenets of instrumentation which can improve both the ends and means of democratic government.²⁸

Practitioners have gone charging ahead, improvising solutions, without much thought to the deeper meaning behind what they do. The counter-culture theorists have rightly drawn attention to what they feel are wrong paths but their own alternatives seem too idealistic, or at least unrealistic or unrealizable, and unconvincing to practitioners who, steeped in what is, have difficulty focusing on what might be and devising practical bridges between the real and the ideal.

What most needs to be done is to develop theories of public administration. For a start, there is no acceptable or even coherent theory of the administrative state. The administrative state has been a reality for over a century, yet it still lacks an adequate philosophical base. It came into being for good practical reasons. It continues to expand for good practical reasons. Yet it has few ideological defenders. The political Right still wishes it away while the political Left claims ultimately to replace it, but with what is uncertain. Suggested alternatives to the administrative state have no better theoretical underpinnings. Indeed they seem to be drawn more on pious hope than scientific understanding of how organizations work and how people behave in them. Only bureaucracy seems to have performed well on a large scale, presenting a choice between private bureaucracies and public bureaucracies, which for counter-culture theorists is no choice at all.

Public bureaucracies are part of the administrative state while private bureaucracies are regulated by the administrative state in the public interest. Yet there is no acceptable theory of the public interest. Without an adequate theory of the public interest, public

administration loses much of its meaning. Public administration which is not run in the public interest is hardly distinguishable from any other kind of administration run in the private interest. There are good practical reasons why people should obey public authority, abide by public laws, pay taxes and expect high moral standards in transacting public business. They have yet to be adequately integrated into a comprehensive coherent theory of the public interest. Likewise throughout the practice of public administration one finds inadequate theory. Does a merit system of public service recruitment really outperform patronage? Is consolidated budgeting superior to fragmented or segmented budgeting? Is it socially wise to depend on governmental monopolies? Logic may not be empirically validated.

Perhaps the most serious gap in public administration thinking is the failure to recognize that where once public administrators managed things, they now for the most part manage people. The advent of the welfare state has transformed the nature of public sector activities and the predominant kinds of public services. Where once public administration was largely concerned with public laws, the armed services and taxes, it is now concerned with public health, public education, and public welfare. Yet the same administrative theories derived from the management of things is applied to the management of people. No wonder clients of public programs resent the way they are treated for they are being governed by the same management systems that govern the production of things. It may well be that the management of human resources (or whatever other euphemism is employed instead to refer to the management of people) requires a different theoretical base than the production of things.

NOTES

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10 Comparative Administrative Systems

EVERY SOCIETY HAS its own peculiar administrative style, its particular way of doing things through admixtures of administrative systems. No two of them are identical, although similar societies, sharing common cultural traits, may have similar institutional patterns and administrative norms. The coexistence of so many administrative systems tempts comparison of their structures, methods, composition, productivity and general performance and how they shape and are shaped by their specific context. Throughout history people have undertaken such comparisons to find out whether they could improve on their own arrangements. Sometimes they have done well but more often they have been disappointed because either they found nothing worthwhile to copy or what they copied did not turn out to give the expected results. The systematic study of comparative administrative systems dates only from nineteenth century research into comparative administrative law and did not really develop until after World War II. Before then, relatively few comparative studies were undertaken and these were mainly country by country comparisons of public service systems.

World War II transformed the situation by generating a continuing interest in foreign administrative systems. The war altered the political shape of the world. It destroyed the political regimes of the defeated powers and crippled the economies of most of the combatants. Few imperial powers could afford to maintain colonies. They could not resist militant national movements boosted by the war and the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union to champion subject peoples. War mobilization took many people into strange lands and forced them to work together in temporary international administrations. Prewar parochialism was shaken by war trauma and the ideological controversy that accompanied the peace. Internationalism assumed a new meaning as the world shrank in size and distance, with technological progress in transportation, communications, and weapons systems. During the war, new, permanent international bodies had been created to function after hostilities ended. Thus, the post-war world promised to be significantly different.

From the administrative standpoint, the postwar world had to be different. The combatants had to reconstruct their administrative systems to face the postwar challenge, and the defeated countries had to start anew. Numerous colonies of the great powers demanded and were promised independence and they, too, would need to reconstruct their administrative systems. The new international order would require new coordinating mechanisms and new organizations to perform international functions. So in the postwar era, the two major ideological blocs sought to reconstruct their own administrative systems, to convince newly independent states to copy their examples, and to agree between them on an acceptable international framework. Almost without exception, newly devised arrangements soon ran into difficulties and required expert assistance. They were found to lack the necessary infrastructure and resources or they were overburdened or they were just inappropriate. Several combatants made heavy weather of their postwar reconstruction efforts, much more than they had anticipated. Independence rarely provided relief for the new states. On the contrary, some collapsed into chaos and many others had to struggle just to survive. The new international bodies

that began so hopefully soon confronted a hostile reality they had not expected. Disappointment and disillusion spread quickly through the new international order.

The academic challenge was no less compelling than the practical challenge to get things to work better. If there really was to be a universal discipline of public administration, it would have to rise above purely idiosyncratic culture-bound national concerns to become truly transnational and comparative. The case for a truly universal discipline was succinctly put by Robert Dahl.

There should be no reason for supposing . . . that a principle of public administration has equal validity in every nation-state, or that successful public administration practices in one country will necessarily prove successful in a different social, economic, and political environment. A particular nation-state embodies the results of many historical episodes, traumas, failures, and successes which have in turn created peculiar habits, mores, institutionalized patterns of behavior, *Weltanschauungen*, and even "national psychologies." One cannot assume that public administration can escape the effects of this conditioning; or that it is somehow independent of and isolated from the culture or social setting in which it develops . . . Yet the comparative aspects of public administration have largely been ignored; and as long as the study of public administration is not comparative, claims for "a science of public administration" sound rather hollow. Conceivably there might be a science of American public administration and a science of British public administration and a science of French public administration; but can there be a "science of public administration" with the sense of a body of generalized principles independent of their peculiar national setting? . . . We need many more studies of comparative administration before it will be possible to argue that there are any universal principles of public administration.¹

The most important postwar outcome has been the recognition of many different public administration systems at different levels of public concern, with different functions and widely varying boundaries and stages of development. To reduce the complexity, several classifications have been attempted. Most follow the classification of their parent political system. Thus,

there is a separate category for communist regimes, another for western democracies, perhaps separated into common-law Anglo-American systems and administrative-law western European systems. Also present are various categories for newly independent and traditional states in the Third World either by region or by polity, such as bureaucratic, military, and party dominant regimes.² Other classifications prefer distinctions by parent cultural pattern. However, the study of public administrative systems has gone much wider than that of national civil service systems.

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

International administrative systems are still relatively novel although some international organizations go back many centuries. The major organized religions, for example, predate nation states and contemporary public administration. Several international businesses also predate the administrative state. In the past few centuries, many national movements have gone beyond national boundaries to form loose international networks. In more recent times, the multinational corporations, international labor organizations and professional associations, and international sports councils have become prominent and influential around the world. Except for traditional diplomacy, most international public administration systems are quite new, reflecting growing world interdependence. However, they are multiplying so rapidly that they may now be said to constitute a new province for law and order. These new permanent systems have autonomous organizational structures at a settled location, command independent resources, possess sanctions (including expulsion), and employ independent professional staffs. Not only are they slowly evolving distinctive administrative styles of their own, they are having increasing influence over member countries and national administrative systems.

These new systems are engaged in conflict resolution, scientific research, refugee welfare, law and order, economic planning, rescue work, postal integration, and cultural enrichment, to mention but a few of the functions they perform. Administratively

what may be most distinctive about them is their internationalist ideology—one world, human unity, and mutual responsibility. Their ideals are those of humanity—peace, security, safety, well-being, cultural integrity, equality, humanitarianism. They are deeply concerned about humanity and its environment. Unfortunately, they may be a little ahead of member nation states, which still place domestic and national considerations first. Consequently, they come in for much criticism when they fail to live up to their projected ideals, although denied member support and adequate resources to do better. They can only progress as fast and far as their members permit. As they have little formal power, they rely mostly on moral authority. As they are working in novel areas, they have to be great improvisers. They have few guidelines and little experience. Before this century, nobody had attempted to disarm, control population growth voluntarily, improve health and education standards of people who could not help themselves, create enterprise where none existed, police international crime, or keep the peace between hostile neighbors, without adequate powers, sanctions, resources, and cooperation. They have to make up their own rules as they go along. Their work is both challenging and frustrating, given the limitations under which they work and the enormity of their tasks.

The staffs of international administrative systems face peculiar problems of their own. While their concern is with a public interest of world dimensions, they remain state nationals. If they want to change careers they must return home and while on the job their national governments are not above exploiting them for intelligence purposes. They are beset with a conflict of loyalty. The United Nations insists on a loyalty oath that precludes rival instructions to its own, and the International Civil Service Advisory Board has formulated an ethical code that stresses organizational loyalty, cooperation with all colleagues, international mindedness, and restraint in personal and political expression likely to offend. Besides the loyalty issue, foreign location, frequent moves, constant travel, social isolation, and cultural shock, which may be part of international work, are other handicaps of international employment, although the status and prestige of international

jobs and their favorable conditions of employment may compensate.

International systems are the wave of the future. Some contemporary difficulties will disappear as increasingly international systems become accepted, permanent, resourceful, and adaptive. Their existence will be less precarious, their base more secure. It may then be possible to study their inner workings and to discover whether their operations are significantly different from other administrative systems. In the meantime, their influence over national administrative systems will continue to grow.

COMPARING NATIONAL SYSTEMS

For most of its history, public administration has been identified with the formal apparatus of government and analysis of national administrative systems owes much to the study of comparative government. This tradition, reaching back before Aristotle, still continues. It was the dissatisfaction of political scientists with the then state of the art in the early 1950s, that sparked off a reconceptualization of comparative studies, away from historical and legal descriptions of formal structures in the Western world which dominated the field to political and behavioral analysis of whole political systems, both Western and non-Western.³ Two new approaches were tried, one based on general systems theory and the other on political culture theory. There was an obvious temptation to replace political with administrative considerations with systems theory concentrating on a general or universal model of the administrative system as a transformatory process and culture theory concentrating on variety and diversity among national administrative systems.

1. Systems approach

General systems theories followed the search for a general theory of politics based on a conceptual scheme of the political system. Several models were formulated, the most influential

being David Easton's energy system model.⁴ Inputs in the form of demands and support were transformed by the political system (the making and execution of authoritative decisions for a society) into decisions and policies. Comparative analysis would concentrate on how demands arose and were transformed into issues and outputs, and on how systems maintain a steady flow of inputs. A modified version of this model was later used by Ira Sharkansky to analyze the American system of public administration.⁵

There was an obvious temptation to transpose these general systems models by replacing the word "politics" with "administration" and to modify them with administrative systems in mind. They broke away from traditional descriptions of formal institutions to direct attention to the administrative system in context, the administrative transformation of resources (inputs) into societal products (outputs), the structure and functions of the administrative system, administrative behavior, administrative stratification, and administrative recruitment. They escaped from the bureaucratic paradigm and were especially helpful in reorienting the Western mind to nonbureaucratic administrative systems.

2. Political culture approach

The political culture theories did not begin with universals but acknowledged the existence of variety. They sought to reduce diversity by classifying the different systems according to common criteria, from which narrow-range and middle-range hypothesis could be formulated, and from which, in turn, general theories might eventually emerge. They were grounded in Talcott Parsons' interpretation of the concept of systems in sociology, particularly his systems problems of pattern maintenance, integration, adaptation, and goal adaptation, and his pattern variables: universalism—particularism, achievement—ascriptive, specificity—diffuseness, emotion—reason. They discerned different political cultures, each molded in its environment so that the political system could not be meaningfully abstracted. They drew attention to the complex interrelationships between the political system and its parent culture. They were prepared to accept non-Western cultures at

face value, rather than conceive them in the Western terms built into general systems models. Political systems were different because their environments were different, and the environments were different because to some extent their political systems were different. Yet, political systems with a similar political culture might be studied together to advantage, as could apparently similar political systems (from the institutional viewpoint) with different political cultures.

Political culture theories still treated national systems as whole entities, shaping and being shaped by their environments. A system's capabilities denoted its performance in its environment—its ability to extract resources from its environment, its ability to regulate the behavior of its constituents, its ability to maintain a flow of effective symbols, its ability to distribute benefits to constituents, and its ability to respond to demands and pressures, both domestically and internationally. A system's conversion process referred to the ways it transformed inputs into outputs: interest articulation—the way demands were formulated; interest aggregation—the ways demands were combined in the form of alternative courses of action; rule making—the way the rules were applied and enforced; rule adjudication—the way individual cases were decided in rule application; and communication—the way these activities were communicated within the system and between the system and its environment. System maintenance and adaptation described how the system survived through political recruitment (how political roles were filled) and socialization (how political cultures were maintained and changed). The performance of a system was related to its underlying culture, the nature of its environment, the volume and diversity of demand not met through other systems, and the ability of the system to change and adapt.

