
BUREAUCRACY IN PAKISTAN

CHARLES H. KENNEDY

A detailed, candid, and perceptive exposé of the complex and intricate administrative network, *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* draws upon the author's extensive fieldwork in Pakistan; interviews with administrators, academics, and politicians; and a variety of unpublished material.

Dr. Charles H. Kennedy blends scholarship and personal observations in providing insights into the development of the bureaucracy during the period of British colonialism. Discussing the significance of intra-bureaucratic institutions he analyses the outcome of administrative reforms, and assesses the interaction of civil and military institutions in the context of Pakistan's political history.

Bureaucracy in Pakistan is the product of ten years of research and contains an extensive and useful bibliography.

Dr. Charles H. Kennedy is Assistant Professor of Politics, Wake Forest University, U.S.A. He has contributed to various journals and is co-editor of *Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States*, Lynne Rienner, 1986 and co-author of *Government and Politics in South Asia*, Westview, forthcoming.



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Charles H. Kennedy

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To
My Father
Orian R. Kennedy

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Foreword

Since its birth, Pakistan has been governed by its elites, mainly bureaucratic, military, and political. The bureaucratic elite who had formed an important element in the power structure since the very creation of Pakistan gradually became more assertive, frequently gaining their steadily increasing power at the expense of the political elite. An important contributory factor in this development was the fact that at an early stage in Pakistan's history some erstwhile bureaucrats were able to occupy the political positions of Governor General and Prime Minister. They brought with them the traditions, outlook, and attitudes typical of the bureaucrats and their sympathies were slanted more towards the bureaucracy than towards the political institutions. The military *coups* of 1958, 1969, and 1977 further strengthened the power and prestige of civil bureaucracy. It can be maintained that during the greater part of Pakistan's history, higher bureaucracy has ruled the country; in fact Pakistan can be described as a bureaucratic polity. Thus the symbiotic relationship which should exist between the political institutions and bureaucracy failed to develop in Pakistan.

Professor Charles H. Kennedy's book *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* is a penetrating study of the dominant role of this institution in the Pakistani polity. The reader will find in this volume an exhaustive, detailed, and in-depth discussion and analysis of the major aspects of Pakistan's bureaucracy. The painstaking effort which has gone into the writing of this book includes the sifting of numerous government reports, 'Civil Lists of Officers', and other documents covering a period of 200 years and spread over thousands of pages.

In this Foreword a few observations are added to those of Professor Kennedy relating to the following salient characteristics of Pakistan's bureaucracy: The Secretariat and the Secretaries, Preference for Generalists, Importance of Cadres, The 'Quota System' in Recruitment, and the 'Administrative Reforms' of 1973 and their impact on the public personnel system.

The Secretariat and the Secretaries

The Secretariat is the 'policy-making' structure of bureaucracy comprising Divisions in the federal government and departments in the provincial government.

Professor Kennedy's survey of the Secretariat includes a discussion of the functions of the Secretariat and the functional relationships between the Secretariat and the 'Attached Departments' and 'Subordinate Offices' and between the Secretariat and field officials.

The head of the Division in the federal government and of the department in the provincial administration is the Secretary. The post of the federal Secretary is probably the most powerful in the Pakistani bureaucracy and is usually filled by senior-most civil servants. In view of its immense power and prestige the office of the Secretary merits a few comments.

In Pakistan's history, the Secretaries have played a very important role in policy-making and in the affairs of the government, maintaining their power and prestige in political governments and martial law administrations alike. In fact, 'Government by Secretaries' would be a suitably descriptive appellation for the Government of Pakistan.

Among the major factors which make the Secretaries' position pre-eminent, the following are particularly worth-mentioning:

- The '*Rules of Business*' of the Government of Pakistan give considerable power to the Secretary assigning him also the role of an advisor to the Minister in policy-making.
- The Secretary is very often the sole custodian of information and data on which policies are based.
- The Secretaries have inherited a tradition from the British

days whereby they have exercised a great deal of power and influence in the government.

- The Secretaries on the whole are experienced, intelligent, and competent officers whose advice can not easily be ignored by the Ministers.

The author provides insights into the relationship between the Secretaries and the Ministers and enumerates the causal factors responsible for the Secretaries' 'domination' in this relationship.

Preference for Generalists

The other characteristic of Pakistani bureaucracy discussed in great detail in the book is the 'preference for generalists', which is reflected in two ways: (1) in recruitment and (2) in the pre-eminence enjoyed by the generalist cadres. At the time of recruitment in bureaucracy, university graduates in natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, engineering, medicine, and other subjects are treated at par and receive no 'preference for relevance'. A university graduate in biology or chemistry, for instance, may be appointed in the Income Tax Department and a graduate in finance may be selected for the Police Department. It is believed that a candidate who has done well in the university examinations is likely to do equally well in any branch of government activity. The origins of this principle go back to the middle of the nineteenth century, and were enunciated in the following words by Lord Macaulay, whose thinking had a great deal of influence on the public personnel system of the Subcontinent.

We believe that men who have been engaged up to one or two and twenty years in studies which have no immediate connection with the business of any profession, and of which the effect is merely to open, to invigorate and to enrich the mind, will generally be found in the business of every profession, superior to men who have, at 18 or 19 devoted themselves to the special studies of their calling.¹

As pointed out by Professor Kennedy, the lapse of one hundred years has not made much difference in the public recruitment philosophy in Pakistan.

¹ *The British Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. LV, 1876, 'Report on the Indian Civil Service, 1854'.

The second aspect of preference for generalists is that some of the generalist services, particularly the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) and its successor District Management Group (DMG) have occupied a privileged position in the administrative system and their members are frequently the incumbents of the highest posts in bureaucracy. Various aspects of this phenomenon are discussed and analysed by the author including the pre-eminence of generalists and the secondary role played by technocrats in the bureaucracy.

Professor Kennedy observes 'technocrats attempting to break into the system face two formidable hurdles: (a) they must demonstrate extraordinary personal competence—after all 'technocrats are not good administrators' and (b) they must overcome bureaucratic norms and practices designed to favour generalists'.

He contends that 'the relationship between generalist and technocrat is zero-sum. Technocrats and generalists are competing for the same set of jobs. As a consequence a gain by a technocrat is off-set by a loss to generalist'.

Cadre System

Another important feature of bureaucracy discussed by the author is the division of civil servants into well-defined groups, services or cadres. As pointed out by the author, each officer selected in the bureaucracy is assigned to an occupational group and by and large he remains a member of his group throughout his career. His 'promotional prospects, job type, and duties are determined to a large extent by association with his cadre'.

The cadre system, which started approximately 200 years ago in the Subcontinent, was incorporated by the Government of Pakistan 'with only minor modifications'. Professor Kennedy has surveyed in great detail the historical development of the cadre system and discussed the role of each of the cadres in public bureaucracy. He has pointed out some negative aspects of the system which include the following:

- The cadre system has retarded the process of administrative reform.

- It has 'contributed to administrative inefficiency' as it is only marginally related to job performance and encourages 'politics' in bureaucracy.

The Quota System

At the time of Independence the representation of different provinces in higher bureaucracy was disproportional due to various historical, political, social, and economic reasons. A high percentage of senior civil servants comprised immigrants from India, particularly from the Indian state of U.P., and from the Pakistani province of Punjab. Although a majority of Pakistan's population lived in its eastern wing, its representation in higher bureaucracy was fairly low. The same was true with the representation from rural Sind, the NWFP, and Baluchistan. In order to increase the representation of under-represented provinces, the policy-making elite decided at a fairly early stage in Pakistan's history, that each province should be provided with some guaranteed recruitment in the bureaucracy. Thus a 'quota system' was introduced through which each province was allocated a certain percentage of posts at the time of recruitment to the federal bureaucracy.

Professor Kennedy has discussed the history and rationale of this system and analysed its working in great detail. The success of the quota system in the attainment of its objective is illustrated by a table prepared by the author showing that by 1983 the representation of various provinces in the higher bureaucracy was more or less proportionate to their populations.

Personnel Reorganization

The author has discussed in detail the background and contents of the 'administrative reforms' of 1973, which may more aptly be described as Personnel Reorganization. The main features of this reorganization included the following:

- Abolition of service cadres which were henceforth labelled 'occupational groups'.
- Discontinuation of the reservation of certain posts in the bureaucracy for members of certain cadres.

- Abolition of 'service associations'.
- Induction of 'lateral entrants' in the bureaucracy.

The forces that were primarily responsible for the Personnel Reorganization of 1973 included senior and influential members of the bureaucracy outside the Civil Service of Pakistan, who were jealous and critical of the power, privileges, and status of the CSPs. This group had the good fortune of enjoying the support of the political elite of the time, who were unhappy with the performance of government bureaucracy, and who believed that since the CSPs occupied the highest posts in the bureaucracy, they were to be held responsible for maladministration in the country. Similarly the media and public opinion had also been critical of the performance and attitudes of the bureaucrats. The conjunction of all these forces resulted in the re-organization of the personnel system in 1973.

Professor Kennedy notes that the personnel reorganization of 1973 has not changed 'the contextual importance of the cadre system to the bureaucracy of Pakistan' and the organization of bureaucracy into 'semi-functional occupation groups has persisted'. He argues that these 'groups still manifest the characteristics of the services which they replaced' and contends that the 'reforms did not challenge the nature of the cadre system *per se* but rather the prevailing relationships between members of different cadres'.

The author has assiduously collected a wealth of information about hundreds of 'probationers' who were selected for the 'Central Superior Services' between 1970 and 1981 and after tabulating the data has presented the following significant findings.

The prestige of the Civil Service of Pakistan, its 'lineal descendant' the District Management Group, and the Pakistan Foreign Service has declined significantly, whereas that of financial and other cadres has increased. The author thus concludes that the bureaucracy in the eighties is more egalitarian than in the seventies.

Professor Kennedy is, however, of the view that 'the limited successes of the administrative reform have been paid for dearly by the bureaucracy of Pakistan'. In this regard, he notes some major negative effects:

- 'Politicization of the bureaucracy', resulting in 'the decline in morale among public servants'.
- 'Persistent shunning of responsibility for making administrative decisions. . . . Hence the prevalent complaint by senior administrators that even the most mundane matters are "duly noted" all the way to their desks'.
- 'Perhaps most importantly, the administrative reforms have further eroded the perception that choosing a career in administration is a valid career choice. No longer are the "best and brightest" in Pakistan preparing for a career in the CSP/DMG. . . . This depletion of the gene pool of public servants in Pakistan is likely to have a long term negative effect on all aspects of administration in Pakistan'.

Summing Up

The depth as also the breadth of this study, the significance of the issues covered, and the assiduity of the research effort make this book a major contribution to the understanding of the administrative system of Pakistan. Along with a scholarly grasp of the subject and the history and ecology of administration in the Subcontinent, the author also manifests empathy for Pakistan and its people. *Bureaucracy in Pakistan* is an erudite, absorbing, and highly thought-provoking study.

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May 1986

Preface

The data for this study was collected during seven field trips and a total of thirty-nine months of research in Pakistan. My initial trip was sponsored by the American Institute of Pakistan Studies (1975-6). Subsequent trips were made in 1977, 1978, 1982, and 1984-5. My original assignment was to examine Prime Minister Bhutto's administrative reforms for my dissertation in political science at Duke University. This task was completed in 1979. Since that time, the study has undergone extensive revisions and updating. The latest revisions were completed in late 1985 and resulted in this volume. Throughout, my research has relied on a combination of numerous interviews with Pakistan's public servants and an extensive examination of relevant published and unpublished governmental documents.

This study would have been impossible without the help of numerous institutions. In Pakistan special debts of gratitude are owed to the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, the All-Pakistan Administrative Research Centre, and the United States Educational Foundation in Pakistan. In the United States institutional support was provided by Duke University, Bowdoin College, and Wake Forest University.

More important than institutions, however, are the individuals who gave freely of their time, wisdom, and friendship. Particularly notable have been the contributions of the late Dr. Agha Iftikhar Husain (dear friend and administrative expert); Dr. Ralph Braibanti, Duke University (my dissertation supervisor and mentor on Pakistan's bureaucracy); and Hassan Habib (former Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College). Very significant contributions were also made by

Dr. Shafik Hashmi, Dr. Vaqar Ahmed, Dr. Tariq Siddiqui, Dr. Jameel-ur-Rehman Khan, and Dr. S.M. Haider. The staff of USEF/P proved indispensable throughout. Particular thanks are owed to Dr. Bruce Lohof, Dr. Charles Boewe, Ali Imran Afaqi, and Muhammed Arshad. Also, indispensable has been the support of my family—Patricia Poe (who actually typed the dissertation in 1979), and my children Shannon and Colin. The work of two student assistants—Ann Sargent (Bowdoin College) and Amanda Worsham (Wake Forest University)—is also gratefully acknowledged. Finally, I owe a profound debt of gratitude to the literally hundreds of other individuals of various walks of life and nationalities who allowed me to discuss issues relevant to Pakistan's administrative system over the past eleven years.

Financial assistance for this project was provided by the American Institute of Pakistan Studies (1975-6; 1978) and the Fulbright-Hays programme (1984-5). Other sources of financial support were provided by the Department of Political Science and the Islamic and Arabian Development Studies Center of Duke University; and by the Research and Publications Fund of Wake Forest University.

Given so much help, I must shoulder the blame for any errors of fact or interpretation which remain.

20 March 1986

CHK
Winston-Salem, N.C.

1

The Context and Characteristics of Pakistan's Civilian Bureaucracy

The civilian bureaucracy of Pakistan is embedded in the political history, culture, and institutions of the state. This chapter draws a contextual map linking the civilian bureaucracy to such factors. Three significant challenges have beset Pakistan's first four decades of statehood, namely: (a) the problem of reconciling the demand for an Islamic polity with the equally compelling demand for the formation of a secular polity; (b) the problem of integrating competing regional demands within the context of the nation-state; and (c) the problems associated with unequal levels of institutional and political development. It is argued that the civilian bureaucracy has played a crucial role in the formulation of governmental policy to meet each of these challenges. Shifting the focus of the analysis to a description of the characteristics of the administrative system, it is argued that the bureaucratic system of Pakistan can best be described by four closely related factors: the secretariat system of bureaucratic authority, the systemic preference for generalists, the cadre system of organization, and rigid and formal patterns of rank hierarchy. Finally, the relationship between civil bureaucratic and political authority in the state is discussed centreing on the importance of administrative reform.

BUREAUCRACY AND CHALLENGES TO THE INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN

Since the Partition of the Subcontinent in 1947, Pakistan has wrestled with three fundamental and perhaps insoluble

problems. First, Pakistan emerged as a consequence of the ideological demand for the establishment of an Islamic state. This demand had its origins in the perception that within a greater India, the communal importance of Muslims would pale before the more numerous Hindu population. Therefore, consequent with Partition Pakistan was forced to attempt the reconciliation of Islam to the exigencies of modern statecraft. This has proven to be a very difficult task. Unlike India which was able to draft a 'secular' Constitution less than two years after Partition, Pakistan was forced to undergo a painful and time-consuming process of defining the 'Basic Principles' of the new Islamic state. Indeed, it took Pakistan nearly nine years to adopt its first Constitution, and its adoption was as much the consequence of the discrediting of the *ulema* subsequent to the Ahmadi disturbances in the Punjab in 1953, as it was the consequence of the reconciliation of Islamic and secular demands concerning the ideal form the new state should take.¹ The solution reached by the 1956 Constitution created an 'Islamic Republic' which, though it paid lipservice to the Islamic nature of the new state, did little to implement specific policy demands implicit in orthodox interpretations of Islam. Three subsequent Constitutions—President Ayub's 1962 Constitution, and Prime Minister Bhutto's 1972 and 1973 Constitutions, did not significantly modify this pattern. Islamic leaders and their followers have consistently opposed such secularization of Pakistan's development. Accordingly, they constituted the best organized and most effective opposition to governmental policy from the early fifties to the mid-seventies. Indeed, such groups played a major role in the events which led to the downfall of the governments of both President Ayub and Prime Minister Bhutto. Since 1977, President Zia-ul-Haq has placed great reliance on the establishment of an Islamic Order (Nizam-i-Islam) in Pakistan. His reforms have included legal, economic, institutional, and social dimensions.² With the promulgation of the *Restoration of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985*, such Islamic reforms have been embedded in the constitutional structure of Pakistan.³ However, the issue of the proper role of Islam in the Pakistan polity is far from settled. President Zia's Islamic policies have faced

opposition from both those who feel that such policies have gone too far and from those who feel that his policies have not gone far enough.

A second fundamental challenge to Pakistan's existence has been divisive regionalism. Pakistan was formed through the amalgamation of several distinct cultural entities fragmented by language, race, levels of economic development, and in the case of the relationship between East and West Pakistan by over one thousand miles of episodically hostile foreign territory. Given the implicit centrifugal tendencies such divisions engender, much of the creative effort of the Government of Pakistan has been expended in the attempt to keep the state intact. Among the solutions proposed by the government have been the several schemes of 'equitable' representation in the National Assembly, policies of ethnic and regional preference, the Urdu language policy, and the short-lived experiment of 'One Unit' administration in West Pakistan.⁴ Of course, such solutions ultimately failed, and in 1971 Pakistan was dismembered and the new state of Bangladesh emerged. Unfortunately, problems associated with regionalism were not solved by the secession of Bangladesh. Pakistan is still plagued by chronic autonomist and periodic secessionist sentiment in Sind, NWFP, and Baluchistan. Such sentiments are in part fuelled by international linkages (Afghanistan, Iran, India), but more importantly, they have been generated by the persistent perception that the Punjab dominates the political life of the nation. In particular, Punjabis are alleged to dominate the civilian and military bureaucracies. The latter perception has ensured the continuation of the quota system of recruitment to Pakistan's civil bureaucracy. Finally, there are significant discrepancies in the relative levels of regional economic development. Such inequities have further exacerbated divisive regional sentiments.

A third fundamental problem which has challenged the integrity of Pakistan concerns its inability to achieve balanced levels of institutional development. Pakistan inherited a political system from Britain which was crafted to suit the needs of a colonial power, i.e., its overriding concern was to rule a subject people. As a consequence, the

primary tool to effect this control, the administrative system inherited by the new state, demonstrated highly complex patterns of organization, well-established forms of socialization for its members, and a remarkable degree of institutional autonomy. Countervailing institutions, most particularly those responsible for ensuring governmental responsiveness to the demands of the public (legislatures, interest groups, political parties, and local government institutions) existed in only an attenuated form. This developmental gap has widened since Partition. Most importantly, Pakistan has been unable to establish the precedent of orderly succession of political leaders. The results of the four national elections held in Pakistan (1965, 1970, 1977, and 1985) have each been challenged as invalid by the 'losers.' Given such a context the concept of a loyal opposition has never emerged in Pakistan, nor has the role of political parties been very significant. One consequence of such a fragmented and contentious political culture has been the emergence of the military as the dominant political actor in the state. Pakistan has been subject to extensive periods of military rule and periods of dominance by civilianized military leaders. Even when the military is in the barracks, they have exerted a veto power on the political system. Such military dominance has exacerbated the inherited gap between the capabilities of the civil bureaucracy and orthodox political institutions. Indeed, successive governments in Pakistan (military and non-military) have remained exceedingly dependent on the civilian bureaucracy for all phases of the policy process. Conversely, civil bureaucrats have viewed the growth of political institutions as an inherent challenge to their authority.

The civil bureaucracy of Pakistan has been instrumental in the determination of governmental policy regards each of the foregoing issues. First, as an institution the civil bureaucracy is a natural ally of a secular vision of the Pakistan polity. Both the selection process of new recruits and the socialization process of probationers are conducive to this outcome. Indeed, the civil bureaucracy constitutes the most westernized sector of the elite in Pakistan. Consequently, the civil bureaucracy served to counter the more extreme proponents of an Islamic state in the early fifties,⁵ and since 1977, they

have served to 'moderate' the effects of the implementation of the Nizam-i-Islam.⁶ Similarly, the adoption of Islamic reforms have had only a marginal impact on the structure and administrative practices of Pakistan's bureaucracy.⁷

Second, due in part to the crucial role played by the civil bureaucracy in the political system of Pakistan, the issue of regional representativeness of the bureaucracy has also been deemed crucial. In the absence of significant institutions of political representation, one dominant method of securing representation for an ethno-regional group is to reserve positions in the bureaucracy for one's relevant 'nationals.' Consequently, every government since Partition has employed a system of regional quotas to determine selection to the civil bureaucracy. Indeed, one of the issues which led to the secession of East Pakistan was the perception that Bengalis were systematically underrepresented in Pakistan's bureaucracy.

Finally, a compelling argument could be made that the very existence of the highly developed and complex civil bureaucracy of Pakistan has impeded the parallel development of alternative political institutions. In fact, a fairly accurate way to view the political history of Pakistan is to conceive of the system as manifesting the successive dominance of political leaders (most notably Jinnah, Liaquat, Ayub, Bhutto, and Zia), who rule through the sufferance of the civil and military bureaucracy. The political leaders are episodically replaced, but the power of the administrative system and the authority of the bulk of its officers is imperious to change. It is in this context that the importance of the civil bureaucracy must be assessed. Patently, the bureaucracy of Pakistan not only serves as the primary executive branch of government, but in the absence of countervailing institutions, as the primary legislative branch as well. Further this power, except for temporary incursions by political leaders, is not directly subject to popular control.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CIVILIAN BUREAUCRACY

At the risk of oversimplification, Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy can be defined in terms of four fundamental characteristics. Namely, the secretariat system of bureaucratic

authority, systemic preference for generalists, cadre system of organization, and rigid and formal patterns of rank hierarchy. Each is discussed in turn.

The Secretariat System of Bureaucratic Authority

Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution,⁸ the Government of Pakistan has a ministerial form of organization. The number of ministries varies (usually there are around 25 ministries) with each ministry composed of one or more 'divisions.'⁹ Each division in turn is composed of a central secretariat, attached departments and 'subordinate offices' of the division, and 'autonomous' and/or 'semi-autonomous' organizations affiliated with the division. There is no ironclad rule which defines the relationship between attached departments or autonomous organizations and their respective central secretariats. Usually autonomous corporations are subject to less direct control from their parent secretariat than are attached departments. Typically, Directors of autonomous corporations are responsible directly to the Secretary of the division, while heads of attached departments are usually responsible to secretariat officers subordinate to the Secretary. Also, autonomous organizations are usually larger than attached departments. However, in practice, one finds numerous exceptions to such rules.

The combined strength of attached departments and autonomous organizations dwarf the respective sizes of their central secretariats. The best available evidence indicates that a total of 13,784 public servants worked in the parent organizations of the federal secretariat in 1983, while 137,191 worked in attached departments and subordinate offices, and perhaps as many as 400,000 worked in autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations.¹⁰ Central secretariats employ proportionally more officer level employees than do other levels of organizations. In 1983, 19 per cent of the employees of central secretariats carried NPS Grade 17 or above, comparable figures of attached departments and subordinate offices were approximately 7 per cent.¹¹

As this structure of organization indicates, the administrative system of Pakistan firmly adheres to the conceptual

dichotomy between staff and line officers. Ideally, staff officers (secretariat officers) provide the policy direction for programmes, they assess such programmes' effectiveness or ineffectiveness, modify the scope of given programmes, are ultimately responsible for staffing and for the training of officers, serve as the liaison between administrative institutions within the bureaucracy, and act as the conduit through which political control is exercised. Line officers (officers in attached departments/autonomous organizations) on the other hand, execute the programmes which the staff officers introduce. Or, as bureaucrats in Pakistan are likely to state: 'staff officers are the head and line officers are the body.'

In practice, there is a great deal of variation in the amount of control secretariat officers actually exercise over attached departments, and autonomous or semi-autonomous organizations. The primary determinants of the level of such control are the level of technical expertise required to deal with the relevant policy, and the personalities and ambitions of individual officers concerned. Nevertheless, adherence to this dichotomy has two important implications for the career patterns of bureaucrats. First, line officers typically are placed lower in the rank hierarchy of the service structure than secretariat officers holding comparable posts. That is, the typical senior level line officer, a head of department, usually holds a post with the equivalent rank of Deputy Secretary. A comparable officer in the secretariat typically would hold a post in the rank of Joint Secretary. Therefore, the promotional prospects of secretariat officers are more sanguine than such prospects for line officers. Second, the career patterns of secretariat officers are open to a great deal of diversity and inter-institutional mobility. Indeed, the rule of thumb in assigning officers to secretariat postings is to keep officers in a given assignment for at least eighteen months but for no longer than three years. Conversely, line officer's careers are limited, except in extraordinary circumstances, to assignment within their parent line department. The combination of these factors make assignment to secretariat postings much more attractive to prospective officers of the bureaucracy of Pakistan. Not only are the prospects of promotion and the attendant perquisites related

to such promotion higher for secretariat officers, but the likelihood of meaningful and varied employment is also comparatively greater.

The Systemic Preference for Generalists

Both a cause and a consequence of the secretariat system of authority is the long-standing principle of preference for the selection of generalist administrators to fill secretariat posts. As seen above, heads of departments, who for the most part are technical specialists, are responsible to secretariat officers who predominately possess generalist backgrounds. The system of direct recruitment to service, and methods employed in pre-service training reinforce this relationship. Candidates to the CSS Examination, the main avenue to secretariat posting, must possess at the least the prerequisite of a Bachelors degree in Arts or Science—B.A. or B.Sc. (no preference is established for subject matter speciality but a preponderate majority of candidates take degrees in the humanities or behavioural sciences, and a large minority take degrees in English), and are judged on the basis of an examination which emphasizes a liberal arts background, administered in English. Pre-service training follows a similar pattern. Until 1973, the premier service training facility in Pakistan, the Civil Service Academy, included in its syllabus activities which were more conducive to the development of attributes of the English gentleman, than to the training of technically-competent decision makers. For instance, 'games' (tennis, croquet, hunting), horseback riding, and mandatory 'mess nights' (where formal attire was required) were integral to the training process. Indeed the main thrust of training at the Academy was designed to socialize probationers into the context of the norms and ethos of the bureaucracy of Pakistan.

After the officer assumes regular posting in the field, this generalist bias is further reinforced by the organizational environment to which he is subject. First, transfers are frequent and as a consequence the officer usually cannot gain substantive expertise in any given field of administration. Second, there is no personal incentive for officers to

work at gaining such expertise. Indeed within bureaucratic circles there are strong group pressures to not dirty one's hands in the day-to-day activities of line departments. Finally, given the organizational relationship between secretariat officers and line officers, there is little institutional incentive to establish specialization. Heads of departments are responsible for the field operations; secretariat officers are merely responsible for formulating what such field officers should do. The characteristics required for this latter task are tact and the capacity to compromise. In essence, secretariat officers are brokers between political authority and operations in the field.

Cadre System of Organization

Underlying and interacting with the former two characteristics is a distinctive system of organization of bureaucrats into semi-functional occupational cadres, referred to prior to the administrative reforms as 'services' and after, as 'groups.' Subsequent to the completion of the selection process, direct recruits are assigned to an occupational cadre. Typically, an officer remains a member of his originally assigned cadre throughout his career and his promotional prospects, job type, and duties are determined to a large extent by association with his cadre. Officers with federal cadre affiliation predominantly fill the top posts in the central secretariat. In 1983, for instance, 75 per cent of Secretaries to the federal government possessed federal cadre affiliation.¹²

Also of great significance are profound differences in the status and prestige which accrue to membership in particular cadres. Before the administrative reforms of 1973, the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) held a predominant position.¹³ Senior posts were 'reserved' for members of this cadre throughout the central secretariat and in district administration. Further, members of this service were subject to higher scales of pay than members of other services. Promotional prospects, training facilities, and housing allowances were also designed to favour CSP officers. Coupled with these organizational distinctions were distinctions in the social elements of prestige. For instance, the CSP was perceived to

be the elite of the service structure, and, in social contexts, its members were accorded levels of status comparable to judicial or highly-placed political officials. Membership in the CSP Association conferred enormous benefits.

Beneath these 'Brahmins' were a rather broad spectrum of 'Kshatriyas,' whose most favoured *jatis* included the Foreign Service of Pakistan, the Police Service of Pakistan, and the four finance and accounts services. Clearly subordinate to these services were various less favoured Central Superior Services. However, membership in the Central Superior Services, regardless of cadre affiliation, conferred 'twice born' status to its members. Officers without such affiliation were by analogy the untouchables of the administrative system.

The dominance of the CSP was weakened as a consequence of the administrative reforms of 1973. But the cadre system of organization has remained vibrant, as have distinctions in career patterns of members of different occupational groups.

Rigid and Formal Patterns of Rank Hierarchy

A final characteristic of the administrative system of Pakistan is a rigid pattern of rank which corresponds to occupational type. From the dawn of the British *raj*, members of the bureaucracy were divided into 'covenanted' and 'uncovenanted' public servants,¹⁴ later into those who were 'gazetted' and those 'non-gazetted,'¹⁵ and by the twenties into four 'classes'—ranging from officer-level Class I to menial level, Class IV. In 1973, the ranks were reorganized into 22 national pay grades. Grades 1 to 4 were designed for workers performing unskilled tasks; Grades 5 to 15 for various levels of clerical personnel; Grade 16 for superintendents; and Grades 17 to 22 for officers.¹⁶ Though these scales have been revised several times since, the fundamental pattern of organization has remained constant. Table 1.1 presents the Basic Pay Scale introduced in 1983.

Despite such pay reforms, it should be noted that there are vast differences in the perquisites of office and attendant life-styles of members of Pakistan's civil bureaucracy. For instance (including perquisites), a Secretary to the government earns eleven times more than his Grade 1 counterpart.¹⁷

PHASES OF BUREAUCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

It is impossible to adequately assess Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy without placing it in the context of Pakistan's political history. We have seen that the bureaucracy was the creation of the traditions, norms, and practices inherited from the British *raj*; the peculiar historical circumstances which led to the formation of South Asia's Islamic state; and of the troubled history of the new state since Partition. But it must also be stressed that Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy has been a critical determinant of Pakistan's political development.

TABLE 1.1
BASIC PAY SCALE, 1983

Basic Pay Grade	Basic Pay Scale ^a rupees/month	Comparable Posts
1	440 — 10 — 640	Peon, <i>mali</i> , <i>jamadar</i>
2	460 — 12 — 700	Record sorter
3	480 — 14 — 760	Machine operator
4	500 — 16 — 820	Staff car driver
5	520 — 18 — 880	Lower division clerk
6	540 — 20 — 940	Clerk
7	560 — 23 — 1020	Upper division clerk
8	590 — 26 — 1110	Typist
9	620 — 29 — 1200	Stenotypist
10	660 — 32 — 1300	Senior stenotypist
11	700 — 35 — 1400	Assistant
12	750 — 40 — 1550	Assistant-in-charge
13	800 — 45 — 1700	Assistant-in-charge
14	850 — 50 — 1850	Stenographer
15	900 — 55 — 2000	Senior stenographer
16	1050 — 80 — 2250	Superintendent
17	1600 — 120 — 3040	Entry level officer
18	2100 — 150 — 3600	Section Officer
19	3200 — 160 — 4480	Deputy Secretary
20	3800 — 180 — 5240	Joint Secretary
21	4200 — 225 — 6000	Additional Secretary
22	4500 — 250 — 6500	Secretary

Source: *Dawn*, 19 August 1983. Scales were made retrospective to 1 July 1983.

^aThe first number represents initial salary in the grade, the middle number yearly increment of salary, and final number maximum salary in the grade.

At Partition, Pakistan's bureaucracy manifested levels of institutional capabilities far in excess of other political institutions in the state. This advantage was translated into a comparatively high level of bureaucratic control of the political process during Pakistan's first 25 years of statehood. Such dominance was weakened by Bhutto's administrative reforms and even though the reform was later repudiated by Zia's administration the bureaucracy has not been able to recover its former position of dominance. Therefore, it is useful to describe civil bureaucratic-political interaction in terms of three sequential phases: pre-reform, reform, and post-reform.

Pre-reform Environment

Before the introduction of administrative reforms, Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy exercised an extraordinary degree of control over the policy-making process of the state. As discussed above, this was partially a consequence of the comparative weakness of other potentially competitive political institutions: legislatures, political parties, interest groups, and so forth. It was also the consequence of the relationship between Ministers and Secretaries. Ministers were political appointees, Secretaries career bureaucrats. Nominally, Ministers headed ministries, with Secretaries their chief executive officers. In practice, however, Secretaries dominated the relationship. First, the tenure of Ministers was typically brief. There were literally dozens of Cabinets in the early years of Pakistan's political history; the average term of a Minister was less than six months. Second, there was at best a loose fit between the experience and competence of Ministers and the functions of their respective ministries. The primary criterion for the selection of Ministers was political loyalty, not administrative experience nor functional expertise. On the other hand, Secretaries manifested several advantages over Ministers. Their tenure of office was longer (averaging around three years); as career bureaucrats they possessed considerable administrative experience; were connected through service affiliations to a wide network of administrators and institutions; and commanded a high degree of institutional loyalty from subordinates. Most

importantly, however, Secretaries controlled access to information. Quite literally, they controlled the content and quality of information available to Ministers.

Interacting with, and reinforcing the foregoing, the pre-reform environment insulated the civilian bureaucracy from political control. Before the reforms, Pakistan's bureaucracy manifested a remarkable degree of institutional autonomy. The civil bureaucracy exclusively controlled the selection, training, and posting of its members. Political interference with this process was deemed abnormal and violative of the principle of administrative neutrality.

Finally, the linchpin of this bureaucratic structure was the predominance of the Civil Service of Pakistan. In its heyday CSP officers held 93 per cent of the senior administrative posts in the federal bureaucracy. (See Chapters 4 and 9.) Indeed, the 500-odd members of the CSP constituted a 'governing corporation,' with its authority stretching to virtually all significant government activities.

Bhutto's Reforms

Prime Minister Bhutto came to power in 1971 with ambitious plans to restructure Pakistan's political system. Bhutto perceived that the greatest obstacle to his plans was the *status quo* oriented civilian bureaucracy. Accordingly, armed with the rationale that the bureaucracy was a 'legacy of the colonial past,' 'corrupt,' 'inefficient,' and 'elitist,' he introduced a package of administrative reforms on 20 August 1973. The most significant provisions of the reform were:¹⁸

- All service cadres were abolished, and were replaced by a reorganized system of 'occupational groups.' Also, service associations were disbanded, and the use of service designations following officer's names was prohibited.
- The long-standing practice of reservation of senior posts in the central secretariat for members of elite services was discontinued.
- A programme of integrated pre-service training was established. The Civil Service Academy was replaced by the Academy for Administrative Training. While the

former trained only probationers to the CSP and Foreign Service of Pakistan, the latter was designed to train all direct recruits to the bureaucracy.

- Provisions were made for the induction of 'lateral recruits' to the bureaucracy.

The implementation of these reforms modified the bureaucratic environment in two significant ways. First, the reform weakened the dominance of the CSP. Second, the reform increased the level of political influence on the bureaucracy.

Post-reform Environment

Though President Zia's government openly repudiated the administrative policies of his predecessor, the post-reform civil bureaucratic environment is quite different from its pre-reform analogue. Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy has remained a potent actor in the policy process but its role is no longer pre-eminent. First, President Zia has not re-established the CSP. As a consequence the authority of the erstwhile service has undergone increased erosion. Second, Zia has challenged the autonomy of the civilian bureaucracy by introducing wide-scale military recruitment. Such military recruitment has also provided President Zia with a mechanism to exert political influence on the bureaucracy. Finally, and most importantly, a persistent legacy of Bhutto's reforms has been the modification of civil bureaucratic-political interaction. Before Bhutto's reforms, political influence on the civil bureaucracy was infrequent and deemed abnormal. Subsequent to the reforms, such influence has been much more pervasive and has been considered far more legitimate.

CONCLUSIONS

The civil bureaucratic system of Pakistan has been placed in the context of Pakistan's political history. Four major themes have predominated. (1) Pakistan's bureaucracy has been deeply influenced by its institutional predecessors. The legacy of British antecedents is deep and persistent.

(2) Pakistan's bureaucracy has perennially held a central place in the political processes of the state. Therefore, the characteristics of the bureaucracy have often been determinative of policy outcomes. (3) Pakistan's bureaucracy is greatly affected by the political environment of which it is a part. Bureaucracies are not neutral bystanders of the political process but rather are active participants. And (4), the consequences of administrative reform have been crucial determinants of both the administration and political development of the state. The stakes of administrative reform are high; they determine the relationship between civil bureaucratic and political authority. Each of these themes receives comprehensive treatment in the chapters which follow.

NOTES

1. Binder, L., *Religion and Politics in Pakistan*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1961; and Munir, M., *From Jinnah to Zia*, Vanguard Press, Lahore, 1979.

2. For additional reading, see Syed, A., *Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity*, Praeger, New York, 1982.

3. *Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985* (3 March 1985).

4. Kennedy, C.H., 'Policies of Redistributive Preference in Pakistan', unpublished paper delivered at American Political Science Association Convention, Washington D.C., 1984.

5. Government of Punjab, *Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted Under Punjab Act II of 1954 to enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953*, SGP, Lahore, 1954.

6. For instance, a major impediment to the implementation of the *hadd* penalty for theft (amputation of left hand) has been the reluctance of Deputy Commissioners to have the punishment carried out in their districts.

7. Except for the inclusion of 'Islamiyat' in the compulsory section of the written portion of the CSS Examination, the selection process has remained unaltered. Other changes have been primarily cultural. For example, female government employees must wear a *dupatta* at the office, administrative offices are closed on Fridays, and the sanctity of *Ramazan* is strictly enforced in government offices.

8. The *Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order, 1985* (3 March 1985), maintained this structure.

9. There were 40 divisions in 1983 and 6 'agencies' with division status. The number of divisions has expanded rapidly in recent years. In 1966, there were only 23 divisions and 2 agencies. Ahmed, V., 'Public Employment in Pakistan', unpublished manuscript, 1985(a).

10. Calculated from Government of Pakistan, O and M Division, All-Pakistan Administrative Research Centre, *Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report January 1983*, Barqson's, Islamabad, 1984, p. 26. Inadequate data was available for autonomous corporations. The figure used here is an estimate derived from Ahmed, op. cit., 1985(a).

11. Calculated by author from Ahmed, op. cit., 1985(a).

12. Calculated from tables found in Chapter 4.

13. The CSP was abolished as a consequence of the 1973 administrative reforms.

14. Senior officials of the East India Company signed 'covenants' with the Directors of the Company.

15. Postings, transfers, and so forth of a gazetted officer were required by law to be recorded in the *Gazette of India*. No such requirement was necessary for non-gazetted officers.

16. The reorganization left intact distinctions between gazetted and non-gazetted posts. Grade 17 posts and above are gazetted posts. It also left intact distinctions associated with Classes. Grade 17 posts and above accord to Class I status; Grade 16 to Class II; Grades 5 to 15 to Class III; and Grades 1 to 4 to Class IV.

17. Calculated from Ahmed, V., 'Trends in Government Salaries', unpublished manuscript, 1985(b), Annexure III.

18. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 'Broadcast to the Nation Announcing Administrative Reforms on 20 August 1973', in *Speeches and Statements of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, August 14-December 31, 1973*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975, p. 14.

2

The Development of the Cadre System, 1793-1973

A dominant feature of the public service of Pakistan is the separation of its members into well-defined semi-functional 'groups,' 'services,' or 'cadres.' To a large extent, an individual's career prospects (subject and field of job, pay, promotional prospects, status, and so forth) are determined by membership in a particular cadre. Further, there is a close feeling of group identity in the more prominent cadres. Often officers know from memory prodigious amounts of information concerning the careers of fellow cadre members.¹ This phenomenon may partially be explained by the fact that members of the same group tend to be friends outside the work arena, have similar job experiences, and often share school ties. Also service associations are among the most effective pressure groups in Pakistan. Finally, in the remarkably class-conscious culture of the Subcontinent, cadre membership accords roughly comparable status to fellow members. In such a setting, defending one's cadre from 'attacks' or advancing its cause is directly tied to individual class mobility.

Indeed cadre membership may be seen as determining to a great extent the personal identity of individual officers. An entire set of expected behaviour patterns is associated with membership in certain cadres. For instance, to say that a person is a 'former CSP officer' in the context of present-day Pakistan, is to bring forth stereotypic impressions of a well-dressed, urbane, though rugged, aristocrat; a person who would not be out of place at a gymkhana or hunting boar in the Frontier. At the other extreme, to mention that an individual belongs to the former CSS cadre elicits impressions of musty cramped offices, reams of dusty files bound with

ragged strings, and the beginnings of a tell-tale cough that may hearken the onset of consumption.

The cadre system is also important from the perspective of institutional factors. As seen in Chapter 1, the bureaucratic system of Pakistan is dominated by reliance on the secretariat system of authority. This system in turn relies on the maintenance of rigid distinctions between line and staff functions, and implicitly depends on filling policy-making posts with generalist administrators. Though the secretariat system of authority lends itself to straightforward interpretations of formal lines of authority and chains of command within a given department, it is not task oriented. Often administrators in staff positions know little concerning the operation, technical or otherwise, of the department which they head. Indeed there is no incentive for staff officers to become too proficient in a given area of specialization. First, such specialization is not expected by the ethos of the service, and has little substantive bearing on the promotional prospects of such officers. Second, the career patterns of staff officers are subject to frequent transfers which, except in extraordinary circumstances, militate against too great an expertise in any one field. Given this context, staff officers are often forced to rely on alternative sources of authority to direct the operations of a given department. The main mechanism open to such officers to effect this end is the cadre system of organization. Typically members of elite cadres man posts at strategic decision points within each department. Decisions of policy-makers are mediated through such fellow cadre members and information from the line and from other departments in turn is channelled back to the centre or exchanged. There is nothing necessarily conspiratorial in this relationship. Rather, reliance on such personalistic means of authority is a natural consequence of the fellow-feeling generated by similar objective circumstances faced by such officers, and by an often pronounced loyalty to the parent cadre, or in terms employed by Pakistani bureaucrats, 'loyalty to fellow batch-mates.' Therefore, in addition to its importance to the career prospects and self-identity of individual officers, the cadre system of organization serves three institutional functions: (a) it provides a mechanism for the control

of operational departments by policy-making staff officers; (b) serves as a conduit for information within and between departments; and (c) greases the wheels of an otherwise cumbersome bureaucratic machine.

This chapter examines the organizational bases of the system in detail. It traces the history and development of the cadre system of organization from the days of its earliest formulation under the terms of the *East India Company Act* until Partition in 1947. And it continues this analysis by tracing the histories of individual services since Partition until their dissolution under the terms of the administrative reforms of 1973. Neither of these exercises has a parallel in the voluminous writings on the bureaucratic system of Pakistan, though an exposition of both is of critical importance to a full understanding of the operation of the system.

THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CADRE SYSTEM: BRITISH *RAJ* 1793-1947

The origins of the cadre system in the Subcontinent can be traced to the earliest practices of the East India Company. Higher employees of the Company typically signed agreements with their employer describing agreed-upon terms and conditions of service. These agreements were known as 'covenants' and servants who held such came to be known as 'covenanted servants.' Other servants who did not sign such agreements came to be known as 'uncovenanted servants,' probably as one is told by the Aitcheson Commission solely to distinguish one group of servants from another.² Certain higher posts in the Company were generally reserved for covenanted servants, but the principle of exclusively filling such 'covenanted offices' with covenanted civil servants was not mandated until the *East India Company Act of 1793*.³ In practice, there never were enough covenanted civil servants to fill the posts created by the rapidly expanding network of functions performed by the Company. As a consequence uncovenanted officers were posted in large numbers in covenanted offices. These were the first 'listed post holders,'

officers of one cadre who hold posts formally reserved for members of another cadre.