Spearheading these efforts in comparative public administration have been the Comparative Administration Group (later in 1973 retitled Section on International and Comparative Administration) of the American Society for Public Administration with Fred Riggs as its intellectual coach, and the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. Through their continuing efforts information gaps about national administrative systems have been

gradually filled in, although serious deficiencies remain in regard to communist and totalitarian regimes, Latin America and the newer independent nation states. Recent studies have borrowed extensively from other social sciences. They have become so ecologically oriented that no country study lacks its introductory cultural perspective. They are less prescriptive and normative than they used to be and they exhibit less assurance that Western models are superior. Above all, they are truly comparative. They really try

. . . to learn the distinctive characteristics of a particular administrative system or cluster of systems; to find out what makes certain administrative features work well in one country or era while they fail dismally in another; to identify the factors—cultural, political, and social—that are involved in success or failure; to explain the differences in behavior of bureaucrats and bureaucracies in different countries and cultures; and, finally to discern what changes, if any, ought to be introduced and how they can be introduced to improve the performance of a bureaucracy . . . to arrive at a conceptual knowledge rather than a knowledge of details.⁶

They also reflect the two major concerns of comparative administration in the United States, namely, the search for a conceptual framework and practical improvements in public programs.

Two important breakthroughs deserve special attention.

3. Bureaucratic theory

Because the public bureaucracy has been the central concern of public administration, comparative public administration has been equated largely with comparative public bureaucracies. The comparative administration movement killed the neutrality thesis, which had been the core of the traditional institutional approach derived from Western norms. The public bureaucracy is now portrayed as a political actor, an essential ingredient of the political system, a consumer and producer of societal products, a power center, a pressure group, a systems stabilizer, and a change agent. It is further depicted as a political symbol, a political socializer,

a social elite, an interest articulator, a political, social and economic system, a source of political recruitment, a decision broker, and an environment determinant. As a result, bureaucratic theory has been transformed. Bureaucratic theories now take into account these new dimensions:

- a. *bureaucratic typologies*—structural characteristics, functional roles, recruitment systems, political system, general culture, and behavioral characteristics
- b. *bureaucratic ideologies*—role of the bureaucracy in the political system and self-perceived roles of bureaucrats
- c. *bureaucratic power base*—control and dependence, functions, resources, enterprise, status, alliances and rivals, and expectations
- d. *bureaucratic decision making*—scope, extent, direction, quality, locus, style, composition of decision makers, and suitability
- e. *bureaucratic actions*—processes, communications, public relations, administrative behavior, and rationality
- f. *bureaucratic performance*—conversion processes, political socialization and recruitment, systems maintenance and adaptation, administrative capacity and the satisfaction of social needs
- g. *bureaucratic setting*—international and domestic hazards, resource mobility, cultural ambivalence, political culture, social stratification, economic system, political regime, organization scale and other ecological variables
- h. *bureaucratic models*—input-output, information-energy, decision making, policy making, social system, and development
- i. *bureaucratic dynamics*—attitudes, values, external relations, internal mobility, objectives, adaptability, and dysfunctions.

The province of bureaucratic theory grows increasingly complex as theorists became aware that they must get outside their own culture, values, conceptions, and approaches to appreciate

how different other people are and how many different ways exist of achieving the same objectives. Studies of comparative administration show that all societies have their own bureaucratic systems which are trying to do different things through different patterns of administrative behavior. Bureaucratic systems are not all alike. There is no universal pattern although each system may contain common elements. On the contrary, there are specific bureaucratic cultures and a wide variety of institutional forms and arrangements. Various elaborate classifications have been suggested to group bureaucratic systems and to explain differences between like groups.

4. Model building

To structure the mass of data accumulated in comparative studies, a model of some kind has been indispensable. Otherwise, researchers would be swamped with undigested and unrelated information. No theorist maintains that the models coincide with reality, but models do highlight general characteristics and important relationships; facilitate instruction, research, and analysis; point to factors that may escape empirical observation; illustrate variables, and guide proposition building. Among the models in current use are law, machine, organ, system, business, medicine, militia, science, art, ethnics, cybernetics, and mathematics.⁷

Probably the most creative and ambitious model builder has been Fred Riggs who has designed a series of models to challenge culture-bound assumptions implicit in traditional approaches to comparative administration. Drawing on Sutton's social systems models of undeveloped agraria and developed industria,⁸ Riggs illustrated ideal types of public administration systems for each of them. He claimed that similar ideal types could be constructed at various transitional stages between agraria and industria,⁹ with similar categories illustrating the interdependence of administrative systems and societies. Riggs then constructed two ideal opposite types—a refracted society, in which every function had a corresponding structure that specialized in its performance, and

a fused society, in which a single structure performed all functions.¹⁰ Just as a prism refracted white (fused) light into the colors of the spectrum, the prismatic society was a midpoint or intermediary form of transitional society between the two ideal types and combined fused and refracted traits. For example, in prismatic societies the economic system combined the pure barter and market traits in a "bazaar-canteen," whose equivalent in the administrative system was the "sala," which combined the pure (fused) chamber and (refracted) office traits. The "sala men" recognize both administrative rationality and nonadministrative considerations.

Riggs maintained that his prismatic-sala model of administrative systems in transitional societies would catch many problems that slipped through the net of established social sciences. He argued that models with built-in bureaucratic assumptions could not be applied to nonbureaucratic or semibureaucratic administrative systems, and the very attempt to approach all societies with a single conception was intellectually self-destructive. Universal theory should be built on the basis of tested narrow-range and middle-range theory.

The model builders have been accused of being excessively abstract and nonoperational and it has become increasingly fashionable to criticize them. For a start, their new vocabulary was ambiguous¹¹ and their classifications too unwieldy. They failed to make any significant breakthrough beyond conventional wisdom or discover empirically useful development methods and approaches.¹² Their mass of largely indigestible theory was ivory-towered, irrelevant, unmanageable, confused and confusing, "a melange of idiosyncratic theoretical formulations and organizing perspectives," bordering on fantasy.¹³ They had been obsessed with the search for a conceptional framework without doubting the value of such a pursuit or understanding its questionable philosophical, scientific and epistemological assumptions. And so the list of charges has grown to leave little doubt that model-building is intellectually suspect and for all practical purposes, worthless. But the model builders did reshape thinking about

national administrative systems and gave new insights into the way administrative systems really work, particularly in non-Western cultures.

Given the level of ignorance that still prevails about national systems, the current requiem may be too premature and may prove to be a disservice to comparative studies by discouraging further intellectual forays into what is still largely virgin territory. Few people know anything at all about the administrative systems of neighboring countries let alone those around the world and fewer still know how and why they differ or devise plausible patterns.

DEVELOPMENTAL SYSTEMS

While comparative administration theory struggles to survive, development administration, another offshoot of the intellectual ferment of the early 1950s, thrives. It holds out hope for the underprivileged of the world and promises to accelerate progress elsewhere. It attracts theorists and practitioners alike who seek to relieve poverty, strengthen the planning and execution of development programs, and improve administrative capacity and performance. It is grounded in both theory and practice. It subsumes certain normative concepts—that development is desirable; that development can be planned, directed or controlled in some way by administrative systems; that improvements in the quality and quantity of social products is desirable; that obstacles to development can be overcome; and that major problems handicapping social progress can be solved. Yet at the same time it is grounded in reality—the practical solution of human problems, the nitty-gritty of public administration, the real world of people, the practitioners' domain. Theory has a place, but only insofar as it really helps practitioners.

Origins in foreign aid programs

Development administration had its origins in the desire of the richer countries to aid the poorer countries, and more espe-

cially in the obvious needs of newly emerging nations to transform their colonial style bureaucracies into more responsible instruments of social change. The simple underlying conception was that the transfer of resources and knowhow would hasten modernization. Foreign aid programs channeled through public bodies would be directed at sectoral programs that would generate economic growth and social progress. However, the acceleration of development proved to be much more complex. Which countries should receive priority? Who needed most help? Where would aid produce the best results, for whom, in which way, at what price, from whose viewpoint? Before long, technical assistance and foreign aid bureaucracies sprouted in the United Nations complex and in the foreign services of the major powers. Within assisted countries or potential recipients, other bureaucracies sprang up to assist foreign experts, to devise ways of extracting additional international aid, and to manage technical assistance programs. Only a small part of foreign aid was totally free from obligations and commitments on the part of the recipients. Not all was donated in a useful form or used wisely. In any event, it proved to be miniscule compared with the needs of poor countries and the optimistic expectations aroused in recipient countries.

Foreign aid did not turn out to be a universal stimulant. In western Europe and Japan, where war had temporarily reduced development capacity, it was successful but elsewhere its effects were mixed. Some countries used their aid wisely, others frittered it away. For most newly emerging countries, it was a drop in the ocean, compared with requirements. Domestic sources would have to be mobilized for development. An inventory of available domestic resources was required. Programs, projects, and plans had to be devised for their most effective use, and these practical schemes had to be activated through existing institutions and new creations. Then, once activated, they had to be properly managed. Thus, development administration spread its interest from foreign-aid programs to the domestic public policy problems of recipients. At the time, it was largely virgin territory. Many colonial administrators showed no interest or were too absorbed in evacuation problems. New political leaders had no experience in statecraft and very little technical competence. Few recipient countries had

the benefit of a highly qualified indigenous public bureaucracy, business community, trade union movement, or militia.

As no one had tried before to accelerate development artificially, there were no guidelines. At first everything had to be improvised before any kind of base could be established from which coherent public policies could be formulated and practical programs implemented. Usually, the developmental network had to be superimposed on a traditional law-and-order frame or placed alongside the existing structure. In any event, it was something completely new and untried. Development administrators soon found their efforts frustrated by poor administration. They were no longer working in organizational societies with bureaucratic peoples; theirs was a new world. Nothing seemed to work properly. Time was perceived differently. Cooperation was half-hearted. Business was more personal. Poor countries lacked proper institutions. Their organizations lacked proper methods. Their people lacked proper skills.

What was needed, said the administrative experts, was the accumulated wisdom of the Western administrative systems; the new world had to be made in the image of the old. So bureaucratization was essential, institution-building unavoidable, and Western administrative folklore indispensable. Westernized elites accepted the prescription and quickly learned the right things to do, at least according to the book. But the rest of society was unmoved and would not abandon traditional ways. Western administrative precepts were inadequate. As Milton Esman had warned,

Development is not a "natural" process which need only be let free to evolve, nor a series of bottlenecks which enlightened policy makers, like production expeditors, can break successively to permit restrained energies to flow freely. It is a series of humdrum tasks for which the physical, social, psychological, and institutional resources are seldom available in sufficient quantity in the proper combinations. The obstacles to achievement are so often overpowering, and time is a relentless enemy to those who hope to realize results in decades rather than centuries.¹⁴

Accelerated modernization

Something different had to be tried. Development administrators thus began to look closely at the material with which they had to deal, that is, indigenous administrative systems, to discover what might be useful for the development of newly emerging nations or poor countries. But the academic world would not give up so easily. If development was universal, and if modernized societies had already experienced the problems confronting modernizing or transitional societies, there had to be universals. Perhaps they could be derived from historical models of the great powers, which in any case might prove useful to practitioners in the field groping for guidelines. Only reluctantly was it concluded that there really were crucial differences between countries that could generate their own changes, where growth was spontaneous, needing no artificial stimulus, and where the capacity to cope with accelerating change was self-adjusting, and those countries that seemed to lack the requisite components of self-development, and where change has to be induced externally or through governmental action. Even so, all countries were seen as developing, some at a faster pace than others, and in different directions. Each had different development problems. The most serious problem of all, however, was the persistent gap between rich and poor countries, fast developing and slow developing regions, and the possibility that the gap between them was widening or that some countries were actually regressing.

Development studies took off in all directions, into modernization, nation building, social change, industrialization, cultural anthropology, urbanization, political ecology, and anything else that seemed to promise help for policy makers in poor countries. The result was that development came to mean virtually anything anybody wanted it to mean, with attendant confusion among scholars and development experts alike. Development administration switched its emphasis from the administrative development of poor countries to include those aspects of public administration that focus on government-influenced change toward progressive political, economic, and social objectives and the qualitative

advance of living conditions. Its interests range from philosophical speculation about the nature of development administration objectives to techniques for inducing peasants to adopt improved seeds, fertilizers, and mechanical tools. The development administrator is not only program formulator, manager, and implementer, but also policy maker and adviser, interest aggregator and articulator, political communicator, adjudicator, and socializer.¹⁵ A brief review of the major concerns of development administration should make this clear.

Development theory

Development theorists seek answers to such questions as: Why develop? What is development? What are (or should be) the objectives of development? What are the assumptions behind development? What is the impact of development on society? While others rush headlong into development, the theorists want to know where they are rushing, for what reasons, and with which motivations. The answers are by no means obvious. Development may destroy humanity and the planet. Development may keep more people longer in the same abject state of poverty, disease, and pain. Development may create intellectual tyrannies, military and bureaucratic polities, and technological enslavement. It all depends on what kind of future people want. Certainly, the aim is no long westernization or unquestioned modernization into industria. Within every society, there are different ideas about the future and different people have different abilities to realize their ideas.

Technical assistance and cooperation

All the great powers are now involved, along with the wealthier western European countries and a proliferation of international bodies, particularly within the United Nations complex and the World Bank. This transnational transfer of resources, while insignificant to the donors (rarely more than one percent of their national income) is of crucial significance to the recipients. It gives

them access to expertise they would not otherwise have. It brings them the fruits of investments they cannot afford. It provides them with knowledge and experience they do not possess. It saves them time and expense at a price within their means or which can be renegotiated if too expensive.

Institution building

Where recipients of technical assistance have no ability to conduct development activities for themselves, donors have to build the requisite administrative infrastructure from scratch. This involves changing traditional beliefs and values, restructuring economic, social and political systems, and routinizing innovative activities. Not only have laws to be framed but respect for the law and trust in the legal profession have to be developed. Not only do physical structures have to be built, but people have to be taught how to build and maintain them. Political activities, private enterprise and community development have to be encouraged and in some cases a new governmental system, new public organizations and new public services have to be constructed.

National planning and budgeting

Poor countries with few resources available for development cannot afford to waste them. They need a plan of national priorities and means to channel resources into productive projects. Similarly donors of foreign aid want reassurance that their contributions will not be squandered and need some objective criteria by which to judge requests for assistance. Between them they devise machinery for planning and accelerating material development, relying largely on government direction, national planning or similar forms of central guidance, and budgetary instruments in determining investment priorities and assorted policy packages. Implementation has provided most of the pitfalls. The very conditions which make countries poor handicap effective and meaningful national planning and budgeting. They lack adequate financial

institutions and entrepreneurship. Instabilities undermine projections. Budgeting practices and financial realities in conditions of scarcity contradict planning needs and permit considerable seepage and corruption.

Administrative reform

Governments in many countries cannot implement public policy and instigate development programs because they have unsuitable administrative systems which need to be reformed, reorganized, restructured and rebuilt. They seek technical aid in administrative reform and development. They require new machinery and new administrative technology. As in the case of national planning and budgeting, their very deficiencies handicap reform. Nevertheless, with the backing of international agencies, administrative systems around the world are being overhauled and the latest administrative technology incorporated. Unfortunately, performance has not improved commensurately although the life of bureaucratic elites has been eased. What is now needed is a change in perspective, a shift in attention from process to results, from technology to delivery systems, from bureaucratic to public needs.

Nonbureaucratic mechanisms

Disappointment with the transnational transfer of administrative technology and the hesitation about importing foreign administrative models have induced another look at indigenous practices in poor countries that do work and may be capable of assuming additional burdens. If the public sector cannot handle the tasks of development administration, then development projects may be handled by nongovernmental organizations. If bureaucratic mechanisms are deficient and defective, then development administrations may employ nonbureaucratic mechanisms and traditional folkways. Instead of dismissing indigenous practices out of hand because they cannot be found in standard management texts, serious study is being made of them to ascertain

their effectiveness and their potentiality for delivering public goods and services. Thus, instead of extending public bureaucracies, local villagers are encouraged to band together to provide public services for themselves with government assistance.

THE NEGLECTED DIMENSION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Although the heyday of comparative administration studies may, according to some observers, have already passed, the need has scarcely diminished. Public administration is still parochial. Too many public administrators know nothing beyond their own personal experience and suffer from tunnel vision. They are ignorant about practices elsewhere and about possible benefits from exchange of information. They do not keep up with the literature and they ignore anything that at first glance does not seem relevant or that they cannot immediately use. Too few administrative experts understand the difficulties encountered in transferring administrative technologies and the inherent limitations of cross cultural comparison. Too many theorists generalize from limited culture-bound perspectives and claim much more than they have any right to do. As a result, too many others have been misinformed about the nature of administrative systems, including their own, and the ease by which administrative practices can be changed.

Even the most rudimentary comparisons indicate how different things are done from one system to another. Administrations are not alike. There are many different ways of doing the same things and, of course, many different ways of doing different things. Because of the neglect of comparative methodology, not enough is known yet to determine definitively what will or will not work, or which is better or worse. As long as administration remains a trial and error process, which it is more than is commonly supposed, then there is no room for dogma and no grounds for scientific infallibility. This is clear to international administrators who find their national experience of little help to them, and to development administrators who at this stage are grateful to discover anything that works. The problems of the majority of

humanity will not disappear or diminish because the first applied solutions, administrative and other, do not work at all or as expected or satisfactorily. So much more needs to be done, more research, more experimentation, more comparison, more inter-change.

Apart from continued exploration of areas already under study, several gaps need filling.

Administrative cultures

If there is no universal science of public administration, there is the possibility that there may be a French, British, or American science of public administration. Michael Crozier has referred to a distinctive French bureaucratic culture.¹⁶ The British have often talked about their distinctive spirit of public administration. Stereotypes of a certain caste of central European bureaucrat are legion. Are there distinctive national administrative profiles or characteristics or ideal types that could qualify as distinctive administrative cultures?

Regional traits

Within large countries with heterogeneous cultures, there are many different administrative styles. There may be regional administrative cultures or ethnic administrative traits. Perhaps, for example, American public administration as portrayed in most texts is a pure abstraction, a romanticized version of what should be rather than what exists anywhere in the United States.

Sectoral contrasts

The study of public administration has assumed that the public sector operates quite differently from the private sector or that it should operate differently. How far apart are they? What differences result from degree of market exposure, legal constraints, political influences, public scrutiny, and complexity? Consensus exists that there are crucial differences that do distinguish the

way public and private sector organizations work and should not be ignored in management research, training and practice.¹⁷ But substantial empirical backing is needed.

Delivery systems

Comparative administration has concentrated largely on institutional arrangements and management processes rather than the actual delivery of public goods and services such as medicine, environmental health, education, sanitary engineering, traffic control, housing, marketing, and transportation. International bodies like the World Bank, WHO, FAO, ILO have begun to compare comparative delivery systems in various technical fields on a regional and national basis, but evaluation remains rudimentary.

Until these and other gaps are filled, public administrators will be woefully ignorant of one another, of possible alternatives open to them, and the amazing variety that characterizes public administration.

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11 Revitalizing The Administrative State

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION BOTH shapes and is shaped by social forces. Its emergence in the past two hundred years as possibly the leading social change agent is due largely to the development of the administrative state as the principal instrument of government to reshape society. But it is not the only instrument at work nor the only social force at large. There are more momentous influences that are accelerating the pace of change. Indeed turbulence seems to have replaced stability as a permanent condition. Consequently familiar landmarks are disappearing and societies have to adjust to new circumstances. Public leaders do not seem to be on top of things; they stumble from crisis to crisis. Policies and technologies that once served them well, no longer work as expected. As the gap between promise and performance widens, so people lose their confidence in established institutions. Modern civilization seems caught in an uncontrollable spin leading it nobody quite knows where.

Pessimists believe that humanity is bent on self-destruction. They forecast nuclear devastation, economic chaos, violence, debased life. Galloping technology brings untold risks. Resources

are used up faster than new sources are found and substitutes developed. Uneven progress breeds resentment among the deprived. Society is becoming ungovernable. Mass media have accustomed people to human tragedy as commonplace and inevitable. Human life has been cheapened and eventually may be made worthless. Nothing will save humanity from itself or avert the coming collapse.

In contrast, public administration has always been optimistic about human nature and humanity's future. Tomorrow will be better than today. Humanity goes on to better and better things. Far from being doomed, humanity is about to realize the stuff of dreams—longer life, good health, nourishing diet, replaceable limbs, an end to drudgery, universal recognition of individual rights, safer environment. Public administrators believe that soon all human beings will be able to enjoy a decent and satisfying life. This state of affairs will not require much more knowledge than now exists, providing humanity faces up to its responsibilities and adopts solutions to the arms race, ecological deterioration, galloping inflation and man's inhumanity to man. There is much that needs doing and much to be done. Rather than succumbing to fatalism, humanity should redouble its efforts to bring the Good Society closer.

Throughout the world, people who know what should be done or at least give that impression are eagerly sought, and the future of society is being placed more and more in the hands of those who can forecast with confidence, offer better choices, answer clearly, and provide reasonable evidence to back their claims. In this, science and industry, business and commerce, organization and research have obviously benefited. So, too, have the administrative and policy sciences. Not a day passes without some workshop or other convened to focus on specific problems in public policy and administration at which public leaders acknowledge their need for help, experts offer their advice, and practitioners and other interested parties exchange ideas and information. Clearly, they are serving a felt need. If they disappoint, it is not from lack of value, but lack of vision. They have yet to appreciate that their subject matter is nothing less than the whole breadth

of the public arena, the resolution of basic issues confronting humanity, and the fashioning of instruments—ideas, values, laws, systems, structures, processes, skills, techniques—that will serve humanity to better realize its aspirations. Their shortsightedness has obscured to them social movements central to their concerns, not the least of which has been a decided change in public mood toward the administrative state.

DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

Ever since the French Revolution, the administrative state has been seen as an instrument for advancing the public interest. The rule of just laws would replace the rule of unjust men. The general will would prevail over special interests. Collective needs would be satisfied before private inessentials. Individual rights would be protected against unnecessary interference, arbitrariness, and discrimination. By harnessing national energies, the administrative state would advance the welfare of the nation, promote its well-being, and secure it from external dangers. It would construct public works for the enjoyment of all. It would provide public services to all on an equitable basis. It would sponsor and cultivate national talents.

In time, the discovery was made that it could do much more. It could regulate other social institutions. It could assist, supplement, supersede their efforts. It could replace them altogether, if need be. Indeed, there was no end to what it could do if given the chance. Further, it could do whatever it was asked to do as competently, expertly, and efficaciously as any other body, providing certain safeguards were incorporated. Confidence in the administrative state grew to the point where it was commonly assumed that it could do anything and everything, given sufficient resources. Totalitarian regimes proved that there was a great deal of truth in the efficacy of the administrative state. It really worked, albeit bureaucratically and in their case in partnership with the police state. In more liberal regimes, it gave birth to the welfare state.

By the 1950s, statism had become the norm. Whenever a problem arose in the public arena, it was politicized, put up to government for decision, assigned to the public bureaucracy for resolution, and thereafter monitored by public watchdogs and interested parties until the cycle was repeated when the bureaucratic solutions failed to work to satisfaction. People had come to view the administrative state as an instrument of social betterment, an indispensable weapon against evil. They welcomed the politicization and subsequent bureaucratization of social issues and the enlargement of the public arena. They agreed to strengthen governmental ability to discover and deal with potential social problems before these disrupted the social fabric. They went along with the stress on rationality in devising solutions to social problems, and the professionalization of public administration.

Public officials assumed the automatic mobilization of resources to aid government in tackling social problems and the automatic acceptance of governmental requirements in executing policies and programs. The public were prepared to take officialdom at face value and went along readily with official versions of events. The administrative state now touched every aspect of their lives. Politicians began to promise the moon. Government was expected to provide answers to every problem thrust on it. The public bureaucracy grew by every conceivable index—laws and regulations issued, court cases lodged, amount of money passing through public agencies, number of public employees, volume of paperwork, and so forth. There seemed no end to what the administrative state might accomplish.

Ominous signs soon appeared to suggest that too much faith had been invested in the administrative state. With other alternatives being neglected, society was increasingly dependent on its performance, or more particularly its bureaucratic organs. Politicians, so used to competent and efficacious handling of public issues by government, promised things nobody was sure could be delivered. They spelled out unattainable goals and oversold new programs. They passed vague laws with the expectation that the bureaucracies established to administer them would know what had to be done to realize their aims. "Money was thrown at problems . . . but those problems refused to go away."¹

The overloaded government system could not cope indefinitely with extra responsibilities without overstretching itself. Bottlenecks appeared. Public business was delayed or not completed. Agencies could not handle their workloads or they settled for lower quality performance. Traditional routines proved unsuitable. Higher and unjustifiable risks were taken. Curiously, higher inputs and increased efficiency were not necessarily reflected in performance. Results were not so different, a fact all too often verified by program evaluation and productivity measures. Politically, raised expectations were punctured. Politicians were exasperated. Potential beneficiaries were angered. Taxpayers were resentful. Administratively, embarrassed bureaucrats put the best gloss on things they could, often perpetuating gross deceit on the public, and asked for more resources to complete unfinished tasks. Intellectually, it was realized too late that complex social issues were not susceptible to easy solution and that bureaucratic answers were inadequate and occasionally regressive.