Actually it is imprecise to describe the uncovenanted service and the covenanted service as constituting two separate 'cadres,' as the term later came to be used. It is more correct to describe the system prior to the Aitcheson Commission recommendations of 1887, as being comprised of one cadre, the covenanted civil service, and another multifarious cluster which contained everyone else. Indeed the uncovenanted were constituted into various categories with different grades, conditions of service, and methods of recruitment prevailing in each. Even the distinctions between covenanted and uncovenanted services were not that clear. For instance, some uncovenanted servants actually signed covenants with the Directors of the Company and later with the Secretary of State.⁴ Further, while uncovenanted civil servants generally worked in subordinate posts *vis-a-vis* covenanted civil servants, others worked in special departments, such as the Salt, Opium, Education, Public Works, and Forest Department, with comparable responsibilities to covenanted civil servants.⁵ Also, as mentioned earlier, others held posts reserved for covenanted civil servants.

From the implementation of the *East India Company Act* until the *Report of the Aitcheson Commission*, some one hundred years later, there was little modification in the service structure of India. The British after assuming authority from the Company in 1858, kept intact the loose distinctions between the covenanted and uncovenanted civil services. However, beginning in 1870, though the programme was not implemented until 1879, the British administration did experiment with the short-lived constitution of the 'Statutory Civil Service.' This service was formed in answer to demands for indigenous membership in the Covenanted Civil Service, at that time the almost unexceptionable preserve of European officers. The scheme envisaged that one-sixth of the posts then reserved for the Covenanted Civil Service would be filled by Indians nominated by local governments, approved by the Governor General, and appointed by the Secretary of State. However, this programme lasted only 8 years from its inception in 1879 to its dissolution in 1887.⁶

During this time a total of 69 appointments were made to the newly constituted service.⁷

Of incalculably greater importance to the formation of the cadre system of India were the recommendations of the Aitcheson Commission. This Commission was directed in its terms of reference to study the nature of demands for future Indianization of the services. In this regard, the Commission recommended that the Statutory Civil Service should be abolished. It was argued that this service had not attracted the type or quality of recruit for which it had been designed. Further, the rank and prestige of officers inducted into the Statutory Civil Service were inferior to that enjoyed by officers of the Covenanted Civil Service, and the former as a consequence constituted in reality a subordinate service. Finally, the Statutory Civil Service was charged with having caused more 'dissatisfactions' among the Indian community than it had alleviated.⁸ In its place the Commission recommended the creation of the 'Provincial Civil Service.' This latter service was also designed to increase the representation of Indians in the public service. The Provincial Civil Service was to be initially encadred against posts made surplus from a reduction in the reservations for the Covenanted Civil Service. Such posts were to be filled on a local basis with recruitment of officers under the authority of individual provinces.⁹

The Aitcheson Commission also recommended that the terms 'covenanted' and 'uncovenanted' were not in keeping with the realities of the service structure. The Commission reasoned that the Covenanted Civil Service and the Uncovenanted Civil Service never constituted discrete entities. Some uncovenanted servants had entered into contracts with the Secretary of State, the supposed *sine qua non* of entry to the ranks of the covenanted; distinctions of responsibilities and status were not clear between members of the Services; and the Uncovenanted Civil Service never constituted a coherent cadre.¹⁰ As a consequence, the Commission recommended the establishment of the 'Imperial Civil Service of India.' The name of this cadre was modified by the Government of India to the 'Civil Service of India,' though the initials 'ICS' persisted and the cadre generally came to be

known as the 'Indian Civil Service.' The ICS was encadred from the ranks of the reformed Covenanted Civil Service, i.e., minus those posts assigned to the newly-constituted Provincial Civil Service. The Uncovenanted Civil Service, on the other hand, was to be divided into two groups on the basis of the relative status of posts in the two cadres. The higher ranking posts were to be encadred as the Provincial Civil Service, and the lower administrative appointments were to be encadred in the 'Subordinate Civil Service.'¹¹ The Commission also recommended that the Provincial Civil Service should be on terms of social equality with the ICS, and, that a proportion of the posts reserved for the ICS should be open to entry from the Provincial Civil Service.¹² Subsequent to these recommendations, the Government mandated the reservation of one-sixth of the ICS posts for officers of the Provincial Civil Service, but officers so selected were not made members of the ICS as a result of such posting, but rather maintained their previous service designation.¹³ Analogously, members of the Subordinate Civil Service were made eligible for promotion to the lower grade of the Provincial Civil Service on the basis of merit.¹⁴ Further, the Commission took the first steps toward the application of this scheme of cadre organization to administrative departments of India. Namely, they recommended that both the Forest and Public Works Departments should consist of 'imperial' and 'provincial' branches.¹⁵

Subsequent to the adoption of these recommendations by the Government, the basic patterns of the cadre system of organization had been established. The Aitcheson Commission had recommended the establishment of the ICS at the apex of the service structure. This cadre was later to develop, with only minor modifications, into the CSP—the Civil Service of Pakistan. Similarly, the establishment of the Provincial Civil Service presaged the development of the PCS—the Provincial Civil Service(s), and other specialized provincial services. Further, the formation of the Provincial Service ushered in a heretofore new basis for the formation of cadres, namely that of defining cadres in terms of spatial distinctions. The ICS was the predecessor of what came to be known as the All-India Services, later All-Pakistan Services, whose officers were

recruited by the central government primarily for assignment in the provincial sphere, though these officers often undertook assignment at the central level. Typically, an officer of an All-India Service alternately held posts in the provincial and central sphere, or sequentially held posts in several provinces. Movement between such postings was frequent. Officers of the Provincial Civil Service, on the other hand, were generally limited to postings within the geographical boundaries of their original assignment. Finally, the Aitcheson Commission's recommendation regarding the creation of imperial and provincial branches within departments coupled with the distinctions between provincial and imperial services in general, formed the bases for the eventual development of the Central Services.

In terms of the development of the service structure of India, the half century following the *Report of the Aitcheson Commission* until Independence is most fruitfully seen as manifesting the application or rationalization of the principles advanced by the Commission to the exigencies of the political situation in the Subcontinent. The cadre system in India during this period was in a constant state of flux, due throughout to the increasingly insistent demands of Indians for greater representation in the administration and episodically by the two World Wars and the Depression. The modifications that were made in the service structure were a consequence of this flux, and were viewed in the early years of the period as rational adjustments to the principles of the Aitcheson Commission, and in later years as stopgap measures designed to maintain British power.

It is probably impossible and certainly beyond the scope of this endeavour to reconstruct fully the shifting patterns of cadre formation and dissolution prior to Independence. However, it is instructive to look briefly at the details of such organization as evidenced in the more important administrative reports of the period. Tables 2.1 through 2.4 show the development of the service structure at the central level, in four time frames—1888, 1917, 1934, and 1947. An examination of these tables discloses that what later came to be known as 'services' had their origins in functionally discrete 'departments.' As the functions and responsibilities of certain

jobs or job-types within departments became clearly defined, individuals holding such appointments became encadred in service or departmental cadres. In turn, membership within a cadre came to define that individual's terms and conditions of service.

Naturally due to the overarching concern of the British to maintain control of the civil administration of the Subcontinent, certain departments/services came to be considered more important as mechanisms to effect this end. Consequently, departments/services came to have varying degrees of European penetration and control, roughly analogous to the relative importance to British hegemony of a given cadre. For instance at one extreme, the ICS was primarily staffed by Europeans, was recruited to varying degrees in Britain, under the direct authority of the Secretary of State, and the terms and conditions of service for its members were safeguarded by the relevant *Government of India Act*. At the other extreme, various provincial services were staffed wholly by Indians, were recruited in India, or within a province of India, and fell under the authority of the Governor and later Ministers and provincial legislatures.

The half century preceding Independence was a time of ever-increasing Indian influence in the civil administration of the nation, coupled with a corresponding diminution of the British presence. However, throughout this period, in regard

TABLE 2.1
THE SERVICE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA, 1888

1) Imperial Civil Service ^a	9) Mint Department
2) Forest Department ^a	10) Opium Department
3) Public Works Department ^a	11) Pilot Service
4) Accounts Department	12) Postal Department
5) Archaeological Survey Department	13) Police Department
6) Customs Department	14) Registration Department
7) Education Department	15) Salt Department
8) Geological Survey	16) Survey Department
	17) Telegraph Department

Source: Compiled by the author from the *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888, paragraph 75 in conjunction with paragraphs 92-127.

^aThese services were each composed of two cadres, a 'provincial' and an 'imperial' branch. See respectively *ibid.*, paragraphs 75, 101, and 119.

TABLE 2.2
THE SERVICE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA, 1917

-
- A) Separate Imperial and Provincial Services
- 1) Indian Civil Service/Provincial Civil Service
 - 2) Indian Police Service/Provincial Police Service
- B) Departments with Imperial and Provincial Branches
- 1) Civil Veterinary Department
 - 2) Agriculture Department
 - 3) Education Department^a
 - 4) Forest Department
 - 5) Medical Services
 - 6) Survey of India Department
 - 7) Public Works Department and Railway Department (Engineering Establishment)
- C) Homogenous Departments Under Direct Control of the Secretary of State
- 1) Customs Department
 - 2) Indian Finance Department
 - 3) Military Finance Department
 - 5) Mint and Assay Department
- D) Homogenous Departments not Under Direct Control of the Secretary of State
- 1) Post Office of India and Telegraph Department
 - 2) Railway Department (Revenue Establishment)
 - 3) Factory and Boiler Inspection Department
 - 4) Geological Survey Department^a
 - 5) Land Records (Burma) Department
 - 6) Bengal Pilot Service
 - 7) Northern India Salt Revenue Department
 - 8) Survey of India Department^a
 - 9) Madras Survey Department
 - 10) Indian Mines Department^b
 - 11) Registration Department^c
 - 12) Salt and Excise Department^d
-

Source: Compiled by the author from: Great Britain, Parliament, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India*, Cd. 8382, Vol. 1: *Report of the Commissioners*, Islington, Chairman, HM Stationary Office, London, 1917, paragraph 34 in conjunction with Annexures I-XXIV, pp. 67-370. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Islington Commission Report*, 1917.)

^aThese departments were divided into Class I and Class II Services.

^bA homogenous department under the control of a technical council. There were only 5 members of this department in 1913. Ibid., Annexure XIII, pp. 284-5.

^cOrganized on a quasi-provincial basis. However, in 1913 only one functioning body existed, the Madras Registration Department. Ibid., Annexure XX, p. 345.

^dProperly speaking, these departments were solely provincial departments. For reasons unclear, the Islington Commission chose to deal with them anyway. Ibid., Annexure XXII, p. 352.

to the organization of the service structure, the interplay of the two political forces was carried out within the general framework established by the Aitcheson Commission.

For example, the next thoroughgoing work on the administrative system of India, the Islington Commission,¹⁶ had only marginal effects on the service structure (Table 2.2). First, the Commission recommended that the practice of separating departments into imperial and provincial branches should continue but be restricted only to departments 'where there is a large body of work of a less important character to be done, though of a kind not suitable for subordinate agencies or for men suited for higher duty.'¹⁷ The imperial branches were to continue to be dominated by European officers, while the provincial branches were left for the most part to Indian nationals. Officers promoted from the provincial branches to the imperial branches should be entitled to the same status as their new post normally entailed. However, officers promoted from the Provincial Civil Service to the ICS should remain in their former cadre.¹⁸ This latter recommendation coupled with the Commission's recommendation regarding the continued efficacy of borrowing ICS officers to fill key positions in other departments,¹⁹ led to further consolidation of ICS pre-eminence. Also, the Islington Commission introduced the 'Class' designation in order to rationalize and describe different categories of government servants. Class I officers were defined as those who held positions at executive or administrative levels, and Class II officers as those who held posts at operational levels. The ambit of this latter recommendation was narrow, with application to only three departments—the Education Department, the Survey of India Department, and the Geological Survey Department.²⁰ However, the concept germinated quickly in the fertile field of class distinctions within the Indian administrative system, and in time largely replaced or overlapped the former imperial and provincial branch designations.

Similarly, the Lee Commission²¹ recommended only modest changes in the service structure (Table 2.3). This Commission was constituted in the light of the British Government's intention, as outlined in the *Montagu-Chelms-*

TABLE 2.3
THE SERVICE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA, 1934

-
- A) All-India Services
- 1) Indian Civil Service^a
 - 2) Indian Police Service^a
 - 3) Indian Forest Service^b
 - 4) Indian Educational Service^b
 - 5) Indian Agricultural Service^b
 - 6) Indian Veterinary Service^b
 - 7) Indian Medical Service (Civil)^b
- B) Central Departments Under the Control of the Secretary of State
- 1) Political Department
 - 2) Imperial Customs Department
 - 3) Ecclesiastical Department
 - 4) External Affairs Department
 - 5) Irrigation Service^c
- C) Central Departments Under Joint Provincial and Imperial Control
- 1) State Railways Engineers
 - 2) State Railways (Revenue Establishment)
 - 3) Superior Telegraph and Wireless Branch of the Posts and Telegraph Department
- D) Central Departments Under Provincial Control.^d
-

Source: Compiled by the author from Great Britain, Parliament, *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. 8, 27 March 1924, Cmd. 2128, 'Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Services in India,' Lee, Chairman. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Lee Commission Report*, 1924.) And, Great Britain, Parliament, *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. VI, 'Report of Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform,' 1933-4. (Hereinafter referred to as *Report of the Joint Committee*, 1934.)

^aAll-India Services 'reserved' by the British, i.e., services whose members were recruited and whose terms and conditions of service were under the aegis of the Secretary of State.

^bAll-India Services in the 'transferred field,' i.e., authority for the control and appointment transferred from the Secretary of State to provincial ministers. The *Report of the Joint Committee*, 1934, shifted the Indian Forest Service from 'reserved' status to 'transferred' status.

^cThe Irrigation Service, formerly the Indian Service of Engineers (Irrigation Branch) was reorganized and removed from the All-India Services as a consequence of the recommendations of the *Report of the Joint Committee*, 1934.

^dNo complete iteration of Central Departments under provincial control is available. A rough estimate can be obtained by comparing Tables 2.2 and 2.3.

ford Reforms,²² to eventually transfer power to Indian hands. To advance these ends the Commission divided the existing service structure into three categories: (1) All-India Services,²³ whose control was to be 'reserved' by the Secretary of State, i.e., the British Government. Such services included the ICS, the Indian Police Service, and the Irrigation Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers.²⁴ (2) All-India Services 'transferred' to Indian control. These included the Indian Agricultural Service, the Indian Veterinary Service, the Indian Forest Service, the Buildings and Road Branch of the Indian Service of Engineers, and the civil side of the Indian Medical Service.²⁵ The appointment and control of the latter services was to reside with local governments. Officers who had entered into the transferred fields of the All-India Services prior to the reforms of 1924 maintained the terms of their original appointment and remained under the direct control of the Secretary of State.²⁶ (3) Central Departments under the Government of India. Some of these departments continued to be controlled by the Secretary of State, the Political Department, the Ecclesiastical Department, and the Imperial Customs Department, while others were either under joint imperial and provincial control or solely under provincial control.²⁷ ICS officers employed in the Central Departments remained members of their parent cadre.²⁸

In 1934, the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform,²⁹ further expanded the list of transferred services within the All-India Services (Table 2.3). The Committee recommended that recruitment to the All-India Services should come to an end save for the ICS and the Indian Police Service,³⁰ with the Irrigation Service transferred from All-India status to Central status and, the Indian Forest Service from central to provincial control.³¹ In all other matters relating to service structure they agreed with the provisions of the Lee Commission. The recommendations of the Joint Committee were enacted into law in 1935 in the *Government of India Act* of that year.³²

Subsequent to the *Government of India Act of 1935* there were no substantive changes in the service structure of India until Independence, save for further rationalizations of the

Class I and Class II distinctions, first introduced by the Islington Commission. The service structure as it existed at the time of Partition is presented in Table 2.4.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL SUPERIOR SERVICES IN PAKISTAN

Subsequent to the partitioning of the Subcontinent in 1947, the Government of the newly-created state of Pakistan maintained with only minor modifications the system of the cadre organization inherited from the British. At least three factors were conducive to this outcome. First was the weight of tradition, coupled with bureaucratic inertia. As seen above, the cadre system of organization developed slowly in the environment of the Subcontinent. It was a product of the adjustment between the competing needs of the British to maintain control of the civil administration, and the demands of Indian nationals for increasing levels of self-rule. The cadre system of organization then, developed both as a response to the expanding functions necessary for governing the Subcontinent, with the attendant need for greater specialization of personnel; and as a response to meet the demands of the Indian nationals while maintaining British control over the key sectors of the civilian bureaucracy. When Independence was finally realized in Pakistan no competing system of organization had been formulated. The cadre system of organization had served well the needs of the British *raj*—why shouldn't it serve the needs of the state of Pakistan?

Second, even if there had been significant sentiment to modify the system of bureaucratic organization inherited from the British the Government of Pakistan was hardly in a position to do anything about it. Partition left the institutions of the newly-created state in a shambles. Further, because Muslims had traditionally been underrepresented in service cadres, Pakistan did not inherit enough trained personnel to fill requisite posts in the civilian bureaucracy. These 'disabilities'³³ of Partition militated against tampering with the bases of civil order in the new state. The Government of Pakistan had more pressing concerns than to plunge into the muddy waters of administrative reform.

TABLE 2.4
THE SERVICE STRUCTURE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA INCIDENT WITH PARTITION, 1947

-
- A) All-India Services
- 1) Indian Civil Service^a
 - 2) Indian Police Service^a
 - 3) Indian Agricultural Service
 - 4) Indian Educational Service
 - 5) Indian Forest Service
 - 6) Indian Forest and Engineering Service
 - 7) Indian Medical Service (Civil)
 - 8) Indian Service of Engineers
 - 9) Indian Veterinary Service
 - 10) Indian General Service
- B) Central Services, Class I Only
- 1) Indian Audit and Accounts Service
 - 2) Central Engineering Service
 - 3) Imperial Customs Service
 - 4) Superior Telegraph Engineering and Wireless Branch of the Indian Posts and Telegraphs Department
 - 5) Archaeological Department
 - 6) Zoological Survey of India
 - 7) Indian Ecclesiastical Department
 - 8) Political Department
 - 9) Medical Research Department
 - 10) Central Revenues Chemical Service
 - 11) Mercantile Marine and Trading Ship Service
- C) Central Services, Class I and II
- 1) Geological Service (Class I) Survey (Class II) of India
 - 2) Indian Meteorological Service
 - 3) Income Tax Service
 - 4) Mines Department
 - 5) Survey of India
 - 6) Imperial Secretariat Service
 - 7) General Central Service
- D) Central Services, Class II Only
- 1) Imperial Secretariat Stenographers Service
 - 2) Imperial Secretariat Council Reporters Service
 - 3) Telegraph Engineering and Wireless Service
 - 4) Postmasters Service
 - 5) Postal Superintendents Service
 - 6) Telegraph Traffic Service
 - 7) Military Assistant Surgeons
 - 8) Northern India Salt Revenue Service
 - 9) Customs Appraisers Service
 - 10) Customs Preventive Service
 - 11) Assistant Accounts and Audit Officers Service
 - 12) Bengal Pilot Service
-

Source: Compiled and adapted by the author from Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal Rules)*, first edition, 1951, reprint, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1972, Schedules I and II. And from Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission*, AMGGPP, Karachi, 1949, M. Munir, Chairman. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Munir Commission Report*, 1949.)

^aServices whose members were recruited and whose terms and conditions of service were under the aegis of the Secretary of State.

Finally, there was a strong incentive among members of the civil administration to leave well enough alone, and to maintain the cadre system of organization. As seen above, this system accorded enormous responsibilities and attendant status to members of the Central Services. Further, as a consequence of the shortage of skilled administrators inherited by the new state of Pakistan, public servants were subject to very sanguine career prospects. Therefore, any contemplated modification of the cadre system of organization had to oppose the vested interests of officers who benefited from the terms of its operation.

The following pages trace in detail the development of the Central Superior Services in Pakistan.³⁴ Where possible, the analysis searches for the origins of each cadre in the structures of British administration, and then views the modifications such institutions underwent during the period 1947-73. It also analyses the types of posts held by members of the cadres, and discusses the relative degree of influence exercised by each on the bureaucratic system.

All-Pakistan Services

The term 'All-Pakistan Services' is analogous to the inherited British institution of the All-India Services. The latter were under the direct control of the Secretary of State, though members of these services were primarily assigned to provincial duties. By 1935 only two All-India Services persisted, that fit the 1920 definition, the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service. After Independence, the Government of Pakistan maintained this condition, creating two All-Pakistan Services—the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Police Service of Pakistan.

Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP). At the apex of the service structure in Pakistan was the CSP. This service was the lineal descendent of the ICS and as such could trace its origins back to the recommendations of the Aitcheson Commission of 1887. As a result of Partition, Pakistan inherited too few former ICS officers to fill requisite posts in the new Government. Consequently by the time the CSP was formally encadred in 1950, a number of officers had been admitted to

the CSP from extra-ICS ranks. Indeed of the total CSP cadre strength of 175 in 1950, only 94 were former ICS officers.³⁵ Subsequent to the encadrement of the Service, however, entry was predominately governed by the results of a competitive examination almost identical to that formerly administered to ICS candidates.³⁶ The relative rank, prestige, and multifaceted career patterns of CSP officers were also analogous to those formerly enjoyed by the ICS. CSP officers were paid on a higher pay scale than other members of the Central Superior Services, members of this cadre held a disproportionately large share of higher posts in the civil administration, and membership in the CSP accorded a certain deference from the public and from other members of the bureaucracy.

The typical career-pattern of a newly-recruited CSP probationer started with an intensive, in its own peculiar way, training period at the Civil Service Academy. This training was followed by assignment to the post of Assistant Deputy Commissioner. After what was viewed as an apprenticeship in the field, the CSP officer could expect rapid promotion in, and often rapid mobility between the fields of district administration, the provincial secretariat, the judiciary, and the Central Secretariat. This glamorous career pattern was made possible by the constitutionally-sanctioned system of reservation of posts for CSP officers, a practice also with its roots in the colonial system of reservation of posts for ICS members. The size and importance of the CSP cadre steadily grew subsequent to Independence. Table 2.5 presents the relative cadre strengths of the CSP and other Central Superior Services from 1961 through 1971.

Police Service of Pakistan (PSP). The other All-Pakistan Service was the Police Service of Pakistan. Like the CSP, the PSP could trace its origins deep into the colonial past. Indeed the organizational structure of the police was largely constituted as it remains today as early as 1860. At that time, the military police was abolished as a separate organization, and a single homogenous force of civil officers was established. The Commission of 1860 also established, with minor exceptions, the present hierarchy of posts in the police administration. 'Inspectors-General' headed the provincial establishments,

with 'District Superintendents' and 'Assistant Superintendents' holding sway over the districts. Beneath these posts were 'inspectors,' 'head constables,' 'sergeants,' and 'constables.'³⁷ The Fraser Committee in 1903, established imperial and provincial branches of the Police Service,³⁸ which later came to be encadred into separate services—the Imperial Police Service and the Provincial Police Service. The former service was encadred soon after Independence, as the Police Service of Pakistan, with probationers entering the Service either through the CSS examination or through promotion from provincial police services.

Until 1955, with the adoption of 'One-Unit,' the police establishments were organized along semi-provincial lines, for example, there were eight 'police forces' in West Pakistan corresponding to the eight police ranges of the area. Members of the PSP were recruited by the centre and could be assigned to any province. In 1955, the police establishment was reorganized into two branches corresponding to East and West Pakistan, and members of the two branches (with membership determined by an individual member's domicile), came to be listed in separate cadres, the PSP(W) and the PSP (E).³⁹ Officers of the two branches could be deputed from one cadre to another but such assignments were exceptional.

Unlike officers of the CSP, officers of the PSP were restricted for the most part to careers within the police establishment. For instance, in 1971 only 10 of the 132 members of the PSP(W) were deputed to posts outside police administration.⁴⁰ Indeed after successful training at one of the police academies (Sardah—West Pakistan; Sihala—East Pakistan) the typical PSP officer undertook successive 10 to 15 year assignments in the field first at the district level and then at the provincial level before being assigned to a secretariat posting. Of course, the disparities between CSP and PSP officers were not lost upon members of the less-favoured PSP. Consequently, in 1961, the Constantine Commission, at the insistence of the PSP Service Association, called for the enhancement of the status of the PSP to a level commensurate with their All-Pakistan status, i.e., to a level equal to that of the CSP.⁴¹ This recommendation was not acted upon by the Government.

Source: Compiled by author, from Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1961, MOP, Karachi, 1961; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1962, MOP, Karachi, 1962; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1963, MOP, Karachi, 1963; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1964, MOP, Karachi, 1965; Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1965, MOP, Karachi, 1967; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1966, MOP, Karachi, 1968; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1967, MOP, Karachi, 1971; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1968, MOP, Karachi, 1972; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1969, MOP, Karachi, 1972; and Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Officers Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1971, MOP, Karachi, 1975; Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee*, G. Ahmed, Chairman, GOPP, Karachi, 1963. (Hereinafter referred to as the *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 1963.); Government of Pakistan, *Services Reorganization Committee Report*, 1969-70, A.R. Cornelius, Chairman, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1971. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970.) Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Review Committee on the Section Officer's Scheme*, M.H. Zuberi, Chairman, MGPP, Rawalpindi, 1967. (Hereinafter referred to as the *M.H. Zuberi Report*, 1967.)

The table does not include the Pakistan Railway Transportation (Traffic and Communications Service) nor the Pakistan Railway Service of Engineers, both were provincialized in 1962. Also, figures do not include 'officers on leave preparatory to retirement.'

^a1970 data calculated by combining data of 1969 and 1971 *Civil Lists* and information concerning direct recruitment to the Central Superior Services from the Establishment Division.

^bThe Traffic Branch of the Postal Service was amalgamated with the Pakistan Postal Service in 1967.

^cIncludes Telegraph Service, Class I.

^d45 non-direct recruits previously denied entry to the TES were encadred in 1964.

^eThe CSS was officially encadred in 1965. The figure quoted is from *M.H. Zuberi Report*, 1967, p. 26.

^fThe General Administrative Reserve is not a Central Superior Service, as such a gradation list for this service was never compiled. The figure '84' was the cadre strength of the service in 1960. *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 45th Report, 1963, p. 348.

^g'Central Class I Civil Association Memorandum' to Services Reorganization Committee in *Cornelius Commission Report*, Vol. II, Part II, Appendix II, 1970, p. 430. It is not altogether clear how many CSS officers were encadred since no gradation list was ever produced for the service. This is a very conservative estimate.

^hComputed using *ibid.*, and information from the Establishment Division concerning direct recruits.

ⁱThe CSP Association Memorandum' to Services Reorganization Committee, in *ibid.*, p. 163.

^jCalculated by combining cadre strength of FPS and P and T (Postal) in 1961.

Central Services

The term 'Central Services' derives its meaning from British practices. The Lee Commission⁴² defined this term as applicable to those services which were recruited by the centre and whose officers were assigned exclusively to central level posts. The term took on the same meaning after Independence.⁴³ In 1971, there were 13 Central Services. The following pages briefly describe the history of each of these services as well as the respective career pattern of their members.

Pakistan Foreign Service (PFS). At Partition, the External Affairs, Commonwealth Relations, and Political Departments of the Government of India, were merged to form the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Later, in 1948, the units of the Political and External Departments which had formed an adjunct to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were separated to form the Ministry of States and Frontier Regions, the rest remaining as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.⁴⁴

The Pakistan Foreign Service was formed in 1948 to man diplomatic, counsellor, and commercial posts abroad within the overall control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. However, commercial and later press duties in foreign missions were usually performed by non-PFS officers. This has been of recurrent concern to the Government of Pakistan. In 1949, citing the 'importance' of the newly-formed PFS, the Munir Commission argued that specialist officers employed abroad should be under the control of diplomatic personnel and ultimately of the Foreign Office.⁴⁵ Going further in the same direction, the G. Ahmed Commission recommended in 1959, that PFS officers should undertake the press and commercial responsibilities directly, as part of their normal duties in foreign missions.⁴⁶ The Pay and Services Commission of 1962 agreed, if not whole-heartedly, with the recommendations of the G. Ahmed Commission.⁴⁷ Despite these recommendations, specialist officers in foreign missions continued to be controlled by their parent Ministry. And eventually separate service structures were established to accommodate such

officers. Namely, in 1959, the Central Secretariat Service; in 1963, the Central Information Service; and in 1969, the Trade Service of Pakistan were formed.⁴⁸

Another issue which has had a bearing on the organization of the PFS, was the short-lived proposal to amalgamate the PFS cadre with the CSP. This proposal urged that the PFS should be reconstituted as the CSP (Foreign Branch) and that probationers to the service should undergo joint training, with probationers of the CSP (Domestic Branch), at the Fletcher School of International Diplomacy.⁴⁹ At the urging of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this proposal was scrapped soon after its introduction.⁵⁰ Of course, the fact that the proposal was seriously entertained further attests the dominance of the CSP.

After successfully completing the CSS Examination, the probationer to the PFS underwent training at the Civil Service Academy.⁵¹ From there he was normally assigned to Third Secretary status in a major diplomatic mission abroad. The officer typically continued his service abroad until he reached First Secretary/Counsellor status, whereupon he normally returned to domestic service at the Director level. From there the PFS officer, if assigned to foreign missions, advanced to the rank of Minister after which the next rank was that of Ambassador. On the other hand, if the officer was assigned to a domestic posting the highest positions were those of Director General and ultimately Foreign Secretary.⁵² PFS officers shared the responsibility for higher posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with *ad hoc* recruits appointed by the Governor General, and later the President, who was empowered to fill up to 50 per cent of the posts of Ministers and Ambassadors from outside the PFS.⁵³ Most PFS officers served the bulk of their careers abroad, for instance in 1971, only 27 of the total cadre strength of 190 PFS officers were posted in the domestic secretariat in Islamabad.⁵⁴ These long absences from the domestic environment caused certain recurrent difficulties for the officers and families of the PFS cadre.⁵⁵

*Accounts Services: Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service (PAAS); Pakistan Military Accounts Service (PMAS); Pakistan Railways Accounts Service (PRAS).*⁵⁶ The genesis

of the Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service can be traced directly to the Accounts Department of the Government of India. In 1899 this Department, heretofore recruited in India, was opened to European entry—the British Government reserving four-ninths of the posts in the reformed Department for Europeans. As a consequence of this development the Department came under the direct control of the Secretary of State.⁵⁷ Paralleling these developments, the Military Finance Department was established at the turn of the century to deal with military accounts. First composed exclusively of military officers, the Military Finance Department was converted into a civilian organization in 1909 and by 1913 was centralized under the direct control of the Secretary of State.⁵⁸ The Pakistan Railways Accounts Service originated in the establishment of the Railway Finance and Accounts Service in 1929.⁵⁹ By the time of Independence, these Departments were grouped under the overall control of the Audit and Accounts Department, though separate branches and cadres were maintained for civil accounts, the army audit, the railway audit, and postal accounts. The latter branch was merged with the civil accounts in 1948,⁶⁰ leaving three departments and their corresponding service structures intact, the PAAS, the PMAS, and the PRAS. With minor modifications this unique division of accounts functions remained unchanged until the promulgation of the reforms of 1973.⁶¹

The career patterns of officers in the accounts services were similar. All underwent training at the Finance Services Academy in Lahore,⁶² after which they were assigned to officer level status in their respective organizations. Officers after serving 20 years or so in their parent bodies, arrived at senior administrative positions. Typically at this level, officers of the accounts groups were deputed to the Economic Pool and distributed throughout the Central Secretariat, though most such officers continued to hold posts within the Ministry of Finance.⁶³ Posts in the Central Secretariat were highly prized, due to the relative dearth of high administrative positions within the accounts establishments. As Table 2.5 demonstrates, the cadre strength of the accounts services grew rapidly during the decade prior to the administrative reforms.

Pakistan Customs and Excise Service (PCES). The PCES is the product of the amalgamation of two Departments inherited from the British—the Customs Department and the Central Excise Department. The Customs Department, like the Accounts Department of the Government of India, was originally a provincial entity. In 1906, it became a centrally controlled service under the authority of the Secretary of State.⁶⁴ The status of this Department remained the same until Partition. The Central Excise Department, on the other hand, was the product of an accretion of functions carried out by a number of departments and branches of departments. At Partition, the Central Excise Department was responsible for the collection of duty on sugar, matches, betel-nuts, and tobacco, and was responsible for the administration of Land Customs (between NWFP and the Punjab) as well as the operation of the Salt Mines.⁶⁵ Officers of the Central Excise Department were for the most part Class II officers. Subsequent to the recommendations of the Munir Commission, calling for the amalgamation of the Land Customs Service and the Excise Service,⁶⁶ and coupled with the rapid increase of excise taxes as a means of generating revenue, the Central Land Customs and Excise Service, Class I, was created in 1952. In 1959, the Sea Customs Service and the Central Land Customs and Excise Service were combined to form the Pakistan Customs and Excise Service.⁶⁷

Probationers to the PCES were also trained at the Finance Services Academy. Their careers started at the Assistant Collector level and proceeded to Collector status or parallel positions in the Central Board of Revenue. Senior PCES officers were eligible for deputation to the Economic Pool, though in smaller numbers than officers in the accounts services.⁶⁸

Pakistan Taxation Service (PTS). The Income Tax Service of the Government of India, the direct ancestor of the PTS, was created in 1944, though the functions of the Income Tax Department, the largest revenue generating agency in the Government of India, had existed long before that date. At first due to the rapid formation of this cadre most of the officers of the PTS, unlike other Central Superior Services, had entered the Service as a result of promotion from

provincial or Class II services. The Munir Commission recommended normalization of recruitment to the Service,⁶⁹ and in 1957, Income Tax Officers who had been promoted to the PTS (and who at that time for the most part were holding Class II posts), were upgraded to Class I status.⁷⁰

Like members of accounts services and the PCES, probationers to the PTS underwent training at the Finance Services Academy. For PTS officers there was an additional period of probation under the Directorate of Training (Income Tax) in Karachi. After the successful completion of this training the career pattern of the officer of the PTS was very similar to that of PCES officers. Typically an officer advanced within the Department to the post of Commissioner of Income Tax, with occasional assignments in parallel posts in the Central Board of Revenue. At senior levels, an officer aspired to deputation to the Economic Pool.⁷¹

Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service (PMLCS). One of the unique features of British administration in the Subcontinent was the creation of extensive cantonment areas, formed to house British military and civilian personnel, under the direct control of the Government of India. At first these areas were administered by military personnel but after 1924 most of the posts were transferred to civilian control. In time the Department was divided into two branches—the Lands Branch and the Cantonment Executive Service. The latter service was recruited by the Public Service Commission. These conditions persisted until 1947 when the two branches were combined into the Military Lands and Cantonment Service.⁷² The newly created service was incorporated into Pakistan's administrative system subsequent to Partition. The responsibilities of officers of the PMLCS have remained virtually unchanged from those entrusted to Cantonment Officers prior to Independence. Cantonments are administered in ways analogous to municipal bodies. PMLCS officers are in charge of the maintenance and control of lands within the cantonment area, and they supervise the local governments of the areas. The PMLCS is a relatively small cadre and careers in the Service are restricted for the most part to assignments within the department, with occasional assignment at senior levels to posts within the Defence Division.⁷³

Pakistan Postal Service (PPS). The origins of the Pakistan Postal Service can be traced to the formation of the Postal Department of the Government of India in the mid-nineteenth century. In 1914, the Traffic Branch of the Telegraph Department was assimilated with the Postal Department, though separate cadres were maintained for their respective memberships.⁷⁴ From the earliest days the Postal Department was manned predominately by Indians, and though classified as a Central Service, members of the Department were never under the control of the Secretary of State. By the time of Independence there were four Class I services which performed the functions of the Postal and Telegraph Department: the Superior Telegraph Engineering Service; the Posts and Telegraph Traffic Service Class I; the General Central Service Class I; and the Telegraph Traffic Service.⁷⁵ Officers were recruited directly to the General Central Service, which after Independence came to be known as the Pakistan Postal Service, to the Telegraph Traffic Service, and to the Telegraph Engineering Service. The Posts and Telegraph Service was comprised of senior officers from the former two cadres, and some officers from the Telegraph Engineering Service. In 1961, the Postal Department and the Telephones and Telegraphs Departments were formally separated under different Directors General, with the Posts and Telegraph Service and the Pakistan Postal Service falling under the authority of the Postal Department, and the Telegraph Engineering Service and the Telegraph Traffic Service under the Telephones and Telegraphs Department.⁷⁶ In 1965, the Telegraph Traffic Service was formally encadred as the Telegraph Engineering Service,⁷⁷ and in 1968, the Posts and Telegraph Traffic Service was incorporated into the Pakistan Postal Service.⁷⁸ Officers of the PPS preponderately remained within the boundaries of the Postal Department for the duration of their careers.⁷⁹

Telegraph Engineering Service (TES). The history of the TES is outlined above. Officers of the TES entered service through a separate Engineering Examination administered by the Federal Public Service Commission, or through promotion from Class II posts. Members of the cadre were assigned almost exclusively to technical posts within the ambit of their Department.⁸⁰

Central Engineering Service (CES). The CES can trace its roots back to the mid-nineteenth century. The Aitcheson Commission established separate imperial and provincial branches of the Public Works Department,⁸¹ the former providing the basis for the present organization of the CES. In 1905, the Railway Branch of the Public Works Department was abolished, though officers of the Building and Roads Branch, Irrigation Branch, and Railway Branch continued to be treated as members of the same cadre at least as late as 1918.⁸² By 1924, however, the engineering establishment was divided into two cadres: The Indian Service of Engineers, with two branches—the Building and Roads Branch and the Irrigation Branch; and the State Railway Engineers, a Central Service.⁸³ At the time of Partition the Indian Service of Engineers was classified as an All-India Service.⁸⁴ Since Independence the CES has grown very rapidly. Like their counterparts in the TES, members of the CES were for the most part trained engineers, and had to pass (if a direct recruit) a separate engineering examination to enter the Service. Officers of the CES were exclusively assigned to positions within the Pakistan Public Works Department.⁸⁵

Information Service of Pakistan (ISP). In 1963, the Government of Pakistan formed a new cadre, the Central Information Service, in order to provide a service structure for those officers working in a journalistic capacity in domestic and international posts. As seen earlier in the discussion of the origins of the FSP, there existed for some time an active debate concerning the efficacy of posting FSP officers to journalistic positions in foreign missions. The formation of the CIS gave *de jure* status to those officers already posted to such assignments. The domestic contingent of the cadre served as government representatives to the press, and radio, and later to the Pakistan Television Corporation. In 1970, for reasons not altogether clear, the Government changed the designation of this cadre to the Information Service of Pakistan (ISP). Officers of the ISP held posts in the Ministry of Information and National Affairs and in foreign missions.⁸⁶

Trade Service of Pakistan (TSP). The TSP is another new cadre, created much like the ISP to provide service structure

and corresponding status to officers working in commercial fields against domestic and international posts. This cadre was formed in 1970.⁸⁷ Officers of the Service worked within the Ministry of Commerce and some were posted abroad as Commercial Secretaries.⁸⁸ There was never any direct recruitment to the TSP.

Central Secretariat Service (CSS). The formation of the CSS was the product of a major administrative reform in the structure of the secretariat of Pakistan, namely, the Section Officer's Scheme. This scheme was first proposed by the G. Ahmed Committee in 1959.⁸⁹ Essentially the Committee concluded that the heretofore prevailing system of employing Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries (rank beneath Deputy Secretaries) was 'wasteful, cumbersome, and dilatory' because it provided too many administrative tiers between the locus of the first review of an administrative proposal, the Assistant or Superintendent and the first level of disposing authority, the Deputy Secretary.⁹⁰ In its place the Committee recommended that a new rank, Section Officer, should be created to perform the functions of Assistant Under Secretaries. Further, Section Officers would be given the additional responsibility of serving as the first reviewing authority of new proposals, and would be granted limited powers to dispose of cases on the spot. The intention of this reform was to eliminate unnecessary time consuming review of cases at levels below that of the disposing authority.⁹¹ To effect these ends the Committee proposed the organization of a Section Officer cadre on the following lines: (1) all Assistant Secretaries and Under Secretaries would be redesignated as Section Officers; (2) members of the Central Superior Services would be eligible for promotion as Section Officers; (3) 70 per cent of the remaining cadre would be filled by promotion from Superintendents, Assistants, and other Class II posts; and (4) the remaining 30 per cent of the cadre would enter by direct recruitment.⁹² This proposal was accepted *in toto* by the Government in 1959.⁹³

Since the adoption of this scheme, there has been considerable debate concerning the efficacy of its operation. The Pay and Services Commission of 1962 argued that the Section Officer's Scheme produced a 'blind-alley cadre,' in which

Section Officers because of a lack of experience in the field, would not be qualified for promotion to Deputy Secretary status. Consequently the Commission recommended that the system of Under Secretaries be revived.⁹⁴ The Services Reorganization Committee tempered this criticism in 1969, but again called for the revival of the Assistant Secretary post and for further specialization of Section Officers.⁹⁵ Similarly the *M.H. Zuberi Report of 1967*, though deploring the lack of *esprit de corps* among Section Officers and the relatively low levels of education among promotees to the Service, concluded that 'remedial' and not 'wholesale changes' were needed in the system.⁹⁶ Such debate has continued in the eighties. (See Chapter 4.)

By 1971, members of the CSS held positions in virtually every Ministry of the Government and the cadre strength of the Service was greater than that of any other Central Superior Service. However, the preponderate share of the cadre was locked into posts at the Section Officer level, and no CSS officer held a charge higher than that of Deputy Secretary.⁹⁷

Other Services

General Administrative Reserve (GAR). The GAR was never a regularly constituted Central Superior Service but due to its importance in the development of the service structure it has been included here. The GAR was originally created in undivided India by recruiting 100 senior officers from various walks of life on a competitive selection basis at the Under Secretary/Deputy Secretary levels.⁹⁸ After Partition, the Government of Pakistan continued the programme and inducted approximately an additional 100 officers at the Deputy Secretary level during the years 1948-52. Moreover, 7 GAR officers from pre-partition India also were inducted into the newly constituted GAR. From among the officers so inducted, 35 were selected into a 'Special Wing,' GAR(SW), encadred by officers with financial experience for appointments to posts within the Ministry of Finance.⁹⁹ As such, the creation of the GAR represents the first experiment by the Government of Pakistan with wide-scale lateral recruitment.

Further, the functions of the Special Wing were analogous to functions later performed by the Economic Pool.

Corresponding to the regularization of recruitment practices in regularly constituted services, recruitment to the GAR stopped in 1952. Despite repeated demands from the Association of GAR Officers, the GAR was never encadred into a separate service, nor were specific posts in the secretariat reserved for its members, nor were officers in the GAR absorbed into other services.¹⁰⁰ The Government examined the status of the GAR in 1959. It decided to allow members of the organization to serve out their terms of employment until retirement, but not to support the creation of an additional service cadre. The Commission argued that since recruitment to the GAR had stopped there was no further need to encadre members of the GAR, that it was not 'administratively sound' to reserve posts in the secretariat for its members, and finally that the 'absorption of GAR officers into the regular Central Superior Services (would) go against the basic concept of these services . . . It (would) also upset their rank, structure, affect prospects of promotion, undermine morale, and cause endless administrative difficulties over such questions as pay and promotion.'¹⁰¹

As a consequence of this decision, the cadre strength of the GAR has steadily decreased due to attrition caused by retirement. In 1961, there were 84 GAR officers,¹⁰² by 1970 only 24 of these were still employed by the Government,¹⁰³ and by 1982 all had retired.¹⁰⁴

Economic Pool. In 1937, the Wheeler Committee foresaw the need for the constitution of a cadre of specialist officers to permanently fill posts within the Finance and Commerce Departments of the Government of India.¹⁰⁵ As a consequence of their recommendations the Finance and Commerce Pool was formed in 1939. The composition of this Pool was primarily drawn from ICS officers and officers of the Accounts Departments. Pakistan, at the time of Independence, inherited 8 Pool officers. The Government of Pakistan decided, in 1950, to reconstitute the Pool, and 24 officers were duly appointed.¹⁰⁶ However, the Finance and Commerce Pool did not come into effective operation until 1959. At that time, the G. Ahmed Committee proposed the

revivification of the Pool concept and the Government consequently established the Economic Pool. Pool officers were to serve in the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Industries, and were to be drawn from the CSP (60 per cent), and from accounts and finance services (40 per cent).¹⁰⁷ It was further proposed that 126 posts in the foregoing Ministries would be reserved for Pool officers. The original intent of the Government was to form a new cadre wherein officers, after confirmation of their appointment to the Pool, would relinquish their prior service affiliation.¹⁰⁸ However, due to a number of factors, not the least of which was reluctance of CSP officers to give up membership in their cadre, the Economic Pool never became a regularly constituted service. Officers were deputed to the Pool but retained their previous service designation, seniority, and terms and conditions of service.