The public was split between those who retained their faith in the beneficent administrative state and were prepared to accede to its request for additional resources, and those disturbed by its performance who wanted to slow things down until it could be ascertained with greater accuracy whether further investment in the administrative state would be worthwhile. Even if only for technical reasons, the momentum of the administrative state could not be slowed easily. People had built their lives on the assumption that its programs would continue. Vested interests had developed in them and termination was greatly resisted. Besides, while the general economy thrived, the public sector automatically benefited through increased receipts from a rising demand for public goods and services and a higher tax base. The very strength of the administrative state had lulled its supporters into a false sense of security. They had so long discounted criticism as emanating mostly from confirmed anti-statists that they had ignored many legitimate complaints from the victims of the administrative state and failed to heed a rising groundswell against further public initiatives, governmental interference, bureaucratization, arrogant officialdom and rising taxes. More people supported tactics that they hoped would make responsible public officials take them

seriously. Their message was clear—enough was enough. They wanted no further governmental interference in their lives. Ideologists from both left and right capitalized on this assault on the administrative state.

REEXAMINING ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

In contrast to the optimism of the immediate post-World War II world, more and more people in recent years have been revising their assumptions about the administrative state. First, they no longer see it as inevitable or beneficial. It does not necessarily solve social problems but it may itself compound them. It has sapped private initiatives, weakened individual enterprise, softened self-will, undermined individualism, and made everyone too dependent on officialdom. To strengthen the administrative state further would only intensify bureaucratic collectivism and lead eventually to state totalitarianism. Government is no longer of the people, by the people, for the people but of the bureaucrats, by the bureaucrats, for the bureaucrats. Government officials are the real rulers of society, the new mandarin class. This situation has to be halted and reversed.

Second, the politicization of social issues does not guarantee their solution. Public agencies have been expected virtually single-handedly to do things beyond their capacity—to halt moral decay, end wars, prevent population growth, ensure equality, eradicate crime. They have been established by law to tackle a multitude of worthy causes, staffed with experts and given abundant resources. But the results are disappointing. Few problems have been solved. The experts have few workable solutions; they are more expert at identifying more problems for government to tackle. The funds are often spent on heavy administrative overheads, bloated staffing, impractical schemes and purely self-justificatory exercises. The agencies turn inwards toward self-preservation and engage in much activity without accomplishment.

Third, strong executives, implicit in the idea of the adminis-

trative state, tend to abuse their wide powers and use them to evade public accountability and responsibility. They manipulate mass media, buy off dependent parties, terrorize internal critics, disregard audits and break the law with impunity. Official arrogance is intolerable. Public officials are turning their agencies into their private preserves. Other branches of government are forced either to go along or to reassert themselves by blocking executive actions. Either way, the public loses. Meantime, people tire of the petty maneuvering that passes for leadership, and give up hope that anything can be done to control leviathan. They see newcomers to public office try at first, get compromised, and eventually become part of the establishment. They despair that active public participation will fare any better in reasserting public control. The administrative state has gotten too far out of hand.

Fourth, professionalization does not guarantee competence. Rarely is society's best talent attracted to the service of the administrative state. Public service careers are not rated in the highest occupational categories. Even where they are, procedures actually deter competent people and protect the incompetent. Merit often turns out to be little more than ability to pass tests of questionable validity, not a measure of actual work performance or future potential. Public personnel systems breed security-conscious time-servers, adept at avoiding responsibility while giving the appearance of busying themselves. "The bureaucratic life rewards conspiracy, sycophancy, ideological conformity, caution and class solidarity. It punishes innovation, originality, and the work ethic."² The professionals are doing so poorly in many instances that not much is risked by turning over what they do to other social institutions or dropping them altogether.

Fifth, automatic mobilization and conformity to governmental imperatives cannot be taken for granted. A significant portion of people, particularly in the middle class, that feels the pressures of taxation and inflation, is not so prepared as once it was to cooperate with public agencies or volunteer its services or foot the bills for mounting governmental costs for what it considers inadequate returns. It believes it can do better for itself with less government and lower taxes. It is convinced that it is more careful

with its money than the government which seems to waste a chunk on questionable projects, parasites and corruption. Few incentives exist in public finance to save. Officeholders often measure their successes by how much they spend or how fast their agencies grow. It would rather forego some benefits of the administrative state than comply with additional governmental requirements, deal with exasperating bureaucrats, and subject itself to the demeaning processes of public administration. It would rather do without or provide for itself from money and other resources that now go to government.

Sixth, more people want more control over their own lives and a greater say in what personally affects them. They resent the idea that someone, somewhere in leviathan knows what is better for them than they do themselves. They want to count for something, to be considered, informed, consulted, and treated as intelligent beings, not ignorant ciphers. They want to make decisions for themselves or to deal directly with key decision makers, without going through hosts of intermediaries who flatter and shelter their superiors, who are, anyway, too often isolated and cut off from the effects of their decisions and unaware of what is actually going on. They do not trust officialdom anymore. They do not take pronouncements of distant officials too seriously. They are deaf to exhortations, threats, promises. They do not believe Big Brother. The rhetoric of the administrative state is designed to seduce them, co-opt them, deceive them, into believing that everything Big Brother does is in their best interests, when it is only in the best interests of power elites and their sycophantic servants.

This assault on the administrative state cannot be easily dismissed by public administration even though historically it may turn out to be a temporary setback, a result of too rapid development of the administrative state before adequate administrative technology was available to enable it to perform all its tasks adequately. Alternatively, it may denote a real turning point in the history of the world when humanity changed direction in social development and moved away from Big Government to alternative institutional designs. Either way, public administration has to

examine carefully why the assault has come at this point of time, what truth there may be in the charges against the administrative state, whether the charges will stick sufficiently to tarnish the administrative state permanently, and how best the charges might be confronted.

The assault on the administrative state cannot be separated from a much wider concern about the growth of Big Government, more particularly the aggrandizement of the machinery of government and its increasing complexity. Leviathan seems to be at the point where it is feeding on itself and growing into gargantuan portions. There seems no end in sight. This aspect does not worry people so much as the possibility that nobody appears to be in charge anymore. Those who claim to be are only nominally in control of a fraction and outside that they are as ignorant as everybody else about what is going on. They confirm a growing impression that Big Government is out of control and is probably uncontrollable.

Public administration has long realized that control of Big Government by one central authority is impractical. It has explored several alternative models, such as partisan mutual adjustment, competition, multiple watchdog agencies, openness ("government in the sunshine," minimal secrecy, public accessibility, free mass media), professional self-controls, spot checks and continuous auditing. It has failed to impress on the public that though nobody may apparently be in charge of the government store, the store's management is adequate and responsive and controls do exist and on the whole work well. Such public education would be more effective if in fact public administration could better demonstrate the efficacy of the various controls imposed on Big Government.

The day is passed when the public was prepared to accept unsubstantial assertion of experts. They have been let down too many times by public safety inspectors, drug testers, nuclear engineers, airplane designers, food analysts. Maybe the controls no longer work at all or as they should. Unless constantly tested and evaluated, there is no way of telling. There is good reason to suspect that public financial controls are faulty. Governments are all too prone to spend what they can get without making more

than a precursory attempt to discover whether they are receiving value for money and whether they might not be capable of a better mix. There is good reason to suspect that public agencies are too lenient with incompetent officials and carry too many passengers that nobody tries to make productive. There is good reason to suspect that regulatory agencies get captured by the very concerns they are supposed to regulate and act as their advocates rather than guardians of the public interest. Likewise public agencies that are supposed to compete and thereby prevent joint exploitation, do arrange between them to share and keep each other in existence for the sake of a quieter life. While enforcers have little in their hand, the evaders have much to offer. The interest of all is in the interest of none.

RECONTROLLING BIG GOVERNMENT

The challenge to public administration is to demonstrate conclusively whether Big Government can be controlled, which controls are most effective, and what new controls might be needed. Meantime various suggestions are being made as to what should be done immediately to prevent the situation from deteriorating further.

1. Zero-growth

One of the most popular proposals is to freeze Big Government in place by postponing any new public initiatives, holding budgets and establishments at current levels, replacing only existing staff, and fixing expenditure ceilings at either a predeterminate figure or a certain percentage of the gross national product. Further expansion would be prevented altogether or limited to a proportionate increase in general resources. Absolute controls would be imposed but within them, shifts in allocation would be permitted to accommodate change and improve the product mix. Big Government would not be able to grow bigger. New activities would entail trade-offs and sacrifices elsewhere. Public services

and goods would be put into effective competition with each other as each scrambled to retain or improve its share of a fixed pot.

2. Retrenchment

Much more drastic and difficult is the proposal to reduce Big Government to manageable size by lowering its level of activities, shedding functions, cutting public finance and retrenching staff. Anti-statists have longed to scale down government, get it out of where it should not be, cut out unnecessary programs, reduce services, eliminate frills, and generally reprivatize public resources. Most governmental activities deemed indispensable would not disappear but would be transferred or assumed by nongovernmental bodies, though much regulatory activity would be abandoned, at least by rightists. Thus leftists would shift them to cooperatives, collectives and not-for-profit third sector organizations, while rightists would expect private enterprise to pick them up. Retrenchment would reduce governmental interference and might strengthen institutional alternatives, leaving the public less dependent on governmental performance and more able to exercise independent choice.

3. Depoliticization

Privatization signifies a strong desire to take many issues now in the public arena out of governmental decision-making and to make people decide more things for themselves. The administrative state has become too much of a crutch and too many issues have been thrust on government which should be decided elsewhere. Rightists consider that the government should not regulate business activity. Libertarians consider that the government should not legislate public morality. These are matters which the government should not do at all or which it is incompetent to do well and should leave to other social institutions or to individuals to decide. Politicization of public issues has been carried too far. However, the possibility that governments or politicians will voluntarily relinquish some area of their intervention seems

remote. There seems more likelihood that governments will examine marginal areas where they do not perform well and they will take more notice about limitations to public administration and organization so that they do not overcommit themselves.³ They will do so as part of the general debate over the proper role and size of government in society.

4. National planning

Instead of arbitrarily curbing the growth of Big Government, all societal activities should be subordinated to a national planning framework or central guidance cluster that would determine national objectives, decide priorities, allocate available resources, and monitor any serious departures from its guidelines. Big Government would be part of this network like other social institutions. Its requests would be considered along with everybody else's requests, as would its performance, and it would have to justify every estimate and account for every disbursement. In assessing its performance, social indicators would be employed in an elaborate national social accounting system. No country has yet gone this far but several are creeping in this direction.

5. Repoliticization

If Big Government has been captured by public agencies and their official coteries, then it can be retaken by strengthening political and other external controls. The political overseers who are nominally in charge should be restored to full control. First, their dependence on bureaucratic advice and counsel should be reduced by the establishment of alternative channels such as independent policy study units located outside the public bureaucracy or attached to the personal offices of the political overseers. They would then be in a better position to choose between different policies and overrule their official advisors. Second, their personal staffs should be greatly enlarged to assist them perform their work. The personal staff should be empowered to act as roving

commissioners with full access and capable of acting for their chief. They would know whether or not political directives were being followed, where resistance was occurring, and what trouble spots should be attended to. Third, the political overseers should be able to exercise greater managerial authority instead of being hidebound by legal restrictions or relying on bureaucratic control devices. Protection against political abuse and manipulation has been overdone and some relaxation within safeguards is needed. Actually the real issue may not be that of public powers and controls as such but of a political style that seems to have gone out of fashion—politicians capable and willing to exercise their powers and controls without feeling guilt-stricken should they clash with officialdom.

6. Restore balance of power

Repoliticization may restore executive control but it does little to reduce executive domination in big government. The powers of the legislatures and the courts need to be strengthened: they have been weakened too long. Legislatures should not comply so readily with executive proposals but insist as an institution on independent investigation and research. They should not relinquish so easily their powers to the executive but guard them jealously and minimize possible executive abuse. They should reassert their authority over executive actions and show less reluctance in calling officialdom into account. They should perform much more of a watchdog role and strengthen their supervision of delegated legislation and executive discretion. To some extent weak legislatures have been offset by stronger judiciaries that have been willing to act when legislatures (and even executives) have been reluctant to rule on public issues. At least, unpopular judicial rulings have goaded the other branches into action. But all judiciaries are vulnerable and their interpretations of public law are subject to subsequent legislature overrule. Anyway, what superior qualifications does the judiciary possess to decide political questions? Constitutional imbalance is not accidental and it is not

likely to be restored by admonitions to the weaker elements to be more aggressive not when they show no inclination in that direction and the public may resent such moves.

7. Decentralization

Big Government is too centralized. Decisions are made too distant from the people they most affect. If the locus of decision-making was brought closer to the public, decision makers might be more responsive. To this end, public laws, national programs and the machinery of government should be redesigned. Geographically, public agencies should not be huddled together in one location but distributed around a country so that officials identify themselves more with the people they serve. Functionally, more governmental activities should be transferred from central to regional, local and even communal or neighborhood levels. Structurally, operations within public agencies should be localized. Executive power would be more diffuse and government itself would be more accessible to the public. Whether decentralization without debureaucratization would enhance public control is moot.