The formation and continuation of the Economic Pool proved contentious. The two Commissions headed by Justice Cornelius were perhaps the most comprehensive in their criticism. Both Commissions argued that the operation of the Pool served the exact opposite purpose for which it was formed, namely that of promoting specialization in posts associated with finance and commerce. The reservation of 60 per cent of the posts for members of the CSP, they argued, allowed key posts in the relevant Ministries to be filled by individuals not qualified to hold such posts.¹⁰⁹ Various service associations, most notably the GAR, PTS, PCES, and PAAS, were also less than happy about the effects of the Economic Pool on administrative efficiency in general, and specifically upon the promotional prospects for members of their respective cadres.¹¹⁰

The contention that the CSP dominated the Pool is borne out by an examination of the service affiliations of Economic Pool officers. In 1971, of the total cadre strength of 120 officers in the Pool, 72 were members of the CSP, 19 of the PTS, 14 of the PCES, and 5 of the PRAS.¹¹¹

CONCLUSIONS

The development of the cadre system of organization in Pakistan has been outlined in painstaking detail. Two broad

conclusions emerged from this analysis. First, the origins of the cadre system were not the consequence of any well- or ill-formulated policy of the British Government in India. Rather, the cadre system developed in an *ad hoc* fashion due to the unique set of circumstances facing British policy-makers in the Subcontinent. Namely, the British were concerned with balancing their interest in controlling the civilian administration, with their equally compelling interest in opening the ranks of the bureaucracy to Indian nationals. The cadre system of organization was uniquely suited to these tasks. It allowed British nationals to effectively control the civil administration of India with relatively small numbers of public servants. Also, the terms of the system allowed for a long period of indigenous tutelage of Indian nationals, and the introduction of gradations of ever-increasing levels of self-rule.

Second, the Government of Pakistan embraced the cadre system of organization with only minor modifications subsequent to Partition. Pakistan adopted a service structure that largely paralleled British practice. (a) The establishment of the 13 Central Superior Services followed closely the functional divisions inherited from the British. (b) At the apex of both service structures was an explicitly-defined elite, the ICS and the CSP, with attendant privileges and responsibilities. (c) Both systems created an implicit class structure within the bureaucracy. Access to the elite cadres was governed almost exclusively by reliance on direct entry competition. Also, quite significant distinctions were drawn between the monetary benefits and the accompanying status accruing to membership in different cadres. And, (d) perhaps most importantly, both systems placed enormous reliance on the administrative system to perform legislative and judicial, as well as executive functions.

At least three consequences of the incorporation of the cadre system of organization have been significant determinants of the administrative environment of Pakistan since Partition. First, the cadre system has been a contributory factor in what can best be termed the 'unbalanced development' of Pakistan's national institutions. The British left a legacy of an extraordinarily complex civil bureaucracy whose

linchpin was the cadre system. Since Partition, Pakistan has relied on this institution to carry out the functions performed in democratic societies by representative institutions. A compelling argument can be made that the existence of the complex bureaucratic system of Pakistan has retarded the parallel development of political institutions. For example, one could cite the ineffectiveness of the National Assemblies, the persisting 'normality' of military regimes, the difficulties attendant with formulating a viable Constitution, and the continuing failures at attempts to formulate meaningful organs of local government.

Second, the cadre system has impeded the process of administrative reform. The organization of bureaucrats into cadres has both guaranteed sanguine career prospects for members of elite cadres and facilitated the mobilization of the bureaucracy into pressure groups ('service associations'). Therefore, the cadre system has both created vested interests for those who benefit from the system and encouraged the aggregation of such interests along group lines. Obviously, those who benefit from the *status quo* see little value in administrative reforms and as will be discussed in Chapter 3 members of the elite cadres and their attendant service associations have provided potent obstacles to the introduction of such reforms.

Finally, the cadre system has contributed to administrative inefficiency. As demonstrated, the cadre system is only tangentially related to task performance. The primary motivation and most cogent explanation for the proliferation of the cadre system both before and since Independence is rooted in the individual motives of affected bureaucrats. Bureaucrats perceive it to be in their interest to belong to a cadre—the more prominent the cadre the greater the benefit of membership. In this sense cadres perform a role analogous to that of labour unions. Given this situation 'cadre politics' channels away a significant portion of the creative energy of affected bureaucrats from job performance towards issues related to individual careers—seniority, terms and conditions of employment, promotions, and so forth. Cadres also serve as a mechanism for insulating their members from having to produce in order to secure career advancement. In the

context of Pakistan's more successful cadres rank is determined almost exclusively by cadre membership and seniority. Both of these factors, obviously, conduce to administrative inefficiency.¹¹²

NOTES

1. For instance an informant on the current careers of former CSP officers was able without mistake, later confirmed by documentary sources, to describe posts held, and for how long they were held, for officers up to 15 years his senior and 20 years his junior.

2. Great Britain, Parliament, *Sessional Papers*, Vol. XLVIII, 1888, C. 5327, 'Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-7', paragraph 75. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888.)

3. Great Britain, *The Charter Act, 1793*, 33 Geo. III, C. 52.

4. *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888, paragraph 75.

5. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 36-45.

6. *Ibid.*, paragraph 72.

7. Lovett, Sir H.V., 'The Development of the Services, 1858-1918', in *Cambridge History of India*, Cambridge University, Cambridge, 1932, p. 365. The Aitcheson Commission reported that only 48 officers were appointed to the Statutory Civil Service—27 Hindus; 15 Mohammedans; 2 Parsis; 2 Sikhs; and 2 Burmans. *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888, paragraph 45.

8. *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888, paragraphs 67-72.

9. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 75, 101, 119.

10. *Ibid.*, paragraph 75.

11. *Ibid.*

12. *Ibid.*

13. Ahmed, A., *Role of Higher Civil Servants in Pakistan*, National Institute of Public Administration, Dacca, 1968, pp. 56-7.

14. *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888, paragraph 89.

15. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 101 and 119. The Fraser Commission established separate imperial and provincial services within the Police Service in 1905. Government of Pakistan, *Fraser Report: Report of the Indian Police Commission, 1902-1903*, NIPA Reprint Series No. 6, National Institute of Public Administration, Karachi, 1965, paragraphs 58, 61, 64, 66. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Fraser Report*, 1905.)

16. Great Britain, Parliament, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India*, Cd. 8382, Vol. I: *Report of the Commissioners*, Islington, Chairman, HM Stationary Office, London, 1917. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Islington Commission Report*, 1917.)

17. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 305, 309.

18. *Ibid.*, paragraph 27.

19. *Ibid.*, paragraph 29.

20. *Ibid.*, respectively Annexure IV, pp. 93-121; Annexure XXIII, pp. 367-70; Annexure IX, pp. 156-60.

21. Great Britain, Parliament, *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. 8, 27 March 1924, Cmd. 2128, 'Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Services in India', Lee, Chairman. (Hereinafter referred to as *Lee Commission Report*, 1924.)

22. Great Britain, Parliament, *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, Cd. 9109, Montagu-Chelmsford, Chairman, HM Stationary Office, London, 1918. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms*, 1918.)

23. The term 'All-India Services' was first coined and defined in a resolution of the Government of India on 22 December 1920. See *Lee Commission Report*, 1924, Annexure I, p. 86. Conceptually the distinction between 'All-India'

and 'Central Services, Class I' is straightforward. The Central Services worked under the direct control of the Central Government of India, and their members were appointed by the Governor General in Council. All-India Services, on the other hand, worked primarily with provincial governments, though officers of such services were subject to central government assignment. Members of the All-India Services were supposed to be appointed by the Secretary of State in Council. In practice, however, the distinctions between such categories of services was not that clearcut. As will be seen, the Lee Commission separated the All-India Services into reserved and transferred fields. As a result, the services so transferred, though technically remaining 'All-India Services,' ceased to maintain the defined characteristics of such services, i.e., services appointed by the Secretary of State with assignment to the provincial sphere. The Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform, 1934, further reduced the ambit of the reserved field. In addition two Central Services, the Political Service and the Ecclesiastical Service were appointed by the Secretary of State. See Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *The Civil Service (Classification, Control and Appeal Rules)*, first edition, 1951, reprint, MPCPP, Islamabad, p. 14. This chapter contends accordingly that although there were ten All-India Services at Partition (Table 2.4) only two of these services, the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police Service remained All-India Services under the original definition.

24. *Lee Commission Report*, 1924, paragraph 13.

25. *Ibid.*, paragraph 14.

26. *Ibid.*, paragraph 17.

27. *Ibid.*, paragraph 19.

28. *Ibid.*, paragraph 32.

29. Great Britain, Parliament, *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. VI, 1933-4, 'Report of the Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform'. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Report of the Joint Committee*, 1934.) The foregoing report was presaged by Great Britain, Parliament, *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. XX, Cmd. 4268, 1932-3, 'Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform'. (Hereinafter referred to as *Proposals for Reform*, 1933.)

30. *Report of the Joint Committee*, 1934, paragraph 297.

31. *Ibid.*, paragraph 304.

32. Great Britain, *Government of India Act, 1935*, 26 Geo. 5, C. 2, see especially sections 244 and 246.

33. Several works by Ralph Braibanti provide the most complete analysis of the membership of the bureaucracy in the early years of Pakistan's statehood. See especially Braibanti, R., *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan: A Critique of Sources, Conditions, and Issues with Appended Documents*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1969.

34. The term 'Central Superior Services' was employed as early as 1924 in the *Lee Commission Report*, 1924, paragraph 6, to refer to the All-India Services and the Central Services. The term came to have an analogous meaning subsequent to Partition.

35. Membership in the CSP in 1950 consisted of: (1) 94 former ICS members; (2) 15 war service appointees; (3) 4 *ad hoc* finance service appointees; (4) 44 direct recruits by examination in Pakistan in 1949 and 1950; and (5) 18 direct recruits from the Indian Administrative Service competition. See Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pay and Services Commission, 1959-62*, A.R. Cornelius, Chairman, MOP, Karachi, 1969, p. 65. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962.)

36. Only 33 individuals entered the CSP by non-competitive means during the period 1950-73. 18 were *ad hoc* recruits whose careers, for the most part, originated in the Provincial Civil Service or in one of the finance services. See *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 66. The other 15 were inducted from the military, see Braibanti, R., 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan', in Braibanti, R., and associates, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1966, p. 248.

37. *Fraser Report*, 1902, paragraph 17.

38. *Ibid.*, paragraphs 58, 61, 64, 66.

39. The Police Services Integration and Reorganization Committee under the chairmanship of Sir Gilbert Grace integrated the West Pakistan police forces into one entity. Recommendations of the Committee were published in Government of West Pakistan, *Report of the Council for Administration of West Pakistan, February 1955*, GOPP, Lahore, 1955, p. 18. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Grace Committee Report*, 1955.)

40. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Officers of Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1971, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975, pp. 436-48. (Hereinafter referred to as *Civil List*, 1971.)

41. Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pakistan Police Commission 1960-61*, C.B. Constantine, Chairman, unpublished, 1961, p. 108. (Hereinafter referred to as *Constantine Commission Report*, 1961.)

42. *Lee Commission Report*, 1924, paragraph 6.

43. Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission*, M. Munir, Chairman, AMGGPP, Karachi, 1949, p. 16. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Munir Commission Report*, 1949.)

44. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 141.

45. *Munir Commission Report*, 1949, p. 122.

46. Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee*, G. Ahmed, Chairman, GOPP, Karachi, 1963, 41st Report, p. 29. (Hereinafter referred to as the *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 1963.)

47. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 142.

48. More will be said concerning these services later. In 1968, 14 CIS officers of the total cadre strength of 67, were posted abroad. Similarly, 17 of the 100 TSP officers were posted abroad in 1971, and 13 CSS officers held foreign posts in 1971. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 212-35 and 517-24. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1968, MOP, Karachi, 1972. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Civil List*, 1968.)

49. *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 1963, 13th Report, pp. 318-22.

50. *Ibid.*, 41st Report, p. 28.

51. This was the situation prevailing in 1973, prior to this time PFS probationers episodically underwent training in foreign institutions, for example, the Fletcher School of International Law and Diplomacy.

52. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 212-35.

53. This was the situation as it prevailed in 1969. Government of Pakistan, *Services Reorganization Committee Report*, 1969-70, Vol. I, A.R. Cornelius, Chairman, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1971, p. 115. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970.)

54. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 212-35.

55. For example see *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 114-16.

56. Because the functions of these three services are similar and because service boundaries have been traditionally determined by the functions of the other accounts services they are treated together.

57. *Islington Commission Report*, 1917, Annexure VI, p. 132.

58. *Ibid.*, Annexure VII, p. 139-40.

59. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 154.

60. *Munir Commission Report*, 1949, p. 123.

61. After Independence the Railway Board was abolished in Pakistan and railway finances were placed under the Ministry of Communications. In 1959, railway finances were reorganized under the Central Railway Board. In 1962, railway finances were transferred to the provinces, though the PRAS remained under the control of the Comptroller and Auditor-General of Pakistan, the same authority that was responsible for the operation of the PAAS. See *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 155.

62. Direct recruitment to the PRAS was halted in 1967. *Civil List*, 1971, p. 476.

63. *Ibid.*, pp. 449-76.

64. *Islington Commission Report*, 1917, Annexure III, p. 88.
65. *Munir Commission Report*, 1949, pp. 135, 139.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
67. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 112.
68. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 504-16.
69. *Munir Commission Report*, 1949, pp. 132-3.
70. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 108.
71. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 477-503.
72. *Munir Commission Report*, 1949, p. 446; and *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, p. 348.
73. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 588-93.
74. *Islington Commission Report*, 1917, Annexure XVII, p. 317.
75. *Munir Commission Report*, 1949, pp. 189-91.
76. Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1961, MOP, Karachi, 1961, pp. 438-56. (Hereinafter referred to as *Civil List*, 1961.)
77. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan*, 1965, MOP, Karachi, 1967, pp. 433-6. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Civil List*, 1965.)
78. *Civil List*, 1968, pp. 460-6.
79. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 561-8.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 533-60.
81. *Aitcheson Commission Report*, 1888, paragraph 119.
82. *Islington Commission Report*, 1917, Annexure XVII, p. 326.
83. *Lee Commission Report*, 1924, paragraphs 13-14.
84. *The Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal Rules) 1951*, 1972, Schedule I, p. 29.
85. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 569-87.
86. 14 of 75 ISP officers were posted abroad. *Ibid.*, pp. 525-32.
87. The date '1970' is arrived at because references to the TSP do not appear in the *Civil Lists* prior to 1971.
88. *Civil List*, 1971, pp. 517-24.
89. *G. Ahmed Committee Report*, 1963, 17th Report, pp. 255-66. A very similar proposal for reorganization of the Imperial Secretariat Service was broached by R. Tottenham in 1946. His proposal did not, however, eliminate posts of Assistant/Under Secretaries, but rather upgraded the posts of Superintendents, whose new appellation would be 'Principles' [sic] to head Sections. Each Assistant/Under Secretary would head two Sections. Details are found in Government of Pakistan, *Reports on the Reorganization of the Central Government*, 1945-6, NIPA Reprint Series No. 1, National Institute of Public Administration, Karachi, 1963, Report 4, paragraphs 56-9. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Tottenham Reports*, 1946.)
90. *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 1963, 17th Report, p. 255.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 261-3.
94. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. I, pp. 125-8.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
96. Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Review Committee on the Section Officer Scheme*, M.H. Zuberi, Chairman, GOPP, Rawalpindi, 1967, p. 10. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Zuberi Report*, 1967.)
97. 'CSS Association (Direct Recruits) Memorandum to Services Reorganization Committee', in *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. II, Part II, p. 197.
98. The formation of the GAR was first proposed by R. Tottenham in his 4th Report, 'Reorganization of the Secretariat', in March 1946. The terms and conditions of the new service as they were later accepted by the Government of India appear in an Annexure to the Report. See *Tottenham Reports*, 1946, 4th Report, paragraphs 72-3. The Annexure is found on pp. 122-4.
99. 'GAR Officers Memorandum to Services Reorganization Committee', in *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. II, Part II, p. 186.

100. Ibid., p. 186.
101. *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 1963, 45th Report, p. 344.
102. Ibid., p. 348.
103. 'CSP Association Memorandum to Services Reorganization Committee', in *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. II, Part II, p. 163.
104. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grades, Secretariat Group*, May 1982, unpublished, in conjunction with *Civil List, 1971* and *Civil List, 1961*.
105. Government of Pakistan, *Wheeler Report: Report of the Government of India Secretariat Committee, 1935-6*, NIPA Reprint Series No. 3, National Institute of Public Administration, Karachi, 1963, paragraph 23.
106. In 1959, there were 29 officers in the Finance and Commerce Pool, though 6 of these had not been formally appointed to the Pool by the Prime Minister. 13 were encadred against posts in the CSP (all of these were former ICS officers); 7 were from the PAAS; 2 were from the PMAS; 3 from the PRAS; 2 from the PTS; and 2 from the PCES. *G. Ahmed Commission Report*, 1963, 19th Report, p. 327.
107. Ibid., pp. 323-6.
108. Ibid., p. 320.
109. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, pp. 106, 132-3; and, *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. I, p. 20.
110. 'GAR Association Memorandum'; 'PCES Association Memorandum'; 'PTS Association Memorandum'; and 'PAAS Association Memorandum' to the Services Reorganization Committee, in *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. II, Part II, respectively, pp. 185; 241; 251; 262.
111. Computed from the *Civil List, 1971*. A separate gradation list of the Economic Pool was never published.
112. This argument conforms to the logic of Mancur Olson's argument concerning the effect of labour unions on business productivity in Olson, M., *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982.

3

The Formulation of Bhutto's Administrative Reforms

The focus of analysis is now shifted to issues pertinent to Bhutto's attempt to reform the administrative system of Pakistan, in large part targeted at weakening the cadre system.

In a widely publicized address to the nation, on 20 August 1973, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced what were termed 'revolutionary' reforms in the administrative system of Pakistan. The more salient features of the policy included:

- The abolition of service cadres, and their functional replacement by 'occupational groups';
- The establishment of a Unified National Pay Scale replacing the numerous pay scales extant at the time of the reform;
- The discontinuance of the long-standing practice of reservation of certain posts in the Central Secretariat for members of the elite cadres;
- The establishment of a programme of joint pre-service training;
- The establishment of provisions for the introduction of 'lateral recruits', i.e., individuals without cadre affiliation to posts within the Central Secretariat. Provision for vertical movement between cadres was also introduced.¹

Each of these provisions taken separately constituted a significant departure from the established patterns of administration inherited by the Bhutto regime (see Chapter 2); when considered in their totality their scope was certainly ambitious and, perhaps without exercising too much hyperbole, could be described as 'revolutionary'. This chapter seeks to offer

explanations as to how various elements—intellectual, intra-bureaucratic, historical, and political—influenced the shape of the administrative reforms so formulated. It is contended that only the application of such a multicausal model can hope to explain the adoption of the reforms. An explanation centreing on only one or two of the foregoing factors would be both superficial and fundamentally at odds with the logic of the reform movement.

Indeed, the late summer of 1973 was a particularly propitious time for the formulation and implementation of administrative reforms in Pakistan. First, the intellectual groundwork for the reform had already been carefully laid by the quite remarkable achievements of the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962, made public in 1969.² This document was the first indigenously-composed report which called for a thorough overhaul of the bureaucratic system inherited from the British. Second, for perhaps the first time in Pakistan's history, a majority of the Central Superior Services favoured some type of administrative reform. This development may partially have been a consequence of the wide-scale publicity given the content of the foregoing administrative report, but it was also the consequence of widespread and long-simmering dissatisfaction among officers not subject to the sanguine career prospects of members of the CSP. Third, the administrative system of Pakistan had been rocked by the events of 1969 to 1973. The 'disturbances' of 1969, largely attributable to the public perception that the bureaucracy was inefficient and corrupt, challenged the assumption that the bureaucracy was immune to political currents prevalent in the society as a whole. It also challenged the assumption that the bureaucracy was the legitimate and paramount locus of authority in the government. The big losers in this general collapse of esteem for the bureaucracy were members of the CSP, and rightly or wrongly, the resultant 'purges' of the bureaucracy in 1969 and again in 1972 were directed at this cadre. Perhaps of more importance, however, to the eventual adoption of the reforms, was the dismemberment of the nation occasioned by the War of 1971. On one hand, membership in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy was cut nearly in half, as Bengali officers opted for the newly-

created state of Bangladesh. On the other hand, the defeat prompted both a reappraisal of institutions which had failed, and a commitment to innovation—to experiment with forms of organization which conceivably would be more effective. Finally, the aftermath of the War ushered in the first civilian government in Pakistan since the mid-fifties. Though this analysis contends that it is an overstatement to claim that the reforms were primarily designed to serve narrow political interests, it is undoubtedly the case that Prime Minister Bhutto's regime had compelling motivations to challenge the authority of the bureaucracy.³ Further, unlike preceding political leaders, Bhutto commanded enough public support to make such a challenge credible.

This chapter first presents the domain of the debate concerning the adoption of the reforms. Specifically, the analysis isolates thirteen issue areas addressed by the reform, and traces the range of opinion in each. Second, it explores the intellectual antecedents of the reform movement focusing on the content of eight influential administrative reports and their respective positions in regard to the thirteen issue areas. Third, it analyses the stance taken by service associations towards the same. Finally, it touches briefly on the historical and political setting of Pakistan as it applied to the bureaucracy during the years immediately antecedent to the adoption of the reforms.

ISSUES OF REFORM

Before embarking on a discussion of the antecedents of the reform movement it is imperative to describe the domain in which the issues of reform were addressed. Namely, two questions must be answered: (a) What were the major issues addressed by the reform movement? and (b) What was the range of opinion in each of these issue areas?

The answer to neither of these questions is as straightforward as it may seem at first glance. Throughout the voluminous literature on administrative matters in Pakistan, innumerable issues have been addressed, and positions on such issues have oft-times been astoundingly diverse. For the

purposes of this analysis the richness of this debate has been limited to 'major issue areas'⁴ which have *direct correspondence to reform measures implemented in 1973*. Thirteen such issue areas have been isolated; for these four policy positions, 'Positions A-D,' have been abstracted. In general, these positions range from those advocating the greatest change in the bureaucratic system, Position A, to those advocating resistance to any change, Position D. Specifically, Position A stances 'strongly favour' the adoption of modifications in a given issue area; Position B 'favours' moderate changes in the respective issue area; Position C describes a stance in which the issue is either not substantively addressed, or is addressed with 'neutrality'; Position D advocates a return to, or continuing confidence in, the *status quo*.

The thirteen issues of reform and the range of their corresponding positions are listed here. Throughout the analysis only those actual positions which were advocated by one or more commissions, service associations, or by the provisions of the reform have been identified. The relevant position advocated by the reform of 1973 is designated by an asterisk.

Issue 1: *Reservation of Posts*. Whether certain posts in the secretariat, district administration, Economic Pool, etc., should remain legally reserved for members of designated service cadres.

Position A* Abolition of reservation of posts.

Position B Posting should be equitable and a quota system for equal representation of all services should be implemented.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D System of reservation of posts should be continued.

Issue 2: *Pay Differentials*. Should remuneration of officers be based on a cadre-wise or system-wise scale?

Position A* Uniform pay scales should be established.

Position B None advocated.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D Inequitable pay scales are justified and should be continued.

Issue 3: *Status of All-Pakistan Services.* Whether the functions and roles of the All-Pakistan Services should be continued.

Position A* The All-Pakistan Services should be abolished, and should be replaced with a single unified civil service composed of sub-cadres of all Class I officers.

Position B The All-Pakistan Services should be abolished, and should be replaced with a Central and a Provincial Service.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D The All-Pakistan Services should be preserved; and service designations should be maintained.

Issue 4: *Status of CSP.* Whether the roles, functions, and powers of the Civil Service of Pakistan should be modified.

Position A* Abolition of the CSP in a reformed service structure with its former membership assigned to one or more independently constituted sub-cadres.

Position B Continuation of the CSP as a functional sub-cadre in a reformed service structure.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D No modification in service structure or status of the CSP contemplated nor desirable.

Issue 5: *Affective Sentiments, CSP.*

Position A Hostile towards the CSP. Refers to the CSP in terms such as: 'corrupt,' 'inefficient,' 'arrogant,' etc.

Position B* Resentful of CSP as an institution. Refers to the CSP in terms such as: 'undeserved elite,' 'governing corporation,' etc.

Position C CSP not mentioned by name.

Position D CSP mentioned in favourable terms.

Issue 6: *Lateral Recruitment*. Whether provision should be made for recruitment to posts within the Central Superior Services other than through direct entry, competitive examination.

Position A* Provision for lateral recruitment to the Central Superior Services should be established and such recruits should be amalgamated into the regular service structure.

Position B A small number of lateral recruits with professional expertise should be admitted to the Central Superior Services strictly in accordance with merit.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D No lateral recruitment should be allowed.

Issue 7: *Horizontal Movement*. Should movement from posts of comparable levels within a given cadre be allowed to take place to posts in other cadres?

Position A* After training in a given sub-cadre movement to other sub-cadres should be encouraged.

Position B Barriers against horizontal movement should be lifted but cases of such movement would be rare.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D Careers of officers should be determined by sub-cadre/service membership with no movement countenanced between sub-cadres/services.

Issue 8: *Status of Technical Officers*. Should officers with 'technical' training hold policy-making posts?

Position A Most, if not all, ministries and departments should be headed by specialists or professionals.

Position B* The role of specialists in service should be enhanced with a rough parity established between specialists

and generalists in policy-making positions.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D Issue is moot, present services are 'professional' services.

Issue 9: *Role of Head of Department versus Secretary.* What is the optimal relationship between line and staff officers? Should the system favouring the paramountcy of the latter be modified?

Position A Structure should be reorganized with Heads of Departments and Secretaries accorded comparable status.

Position B* The functional relationship between Heads of Departments and Secretaries should remain unchanged but posts should be open to all on the basis of merit.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D Structure should remain the same. Technical officers should be eligible for posts of Secretaries but only on a 'tenure basis' and only if the former have considerable seniority.

Issue 10: *Status of Pre-Service Training.* Should changes be made in the system of pre-service training for recruits to the Central Superior Services?

Position A Separate tests should be administered for entry to each service and sub-cadre. Or, entry to sub-cadres should be determined by a lengthy work-related, probationary period.

Position B* A system of common, joint training of all CSS recruits should be established with allocation to specific services dependent on such training.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D None advocated.

Issue 11: *Service Tribunals.* Should service tribunals be established?

Position A Service tribunals should be established which would have broad powers both in regard to internal service matters and in regard to the relationship between the services and the public.

Position B* Service tribunals should be established to deal with internal service matters only.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D The establishment of service tribunals should be discouraged.

Issue 12: *Role of the Public Service Commission.* What role should the Public Service Commission play in the affairs of personnel administration and recruitment?

Position A The status of the CPSC should be raised, and it should be dominant in career planning.

Position B The functions of the CPSC should remain the same.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D* Disciplinary functions currently performed by the CPSC should be transferred to the Establishment Division.

Issue 13: *Status of the Establishment Division.* What role should the Establishment Division play in the affairs of personnel administration and recruitment?

Position A The Establishment Division should be abolished and replaced by another body.

Position B* The Establishment Division should not be dominated by any one service and/or its membership should be determined on the basis of a quota, while its functions should remain the same.

Position C Issue not addressed.

Position D The role of the Establishment Division should be expanded, and its personnel should still be drawn from the elite cadres of the bureaucracy.

INTELLECTUAL ANTECEDENTS
OF THE REFORM MOVEMENT:
COMMISSION REPORTS AND THE REFORMS OF 1973

One fact which emerges from even a cursory investigation of the bureaucracy of Pakistan is that if the number and length of reports addressing the issue of administrative reforms is an indicator of fervour then, the Government of Pakistan has been very keen concerning the need for reform. Indeed, administrative reports concerning reform have been so voluminous that only a handful of researchers and governmental officials have seen all of the relevant documents, let alone read them and no library in the world has more than a small fraction of such reports in their collections. A conservative estimate of the number of 'officially-sanctioned reports'⁵ addressing the issues of administrative reform (1947-78) includes 44 documents with a combined length in excess of 7,654 pages, not including Appendices. Further, fully 459 individuals have served as full members on such committees.⁶ Table 3.1 presents a listing of such reports issued since 1967.⁷

Fortunately, this welter of reports can be reduced to manageable proportions by considering only those documents which deal with several of the issues of reform cited earlier and which have had a significant impact on the reform movement of 1973. There are eight such reports.⁸ Table 3.2 summarizes the relevant arguments of these commissions in terms of the 'Position A-D' classificatory scheme introduced earlier juxtaposed to the relevant position advanced by the reforms.

Three conclusions follow from a consideration of Table 3.2. First, no single administrative report corresponds exactly with the position advanced by the reform. This means that the introduction of the reforms cannot be attributed to the wholesale adoption of the recommendations of any one administrative report. Second, each individual provision advanced by the reform, save for the dilution of the responsibilities of the Public Service Commission (Issue 12) had its origins in one or more of the administrative reports analysed. Therefore, at the same time that the reforms did not mirror precisely the recommendations of any one administrative report, each of the provisions eventually

TABLE 3.1

REPORTS OF OFFICIALLY SANCTIONED ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMISSIONS WHOSE SUBJECT MATTER PERTAINS TO
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN PAKISTAN, 1967-78

Name of Body and Chairman	Number of Members	Date Report Signed	Number of Pages
(1) Review Committee on Section Officers Scheme M. H. Zuberi	5	1967	30
(2) Study Group on Fixation of Time Limits for the Disposal of Cases and Streamlining Procedures Hassan Habib	5	May 1969	45
(3) Study Group on Toning Up Provincial Administration Hassan Habib	5	July 1969	145
(4) Working Group on the Reorganization of the Public Service Structure D.K. Power	10	July 1969	174
(5) Working Group on Developing the Consultancy and Contractual Services in Pakistan ^a B.A. Kureshi	12	August 1969	Approx. 200
(6) Committee on Regional Administrative Reorganization Fazl-e-Akbar	6	1969	Unpublished
(7) Law Reform Commission Hamoodur Rehman	9	February 1970	489
(8) Services Reorganization Committee, 2 Volumes A.R. Cornelius	13	August 1970	1241
(9) Pay Commission, 1972 Mubashir Hassan	?	May 1972	Unpublished
(10) Local Government Reorganization Committee Naseem Mahmood	8	August 1972	24
(11) Constitution Committee Hafeez Pirzada	25	December 1972	36
(12) Administrative Reforms Committee Khurshid Hassan Meer	4	1973	Unpublished
(13) Conference on Administrative Reforms ^b	—	January 1974	Approx. 800
(14) Agricultural Enquiry Committee Shaikh Mohammad Rashid	190	June 1975	436
(15) Pay Commission, 1976 Anwarul Haq	8	December 1976	Approx. 400
(16) Civil Services Commission Anwarul Haq	13	1979	213

^aThe data presented here applies to the working group extant at the time of presentation of the report. This working group was constituted in June 1964, and during the following 5 years was reconstituted 6 times.

^bSeminar held at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore in January 1974.

TABLE 3.2
POSITIONS OF COMMISSIONS AND ISSUES OF REFORM

Report	Issue Area												
	Reserva- tion of Posts	Pay Dif- ferentials	Status of All-Pakistan Services	Status of the CSP	Affective Sentiments CSP	Lateral Recruitment	Horizontal Movement	Status of Technical Officers	Role of Head of Department versus Secretary	Status of Pre-Service Training	Service Tribunal	Role of the Public Service Commission	Status of the Establishment Division
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Munir 1949	C	D	D	C	C	C	D	D	D	C	D	B	C
Egger 1953	A	C	A	C	C	A	A	B	A	B	C	A	D
Gladieux 1955	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	B	A	A	C	A	B
First Five Year Plan 1957	C	A	B	B	C	C	B	B	A	B	C	A	C
G. Ahmed 1963	D	D	D	D	D	D	C	C	B	C	C	B	C
Cornelius 1962	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	B	A	A	A	A	A
Power 1969	A	A	A	B	C	B	B	A	B	B	C	A	B
Cornelius 1970	A	A	A	A	B	B	C	A	A	A	A	A	A
Policy proposed by the Administrative Reforms of 1973	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	B	B	B	D	B

Source: Author's analysis.

The policy stances advocated by the administrative commissions, as presented in detail in Table 3.2, are categorized here in terms of the four positions, 'Positions A-D,' defined fully in the text. In general:

Position 'A'—'strongly favours' the adoption of modifications in a given issue area.

Position 'B'—'favours' moderate changes in the respective issue area.

Position 'C'—is a stance of neutrality, or substantive disinterest towards a given issue.

Position 'D'—advocates a return to, or continued confidence in the status quo.

adopted was already in the policy arena. Finally, it is important to note that two provisions of the reform—the first advocating wide-scale lateral recruitment, the second advocating horizontal movement—were not conceived by indigenous administrative commissions, but rather originated in the recommendations of *Rowland Egger's Report of 1953*. Though more will be said concerning these two provisions of the reform later, it is important to bear in mind at this point that these two provisions, and the provision limiting the authority of the Public Service Commission have been the only provisions of the reform subsequently repudiated by President Zia's regime.

INTRA-BUREAUCRATIC INPUT: SERVICE DEMANDS AND ISSUES OF REFORM

Another factor which must be explored to gain a complete picture of the antecedents of the reform are the opinions of the bureaucracy itself. After all, it is a generally accepted, and long-standing proposition, that administrative reforms in Pakistan were blocked before 1973 because of the machinations of government officials unwilling to accept the consequences of such reforms. The intimations of such a concern were first voiced by Bernard Gladieux in 1955, when he stated that whatever reforms were contemplated would have to be accepted by the Establishment Division, whose interests were opposed to any fundamental modification of the powers of the 'administrative class.'⁹ Such a concern was reiterated in the *Cornelius Report*, 1962,¹⁰ and both, the Services Reorganization Committee¹¹ and the Power Commission¹² provided procedures whereby the implementation of their respectively contemplated reforms would bypass orthodox channels of bureaucratic authority.

Of course, the main villain in these scenarios was conceived to be the CSP, whose officers, it was argued, stood to lose most from the adoption of any reform challenging their 'elite status.' Whether this reading of history is accurate or not, the argument was certainly a potent salvo in the polemical war between those favouring reforms and those opposed to the reforms.

The most systematic approach to the study of the demands of the intra-bureaucratic actors is through the examination of the policy statements of service associations. Prior to 1973, when service associations were banned by the administrative reforms, such associations served as a formal institutional link between individual officers and the relevant level of political authority. There were literally hundreds of service associations in Pakistan, ranging from organizations representing the most elite services, such as the CSP Association, to the most mundane, such as the Association of Peons Working in the Federal Government. Virtually every government servant was represented by one or more such organizations, and the more mobilized service associations collected dues and organized social and political events for their members.

Fortunately for the purposes of this analysis, the service association petitions made to the Services Reorganization Committee, 1970, were preserved by the Government of Pakistan. These documents are doubly valuable because hundreds of service associations made presentations to the Committee,¹³ and because all the presentations were submitted during a relatively short time span, six months. Therefore, they represent an extremely wide range of opinion on very similar policy concerns. Further, since the petitions were written for a Committee entrusted with reforming the bureaucracy, the service association petitions perforce deal with relevant issues of administrative reform. Finally, it must be added that the political environment during the period of the composition of the petitions was particularly turbulent from the standpoint of the bureaucracy. The 'disturbances of 1969' called into question the very foundations of the bureaucratic system. As a consequence of the latter, the service association petitions possess a flavour of introspective self-criticism, are highly politicized, and extremely frank.

For the purpose of the analysis that follows, only those service petitions written by service associations representing federal services were selected for inclusion. That is, the sample was chosen from the Central Superior Services, the General Administrative Reserve, and the Central Class I Services.¹⁴ In each case, a content analysis of the relevant

service petition was performed. This content analysis enables a categorization of the petitions in regard to the thirteen issue areas dealt with earlier, and in terms of the 'Position A-D' classificatory scheme, within each given issue. That is, the purpose of such an analysis is to present the information contained in the service petitions in a manner directly comparable to the presentation of the positions of the administrative commissions. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 3.3.

An examination of Table 3.3 reveals two dimensions of support for the issues of reform. On one hand, by reading down the columns it demonstrates aggregate service support for the various issues of reform; on the other by reading across the rows, it presents the disaggregated support of individual services for these issues.

Aggregated service support

Again referring the reader to Table 3.3, one finds that direct service support for any individual issue of the reform varies widely, from a high of eleven service associations supporting the reform's position on Issue 1 (reservation of posts), to no service supporting the reform's stance on Issues 8 (status of technical officers), and 12 (role of Public Service Commission). A more useful array of support is described when one explores the number of stances by service associations in the 'direction of the reform.'¹⁵ Using the latter measure, one can delineate issues in which there was a 'high' level of overall service support (eight or more service associations agreed with recommendations of the reform), a 'moderate' level of support (four or five service associations supported the reform measures), and a 'low' level of support (three or fewer service associations supported the position advanced by the reform).

An examination of the issue areas reveal that Issue 1, reservation of posts; Issue 2, pay differentials; Issue 3, status of the All-Pakistan Services; Issue 4, status of the CSP; Issue 5, affective sentiments—CSP; Issue 9, role of Heads of Departments *versus* Secretary; and Issue 13, status of the

TABLE 3.2
STANCES OF SERVICE ASSOCIATIONS *VIS-À-VIS* THE ISSUES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Service	Issue of Reform												
	Representa- tion of Posts	Pay Differ- entials	Status of All-Pakistan Services	Status of the CSP	Affective Sentiments CSP	Lateral Recruitment	Horizontal Movement	Status of Technical Officers	Role of Head of Depart- ment <i>versus</i> Secretary	Status of Pre-Service Training	Service Tribunal	Role of Pub- lic Service Commission	Status of the Establishment Division
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
GSP	D	A	D	D	D	C	D	D	D	B	A	C	C
PFS	C	C	C	D	C	C	D	D	C	C	C	C	C
PSP	A	C	A	B	A	C	D	C	A	B	C	A	B
PAAS	A	A	A	B	A	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	A
PMAS	A	A	A	A	B	A	D	C	C	C	C	C	C
GAR	A	C	A	A	B	C	D	C	B	C	C	B	C
PTS	B	A	B	A	A	C	C	A	C	C	A	C	B
PCES	A	A	A	A	A	C	C	C	C	C	B	C	B
PMLCS	A	A	A	B	C	C	A	C	A	B	C	B	B
GIS	A	A	A	B	B	C	D	C	C	B	A	A	A
CSS	A	A	A	A	A	C	D	C	B	C	A	C	B
Class I	A	C	A	A	A	C	D	A	B	C	C	C	C
CES	A	A	A	B	C	C	A	A	C	C	C	C	C
TES	A	A	C	C	B	C	A	A	A	C	C	C	C
Policy proposed by the Administrative Reforms of 1973	A	A	A	A	B	A	A	B	B	B	B	D	B
Number Identical to Reform ^b	11	9	10	5	5	1	4	0	5	4	1	0	6
Number with Direction of Reform ^c	12	9	11	11	10	1	4	4	8	4	5	0	8

Service	Number Identical to Reform	Number with Direction of Reform	Service	Number Identical to Reform	Number with Direction of Reform
CSP	2	3	PCES	6	9
PFS	0	0	PMLCS	6	7
PSP	4	7	GIS	7	9
PAAS	5	8	CSS	5	8
PMAS	4	6	Class I	5	7
GAR	5	5	CES	5	7
PTS	4	6	TES	3	5

Source: Content analysis of service petitions to the Services Reorganization Committee.

^aThe policy stances advocated by the administrative commissions, as presented in detail in Table 3.2, are categorized here in terms of the four positions, 'Position A-D,' defined fully in the text. In general:

Position 'A'—'strongly favours' the adoption of modifications in a given issue area. Position 'B'—'favours' moderate changes in the respective issue area.
Position 'C'—is a stance of neutrality, or substantive disinterest towards a given issue. Position 'D'—advocates a return to, or continued confidence in the *status quo*.
^bThe number of positions advocated by the 14 federal service associations that were functionally identical to the relevant position advocated by the administrative reforms of 1973.
^cThe number of positions advocated by the 14 federal service associations that are in the direction of the relevant position advocated by the administrative reforms of 1973.

Establishment Division, generated high levels of support. Issues 7, 8, 10, and 11, respectively: horizontal movement, status of technical officers, status of pre-service training, and the establishment of service tribunals, were given moderate support. And Issues 6 and 12—lateral recruitment, and the role of the Public Service Commissions—generated low levels of support.

Though there is no direct correspondence between the support given by service associations and the subject of the issue addressed, it seems generally to be the case that those issues calling for reassessment of the dominance of the CSP and of the relationship between services (Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13) were of high salience to the service associations and were accorded overwhelming support. Conversely, issues calling for a change in the basis of recruitment and the terms and conditions of service of the Central Superior Services as a whole (Issues 6, 7, 12), were resisted. Finally, issues bearing on general service matters (Issues 8, 10, 11), were of low salience to the bureaucracy and were given only lukewarm support.

Disaggregated service support

Of equal or greater importance than aggregate levels of service support for the adoption of any given issue of reform are the positions of individual service associations. Namely, two complementary questions must be addressed: (a) which services supported the adoption of the reforms, and (b) which services resisted the reforms?

A glance at Table 3.3 provides partial answers to these questions. Most obviously it shows that the CSP and the PFS were more likely to disagree with the measures of reform than any other groups. That is, the stances of these services corresponded directly only twice, in the case of the CSP, and never in the case of the PFS, with the positions adopted by the reform. All other services had more points of correspondence. This relationship is even clearer when one looks at agreement with the 'direction of the reform.' Using this looser criterion, the PFS still never agrees with the thrust of

the reform measures and the CSP demonstrates agreement only three times. The lowest level of agreement demonstrated by any of the other services is with five of the reform measures.

As useful as such an analysis may be, it says nothing concerning the strength of such relationships or the particular in-service issues such positions represent. To address such questions the thirteen issues of reform were divided into three clusters according to subject matter. Namely, (1) those calling for a reassessment of the CSP and of the relationships between services (Issues 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 13); (2) those bearing on the role of the specialists *versus* generalists (Issues 6, 7, 8, 9); and (3) those dealing with personnel administration and training (Issues 10, 11, 12, 13).¹⁶ Then a numeric value was applied to the specific stances taken by each service. Position A stances, those that 'most strongly favour' reform, were assigned 2 points. Position B stances, those 'favouring' reform, were given 1 point. Position C, in which the issue was not addressed, were assigned values of 0. Position D stances, advocating a return to the *status quo*, were assigned a value of -1. Summing the individual values of specific issues within each cluster produces Table 3.4.

An examination of Table 3.4 lends credence to the hypothesis that the CSP and the PFS were opposed to certain aspects of the reform movement. However, it cannot be argued that these cadres were opposed to all provisions of the reform. Opposition by these cadres to the reform measures is displayed most clearly by an examination of the first issue cluster—'service reforms.' Here, the CSP and the PFS stand alone against the demands of the remainder of the Central Superior Services. Such a dichotomy does not prevail within the other two issue clusters.

A more compelling explanation of service positions on individual aspects of the reform is provided by the straightforward dicta of interest group behaviour: Interest groups support issues deemed to be in their group interest; oppose issues which are deemed to not be in their group interest; and remain unconcerned with issues which are perceived to be neither in, nor not in, their interest.