8. Public participation

Big Government should not be restored to representative elites but to the public which should assume more direct responsibility for running their own affairs. Greater public participation at all levels of government should reassert more public control and ensure that the interests of the participants are more adequately considered in decision-making.⁴ Proposals for gaining more public participation range from the multiplication of advisory and consultative committees in which the public is represented, through the mobilization of local power to exercise more clout on the political system so as to obtain more favorable political and bureaucratic treatment, to the creation of new forms of neighborhood government or communal associations that would deliver public services directly or on a contract basis. They include the coopta-

tion of underrepresented groups into the political system, the wider distribution of government spoils to the underprivileged, and the formation of public interest organizations, consumer protection agencies, and good government associations. They also include use of citizen initiatives, referenda, recall elections and other constitutional devices, as well as legal challenges to governmental authority, tax withholding, and passive resistance, and ultimately, direct action.

9. Corporatization

If Big Government is too big to be controlled then it should be reduced to more manageable portions by hiving off or slicing self-contained activities into public corporations that can manage their affairs properly and still conduct themselves in the public interest. This practice is already widely used for public utilities and enterprises but it could be extended to human services, such as health, education and welfare, communications, such as postal, telegraphic and telephonic services, and cultural facilities, such as music centers, art galleries, museums, and sports arenas. These governmental corporations would be free to devise their own internal arrangements consistent with functional requirements and technocratic efficiency, would be administered independently of one another, and would be responsible to a representative board of governors directly accountable to the government. Presumably many small empires would be easier to deal with than one large one.

10. Rivalry

As an alternative to hiving off or slicing self contained activities into independent self-managing monoliths, several rival agencies should be formed instead to compete against one another with rewards going to the best performers. Competition would promote internal efficiency and political control. It would make public agencies more responsive to clients. Much of this is pure speculation because there are few instances where governments have opted for this strategy and where they have, as in the case of

policy research and scientific research and development, the experience cannot be generalized.

11. Watchdogs

If public agencies cannot control themselves, then maybe special watchdog agencies can. To the gallery of traditional watchdogs—treasuries, civil service commissions, auditors—additions are being made in the form of appeal tribunals, regulatory commissions, ombudsman offices, ministries of public enterprise, administrative reform departments, general services administration, attorney-general's offices. If they cannot prevent abuses, they can at least help to rectify them and devise procedures to minimize further occurrence.

Currently the public is unaware of the array of controls that are already imposed or could soon be imposed on big government. It does not know whether existing controls are adequate or not or whether they are breaking down and need to be strengthened. It can only sense that things are not as they should be, that maybe they are getting out of hand, and that nobody is game enough to do something about it. As individuals, its members feel powerless to do anything themselves and, anyway, they do not know where to start or what to do. They cannot really judge when things improve for as far as they are concerned, little changes. They get just as irritated in their dealings with Big Government and the treatment they receive from officialdom. They are still inclined to exaggerate and generalize administrative defects that come to light and to believe the worst about what is supposed to happen behind the scenes. They cannot make the connection between Big Government and themselves. They do not trust it.

Public suspicion of Big Government runs deep. People do not know what it is, how it got to be what it is, or where it is heading. They do know that it is exerting more influence over their lives, that they have to do more and more business with it, and that whatever they do it is lurking in the background. They recognize its enormous power and the fearsome forces that it can unleash.

They want to reimpose controls not so much because they are concerned about rising taxes or bloated establishments but because they fear that if Big Government gets out of hand, nobody will be able to prevent gross abuse and misuse of public power and to remedy just grievances when public wrong is done. In the lifetime of generations still living, it has involved humanity in devastating wars, exterminated millions of innocent victims, enslaved millions more to a living death as forced labor, fermented hatred, restricted movement, association and livelihood, forcibly separated families and loved ones, and perpetrated all manner of wickedness on a grand scale. Where it has desisted, the memory lingers, the threat stays, the possibility of more evil and harm exists.

Even in the best administered nations, Big Government still mistreats individuals, particularly those who have been institutionalized—the deformed, feeble-minded, sick, lonely, deserted, homeless, elderly, delinquent, violent, poverty-stricken—and forgotten by others. There is no telling when any of us may find ourselves unwilling guests in such places and unable to get anyone to listen to just complaints. Few can have much confidence that their personal interests would be protected should they fall into the clutches of such *gulags*, or confinement centers. As long as they exist, the credibility of any government, big or small, remains suspect. The challenge before public administration is to eliminate the *gulags*, minimize unnecessary institutionalization, and transform the atmosphere in which public business is conducted so that people can trust the officials with whom they deal.

NEGLECT OF PUBLIC ETHICS

What makes public institutions particularly unworthy of respect and deserving public contempt are the neglect of public ethics in public policy, the practice of deceit, and the use of public office for personal gain. Between them, they make government and public agencies appear hypocritical, untruthful and dishonest—hypocritical because they do not practice what they preach, untruthful because their public statements are too often deceitful

and misleading, and dishonest because their members obtain things to which they would not otherwise be entitled. Probably no other aspects of public immorality lower public confidence and destroy the credibility of public administration. This failure to translate social ethics into public policy is a distressing feature about contemporary society.

Living together imposes many social obligations and controls. Yet what may be forbidden to individuals as individuals may be permitted to individuals as members of social organizations. Individuals cannot take life except in self-defense, that is, when their own lives are clearly threatened and without precipitous action they would die. But individuals as members of certain social organizations may take life even though their own is not threatened. Such moral contradictions abound in the organizational society. Where the line is drawn in public policy is usually decided by politics, not ethics. Yet if anything marks the progress of civilization, it is the triumph of moral principles over political expediency and the subjugation of convenience to right.

Internationally, public ethics has done better at least symbolically this century than in most others. Efforts have been made to establish permanent machinery to settle peacefully disputes between countries. The idea that there are crimes against humanity has been accepted. Genocide has been condemned. Formal allegiance has been given to various declarations of human rights. These are all attempts to rule humanity according to universal moral precepts and the United Nations secretariat has often tried to inject morality into world issues as have leaders of international humanitarian causes acting as the conscience of humanity. They have had some successes in protecting refugees and other victims of war and natural disaster and reducing Machiavellianism in international affairs. Otherwise, their practical impact has been poor, for much the same reason as it has been poor at national level. In the words of Wayne Leys, "The connection between ethics and policy decisions is not very clearly understood. . . . Some people . . . entertain quite clear and straightforward ideas about ethical duties and they may have definite notions about policies, but they can seldom tell you how to get from ethics to policy or vice versa."⁵

Clearly, links have to be reforged between public ethics and public policy. Among the most successful in bridging them recently have been the medical ethicists. Recent advances in medicine, genetics and related areas have raised several practical ethical dilemmas—Under what conditions should scientific experiments be conducted on human beings? Who should determine when a person is dead for the purpose of transplanting limbs? Should treatment be given without willing consent? Should persons suffering incurable diseases and in great pain be able to request to be taken off life-support systems? It has been medical ethicists who have advocated a more active role in public policy for ethical analysts, especially in articulating relevant moral principles in policy problems, elucidating policy options in the light of relevant moral principles, and ranking moral options for policy choice.⁶ They should design moral policies and clarify value considerations in public decision-making.⁷ Such a thrust toward compelling policymakers to consider ethics would be a welcome antidote to the vast bulk of the literature on public policy and administration that avoids any mention of values and moral principles, that fails to link ends and means, and that plays up to technocratic Machiavellians and their unprincipled political masters.

Public administration has much to answer for in the neglect of public ethics. It has been far too complacent for too long. It assumed all too readily that having replaced patronage with merit systems, the moral side of conducting public business had been solved. Public administration had been transformed into a gentleman's vocation. It had joined the dignified professions and now exemplified the same middle class virtues. Indeed what distinguished it from business was its superior moral standards. Having attracted good, i.e., moral people, it had only to train them in the best ways of conducting public affairs. Good people could be trusted to conduct themselves properly, to make the right decisions, and to protect the public interest and administrative integrity against political immorality. The law would define unethical conduct and open government would ensure that public ethics were maintained. Little more need be done.

Until Watergate, little more was done. Practitioners preferred to be discreet about the ethical side of government. Professional

bodies toyed with codes of ethics for public officials but nobody took them too seriously. It was felt that they were not really needed. The law was sufficient. Morality was second nature. Ethical codes just spelled out the obvious. Scholars left questions of values and ends to other disciplines. Few courses and fewer texts even mentioned moral dilemmas facing public officials. World War II shook this complacency and brought more serious reflection about the moral obligation of public officials. A few scholars, concerned with the contrast between theory and practice, pushed unsuccessfully for a normative theory of personal ethics in public service.⁸ It was the very amorality of public administration, its lack of involvement in public debate, its silence on the basic issues of the day, that brought forth the New Public Administration movement and its call for moral commitment.

Watergate and attendant scandals revised interest in public ethics. A panel of the National Academy of Public Administration found a disturbing array of myth, ignorance and disregard of ethical considerations. A spate of articles on the neglect of public ethics in public administration began to appear in the leading academic journals and professional associations organized conferences around the same theme. The International Institute of Administrative Sciences established a Working Group on Ethics in the Public Service, the International Political Science Association set up a study group on Political Finance and Political Corruption, and the American Society for Public Administration renamed its Committee on Professional Standards by adding "and Ethics" to its title. After decades of benign neglect, values and ethics were being restored to their rightful place in public administration. But it will take some time to make up for lost ground and only if interest is maintained.

TACKLING PUBLIC MALADMINISTRATION

Public confidence in the administrative state, Big Government, social institutions generally and public administration in

particular is undermined by wrongdoing in high places and constant frustration in conducting business with officialdom. It is shattered if nothing appears to be done to tackle public maladministration. People would not be so concerned about the size of the public sector or the government budget or even taxation if they believed that they received value for their money and they could see constant improvement in the delivery of public goods and services. They do not believe that they do get value for their money and they rarely see impactful improvements in public administration. Instead, little seems to change. The same old routines are conducted in the same old ways; the same people seem to staff public offices; the same uncomfortable furniture fills the same drab premises. Inertia rules, perpetuating existing defects and blocking innovation and reform. There is sufficient proof to back up these impressions that few people realize that improvements are made and the state of the art does advance. To restore public confidence in public administration serious efforts must be made to tackle public maladministration whenever it occurs.

Misconduct

Probably nothing irks people more than the flaunting of public office for personal, private, pecuniary, and partisan gain. Despite cultural differences, there is almost universal agreement that public officials should not indulge in influence peddling, financial transactions which conflict with their official responsibilities, outside employment which causes a conflict with their official duties, future employment from an employer with whom they have transacted official business, nepotism and patronage, and the acceptance of gifts and entertainment which may influence the impartial discharge of their offices.⁹ Every effort should be made to codify, promulgate and strictly enforce public service ethics. Otherwise public administration will appear hypocritical, untruthful and dishonest, and therefore unworthy of public respect. Values and ethics need to be enhanced in the practice of public administration.

Deceitful practices

Although misconduct covers a multitude of public sins committed by public officials as individuals, it does not cover institutionalized lying in pursuit of the national interest which has been overdone to the point where people distrust government. If it is right for government to lie, is it not also right for the governed to lie back? David Wise raises the important question, "If the governed are misled, if they are not told the truth, or if through official secrecy and deception they lack information on which to base intelligent decisions," can democracy itself survive?¹⁰ Open government should be the practice with secrecy confined to exceptional areas such as diplomatic negotiations, military security, and the protection of individual privacy, and public administration needs to examine its operating procedures to reduce practices that encourage deceit.

Corruption

Far from being an oddity on the fringes of political and administrative science, corruption is a central and urgent problem in contemporary public life. It weakens moral authority, undermines the efficiency of government operations, encourages organized crime, adds to taxpayers' burdens, benefits the unscrupulous at the cost of the law abiding, and puts the law up for sale to the highest bidder. It is highly contagious, debilitating and costly to treat. It is a particularly viral form of organizational cancer, quick to spread, hard to detect, and rare to eliminate. It cannot be tackled as individual misconduct, because like deceitful practices, it has become so regularized that organizational supports back collective wrongdoing. Special measures have to be taken to root it out, but as long as opportunities exist, no public organization is corruption proof. All that can be done is to drive it from intolerable to tolerable and from consequential to inconsequential effects.

Defective policy implementation

While much effort goes into devising and formulating public policies, less attention is given to how they are to be implemented. As a result, public administrators are called upon to establish machinery after the event without any clear guidelines. The policies themselves may be beyond implementation, being too idealistic, perfectionist, abstract. The machinery created may defeat the spirit if not the intent of the policy. Designing suitable machinery for feasible policies would prevent some maladministration occurring in the first place.