Such an interest group interpretation seems to explain the behaviour of the service associations, at least in regard to

issues falling under the rubric of 'service reforms.' Quite obviously, the losers in the abolition of reservation of posts, enhancement of the status of Heads of Departments, the abolishment of the CSP, etc., were members of the CSP. Accordingly, as Table 3.4 demonstrates, the CSP was opposed to such provisions. It is interesting to note here

TABLE 3.4
STANCES OF SERVICE ASSOCIATIONS FOR SPECIFIED ISSUE
CLUSTERS CONCERNED WITH ISSUES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM

Service	Service Reforms ^a	Issue Clusters	
		Specialists <i>versus</i> Generalists ^b	Personnel Administration ^c
CSP	-3 ^d	-3	3
PFS	-1	-2	0
PSP	10	1	4
PAAS	11	1	5
PMAS	10	0	2
GAR	7	1	0
PTS	8	0	1
PCES	12	3	3
PMLCS	8	2	2
CIS	11	4	3
CSS	12	-1	6
Class I	10	2	3
CES	8	5	0
TES	7	6	0
Means	8	1.5	2.3

Source: Author's calculation.

^aIssues calling for reassessment of the CSP and of the relationships between services. Included in this category are: Reservation of Posts, Pay Differential, Status of All-Pakistan Services, Status of the CSP, Affective Sentiments CSP, Role of Head of Department *versus* Secretary, and Status of the Establishment Division.

^bIssues bearing on the relationship between specialists and generalists in administration. Included in this category are: Lateral Recruitment, Horizontal Movement, Status of Technical Officers, and Role of Head of Department *versus* Secretary.

^cIssues which deal with personnel administration and training. Included in this category are: Status of Pre-Service Training, Service Tribunal, Role of the Public Service Commission, and Status of the Establishment Division.

^dIndividual values for each service were computed by summing the values of each group for the relevant issue cluster. For each 'A' position (see text) 2 points were assigned; 'B' position, 1 point; 'C' position, 0 points; 'D' position, -1 point.

that the CSP favoured the establishment of uniform pay scales (Issue 2). Quite possibly this 'concession,' which was a departure from the CSP's position in the mid-sixties, was designed to stave off demands for more thoroughgoing reforms.¹⁷

Understandably, the PFS seems to have approached the issues described by 'service reforms' in an ambivalent manner. Members of the PFS were the obvious beneficiaries of several of the characteristics of the service structure of Pakistan that the reforms hoped to abolish—most notably, reservation of posts and differential pay scales. At the same time, however, the PFS was never a part of the All-Pakistan Services, nor did its members have direct access to higher posts in the secretariat, even in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given these conflicting interests, the PFS abstained, expressing no substantive opinion on six of the seven issues of service reform. Of course, given the politically charged atmosphere of 1969, such an abstention was tantamount to tacit support of the *status quo*.

Just as the CSP clearly stood to 'lose' the most if the 'service reforms' were adopted, the remainder of the Central Superior Services, with the exception of the PFS, clearly stood to gain from such an outcome. The beneficiaries of provisions to make the terms and conditions of service more equitable in time period $n+1$, are obviously those services whose terms and conditions were less than equal in time period n . In this regard, it is important to note that there was nearly uniform support from the remainder of the services for the policies described by Issues 1 through 5, the issues most clearly framed to challenge the authority of the CSP.

The interest group paradigm also seems to offer a cogent explanation for differences in the position of service associations in regard to the second issue cluster — 'specialists *versus* generalists.' In the context of the use made of these terms in Pakistan, one would classify the CSP, PFS, CSS, and GAR as archetypal generalist cadres. That is, those services whose members aspired to the world outlook inspired by visions of Thomas Babington Macaulay's 'well-rounded gentleman administrator', and whose career prospects offered an equally

broad compass. Members of the Central Engineering Service (CES) and the Telegraph Engineering Services (TES), for the most part engineers, clearly fell on the opposite end of the specialist-generalist continuum. Career prospects for such officers were limited almost exclusively to service within their parent departments. Falling in between these two traditions were the remainder of the cadres. Officers of such cadres generally became 'specialists' in their field of endeavour, though at more senior levels they were often transferred to posts unrelated to their speciality.

Table 3.4 reveals that service associations tended to follow their interest as per the classifications above. The CSP, PFS, and CSS at one end were loath to expand the authority of 'specialist administrators.' At the other end of the spectrum, the CES and TES, with the most to gain from a transfer of authority to specialists, demonstrated the highest degree of support for such a transfer. The apparently aberrant score of the GAR (whose support score was much higher than other generalist cadres), can be explained by their concern with the status of lateral recruitment. As may be recalled from Chapter 2, the GAR was composed entirely of lateral recruits, and their support for this issue can be attributed to a concern for the future of their cadre. Further, in keeping with the interest group explanation, the services which fell between the two poles of specialist-generalist, demonstrated support scores which fell between the ranges of the specialist and generalist cadres. Indeed, variations in the support scores of these latter cadres can be explained, for the most part, by exploring concerns of the individual services.¹⁸

The zero-sum assumption implicit in the interest group paradigm does not have application to the third issue cluster—'personnel administration and training.' That is, a necessary attendant consequence of the determination of such issues was not the advancement of the interests of one service at the expense of other service(s). This is demonstrated by an examination of the service association positions on such issues. First, no service association took a position in opposition (Position D) to any of these issues. Second, each of these issues had a relatively low level of salience—a majority of service associations did not address (Position C)—Issues 10,

11, and 12, and six services did not address Issue 13. Finally, no discernible pattern of support or opposition to these issues emerges from a consideration of Table 3.4.

Conclusions

Firstly, it was argued that aggregate support for given issues of reform was related to the subject that that given issue addressed. It was found that issues calling for reassessment of the CSP were given the greatest support, issues bearing on general service matters were given moderate support, and issues bearing on the modification of the terms and conditions of service of the bureaucracy as a whole were given the least support. Secondly, the relationship between service associations within issue clusters, roughly corresponding to these three subject areas, was examined. The environment of the first cluster, encompassing the issues related to a reassessment of the CSP, was found to be dominated by two factions: those wanting to maintain the *status quo*—the CSP and the PFS, and those wishing to alter this balance—the remainder of the services. Indeed the pattern found here corresponds to the perception that the CSP and to a lesser extent the PFS attempted to 'block' the reforms. However, the pattern is quite different when one considers the other issue clusters. The environment of the second cluster, 'specialists *versus* generalists,' was characterized by the interplay of three factions: specialists, generalists, and those that fell somewhere in between. Unlike cluster one, where the balance of power resided in the hands of those services advocating reform, the balance in the second cluster lay on the side of those wanting to maintain the *status quo*. Of particular interest here, only one service association advocated the introduction of lateral recruitment and only four called for a liberalization of horizontal movement between services. In the third cluster, 'personnel administration and training,' no discernible factions were found. Where debate in the first two clusters was highly partisan and designed to advance the interest of a given service at the expense of other services, debate on issues of the third cluster was half-hearted and conciliatory.

HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE REFORM MOVEMENT: THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT OF 1969-72

It is not the intention here to present a detailed historical narrative of political events between 1969 and 1972. However, three events of this period are of indubitable importance. First, there are the 'disturbances' of 1969, that led to the resignation of General Ayub, and the imposition of martial law in March; secondly, the consequences of the Pakistan-Bengali-Indian War of 1971; and, finally, the rise to power of President and later Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

The Disturbances of 1969

Severe civil unrest gripped Pakistan during January-March, 1969.¹⁹ The problems started on 7 November 1968, when a student demonstration championing the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and pressing for a list of student demands including the revocation of the University Ordinances, was fired upon by overzealous police officers. Three students were killed. From these rather modest beginnings, the fabric of Pakistan's civil order rapidly unravelled. Students angered over the deaths of their peers, the subsequent closings of the universities, and the jailing of Bhutto, staged ever more widespread and frequent processions, *hartals*, and demonstrations. Joining the students in their demands were lecturers and a myriad of labour organizations. Adding to the confusion, government physicians and engineers staged similar demonstrations to press demands for upgrading their relative standing within the bureaucracy. Then, almost inevitably, the mobs took over. Indeed, the week of 24-31 January marked a hitherto unprecedented period of civil violence within Pakistan. Virtually every major Pakistani city was brought to a standstill as mobs battled with police, and hundreds, if not thousands, of people were killed. Though the intensity of the demonstrations quieted somewhat after this bloodbath, the damage to the government of General Ayub was irreparable. On 21 February, Ayub announced that he would not contest

the general elections. Finally on 25 March, in a television address in which Ayub claimed he could no longer maintain order in the nation by constitutional means, he resigned, declared martial law, and appointed General Yahya Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator.

The role of the bureaucracy in the ousting of General Ayub was crucial. Sectors on the periphery of the central bureaucracy—lecturers, engineers, physicians—were the loci around which the early disturbances of 1969 crystallized. During February and March these groups were joined by organizations at the centre of orthodox administrative authority. On 12 February, and again on 5 March, postal employees went on strike; officers of the Telegraph Engineers Association struck on 11-14 March; and officers of the Pakistan Customs and Excise Service as part of their demands for enhanced status for their cadre, threatened to strike. The most significant list of demands, however, came from the Class I Officers Services Association. This petition, signed by every Central Superior Services Association, save those representing the CSP and the PFS, called for the radical restructuring of the service structure of Pakistan, a structure which it claimed was responsible for the disturbances.²⁰

Conversely, the participation of the bureaucracy in the disturbances of 1969, coupled with the wide publicity given to the service association demands, adversely affected the public's perception of the bureaucracy. During the disturbances the alleged deficiencies of the bureaucracy—corruption, malfeasance, laziness, mediocrity, aloofness—were publicized in spectacular ways through the streets of Pakistan. Indeed provincial secretaries were twice attacked by angry mobs incited by charges that the bureaucrats were corrupt. Of course, the CSP, as the symbol of the bureaucracy, came under the most scathing criticism, both from disaffected service associations and from opposition politicians who saw this cadre as a bulwark of General Ayub's power.

The newly-constituted government moved quickly to deflect such overt manifestations of opposition to the bureaucracy. One of the first acts of General Yahya was to establish the Services Reorganization Committee. The preface to the 'composition and terms of reference' of this committee

provides evidence that the government had chosen to meet the criticisms of the bureaucracy by reforming its structure;

Among the causes of public resentment, which led to country-wide demonstrations during the period preceding Martial Law on 25 March 1969, the resentment against the structure of administration of the country figures prominently. People in all walks of life including a majority of those in government services condemned this structure on the grounds that

- it was a relic of the colonial past in which the relationship between the government functionaries and the people was that of ruler and ruled
- it had during the last 22 years proved to be unsuited to the needs and aspirations of a free and sovereign people
- it had continued to sustain and even to strengthen a ruling elite within the service cadres, which had sacrificed administrative neutrality for political partisanship
- it had helped to promote corruption, inefficiency, and selfishness.²¹

As further evidence of the priority Yahya's government gave to administrative reform, six other bodies, in addition to this committee, were constituted during Yahya's brief tenure to consider aspects of reform.

Yahya's concern with answering the critics of bureaucracy went even further than this, however. On 2 December 1969, under the terms of the Removal from Services (Special Provisions) Regulation, (popularly known as Martial Law No. 58),²² 303 Class I officers were removed from service. Many of these officers were highly-placed—38 were members of the CSP, and 78 were members of the Central Superior Services. Such a widespread purge was unprecedented in the history of Pakistan, and violated the well-established principle of the insulation of the bureaucracy from political control. Nevertheless, the action was met with acclaim throughout Pakistan. Favourable editorials were run in the major dailies; Yahya was pictured as having done a great service in rooting out official corruption, and rejoinders from the bureaucracy were half-hearted and ineffective. This act and the comparatively mild reaction to it clearly demonstrates the extent to which the public's perception of the bureaucracy had changed after the disturbances of 1969. The removal of senior bureaucrats on non-justiciable charges, an

unthinkable policy option in 1968, was commonplace in 1969.

Consequences of the Dismemberment of Pakistan

After the defeat of Pakistan in December 1971 the state of Bangladesh was formed. The most immediate consequence of this for the administrative system of Pakistan was that many officers opted for Bangladeshi citizenship.²³ There was nothing sinister about this phenomenon: such officers merely stayed with or returned to their families and properties. However, the effect of this exodus on the membership of the bureaucracy of Pakistan was quite significant. As Table 3.5 demonstrates, 645 of the 1,656 officers in the ten Class I Services for which requisite data was available, 39 per cent of the total, opted for service in Bangladesh. Each cadre underwent severe curtailment. The PFS was least affected but still lost 23 per cent of its officers, the Pakistan Postal Service, the worst affected, lost 48 per cent of its cadre strength. The most significant change occurred, however, in regard to membership in the CSP. Unlike other Class I Services, CSP officers held important posts in virtually every ministry and division of the central government. Indeed this was the hallmark of the All-Pakistan Services, and a basis for the high degree of influence the CSP enjoyed. In the aftermath of the War, however, 89 CSP officers holding posts at policy-making level (Deputy Secretary and above), opted for Bangladesh. 28 of the latter held posts at the level of Joint Secretary or above. The net result, then, was that the CSP lost a significant portion of its influence in the federal government. On the other hand, other Class I Services, though they may have lost proportionally more officers than the CSP, lost for the most part officers who were serving out their careers in provincial government, and consequently did not lose the same degree of relative control over the affairs of the federal government. To put it simply, Bengali CSP officers before the formation of Bangladesh held more influential posts than Bengali non-CSP officers. Therefore, when Bengali officers

TABLE 3.5
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE CADRE STRENGTH OF THE CENTRAL
SUPERIOR SERVICES OF PAKISTAN AND THE DEGREE
OF THEIR INFLUENCE, 1968-73

Services	Cadre ^a Strength 1968	Removed ^b by MLR 58	Officers ^c who opted for Bangladesh	Removed ^d by MLR 14	Officers ^e who Retired	New ^f Recruits	Cadre ^g Strength 1973	Percentage ^h Change
CSP	514	38	188	13	29	69	315	-38.7
PFS	180	0	41	5	8	41	167	-7.2
PSP	222	11	85	6	17	36	139	-37.4
PAAS	146	0	46	2	21	36	113	-22.6
PRAS	56	0	18	1	6	0	31	-44.6
PMAS	70	2	20	2	11	26	61	-12.9
PTS	260	11	123	5	10	91	202	-22.3
PCES	109	12	49	9	10	33	62	-43.1
CIS	67	0	22	0	8	29	66	-1.5
PPS	80	2	38	2	8	44	74	-7.5
PMLCS	52	2	15	0	6	19	48	-7.7

Source: Computed by author.

^aNumber of cadre members, 1968. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1st January, 1968*. MPCPP, 1971. Figures for the PCES were computed from the 1969 *Civil List* deleting recruits of 1968. *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1st January, 1969*. MPCPP, Karachi, 1973.

^bOfficers retired under Martial Law Regulation 58, *Pakistan Times*, 3 December 1969.

^cOfficers who chose to remain or return to Bangladesh subsequent to the War of 1971. Source: Interviews, comparison of Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Officers of Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1971*, MOP, Karachi, 1975 with Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *All-Pakistan Unified Grades, 1975*, Rawalpindi, 1976.

^dOfficers retired under Martial Law Regulation 14. The regulation was promulgated on 9 March 1972. Announcement of officers affected by its terms was made in the *Pakistan Times*, 12-18 March, 1972.

^eRetired from service after having reached age of superannuation. Source: Interviews; *Civil List, 1968* (1971).

^fDirect recruits to the respective cadres, 1968-72 batches. *Civil List, 1971*, (1975); *APUG List*, (1976); and Establishment Division files.

^gNumber of cadre members, 1973. Computed from the table.

^hPercentage change, 1968-73. Computed from the table.

opted for Bangladesh, the CSP lost relatively more influence than other cadres.

The War also furthered the decline in public esteem for the bureaucracy. General Yahya's regime, blamed for the debacle, was discredited in the eyes of most sectors in Pakistan. Indeed, in the aftermath of the War the former government was characterized in the press as 'corrupt', 'weak', and 'inefficient'. It is in this context that, less than 3 months after Bhutto became President of Pakistan, he promulgated the Removal from Service (Special Provisions) Regulation, 1972 under Martial Law No. 14.²⁴ This regulation, although it mirrored the 1969 regulation was implemented much more enthusiastically. Press reports of the period list a total of 1,828 officers who were compulsorily retired as a consequence of the regulation—six times as many as were removed in 1969. Because of erroneous reporting, however, this figure was later amended to 1,303 officers and, while in bureaucratic circles the consequences of the 1969 Act were referred to as the 'purge of 303', the 1972 Act became known as the 'purge of 1303.'²⁵

The combined effect of the removal of officers under Martial Law No. 58 and Martial Law No. 14, and the attrition caused by the War, was not offset by fresh recruitment to the Central Superior Services. Indeed, the membership of every cadre for which requisite data is available declined over the period 1968-73. As argued earlier, this development weakened the power of each of these cadres to some extent, but it weakened the influence of the CSP to a relatively greater extent. The CSP lost relatively more officers holding senior level posts.

Therefore, it is contended that the events of 1969-72 both adversely affected the esteem and prestige of the bureaucracy and lessened the relative power and authority of the Central Superior Services, particularly the CSP. Both of these factors were conducive to the implementation of administrative reforms. That is, to the extent that there was intra-bureaucratic resistance to provisions of the reform, the strength of such resistance declined after 1969-72. The bureaucracy, and particularly the CSP, became less able to block change and less able to resist political control.

Political Rationale for the Reforms

So far this analysis has dealt primarily with the attitudes of service associations and service commissions as they relate to the reforms of 1973. Here the analysis shifts its focus to the political environment facing the other main actor in the formulation of the reforms, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Assigning political motives is a tricky business, and admittedly the vantage point of this analysis allows only a murky picture of the decision-making process that shaped the formulation of the reforms. Totally to ignore this dimension of the environment, however, would be indeed myopic.²⁶

First, from all available evidence, Bhutto demonstrated a decided antipathy towards members of the CSP. This may have stemmed from his days of imprisonment during Ayub's government, or from the generally perceived notion that CSP officers represented an impediment to his social and economic reforms; it might also have been based on the perception that the CSP was a potent and competing base of political authority.²⁷ Bhutto was never kind to the CSP in his public utterances, referring to the CSPs dominance of the bureaucracy with code words such as *naukarshahi*, *burra sahibs*, mandarins, and Brahmins. Further, in administrative matters he relied closely on the advice of Vaqar Ahmed, the Cabinet and Establishment Division Secretary, and the author of the highly vituperative Class I Services Association demands. This may, in part, explain the government's ready acceptance of the radical restructuring of the authority of the CSP.

Another general motive behind Bhutto's attitude towards the administrative reforms was the desire to gain some measure of political control over members of the bureaucracy. The purge of 1972 has already been chronicled. The message that was received by the bureaucracy as a result of the purge was clear and straightforward: 'Support the policies' of the People's Party or look for another job.' This message was reinforced the day before the formal announcement of the administrative reforms when 18 additional senior officers were compulsorily retired with no benefit of extraordinary martial law provisions.²⁸ Bhutto also had a vested interest in gaining some measure of control over the selection process

to the bureaucracy. This motive provides a cogent explanation for the introduction of wide-scale lateral recruitment and horizontal movement under the terms of the reform. Indeed, as was noted above, neither of these provisions commanded broad-based support either in service association demands or in the reports of indigenous administrative commissions.²⁹ Another provision of the reforms, the transfer of certain recruitment and disciplinary functions from the Public Service Commission to the Establishment Division, also seems to have originated with Bhutto. It was palpably easier in the context of Pakistan's administrative system to control the policies of an orthodox administrative institution with no independent constituency, such as the Establishment Division, than to contend with the long-established tradition of independence from political influence enjoyed by the Public Service Commission.³⁰ Further, such a transfer of authority was never contemplated by the report of any administrative commission nor by any service association petition. The combined effect of the provisions of the administrative reform and particularly of the introduction of lateral recruitment, horizontal movement, and the transfer of authority from the Public Service Commission to the Establishment Division, was therefore to challenge the autonomy of the services, and to further Bhutto's goal of gaining a measure of political control over the bureaucracy.

CONCLUSIONS

An attempt has been made to dispel several shibboleths concerning the antecedents of the reform movement. It has been argued that claims such as: 'The CSP blocked the progress of administrative reforms prior to 1973'; 'the reforms were a political ploy of the People's Party'; 'the reforms did not change anything because they were what the bureaucracy wanted'; 'the reforms were the work of Justice Cornelius or of the "High-Powered Committee of 1972"'; etc., offer at best superficial explanations of reality. Each of these explanations has partial validity, but a better explanation of the phenomenon of reform takes account of several causes. The policy announced in August 1973 was the

culmination of the intellectual groundwork laid by numerous administrative commissions, the particular configuration of forces within the bureaucracy, and the political and historical environment prevalent at the time of the adoption of the policy.

Further, this analysis has proved conclusively that the process of administrative reform in Pakistan has been an intensely political phenomenon. The reforms proposed in 1973 were not simply the reflection of the cool deliberations of an administrative commission, quoting the niceties of sound public administration, neither were they the end-product of conspiracies among clever politicians. Rather, the reforms were the consequence of an implicit compromise between politicians and bureaucrats. The particular form that this compromise took was influenced by the turbulent and unsettling political environment of which both sets of actors were a part.

* * *

This chapter is a revised and expanded version of Kennedy, C.H., 'Policy Formulation in Pakistan: Antecedents to Bhutto's Administrative Reforms', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 20, 1982, pp. 42-56.

NOTES

1. The policy pronouncements concerning the scope of the contemplated reform movement were announced in several places including the 'Broadcast to the Nation Announcing Administrative Reforms on 20 August 1973', in *Speeches and Statements of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Prime Minister of Pakistan, August 14 - December 31, 1973*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975, pp. 13-14.

2. Government of Pakistan, *Report of Pay and Services Commission, 1959-62*, MOP, Karachi, 1969. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962.)

3. The most compelling case for Bhutto's personal and political motives is found in Burki, S.J., *Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1980.

4. 'Major' issue areas were determined by studying administrative reports, service demands, newspaper articles, and by interviewing and discussing the issues of reform with numerous government officials. Obviously, some of these major issues may be more salient than others. Also, the analysis does not deal with several possible issue areas which are of conceivable importance. Candidates for the latter include: a) the abolishment of the Economic Pool; b) the abolish-

ment of the GAR; c) the question of the efficacy of in-service training; d) the advisability of setting up new institutions to administer the implementation of the reforms; e) endorsement or non-endorsement of the Class I Officers Association Report; and f) endorsement or non-endorsement of the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1962.

5. The term 'officially sanctioned' refers to formal announcement of the encadrement of a commission in the *Gazette of Pakistan*.

6. These figures were compiled by summing relevant data from Table 3.1 and combining it with Braibanti's listing of 'Major Administrative Inquiries' in Braibanti, op.cit., 1966, p. 215. This exercise gives a combined estimate of the reports produced since 1947. This estimate does not include reports concerned primarily with other aspects of the administrative system of Pakistan, nor does it include works that were not 'officially sanctioned' by the government.

7. This listing cannot claim to be exhaustive. The availability of documents concerning administrative matters in Pakistan is problematic, and no official comprehensive list of such documents has ever been published. However, Table 3.1 in conjunction with Braibanti's listing, ibid., p. 215, is the closest thing to such a compilation.

8. Full citations of these reports are: Munir, Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Pakistan Pay Commission*, AMGGPP, Karachi, 1949; Egger, *The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan: A Report with Recommendations*, photostat, Karachi, 1953; Gladieux, *Reorientation of Pakistan Government for National Development*, photostat, Karachi, 1955; Government of Pakistan, National Planning Board, *The First Five Year Plan, 1955-1960*, MGPP, Karachi, 1964; G. Ahmed, Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee*, GOPP, Karachi, 1963; Cornelius, op.cit., 1962; Power, Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Working Group on the Reorganization of the Public Service Structure in light of the Fulton Report*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1969; Cornelius, Government of Pakistan, *Services Reorganization Committee Report, 1969-1970*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1971.

9. Gladieux Report, 1955, pp. 101-2.

10. Cornelius Commission Report, 1962, see especially p. 55.

11. Cornelius Commission Report, 1970, pp. 122-8.

12. Power Commission Report, 1969, p. 45.

13. In all, discounting cases of personal grievance, there were 1,051 petitions addressed to the committee, in excess of 200 of these documents were official representations of service associations.

14. In constructing Table 3.3 petitions of the following service associations were analysed: Central Information Service; Central Class I Services; Pakistan Customs and Excise Service; Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service; Pakistan Postal Service; Pakistan Military Accounts Service; Central Police Service; Police Service of Pakistan (West Pakistan Branch); Police Service of Pakistan (East Pakistan Branch); Pakistan Audits and Accounts Service; Pakistan Foreign Service; General Reserve Officer's Association; Central Engineer's Service Association; Telegraph Engineer's Service Association; Central Secretariat Service (Direct Recruits); Central Secretariat Service; Section Officers in Central Secretariat; CSP Association (Rawalpindi); CSP Association (Dacca); West Pakistan CSP Association; and Karachi CSP Association. Some of these documents are reprinted in the *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, Vol. 2, Part I.

15. By 'direction of reform' is meant stances taken by service associations that are either identical to those adopted by the reform or which agree substantially with the reform. That is, if for a given issue the reform took Position A or B, a service association's position would be said to be in the 'direction of the reform' if it advocated Position A or B, and conversely, it would be deemed to not be in the 'direction of the reform' if it took a stance advocating Position C or D.

16. As is clear from this treatment, two issues—Issue 9, the role of Head of Department *versus* Secretary and Issue 13, the status of the Establishment Division—do not fall neatly into any one category. The former issue substantively bears on the broader question of specialists *versus* generalists, but its treatment is inextricably linked with the relationship between services and the future role of

the CSP. That is, generalist dominance by the premier generalist cadre, the CSP. Similarly, Issue 13 ostensibly falls under the rubric of 'personnel administration and training,' but it is also linked to the alleged dominance of the CSP officers in the Establishment Division.

17. It must be stressed that by 1969 the issue of equality of pay between services was no longer the locus of intense partisan struggle. As Table 3.3 demonstrates, no service took a stance against the formation of uniform pay grades. The battle lines were drawn rather between services over the question of access to policy-making posts.

18. For instance, the comparatively high score of the CIS can be explained both by the demands of the CIS to be eligible for encadrement in the PFS through horizontal movement, and in their oft-repeated claim that information officers were 'specialists.' Similarly, members of the PMLCS were concerned with inter-service mobility to the accounts services.

19. Information for the treatment of the disturbances comes from *Dawn*, Karachi, November 1968-March 1969, and from interviews. Useful analyses of the disturbances are found in : Sayeed, K., 'Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political Change in Pakistan', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 17, 1979, pp. 111-35; Heeger, G., 'Politics in the Post-Military State: Some Reflections on the Pakistani Experience', *World Politics*, Vol. 29, 1977, pp. 242-62; Burki, S.J., 'Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, 1972, pp. 201-12; Ahmed, M., *Political Sociology: Perspectives on Pakistan*, Punjab Adabi Markaz, Lahore, 1978; and Feldman, H., *The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971*, Oxford University Press, London, 1972.

20. Class I Officers Service Association, 'Demands for Administrative Reorganization', unpublished, 1969.

21. *Cornelius Commission Report*, 1970, p.v.

22. The substantive provisions of the regulation were:

- (1) Where, in the opinion of the authority, a person in the Civil Service of Pakistan or a person serving in corporation service,
 - (A) is inefficient, or had ceased to be efficient for any reason
 - (B) is guilty of misconduct, or
 - (C) is corrupt or may reasonably be considered corrupt because:
 - i) he is, or any of his dependents or any other person through him or on his behalf is, in possession of pecuniary resources or of property, for which he cannot reasonably account, and which are disproportionate to his known source of income or,
 - ii) he has assumed a style of living beyond his ostensible means, or
 - iii) he has a persistent reputation for being corrupt, or
 - (D) is engaged, or is reasonably suspected of being engaged, in subversive activities, or is reasonably suspected of being associated with others engaged in subversive activities, and his retention in service is considered prejudicial to national security, the authority may notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the terms and conditions of such person dismiss or remove such person from service or reduce him in rank or direct that he shall prematurely retire from service.
- (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or in any decision of a court nothing in sub-paragraph (1) shall be construed as requiring the competent authority, before making an order under that clause in respect of any person, to give such person an opportunity for showing cause against such order.
- (4) No action taken, order issued, thing done, or power exercised under this Regulation shall be called in question before any court including the Supreme Court and a High Court or a tribunal or another authority.'

23. The figures are derived from interviews and from the pairing of officers found in Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division),

Civil List of Officers of Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1971, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975 with Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grades*, 1975, Rawalpindi, 1976. This compilation is subject to some minor degree of error. Maniruzzaman, T., 'Administrative Reforms and Politics within the Bureaucracy of Bangladesh', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. 17, 1979, pp. 47-59 contains information regarding the encadrement of Bengali CSP officers in the Bangladeshi public service.

24. The substantive provisions of this Regulation are identical to the provisions of Martial Law Regulation No. 58. See also note 22.

25. Figures are compiled from lists of removed officers published in the *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 13, 14, 19, and 20 March 1972. The breakdown by type of officers removed was as follows: 45 Central Superior Class I, 331 other federal officers, 406 Punjabi officers, 662 Sindhi officers, and 384 NWFP officers. The reliability of these figures is suspect. There was undoubtedly duplication of reporting in the press accounts, and some officers 'removed' were reinstated immediately. The total of 1,303 is as good an estimate as any, and in any case this figure is believed, according to bureaucratic personnel, to be fairly accurate. For a description of the alleged inconsistencies and arbitrariness in the implementation of the purge, see Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. II, MPCPP, Rawalpindi, 1979.

26. Indeed, S.J. Burki takes the view that the restructuring of the CSP was solely or at least preponderately determined by Bhutto's personal and political motives. He advances four such motives: 1) Bhutto's antipathy to the CSP; 2) the attempt to weaken a competing source of power; 3) the ideological conflicts between the CSP and prominent members of the PPP; 4) the desire to provide patronage (particularly in regard to the establishment of the lateral recruitment programme) for individuals personally loyal to Bhutto. Burki, *op.cit.*, pp. 101-2. These motives undoubtedly influenced the decision-making process which resulted in the reform movement. However, Burki's treatment of the reform movement ignores a quarter century of attempts by various political leaders, with similar if not as compelling motives, to reform the bureaucracy and to weaken the authority of the CSP. It also ignores the role played by the bureaucracy itself in the formulation of the reforms. As has been demonstrated, most provisions of the reforms, particularly in regard to the restructuring of the CSP, were accepted, encouraged, and originally articulated from within the bureaucracy. In other words, Burki's thesis begs the question of why Bhutto was successful in restructuring the CSP where so many others had failed. The argument of this chapter is that historical facts placed Bhutto in a position to command the political capital to push the reforms past a weakened and besieged CSP, and that, perhaps more importantly, Bhutto's policy had the backing of the majority of the members of the remainder of the superior bureaucracy.

27. The latter reading is supported by Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Conduct of General Elections in March 1977*, MPCPP, Rawalpindi, 1979, especially pp. 61-80. In a particularly telling passage directed to Bhutto (p. 63), and signed by Vaqar Ahmed, then Cabinet Secretary, the latter states that: 'The main opposition to the Government will come from the following quarters: 1) Qadianis, 2) CSPs 3) businessmen and industrialists, 4) zamindars, and 5) retired army and civil officers.'

28. The announcement was made in the *Pakistan Times* on 20 August 1973. The rationale of the dismissals was stated to be connected with the desire to 'effectively and speedily implement the socio-economic reforms which the Government had launched.' 13 of the officers retired under the provisions of this announcement were members of the CSP, 2 of the PAAS, 1 of the PRAS, and 1 of the PMAS. One retired officer had no cadre affiliation.

29. There is considerable doubt as to whether the Administrative Reforms Committee, 1972, recommended all of the provisions of the reform as was stated in the press announcement of Khurshid Hassan Meer, Chairman of the Committee. *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, 21 August 1973. The report of the Committee was never published. Even if the report was found to correspond to the provisions of the

reform of 1973, it does not follow that such recommendations would be bereft of significant political input. After all, the members of the Committee, Khurshid Hassan Meer, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Faizullah Kundi, and Vaqar Ahmed were members of the PPP, and were hand-picked by Bhutto to serve on the Committee.

30. There is a well-established tradition of both *de jure* and *de facto* independence of the Public Service Commission in Pakistan. The FPSC, under its several appellations, has been in continuous operation in Pakistan since Partition. The existence of the Commission was sanctioned by the *Government of India Act of 1935*, and by each of the three successive Constitutions of Pakistan. To the author's knowledge no report, commission, etc., has called into question the integrity of the Public Service Commission during its almost 40 year existence. Further, save for the period 1971-7, the Commission has published a detailed and reliable *Annual Report*. On the other hand, the Establishment Division is more amenable to political control. The appointment of relatively few top level officers with close political ties secures a measure of political direction, and the actions and processes of the Division are not open to public scrutiny.

4

The Implementation of Bhutto's Reforms and Aftermath: The Structure of Pakistan's Administrative System, 1973-85

The service reforms introduced by Prime Minister Bhutto in 1973 manifested one of two forms: (a) reforms associated with the statutory bases of cadres; and (b) reforms associated with the membership and composition of the newly-created occupational groups. The thrust of such reforms was ambitious, challenging the firmly entrenched and long-standing practices of Pakistan's bureaucracy. First, all 'services' in the federal civilian bureaucracy were formally abolished and replaced with 'occupational groups.' Second, as a corollary of the abolition of the 'services,' the century-old practice of reservation of posts for members of elite services was discontinued.

The implementation of such reforms, however, was not immediate, nor has its application been uniform. Originally, the reforms faced resistance from within the bureaucracy itself, both due to bureaucratic inertia and to the particularistic interests of affected services. After the Zia administration assumed power the reforms have faced further difficulties due to additional resistance engendered by the new government's reluctance to support policies initiated by its predecessor.

This chapter traces the implementation of service reforms both during the period of Bhutto's administration (1973-7), and during Zia's administration. First, it analyses the structural reforms initiated during Bhutto's tenure and traces the level of implementation of such reforms. Second, it continues the analysis of the effects of service reforms during President Zia's administration.

THE IMPLEMENTATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF BHUTTO'S SERVICE REFORMS, 1973-7

The All-Pakistan Unified Grade

Virtually consequent with the announcement of the administrative reforms, the Establishment Division issued several memoranda which fundamentally altered the structure of the All-Pakistan Services.¹ First, the government discontinued the practice of designating certain posts in the All-Pakistan Services as 'listed posts.' Listed posts had been defined as positions which were reserved for members of particular services (predominantly the CSP), but which were 'temporarily' filled (due to a shortage of membership in such favoured services) by members of other services. Officers who held listed posts, regardless of time served in said post or relevant qualifications, were rarely inducted into the relevant service to which their position was linked. Rather such officers maintained their original service affiliation throughout their careers. Consequently, such listed post officers did not become members of the CSP nor of the All-Pakistan Services, nor were such officers eligible for the favourable terms and conditions of appointment which accrued to members of such services. Bhutto's reforms abolished this system by mandating that once an officer was appointed to a post reserved for a particular service that he became a member of the relevant service and ceased to be a member of his original service.²

Three weeks later, the government added teeth to this reform by abolishing the CSP and PSP, assigning erstwhile members of these services to the All-Pakistan Unified Grade (APUG).³ Further, the government designated that all officers holding listed posts against reservations in the defunct services were also members of the APUG.⁴

Combined such reforms eliminated the century-old practice of reservation of posts for members of elite services. (See Chapter 2.) Also, such reforms significantly altered the composition of the All-Pakistan Unified Grades, formerly All-Pakistan Services. Before the reforms, the All-Pakistan Services were composed entirely of members of the CSP or

the PSP and had a combined cadre strength of 615. (See Table 2.5.) Consequent with the announcement of the reform (1973), neither the CSP nor the PSP formally existed and 40 per cent of the newly-constituted APUG was composed of officers who had not previously been members of the All-Pakistan Services.

In subsequent months, Bhutto's reforms were further rationalized through the creation of four new groups within the APUG — the Tribal Areas Group (TAG), the District

TABLE 4.1
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE ALL-PAKISTAN UNIFIED GRADE
BY CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE
REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1973

Former Service	Grade of post held						Total
	23	22	21	20	19	18-19	
CSP	1	13	17	69	47	(113)	147(260)
PSP	0	1	5	4	41	(64)	51(115)
PAAS	0	3	2	7	3	—	15
PMAS	0	1	3	5	5	—	14
PRAS	0	0	0	5	2	—	7
PCES	0	0	1	5	3	—	9
PTS	0	0	6	3	10	—	19
TSP	0	0	2	2	1	—	5
ISP	0	0	0	3	1	—	4
PPS	0	0	0	1	0	—	1
CSS	0	0	0	4	53	—	57
PMLCS	0	0	0	0	3	—	3
PCS	0	0	5	20	10	—	35
GAR	0	0	1	4	3	—	8
Other	0	0	9	13	52	—	74
Total	1	18	51	145	234	(177)	449(626)

Source: Compiled by the author by comparing gradation lists of the various services as found in Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Officers of Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1971*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as *Civil List, 1971*), against Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List All-Pakistan Unified Grades (Provisional) Grades 23-20, 31 August 1973*, Cabinet Division, Reproduction Cell, Rawalpindi, 1973; and Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List All-Pakistan Unified Grades (Provisional) Grade 19, 30 November 1973*, Cabinet Division, Reproduction Cell, Rawalpindi, 1973. Since the use of service labels was barred subsequent to the promulgation of the reforms, this procedure had to be done by hand, and as a consequence the table may contain minor inaccuracies attributable to clerical error.

Management Group (DMG), the Police Group (PG), and the Secretariat Group.

The Tribal Areas Group as its name implies was formed to encadre officers concerned with tribal administration. 'Tribal Areas' include certain partially incorporated administrative districts in Baluchistan, the NWFP, and the Northern Areas.⁵ Given the fact that prior to the reforms such posts were reserved for members of the CSP, the formation of the group served to expand the APUG to include listed post holders occupying relevant positions in tribal administration (mostly PCS officers). Subsequent to its encadrement, recruitment to the TAG was made either through direct competition or through lateral recruitment. The largest induction to the TAG by the latter means occurred in 1975, when 38 military officers were inducted into the group. Table 4.2 details the composition of the TAG as of 1976.

TABLE 4.2
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE TRIBAL AREAS GROUP BY
CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE
REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1976

Former Service	Grade				Total
	20	19	18	17	
CSP ^a	12	0	10	0	22
PCS ^b	5	3	14	8	30
Direct Recruits to TAG ^c	0	0	0	13	13
Other ^d	9	16	17	0	42
Total	26	19	41	21	107

Source: Information for this table was collated by comparing respectively the gradation list of the CSP as found in the *Civil List, 1971*, and the gradation list of the PCS as found in Government of West Pakistan, *The West Pakistan Civil List, July 1, 1968*, 2 Vols., WPGP, Karachi, 1968, (hereinafter referred to as the *West Pakistan Civil List, 1968*), against the Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grades, Tribal Areas Group*, 1 October 1975, unpublished.

^a9 CSP officers are members of both the Tribal Areas Group and the District Management Group; 3 are members of the TAG, the DMG, and the Secretariat Group.

^b2 PCS officers are members of both the TAG and the DMG.

^cIncludes the 1976 batch of direct recruits.

^dThis includes 38 military officers inducted into the TAG but not assigned to posts as of October 1976. 7 of these officers were in line for Grade 20 appointments, 31 for Grade 19 appointments. In 1978, only 20 of these officers were still in the TAG.

The counterpart to the TAG, the District Management Group (DMG), was formed some four months later in February 1974.⁶ This group was formed from posts in district administration not included within the geographical ambit of the TAG. That is, the DMG encadred posts of district administration in 'settled' areas. Like the TAG, the DMG was initially encadred through the induction of officers holding such relevant posts, and subsequent recruitment to the DMG was made either through direct competition or through lateral recruitment. As Table 4.3 demonstrates, the DMG as of 1976 was composed primarily of former CSP officers and of direct recruits to the group.

While positions formerly reserved for members of the CSP in district administration were deputed to the TAG and DMG, the positions formerly reserved for the PSP were deputed to the newly formed Police Group (PG).⁷ Officers gained

TABLE 4.3
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE DISTRICT MANAGEMENT GROUP
BY CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE
REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1976

Former Service	Grade					Total
	21	20	19	18	17	
CSP ^a	4	11	1	19	9	44
PCS ^b	4	3	0	0	0	7
Direct Recruits to DMG ^c	0	0	0	0	42	42
Other ^d	0	3	4	0	0	7
Total	8	17	5	19	51	100

Source: Information for this table was collated by comparing respectively the gradation list of the CSP as found in the *Civil List, 1971* and the gradation list of the PCS as found in *The West Pakistan Civil List, 1968*, against Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, District Management Group*, 1 October 1975, unpublished.

^a5 CSP officers are members of both the District Management Group and the Secretariat Group. 9 CSP officers are members of the District Management Group and the Tribal Areas Group. 3 CSP officers are members of all three groups.

^b2 PCS officers are members of both the District Management and the Tribal Areas Group.

^cIncluding the 1976 batch of direct recruits.

^dIncludes 6 military officers under training in 1976 at the Academy for Administrative Training. They had not been assigned posts as of October 1976. One of these military officers died before posting.

membership in the PG either through holding former membership in the PSP or by holding posts in the provincial police establishment at the level of Superintendent of Police or higher. Table 4.4 presents the original membership of the Police Group.

The final constituent element of the APUG is the Secretariat Group. It was formed in 1975 in order to regularize and encadre 'all posts of Deputy Secretary and above in the Federal Secretariat and such posts in the Provincial Secretariats as are borne on the cadre of the All-Pakistan Unified Grade.'⁸ That is, the Secretariat Group was formed to provide cadre status to all officers of the APUG who had not been inducted into the TAG, DMG or PG. Unlike recruitment to other groups within the APUG, the Secretariat Group could not be entered through direct competition. Rather, the Secretariat Group was an amalgam of lateral recruitment (discontinued in 1975—see Chapter 6), promotion and/or

TABLE 4.4
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE POLICE GROUP BY CADRE
OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE
REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1976

Former Service	Grade						Total
	22	21	20	19	18	17	
PSP ^a	5	10	7	60	18	18	118
Provincial Police ^b	0	0	0	0	91	0	91
Direct Recruits to PG ^c	0	0	0	0	0	47	47
Other ^d	0	0	0	13	4	0	17
Total	5	10	7	73	113	65	273

Source: Compiled by comparing gradation lists of PSP as found in *Civil List, 1971*, against Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List of Police Group Grade 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17 (ASP), (Provisional)*, 1 October 1975, unpublished.

^a7 former PSP officers are in the Secretariat Group—1 in Grade 22, 1 in Grade 21, 3 in Grade 20, and 2 in Grade 19.

^bListed on a separate schedule from former PSP officers. As of January 1977, it was uncertain whether such officers would be incorporated fully within the Police Group for the purposes of calculating seniority.

^cIncluding the 1976 batch of direct recruits.

^dNo prior service affiliation.

TABLE 4.5
THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SECRETARIAT GROUP BY
CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK IN THE
REFORMED SERVICE STRUCTURE, 1976

Former Service	Grade							Total
	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	
CSP	2	12	32	61	18	94	6	225
PSP	0	1	1	3	2	0	0	7
PAAS	0	4	1	10	5	0	0	20
PMAS	0	1	4	7	4	0	0	16
PRAS	0	0	3	2	1	0	0	6
PTS	0	3	3	9	8	0	0	24
PCES	0	2	1	3	2	0	0	8
TSP	0	0	2	2	3	0	0	7
CIS	0	0	1	3	5	0	0	9
PPS	0	0	0	4	2	0	0	6
CSS ^a	0	0	0	10	68	0	0	78
PMLCS	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	5
CES	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total former Central Superior Service	2	23	48	115	123	94	6	411
PCS ^b	0	1	6	16	10	0	0	33
GAR	0	1	1	2	3	0	0	7
Other ^c	0	10	24	62	133	0	0	229
Grand Total	2	35	79	195	269	94	6	680

Source: The table, except as below, was compiled by comparing gradation lists of the various services as found in *Civil List, 1971* and/or Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1969*, MOP, Karachi, 1972, against Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, Secretariat Group*, 1 October 1975, unpublished. Since the use of service labels was barred subsequent to the promulgation of the reforms, this procedure had to be done by hand, and as a consequence the table may contain minor inaccuracies, attributable to clerical error.