Bureaupathologies

Antidotes are badly needed for common bureaucratic deficiencies—indecision, red tape, circumlocution, insensitivity, rigidity, sycophancy, and overstaffing. Means have to be found to protect the public against

. . . injustice, failure to carry out legislative intent, unreasonable delay, administrative error, abuse of discretion, lack of courtesy, clerical error, oppression, oversight, negligence, inadequate investigation, unfair policy, partiality, failure to communicate, rudeness, maladministration, unfairness, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, arrogance, inefficiency, violation of law or regulation, abuse of authority, discrimination, errors, mistakes, carelessness, disagreement with discretionary decisions, improper motivation, irrelevant consideration, inadequate or obscure explanation, and all the other acts that are frequently inflicted upon the governed by those who govern, intentionally or unintentionally.¹¹

Both within and without the machinery of government there are many vigilant watchdogs but either they are too weak or the task is beyond them. Certainly their powers of access, the resources available to them, knowledge of their findings, and their ability to overhaul administration systems need to be strengthened. Just how this could be done without inhibiting administrative action

or exposing confidences is just another challenge before public administration.

Paperasserie

All large scale organizations seemed to be drowning in their own paperwork. Seemingly, almost no official business can be conducted without recourse to it. Herbert Kaufman¹² has explained why so much paperwork is necessary in the administrative state to ensure compliance with the law, equity in public service delivery, consistent decision-making, and public accountability. However he also illustrated the absurd lengths to which it can be taken, and the efforts periodically undertaken at least by the U.S. Government to reduce federal paperwork that initially make things worse in the present to make them better in the future.

Defective accounting

Maladministration usually shows up somewhere in the accounts. Independent, competent, fearless and trustworthy accounting and auditing can make all the difference in the conduct of public business. Without it, several countries have experienced the collapse of public morality, the exploitation of public office for private plunder, and the acceptance of corruption as a way of life. In them, lack of confidence in public sector financing has undermined the taxation system, scared off foreign investors, made public budgeting a fiction, ruined public accountability and aborted national planning. Competent auditing and accounting are more than a major prop of orderly, systematic, regular, legal and frugal public finance. They are also a major instrument in investigating administrative irregularities, faulty planning, project mismanagement, low productivity and personal improprieties.

Public maladministration contradicts the ideals of true public service and detracts from the image of public administration as a virtuous, noble instrument advancing humanity. Whenever bad prevails, the good is overlooked. With the best will and the latest tools, public maladministration is unlikely to be eliminated alto-

gether, but it could be reduced to everybody's advantage. Much progress has been made but there is much remaining to be done.

Surprisingly, a number of obvious proven remedies have not been given a fair chance or they have been hastily abandoned on threatening vested interests. Policy makers have found to their cost that administrative systems have a life of their own that may confound their intentions. Scientific managers have discovered also painfully that there is much more to administrative systems than rational design of structure and process. In the organizational society where so much depends on organizational effectiveness, it makes sense to promote administrative improvement and to indoctrinate productivity, frugality, competence and integrity as essential ingredients of the political culture. In any event all these should be basic requirements of professional preparation for public service.

Public organizations can be made to care. Obviously, the individuals who compose them can raise their level of consciousness. Professional managers can assume a more humane and compassionate approach. The clients can help themselves more by indicating their dissatisfaction with public maladministration. Indeed, people generally should be encouraged to express their opinions and complaints. In this way public organizations can discover what they like and dislike, and what ideas they may have for improvement. Public administrators should not assume that they alone can judge administrative performance nor should they place too much credence in self-serving surveys of client satisfaction. In the hundreds of thousands of daily contacts between public administration and the public, mistakes are unavoidable.

Whenever people have been invited to complain, as for instance through ombudsman offices,¹³ it has been found that a sizable proportion of their complaints have been justified, that is, definite wrong has been done. Even when no wrong occurred, public organizations have uncovered public misapprehensions and misconceptions that prejudiced attitudes and behavior toward them and even provoked deviant conduct. Thus, the complaint mechanisms have not only been useful to the public in obtaining redress but also to public organizations in spotting shortcomings

and failures in service delivery, rectifying mistakes soon after occurrence, in reeducating clients as to what is rightfully theirs, and reminding themselves that performance should be judged by the quality of their public service. High quality performance is the only true means for refurbishing the public image of public administration.

NOTES

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Bibliographical Guide

THIS SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHICAL guide is intended for readers who want to delve more deeply into the subject of public administration and are prepared to search out source material for themselves. Although confined to sources that are generally accessible in the United States, it should be sufficiently comprehensive to meet most needs. It is divided into three main sections. The first contains general bibliographies where most reference material to public administration can be located. The second is a more complete list of the major journals dealing with public policy and administration and related topics. The third is no longer a bibliographical essay on the sources used in compiling this book but a guide to landmark studies in the American study of public administration.

A. GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES

No complete bibliography of all published material in public administration exists. In individual countries, where general copyright laws apply and where a national library or archives is legally empowered to receive a copy of all copyright material, fairly complete lists could be compiled if the need arose and the costs were not prohibitive. Only large

international research foundations and governments could undertake the task, providing some agreement were reached on the scope of public administration and the the status of official publications. Keeping such a bibliography up to date requires a large continuing investment. Any bibliography compiled before 1960 is of historical interest only, and the further back in time a bibliography, the less relevant it is.

Items marked with an asterisk are searchable "on line" by computer, a service provided by libraries or other information agencies.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG, BOOKS: SUBJECTS, 1950-.

Probably the most comprehensive set of listings for monographic works in American public administration, based on collections in American libraries, the catalog reproduces Library of Congress printed catalog cards arranged by subject headings.

*PUBLIC AFFAIRS INFORMATION SERVICE BULLETIN (PAISB), 1915-.

Probably the best access tool to current material in the social services, PAISB is a "selective subject list of the latest books, pamphlets, government publications, reports of public and private agencies and periodical articles relating to economic and social conditions, public administration and international relations." Issued weekly with five cumulations a year, the last being an annual cumulation.

*PAIS FOREIGN LANGUAGE INDEX, 1968-.

Almost identical to PAISB, the index includes only foreign language materials of publications in French, German, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish. Authors are indexed. Issued quarterly with an annual cumulation.

*SOCIAL SCIENCE INDEX, 1974-.

Overlaps with PAISB, indexing only annual articles in social and related sciences but contains an author listing of citations and book reviews. Issued quarterly with an annual cumulation.

*SOCIAL SCIENCES CITATION INDEX, 1973-.

This "international multidisciplinary index to the literature of the social, behavioral and related sciences" enables users to identify related writings by authors by indicating where a known work has been cited. Each issue has an author citation index, a source index and a subject index. Issued three times a year, with an annual cumulation.

LONDON BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 1931-.

Exclusive coverage of the social sciences in all Western languages. Annual supplements.

CURRENT CONTENTS: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIOR SCIENCES, 1969-.

Weekly subject indexes list all significant words from article titles appearing in over 1250 journals. No cumulation.

SAGE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ABSTRACTS, 1974-.

This valuable if limited source is the only current bibliographic publication concerning recent literature in public administration selected from over 150 journals together with some books. Contains both subject and author indexes.

INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE, 1941-.

This comprehensive quarterly guide has citations only in French regardless of the language of the original publication. It is arranged in seven broad subject categories with separate author and subject indexes.

INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (IBPS), 1954-.

This annual comprehensive guide is arranged in six broad subject categories, one of which is entitled "Government and Public Administration." Detailed subject index.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ABSTRACTS, 1951-.

This bimonthly comprehensive guide only covers journal articles but is organized similar to IBPS with a cumulative annual index. The relevant section is entitled "Governmental and Administrative Institutions."

ABC POLITICAL SCIENCE, 1969-.

The Advance Bibliography of Contents (ABC): Political Science indexes about 300 journals in English and foreign languages. Has separate author and subject indexes arranged alphabetically by journal title. Issued five times a year with cumulative index.

UNIVERSAL REFERENCE SERVICE, 1966-.

This basic set of ten volumes of computerized information retrieval in political science issued in 1966 has annual supplements of 2-3 volumes each. Well cross-referenced.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS REVIEW: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, 1974-.

This quarterly journal provides a forum for the publication of current practice and new development in government publications.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS, 1932-.

This useful semimonthly listing of recent periodical articles and books issued by the Joint Reference History of the Public Administration Service and seven public administration organizations is arranged in nine broad subject categories: reference, energy and environment, finance and taxation, housing and building, law enforcement and criminal justice, personnel, planning, public works and utilities, and general public administration. No cumulation.

CURRENT BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION, 1971-.

This semimonthly subject list issued by the United Nations Library covers recent "books, publications of governments and of national and international organizations, and selected periodical articles relating to topics considered by organs of the United Nations."

THE MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK, 1975-.

Retrospective coverage to 1970 is contained in a selected bibliography for local government administration and urban affairs.

FROM THE ACIR LIBRARY: PERIODICAL INDEX, 1970-.

This monthly periodical index issued by the Library of the U. S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations covers a broad image of public policy issues.

*MONTHLY CATALOG OF U. S. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, 1895-.

Although not all federal publications are included, the catalog is the basic access tool to U. S. Government Publications. Has four separate indexes by author, title, subject and a series/report index, with cumulative indexes. A semimonthly *Selected United States Government Publications* is also available.

*CIS/INDEX TO PUBLICATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1970-.

A basic retrieval tool for Congressional documents issued monthly and divided into a summary section of abstracts and an index section of subjects and names. Quarterly accumulations and an annual cumulation in the CIS/Annual.

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An index to statistics appearing in federal documents similar to the *CIS/INDEX*, retrospective to 1960 in the *ASI Retrospective Edition*.

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This quarterly index to "the majority of the known local government document issued annually by the largest cities and counties in the United States and Canada," covers over 250 cities and 26 counties with over one million population arranged geographically with a separate subject index. Annual cumulation. Supplements the Urban Documents Microfiche Collection. In addition the Library of Congress issues a monthly *Checklist of State Publications* which covers most state government publications.

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Some 375 reporting institutions in the U. S. list doctoral dissertations in three parts of which Series A covers the social sciences in general and "Political Science: Public Administration" in particular.

Other bibliographies and guides in public administration still in print available in most research libraries would include:

Cutchin, D. A., *Guide to Public Administration*, Itasca, IL; Peacock, 1981.

Harmon, R. B., *Basic Source Materials in Public Administration*, Monticello, Illinois, 1974, Council of Planning Librarians Exchange Bibliography, No. 603.

Hills, W. G., et al., *Administrative Management: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography*, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1975.

Levitan, D., *Informational Sources for Local Governmental Officials and Administrators: Selected Periodicals and References Material*, Monticello, Illinois, 1974, Council of Planning Librarian Exchange Bibliography, No. 642.

McCurdy, H. E., *Public Administration: A Bibliography*, School of Government and Public Administration, American University, Washington, D. C. 1972.

Melrood, M., *A Bibliography on Decentralization*, Milwaukee: Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of Wisconsin, 1970.

Munro, J. L. and Waldo, C., *Administrative Behavior: An Annotated Bibliography with Emphasis on Public Administration*, Albany, New York, State University of New York, 1966.

Palic, V. M., *Government Publications: A Guide to Bibliographical*

- Tool* (incorporating *Government Organization Manuals: A Bibliography*) New York, Pergamon Press, 1977.
- Public Administration Service, *Administration of Public Affairs Library*, Chicago, P.A.S., 1971.
- Rock, M. G., *A Handbook of Information Sources and Research Strategies in Public Administration*, Institute of Public and Urban Affairs, San Diego State University, 1979.
- Ross, B. H. and Fritscher, A. L., *Urban Affairs Bibliography*, School of Government and Public Administration, American University, Washington, D. C., 1974.
- Simpson, A. E., *Guide to Library Research in Public Administration*. Center for Productive Public Management, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York, 1976.

Few of these adequately serve current purposes. More reliance should be placed on professional journals which review current publications, and running bibliographies or lists of new accessions in public administration maintained by the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.; Public Administration Service, Chicago; International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Brussels; Royal Institute of Public Administration, London; and similar national libraries, research institutes of public administration, and universities which publish frequent accession lists.

B. PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS

The frontiers of a discipline are usually presented in the latest issues of professional journals, providing editors remain receptive to new ideas and trends. In these journals, controversial articles provoke debate. Current research findings are summarized. Book reviews and notes inform specialists of recent worthy publications. Conference reports, staff news, and employment services promote professional intercourse. Currently, over one thousand journals have some bearing on public administration. The following is a list of the most frequently consulted journals arranged in ten categories:

I. Administration and Society

- Administration and Society. Quarterly, 1968-.
- Administrative Change. Semiannual, 1973-.