^aSince no gradation list for the CSS was finalized prior to the reforms, data pertaining to the CSS was computed by comparing Government of Pakistan, *Gradation List of Section Officers of the Office Management Group, compiled 1976*, unpublished, and various other unpublished documents of the Establishment Division containing partial gradation lists of the OMG against *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, Secretariat Group*.

^bData pertaining to Secretariat Group membership of former PCS officers (Provincial Civil Service), was collated by comparing gradation lists of the PCS found in Government of West Pakistan, *The West Pakistan Civil List*, against *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, Secretariat Group*.

^c'Other' refers to all officers who do not belong to one of the designated service cadres. A large proportion of such officers entered the Secretariat Group as a result of lateral recruitment. More will be said concerning lateral recruits in Chapter 6.

horizontal movement from other cadres. Induction into the Secretariat Group through the latter two avenues was mediated through the actions of the Central Selection Board.⁹ The initial encadrement of the group included all officers holding posts as defined above and all former CSP officers including those who had not attained the rank of Deputy Secretary.¹⁰ Table 4.5 describes the composition of the Secretariat Group by former service affiliation as of 1976.

In sum, Bhutto's reforms of the APUG were designed to constitute significant modifications in the structure and composition of the elite services and specifically were directed at the status and authority of the CSP. Each of the provisions described above can be interpreted within such a framework: the discontinuance of reservation of posts; the abolition of services; the trifurcation of the functions of the CSP; and finally, the dilution of the dominance of the CSP in the APUG through the induction of lateral recruits. One indicator of the scope of the reforms was that the CSP and PSP which constituted 100 per cent of the membership in the All-Pakistan Services (1971), constituted only 38 per cent of the membership of the APUG by 1976.¹¹ Not unexpectedly, the implementation of the reforms provoked widespread resistance from the most adversely affected services, particularly the erstwhile CSP officers. Consequently, when President Zia replaced Bhutto in July 1977 considerable sentiment existed to reverse or at least to blunt the impact of the service reforms.

Federal Unified Grades

The scope of Bhutto's modifications of the Federal Unified Grades (FUG), formerly 'Central Superior Services,' were much more narrowly defined than reforms associated with the APUG. However, four services underwent significant reorganization and one new group was formed as a consequence of the reforms.

The FUG was constituted in a manner analogous to the creation of the APUG. Indeed, the FUG was defined in terms

of the latter organization. 'Federal Unified Grades comprise all services and civil posts connected with the affairs of the Federation other than those included in the All-Pakistan Unified Grade.'¹² In other words, the Federal Unified Grades are a direct analogue of the Central Superior Services save for the fact that the former's membership does not include listed post holders who had become, by the *All-Pakistan Services (Change in Nomenclature) Rules of 1973*, members of the All-Pakistan Unified Grade.¹³

However, subsequent to the promulgation of this directive two sectors of the Federal Unified Grades did undergo significant reorganization. The Accounts Group (AG) was formed by merging: (a) the PRAS, the PMAS, and the PAAS; (b) the accounts officers of the Telephone and Telegraph Department and the Pakistan Postal Office; and (c) all other accounts posts in the Central Superior Services.¹⁴ The former services remained as 'departments' within a unified 'interdepartmental cadre.' The departments (Military Accounts Department, Pakistan Audits Department, and Railway Accounts Department) maintained their autonomy by retaining authority over entry level (Grade 17) officers of the Accounts Group.¹⁵ Of course, the most obvious consequence of this merger was to increase the cadre strength of the Accounts Group. In 1970, 260 officers were members of either the PAAS, the PMAS, or the PRAS. By 1976, the combined cadre strength of the Accounts Group had grown to 386. Further, only 160 of the latter were cohorts of the original three services. Table 4.6 presents the cadre strengths of the newly-constituted groups in juxtaposition with their pre-reform analogues.

Similarly, the Foreign Affairs Group (FAG) was constituted as the amalgamation of 'all posts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in Pakistan Missions abroad viz.,—all posts of Commercial Attaches, Press Attaches, Education, Labour, Agriculture, etc.'¹⁶ The formation of this group therefore, arbitrated the issue of the status of non-PFS officers in foreign missions. (See Chapter 2.) The reforms also sanctioned the induction of lateral recruits into the FAG. As was the case of the AG, the consequences of such reorganization led to both an increase in the aggregate size of the

cadre, the PFS had 180 members in 1970, the FAG 331 in 1976; and to a decrease in the importance of the PFS cohorts in the unified cadre, only 151 of the 331 officers of the FAG (1976) were cohorts of the PFS. (Table 4.6.)

Also, a new occupational group, the Economists and Planners Group, was formed in 1976.¹⁷ This group was designed to incorporate 'all economists . . . in the Economic Affairs Division, Finance Division, and federal government dealing with economic matters and planning and development in the economic field.' Though the original idea behind the creation of the group had envisioned recruitment at various levels both through direct recruitment and through promotion, in practice the group has been formed solely by the incorporation of officers (Grade 17 and above) serving in the relevant departments and ministries who did not possess other group affiliation. The Economist and Planners Group cannot be entered through direct competition.

Essentially modifications in other sectors of the Central Superior Services (now FUG) merely constituted changes in nomenclature. That is, the pre-reform designation of 'service' was replaced with the post-reform designation of 'group.' Table 4.7 presents a summary of changes in the nomenclature of the constituent elements of the FUG as well as a summary of analogous changes in the APUG.

THE STATUS OF SERVICE REFORMS SINCE 1977

The implementation of Bhutto's service reforms generated considerable opposition from within the bureaucracy. Such opposition came from three main sources. First and most obviously, the erstwhile members of the CSP perceived the reforms as diluting their status and authority within the bureaucracy. Second, the lateral recruitment programme had challenged the corporate interests of the senior bureaucracy by bypassing the established mechanisms of promotion and transfer. Finally, the bureaucracy perceived the overall thrust of Bhutto's reforms as targeted at eroding administrative neutrality. Namely, Bhutto's policies were perceived as an attempt to wrest control of administration from civilian

TABLE 4.6
MODIFICATIONS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE ALL-PAKISTAN SERVICES AND THE CENTRAL
SUPERIOR SERVICES AND THEIR FUNCTIONAL ANALOGUES THE ALL-PAKISTAN UNIFIED
GRADES AND FEDERAL UNIFIED GRADES, 1970-6

Services/Groups	Cadre size 1970	Opted ^b Bangladesh	Normal ^c retirement	Early ^d retirement	Direct ^e recruits	Other ^f recruits	Cadre size ^g 1976
CSP Cohorts ^a	473	188	16	27	31	0	273
PFS Cohorts	180	41	3	5	20	0	151
Foreign Affairs Group	—	—	—	—	16	164	180
Tribal Affairs Group	—	—	—	—	13	94	107
District Management Group	—	—	—	—	42	58	100
PSP Cohorts	122	—5	13	8	12	0	118
Police Group	—	—	—	—	47	108	155
PAAS Cohorts	142	46	18	2	15	0	91
PRAS Cohorts	46	18	6	1	0	0	21
PMAS Cohorts	72	20	22	2	16	0	48
Accounts Group	—	—	—	—	90	136	226
PTS/Income Tax Group	297	123	4	5	91	?	255
PCES/Customs Group	124	49	21	9	31	?	76
TSP/Commerce Group	100	41	9	0	29	?	79
ISP/Information Group	75	22	11	0	34	?	76
PPS/Postal Group	92	38	5	2	30	?	77
PMLCS/Cantonment	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Management Group	46	15	1	0	29	?	59
CSS/Office Management Group	576	?	?	?	246	?	706

Sources: Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List All-Pakistan Unified Grade (Provisional)*, 31 August 1973; Cabinet Division, Reproduction Cell, Islamabad, 1973; *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, Secretariat Group, 1975; Gradation List of Police Group Grade 22, 21, 20, 19, 18, 17 (ASP), (Provisional), 1975; Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, District Management Group, 1975; Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grade, Tribal Areas Group, 1975; Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gradation List Pakistan Foreign Service, 6 August 1973, unpublished; Gradation List of Section Officers of the Office Management Group, 1976; Government of Pakistan, Auditor General, Ministry of Finance, *Gradation List of Accounts Group as**

of 31/12/1975, unpublished; unpublished memos written to Establishment Division from relevant Ministries concerning candidates for promotion and including partial gradation lists of the Federal Revenues (Direct Taxes) Group, the Federal Revenues (Indirect Taxes) Group, the Commerce Group, the Information Group, the Postal Group, and the Cantonment Management Group. Dates of such memos ranged from 1974-6; *Civil List of Officers of Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1971*; *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1969*. Also this table has benefited from information gathered in numerous interviews with officers of the public service of Pakistan.

^aThe usage of the term 'cohort' in this table has reference to officers who were members of the relevant service in 1970 or who became members of the relevant service prior to the promulgation of the reforms in 1973.

^bIt is very difficult to be precise regarding this statistic. These figures were computed by comparing relevant gradation lists, post-1971 with relevant gradation lists pre-1971. The presumption is that if an officer was a member of a cadre prior to 1971 and subsequent to 1971 he was no longer a member of that cadre, that that officer either opted for Bangladesh, retired from service under normal circumstances, or retired 'early' i.e., was dismissed, suspended, died, etc. Officers were considered to have opted for Bangladesh, in lieu of better information, if they: a) did not reappear in post-1971 gradation lists; b) did not retire from service; and c) had official 'domicile' status of East Pakistan. Where possible this information has been confirmed through interviews conducted with cohorts of the relevant officers.

The entry '-5' opposite the PSP cohorts refers to the fact that 8 PSP(E) officers opted for West Pakistan while 3 PSP(W) officers opted for Bangladesh. Therefore, there was a net gain to the PSP of 5 officers.

Since no gradation list of the CSS has ever been finalized it proved impossible to estimate the number of CSS officers who opted for Bangladesh.

^c'Normal retirement' refers to situations in which the officer had reached the prescribed retirement age on or before 1976. Of course, an officer was considered to have retired only if he was no longer a member of the service in 1976. As in the case of those officers who 'opted for Bangladesh' these figures are at best close estimates, though documentation for this category was more readily available than for the former. Where possible such information was confirmed through interviews.

Due to reasons mentioned above, it proved impossible to compute the number of CSS officers who undertook normal retirement.

^d'Early retirements' refer to those officers who were: a) dismissed from service as a consequence of MLR 114, (see *Pakistan Times*, 13-14 March 1972, p. 1; *Dawn*, 13-14 March, p. 1), or as a consequence of the dismissal of senior officers of 19 August 1973, (see '18 Senior Officers Dismissed', in *Pakistan Times*, 20 August 1973, p. 1); b) left service before normal retirement age for some other reason (resignation, suspension, 'unannounced early retirement', etc.); or c) died. Again, much of this information was confirmed by interviews.

It proved impossible to compute the number of CSS officers who were retired early.

^eRecruits who entered service through direct competitive examination. Four batches of recruits are included in these figures inclusive of the 1971-6 batches. This information was provided by the Establishment Division and was confirmed by information gathered from the Academy for Administrative Training.

^f'Other recruits' refer to officers who entered their respective cadres between 1971-6, through means other than direct competitive examination. See Tables 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Chapter 6 deals with lateral recruitment in much greater detail.

Complete gradation lists, as of 1978, had not been finalized for the Income Tax, Customs, Commerce, Information, Postal, or Cantonment Management Groups. Therefore, it was impossible to compute the number of 'other recruits' to such groups.

The latest available gradation list of the FAG is complete only through 1973. Therefore, the number of 'other recruits' to this service does not take into account 'other recruits' who may have entered the FAG subsequent to, and including 1974.

It proved impossible to compute the number of 'other recruits' to the CSS.

^gFor reasons cited in 'f' above, the 'cadre size, 1976' does not include 'other recruits' to the Income Tax Group, the Customs Group, the Commerce Group, the Information Group, the Postal Group, or the Cantonment Management Group. Nor have complete gradation lists of these groups been issued. Therefore, the figures presented here are at best close estimates for the foregoing Groups.

TABLE 4.7
FORMER SERVICE DESIGNATION PRIOR TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OF 1973 AND ANALOGOUS
GROUP DESIGNATION SUBSEQUENT TO THE REFORMS

Name of former Service	Name of corresponding Occupational Group ^a
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP)	District Management Group (DMG)
Police Service of Pakistan (PSP)	Tribal Areas Group (TAG)
Foreign Service of Pakistan (FSP)	Police Group (PG)
and Other Posts under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Foreign Affairs Group (FAG)
Pakistan Audits and Accounts Service (PAAS)	Accounts Group (AG)
Pakistan Military Accounts Service (PMAS)	
Pakistan Railways Accounts Service (PRAS)	
Pakistan Taxation Service (PTS)	Income Tax Group (ITG)
Pakistan Customs and Excise Service (PCES)	Customs and Excise Group (CEG)
Trade Service of Pakistan (TSP)	Commerce and Trade Group (CTG)
Information Service of Pakistan (ISP)	Information Group (IG)
Pakistan Postal Service (PPS)	Postal Group (PG)
Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonments Service (PMLCS)	Military Lands and Cantonments Group (MLCG)
Central Secretariat Service (CSS)	Office Management Group (OMG)
Pakistan Railways Service ^b	Railways Group (RG) ^b
	Secretariat Group
	Economists and Planners Group

^aThe occupational groups were formed by the following memoranda issued by the Establishment Division: *District Management Group*—O.M. No. 2/2/74—ARC 23 February 1974; *Tribal Areas Group*—O.M. No. 22/4/75—AV 7 August 1975. The TAG and DMG were merged on 3 December 1981 as a consequence the TAG ceased to exist. *Police Group*—O.M. No. 3/2/75—ARC 31 May 1975; *Foreign Affairs Group*—O.M. No. 3/2/74—ARC 8 April 1974; *Accounts Group*—O.M. No. 1/2/74—ARC 23 January 1974 amended by O.M. No. 2/1/75—ARC 3 March 1976; *Income Tax Group*—O.M. No. 4/2/75—ARC 9 May 1975; *Customs and Excise Group*—O.M. No. 5/2/75—ARC 9 May 1975; *Commerce and Trade Group*—O.M. No. 6/2/75—ARC 8 May 1975; *Military Lands and Cantonments Group*—O.M. No. 9/2/75—ARC 11 May 1975; *Information Group*—O.M. No. 2/8/75—ARC 17 June 1977; *Postal Group*—O.M. No. 6/2/75 8 May 1975; *Office Management Group*—O.M. No. 3/2/74—ARC 8 April 1974 and O.M. No. 10/1/74 (A) 17 February 1979. Direct recruitment to the OMG has been discontinued. *Economist and Planners Group*—O.M. No. 10/2/75—ARC 25 March 1976; *Secretariat Group*—O.M. No. 1/2/75—ARC 27 June 1975, O.M. No. 2/2/75—ARC 7 May 1976 and O.M. No. 2/1/79—ARC 12 June 1979.

^bThe history of this service is shrouded in mystery. It is not listed as constituting a service in any of the *Civil Lists* inclusive of 1961-71. In fact, the only mention of this service by name is found in Establishment Division O.M. No. 1/9/74—ARC 12 September 1974. The Railway Group has not inducted a direct recruit since the 1975 batch.

bureaucrats by enhancing the role of political appointees. Following the military *coup* of 1977, such opposition was encouraged by the publication of the *White Papers* which related in painstaking detail the excesses of the Bhutto regime in regard to the implementation of the administrative reforms.¹⁸

Therefore by 1978, the Zia regime had both the political motivation and the support of significant sectors of the civilian bureaucracy to rescind, or at least to substantially modify, Bhutto's administrative policies. Accordingly, in February 1978 Zia appointed the Civil Services Reform Commission under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Anwar-ul-Haq to examine the efficacy of Bhutto's reforms.¹⁹ The recommendations which emerged from this Commission envisaged profound departures from Bhutto's system. For instance, among its many recommendations the Commission urged the abolition of all occupational groups including the Secretariat Group; the disestablishment of the administrative tier of the Section Officer; the disencadrement and dispersal of officers of the Office Management Group (OMG); the creation of several technical 'branches' to accommodate engineers, physicians, educators, agriculturalists, scientists, and statisticians; the creation of numerous new in-service training facilities; the wholesale revamping of district administration; the establishment of a National Administrative Reserve (which paralleled the functions of the defunct CSP); the emasculation of the lateral recruitment programme; the revision of the regional quota system; the modification of pre-service training and selection; and the merger of the DMG and TAG into a 'District Management Branch.'

However, despite such wide-ranging recommendations President Zia has moved cautiously in the realm of administrative reform. In fact, Zia's administration has made only four significant changes in the service structure which it inherited. First, Zia abolished the lateral recruitment of civilian bureaucrats. This move had the support of virtually all sectors of Pakistan's bureaucracy, with the possible exception of some technical services. (See Chapters 6 and 7.) Second, following the recommendation of the Anwar-ul-Haq Commission, Zia abolished the TAG, merging its members

within the DMG.²⁰ This policy had been urged by members of both of the affected groups and by erstwhile members of the CSP. Third, the Zia regime expanded reservations for military personnel in the civilian bureaucracy. (See Chapter 5.) Fourth, Zia halted direct recruitment to the OMG. This action was prompted by the Anwar-ul-Haq Commission. The latter had argued that OMG officers did not have sufficient experience in the field to undertake senior administrative assignments; that the concept of 'office management' was not in keeping with promoting occupational speciality; and that officers who had been inducted into the OMG since the reforms were not fit academically for senior posting.²¹ This position is in consonance with the interests of the former CSP officers. With the avenue of lateral recruitment blocked, access to the Secretariat Group had by definition been limited (subsequent to 1978) to either officers already in the Secretariat Group (former CSP officers) or to members of the OMG. The latter group is much larger than the former and therefore constitutes a challenge to the promotional prospects of former CSP officers. Zia's government, however, has not (as of 1986) dispersed members of the OMG to other groups (a policy favoured by the Anwar-ul-Haq Commission).

Combined such policies (with the exception of military recruitment) tend in the direction of re-establishing the administrative *status quo ante*. Indeed, the cessation of lateral recruitment, the abolition of the TAG, and the disenfranchisement of the OMG all tend to blunt the thrust of Bhutto's service reforms. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue that Zia's policies have obviated Bhutto's initiatives. At least as important as what Zia's policies have done, are what Zia's policies did not do. First, Zia's government never seriously considered the re-encadrement of the CSP. Second, Zia has not re-established the use of service designations nor sanctioned the re-introduction of service associations. Third, Zia's government has consistently rejected recommendations to expand the number of occupational groups to include technical cadres.

Perhaps the most adequate way to describe the changes wrought by the service reforms is to compare the composition of the federal bureaucracy in four time frames: before

(1969); at the inception (1973); during the heyday (1976); and in the aftermath (1982-3) of the reforms. Information pertaining to the latter time period is presented in Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10.

Such comparisons reveal that:

- The service reforms reduced the positional dominance of the CSP in the federal bureaucracy. In 1969, CSP officers held 93 per cent of all posts of Joint Secretary and above in the federal government.²² In 1973, the comparable figure had been reduced to 44 per cent.²³
- The positional dominance of the CSP has continued to decline since 1973. Comparable figures to those above

TABLE 4.8
THE MEMBERSHIP OF SECRETARIAT GROUP BY CADRE OF
FORMER SERVICE AND BY RANK, 1982

Former Service	Grade					Total
	22	21	20	19	18	
CSP	32	27	75	43	7	184
PSP	0	0	1	0	—	1
PAAS	1	6	9	5	—	21
PMAS	4	3	6	0	—	13
PRAS	1	3	4	0	—	8
PTS	2	5	10	5	—	22
PCES	0	1	1	0	—	2
TSP	0	0	0	1	—	1
CIS	0	1	2	1	—	4
PPS	0	0	3	2	—	5
CSS	0	0	15	156	—	171
PMLCS	0	0	5	0	—	5
PCS	1	2	7	2	—	12
Military	7	7	25	23	—	62
Engineer	3	5	10	6	—	24
Educator	0	0	0	19	—	19
Scientist	3	0	1	3	—	7
Other	3	8	49	74	—	134
Grand Total	58	68	223	340	7	696

Source: Compiled by the author from Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Provisional Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grade, Secretariat Group Grades 22 to 18*, unpublished, Islamabad, 1982; and from sources listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.5.

reveal that the CSP cohort controlled 42 per cent of all senior posts in 1976²⁴ and 36 per cent of such posts in 1982.²⁵

- Conversely, the representation of other groups in senior administrative positions has proportionally increased.

TABLE 4.9
MEMBERSHIP OF THE FEDERAL UNIFIED GRADES
BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP AND RANK, 1983

Group	Grade						Total
	22	21	20	19	18	17	
Accounts	1	4	25	22	91	547	690
Commerce	0	1	2	15	39	93	150
Customs	0	3	15	18	28	94	158
Economists and Planners	1	2	21	27	70	80	201
FAG	7	20	58	53	76	67	281
Income Tax	1	2	30	86	106	119	344
Information	0	0	4	13	55	77	149
OMG	0	0	0	0	417	436	853
Police	1	6	17	44	153	154	375
Postal	0	1	10	18	20	59	108
Railways	0	4	17	40	64	22	147

Source: Adapted from Government of Pakistan, Public Administration Research Centre (Statistics Cell), O and M Division, *Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report 1983*, Barqson's, Islamabad, 1984, p. 79.

TABLE 4.10
THE MEMBERSHIP OF DISTRICT MANAGEMENT GROUP
BY CADRE OF FORMER SERVICE AND RANK, 1982

Former Service	Grade						Total
	22	21	20	19	18	17	
CSP	1	6	26	15	15	0	63
Direct Recruits							
DMG/TAG	0	0	0	0	83	114	197
PCS	1	1	3	5	15	0	25
Military	0	0	9	2	26	17	54
Total	2	7	38	22	139	132	339

Source: Compiled by author from Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Provisional Gradation List of District Management Group Grades 22 to 17*, unpublished, Islamabad, 1982; and from sources listed in Tables 4.1 and 4.5.

Such gains have been registered predominantly by members of the Federal Unified Grades and since 1977 by military recruits to the civilian bureaucracy.

- Such trends are likely to continue. First, recruitment to the CSP has been discontinued. Second, the size of Pakistan's bureaucracy is expanding. Third, military recruitment continues to expand.
- Given current trends the dominance of the CSP cohorts at senior level positions will decline as officers reach retirement age, but will continue to persist at least until 2010.

CONCLUSIONS

It has been demonstrated that Bhutto's oft-repeated claim that the service reforms of 1973 constituted 'revolutionary' departures from the prevailing system of bureaucratic organization in Pakistan had a concrete basis in fact. Also, that the impact of such reforms, though challenged, has remained significant since 1977.

The implementation of Bhutto's service reforms altered the cadre system of organization of the bureaucracy in several important ways. First, the CSP, the lineal descendent of the ICS, was abolished. Its membership was scattered to the newly-created District Management Group, Tribal Areas Group, and the Secretariat Group. Though President Zia merged the former two groups in 1981, he has not reconstituted the CSP. Second, the practice of designating non-CSP officers as 'listed post holders' in the All-Pakistan Services was abolished. Third, as a consequence of the former the century-old practice of the reservation of posts for members of the CSP and other elite services was discontinued. Fourth, the domain of the All-Pakistan Services, newly-constituted as the All-Pakistan Unified Grade; was expanded to include a majority of non-CSP and non-PSP officers. Fifth, the former accounts services (PAAS, PMAS, and PRAS) were merged to form the Accounts Group. Finally, the composition of the PFS was greatly modified and expanded to form the Foreign Affairs Group. In each of these instances the cadre system as

it was inherited from the British, and as it developed since Partition, was significantly modified. In each of these instances the 'elite of the elite' was watered down by an expansion of the size of the respective cadre and a concomitant decline in the relative proportion of former service cohorts in the newly-constituted occupational groups. Given the heretofore impervious nature of the cadre system, such modifications were indeed 'revolutionary.'

But it must be stressed that the reform of the cadre system of organization left the role of the cadre system to the overall scheme of Pakistan's administrative system unaltered. Despite the changes in the relative authority and power of given services within the bureaucracy attendant with the reforms, the organization of the bureaucracy into semi-functional occupational groups has persisted. Such redefined groups still manifest the characteristics of the services which they replaced. An officer's promotional prospects, job type, and relative status are still determined preponderately by group affiliation. Further, the role exercised by 'service' membership in defining the self-identity of individual officers has been mirrored in the functionally equivalent role exercised by 'group' membership. Finally, the relative rank-order of group preferences for group membership closely accords with the previous rank-order for service membership. (See Chapter 9.)

More importantly, the reforms have not modified the contextual importance of the cadre system to the bureaucracy of Pakistan. The reforms have not significantly modified the belief among relevant bureaucratic actors that some form of cadre system of organization is necessary. A pertinent example was the formation of the Economist and Planners Group in 1976, a new group with no functional analogue in the pre-reform service structure. The formation of this group was designed to improve the relative standing of economists and 'planners' in the bureaucracy. What is important to note is that such improvement is perceived as a necessary by-product of cadre affiliation. Patently then, the reform did not challenge the nature of the cadre system *per se* but rather the prevailing relationships between members of different cadres. Its effect was to eliminate the statutory bases of

inequality between cadres, not to modify the institutional functions performed by the cadre system.

* * *

This chapter is a much revised and updated version of Kennedy, Charles H., 'Policy Implementation: The Case of Structural Reforms in the Administrative System of Pakistan', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3, Spring 1981.

NOTES

1. Bhutto's announcement was made on the evening of 20 August 1973; the notifications introducing changes in the composition of, and rules governing the All-Pakistan Services were drawn on 21 August 1973.

2. The following amendment was made to *Rule 3* of the *Civil Services of Pakistan (Composition and Cadre) Rules, 1954*. Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat, Notification No. F. 25/12/51 SEI, Karachi, 1 June 1954:

Every person, not being a member of the Service (CSP), who is appointed to a Cadre post in accordance with the rules regulating such appointment shall,—

(a) on his appointment to that post, become a member of the Service; and

(b) on his confirmation in the Service cease to be a member of the Service, if any, to which he belonged immediately before such confirmation.

(Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, S.R.O. 1237(I)/73, 21 August 1973.)

3. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, S.R.O. 1307(I)/73, 14 September 1973.

4. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 1/1/73—ARC, 14 September 1973.

5. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 1/6/73, 20 October 1973.

6. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 2/2/74—ARC, 23 February 1974.

7. Formed as per Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 3/2/75—ARC, 31 May 1975.

8. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 2/2/75—ARC, 21 February 1975.

9. For the full procedure see the *Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1973*, S.R.O. 1498(I)/73, 20 October 1973.

10. This latter provision gave rise to a great deal of confusion and spawned the conceptually messy phenomenon of former CSP officers seeking lateral appointment to a group (Secretariat) to which they already belonged. (See Chapter 6.)

11. See Kennedy, C.H., 'Policy Implementation: The Case of Structural Reforms in the Administrative System of Pakistan', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 3, Spring 1981, p. 88.

12. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, *Civil Servants (Changes in Nomenclature of Services and Abolition of Classes) Rules, 1973*, S.R.O. 1530 (I)/73, 3 November 1973.

13. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, S.R.O. 1307(I)/73, 14 September 1973.

14. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 1/2/74—ARC, 23 January 1974.

15. This latter provision was amended in 1976. During that year 100 per cent of all Grade 17 direct recruits were assigned to the interdepartmental cadre while 25 per cent of the P and T and Postal Accounts officers were assigned to the interdepartmental cadre. This amendment served to consolidate the Accounts Group. Since that time 'departments' serve only as divisions of training. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 1/2/74-ARC, 23 January 1974 as amended by Establishment Division, O.M. No. 2/1/75, 3 March 1976.

16. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 3/2/74-ARC, 8 April 1974.

17. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 10/2/75-ARC, 25 March 1976.

18. See Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1979.

19. The Commission was established in February 1978 and it issued its report in September 1979. However, the report was never made public. Information that follows was derived from interviews.

20. The groups were merged in accordance with Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, S.R.O. 1294(I)/81, 3 December 1981.

21. Probationer preference for joining the OMG has been very low. Accordingly, the great bulk of probationers entering the group have stood low in the results of the CSS Examination. Arguments cited are derived from interviews.

22. Computed from Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, *Services Reorganization Committee Report*, Vol. II, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1971, p. 422.

23. Calculated from Table 4.1. The rank of Joint Secretary prior to the reforms is roughly equivalent to that of Additional Secretary subsequent to the reforms.

24. Calculated from Tables 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. The number represents the percentage of CSP officers in the rank of Additional Secretary and above.

25. Calculated from Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. The number represents the percentage of CSP officers in the rank of Additional Secretary and above.

5

Recruitment to the Federal Bureaucracy

Since 1977 there have been four avenues of recruitment to the officer corps of the federal bureaucracy of Pakistan. First is 'direct recruitment.' Direct recruits enter the bureaucracy through a combined competitive examination (CSS Examination) which is administered by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC). Since 1973, successful direct recruit candidates (probationers) have also attended a programme of joint pre-service training. After completing such training probationers join an occupational group at entry level (Grade 17) positions. (See Chapter 4.) Around 125 direct recruits enter the bureaucracy annually.¹ The second avenue is 'military recruitment.' Subsequent to 1977, retired military officers were appointed to civilian bureaucratic posts on an *ad hoc* basis. In 1980, this practice was regularized so that 10 per cent of Grade 17 and Grade 18 vacancies could be filled by military officers on a permanent, regular basis and 10 per cent of all senior vacancies (Grades 19 and above) by military officers re-employed on contract. Military recruits are selected on the basis of recommendations by the 'High Powered Selection Committee' chaired by the President.² Approximately 30 military recruits enter the bureaucracy annually.³ A third avenue is 'initial recruitment.' Initial recruits enter the bureaucracy through answering advertisements against posted vacancies in relevant ministries and departments. The FPSC advertises such posts, defines requisite qualifications, and conducts interviews for prospective candidates. Initial recruits enter the bureaucracy at a rank commensurate with the responsibilities of the relevant

vacancy. Approximately 500 initial recruits enter the federal bureaucracy annually, 300 at officer level ranks.⁴ The final avenue is 'ad hoc recruitment.' Such recruits fill temporary vacancies and are appointed by the concerned department or ministry wherein the vacancy occurs. The FPSC is authorized to regularize such appointments.

This chapter discusses aspects of direct and military recruitment. First, it examines the selection process of direct recruits; second, describes the socio-economic characteristics of such direct recruits; and third, explores the dimensions of military recruitment.

SELECTION PROCESS OF DIRECT RECRUITS

The selection process of direct recruits to the federal bureaucracy of Pakistan is dominated by three long-standing principles. The first principle sanctions a *preference for generalists*. It is assumed that the ideal background for a candidate to service is a firm grounding in the liberal arts. Manifestations of this principle include the content and scope of the Central Superior Services (CSS) Examination, the requirement that candidates must possess the equivalent of a B.A. from a recognized university to compete in the CSS Examination, and the fact that the examination is conducted in English. Complementing this first principle is the assumption that service in government requires a certain degree of specialization or expertise. This latter assumption combined with the first gives rise to the second principle that of *reliance on pre-service training programmes*. The third principle of the selection process is *reliance on merit tempered by political considerations*. That is, since 1949 the open competition which characterizes the CSS Examination has been modified by considerations of regional quota. (See Chapter 8.)

British Antecedents

Each of these principles can be traced to the earliest days of the British *raj*. The principle of *preference for generalists*

was advanced at least as early as Thomas Babington Macaulay's oft-quoted defence of direct competition for entry to the Covenanted Civil Services:

It is said, I know that examination in Latin, in Greek, and in Mathematics are no tests of what men will prove to be in life. I am perfectly aware that they are not infallible tests; but that they are tests I confidently maintain. Look at any walk of life—this House—at the other House—at the Bar—at the Bench—at the Church—and see whether it not be true that those who attain high distinction in the world are generally men who are distinguished in their academic career.⁵

Macaulay's side won the day in the debate before the House of Commons, and one year later in 1854, he was made President of a Committee entrusted with the task of implementing the *Government of India Act of 1853*.⁶ Under the direction of Macaulay, the Committee recommended that the competitive examination should be designed to test the general education of candidates, where 'general education' was defined in terms of a traditional liberal arts programme at an Oxbridge-style university. Consequently, the syllabus of the proposed exam included General Science, Mathematics, European literature, and modern and classical languages,⁷ with the inevitable mid-nineteenth century reliance on Greek and Latin. Only two subjects tested in the competitive examinations had direct non-European origins—Sanskrit and Arabic. It was taken for granted that this examination was to be conducted only in English, and was to be administered exclusively in Britain. Finally, the Committee restricted entry to service to only those candidates who fell within the age range 18 to 23.⁸ This, of course, reinforced the already strong presumption that candidates to service would usually be drawn from the pool of new graduates of British universities.

Though there were modifications from time to time, the adoption of these recommendations established the basic structure of the competitive examination. Namely, the recommendations of the Macaulay Committee established that the competitive examination should be a test of general education, that the goal of the selection process was to recruit candidates who possessed academic promise, that the

examination should primarily test knowledge concerning topics of European culture, and that the examination should be conducted in English. None of these latter principles were ever seriously challenged prior to Partition, and indeed they remain largely valid today.

The second principle *reliance on pre-service training programmes to impart administrative expertise* has an even older history than the first. As early as 1800, Lord Wellesley while attempting to rationalize the administrative system of the East India Company, established the College of Fort William in Calcutta. The aim of this institution was to take the newly-appointed recruit to the Covenanted Service, who usually possessed no prior experience in the Subcontinent, and subject him to a comprehensive 3 year training programme in the Humanities (modern history and literature, classical history and literature, laws of nations, ethics and jurisprudence), general science, and in Indian subjects (Sanskrit, Arabic, Marathi, Urdu, Bengali, and Indian Laws and administrative practices).⁹ The experiment was short-lived largely because it ran into financial problems soon after it was established, and though the College existed in an attenuated form until the mid-nineteenth century, the grandiose scheme of training it originally undertook was abandoned in 1805.¹⁰

However, Wellesley's framework formed the basis of the East India College at Haileybury, which opened its doors in 1806. Indeed the syllabus of this latter institution seems to have been borrowed directly from Fort William. Like Fort William, the Haileybury curriculum included extensive training in the Humanities and in general science, and its 'Oriental' subjects were primarily designed to impart linguistic skills. Admission to both Fort William and to Haileybury was through nomination by the Directors of the East India Company.

After the principle of direct competition for posts in the Covenanted Service was introduced as a consequence of the *Government of India Act of 1853*, the basis of Haileybury was undermined, and the College was abolished in 1857. However, a modified pre-service programme was continued. Indeed Macaulay's Committee recommended a shorter course of academic instruction subsequent to the completion of

the competitive examination (patterned along the lines of Haileybury), followed by a further period of probation in India.¹¹ As was the case with the establishment of the principle of *preference for generalists* the recommendations of the Macaulay Committee proved resilient. Subsequent to the Macaulay Committee recommendations, candidates to service had to pass two hurdles. The first, was a competitive examination largely reflective of a liberal academic background; the second, a course of pre-service studies designed to train the probationer to assume his duties in the field. This two-step process of selection existed throughout the period of British rule, and a variation of this pattern still persists.

As discussed earlier, initial selection of candidates to service in the Covenanted Civil Service was originally based on nomination by the Directors of the East India Company and subsequent to 1853, on the basis of direct competitive examination. Obviously, one major rationale of this modification was to enhance the principle of selection by merit to the service ranks. But consequent with the establishment of this principle came disclaimers designed to enable it to fit the needs of governmental policy in the Subcontinent. As can be readily inferred from the brief description above of the competitive examination process, successful candidates from India were a rarity under the terms of open competition. Patently, a prospective Indian recruit had to face several disabilities in open competition with European candidates. First until 1922, the examination for entry into the Covenanted Civil Service and later the ICS was held exclusively in Britain. The opportunity costs of would-be Indian candidates were therefore much greater than for their British counterparts. Second, the competitive examination was designed to test the candidate's knowledge of British-Western cultural traditions. That is, the examination was designed by graduates of British universities for graduates of British universities. Indian candidates, for the most part, were excluded from this community. Third, the relatively low age limit for candidates (prior to Partition the maximum age for a candidate never exceeded 25) militated against late entry into the Covenanted Services. Of course, this factor further acted to limit the number of successful Indian recruits. Finally, exacer-

bating all of these disabilities, the examination was held in English.

It is no wonder then, given such disabilities and the attendant minimal representation of Indians in the Covenanted Civil Services, that demands were made to open the services to greater degrees of Indian penetration. Indeed as Chapter 2 demonstrated, the development of the cadre system of organization was as much the consequence of the quest for differential modes of recruitment to the respective services (and the consequent increase of Indian representation), as it was the result of the expansion of the functions of British rule. For instance, the establishment of the Statutory Civil Service was designed to increase the level of Indian representation to the Covenanted Civil Service,¹² reserving one-sixth of the appointments in the Statutory Service for the nomination of Indian nationals. Similarly, the Aitchison Commission's recommendations outlining the establishment of a three tiered system of services—Indian Civil Service, Provincial Services, and Subordinate Services—was designed to increase Indian representation by nominating candidates from the Provinces (i.e., Indian nationals), for positions in the latter two services.¹³ As the demands for increased Indian representation became more insistent, the Government simply raised the quota reserved for Indians in the respective services. In 1914, the Islington Commission sanctioned that 25 per cent of the ICS cadre should be filled by 'listed post holders,' which functionally amounted to the reservation of such posts for Indian nationals.¹⁴ In 1918, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms raised this figure to 33 per cent;¹⁵ and the Lee Commission set an ultimate goal of a 50-50 split between Indians and Europeans in the ICS.¹⁶ Paralleling these developments, similar recruitment patterns were established for each service, and by 1947 the 'European quota' (officers recruited on the basis of merit through the competitive examination), constituted less than 50 per cent of the total in all services save the 'Security Services'—the ICS, the Indian Police Service, and the Political Department.

Therefore by Partition, the third principle that *reliance on merit tempered by political considerations* had been established. By 1947, the bulk of recruits to the Superior Services

of India entered the service on the basis of an implicit quota.¹⁷

Selection Process 1985

Since the early eighties¹⁸ the selection of direct recruits to the federal bureaucracy has consisted of two sequential steps. The first consists of a combined competitive examination (CSS Examination) which in conjunction with regional quotas determines both initial selection into the public service and assignment to occupational groups. The second is joint pre-service training at the Civil Services Academy,¹⁹ a prerequisite for taking up assignment in one's occupational group.

CSS Examination. Candidates for the Central Superior Services Examination²⁰ must possess at least the equivalent of a Second Division Bachelor's degree from a recognized Pakistani or foreign university and be between the ages of 21 to 25.²¹ Fulfilling such prerequisites individuals may participate in the annual combined examination,²² which is administered by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC).²³ Typically, a candidate devotes several months subsequent to graduation in preparation for the CSS Examination. It is also not uncommon for individuals to appear more than once in the examination in order to improve their relative standing in the competition.

The CSS Examination consists of four parts: a written examination, interview, psychological testing, and a medical examination. The written examination carries a total of 1,100 marks divided between 'compulsory' and 'optional' subjects. Compulsory subjects which account for 500 marks include Islamiyat (100 marks), English essay (50 marks), English precis and composition (100 marks), and general knowledge (250 marks).²⁴ The compulsory section of the examination is designed to test facility in English as well as general knowledge of Pakistan's socio-political environment. Whether the examination provides an adequate measure of such dimensions is problematical. The written examination is particularly vulnerable to the charges that it overstresses the

importance of English,²⁵ that it requires the recall of irrelevant or unimportant facts, and that it relies too heavily on Western cultural traditions.²⁶

The optional section of the written examination is designed to test a candidate's knowledge of self-elected academic disciplines. Candidates choose a combination of optional subjects to total 600 marks (optional subjects carry varied weightings) from 50—odd offerings covering the range of university curricula.²⁷

Candidates are then subjected to an interview before members of the FPSC and other senior governmental officials. Here, the candidate's composure, temperament, linguistic competence, and so forth are tested. This exercise carries 300 marks. Psychological tests, including a General Aptitude Test, are also administered to candidates as well as a medical examination. Neither of the latter carry marks but adverse findings on either may veto an otherwise acceptable candidate.

Subsequent to the completion of the examination, scores are totalled and subject to the number of vacancies and regional quotas (see Chapter 8) candidates are declared successful or not successful. The former are assigned to an occupational group and undertake pre-service training at the Civil Services Academy.

Integrated Pre-Service Training. Integrated pre-service training for all successful candidates of the CSS Examination was mandated by the administrative reforms of 1973. Prior to the reforms, probationers were assigned directly to their assigned services where they often underwent separate pre-service training programmes.²⁸ The length and content of such training (as well as the name and venue of the institution) has undergone considerable variation in subsequent years, but the rationales of such a common training experience have remained constant: education and socialization.

First, the Civil Services Academy is an educational institution. The Academy's curricula consists of public administration, Pakistan Studies, development finance, social development, law, and international relations. Though there are shortcomings in such training,²⁹ the educational programme does serve to provide a common body of knowledge to probationers. Given the wide qualitative discrepancies be-

tween educational institutions in Pakistan and the diverse regional backgrounds of probationers such a common educational experience is useful.

The Academy has been far more successful, however, in regard to its second goal, that of socialization. Most importantly, the integrated system of training has served to equalize the training opportunities and experiences of probationers. Before the system of integrated training was adopted such experiences were anything but equal. At the apex of the training institutions was the legendary Civil Service Academy.³⁰ This 'school of arrogance'³¹ was designed to train, in the glorious tradition of the ICS Academy, the future rulers of Pakistan. In the baronial splendour of its campus, now the State Guest House, the fortunate probationer was trained both in academic subjects as well as the social graces. During the heyday of the CSA, probationers were required to be proficient in horseback riding, were given membership in the Lahore Gymkhana, and were required to attend periodic 'mess nights,' where formal attire was mandatory.³² Descending the pyramid of training institutions one found the Finance Services Academy and the Police Training Institute. These institutions were, for all intents and purposes, toned-down replicas of the CSA. Probationers to other less-favoured services either underwent no formal pre-service training, or undertook on-the-job training in the tacky atmosphere of administrative offices.

The rigid boundaries between service academies and the stable hierarchical relationships between such institutions were replicated in relationships between members of different services after they completed their pre-service training. Old school ties, especially when those ties represented the heady atmosphere of the CSA formed strong bonds between batch mates.

The adoption of integrated training was designed to short-circuit this process. Namely, to the extent that differences between the status and prestige of services was the consequence of the system of distinct pre-service training experiences, it follows that integrating the system of pre-service training would lead to more equitable relationships between services. There is evidence to suggest that the system of joint

training has made strides in this direction. First, integrated training has encouraged familiarity between contemporaries undergoing training together at the Academy. Probationers to the Academy spend several months together in a boarding-school setting. They eat together, attend class together, and live together in student hostels. When the probationers graduate from the Academy and are placed in different occupational groups, the legacy of this interaction persists. Unlike the system of separate service training, common training breaks down the isolating and self-perpetuating nexus of service affiliations. Indeed, there is increasing evidence that graduates of the Academy interact both professionally and socially with members of other occupational groups to a greater extent than was the case before integrated training.³³ Further, though familiarity may breed contempt as well as friendship, it certainly counteracts deference. Without such deference the subordinate/superordinate roles implicit in the hierarchical structure of the services are weakened.

Second, regardless of the content of the academic programme at the Academy, probationers are exposed to common experiences and to a common body of knowledge. These common experiences are the stuff of *esprit d'corps*, and serve as the basis of institutional loyalty. Such sentiments proliferated before the introduction of joint training. But where prior to the reform the domain of such sentiment was focused on the individual's service and members within that service, now the sentiment extends across occupational group boundaries. Graduates of the Academy speak of other graduates of the Academy as being 'in my batch' much as former CSP officers refer to their contemporaries.