- American Academy of Political & Social Science. Annals. Bimonthly, 1891-.
- American Behavioral Scientist. Bimonthly, 1957-.
- American Economic Review. Quarterly, 1911- (American Economic Association)
- American Journal of Political Science. Quarterly, 1957- (Midwest Conference of Political Scientists).
- American Journal of Sociology. Bimonthly, 1895-.
- American Political Science Review. Quarterly, 1906- (American Political Science Association).
- American Sociological Review. Bimonthly, 1936- (American Sociological Association)
- Behavioral Science. Bimonthly, 1956- (Society for General Systems Research).
- Federal Bar Journal. Monthly, 1931-.
- Futures. Bimonthly, 1968-.
- The Futurist. Bimonthly, 1967- (World Future Society).
- International Social Science Journal. Quarterly, 1949- (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization).
- Journal of Politics. Quarterly 1939- (Southern Political Science Association).
- National Forum. Quarterly, 1924-.
- Philosophy and Public Affairs. Quarterly, 1971-.
- Political Quarterly. Quarterly, 1930-.
- Public Interest. Quarterly, 1965-.
- Social Policy. Bimonthly, 1970-.
- Social Problems. 5/year, 1953- (Society for the Study of Social Problems).
- Society. Bimonthly, 1963-.
- Socioeconomic Planning Sciences. Bimonthly, 1967-.
- The Urban Interest. Quarterly, 1979- (University of Kansas, Department of Political Science).
- The Western Political Quarterly. Quarterly, 1948-.

II. American Government

(i) General and Intergovernmental

- CFS Notebook. 1972- (Conference on Federal Studies).
- Good Government. Quarterly, 1881- (National Civil Service League).

Intergovernmental Perspective. Quarterly, 1975- (U. S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations).

National Civic Review. Monthly, 1911- (National Municipal League)

Publius. Semiannual, 1971- (Temple University Center for the Study of Federalism).

(ii) Federal

Capitol Studies. Semiannual, 1972- (U. S. Capitol Historical Society).

CQ Weekly Report. Weekly, 1945- (Congressional Quarterly, Inc.).

GAO Review. Quarterly, 1967- (U. S. General Accounting Office).

National Journal. Weekly, 1969-.

Presidential Studies Quarterly. Quarterly, 1978-.

Washington Monthly. Monthly, 1969-.

(iii) State

State and County Administrator. Monthly, 1976-.

State and Government. Quarterly, 1930- (Council of State Governments).

State Government Administration. 1966- (National Society of State Legislators).

State Government News. Monthly, 1958- (Council of State Governments).

(iv) Local Government

American City and County. Monthly, 1909-.

County News. 1969- (National Association of Counties).

ICMA Newsletter. Semimonthly 1919- (International City Management Association).

Nation's Cities Weekly. Weekly, 1963- (National League of Cities).

Urban Affairs Quarterly. Quarterly, 1965-.

Urban Data Service Reports. Monthly, 1969- (International City Management Association).

(v) Other (by State)

Alabama Municipal Journal. Monthly, 1948- (Alabama League of Municipalities).

- Arkansas Municipalities. Monthly, 1947- (Arkansas Municipal League).
- California Journal. Monthly, 1970- (California Center for Research and Education in Government).
- Public Affairs Report. Bimonthly, 1960- (University of California, Institute of Governmental Studies).
- Western City. Monthly, 1925- (League of California Cities).
- Colorado Governmental Research Newsletter. Semiannual, 1974- (University of Colorado, Bureau of Governmental Research and Service).
- Colorado Municipalities. Bimonthly, 1925- (Colorado Municipal League).
- Florida Municipal Record. Monthly, 1928- (Florida League of Cities).
- State and Local Government Review. 3/yr. 1968- (University of Georgia, Institute of Government).
- Urban Georgia. Monthly, 1951- (Georgia Municipal Association).
- Idaho Cities. Monthly, 1964- (Association of Idaho Cities).
- Illinois Issues. Monthly, 1975-.
- Illinois Municipal Review. Monthly, 1922- (Illinois Municipal League).
- Iowa Municipalities. Monthly, 1960- (League of Iowa Municipalities).
- Kansas Government Journal. Monthly, 1914- (League of Kansas Municipalities).
- The Kentucky City. Monthly, 1975- (Kentucky Municipal League).
- Public Affairs Analyst. Quarterly, 1974- (University of Kentucky, Center for Public Affairs).
- Louisiana Municipal Review. Bimonthly. 1936- (Louisiana Municipal Association).
- Maine Townsman. Monthly, 1939- (Maine Municipal Association).
- Municipal Maryland. 11/yr. 1948- (Maryland Municipal League).
- Michigan Municipal Review. Monthly, 1928- (Michigan Municipal League).
- Minnesota Cities. Monthly, 1916- (League of Minnesota Municipalities).

- Mississippi Municipalities. Monthly, 1955- (Mississippi Municipal League).
- Missouri Municipal Review. Monthly, 1927- (Missouri Municipal League).
- Montana Public Affairs Report. 4/yr. 1971- (University of Montana, Bureau of Governmental Research).
- Nebraska Municipal Review. Monthly, 1930- (League of Nebraska Municipalities).
- Nevada Government Today. Quarterly, 1973- (Nevada Association of County Commissioners).
- Nevada Public Affairs. Monthly, 1975- (University of Nevada, Bureau of Governmental Research).
- New Hampshire Town and City. Monthly, 1957- (New Hampshire Municipal Association).
- New Jersey Municipalities. Monthly, 1923- (New Jersey State League of Municipalities).
- New Mexico Municipal League, Municipal Reporter. Monthly, 1959-.
- City Almanac. Bimonthly, 1966- (New School for Social Research, Center for New York City Affairs).
- COMP News. Monthly, 1974- (Council for Municipal Performance, New York).
- COMP Report. Bimonthly, 1974- (Council for Municipal Performance, New York).
- Empire State Report. Monthly, 1974-.
- New York Affairs. Quarterly, 1973-.
- New York State Town and County Government. 1952- (Supervisor's and County Legislator's Association of the State of New York).
- Popular Government. Quarterly, 1931- (University of North Carolina, Institute of Government).
- Public Affairs. Quarterly, 1960- (University of South Dakota, Governmental Research Bureau).
- South Dakota Journal of County Government. Monthly, 1953-.
- Public Affairs Comment. Quarterly, 1975- (University of Texas, Lyndon Baines Johnson School of Public Affairs).
- Public Service. 1973- (Texas Tech University, Center for Public Service).
- Texas Town and City. Monthly, 1914- (Texas Municipal League).
- Virginia Municipal Review. Monthly, 1923-.

III. American Public Administration and Management

- Academy of Management Journal. Quarterly, 1958-.
- Academy of Management Review. Quarterly, 1976-.
- Administrative Law Review. Quarterly, 1939-.
- Administrative Management. Monthly, 1940-.
- Advanced Management Journal. Quarterly, 1935- (Society for the Advancement of Management).
- American Review of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1981-.
- The Bureaucrat. Quarterly, 1972- (American Society for Public Administration, National Capital Area Chapter).
- California Management Review. Quarterly, 1958- (University of California).
- Critique: Southern California Public Policy and Administration. Quarterly, 1976- (California State University, Long Beach).
- Harvard Business Review. Bimonthly, 1922- (Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration).
- Indiana Public Management. Quarterly, 1975- (Indiana Society for Public Administration).
- International Journal of General Systems. Quarterly, 1974-.
- International Journal of Management and Organization. Quarterly, 1971-.
- International Journal of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1979-.
- Journal of Management Studies. 3/yr. 1964-.
- Journal of Public International Affairs. Quarterly, 1979-.
- Management Review. Monthly, 1923- (American Management Association).
- Management Science. Monthly, 1954- (Institute of Management Sciences).
- Maxwell Review. Semiannual, 1963- (Syracuse University Graduate Student Association, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs).
- Midwest Review of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1967-1980.
- MIS/Management Information Service. Monthly, 1946- (International City Management Association).
- Municipal Yearbook. Annual. 1934-.
- Public Administration Survey. Bimonthly. 1953- (University of Mississippi, Bureau of Governmental Research).
- Public Administration Review. Bimonthly. 1940- (American Society for Public Administration).
- Public Administration Times. Biweekly, 1978- (American Society for Public Administration).
- Public Management. Monthly. 1919- (International City Management Association).

Public Productivity Review. Quarterly, 1975- (Center for Productive Public Management).

Public Sector. Quarterly, 1976- (Auburn University).

Public Welfare. Quarterly, 1943- (American Public Welfare Association).

Research Management. Bimonthly, 1958- (Industrial Research Institute).

Review. 3/yr. 1979- (School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University).

Sloan Management Review. 3/yr. 1960- (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

Southern Review of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1977- (Southern Public Administration Education Foundation).

State Planning Issues. Semiannual 1976- (National Governor's Association).

IV. Comparative, Development, and International Administration

Administration. Quarterly, 1953- (Institute of Public Administration, Dublin).

Australian Journal of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1938- (Royal Institute of Public Administration).

Canadian Public Administration. Quarterly, 1958- (Institute of Public Administration of Canada).

Chinese Journal of Administration. Semiannual, 1963- (National Cheng-chi University, Center for Public and Business Administration Education, Taiwan).

Developing Economies. Quarterly, 1962-.

Development and Change. Quarterly, 1969- (Institute of Social Science, The Netherlands).

Economic Development and Cultural Change. Quarterly, 1952-.

Economic and Industrial Democracy. Quarterly, 1980-.

Finance and Development, Quarterly, 1964- (World Bank).

Hong Kong Journal of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1979-.

Indian Journal of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1955- (Indian Institute of Public Administration).

Institute of Development Studies Bulletin. Quarterly, 1969- (University of Sussex).

International Development Review. Quarterly, 1959- (Society for International Development).

International Organization. Quarterly, 1947-.

International Review of Administrative Sciences. Quarterly, 1928- (International Institute of Administrative Science, Brussels).

Journal of Rural Development and Administration. Quarterly, 1971-.

- New Zealand Journal of Public Administration. Semiannual, 1938- (New Zealand Institute of Public Administration).
- Pakistan Journal of Public Administration. Semiannual, 1961- (National Institute of Public Administration).
- Philippine Journal of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1957- (University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration).
- Planning and Administration. Semiannual, 1967- (International Union of Local Authorities).
- Politics, Administration and Change. Quarterly, 1980- (Center for Administrative Studies, University of Dacca, Bangladesh).
- Public Administration. Quarterly, 1923- (Royal Institute of Public Administration, London).
- Public Administration and Development. Quarterly, 1980- (Royal Institute of Public Administration).
- Public Administration and Finance Newsletter. 1966- (United Nations, Division of Public Administration and Finance).
- Public Administration Bulletin. Quarterly, 1969- (Joint University Council for Society and Public Administration, London).
- Quarterly Journal of Administration. 1967- (University of Ife, Nigeria, Institute of Administration).
- Thai Journal of Public Administration. Quarterly, 1960-.
- World Politics. Quarterly, 1948-.

V. Health Care Administration

- Administration in Mental Health. Semiannual, 1972-.
- American Journal of Public Health. Monthly, 1911- (American Public Health Association).
- Health and Medical Care Services Review. Quarterly, 1978-.
- Health Care Financing Review. 1979- (U. S. Health Care Financing Administration).
- Health Care Management Review. Quarterly, 1976-.
- Health Services Research. Quarterly, 1966- (Hospital Research and Educational Trust).
- International Journal of Health Services. Quarterly, 1971-.
- Journal of Allied Health. Quarterly, 1972- (American Society of Allied Health Professions).
- Journal of Community Health. Quarterly, 1975- (Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine and Community Health).
- Journal of Health and Human Resources Administration. Quarterly, 1978- (Southern Public Administration Education Foundation).
- Journal of Health and Social Behavior. Quarterly, 1967-.

Journal of Health, Politics, Policy and Law. Quarterly, 1976-.
Public Health Reports. Bimonthly, 1896- (U. S. Public Health Service).

VI. Justice and Law Enforcement Administration

American Journal of Correction. Bimonthly, 1920-.
Crime and Delinquency. Quarterly, 1955- (National Council on Crime and Delinquency).
Crime and Social Justice. Semiannual, 1974- (University of California, School of Criminology).
Crime Prevention Review. Quarterly, 1973- (California, Attorney General's Office).
Criminal Justice and Behavior. Quarterly, 1974- (American Association of Correctional Psychologists).
Criminal Justice Review. Semiannual, 1972- (Georgia State University).
Criminology. Quarterly, 1963- (American Society of Criminology).
Enforcement Journal. Quarterly, 1962- (National Police Officers Association of America).
Federal Probation. Quarterly, 1936- (Administrative Office of the U. S. Courts).
International Journal of Criminology and Penology. Quarterly, 1973-.
International Review of Criminal Policy. Annual, 1952- (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs).
Journal of Criminal Justice. Quarterly, 1973-.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. Quarterly, 1910- (Northwestern University School of Law).
Journal of Police Science and Administration. Quarterly, 1973- (International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.).
Law and Order. Monthly, 1953-.
Law Officer. Bimonthly, 1968- (International Conference of Police Associations).
National Sheriff. Bimonthly, 1948-.
Police Chief. Monthly, 1934- (International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc.).
Police Journal. Quarterly, 1928-.
Police Law Quarterly. Quarterly, 1971-.
Police Studies. Quarterly, 1978-.

VII. Organization Theory and Behavior

Administrative Science Quarterly. Quarterly, 1956- (Cornell University Graduate School of Business and Public Administration).