Finally, there is no doubt that training at the Academy is much more egalitarian than during the days of the Civil Service Academy. Gone are the days of horseback riding and mess nights at the Gymkhana. The dominant ideology of the Academy has been designed to inculcate a sense of service, or of public duty, rather than to reinforce the already wide gap between the public servant and the masses which he serves. This ideological commitment may have originally been the consequence of the permeation of the training process with the ideology of the Pakistan People's Party, but it seems to have redoubled under Zia's administration.

CHARACTERISTICS OF DIRECT RECRUITS

So far the analysis has focused on the process of selection of direct recruits. We now look at the outcome of this process. Namely, what kind of candidates does the selection process favour? What are the background characteristics of probationers?

Table 5.1 presents indicators of the social class of direct recruits selected during 1979 and 1980. An examination of

TABLE 5.1
SOCIAL CLASS CHARACTERISTICS OF PROBATIONERS, 1979-80

	1979 n = 128	1980 n = 131
I. Father's Education		
Masters and above	10	16
Bachelors	28	34
Intermediate	17	9
Matric	30	26
Below Matric	20	21
No formal education	18	9
Missing data	5	16
II. Father's Occupation		
Government Service		
General service	29	24
Professional ^a	8	12
Retired	23	26
Private Professional	9	5
Agriculture	30	34
Business	21	22
Missing data	8	8
III. Family's Annual Income		
Below Rs. 5,000	9	11
5,000 to 10,000	15	19
10,000 to 15,000	28	20
15,000 to 20,000	12	13
20,000 to 25,000	15	19
25,000 to 50,000	19	19
More than Rs. 50,000	13	9
Missing data	17	21

Source: For 1979: Adapted from tables found in Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1981*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1982. For 1980: *Annual Report 1982*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1983.

^aIndividuals employed by the government in the fields of engineering, law, journalism, medicine, and education.

it reveals that in the context of Pakistan society, direct recruits hail from the upper-middle class. In regard to father's education over 40 per cent of the probationer's fathers possess at least a Bachelor's degree. The comparable figure for Pakistan as a whole is less than 2 per cent. Similarly, around 90 per cent of Pakistan's population has no formal education, while less than 10 per cent of the probationer's fathers have no formal education. The occupations of direct recruits' fathers is equally atypical of the society. Only 25 per cent of the probationer's fathers are engaged in agriculture, while over half of Pakistan's labour force is engaged in agriculture. Indeed, a majority of probationer's fathers are engaged in modern urban careers, and a plurality of these are government servants. Also, probationers are drawn predominantly from families with incomes far in excess of the national median.

The educational backgrounds of probationers are presented in Table 5.2 First, approximately 70 per cent possess an advanced academic degree. Second, the academic speciality of probationers is skewed towards the behavioural sciences and the Arts. The three most prevalent disciplines are Political Science, English, and Economics. Comparatively few probationers possess an academic speciality in the natural sciences. This supports the contention that the selection process tends to favour candidates with 'generalist' backgrounds. Finally, a preponderate majority of the probationers (80 per cent) received their degrees from only two universities—the Punjab University and Peshawar University, with a majority of probationers in each batch attending the former.

The profile of direct recruits which we have described is nearly indistinguishable from the profile of a direct recruit selected two decades earlier. The characteristics of the typical probationer of 1980 are very similar to the characteristics of the 1960 probationer. Both archetypical probationers came from upper-middle class backgrounds and both typically possessed a Master's degree in English, Political Science or Economics.³⁴

Despite such similarities, however, there is a persistent and widespread belief among bureaucrats that the quality of direct recruits has been in steady decline during the last decade or longer. Though part of this belief is attributable to

TABLE 5.2
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF PROBATIONERS, 1979-82

	1979 n=128	1980 n=131	1981 n=157	1982 n=89
I. Last Degree Earned				
Masters	83	77	90	42
Bachelors	28	32	53	34
Law	12	15	9	9
Education	4	2	1	0
Engineering	1	5	4	1
Missing data	0	0	0	3
II. Academic Major				
Arts	39 (31) ^a	42 (33)	42 (27)	18 (21)
English	29	28	29	8
English Literature	0	5	0	4
History	8	8	10	5
Other	2	1	3	1
Social Sciences	67 (54)	59 (46)	90 (57)	54 (64)
Political Science	34	14	35	15
Economics	19	36	35	25
Public Administration	2	1	1	1
Business	3	4	6	6
Other	9	4	13	7
Sciences	19 (15)	26 (20)	25 (16)	13 (15)
Physics	7	4	4	0
Chemistry	4	3	5	3
Math	0	3	6	3
Life sciences	5	9	4	3
Engineering	2	5	4	2
Other	1	2	2	2
Missing data	3	4	0	4
III. University				
Punjab University,				
Lahore	75	74	81	52
Peshawar	26	26	28	8
Quaid-i-Azam, Islamabad	6	1	8	8
Sind, Jamshoro	4	7	14	6
Karachi	5	9	10	5
Bahauddin Zakaria	3	3	4	2
Gomal, Dera Ismail Khan	4	1	2	2
Baluchistan, Quetta	2	0	2	0
Agriculture University,				
Faisalabad	1	0	0	1
Engineering and				
Technology, Lahore	0	0	1	0
Pakistan Military				
Academy, Kakul	0	0	1	1
Foreign universities	2	4	3	1
Missing data	0	6	3	3

Source: For 1979: Adapted from tables found in Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1981*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1982. For 1980/81: *Annual Report 1982*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1983. For 1982: *Annual Report 1983*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984.

^aFigures in parentheses refer to percentages of total deleting missing data.

nostalgia,³⁵ more concrete evidence can be cited in regard to declining standards of education and educational institutions, increased regional disparities in performance on the examinations, and in regard to the increased attractiveness of alternative labour markets—particularly in the professions, business, and abroad. Of course, to the extent that such trends continue they will weaken the base of recruitment to the federal bureaucracy.

MILITARY RECRUITMENT

Both the Ayub and Bhutto administrations inducted retired and released military personnel into Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy. In 1962, President Ayub introduced a 50 per cent reservation for ex-servicemen in Class IV posts,³⁶ and he mandated that retired military officers should be given preference³⁷ in filling ex-cadre vacancies. He also appointed (1961-2) 8 army Captains to the CSP.³⁸ Prime Minister Bhutto extended military recruitment by making military officers eligible to participate in the lateral recruitment programme. Accordingly, Bhutto appointed 83 military officers into Pakistan's senior bureaucracy—38 to the TAG, 25 to the FAG, 14 to the Secretariat Group, and 3 to the DMG.

Military recruitment to the civilian bureaucracy has been extended much further during Zia's administration. At first (1977-80), President Zia followed the precedents of his predecessors by re-employing senior retired military officers on a contract basis in civilian posts. The number of such military recruits was small, and such re-employed officers never became regular members of the public service nor did they enter occupational groups. Since 1980, however, President Zia has broken from such precedents by introducing rules which formalize such recruitment and establish military quotas for recruitment to the civilian bureaucracy. Under this programme up to 10 per cent of vacancies in the federal bureaucracy in Grades 17 and 18 are reserved for retired or released military officers. Importantly, such military appointees become regular and permanent members of the civilian

bureaucracy and they become members of occupational groups.³⁹ Similarly, up to 10 per cent of senior vacancies (Grades 19 and above) in the Secretariat Group, FAG, Accounts Group, and Information Group have been reserved for former military officers re-employed on three to five year contracts. Though such re-employed military officers have no security of tenure, they become full-fledged members of the occupational groups to which they are assigned.⁴⁰ The selection of military recruits and their assignment to occupational groups is governed by the 'High Powered Selection Committee.' The latter institution is chaired by President Zia.

Translated into numbers this means that military officers are entitled to permanent appointment in approximately 13 posts at Grade 17 and 15 posts at Grade 18 annually. Also, approximately 10 military officers are eligible annually for appointment to senior level positions.⁴¹ In practice the government has departed from this quota. In August 1985, 98 former military officers were in permanent government service in Grades 17 and 18, while 111 held senior appointments on contract.⁴² That is, since 1977, an average of 12 former military officers have entered permanent government service (Grades 17 and 18); and 14 have been re-employed on contract (Grades 19 and above) annually.⁴³

Therefore, President Zia's military recruitment programme has departed from the policies of his predecessors in four significant respects. First, it has inducted comparatively more military officers into civilian government service. Second, it has placed such officers in comparatively higher ranks. Third, Zia's military recruitment programme has become an institutionalized and regular part of the selection process to the federal bureaucracy. Unlike previous military recruitment policies, Zia's programme entitles military officers a specified number of posts in the civilian bureaucracy annually. Finally, military officers inducted under Zia's programme are integrated much more closely with the civilian bureaucracy than their counterparts under previous military recruitment programmes. Some of the military recruits become regular and permanent members of the bureaucracy; all become members of occupational groups.

Not surprisingly, Zia's military recruitment programme has encountered considerable resistance from within the civilian bureaucracy. Patently, the extension of military recruitment has increased the capabilities of the government to exert political influence on the bureaucracy. Through the operation of the High Powered Selection Board, President Zia and his advisors annually select around 30 military officers to assume civilian bureaucratic postings.

Partisan considerations undoubtedly play a role in such appointments. Arguably from the perspective of administrative efficiency such increased political control may enhance the coherence of governmental policy. However, from the perspective of civilian bureaucrats the military recruitment programme constitutes a challenge to their corporate autonomy. Indeed, many of the liabilities associated with Bhutto's ill-fated lateral recruitment programme (see Chapter 6) are applicable to Zia's military recruitment programme. Most importantly, military recruits are perceived as constituting a threat to the career patterns of established bureaucrats. Often military recruits are assigned to much coveted administrative postings; their induction also often blocks or retards the promotional prospects of their civilian counterparts. The cost to morale is correspondingly high. Further, military recruits are sometimes perceived as unqualified or ill-qualified to assume their administrative assignments. Military recruits have not undergone the process of civilian bureaucratic socialization nor are they likely to have extensive administrative experience.

On balance, however, military recruits have met far less civilian bureaucratic resistance to their incorporation than did lateral recruits. Unlike the lateral recruits, military recruits have a reputation for probity, loyalty, and hard-work. Military recruits also share many of the characteristics of Pakistan's civilian bureaucracy. They have similar social class backgrounds, have undergone analogous training programmes, and they predominantly share the Westernized ethos of their civilian counterparts. Finally, unlike lateral recruits military recruits have benefited from institutional affiliations. The military recruitment programme has the unquestioned support of the military and, of course, military recruits remain former military officers. Therefore, military recruits

belong to the functional equivalent of a service cadre—a cadre of retired military officers. Such affiliation has afforded military recruits with far more institutional authority than the lateral recruits.

CONCLUSIONS

The fundamentals of direct recruitment to Pakistan's bureaucracy have remained substantially unchanged since the mid-nineteenth century. The CSS Examination is a lineal descendant of the competitive examination for the Covenanted Civil Services and the ICS Examination. Like its predecessors the CSS Examination is a test of general knowledge, success depends heavily on facility in English, and it is designed to be administered to recent university graduates. Similarly, the thrust of the pre-service training programme at the Civil Service Academy closely follows the traditions of Haileybury. Probationers to the Academy are assumed to be a bit wet behind the ears, or at least highly impressionable. Given this context, the main goal of the Academy is to socialize probationers into the texture of the grand tradition of the bureaucracy of Pakistan, rather than to impart specific skills to prospective administrators. Also, like British antecedents the selection process predominantly favours the candidate with a liberal education, the 'generalist.'

Obviously, Zia's military recruitment programme departs significantly from this traditional pattern of selection. Military recruits are not 'competitionists,' they enter the bureaucracy in mid-career, and many do not fit the generalist pattern of direct recruits. Since 1980, the pace of such recruitment has increased dramatically. Like the lateral recruitment programme, which is analysed in Chapter 6, the military recruitment programme has been met with resistance, and has served to challenge the integrity and morale of Pakistan's public service.

NOTES

1. This figure represents direct recruits since and inclusive of the 1979 batch. During the period of Bhutto's government the induction of direct recruits averaged

around 200 per year. See Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Reports 1971-83*, MPCPP, Islamabad, various dates.

2. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 14/5/78—D. III, 11 February 1980.

3. This figure is an educated guess. No complete official figures were available.

4. This figure represents initial recruitment since and inclusive of the 1978 batch. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1983*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984, p. 20.

5. Great Britain, Parliament, *Hansard's Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. CXXVII, 24 June 1853, Cols. 750-3.

6. The report of this Commission is published as: Great Britain, Parliament, *Parliamentary Papers*, Vol. LV, 1876, 'Report on the Indian Civil Service, 1854.' (Hereinafter referred to as the *Macaulay Commission Report, 1854*.)

7. *Macaulay Commission Report, 1854*, p. 25.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-9.

9. Ahmed, Ali, *Role of Higher Civil Servants in Pakistan*, National Institute of Public Administration, Dacca, 1968, pp. 21-2.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

11. *Macaulay Commission Report, 1854*, pp. 27-9.

12. Great Britain, *Government of India Act, 1870*, 33 and 34 Vict., C3, paragraph 6.

13. Great Britain, Parliament, *Sessional Papers*, Vol. XLVIII, 1888, C. 5327, 'Report of the Public Service Commission 1886-7.' C.U. Aitcheson, Chairman, paragraph 75. (Hereinafter referred to as *Aitcheson Commission Report, 1888*.)

14. Great Britain, Parliament, *Report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India*, Cd. 8382, Vol. I, *Report of the Commissioners*, Islington, Chairman, HM Stationary Office, London, 1917, paragraph 36. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Islington Commission Report, 1917*.)

15. Great Britain, Parliament, *Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms*, Cd. 9109, Montagu-Chelmsford, Chairman, HM Stationary Office, London, 1918, paragraph 317. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, 1918*.)

16. Great Britain, Parliament, *British Sessional Papers*, Vol. 8, 27 March 1924, Cmd. 2128, 'Report of the Royal Commission on the Superior Services in India,' Lee, Chairman, paragraph 25. (Hereinafter referred to as the *Lee Commission Report, 1924*.)

17. It is important to note that the argument employed by the British to support the induction of Indians by nomination instead of by direct competition is virtually identical to the post-partition rationale for maintaining the regional quota in Pakistan. That is, as the Islington Commission argued, since access to educational opportunities differed between communities within India, recruitment by direct competition would result in inequitable representation in the service between regions. *Islington Commission Report, 1917*, paragraphs 43-6.

18. President Zia's administration modified the selection process inherited from Prime Minister Bhutto by making assignment to occupational groups before entry into the government pre-service training programme. Under Bhutto's schema assignment to groups was determined by performance on the CSS Examination, regional quotas, and the results of the Final Passing Out Examination at the Academy for Administrative Training. For a full description of the earlier system see Kennedy, C.H., *Context, Content and Implementation of Bhutto's Administrative Reforms in Pakistan, 1973-1978*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Duke University, Durham, N.C., 1979, pp. 175-8; 223-32.

19. Formerly named the Academy for Administrative Training.

20. Subsequent to the reforms of 1973, the term 'Central Superior Services' is a misnomer. First, the reforms abolished all services. Second, the former 'Central Superior Services' were divided into the All-Pakistan Unified Grades and the Federal Unified Grades. However, the term 'CSS Examination' is still employed.

21. These requirements were relaxed for the Special Competitive Examination of 1982 to accommodate candidates with Third Division degrees and the age limit was raised to 30. The Examination was designed to recruit candidates from disadvantaged regions. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1982*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1983, p. 19.

22. The CSS Examination was 'combined' for recruitment to all services from 1949 to 1956. In 1957, a short-lived experiment, ostensibly designed to give candidates an opportunity to express an early choice of cadre preference, was attempted in which three separate examinations were held—one for the CSP, one for the PSP, and one for the rest of the Central Superior Services. See Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1958*, MGP, Karachi, 1959. In 1961, this experiment was abandoned and the CSS Examination was made a combined vehicle for recruitment to all services. See Government of Pakistan, Central Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1962*, MGP, Karachi, 1963, p. 9.

23. The name of this Commission has changed several times since Partition, but the functions of the institution have remained virtually unchanged. From its formation in 1948 to 1955 the Commission was named the Pakistan Public Service Commission. Under the 1956 Constitution its name was changed to the Federal Public Service Commission. The 1962 Constitution renamed the institution Central Public Service Commission. Finally, post-1972, the Commission has been once again named the Federal Public Service Commission.

24. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1983*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984, p. 154. President Zia's administration added 'Islamiyat' to the list of compulsory subjects in 1979.

25. For instance Agha Iftikhar Husain, 'The Role of the Public Service Commission Under the New Administrative System', in *Conference on Administrative Reforms Held at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College*, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, 1977.

26. Kennedy, C.H., 'Technocrats and the Generalist Mystique: Physicians, Engineers and the Administrative System of Pakistan', *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. XVII, April 1982, pp. 102, 118.

27. In the 1982 examination candidates offered 41 optional subjects. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1983*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984, pp. 154-6.

28. The more notable training institutions of this latter type were the Civil Service Academy (for the CSP and PFS), the Police Training Institute (for the PSP), and the Finance Services Academy (for the PAAS, PMAS, PRAS, and PCES). In 1973, the Civil Service Academy and the Finance Services Academy were merged to form the Academy for Administrative Training. This Academy was renamed the Civil Services Academy in 1981.

29. Kennedy, op. cit., 1979, pp. 223-7.

30. Not to be confused with the Civil Services Academy.

31. Term borrowed from Hassan Habib, former Principal of the Pakistan Administrative Staff College.

32. There are a number of excellent accounts of the style of training at the Civil Service Academy. Among the best are Braibanti, op.cit., 1969; and Nazim (Hassan Habib), *Babus, Brahmins, and Bureaucrats: A Critique of the Administrative System of Pakistan*, Peoples Publishing House, Lahore, 1974.

33. Interviews with probationers and staff, Academy for Administrative Training, 1975-6; Civil Services Academy, 1982, 1985.

34. Compare for example, Kennedy, op. cit., 1979, pp. 180-6 and Ahmed, op. cit., 1968, pp. 330-2.

35. No formal study has been undertaken to comparatively assess the performance of candidates from batch to batch. The annual assessments of the performance of candidates by examiners of the public service commissions provide little help. Indeed, there seems to be little difference between the negative comments made by the first Commission pertaining to the quality of recruits. See Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Public Service Commission, *Pamphlet of the Central Superior Services Examination 1950*, Karachi, 1950, pp. 2-5; and similar comments made by members of the Federal Public Service Commission in interviews with the author 35 years later.

36. This practice has persisted ever since. In 1985, 50 per cent of all Grades 1 to 3 vacancies and 50 per cent of staff driver vacancies (Grade 4) were reserved for retired military personnel. See Government of Pakistan, Establishment Divi-

sion, O.M. No. 1/8/58-D.V., 19 October 1962; O.M. No. 17/1/68-D. III, 9 May 1974; and O.M. No. 14/1/73-D. III, 29 May 1978.

37. Military officers were to be given up to 10 years relaxation in age limits for recruitment and were to be 'preferred to candidates from the open market, provided they possess the requisite educational and other qualifications.' Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 10/5/60-D.V., 6 November 1962.

38. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, *Civil List of Class I Officers Serving Under Government of Pakistan January 1965*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1967, pp. 347-9.

39. Entry to Grade 17 is limited to officers with less than 8 years of military service, such officers are typically Captains when they enter civilian service. To enter Grade 18 the officer must have attained the rank of Major. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 14/5/79-D. III, 10 February 1980. With the exception of the Economist and Planners Group, Commerce Group, and Office Management Group, military officers (Grades 17 and 18) may enter any occupational group. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. 1/22/80-Ind. Cell, 29 November 1980.

40. Entry to senior level positions is limited to military officers who carry a rank of Major or higher. Such re-employment on contract is restricted to the Secretariat, Information, Foreign Affairs, and Accounts Groups. Government of Pakistan, O.M. No. 1/22/80-Ind. Cell, 29 November 1980.

41. Calculated by the author from military recruitment rules and from relevant numbers of vacancies and posts in 1983.

42. Statement of Finance Minister, Mahbubul Haq, reported in *Dawn*, 13 August 1985.

43. Due to retirements of military recruits re-employed on contract who have subsequently retired, these figures are low estimates. The best estimate of average annual military recruitment to the civilian bureaucracy is therefore around 30 officers. Table 4.8 gives the rank of military officers inducted into the Secretariat Group as of 1982. Reportedly, 22 retired military officers held the rank of Ambassador (Grade 21 or above) in the Foreign Affairs Group in 1985.

6

The Lateral Recruitment Programme

Unlike other programmes of the reform movement of 1973, the 'lateral recruitment programme'¹ had little, if any, prior intellectual or institutional support from the relevant bureaucratic actors. None of the numerous indigenously-constituted administrative commissions formed subsequent to Partition advocated lateral recruitment between cadres,² nor did any of the service associations press for the adoption of such a policy.³ Undoubtedly, both a cause and consequence of this relative lack of support for the policy was the fact that the selection process to the federal bureaucracy afforded little precedent for the use of lateral recruitment or horizontal movement. Rather, prior to the reforms entry to the Central Superior Services was effected through direct entry competitive examination or through means of promotion.⁴ (See Chapter 5.) It is true, however, that nearly 100 officers were inducted into the General Administrative Reserve (GAR) during the years 1948-52. But such recruitment was perceived to be temporary or '*ad hoc*', and the GAR never became a regularly constituted service, nor were its members ever amalgamated into the Central Superior Services.⁵ Similarly, the short-lived induction of military officers into the CSP during the early sixties, generically a form of lateral recruitment, was soon abandoned when the 'temporary' need for such officers ended.⁶

The introduction of the lateral recruitment programme then, was accomplished without the benefit of wide-scale bureaucratic support for its implementation, and without the benefit of relevant precedents. In retrospect given these

disabilities, what is most remarkable about the lateral recruitment programme was not that it was repudiated barely 5 years after its introduction, but rather that it lasted as long as it did. This chapter chronicles the history of this short-lived programme.

THE OPERATION OF THE PROGRAMME, 1972-5

Fully 9 months before Prime Minister Bhutto's address to the nation outlining the scope of the planned administrative reform, on 20 November 1972,⁷ the government called for applications for appointment to the Pakistan Foreign Service and to Central Secretariat posts. Selection to these posts was designed to bypass the orthodox selection process. Namely, for posts at the Additional Secretary level in the Central Secretariat, applicants were screened by the Cabinet Secretary and a Special Selection Board. The latter body was composed of several Cabinet Ministers, and was responsible directly to the Prime Minister. Applicants for posts at the Joint Secretary and Deputy Secretary level in the Cabinet Secretariat were required first to take a written examination,⁸ administered by the Establishment Division. Candidates who passed this hurdle, if already employed in government service, were subject to an investigation of their service record (Annual Confidential Reports, dossiers, etc.) before final selection. If the candidate was not a government servant, he was subject to an interview before another Special Selection Board, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary.⁹

Similarly, selection to posts in the Pakistan Foreign Service was based on a combination of written tests and interviews. However, in the case of such candidates, the interview process served to 'screen' the applicants, and after passing this hurdle they were eligible to take the written examination.¹⁰ Relevant authorities governing the appointment of such officers were the Foreign Minister and still another Special Selection Board. This latter Board was composed of senior members of the PFS and the Cabinet Secretary.¹¹

Depending on the background of the successful candidates, such recruits either were directly eligible for assignment to

their new posts, or were required to attend a course of study at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College.¹² The latter institution accordingly conducted six 'Foreign Officer Training Courses,' and three 'Special DS/JS Short Courses,' during the years 1974-7.¹³ The course of instruction at the Staff College drew heavily on the fundamentals of administration, aspects of the administrative reform, the budgetary system of Pakistan, and the ideology and history of Pakistan. The course of instruction for the FAG officers was supplemented with outside lectures on international relations and diplomacy. Subsequent to this training the candidates were given an examination conducted by the staff of the PASC. The results of this examination were conveyed to the Establishment Division.

As is apparent from this description, the selection process for 'lateral recruits,' as these officers came to be known in the summer of 1973, completely bypassed the relevant authorities normally entrusted with the responsibility of selecting candidates to the federal bureaucracy. Neither the content of the examinations given to candidates, nor the evaluation of such examinations was entrusted to the Federal Public Service Commission.¹⁴ Indeed, functional authority for all steps in the selection process resided with the Cabinet Secretary and with the Special Selection Boards.

Under the terms of this selection process, the government selected three 'batches' of lateral recruits. The first batch, whose appointments were announced on 17 August 1973, included 122 officers appointed to the Pakistan Foreign Service (now Foreign Affairs Group) and 98 officers to the Secretariat Group. On 26 June 1974, an additional 141 officers were inducted into the Secretariat Group, and on 25 September 1975, a final batch of 85 officers were appointed to the Secretariat Group.¹⁵ In addition the government, ignoring the terms of its own special selection process for lateral recruits, appointed 24 additional officers to the FAG during the years 1974 and 1975; 38 military officers to the Tribal Areas Group in 1975; and 6 officers to the District Management Group in 1975. Therefore, during the 3 year period in which the lateral recruitment programme was in active operation, the government appointed a grand total of 514 officers.¹⁶

TABLE 6.1
RANK OF APPOINTMENT AND GROUP OF ASSIGNMENT,
LATERAL RECRUITS TO THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY OF
PAKISTAN, 1973-5

Rank	Secretariat Group				TAG	DMG
	1973	1974	1975	Total		
Additional Secretary	23	—	—	23		
Joint Secretary	33	38	29	100		
Deputy Secretary	42	103	56	201		
Section Officer	—	—	—	—		6
Total	98	141	85	324	38 ^a	6

Rank	Foreign Affairs Group ^b				TAG	DMG
	1973	1974	1975	Total		
Minister	11	—	1	12		
Counsellor	17	1	—	18		
First Secretary	27	3	—	30		
Second Secretary	30	1	2	33		
Third Secretary	37	4	12	53		
Total	122	9	15	146		

Source: Information for this table and for all other empirical statements concerning the composition and backgrounds of the lateral recruits made in this section were compiled from several sources both published and unpublished. Namely, the 'Press Notes' issued by the Establishment Division; numerous interviews with officers of the Establishment Division, the Academy for Administrative Training, the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, the Federal Public Service Commission, the Punjab Services and General Administration Department, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The author also interviewed several of the lateral recruits while they underwent training at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College. Also, Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List (Provisional) All-Pakistan Unified Grades . . .*, unpublished, Rawalpindi, 1973; Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Pakistan Foreign Service Gradation List*, unpublished, Islamabad, 1973; Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Civil List of Officers of Grade 17 and Above . . . 1st July 1971*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975; Government of West Pakistan, Services and General Administration Department, *The West Pakistan Civil List July 1968*, 2 Volumes, MPCPP, Karachi, 1972; Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 'Biodata of Participants, DS/JS Courses I-II' and 'Biodata of Participants, FOTC Courses I-IV', unpublished, Lahore, 1973-6.

^aLateral entrants to the TAG were not assigned a rank within the bureaucracy at the time of original recruitment. Rather, such officers maintained their previous military rank.

^bThe Foreign Affairs Group rank hierarchy corresponds directly to the rank hierarchy of the Secretariat Group. Minister = Additional Secretary (Grade 21); Counsellor = Joint Secretary (Grade 20); First Secretary = Deputy Secretary (Grade 19); Second Secretary = Section Officer (Grade 18); and Third Secretary = Officer (Grade 17).

Two facts are apparent from a consideration of Table 6.1. First, the Secretariat Group was the most affected by the operation of the lateral recruitment programme. More lateral recruits were assigned to the group and those inducted into the Secretariat Group carried higher ranks than those assigned to other groups. Second, a preponderate number of lateral recruits, regardless of group assignment, were posted at the Joint or Deputy Secretary level (348 of 514). Therefore, the lateral recruitment programme mainly served to staff lower level policy-making posts.

The remainder of this section discusses the efficacy of the lateral recruitment programme by examining three related issues: (1) the background characteristics of the recruits; (2) the suitability of the recruits to undertake the posts to which they were assigned; and (3) the relationship between the lateral recruits and 'regular' members of the public service.

Background Characteristics of Lateral Recruits

A straightforward means to approach this issue is to construct tables describing the aggregate occupational characteristics of the lateral recruits. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 are the results of this exercise. The most important finding disclosed by these tables is that a majority of the individuals selected by the programme were already government servants. Table 6.2 shows that 61.4 per cent of the lateral recruits were formerly employed by the government. The next largest source of recruits was the military (16.3 per cent), followed by the educational sector (12.4 per cent), private professionals (6.3 per cent), and private business (3.5 per cent). This predominance of former government employees is reflected in the occupational specialities of the lateral recruits. Table 6.3 demonstrates that the two most prevalent occupational categories of lateral recruits were finance and public administration. Both specialisms, of course, are closely related to employment in the public sector.

The tendency to select individuals from within government was more pronounced in regard to the selection of recruits to the Secretariat Group than to the Foreign Affairs Group.

Though, even in the latter case, a plurality of lateral recruits were selected from the civilian bureaucracy. Also, while the Secretariat Group depended most heavily on recruitment from occupational specialities such as finance, public administration, and technical fields; the FAG relied more on recruitment from the educational sector and from the legal profession.

TABLE 6.2
FORMER OCCUPATIONAL SECTOR AND RANK OF LATERAL
RECRUITS TO THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY OF PAKISTAN

Occupation	Group of Assignment				Total
	Secretariat Group	FAG	TAG	DMG	
Public Servant ^a	259(80.0) ^b	56(40.0)	—	3(50.0)	312(61.4)
Additional					
Secretary	2	—	—	—	2
Joint Secretary	30	1	—	—	31
Deputy					
Secretary	70	16	—	2	88
Section Officer	150	20	—	1	165
Officer	7	17	—	—	24
Superintendent	—	2	—	—	2
Education	31(9.6)	34(24.3)	—	—	63(12.4)
Professor	25	7	—	—	31
Lecturer	6	11	—	—	16
Student	—	16	—	—	16
Military	14(4.3)	25(17.9)	38(100)	3(50)	83(16.3)
Brigadier	5	3	—	—	9
Colonel/Lieutenant Colonel	5	8	7	2	23
Major	4	6	16	1	28
Captain	—	5	14	—	19
Lieutenant	—	3	1	—	4
Private Professional	17(5.2)	14(10)	—	—	32 (6.3)
Business	3	11(7.9)	—	—	18 (3.5)
Unknown	—	6	—	—	6
Total	324	146	38	6	514

Source: Same as Table 6.1.

^aIncludes employees of federal and provincial governments as well as employees of governmental corporations. The ranks of public servants conform to the Federal Grade/Pay Structure, Grades 17-21.

^bFigures in parentheses are adjusted frequencies of total deleting missing data.

Perhaps even more anomalous than the fact that a majority of individuals selected under the terms of the lateral recruitment programme were already public servants, was the fact that 100 (19 per cent of the lateral recruits selected), had originally entered service through direct, competitive examination. That is, they were already members of the Central Superior Services. The cadre strength of such recruits is presented in Table 6.4.

The inescapable conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that the lateral recruitment programme as implemented and interpreted by the Government of Pakistan was not limited to what is traditionally referred to as 'lateral recruitment.'

TABLE 6.3
FORMER OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY OF LATERAL
RECRUITS TO THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY OF PAKISTAN

Occupation ^a	Group of Assignment				Total
	Secretariat Group	FAG	TAG	DMG	
Public					
Administration	69(22.8) ^b	18(12.9)	—	2(33.3)	89(18.3)
District					
Administration	17 (5.6)	10 (7.1)	—	1(16.7)	28 (5.7)
Finance	90(29.7)	8 (5.7)	—	—	98(20.1)
Law	21 (6.9)	24(17.1)	—	—	45 (9.2)
Business					
Administration	7 (2.3)	10 (7.1)	—	—	17 (3.5)
Military	17 (5.6)	25(17.9)	38(100)	3(50)	83(17.0)
Education	33(10.9)	28(20.0)	—	—	61(12.5)
Arts	19	17	—	—	36
Social Sciences	8	7	—	—	15
Natural Sciences	6	4	—	—	10
Journalism	2 (.7)	9 (6.4)	—	—	11 (2.3)
Agriculture	3(1)	2 (1.4)	—	—	5 (1.0)
Medicine	1 (.3)	—	—	—	1 (.2)
Technical/Scientific	43(14.2)	6 (4.3)	—	—	49(10.1)
Missing	21	6	—	—	27
Total	324	146	38	6	514

Source: Same as Table 6.1.

^aThe categories of occupation were defined by the author after exploring available information for each recruit. Since recruits often had diverse backgrounds, we chose to present the 'dominant background,' of the candidates.

^bFigures in parentheses are adjusted frequencies of total, deleting missing data.

Rather, the programme combined characteristics of lateral recruitment (entry from outside the civilian bureaucracy), vertical movement (promotion within established bureaucratic cadres and sub-cadres), and horizontal movement (the transfer of officers from one occupational cadre or sub-cadre to another, i.e., to the APUG or the FAG).¹⁷ Indeed, an analysis of the recruits who were inducted under the terms of the lateral recruitment programme from within the government, demonstrates that the bulk of such officers entered their new posts as a consequence of the confluence of both vertical and horizontal movement. For instance, among the 253 former public servants inducted into the Secretariat Group, 225 were both transferred from another occupational cadre (horizontal movement), and were promoted to a higher grade (vertical movement) in the service.¹⁸ Similarly of the 56 public servants inducted into the FAG, 31 were both transferred and promoted.¹⁹

TABLE 6.4
LATERAL RECRUITS TO THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY OF
PAKISTAN WHO HAD ORIGINALLY ENTERED GOVERNMENT
SERVICE THROUGH THE CSS EXAMINATION,
BY CADRE AFFILIATION

Cadre	Group of Assignment		
	Secretariat	FAG	Total
CSP	14	4	18
PSP	1	—	1
PAAS	10	1	11
PMAS	6	—	6
PRAS	1	1	2
PTS	10	2	12
CSS	32	7	39
TSP	3	1	4
CIS	1	1	2
PPS	4	—	4
PMLCS	—	1	1
Total	82	18	100

Source: Same as Table 6.1.

Suitability of Lateral Recruits

Much has been written since 1977 concerning the unsuitability of candidates selected, and of political interference in the operation of the lateral recruitment programme. Charges have been levelled that the programme served as a mechanism to distribute patronage to those personally loyal to Bhutto or to the PPP, and conversely served to punish political opponents. Also, it has been alleged that the lateral recruits were incompetent to hold the posts to which they were assigned.²⁰ However plausible such charges may be, little reliable empirical support for such assertions is provided in the sources alleging such improprieties.²¹ This is not to say that political exigencies did not influence the structure and ultimate implementation of the programme. Patently, however, political concerns were not the sole criterion for selection to the lateral recruitment programme, as the revisionist history found in the *White Papers* would lead one to believe.

Though this analysis cannot claim to be authoritative concerning the extent of political influence in the operation of the lateral recruitment programme, it can explore a closely related issue. Namely, were lateral recruits qualified to hold the posts they were eventually assigned? Table 6.5 juxtaposes the 'occupational specialities' of the lateral recruits with the 'category of their first assigned post'. An examination of this table reveals that there is a loose correlation, albeit with some slippage, between the specialities of the recruits and their assigned posts. For instance, those with a speciality of 'public administration' were assigned for the most part (31 of 41) to the provincial and federal secretariats in posts requiring skills of 'general administration'. Similarly, 46 of 69 financial specialists were assigned to finance and accounts posts, 16 of 21 educators to posts in education and 21 of 27 with technical backgrounds to technical posts. Of course, there is considerable variation within these categories. An individual who taught Persian at a university, and hence an 'educator' by this classificatory scheme, would be considered to have remained in his speciality if he became a Deputy Secretary in the Education Division. Also, many recruits were assigned to posts with little, if any, seeming relationship to their former

TABLE 6.5
LATERAL RECRUITS TO THE SECRETARIAT GROUP, OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY
COMPARED TO POSTED JOB SPECIALITY AS OF 1975^a

Occupational Speciality ^b	Category of Assigned Post ^c						Row Total
	General Admini- stration	Govern- ment Corpo- ration	Finance/ Accounts	District Admini- stration	Education	Technical/ Science	
Public Administration	31	2	7	1	0	0	41
Law	10	0	3	1	0	2	16
Finance	12	9	46	0	0	2	69
Business Administration	0	4	2	0	0	1	7
District Administration	2	0	1	4	0	0	7
Military	6	0	2	1	0	0	9
Education	2	0	2	0	16	1	21
Technical/Science	3	2	1	0	0	21	27
Total	66	17	64	7	16	27	197

Source: See list of sources Table 6.1. The 'posted job speciality' refers to posts held by recruits in 1975, as per the *Gradation List APUG, 1975, 1976*.

^aThe table does not include lateral recruits who were selected in 1975, nor does it include lateral recruits who had not been assigned to posts by October 1975 from the 1973 and 1974 batches. There were 40 of the latter. 3 recruits who were assigned duties as of 1975 were not included in this table--2 of the latter were formerly journalists, and 1 was an agriculturalist. All 3 were assigned to posts in 'General Administration'.

^bDetermined by an analysis of each individual officer's educational background and prior employment history.

^cThis refers to the first job held by the recruit subsequent to his selection as a lateral recruit. For the purpose of simplicity, several categories of government employees were lumped together under the rubric of 'General Administration' to consolidate this table. 'General Administration' refers to officers who were employed in secretariat posts in the federal secretariat, the provincial secretariats, the Foreign Service, the Establishment Division, Law Division, and the Information Division.

speciality. A dramatic, but not atypical example of such slippage is afforded by the case of an officer, eventually assigned to the post of Joint Secretary, Religious Affairs Division. This officer, a mathematician by trade, had demonstrated his expertise in religion by developing a computer programme to regulate the flow of *Hajis*.

Nevertheless, given the prevalent system of assigning individuals to posts in the bureaucracy of Pakistan with minimal reliance on prior speciality, and the prevailing ethos of generalist administration implicit in the secretariat structure of the bureaucracy, the slippage between occupational speciality of lateral recruits and their eventual job assignment is not *prima facie* evidence of the assignment of unqualified or 'only politically qualified' candidates to posts in the lateral recruitment programme. In no department or division of the bureaucracy of Pakistan is there a necessarily close fit between occupational or educational speciality and job assignment. Indeed, the secretariat system of authority and the cadre system of organization preclude such a relationship. The implementation of the lateral recruitment programme clearly fit within this dominant tradition of reliance on an imperfect fit between an officer's background characteristics and his job. In fact, if anything, the relationship between background qualifications and job assignment was closer among the lateral recruits than among the generalist cadres.

A more serious problem concerning the implementation of the lateral recruitment programme proved to be the inability of the government to find suitable positions for all of the candidates it selected to the programme. The lateral recruitment programme was implemented with little concern for the manpower needs of government. Advertisements were posted soliciting applications to the programme, and candidates were selected with no reference to projected or actual vacancies in the APUG. A consequence of this lack of planning was that lateral recruits often had to wait months before they were posted in their new rank, and some successful candidates were never assigned to new posts. Table 6.5 shows that 40 (17 per cent) of the recruits selected during 1973 and 1974, had not been assigned to posts as of October 1975. This inability to find suitable positions for successful candidates

proved to be a persistent disability of the lateral recruitment programme.

So far the fit between the occupational speciality and job assignment of candidates selected to the Secretariat Group has been analysed. Similar conclusions emerge from a consideration of this phenomena in regard to other lateral recruits. Obviously, as Table 6.3 demonstrates, the occupational specialities of recruits to the FAG are not directly comparable to the expected skills necessary for assuming assignment in the Foreign Service. Also, the FAG had difficulty absorbing 146 recruits into its cadre. Similarly, whether a military background automatically conduces to expertise in Tribal Administration, is doubtful. And as was the case with the Secretariat Group and the FAG, only a fraction of the recruits to the TAG were ultimately assigned posts in the cadre, 20 of 38.

Lateral Recruits, 'Regular Recruits' and Pakistan's Service Structure

It is undoubtedly the case that the lateral recruitment programme was alien to the nature and history of the service structure of Pakistan. As was described in detail earlier, the bureaucracy of Pakistan is predicated on the twin pillars of the secretariat system of policy-making and the cadre system of organization. The concept of lateral recruitment is antithetical to both of these foundations. First, the lateral recruitment programme was designed to short-circuit the process of secretariat transfer. That is, ideally lateral recruits were to be drawn from outside the bureaucratic nexus of policy-makers. Instead of serving a long apprenticeship in the relevant Ministry, or possessing the eclectic training of members of generalist cadres; lateral recruits were to be chosen either because of their expertise in a given field, or because of their lack of direct ties to the orthodox bureaucratic structure. Second, the selection of lateral recruits violated the long-standing tradition of the cadre system of organization, i.e., bureaucratic organization in terms of semi-functional occupational groups with corresponding rank hierarchy and attendant fields of bureaucratic control. (See Chapter 2.) Such service

cadres depended on detailed processes to socialize their members both in regard to their particular occupational speciality, and in regard to their place within the bureaucratic framework as a whole. The selection of lateral recruits was designed to bypass this socialization process.

Given the alien nature of the lateral recruitment programme, it is no wonder that no indigenously-constituted service commission recommended the adoption of such a programme; and that no regularly-constituted service association listed lateral recruitment among their demands during the upheavals of 1969. (See Chapter 3.) Patently, this absence of debate was not indicative of apathy in regard to the adoption of such a programme, but was rather an example of what Bachrach and Baratz would call the 'other face of power'. That is, the very fact that the policy option was not addressed, signifies that a policy of lateral recruitment was not considered to be in the policy arena.²² The relevant actors assumed that the adoption of a lateral recruitment programme was inconceivable, and hence afforded it no place in their policy pronouncements.

The image of lateral recruitment which was held by orthodox members of the bureaucracy did not improve subsequent to the adoption of the lateral recruitment programme. Almost universally, such officers complained that the lateral recruits had: (a) blocked their prospects for promotion and/or (b) were not competent/did not have the requisite experience, to handle the posts to which they were assigned. Another prevalent theme among the members of the orthodox bureaucracy was that the lateral recruits had received their posts through some (usually shady) political connection. Also prevalent was the latent fear that the lateral recruits, because of their alleged political connections, were at worst 'spies' within the bureaucratic camp or at best permanent 'outsiders', lacking the background and ethos of orthodox bureaucrats.²³

To a certain extent these perceptions became self-fulfilling prophecies. Lateral recruits were put in the unenviable position of being placed in an organization where colleagues, for the most part, were suspicious, if not hostile, to their presence; and where they had little, if any, prior experience. Also, lateral recruits were often assigned to posts which were

created simply to absorb the given officer. Given this situation, lateral recruits often became isolated from the organization to which they were assigned. Typically, there was a profound difference between the level of activity within a lateral recruit's office and the confusing interplay of activity that characterizes the typical bureaucratic environment in Pakistan. Lateral recruits were often bypassed in the routine of noting documents, and their decisions were often ignored by subordinates and superiors alike.²⁴ Compounding the difficulties encountered by the lateral recruits, were their lack of institutional connections with the bureaucratic infrastructure. Lateral recruits did not belong to service associations, and consequently lacked access to the informal channels of bureaucratic authority. Where a typical officer could disentangle the web of red tape inevitably accruing to virtually any decision in the bureaucracy by making a well-timed phone call to a 'batch-mate', or a long time associate, the lateral recruit was left to his own devices.

The case-histories of two not atypical lateral recruits conclusively demonstrate the difficulties attendant with lateral recruit status.²⁵ Officer *A* served several years as an Inspector to an Ordnance Factory Board before taking the lateral recruitment examination. Subsequent to his successful candidacy, he was assigned the post of Officer on Special Duty (OSD) in a major Division of the federal government. This post had been created solely for the officer, it had not existed before he was assigned to it. As a consequence the duties of the officer were never clearly defined. When the author first visited this officer, some six months after he had assumed the post, he repeatedly referred to other officers in the Division as being more knowledgeable than he, because he had 'just arrived at the Division, and did not know the procedures.' There was a marked contrast between the calm, paperless, and visitor-less office of this officer, and the turbulent, often confusing environment of officers of the same rank across the hall. One did not get the impression that many decisions were made in this office, and indeed this impression was confirmed by several conversations with superiors and subordinates of the officer alike. During the period in which Officer *A* was assigned to the Division (more than 9 months) his office was

moved twice. The last move was to an office still under construction, some 15 miles away from the main office. Shortly after this move he was transferred to one of the newly nationalized rice milling corporations deep in the hinterlands of Sind.