- Dialogue. Quarterly, 1979- (The Public Administration Theory Network, Evergreen State College).
- Group and Organization Studies. Quarterly, 1976-.
- Human Relations. Monthly, 1947- (Tavistock Institute of Human Relations).
- Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, Quarterly, 1965- (National Institute for Applied Behavioral Science).
- Journal of Voluntary Action Research. Quarterly, 1972- (Association of Voluntary Action Scholars).
- Organization and Administrative Sciences. Quarterly, 1970- (Kent State University, Comparative Administration Research Institute).
- Organization Studies. Quarterly, 1980-.
- Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. Bimonthly, 1966-.
- Organizational Dynamics. Quarterly, 1973- (American Management Association).
- Small Group Behavior. Quarterly, 1970-.
- Teaching of Organizational Behavior. Quarterly, 1975- (Stanford University Graduate School of Business Administration).

VIII. Public Finance

- Assessor's Journal. Quarterly, 1966- (International Association of Assessing Officers).
- Federal Accountant. Quarterly, 1952-1975.
- Fiscal Observer. Monthly, 1977- (New School for Social Research, Center for New York City Affairs).
- Government Accounts Journal. Quarterly, 1975-.
- Governmental Finance. Quarterly, 1926- (Municipal Finance Officers Association).
- International Assessor. Monthly, 1934- (International Association of Assessing Officers).
- Local Finance. Bimonthly, 1922-.
- National Tax Journal. Quarterly, 1948- (National Tax Association—Tax Institute of America).
- People and Taxes. Monthly, 1973- (Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group).
- Public Budgeting and Finance. Quarterly, 1981-.
- Public Finance. 3/yr. 1946-.
- Public Finance Quarterly. Quarterly, 1973-.
- Tax Review. Monthly, 1940- (Tax Foundation, Inc.).
- Taxing and Spending. Quarterly, 1978- (Institute for Contemporary Studies).

IX. Public Personnel Administration

- ASTD Journal. Monthly, 1945- (American Society for Training and Development).
- California Public Employee Relations. Quarterly, 1969- (University of California, Institute of Industrial Relations).
- Civil Service Review. Quarterly, 1928- (Public Service Alliance of Canada).
- Government Executive. Monthly, 1969-.
- Human Resources Management. Quarterly, 1961- (University of Michigan, Graduate School of Business Administration).
- Industrial and Labor Relations Review. Quarterly, 1947- (New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations).
- Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector. Quarterly, 1972-.
- Journal of Human Resources. Quarterly, 1966- (Industrial Relations Research Institute).
- Personnel. Bimonthly, 1919- (American Management Association).
- Personnel Administrator. 9/yr. 1948- (American Society for Personnel Administration).
- Personnel Journal. Monthly, 1922-.
- Personnel Management. Monthly, 1920-.
- Personnel Psychology. Quarterly, 1948-.
- Public Personnel Management. Quarterly, 1940- (International Personnel Management Association).

X. Public Policy/Policy Studies/Science Policy

- Canadian Public Policy. Quarterly, 1975-.
- Evaluation and Program Planning. Quarterly, 1978-.
- Evaluation Quarterly. Quarterly, 1977-.
- Foreign Affairs. Quarterly, 1922-.
- Minerva. Quarterly, 1962- (International Association for Cultural Freedom).
- Policy Analysis. Quarterly, 1975-.
- Policy and Politics. Quarterly, 1972-.
- Policy News. Quarterly, 1972-.
- Policy Review. Quarterly, 1977- (Heritage Foundation).
- Policy Sciences. Quarterly, 1970-.
- Policy Studies Journal. Quarterly, 1972- (Policy Studies Organization).
- Public Choice. Quarterly, 1966- (Public Choice Society).
- Public Policy. Quarterly, 1940- (Harvard University, J. F. K. School of Government).

- Regulation. Bimonthly, 1977- (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
- Science. Weekly, 1880- (American Association for the Advancement of Science).
- Science and Public Policy. Bimonthly, 1972- (Science Policy Foundation).
- Technological Forecasting and Social Change. Quarterly, 1969-.
- Technology in Society. Quarterly, 1979-.
- Working Papers for a New Society. Quarterly, 1973- (Center for the Study of Public Policy, Inc.).

C. THREE HUNDRED HISTORICAL LANDMARKS IN THE STUDY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 1781-1981

Two hundreds years in any discipline produces many important landmarks when something was done for the first time or a new ordering of the subject matter was sketched or a major work of lasting influence was published. The problem is not what to include but what to exclude. Despite the relatively late evolution of an American discipline of public administration distinct from its European forebears, there is an abundant literature of more than passing historical interest. If anyone would like to taste the antecedents of contemporary American public administration, the following 300 or so historical landmarks should prove rewarding.

- 1788 Hamilton, A., Madison, J., et al., *The Federalist Papers*.
- 1834 de Tocqueville, A. C., *Democracy in America*.
- 1880 Eaton, D. B., *Civil Service in Great Britain*, New York, Harper.
- 1885 Wilson, W., *Congressional Government*, New York, Meridian (1956).
- 1893 Goodnow, F. J., *Comparative Administrative Law*, New York, Putnam.
- 1900 Goodnow, F. J., *Politics and Administration*, New York, Macmillan, also Russell and Russell (1967).
- 1905 Goodnow, F. J., *The Principles of Administrative Law in the United States*, New York, Putnam.
- 1909 Small, A. W., *The Cameralists*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- 1911 Taylor, F. W., *The Principles of Scientific Management*, New York, Harper.

- 1912 House, E. M., *Philip Dru, Administrator*, New York, Huebsch.
- 1913 Bruere, H. J., *The New City Government*, New York, Appleton.
Cleveland, F. A., *Organized Democracy*, New York, Longmans
Green.
- 1915 Toulmin, H. A., *The City Manager*, New York, Appleton.
- 1917 Stourm, R., *The Budget*, New York, Appleton.
- 1918 Meriam, L., *Principles Governing the Retirement of Public Em-
ployees*, New York, Appleton.
Willoughby, W. F., *The Problem of a National Budget*, Wash-
ington, D. C., Brookings.
- 1919 Weber, G. A., *Organized Efforts for the Improvement of Methods
of Administration in the United States*, New York, Appleton.
- 1921 Buck, A., *Public Budgeting*, New York, Appleton.
Oakey, F., *Principles of Government Accounting and Reporting*
Washington, D. C., Brookings.
Procter, A., *Principles of Public Personnel Administration*, Wash-
ington, D. C., Brookings.
- 1923 Freund, E., et al., *The Growth of American Administrative Law*.
St. Louis, Missouri, Thomas.
- 1926 White, L. D., *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration*.
New York, Macmillan.
- 1927 Baxter, G., *Governmental Administration*, Norfolk, VA, The
Economic Press.
Dewey, J., *The Public and Its Problems*, New York, Holt.
Greer, S., *A Bibliography of Public Administration*, New York,
Macmillan.
White, L. D., *The City Manager*, Chicago, University of Chicago
Press.
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more, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- 1928 Gulick, L. H., *The National Institute of Public Administration*.
New York, Institute of Public Administration.
- 1929 Stewart, F., *The National Civil Service Reform League*, Austin,
The University of Texas Press.
- 1931 Sharp, W. R., *The French Civil Service*, New York, Macmillan.
- 1932 Beck, J. M., *Our Wonderland of Bureaucracy*, New York, Mac-
millan.
Friedrich, C. J., and Cole, T., *Responsible Bureaucracy*, Cam-
bridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

- Mosher, W. E., and Crawford, F. G., *Public Utility Regulation*, New York, Harper.
- 1933 Stephens, H. M., *Administrative Tribunals and the Rules of Evidence*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
- White, L. D., *Trends in Public Administration*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- 1935 Haines, C. G., and Dimock, M. E., *Essays on the Law and Practice of Governmental Administration*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Merriam, C., et al., *Better Government Personnel*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- Pfiffner, J. M., *Public Administration*, New York, Ronald Press.
- Pigors, P. J., *Leadership or Domination*, Boston, Houghton-Mifflin.
- Tead, O., *The Art of Leadership*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- White, L. D., *Government Career Service*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Wilmerding, L., *Government by Merit*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- 1936 Friedrich, C., et al., *Problems of American Public Service*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- Gaus, J. M., et al., *The Frontiers of Public Administration*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Herring, E. P., *Public Administration and the Public Interest*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- Kingsley, J., and Mosher, W., *Public Personnel Administration*, New York, Harper.
- 1937 Dimock, M. E., *Modern Politics and Administration*, New York, American Book Company.
- Gulick, L., and Urwick, L., *Papers on the Science of Administration*, New York, Institute of Public Administration, Columbia University.
- 1938 Barnard, C. I., *The Functions of the Executive*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
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- Ridley, C. E., and Simon, H. A., *Measuring Municipal Activities*, Chicago, International City Management Association.
- 1939 MacMahon, A. W., and Millett, J. D., *Federal Administrators*, New York, Columbia University Press.

- Tead, O., *New Adventures in Democracy*, New York, McGraw-Hill.
- 1940 Blachly, F. M. and Oatman, M. E., *Federal Regulatory Action and Control*, Washington, D. C., Brookings.
- Marx, F. M. (ed.), *Public Management in the New Democracy*, New York, Harper.
- Pfiffner, J. M., *Municipal Administration*, New York, The Ronald Press.
- Pfiffner, J. M., *Research Methods in Public Administration*, New York, The Ronald Press.
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- Beard, C. A., *Public Policy and General Welfare*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- Graham, G. A., *Education for Public Administration*, Social Science Research Council, Chicago.
- Wallace, S. C., *Federal Decentralization*, New York, Columbia University Press.
- 1942 Leiserson, A., *Administrative Regulation*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- 1944 Caldwell, L. K., *The Administrative Theories of Hamilton and Jefferson*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Hayek, F. A., *The Road to Serfdom*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Kingsley, J. D., *Representative Bureaucracy*, Yellow Springs, Ohio, The Antioch Press.
- Lilienthal, D. E., *T.V.A. Democracy on the March*, New York, Harper and Row.
- Von Mises, L., *Bureaucracy*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press.
- 1945 Appleby, P. H., *Big Democracy*, New York, Knopf.
- Dimock, M. E., *The Executive in Action*, New York, Harper and Row.
- Leighton, A. H., *The Governing of Men*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Tead, O., *Democratic Administration*, New York, Association Press.
- White, L. D., et al., *New Horizons in Public Administration*, University, AL, University of Alabama Press.

- 1946 Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. W., *From Max Weber*, New York, Oxford University Press.
Marx, F. M., (ed.), *Elements of Public Administration*, Prentice-Hall.
- 1947 Gaus, J. M., *Reflections on Public Administration*, University, AL, University of Alabama Press.
Simon, H. A., *Administrative Behavior*, New York, Macmillan.
- 1948 Seckler-Hudson, C., (ed.), *Processes of Organization and Management*, Washington, D. C., Public Affairs Press.
Waldo, D., *The Administrative State*, New York, Ronald Press.
White, L. D., *The Federalists*, New York, Macmillan.
- 1949 Appleby, P. H., *Policy and Administration*, University, AL, University of Alabama Press.
Fesler, J. W., *Area and Administration*, University, AL, University of Alabama Press.
Lepawsky, A., (ed.), *Administration*, New York, Knopf.
McLean, J., *Public Service and University Education*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
Selznick, P., *TVA and the Grass Roots*, New York, Harper and Row.
- 1950 Emmerich, H., *Essays on Federal Reorganization*, University, AL, University of Alabama Press.
Simon, H. A., et al., *Public Administration*, New York, Knopf.
Stewart, F. M., *A Half Century of Municipal Reform*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press.
Thompson, V. A., *The Regulatory Process in O.P.A. Rationing*, New York, King's Point Press.
- 1951 Dimock, M. E., *Free Enterprise and the Administrative State*, University of Alabama Press.
Godine, M. R., *The Labor Problem in the Public Service*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Lerner, D., and Lasswell, H. D., (ed.), *The Policy Sciences*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press.
Maass, A., *Muddy Waters*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Mills, C. W., *White Collar*, New York, Oxford University Press.
Nigro, F. A., (ed.), *Public Administration*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
White, L. D., *The Jeffersonians*, New York, Macmillan.

- 1952 Appleby, P. H., *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government*, Baton Rouge, LA, Louisiana State University Press.
- Merton, R. K., et al., (ed.), *Reader in Bureaucracy*, Glencoe, IL, Free Press.
- Stein, H. (ed.), *Public Administration and Policy Development*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.
- 1954 Charlesworth, J. C. (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Democratic Government*, Philadelphia, AAPSS, Vol. 292.
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- Mosher, F. C., *Program Budgeting*, Chicago, Public Administration Service.
- Price, D. K., *Government and Science*, New York, New York University Press.
- White, L. D., *The Jacksonians*, New York, Macmillan.
- 1955 Bernstein, M. H., *Regulating Business by Independent Commission*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press.
- Blau, P. M., *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Burkhead, J., *Government Budgeting*, New York, Wiley.
- Grodzins, M., *The Loyal and the Disloyal*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
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