The career of Officer *B*, follows a similar, though even more peripatetic pattern. Officer *B*, prior to taking the lateral recruitment examination, was a Principal at a small college. Subsequent to his induction as a lateral recruit, he was assigned to the Education Division. Shortly thereafter, he was called for training at the Staff College, then he was reassigned to the Education Division. Less than a month later, he was once again called for additional training, this time to one of the National Institutes of Public Administration. Subsequent to this, he was assigned to 4 other posts, all within a period of a year. During this time he was assigned to 3 different rice milling concerns, and briefly as an OSD to the Frontier Regions Division. After he was removed from service in 1978, he has returned to his former job as Principal of the same college.

The analysis of the relationship between lateral recruits and regular members of the bureaucracy has dealt so far only with the ideal-typical lateral recruit, i.e., one who came from outside government. The relationship between the 'lateral recruit' from within government and the orthodox service structure was, to a greater or lesser extent, more amiable. Indeed, for those lateral recruits who were members of the Central Services, participation in the lateral recruitment programme was functionally a means to secure a promotion. Such officers were not referred to as 'lateral recruits' by other officers, but typically rather as 'former members of *X* service.' Lateral recruits from within government but without service affiliation fell somewhere in between such direct recruits and those from outside government. Unlike the latter, such officers were already socialized into the role-pattern prevalent within the bureaucracy, and they had extensive contacts with other members of the bureaucracy. Also, a large percentage of the latter possessed scientific or technical expertise, and their selection by the lateral recruitment programme occasioned little disruption in their formal duties, i.e., they were promoted within their parent Division.

THE AFTERMATH OF THE PROGRAMME, 1976-85

As mentioned earlier, the last candidates selected under the terms of the lateral recruitment programme were inducted on 25 September 1975. Therefore, the programme was effectively halted approximately 3 years after it was initiated, and nearly 2 years before the *coup* that was to topple Prime Minister Bhutto's regime. There are at least two explanations for this abrupt discontinuance of the programme. First, the government found it increasingly difficult to absorb the large number of officers being inducted under the terms of the lateral recruitment programme. This fact was alluded to earlier, when it was stated that 40 officers inducted as members of the 1973 and 1974 batches of lateral recruits had not assumed their new assignments as of October 1976. This is only the tip of the iceberg, however. Many of the recruits fortunate enough to receive appointment in their new grade, were placed in posts newly-created for the sole purpose of absorbing the individual recruit. Others were kept in a bureaucratic limbo, with frequent transfers from one post to another, often interspersed with stints in training institutions. Still others were absorbed by the government's mushrooming involvement in the production of rice and wheat, subsequent to the nationalization of these industries in 1976. Given these difficulties, it is no wonder that the government had second thoughts about continuing the programme. As one Establishment Division Officer put it in 1976 (though in slightly more descriptive terms): 'we are knee-deep in lateral recruits already, and we don't know what to do with them. We don't need any more'.²⁶

Second, there was increasing evidence that the lateral recruitment programme was not living up to its expectations. Our analysis has shown that the programme was less than popular among the officers not directly benefiting from its operation. Indeed, though individual officers inducted under the terms of the programme may have given creditable service, the net effect of the programme had done little to improve the efficiency of the service, and it certainly had lowered the morale of the bureaucracy as a whole. Evidence for the latter is provided most dramatically by the resignation

of 3 young officers (Second Secretaries) from the FAG in 1976. They gave as reasons for their resignations the fact that their prospects for promotion had been adversely affected by the induction of lateral recruits to posts superordinate to their own.²⁷

In any event, by the time the military government came to power in July 1977, the lateral recruitment programme was already largely defunct. And given the strong incentive of the new government to investigate the policies of the previous regime²⁸ it is no surprise that the efficacy of what was left of the lateral recruitment programme was called into question. Accordingly, in the spring of 1978, a Review Board was set up within the Establishment Division to investigate the cases of individual lateral recruits. The criterion employed to determine whether an individual should be retained in service was whether that individual's original appointment had been in accord with the established criteria of selection at the time of appointment. That is, if there was evidence of irregularity in appointment, the individual would be denied his post.

The Review Board found many such irregularities in appointment. Among such irregularities were the selection of candidates who had failed the written examination to service; had bypassed the scrutiny of the Special Selection Boards; been promoted to posts without the requisite qualifications of experience or education; had been or were active members of the People's Party (PPP); and those whom the Federal Security Force (FSF) had deemed to be 'anti-Pakistan.'²⁹ In all, the Board reviewed the cases of 113 officers of the FAG, and 199 cases of officers inducted into the Secretariat Group. Of the former, 41 officers were retained in service; the cases of 24 were sent to the Federal Public Service Commission for further review; 28 were reverted to their former posts within government; and 20 were removed from service.³⁰ In regard to the Secretariat Group, 94 officers were retained in service;³¹ the cases of 10 were sent for further review to the FPSC; 59 were reverted to their former post within government; and 36 were removed from service. It is important to note that those officers 'reverted to former posts' were originally public servants before their selection under the terms of the lateral recruitment programme and

that those 'removed from service' had originally been employed by the private sector.³²

Subsequent to the actions of the Review Board, the Federal Public Service Commission conducted interviews and examinations³³ of lateral recruits whose cases had been referred to them by the government. In all, the FPSC examined the credentials of approximately 200 individuals and recommended that 'all but a handful' be retained in service.³⁴ Most of these were later reinstated by the government. Neither the details of the review process nor the names of reinstated officers were ever released by the government. However, by piecing together several sources it is possible to trace the status of lateral recruits from 1976-82. Such information is summarized in Tables 6.6 and 6.7.

An examination of these tables discloses three basic facts. First, approximately 60 per cent of the lateral recruits originally inducted to the Secretariat Group, District Management Group, and Tribal Areas Group were still in service by 1982. Or conversely, that 40 per cent of the lateral recruits had been removed for whatever reason between 1977-82.³⁵ The presumption is that many of the latter were deemed to have been 'political appointees'; while those retained were deemed to have been appointed on the basis of merit. Second, and an implication of the foregoing, is the fact that the government's actions (1977-82) belie the more extreme charges advanced by the *White Papers* concerning wide-scale political manipulation of the lateral recruitment programme by the Bhutto regime. As mentioned above, some of the lateral recruits selected between 1973-5 were never assigned to their new posts. Indeed, as of January 1978, only 280 of the original inductees were still in service. Therefore, between 60 and 78 per cent³⁶ of the lateral recruits screened by the new government were retained in service. Further, by July 1982 13 per cent of those retained had received promotions,³⁷ a percentage comparable to regular recruits. Clearly, if the lateral recruitment programme had been solely designed to politicize the bureaucracy in ways favourable to the Bhutto regime, its successor government would not have been likely to have retained and certainly not to have promoted such a high proportion of its appointees. Finally, the bulk of retained

TABLE 6.6

THE STATUS OF LATERAL RECRUITS TO THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY OF PAKISTAN, 1976-82

Groups	January 1976 ^a	January 1978 ^b	September, 1978		
			Retained ^c	Status uncertain ^d	July 1982 ^e
Secretariat					
AS 1973	23	17	17	0	7
JS 1973	33	22	19	3	15
DS 1973	42	31	18	13	23
JS 1974	38	32	12	20	30
DS 1974	103	92	41	51	62
JS 1975	29	25	9	16	21
DS 1975	56	45	12	33	35
Total	324	254	128	136	193
TAG	38	20	20	0	20
DMG	6	6	6	0	5
FAG	146	?	41	105	?

Source: Announcements made on 8 June 1978 and 17 August 1978 by the Establishment Division and found respectively in *Dawn*, 9 June 1978, and the *Pakistan Times*, 18 August 1978. Interviews with members of the Review Board constituted to review the lateral recruitment programme, 17-18 August 1978. Also see list of sources found in Table 6.1.

^aSome of these recruits were never posted to assignments corresponding to their new rank.

^bCompiled by comparing the lists of lateral recruits with Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grades . . . January 1978*, unpublished, Rawalpindi, 1978. An analogous list for the FAG was not available.

^cOfficers retained in the grade assigned to them by the lateral recruitment programme or at a higher grade.

^dSince no comprehensive list of officers removed from service was ever published by the government, this category lumps together all officers as of September 1978 who were: (a) reverted to their former grade; (b) removed from service; (c) referred to the FPSC; and (d) had died or voluntarily retired from service since January 1978.

^eCompiled by comparing the lists of lateral recruits with Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grades...July 1982*, unpublished, Rawalpindi, 1982. No analogous list for the FAG was available; also since 1982 the government has discontinued printing gradation lists of the APUG.

TABLE 6.7
LATERAL RECRUITS SECRETARIAT GROUP BY OCCUPATION, 1973-82

Occupation	Inducted, 1973-5				N	Retained 1982				Per cent Retained	
	21	Grades				22	21	Grades ^a			N
		20	19					20	19		
Government—											
Direct Recruit	12	33	43	88		3	7	19	29	58	66
Other Government											
Administration	3	16	41	60		0	0	19	23	42	70
Financial	0	19	36	55		0	0	9	25	35	64
Engineer	5	17	19	41		2	2	10	5	19	46
Scientist	1	2	6	9		0	0	1	2	3	33
Forestry	1	2	1	4		0	0	1	1	2	50
Statistician	0	1	1	2		0	0	1	0	1	50
Total Government	22	90	147	259		5	10	60	85	160	62
Military	1	6	7	14		0	0	5	1	6	43
Educators	0	3	28	31		0	0	2	18	20	65
Business	0	1	2	3		0	0	1	2	3	100
Law	0	0	15	15		0	0	0	3	3	20
Journalist	0	0	2	2		0	0	0	1	1	50
Grand Total	23	100	201	324		5	10	68	110	193	60

Source: Same as Table 6.1.

^aOfficers listed in ranks held in 1982.

lateral recruits had previously been employed by the government. Of the 193 lateral recruits retained in the Secretariat Group, 160 had originally been government servants and only 33 officers (22 of whom were educators) were retained from outside government. Therefore, the infusion of 'new blood' promised by the architects of the lateral recruitment programme was in reality but a trickle. The primary net effect of the lateral recruitment programme served merely to enable government servants to receive promotions or to change cadre affiliation.

CONCLUSIONS

The implementation of the lateral recruitment programme has neither proved as 'unworkable' and 'ineffective' as its critics have argued; nor has it proved as beneficial as its formulators had envisaged. On the one hand, there is ample evidence to suggest that political motives unduly influenced the selection of some of the recruits; but such political manipulations affected less than one-third of those selected. On the other, the programme did serve to loosen some of the rigidities of Pakistan's administrative system by providing a mechanism for the horizontal movement and for the induction of technocrats. However, such gains were short-lived and the number of officers actually benefiting from its operation quite small.

With the advantage of hindsight it could be argued that the lateral recruitment programme was doomed to fail. The concept of lateral recruitment is alien to the bureaucratic structure of Pakistan; and its operation antithetical to the interests of most relevant bureaucratic actors. Further, in the course of its implementation the programme became inextricably linked to the policies and career of Prime Minister Bhutto. Of course, once the Zia regime assumed power it became inexpedient to continue a policy that generated little support among relevant affected groups and which was associated with a predecessor's regime. Consequently, the programme became an easy target of Zia's government; and its operation was discredited in the *White Papers* and relevant administrative commissions.

Given the foregoing, it is extremely unlikely that policies of lateral recruitment will be re-introduced in Pakistan in the foreseeable future. This is unfortunate. Without mechanisms designed to bypass the effects of Pakistan's cadre system, Pakistan's bureaucracy is subject to increasing rigidity and dominance by generalist direct recruits. As seen in Chapter 7, such tendencies have proven particularly frustrating to Pakistan's technocrats.

* * *

This chapter is a much revised version of Kennedy, C.H., 'Analysis of the Lateral Recruitment Programme to the Federal Bureaucracy of Pakistan', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.3, Summer 1980, pp. 42-65.

NOTES

1. There is inherent confusion in the use of the term 'lateral recruitment'. Generically, the term refers to the induction of officers into the government from the non-governmental sector. In Pakistan, the term refers rather to a specific programme of the administrative reform of 1973. This programme included provisions for what would generically be referred to as 'lateral recruitment,' but it also included horizontal movement between cadres, and vertical movement within cadres. The use of the term 'lateral recruitment programme' in this chapter has reference to the programme of the Government of Pakistan, initiated in 1972 and formally announced in 1973. In Chapter 3, the issues relating to this programme were termed 'lateral recruitment', and 'horizontal movement'.
2. The idea of applying the techniques of lateral recruitment and horizontal movement to the bureaucratic structure of Pakistan originated in Rowland Egger's *Report of 1953: Egger, R., The Improvement of Public Administration in Pakistan: A Report with Recommendations*, photostat, Karachi, 1953.
3. Save for the General Administrative Reserve Association, itself composed of *ad hoc* recruits, seeking the regularization of the terms and conditions of their cadre. See Chapter 3.
4. In 1969 the proportion of recruits selected by direct recruitment and by promotion were: CSP, PFS, PMLCS—100 per cent direct; PTS, CSS—80 per cent direct, 20 per cent promotion; PMAS, PRAS, PAAS, PCES, PSP—75 per cent direct, 25 per cent promotion; CIS, PPS, TES, CES—67 per cent direct, 33 per cent promotion.
5. The history of the GAR is related in detail in Chapter 2.
6. This programme was designed to induct 5 military officers into the CSP each year. It remained operative during the years 1960, 1961, and 1962 with a total of 13 officers actually inducted. See Braibanti, op. cit., 1969, p. 111.
7. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), 'Press Note, 20 November 1972.'
8. All candidates to the lateral recruitment programme had to possess the B.A. degree or its equivalent. The written examination, separately composed for Joint Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries, were without exception essay-style exams designed to test the candidate's facility in English, and his knowledge of issues administrative, international, and domestic which were deemed significant to Pakistan. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), 'Deputy Secretary/Joint Secretary Examinations 1973, 1974, 1975', six examina-

tions, unpublished, 1973-5. The results of individual candidates on the examinations were never made public.

9. Interviews with officials of the Establishment Division, April 1976.

10. The written examination given to applicants of the Pakistan Foreign Service, later Foreign Affairs Group, was similar to those administered to the Secretariat applicants. However, the exam was only administered in 1973. Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Pakistan Foreign Service Examination, 1973', unpublished, 1973. The results of individual candidates on this examination were never made public.

11. Interviews with officials of the Establishment Division, April 1976.

12. Ostensibly, candidates with extensive experience in governmental service were excused from participation in the course of instruction at the Staff College. However, there were exceptions to this in practice.

13. Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 'Syllabi of FOTC Courses', and 'Syllabi of the DS/JS Courses', unpublished, Lahore, 1973-6.

14. Indeed the *Federal Public Service Commission Act* was revised in 1973 (LXVI of 1973) to allow lateral recruitment.

15. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), 'Press Notes', unpublished, 17 August 1973; 24 June 1974; 25 September 1975.

16. This figure was arrived at by the author's compilation of the sources listed in detail in Table 6.1. This is the best available estimate of the number and type of lateral recruits inducted. It does not include officers who were inducted by *ad hoc* means to the Federal Unified Grades (there were approximately 25 such officers) and it does not distinguish between officers who were inducted and those who were eventually posted to the relevant grade. Some officers were never assigned a post. Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. II, 'Treatment of Fundamental State Institutions', MPCPP, Rawalpindi, 1979 wildly inflates the number of recruits selected by the lateral recruitment programme. It claims that 2,796 officers were inducted into the federal government as a consequence of the programme, p. 159.

17. This treatment conforms to the usage of such terms in the context of Pakistan's administrative system.

18. Of the remaining 28 officers, 15 were merely promoted. These were officers who by definition were already members of the APUG-CSP and PSP officers. The remaining 13 officers were transferred from other cadres or departments to the Secretariat Group with no attendant promotion. Of the officers promoted, 224 were enhanced one grade, and 16 were enhanced two grades.

19. In the FAG, all recruits underwent horizontal movement with or without an attendant promotion. 25 officers were inducted into the FAG from outside the cadre with no promotion; 25 were promoted the equivalent of one grade, 5 were promoted the equivalent of two grades, and 1 officer was promoted the equivalent of three grades.

20. Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, 4 volumes, MPCPP, Rawalpindi, 1979; and Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977*, MPCPP, Rawalpindi, 1978.

21. There are several glaring distortions found in the *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, op.cit., 1979. An example of such distortion is the exaggeration of the scope of the lateral recruitment programme described in note 16. Further distortions wrongly impugn the educational qualifications of certain recruits and misrepresent the level of political interference in the selection process.

22. Bachrach, P., and Baratz, M., *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1970.

23. Interviews with government officials, 1975-85.

24. Personal observation and interviews with government officials, 1975-8.

25. The following case-histories describe the actual career patterns of 2 lateral recruits.

26. Interview, 17 March 1976.

27. Interview with one of the Principals, 28 December 1976.

28. As evidenced by the quite remarkable publication of the Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March 1977*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1978; and the Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1979.

29. Interview with a member of the Review Board, 17 August 1978. According to the information provided only 3 officers were reverted/removed from service because of their affiliation with the PPP; and only 2 were removed because of their alleged status as 'anti-Pakistan.' Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. II, 1979, pp. 139-142 supports this assertion.

30. Interview with a member of the Review Board, 17 August 1978. For additional information concerning the dismissal of the FAG lateral recruits and for some examples of individual irregularities see *Dawn*, 9 June 1978; and Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, Vol. II, 1979.

31. The names of these officers are found in the *Pakistan Times*, 18 August 1978.

32. Interviews with members of the Review Board, 17 and 18 August 1978.

33. Both written examinations and interviews were administered to Grade 19 officers; Grade 20 officers were subjected only to an interview; and Grade 21 officers were not referred to the FPSC.

34. Interview with a member of the Federal Public Service Commission, 19 June 1982. The only published record of the review process is found in Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1979*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1980.

35. Due to limitation of data it is impossible to be precise regarding the number of lateral recruits removed as a consequence of the actions of the Zia government and the number who had already left service before July 1977.

36. It is likely that the percentage retained approached the higher figure.

37. In all, 25 lateral recruits had received promotions by July 1982. 5 Grade 21 recruits, 8 Grade 20 recruits, and 11 Grade 19 recruits.

7

Technocrats and Generalists

Since the summer of 1982 members of Pakistan's 'technocratic' community (particularly physicians and engineers) have been chronically involved in political activity designed to improve the career prospects of members of their professions. Such activity has ranged from symposia and conferences to work stoppages and even occasional pitched battles with the police. The government's responses to such agitation have been only partially successful in blunting the demands of the disaffected groups. Indeed, the problems facing the technocratic community belie any immediate or easy solution—underemployment, declining standards of education and training, and unfavourable comparisons with the career prospects of expatriate colleagues. Perhaps more importantly, such episodes are also indicative of the long-simmering controversy between technocrats and generalists in Pakistan's administrative system.

This chapter examines the demands and interests of three relevant groups of technocrats in the context of Pakistani politics: physicians, engineers, and economists.

TECHNOCRATS AND THE CONTEXT OF PAKISTANI ADMINISTRATION

The neologism 'technocrat' was originally coined to refer to public servants possessed with the 'techniques of economic science' and 'wedded to the twin goals of knowledge and action.'¹ The translation of this term into practical politics, however, has been more mundane. Two functional and partially complementary definitions of the term have emerged.

Simply, (1) technocrats are 'technocrats' because of self-perceptions or (2) technocrats are 'technocrats' because of the perceptions of relevant others. Indeed, as Milne argues, the appellation technocrat is determined by a host of historical and political factors. In some states economists are *sui generis* technocrats, in others they are not; in some engineers are included in the category, in others they are excluded; in some other professional groups are relevant to the definition, while in others such groups are irrelevant, and so forth.² Common to all situations in which technocratic politics are relevant, however, is the perception that 'technocratic interests' can be delineated and that such interests are contrary, if not hostile, to 'non-technocratic interests.' Such interests may range from existential and philosophic concerns regarding the pace and direction of societal change, to the more immediate concerns of intra-bureaucratic authority and prestige.

In Pakistan, the definition of 'technocrat' or 'technocratic interest' is particularly loose. Indeed, neither of these terms is widely used, much more common is the usage of terms such as 'specialists' or 'professionals' to refer to technically-trained officers while those not so trained are referred to as 'generalists.' Also, the distinction between specialist and generalist is blurred, a phenomenon compounded by the often pejorative usage of the latter term since the late sixties. Accordingly, this chapter has adopted the imperfect solution of defining two groups—physicians (medical doctors) and engineers—as constitutive of the technocratic elite in Pakistan. A third group, economists, arguably 'technocratic' though in practice politically dormant, are treated separately in the later part of the chapter. Such treatment roughly accords with the usage of the concept in Pakistan, though it is open to the charge that it is either too inclusive (engineers may not share the characteristics usually attributed to technocrats), or too exclusive (the definition does not include other arguably relevant professional groups, for example, architects, dentists, statisticians, and so forth who have been episodically involved in technocratic politics). However, the three groups chosen for analysis comprise a relatively large group of officers within Pakistan's bureaucracy, are reflective of a broad-based consensus on the norms and structures of bureaucratic development, and have been chronically involved in technocratic politics.

However defined, a discussion of the role and status of technocrats in Pakistan is inextricably linked with the norms and structures of the bureaucracy of which such officers are a part. Therefore, a fruitful point of departure is a brief amplification of the dominant characteristics of the administrative system of Pakistan with particular relevance to technocratic officers. Mirroring the treatment found in Chapter I there are three such relevant characteristics: (1) the secretariat system of bureaucratic authority, (2) the systemic preference for generalists, and (3) the cadre system of organization. The interaction of the foregoing factors has served to curtail the authority of technocratic officers in the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan.

First, the secretariat system of bureaucratic authority imposes a rigid distinction between staff and line officers. Policy direction, programme assessment, personnel matters, inter-bureaucratic liaison, and political interaction are dominated by staff officers. Conversely, line officers are theoretically responsible merely for the routine administration of programmes designed and overseen by staff officers. The great bulk of staff positions in turn are filled by administrative generalists while line positions are filled by officers with relevant programmatic training. Most technocrats in Pakistan's administrative system hold line positions in so-called 'technical' divisions, attached departments, or autonomous corporations. Compounding such difficulties from the perspective of technocrats is the fact that generalist officers, as a consequence of the foregoing distinctions command higher rank, more favourable terms and conditions of service, and greater career mobility than their technically-trained colleagues.

Second, both a cause and consequence of the foregoing is the systemic preference for selection of generalists to fill staff positions in the civil bureaucracy. This phenomenon is demonstrated most forcefully by examining the outcome of the CSS Examinations. Successful candidates of the CSS Examination, (see Chapter 5) enter Pakistan's bureaucracy as 'direct recruits', the fast-track for advancement through the bureaucracy. A number of factors including the nature of the examination and restrictive age limits for competition, have served to limit the number of successful candidates possessing tech-

nical backgrounds. During the last ten years less than 20 per cent of the successful CSS candidates held a degree in the natural sciences and less than one-half of these had an advanced degree.³ Indeed, technocrats predominantly enter Pakistan's bureaucracy through mechanisms other than the CSS Examination. Engineers, unlike other professionals, were inducted into the Federal Public Service until 1976 through a separate direct competitive examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission. This examination tested both general knowledge and specific technical expertise.⁴ The last such examination was held in 1976 and upon the recommendations of the FPSC⁵ was replaced by a system which subjects qualified engineers to an interview by the FPSC against specific advertised posts. The recruitment of physicians, who for the most part enter health departments under the authority of relevant provincial governments, has never fallen under the purview of the FPSC. The selection of members of other technical professions qua profession has also never been subject to systematic federal recruitment rules.

Given this state of affairs, the great bulk of technocrats enter the bureaucracy through the process of answering advertisements against specific vacancies in relevant departments. As a consequence most engineers find employment with autonomous corporations; most physicians with provincial health departments. Entry into the bureaucracy by such means neither confers 'civil service' status nor cadre affiliation to such entrants.

Third, interacting with the foregoing factors is the dominance of the cadre system of organization in Pakistan's bureaucracy. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, officers with federal group affiliation dominate policy-making positions in the federal government. Membership in such groups in turn is conferred solely on individuals who have entered the bureaucracy through the CSS Examination, and who have undergone pre-service training in their assigned group. Since the bulk of Pakistan's technocrats do not enter the bureaucracy through direct recruitment, it follows that they are consequently not the beneficiaries of the sanguine career prospects which are associated with federal group affiliation. Though technocrats have attempted to form their own groups, for

example, the Central Engineering Service and the West Pakistan Health Service (see Chapter 2), such groups were never as effective as generalist services in advancing the demands of their members and since 1973 such services have been banned by the government.

Therefore in sum, the characteristics of Pakistan's administrative system have been and remain stacked in favour of generalists and against technocrats. Staff officers (primarily generalists) are favoured over line officers (primarily technocrats) in terms of career prospects and administrative authority. Direct recruitment, the main avenue to staff appointments, is dominated by a generalist bias which results in filling most entry level positions with promising 'all-rounders.' And federal group affiliation, the main determinant of individual career mobility within the system is functionally denied to bureaucrats who enter by non-direct means. The most important consequence of the foregoing factors is that technocrats hold disproportionately few senior level positions

TABLE 7.1
TECHNOCRATS EMPLOYED IN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
BY GRADE, 1983

Group	N	Grade					
		22	21	20	19	18	17
Engineers	645 (7.5) ^b	3	8	43	111	214	266
Physicians	585 (6.8)	0	0	18	34	222	311
Scientists	332 (3.9)	3	1	11	34	86	197
Economists and Planners ^a	201	1	2	21	27	70	80
All Technocrats	1763 (20.6)	7	11	93	206	592	854
All Federal Employees	8547	78	133	577	1009	2462	4288

Source: Calculated from Government of Pakistan, All-Pakistan Administrative Research Centre, *Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report, January 1983*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984, p. 79 with Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, *Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grades Secretariat Group, July 1982*, unpublished, 1982 and numerous interviews.

The table is subject to a certain degree of error due to the imprecise definition of categories. Numbers include officers re-employed on contract.

^aMembers of the Economists and Planners Group.

^bFigures in parentheses are percentage frequencies.

in the federal bureaucracy. For instance, Table 7.1 demonstrates that, though technocrats hold over 20 per cent of the posts in the federal bureaucracy, they hold less than 9 per cent of the positions carrying a rank of Additional Secretary or above. Given such objective factors technocrats possess potent grounds for dissatisfaction with the civil bureaucratic system of Pakistan.

PHYSICIAN AND ENGINEERING DEMANDS AND THE DISTURBANCES OF 1968-9

As discussed above, technocrats have had long-standing grievances with the bureaucratic system of Pakistan. However, these grievances did not translate into political action until late 1968 when physicians and engineers became the vanguard of intra-bureaucratic dissent during the so-called 'disturbances.' As many observers have noted,⁶ the late sixties were a particularly propitious time for the venting of political steam. President Ayub's decade-long formula of civil-military authoritarianism was under severe attack from several directions and change was imminent.

Physicians were among the first to stage an assault from within the bureaucracy itself. As early as 11 November⁷ the Executive Committee of the West Pakistan Health Service Association demanded Class I status (officer level status, the same accorded to CSS recruits) for new recruits to their service. They also demanded the implementation of several other policies which would have had the combined effect of improving the terms and conditions of service for physicians within the bureaucracy. These demands spread rapidly and found ready acceptance among students and doctors attached to medical colleges. Indeed by 11 January 1969, medical personnel at Liaquat Medical Hospital, Peshawar, and Nishtar Medical Hospital, Multan, had staged protest marches.⁸ Four days later 200 junior doctors in Karachi staged a token strike in support of their colleagues demands.⁹ Finally, 24-hour provincial strikes organized by the newly-formed 'Central Medical Body' were held on 18 January and 14 February.¹⁰

The government's response to such demands was lukewarm at best. Muneer claims that the government even made veiled threats to fire striking medical personnel, replacing them with foreign-trained RCD doctors.¹¹ In any case, the unresponsiveness of the government fuelled an even more radical response by medical personnel. On 5 March the Central Medical Body declared a 'general strike for an indefinite period.'¹² This time the government responded by accepting the most salient of the physician's demands—to accord Class I status to new recruits of the West Pakistan Health Services.¹³ Upon the acceptance of this concession by the striking doctors the strike ended.

While the demands of physicians remained relatively limited, and once accepted easily met by the government, the demands of engineers were much more fundamental to the operation of the bureaucratic system as a whole and consequently much more difficult to address. Namely, the engineers became more directly embroiled in the issue of specialist *versus* generalist. At first, however, the engineers followed the lead of the medical personnel. In December 1968, the 'Lahore Engineering Students' later seconded by the 'Engineering Students Welfare Association' and the 'Student Action Committee of the West Pakistan University of Engineering and Technology' demanded that new engineering recruits (B.S. Eng.) be uniformly accorded Class I status.¹⁴ And as in the case of medical personnel, student engineers took to the streets in January 1969 to press their demands. But as it became increasingly clear that the government had decided to turn a deaf ear to such demands, the *ad hoc* 'Engineers Action Committee' decided to change its strategy by addressing system-wide issues. On 13 February some 2,000 senior engineers joined by hundreds of engineering students marched in Lahore. Their more salient demands included: a call for the implementation of the *Cornelius Commission Report*¹⁵ (a document which had recommended substantial administrative reforms favourable to technocrats); the abolishment of the CSP; and the establishment of a system of reservation of technical posts for engineers.¹⁶ Following a successful three day strike by the Telegraph Engineer's Association on 11 to 14 March,¹⁷ a prospective indefinite general

strike of engineers in support of such wide-scale reform was only forestalled by the imposition of Martial Law.

The resignation of President Ayub on 25 March and the imposition of Martial Law under General Yahya Khan placed the generalist *versus* specialist issue squarely on the policy agenda. First, the actions of the physicians and engineers during the disturbances had served to politicize the grievances of the technocrats. Second, the disturbances had drawn the public's attention to the inefficiencies of the orthodox bureaucracy. Indeed, twice during the disturbances provincial secretariats had been attacked by angry mobs incited by charges that the bureaucracy was corrupt. Of course, the CSP as the symbol of the bureaucratic establishment, had come under the most scathing criticism, both from disaffected service associations, and from opposition politicians who saw the cadre as a bulwark of President Ayub's power. (See Chapter 4.)

One of General Yahya's responses to the bureaucratic crisis was to establish the Services Reorganization Committee under the chairmanship of Justice Cornelius. Once formed the SRC took an active role in the reform movement by soliciting the opinions of a wide range of groups and individuals¹⁸ representing virtually every relevant interest in bureaucratic reform. Prominent among such petitioners were interest groups representing physicians and engineers. The analysis which follows is derived from a careful reading of the relevant documents submitted to the SRC. In particular, the service petitions of 15 engineering associations¹⁹ and 4 physician associations were examined.²⁰ Without doing too much injustice to the welter of arguments found in these petitions, nor to the wide differences in the degree of expression of such arguments, one can summarize the mixture into a fairly coherent technocratic critique of the bureaucratic system, and into a package of recommendations which flow from that critique.

The Technocratic Critique of the Bureaucratic System

Contained within the physician and engineering service association demands are four interrelated themes. The first theme is that Pakistan's bureaucratic system, and particularly

its reliance upon generalist administration, is a product of the much maligned colonial legacy. As a consequence, Pakistan's bureaucratic system is portrayed as profoundly undemocratic and crafted more to serve the needs of a colonial master than a sovereign people. The following description of the bureaucracy is not atypical: 'several thousand public servants of which a few hundred were the elite assumed the position of rulers of the teeming millions.'²¹ Attributed to this legacy are several ills: the overbearing attitude of public servants to the public²² the lack of public accountability of bureaucrats,²³ economic and political underdevelopment,²⁴ inherent class distinctions within the bureaucracy which undermine 'cooperation, coordination, and team spirit,'²⁵ lack of professionalism,²⁶ and, of course, the generalist bias itself.²⁷

The second theme is that generalist officers are inefficient at best, and often corrupt. This is attributed partially to structural dimensions of the bureaucratic system, structures which 'date back to the East India Company' and which place undue authority and hence temptation in the hands of senior public officials.²⁸ But it is also attributed to the selection process of individuals to fill such posts of authority. A process which selects ambitious though a 'second-rate residue' of talent.²⁹

Closely related to the foregoing is a third theme which argues that generalist officers are incompetent or at least not as deserving as technocrats for senior administrative postings. This theme is reiterated frequently in the service demands, the following quotations present the substance of the argument:

The best students in Primary Schools grasp well science and mathematics. After Matriculation, first class students continue with science with medicine or non-medical subjects and the best lot getting through Intermediate Examination goes to engineering, medicine, pure sciences, defence services, etc., the top talent eventually becoming professionals in their field of specialisation. Some of the residue students who cannot make their headway in Commerce, Industry, and other services elsewhere take part in the CSP Examination.

The situation in regard to the Provincial Civil Services is worse. . . Now recruitment in these services is being made through Public Service Commissions. But the people who compete for these services are the residue left after repeated filtrations. First filtration takes place when talented students go in for the scientific and professional

lines. The residual batch endeavour for the superior civil services. Education services, positions in Commercial and Industrial Organisation etc. Last of all, the remaining unemployable ones apply for Provincial Civil Services as a last resort. So their quality is self-evident. But once employed as 'generalists' they under the patronage of their superior 'generalists' become fit for running and controlling any organisation dealing with law and order, revenue collection, management of education and scientific, industrial, commercial, and agricultural departments, organisations and institutions.³⁰ [or. . .]

A doctor entering in service is by-and-large, the best in the academic sense at all levels, matric, intermediate and B. Sc. He takes six years to complete his studies and spends another 6 or 7 years in specialising, competes in a fiercely international examination and then joins up the service at a level and with a sense of progress which can only be termed indescribably [sic] inferior to a graduate who joins up the Civil Service of Pakistan. Instances are available where two members of the same batch at high school and at college were branched out into medicine and CSP. The member who worked his way through his professional education and found himself on joining the service without even a reasonable quarter to live in whereas the member who was inferior to him in academic works and in education occupying the post of a Deputy Commissioner with all this post means. Examples of highhandedness by far junior people holding executive positions towards far senior doctors are many.³¹

A final theme more rarely stated but often implicit in the service association demands is the argument that the CSP as a cadre is responsible for the ills which beset the administrative system of Pakistan. A particularly vituperative, though not unrepresentative statement of this argument is found in the petition of the Pakistan Association of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers:

1. Instead of remaining an impartial administrative machinery, it [the CSP] had taken over the policies of the country against all aspirations of the people.

2. Instead of keeping the judiciary independent, it involved itself into judiciary as well, particularly at the District and Divisional levels.

3. Instead of playing the role of *Civil Servants*, they had become the *Masters* of the people by the misuse of the authority of maintaining law and order.

4. Instead of leaving the policy-making and execution of the professional services in the hands of respective professionals, the CSPs had monopolised all policy-making and execution authority resulting in the problems of teachers, students, doctors, engineers, workers, farmers, industrialists, agriculturalists, commerce, and *Under Productivity* all over.³²

In sum then, these themes can be said to express one general argument. Namely, generalist cadres (particularly the CSP) constitute an undeserved elite within the bureaucracy of Pakistan. Conversely, technocrats equally or more deserving than generalists are denied senior positions within the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, the policy recommendations made by the physicians and engineers were crafted to remedy these perceived injustices.

Policy Recommendations of Technocrats

An analysis of the nineteen service association demands cited above reveals seven 'mainstream' policy positions held in common by the bulk of such associations.

- *Reservation of posts should be discontinued.* The practice of the legal reservation of posts within the Central Secretariat for members of favoured generalist cadres (particularly the CSP) should be discontinued. All posts should be open to all public servants on the basis of merit/suitability of appointment.
- *Remuneration of officers on the basis of cadre affiliation should be discontinued.* Separate pay scales determined by cadre affiliation and skewed to favour members of particular elite cadres (particularly the CSP) should be abolished and replaced with a uniform national pay scale. Remuneration should be based on qualifications/skills not on cadre affiliation.
- *The All-Pakistan Services should be abolished.* The All-Pakistan Services (CSP and Police Service of Pakistan) services with constitutionally mandated advantages and protections, should be abolished and should be replaced with a single unified civil service. The latter organization should be composed of sub-cadres of all Class I officers. Technocrat cadres (though there is a great deal of disagreement as to particulars) should be favoured and made part of the uniform system.
- *The CSP should be abolished.* The CSP as an institution should be abolished and its members scattered to sub-cadres or retired from service.

- *The status of technical officers should be enhanced.* Relevant ministries and departments should be headed by specialists or professionals.
- *The secretariat system of bureaucratic authority should be modified.* The distinction between staff and line officers should either be discontinued or where continued the structure should be reorganized so that Heads of Departments are afforded roughly comparable status to Secretaries.
- *Technocrats should be encouraged/allowed to hold general administrative/policy-making posts.* The movement of line officers to Central Secretariat postings should be part of normal career mobility.

TECHNOCRATS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS OF 1973

Four years later a civilian regime emerged in Pakistan imbued with the motivation to reform the bureaucracy. Though it is naive to suggest that Prime Minister Bhutto's motivation to undertake administrative reforms solely stemmed from an impartial desire to improve the administration of the state, or to improve the career prospects of technocrats (see Chapter 3) it certainly is the case that the reforms incorporated many of the demands voiced by technocrats. Indeed, the rationale the government advanced for the introduction of its reforms reads as if it was borrowed from the numerous physician and engineering service association demands. As was the case with the latter demands two themes predominate. First is the argument that the bureaucracy is a legacy of the colonial past, unsuited to the needs of a free, democratic people. Second is the theme that the administrative system neither works effectively nor efficiently. Similarly, Bhutto's administrative reforms mirrored many of the recommendations which had been advanced by the technocrats. The salient provisions of the reform included the abolition of service cadres, the formation of a uniform national pay scale, and the discontinuance of reservation of posts for generalist officers. (See Chapter 1.)³³

The government's mechanisms designed to enhance the career prospects of technocrats envisaged a combination of the abolition of reserved posts for generalist cadres and the introduction of lateral recruitment. Noteworthy is the fact that none of the nineteen physician and engineering service associations which had presented petitions to the Services Reorganization Committee had recommended the latter policy. (See Chapter 6.) But ironically technocrats became one of the chief beneficiaries of the lateral recruitment programme. During the operation of the programme (1973-5) 60 technical officers³⁴ were selected to join the federal bureaucracy—11.5 per cent of the total number of lateral recruits selected by the programme (Table 7.2). The majority of technical officers inducted into the Secretariat Group were engineers who had previously held non-cadre government appointments. Of the 50 technical officers selected for the Secretariat Group 41 were trained engineers³⁵ and 48 were public servants.³⁶

Subsequent to 1975 the avenue of lateral recruitment was blocked. (See Chapter 6.) And after President Zia assumed power, the military regime was quick to further discredit the programme subjecting officers who had been inducted through lateral recruitment to the scrutiny of a review board designed to ferret-out political irregularities. Only 24 of the technocrats inducted into the Secretariat Group remained in service as of 1982.

The effects of other provisions of the administrative reform have also had important consequences for the status

TABLE 7.2
TECHNICAL LATERAL RECRUITS TO SECRETARIAT GROUP
BY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALITY, 1973-82

Occupation	Selected 1973-5	In-service 1976	In-service 1982
Engineers	40	32	19
Natural Science	9	4	3
Medicine	1	1	1
Total	50	37	23

Source: See Table 6.1.

of technocrats. On the positive side, the abolition of cadre-based pay schedules and the introduction of a uniform pay scale resulted in increasing the pay of technocrats as well as meeting their long-standing demands for the induction of MBBS and B.S. (Engineering) degree holders as Class I (NPS 17) officers. Less positive in the long-term has been the effect of the abolition of service cadres. The net effect of such abolition has been that for generalist cadres 'services' were replaced by functionally-analogous 'groups.' But, for technical services no 'groups' have been allowed to replace the defunct Central Engineering Service, Telephone and Traffic Service, nor any of the formerly numerous provincial physician and engineering services. This latter outcome has hampered the organizational capabilities of technocrats and has lessened their inter-institutional influence in the bureaucracy.

TECHNOCRATIC DEMANDS OF 1982, PAY REFORMS AND BEYOND

Despite the not insignificant gains of 1973-5, technocrats have remained dissatisfied with their role in the civil bureaucracy of Pakistan. Such displeasure found its most dramatic expression in the technocratic disturbances of 1982 which were temporarily quieted by the implementation of the pay reforms of 1983.

The Technocratic Disturbances of 1982

At the vortex of the technocratic disturbances of 1982 were the so-called 'junior doctors.' The term junior doctor is loosely applied to hospital staff physicians who possess a terminal MBBS degree. Their grievances primarily centred on the issue of promotional prospects and pay for staff physicians. Junior duty medical officers typically held posts at NPS Grades 17 and 18. Except for relatively few posts open to such officers in hospital administration, posts of NPS Grade 19 and above were reserved for physicians with advanced degrees. Therefore, the bulk of junior doctors faced relatively

limited career prospects and a relatively low ceiling of pay. Such limitations were particularly galling due to the facts that junior physicians usually have very arduous schedules and often perform the same hospital duties as senior physicians. Also galling was the fact that junior doctors are effectively barred from the lucrative private practices open to their senior colleagues. Finally, most of the positions in provincial and federal health secretariats were typically staffed by administrative generalists.

Among the remedies suggested to cure these ills the junior doctors proposed an expansion of posts at the Deputy Secretary level (NPS 19), the re-introduction of lateral recruitment for medical personnel, and the restriction of future admissions to medical colleges. Also, a salient demand of the junior doctors was the establishment of a 'Central Medical Cadre'—in the words of a disaffected physician crafted to be 'analogous to the CSP.'³⁷

To press such demands physicians staged increasingly effective strikes during March-June 1982. Leaders of the strikes claimed that over 4,000 doctors participated in the protests which were observed widely in the Punjab, Sind, and NWFP. The dominant technique employed was a work slowdown in which the striking staff physicians failed to show up for work three days a week—Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday. There were also reported instances in which physicians refused to perform routine surgery or to make regular rounds of the wards.³⁸

Less dramatic, though none the less significant, were the demands of engineers. Two major demands were voiced by engineering associations during 1982: (1) the establishment of a cadre of engineers—'The Ministry of Engineering Affairs,' and (2) the re-introduction of lateral recruitment. The first demand foresaw the establishment of a massive cadre which would incorporate the 7,000-odd officer level engineers working in various governmental and semi-governmental capacities. This cadre, comprising approximately one-half of all officers in the federal bureaucracy, would be subdivided into ten sub-cadres: water and power, communications, production, railways, housing and works, petroleum and natural resources, industries, science and technology,

defence production, and aviation. The movement of officers between sub-cadres would be encouraged with career planning and personnel policy governed by the central ministry, ostensibly staffed by engineers.³⁹ The second demand called for the induction of engineers into the Secretariat Group. In 1982 only 8 of the 126 Additional and full Secretaries (NPS Grades 21 and 22) in the Secretariat Group were trained engineers.⁴⁰ Such underrepresentation could only be remedied by an extensive influx of lateral recruits. Accordingly, the names of 188 engineers were recommended by the Pakistan Engineering Council (1982) for entry into the Secretariat Group. Similarly, the Council also recommended that most (17 of 19) federal Secretary posts and 45 Secretary level posts in autonomous corporations be reserved for engineers.⁴¹

Governmental Responses and the Future of Technocratic Demands

President Zia's regime has adopted a variety of policies designed to quiet the demands of disaffected technocrats. Disincentives have included numerous arrests, termination of services, and the compulsory transfers of striking physicians and engineers. By far the most creative and important response of the government, however, has been the adoption of the recommendations of the Kazi Pay Commission on 18 August 1983.⁴² Prior to the adoption of such reforms, rank and pay in Pakistan's bureaucracy were coterminous. That is, an officer's pay was determined by the pay scale applicable to such officer's rank. As discussed above, there are disproportionately few vacancies at senior ranks open to technocrats—therefore a perennial complaint of disaffected technocrats has been that technocratic officers are often trapped in dead end positions with little prospect of promotion or for an increase in salary. To address this difficulty the pay reforms introduced the ingenious device of the 'move-over.' Under the terms of the move-over an officer who has reached the limit of pay applicable to a given rank becomes eligible to begin receiving pay at the next higher rank, with no attendant promotion. (See Chapter 4.) That is, officers

would no longer need to wait for a vacancy to occur at a higher rank before receiving a higher salary. In addition the pay reforms introduced several concessions to technocratic officers. For instance, technocrats were awarded 'advanced increments' based upon achieving advanced educational qualifications; technocrats with teaching responsibilities were awarded 'special teaching allowances;' engineers were granted 'design allowances' of Rs. 400 to Rs. 700 per month; and medical doctors not engaged in private practice were awarded a 'non-practicing allowance' of Rs. 700 per month.⁴³

Obviously, the pay reforms partially met the demands of disaffected technocrats, but persistent problems remain. Since late 1983 groups representing physicians have voiced an increasing level of concern over the issue of chronic unemployment of recent graduates of Pakistan's medical colleges. By April 1985, the problem had grown to epidemic proportions with medical associations claiming that 17,000 doctors were unemployed in the state.⁴⁴ The obvious solution, one pressed by most medical associations, is to limit the number of seats in the medical colleges. Indeed approximately 3,000 doctors graduate annually against an estimated 500 new house jobs in hospitals.⁴⁵ However, such a solution is fraught with potential political peril. First, the restriction of seats is resisted by potentially affected students—a vocal and powerful pressure group. Second and more problematic, since education is a provincial subject the admission policies of medical institutions are subject to provincial control. Therefore, the issue of the comparative number of medical seats in particular institutions is inextricably linked with questions of provincial representation and the decision to restrict admission to medical colleges tantamount to restricting entry of one's relevant 'sons of the soil' to a perceived elite group. After all, the establishment of many of Pakistan's medical colleges was spurred by the demands of provincial interests. Not surprisingly, therefore, policies restricting admissions to medical colleges have been seldom employed,⁴⁶ and are not likely to gain significant acceptance in the foreseeable future. Similarly, the government is likely to leave unresolved the demand for the establishment of a central medical cadre because of the profound structural changes

such a reform would entail on the bureaucratic system and due to estimated cost.⁴⁷

The government has also been unwilling or unable to meet the demands of disaffected engineers. Indeed, both the demand for the establishment of a Ministry of Engineering Affairs and for the re-establishment of lateral recruitment were rejected by the government in 1982-3. The former was dismissed with a rationale reminiscent of technocratic critiques of generalist administration. Ironically, the government argued that 'engineering' encompasses disparate occupations and, therefore, cannot logically or efficiently be subsumed under one authority. The response to the demand for the induction of engineers into the Secretariat Group was met with a subcontinental Catch-22. Engineers who work in autonomous corporations (the bulk of senior engineers) are by definition not 'civil servants,' therefore, they cannot be considered for appointment to the Secretariat Group for which civil servant status is a prerequisite. And, the only mechanism to confer such status—lateral recruitment—has been proven by the government to be 'unworkable.'⁴⁸ Of course, however, the real issue is not whether engineers become members of the Secretariat Group, but rather whether engineers can gain access to secretariat appointments, the exclusive preserve of members of the Secretariat Group.

In sum the response of Zia's government to technocratic demands, like the policies of his predecessors, have failed to adequately address the issue of increasing the authority of technocratic officers *vis-a-vis* their generalist colleagues. Until the latter issue is addressed it is likely that relations between technocrats and generalists in Pakistan's administrative system will remain strained, and that technocratic disturbances will continue to be a chronic feature of Pakistan's civil bureaucratic system.

ECONOMISTS: CADRE AND NON-CADRE

So far this chapter has been silent regarding another potential technocratic group—economists. Though most economists in Pakistan share an ideological orientation congruent with

engineers and physicians, curiously economists as a group have remained politically dormant. Unlike engineers and physicians, economists did not participate to any significant extent in the disturbances of 1968-9, nor have economists been involved in the incidents of 1982-6.⁴⁹ There are two explanations for such dormancy.

Explanation 1—*Opportunity Costs.* For groups to participate in the political process requires that such groups have the ability to mobilize their members into collective action. Economists as a group have failed to mobilize—perhaps the fault, therefore, is organizational. Namely, the opportunity costs of mobilizing economists are too great. At first glance this explanation seems credible. Economists are widely scattered throughout the bureaucratic structures of Pakistan. The largest concentration of economists are found in the Planning Division and the Finance Division, but the majority of professional economists serve as ‘Finance Advisors’ or ‘Research Officers’ in a myriad of bureaucratic settings. This dispersion of the group coupled with the normal practice of rapid transfer of officers from ministry to ministry, erects severe obstacles to organization as a professional group. Since the costs of organization are so high the economists cannot bridge the gap between ‘potential and actual group’⁵⁰ and as a consequence the group remains only partially mobilized and relatively unimportant politically.

Perhaps symptomatic of such organizational disability is the fact that economists have been unable or unwilling to form an umbrella or peak professional association. On the other hand, both physicians and engineers possess thriving comparable institutions—the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council and the Pakistan Engineering Council. These latter institutions govern entry to their respective professions and serve to define membership within the professions. They also provide their members with requisite credentials for entering government service, and oversee and partially control the career patterns of their members after they have joined government service.⁵¹ In lieu of comparable peak associations, individual economists are left to fend for themselves or to seek support, like generalist officers, in cadres.

Explanation 2—*Cadre Politics*. This leads to the second explanation. Starting from the assumption that economists are not as well organized as are physicians or engineers, and given the overarching importance of cadre organization to the Pakistani bureaucracy one can infer an important distinction between two subgroups of economists: 'cadre economists' and 'non-cadre economists.'

As a consequence, economists are likely to speak with two voices on issues relevant to technocratic politics—a 'cadre voice' and a 'non-cadre voice.'

Cadre economists. As seen in Chapter 5 the largest single group of direct recruits to the bureaucracy are individuals with an academic speciality in economics. Indeed economists constituted roughly 25 per cent of the batch strength from 1971-81. Within this group approximately 2/3 hold an M.A. degree and 1/3 a B.A. degree, with the predominant majority of both educated at major universities in Pakistan. Given the dynamics of the cadre system in Pakistan, such officers are likely in time to identify more with their cadre of assignment than with their original professional group. This is reinforced by four mechanisms. First, there is no economist peak association. Second, there is no economist cadre *per se*.⁵² Third, assignment to cadres is not based on professional expertise—therefore, direct recruit economists are scattered among all cadres. And, fourth, given the foregoing, individuals who wish to pursue economics as a profession are not likely to choose direct entry government service in the first place. Therefore, the bulk of cadre economists are likely to adopt the norms and beliefs of the cadre to which they are assigned and consequently their orientation is likely to become increasingly 'generalist' over time.

Of course, such a modification of individual orientations does not obviate the need for technically proficient economists in the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, however, cadre economists have argued that this need could be met without recourse to non-cadre officers. The history of the Economic Pool is illustrative of this process.

In 1937, the Wheeler Committee foresaw the need for the constitution of a cadre of specialist officers to permanently fill posts within the Finance and Commerce Departments of the Government of India.⁵³ As a consequence of their

recommendations the Finance and Commerce Pool was formed in 1939. The composition of this Pool was primarily drawn from ICS officers and officers of the Accounts Departments. Pakistan, at the time of Partition, inherited 8 Pool officers. The Government of Pakistan reconstituted the Pool in 1950 and 24 officers were duly appointed. However, the Finance and Commerce Pool did not come into effective operation until 1959. At that time the G. Ahmed Committee proposed the revivification of the Pool concept and the government consequently established the Economic Pool. Pool officers were to serve in the Ministries of Finance, Commerce, and Industries, and were to be drawn from the CSP (60 per cent), and from accounts and finance services (40 per cent).⁵⁴ It was further proposed that 126 posts in the foregoing ministries would be reserved for Pool officers. The original intent was to form a new cadre wherein officers, after confirmation of their appointment to the Pool, would relinquish their prior service affiliation.⁵⁵ However, due to a number of factors, not the least of which was the reluctance of CSP officers to give up membership in their cadre, the Economic Pool never became a regularly constituted service. Officers were deputed to the Pool but retained their previous service membership, seniority, and terms and conditions of service.

Of course, a consequence of the formation of the Economic Pool was that senior policy-making posts in economics related ministries were dominated by cadre economists. In effect the Economic Pool was a closed shop wherein key posts were reserved for members of the Pool and Pool membership in turn was determined by prior cadre affiliation. In practice, the Pool became increasingly dominated by CSP officers (some of whom had no background in economics), and the generalist orientation of this 'specialist' organization became complete. In 1971, of the total cadre strength of 120 officers in the Pool, 72 were members of the CSP, 19 of the Pakistan Taxation Service (PTS), 14 of the Pakistan Customs and Excise Service (PCES), and 5 of the Pakistan Railways Accounts Service (PRAS).⁵⁶ The Pool became a target of Prime Minister Bhutto's administrative reforms and was abolished in 1973.

Non-cadre economists. Non-cadre economists refer to officers who are either trained as economists or who have worked in economic related ministries for the bulk of their careers, but who did not enter government service through the CSS examination and consequently do not have cadre affiliation. This group is disparate, particularly in comparison with cadre economists, and arguably as a consequence it has remained unmobilized. Indeed Olson's opportunity costs/potential group argument seems particularly compelling in regard to non-cadre economists. However, if the collective voice of non-cadre economists has been relatively faint it has also been relatively coherent.

Non-cadre economists share the grievances of other technocratic officers with the bureaucratic system of Pakistan. From an ideological perspective this is not surprising—the term technocrat was invented to refer to bureaucrats with formal training and orientation toward economics and economic method. Also, non-cadre economists, like other technocratic groups, have not been subject to the sanguine career prospects attendant with cadre affiliation, and have suffered from the consequences of generalist bias, and generalist domination of policy-making posts. This has been particularly severe in the case of non-cadre economists due at least in part to the existence of the Economic Pool. Understandably then, demands made to the Services Reorganization Committee by associations representing non-cadre economists are reminiscent of similar demands made by technocratic service associations.⁵⁷ For instance, the East Pakistan Economists and Statistical Association contended that economists and statisticians constituted a professional group, and had been unjustly denied rights implicit with cadre membership, including promotional parity with generalist cadres. Similarly, the Association of Government Economists and Statisticians (Class I) argued that non-cadre economists were better trained than CSP officers; denied policy-making appointments due to the secretariat system of authority; subjected to holding inferior ex-cadre posts; did not receive comparable compensation or perquisites *vis-a-vis* generalist officers (an illustrative example is the reported case of a 'senior economist being forced to travel by second-class rail'); systematically

denied fellowships and scholarships, designed for economists but given to CSP officers; and called for the abolition of the Economic Pool.

Also reminiscent of technocratic group demands made by physicians and engineers has been the proposed remedy for countering the effects of non-cadre status—viz., the formation of an 'Economists and Statisticians' cadre. The idea for such a cadre can be traced back at least as far as 1949 when its formation was suggested by the Statistical Reorganization Committee and various proposals for such a cadre were presented by the Economic Appraisal Committee (1952); the Second Five Year Plan; the Technical Advisory Committee of the National Statistical Council (1963); and the Working Committee of the Planning Commission (1966).⁵⁸ Non-cadre economist service associations reiterated such plans in demands to the Services Reorganization Committee in 1969. Common to all such proposals was the argument that economists and statisticians constituted a viable professional group and that the career prospects of members of such groups were blocked by generalist officers.

In 1976, as part of the administrative reforms the Economists and Planners Group was formed.⁵⁹ This group was designed to encompass all officers serving within the Planning Division, and was to serve as a channel for direct entry, promotional entry, and horizontal entry to the Commission. The 'experiment' fizzled, however. The Group was never formally encadred—no gradation list was ever finalized; recruitment has been suspended since 1979; and as of mid-1985, the future continuation of the cadre was in doubt.⁶⁰ The position of senior members of the Planning Commission is that the Economists and Planners Group is too disparate an occupational cadre and that it should be abandoned. Perhaps this is explicable in part due to cadre politics. Most members of the 'technical side' of the Planning Commission are senior professional economists—over 1/3 have Ph. Ds, and most of these have spent the bulk of their careers within the Commission. The 'secretariat side' of the Commission is predominantly composed of cadre economists. Since the Planning Commission is a high prestige assignment, and since its members have comparatively long tenure within that assignment, it follows

that it is in the interests of members of the Planning Commission to restrict entry to the Commission, and by definition to the Economists and Planners Group. Or alternately to the extent that the goals of the Economists and Planners Group are fulfilled, the Planning Commission becomes less exclusive. Therefore, current members of the Economists and Planners Group have no incentive to expand its membership, or for that matter to belong to the Group in the first place. It is illustrative to note that the proposed formation of a 'Statistician Group' much discussed in 1975-6, and a potential competitor for Planning Commission assignments has remained stillborn.

In conclusion, therefore, economists are divided into two camps: cadre and non-cadre. Cadre economists dominate senior policy-making positions in the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly on most issues such cadre officers are likely to support the generalist/*status quo* position toward bureaucratic reform. Non-cadre economists, on the other hand, share many of the concerns and interests of other technocratic groups. And like other technocratic groups they nurture simmering grievances against generalist domination. However, unlike physicians and engineers their participation in technocratic politics has been muted as a consequence of organizational disabilities and the co-optation of their demands by cadre economists.

CONCLUSIONS

Four tendencies concerning the relationship between technocrats and generalists in Pakistani administration have been identified:

- *Institutional history is important.* Given the historical legacy and current structure of the bureaucratic system of Pakistan one inescapable conclusion is that the rules of the game are stacked to favour generalist administrators over technocrats. More importantly, once the rules have been set, as they were for Pakistan arguably as early as the mid-nineteenth century, they become very difficult to change. Consequently, technocrats attempting to break into the system face two formidable hurdles: (a) they must demonstrate extraordinary

personal competence—after all ‘technocrats are not good administrators,’ and (b) they must overcome bureaucratic norms and practices designed to favour generalists.

- *The relationship between generalist and technocrat is zero-sum.* Technocrats and generalists are competing for the same set of jobs. As a consequence a gain by a technocrat is offset by a loss to a generalist. Though this may be an oversimplified view of the process, such perceptions provide potent imagery for both sets of actors.
- *Technocratic politics is interactive with cadre politics or distributional politics is alive and well in Pakistan.* To a great extent technocratic politics can be explained by looking at the individual motives of bureaucrats. All things being equal, bureaucrats want attractive terms and conditions of service, security of tenure, rapid promotion, and attendant levels of inter-institutional prestige. In Pakistan, such benefits have been distributed unequally to members of particular cadres. Technocratic demands have attempted to redress such inequalities in general, or more often have sought a redistribution of benefits more favourable to the respective group(s) advancing the demand. Interestingly, technocratic demands have predominantly been made by groups not represented by effective or favoured cadres. As such they have constituted both a threat to the cadre system and its attendant vested interests, as well as a demand for expanding the pie of benefits to include the disaffected group. It is this which explains the oft-repeated phenomena of technocratic groups simultaneously denigrating cadre politics while assiduously attempting to gain legitimacy for their own cadre.
- *There is no easy solution.* In Pakistan, the battle between technocrat and generalist has raged since Partition and there is no indication that it will end soon. Perhaps the interests of the groups are inherently irreconcilable. Certain, however, is the fact that external pressures will exacerbate such differences within Pakistan in the future. Physicians, engineers, and economists face under-employment at home and a burgeoning, if episodic, demand for their services abroad. The uncertainties

caused by such a confluence of factors are likely to make both sides intensify and radicalize their struggle. The evidence provided by the disturbances of 1968-9, by the junior physician strike (1982), and by engineers' participation in the Sindhi incidents (1983), lend credence to this hypothesis. Also important to note is that the demands of disaffected groups in 1982-6 are more maximalist than analogous demands in 1969. The sides are further apart. Consequently, a likely prognosis for the future must predict an increasing politicization of the demands of the technocrats, a translation of such demands into episodic strikes and disturbances, and the prospect of possible violence.

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This chapter is a revised version of Kennedy, C.H., 'Technocrats and the Generalist Mystique: Physicians, Engineers and the Administrative System of Pakistan', *Journal of African and Asian Studies*, XVI:1, January 1983, pp. 98-121.

NOTES

1. Ellul, J., *The Technological Society*, Vintage, New York, 1964, p. 159; pp. 148-227. Compare with Daniel Bell's use of the term 'technocratic elite' in Bell, D., *The Coming of the Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting*, Basic Books, New York, 1976.

2. Milne, R.S., 'Technocrats and Politics in ASEAN Countries', *Pacific Affairs*, 55:2, 1982, pp. 403-5.

3. From an examination of Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Reports 1974-83*, MPCPP, Islamabad, various dates.

4. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Combined Competitive Engineering Examination*, MGP, Karachi, 1976.

5. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report 1977*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1978, pp. 14-15.

6. Among the most useful are: Ahmed, Muneer, *Political Sociology: Perspectives on Pakistan*, Punjab Adabi Markaz, Lahore, 1978; Khalid bin-Sayeed, 'Mass Urban Protests as Indicators of Political Change', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, Vol. XVII, 1979; Burki, S.J., 'Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation', *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXII, 1972; and Feldman, H., *The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971*, Oxford University Press, London, 1970.

7. *Pakistan Times*, 12 November 1968.

8. *Ibid.*, 12 January 1969.

9. *Ibid.*, 16 January 1969.

10. *Ibid.*, 19 January; 15 February 1969.

11. Muneer, op. cit., 1978, p. 29.

12. *Pakistan Times*, 6 March 1969.

13. *Ibid.*, 10 March 1969.

14. Muneer, op. cit., 1978, p. 30.
15. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, *Report of the Pay and Services Commission, 1959-1962*, A.R. Cornelius, Chairman, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1971.
16. *Pakistan Times*, 14 February 1969.
17. Ibid., 15 March 1969.
18. In all, disregarding cases of personal grievance, there were 1,051 petitions addressed to the Committee. More than 200 of these documents were official representations of service associations.
19. Central Engineering Service Association; East Pakistan Engineer's Service Association; TIP Junior and Senior Engineer's Association; Civil Aviation Engineer's Association; Telegraph and Telephone Engineering Service; East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Engineer's Association; West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Engineer's Association; The Institute of Engineer's—Dacca; East Pakistan University of Engineering and Technology Teacher's Association; West Pakistan Service of Engineers (Electricity Department); Pakistan Association of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers; Electrical Engineer's Association—Lahore; Punjab Gazetted Engineer's Association; Pakistan Society of Public Health Engineers; and Material Technologists and Engineer's Association, Lahore.
20. Pakistan Medical Association; West Pakistan Health Service Association; Medical Doctors in Central Government Employment Association; and East Pakistan Medical Services Association.
21. East Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Association (EPWAPDA), 'Petition to Services Reorganization Committee', 1969, paragraph 5.
22. Ibid., paragraph 6.
23. Ibid., paragraph 19.
24. Central Engineering Service Association (CES), 'Petition to Services Reorganization Committee', 1969, paragraphs 2-3.
25. EPWAPDA, op. cit., paragraph 13.
26. Pakistan Medical Association (PMA), 'Petition to Services Reorganization Committee', 1969, paragraphs 7-13.
27. East Pakistan Engineer's Service Association (EPESA), 'Petition to Services Reorganization Committee', 1969, paragraphs 10-12.
28. EPWAPDA, op. cit., paragraph 11.
29. EPESA, op. cit., paragraphs 8-9.
30. Ibid., paragraphs 8-10.
31. PMA, op. cit., paragraph 3.
32. Pakistan Association of Electrical and Mechanical Engineer's Association (PAEME), 'Petition to Services Reorganization Committee', 1969, Annexure A, paragraphs 1-4.
33. Compare Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, *Speeches and Statements of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister of Pakistan, August 14-December 31, 1973*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1978, pp. 13-14.
34. 'Technical officers' is used here to refer to physicians, engineers, those trained at the B.Sc. level or higher in the natural sciences, and all individuals who had served in a technical capacity for 10 years or more prior to selection regardless of college training. Not all of the recruits 'selected' were actually inducted into the service. See Chapter 6.
35. 'Trained' means holding at least the B.Sc. (Engineering) degree. Four of these officers also held advanced degrees in engineering—two had Ph.Ds.
36. Forty-two worked for federal or provincial governments and six were faculty or administrators in government colleges. The remaining two were engaged in private business.
37. Derived from *Muslim*, May-June 1982 and from interviews.
38. *Muslim*, 8 June 1982.
39. Interview, 24 June 1982.
40. Government of Pakistan, *Gradation List of All-Pakistan Unified Grades, Secretariat, Group, July 1982*, unpublished, Islamabad, 1982.
41. Pakistan Engineering Council, *Job Analysis of Senior Management Posts*

Under Federal Government and Corporations, Pakistan Engineering Council, Islamabad, 1982.

42. Announced in *Dawn*, 17 August 1983. The reforms were made retrospective to 1 July 1983. Purportedly, the pay reforms were based upon the recommendations of the Pay Commission chaired by A.G.N. Kazi, 1983. However, the report of the Commission was not made public.

43. *Dawn*, 19 August 1983.

44. *Muslim*, 2 April 1985.

45. Interviews, Pakistan Medical Association officials, June 1985.

46. In 1983, the Government of Punjab reduced the number of training slots in Punjab medical colleges by two hundred seats. This resulted in considerable protest by potential students and applicants, and the institution of numerous law suits. The government's right to restrict admission were upheld in the Lahore High Court's decision of Province of Punjab *versus* Miss Khaqan Mahmood, *PLD* 1985, Lah. 300. However, as of mid-1985 no other province has followed Punjab's lead in restricting medical admissions.

47. Interviews with government personnel, June 1982; June 1985.

48. Interviews with government personnel, June 1982.

49. Muneer, *op. cit.*, 1978 systematically examined Pakistan's media for the period encompassed by the disturbances of 1968-9 and found no evidence suggesting economist involvement in any of the incidents. Similarly, I have been unable to find any evidence connecting economists to any of the technocratic protests of 1982-5.

50. Olson, M., *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982 and *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1973.

51. For example the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council enforces minimum standards for admission and teaching qualifications for posts in hospitals. Such standards in 1985 were: for admission to medical schools—an Intermediate degree and 50 per cent + marks in Biology; for teaching Grades 17 and 18 an MBBS degree, for Grade 19 and above a FRCP or other advanced medical degree. Similarly, the Pakistan Engineering Council controls admission to engineering posts by requiring a candidate to possess the minimum qualification of a B.Sc. (Engineering) to enter at Grade 17.

52. There are several cadres which perform economic functions—the Accounts Group, Customs Group, Income Tax Group, and the Economists and Planners Group. But none are exclusive of non-economists, and none are perceived by their members as professional associations.

53. Government of Pakistan, National Institute of Public Administration, Wheeler Report: *Report of the Government Secretariat Committee, 1935-6*, MGP, Karachi, 1963, paragraph 23.

54. Government of Pakistan, Efficiency and O&M Wing, *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee*, Ghiasuddin Ahmed, Chairman, MGP, Karachi, 1963, p. 327.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 330.

56. Computed from Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, *Civil List of Officers of Grade 17 and Above Serving Under Government of Pakistan, 1st July 1971*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975. A separate gradation of the Economic Pool was never published.

57. The demands of four economist-related service association petitions were presented to the Services Reorganization Committee: The East Pakistan Economists and Statistical Association; The Association of Government Economists and Statisticians (Class II); The Association of Government Economists and Statisticians (Class I); and the Association of Economists and Statisticians, Planning and Development Department, Lahore.

58. Cited in East Pakistan Economists and Statistical Association, 'Petition to Services Reorganization Committee', 1969.

59. Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat (Establishment Division), Memo. No. 10/2/75, 25 March 1976, constituted formal encadrement of the Economists and Planners Group.

60. Interviews with government personnel, June 1985.

8

The Quota System of Regional Representation in the Federal Bureaucracy

Pakistan has suffered, before and since its emergence as an independent nation state, from disabilities associated with regional differences and resultant nationalist demands. The creation of Pakistan itself was fuelled by the spectre of prospective second-class citizenship for Muslims in a Hindu dominated independent India. And from Partition until the dismemberment of the state in 1971, Pakistan served as the ideological battleground for antithetical visions of Punjabi and Bengali nationalisms. Indeed the consequences of such conflicting visions—the Civil War of 1971 and the emergence of Bangladesh—have marked the only instance in the twentieth century of a successful violent secessionist movement. Ominously during the last decade, the spectre of regionalism and possible future secessionist sentiment has been voiced by disaffected, if ambitious, Pathan, Baluch, and Sindhi leaders.

One response by the Government of Pakistan to such regional sentiment has been the introduction of regional quotas for recruitment to bureaucratic posts. Such policies of 'redistributional ethnic preference' are the subject of this chapter. First, it presents the case for the adoption of policies of preference; second, provides a brief history of the development of such policies, and third, analyses the operation of the system in Pakistan.

POLICY RATIONALE

The origin of Pakistan's policies of ethnic preference can be traced to the pre-Partition sentiments and strategy of the Muslim League. Perhaps the most compelling argument for

the creation of Pakistan, one stressed with increasing fervour by Muhammad Ali Jinnah following the Lahore Resolution of 1939, was that Muslims in an undivided India would remain subservient to the Hindu majority. To substantiate this hypothesis it was only necessary to point out the wide discrepancies in Muslim and non-Muslim representation in the civil service, the military, educational institutions, and the business elite. Muslims, the argument ran, underrepresented in each could not bridge the gap until they had a state of their own. The eventual form such an interpretation took was the demand for a separate state based upon the amalgamation of majority Muslim communities. Therefore the demand for a state was linked inextricably with the demand for increasing regional representativeness of Muslim majority areas.

After Partition, the focus shifted to similarly defined perceptions of gaps between East and West Pakistan. Bengalis (East Pakistan) were underrepresented in the civilian bureaucracy, the professions, business, the military, and politics.¹ The politicization of these gaps eventually led to the dismemberment of the state in 1971. Before this occurred, however, as will be detailed later, regional quotas were introduced in the federal bureaucracy which were designed to ameliorate such perceived gaps. Since 1971, the justification for the continuation of such regional quotas has been predicated on three characteristics of post-Bangladesh Pakistan: (1) multiethnicity; (2) developmental gaps between regions of the state; and (3) the persistence of unbalanced institutional and political development.

Multiethnicity. Since the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, truncated Pakistan has contained four major ethnic groups. In numbers, the largest of these are the Punjabis, followed in respective populations by the Sindhis, the Pathans, and the Baluch.² Each of these groups is defined by an admixture of linguistic and geopolitical attributes. For instance, Punjabis are centred in the province of the Punjab and their ostensible mother tongue is Punjabi, Sindhis are domiciled in Sind and speak Sindhi, Pathans live in NWFP and speak Pushto, and the Baluch live in Baluchistan and speak Baluchi or Brohi.

However, there is significant slippage in such definitions of ethnic identity. First, Pakistan's ethnic composition has

been deeply effected by external and internal migration. Most obvious are the so-called *muhajirs* (pilgrims). Indian Muslims who opted for Pakistan at the time of Partition and who settled primarily in the urban areas of Pakistan, particularly Karachi.³ Further, since Partition there has been a largely ignored though significant 'trickling' of in-migration, primarily from India and Bangladesh. The 1981 *Census* estimates that this trickle has accounted for 4 million migrants to Pakistan since 1948.⁴ Not included in the *census* data are the variously estimated 2.5 to 3 million 'temporary migrants'/'refugees' from Afghanistan. Most such individuals are Pushto speaking and are closely related ethnically to the Pathans. Most live in border communities or camps in the NWFP, but there have been recent attempts to officially disperse some of these residents to the Punjab and Sind, and considerable unofficial resettlement of individual Afghans in the major cities of Pakistan has already taken place. In addition to such in-migration, there has been considerable inter-provincial and intra-provincial migration as well. Two patterns deserve note. One has been the phenomenon of rural/urban migration, spurred by brighter employment opportunities in the cities. The urban population of Pakistan grew by 7.25 million from 1972-81.⁵ A second phenomenon, also largely fuelled by employment prospects, has been the inter-provincial shifting of population from the Punjab and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to Baluchistan and Sind.⁶ One consequence of such phenomena is to make the major urban areas of Pakistan—Karachi, Lahore, and Rawalpindi/Islamabad—far more ethnically diverse. Another has been to threaten the indigenous population of the smaller provinces, particularly Baluchistan, with the perception of outside domination. For instance, Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, has more Pathan residents than indigenous Baluch.⁷

There is also slippage in regard to linguistic determinants of ethnicity. Pakistan has a national language—(Urdu), and perhaps 90 per cent of the population can speak or at least understand the rudiments of the language.⁸ Conversely, less than 5 per cent of the population can speak or understand English yet it has remained the predominant medium of

higher education, the courts, and government since Partition. Though there have been numerous attempts to enhance the significance of Urdu in the national life of Pakistan, and parallel attempts to limit the importance of English, such policies have been blunted from two directions. On the one hand, it is argued that increasing the importance of Urdu will detract from the importance of provincial languages, particularly Sindhi and Pushto. On the other hand, President Zia's attempts to enhance the importance of Urdu by replacing English as the language of examination at the Matric level by 1989 and by making Urdu instruction compulsory have been met with firm resistance from educators, the middle class parents of affected students, and provincial autonomists. In brief their respective arguments are that: (a) no adequate Urdu language classroom materials exist; (b) that discarding English will limit the international prospects of Pakistani graduates; and (c) that such a policy will favour native speakers of Urdu and closely related Punjabi at the expense of other linguistic communities.⁹ Underlying the debate regarding the enhancement of Urdu in Pakistan is the fact that Urdu, though the link language of the state, is the primary language of only a small minority of the population. The 1981 Census discloses that Urdu is 'usually spoken' by only 7.6 per cent of the households in Pakistan (mostly *muhajirs* or children of *muhajirs* and primarily in Karachi or Islamabad), while Punjabi is spoken in 48.2 per cent of the homes, Pushto in 13.1 per cent, Sindhi in 11.8 per cent, Siraiki in 9.8 per cent, Baluchi in 3 per cent, Hindko in 2.4 per cent, and Brohi in 1.2 per cent.¹⁰ A further complicating factor is that such linguistic diversity is not related exclusively to provincial domicile. For instance, only 79 per cent of those domiciled in the Punjab speak Punjabi in their homes; correspondingly 68 per cent of those domiciled in the NWFP speak Pushto; 57 per cent of the Baluchistan domiciled speak Baluchi or Brohi; and only 52 per cent of the Sind domiciled speak Sindhi.¹¹

Developmental gaps. However loose the definition of ethnic groups in Pakistan, indisputable gaps exist in the respective levels of development of the four provinces. Generally speaking the province of the Punjab and the region

of Urban Sind¹² are the most highly developed, while other provinces are relatively less developed. Indicators of such gaps include differentials in per capita income¹³ life expectancy,¹⁴ levels of industrialization,¹⁵ urbanization,¹⁶ literacy,¹⁷ and electrification.¹⁸ Such gaps are widely perceived and politicized in Pakistan, and have resulted in the perception of the actual or potential spectre of Punjabi or to a lesser extent urban Sindhi (*muhajir*) domination. Indeed the most traumatic event in the history of Pakistan, its dismemberment, was occasioned by the similar perception of widening inequality between East and West Pakistan. Arguably, Pakistan currently faces several prospective Bangladeshes. Most serious is the demand for greater provincial autonomy in Baluchistan. But there are also significant autonomist sentiments in the Sind, and episodic, though recently dormant demands for an independent Pathan state—Pukhtunistan.¹⁹

Institutional and Political Imbalance. A third factor which has encouraged the adoption of redistributive policies has been the inability of Pakistan to achieve balanced levels of institutional development. Pakistan inherited a political system from Britain which was crafted to suit the needs of a colonial power, i.e., its overriding concern was to rule a subject people. As a consequence, a primary tool to effect this control, the administrative system inherited by the new state, demonstrated highly complex patterns of organization, well-established forms of socialization of its members, and a remarkable degree of institutional autonomy. Countervailing institutions, particularly those responsible for ensuring governmental responsiveness to the demands of the public—legislatures, interest groups, local governments—existed in only an attenuated form. This developmental gap has persisted since Partition. For example, Pakistan has been unable to establish the precedent of orderly succession of political leaders. Indeed, the outcomes of the four national elections held in Pakistan—1965, 1970, 1977, 1985—were each challenged by the losers as 'rigged.' Similarly, Pakistan, ostensibly a republic, has been subject to extensive periods of Martial Law and military rule. During such periods elected national assemblies, albeit only marginally consequential

during periods of civilian rule, have been disbanded, and political activity is prohibited or placed under severe restraints. Also, despite numerous attempts at reform, local governments are still dominated by civilian bureaucrats deputed from the federal government for service in the provinces. Functionally, such 'district administration' has served to perform the roles typically entrusted in other systems to elected officials—revenue collection, revenue distribution, rule adjudication, and the execution and formulation of local policy.²⁰

Given this context, meaningful input into the policy-making process can only be ensured by securing representation in the civilian bureaucracy. Therefore, to represent the interests of ethnic groups within Pakistan, or to redress the consequences of inequalities between such groups, requires perforce direct incumbency of 'nationals' in the civilian bureaucracy. This factor makes redistributive policies critical to federal policy-making in Pakistan. It can be argued that denial of civilian bureaucratic office in Pakistan is functionally equivalent to the denial of political representation.

Combined these three factors—ethnic diversity, unequal regional/provincial development, and unbalanced institutional growth—explain the nature of Pakistan's policies of ethnic preference. Accordingly, Pakistan's policies of preference have been based on two principles: (1) the remedial or compensatory principle, and (2) the proportional principle.²¹ The first provided legitimacy for the introduction of the quota system in Pakistan. Before 1971, the quota was designed to ameliorate inequalities between East and West Pakistan; after 1971, inequality between 'more developed' and 'less developed' regions. The argument was that the quota was a necessary expedient designed to close the gap between levels of development while promoting national integration. The second principle, that of proportional representation, has been invoked both as a goal and a strategy for effecting the compensatory principle. That is, there is a loose fit between ethnic groups and provincial domicile, therefore proportional representation favours backward regions or groups. More directly the proportional representation

principle is invoked as a mechanism to ensure equality of representation in governmental institutions.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL QUOTA POLICIES

Due to a number of factors, the most salient of which was the disparity of service representation between East and West Pakistan immediately subsequent to Partition, a federal quota which applied to candidates seeking competitive entry to officer level ranks in the federal bureaucracy was introduced in 1949.²² The provisions of this policy sanctioned that 20 per cent of the vacancies in the Central Superior Services were to be filled by 'merit' as a consequence of the Central Superior Services (CSS Examination). The remaining 80 per cent of the vacancies were to be filled by the application of the following formula: East Pakistan 40 per cent; Punjab and Bahawalpur 23 per cent; Karachi 2 per cent; and Sind, Khairpur, North-West Frontier Province and Frontier States and Tribal Areas, Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir, and Kashmir refugees, 15 per cent.²³ As originally formulated the quota had application to approximately one hundred vacancies a year. Its thrust was to 'prudently' increase the representation of Bengalis who were woefully underrepresented at the time of Partition by, in effect, creating separate competitive pools in the two wings. Advocates of the quota perceived it as a temporary, but necessary remedial expedient, which would be phased out five to ten years after its introduction.²⁴ However, the quota grew and prospered in the fertile soil of regional animosities between East and West Pakistan. By 1956, the quota policy, which had started as an administrative directive within the Establishment Division, had grown to the status of a statutory exception to the 'non-discrimination clause' in the first Constitution.²⁵ This status was reiterated in the 1962 Constitution.²⁶ The quota also became a frequent topic of debate in the National Assembly. Perhaps more importantly, however, its range also underwent steady expansion. By the early fifties the quota was applied to vacancies filled by the Federal Public Service Commission through interviews, and it also eventually became applicable to departmental and attached departmental recruitment to posts in the central

government. Indeed by 1971, the quota had application to approximately 2,000 entry level positions in the federal government each year.²⁷

Despite the phenomenal growth of the quota designed to keep the two Wings together, centrifugal tendencies became too great, and the resultant Civil War left Pakistan dismembered. With the secession of Bangladesh went the most potent original rationale for the quota system. Since 1971, however, instead of dying the quota system has become increasingly vibrant. Immediately following the War (1972-3), the quota was temporarily transformed into a confusing array of six zones and four 'provinces'.²⁸ And in August 1973, the quota emerged in its present form. The current formula reads: 10 per cent merit; 50 per cent Punjab (including Islamabad); 7.6 per cent Urban Sind (Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkur); 11.4 per cent Rural Sind (areas in Sind other than those above); 11.5 per cent NWFP; 3.5 per cent Baluchistan; 4 per cent Northern Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and 2 per cent Azad Kashmir.²⁹ Why this particular formula was chosen is open to conjecture. It is true that the percentages chosen roughly accord with the respective populations of the regions,³⁰ and that the modified system follows fairly closely the relative weightings of the 1949 formulation. However, no public sources indicate that such criteria were used in formulating the regional quotas. More importantly, the more general question of whether in the aftermath of the 1971 War, the quota should have been continued, and if continued what form it should take seem to have had no formal public consideration, and were not addressed directly by any of the numerous administrative commissions of the late sixties and early seventies.

In any event following the War, Bhutto's economic policies served as a catalyst for the continued expansion of the quota system. Between 1972-5, Bhutto nationalized numerous industries (banks, insurance, heavy machinery, natural resource extraction, rice, cotton, textiles, cement, automobiles, and so forth). As a consequence such industries formerly in the private sector became subject to the terms and conditions of federal employment. That is, recruitment to autonomous and semi-autonomous corporations (188

such institutions existed in 1981), became subject to the quota.³¹

However, the expansion was not restricted solely to federal initiative. During the early seventies the provinces established their own quotas for provincial recruitment. In the Punjab recruitment to provincial posts became subject to three intra-provincial reservations—'Zone 1, developed districts'; 'Zone 2, undeveloped districts'; and 'merit' on an all-Punjab basis.³² Since the reorganization of the Punjab in 1982, such distinctions have remained.³³ In Sind, provincial recruitment has followed the federal demarcation of 'rural' and 'urban.' And in the NWFP provincial recruitment has been divided into five zones, two of which are relatively 'less developed', and three which are relatively 'more developed'.³⁴ The ambit of the provincial quotas are analogous to that of the federal quota. That is, recruitment to competitive posts in the Provincial Civil Service, direct recruitment to posts advertised by the Provincial Public Service Commissions, recruitment to provincial departments, and recruitment to provincially-administered public enterprises are all subject to the relevant quotas.

THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM

We turn now to three sets of questions associated with the operation of the quota system: (1) How is the quota system applied to the selection process of recruits at the various levels of its operation? How exactly and enthusiastically is it implemented? How does the system work? How is an individual's domicile determined? (2) Is the bureaucracy of Pakistan regionally representative? Do such levels of representation differ in regard to rank or type or governmental service? And, (3) How does the quota system interact with the bureaucratic system of Pakistan? What are the fixed costs of the system?

How does the 'Quota System work?

Procedures. At the federal level, the quota is applied to the selection process in three distinct patterns. *Pattern 1.* The

first pattern applies to competitive entry through the Central Superior Services Examination administered by the FPSC. In this pattern the quota is applied to both entry level competition and to the competition for entry into occupational cadres. After the number of vacancies is determined for a given year by the Establishment Division an open competition is held in which candidates from all domiciles participate. 10 per cent of such vacancies are filled by candidates who scored highest on the exam regardless of domicile (the merit quota). The remainder of the vacancies are filled by the respective merit-rank within domiciles. For example, if, in a hypothetical year, there are 100 vacancies—10 will be filled on the basis of overall merit, 50 will be drawn from the remaining most meritorious Punjabis, 8 from the most meritorious rural Sindhis, and so forth, as per the federal quota. Since 1980, given our hypothetical sample, 10 additional appointments would also be made from the pool of military candidates. The suitability of such military candidates for appointment is determined by the 'High Powered Selection Board'—military candidates do not take the CSS Examination.³⁵ Vacancies in occupational cadres are allocated on the basis of the quota, the preferences of individual candidates, and exam scores. They are also subject as above to the 10 per cent military quota. This pattern applies to the recruitment and assignment of approximately 200 vacancies each year.

Pattern 2. The second pattern is applicable to the selection of candidates who enter on the basis of interview, either administered by the FPSC or directly by the Ministry or Department concerned. Here posts are advertised or listed against regional vacancies. For example, if the Ministry of Defence needs to recruit communication engineers, the Ministry sets domicile requirements (ostensibly based on regional balances within the Ministry), for the relevant vacancies. In an illustrative case the Ministry had to fill 14 vacancies, designating that 7 should come from the Punjab, 4 from the NWFP, and 3 should be domiciled in Rural Sind. Accordingly, the FPSC interviewed candidates only from such domiciles and made appointments on the basis of such interviews.³⁶ This pattern applies to the recruitment of approximately 3,000 candidates each year.

Pattern 3. The

third pattern is primarily applicable to the recruitment of individuals to autonomous corporations and public enterprises. This pattern requires the submission of 'domicile certificates' by the candidates to the relevant personnel boards, but the domicile limits typically are not binding on the actual hiring practices of such boards. However, considerations of regional balance often play a significant role in hiring decisions, and pressures to comply with the terms of the quota are sometimes exerted by concerned federal and provincial ministries.³⁷

The operation of provincial quotas follow analogous patterns: selection to the provincial civil services follows the first pattern; recruitment to other provincial posts the second pattern; and recruitment to provincially-administered public enterprises the third pattern.

The Determination of Domicile. Critical to the functioning of the regional quota system in Pakistan is the determination of the individual candidate's place of residence, usually and confusingly referred to as 'domicile'. Given the stakes of such determination coupled with the inherent litigiousness of Pakistan culture it is not surprising that such determination is replete with labyrinthine complexities. Indeed, even the lexicon which refers to the all-important proof of residence requires careful interpretation. For instance, there are two general species of proof of residence in Pakistan: 1) the federal domicile certificate, and 2) the provincial residency certificate. Unfortunately, both are usually referred to interchangeably as 'domicile certificates'. Properly speaking, the federal domicile certificate has reference only to the determination of an individual's nationality. The origin of the certificate is rooted in the requirements of the *Pakistan Citizenship Act of 1951*. As part of the latter's procedure to prove Pakistani citizenship it required the completion of Form P, which among other things called for a declaration of a 'place of domicile,' listing 'place,' 'tehsil,' 'district,' and 'province' of domicile.³⁸ This declaration of 'domicile' has drawbacks as a procedure for establishing residency for the purposes of the regional quotas. First, under the *Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951* no proof of district residency is required* to be produced to the District Magistrate (the

relevant authority). Second, the DM cannot revoke the domicile certificate on the grounds of a false declaration of residency, but only either for the commission of traitorous acts against the state of Pakistan or for the fraudulent claim of Pakistani citizenship.³⁹

To close such gaping loopholes and to protect their respective sons of the soil provinces have established their own methods to determine residency. The most thoroughgoing approach has been that undertaken in Sind. *The Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules, 1971*⁴⁰ direct District Magistrates to follow detailed procedures for confirming residency both in the province and in the relevant district. Among the relevant factors used to determine an individual's residency are place of father's domicile, place of applicant's education, place of applicant's birth, and length of applicant's stay in the province/district.⁴¹ The rules also provide for the appeal of the DM's decision to the Sind Permanent Residence Appellate Tribunal whose decisions are final.⁴²

Not as formal but certainly as rigorous has been Baluchistan's policy. In order to prove residence in Baluchistan an individual must either: (a) have a 'local resident certificate' or (b) a 'permanent resident certificate'. The first is issued to those Baluch who have tribal affiliation to Baluchistan and/or can trace their roots to Baluchistan 'since time immemorial'. The second was originally to be issued only to those who had maintained a continuous residence in the province of Baluchistan for 12 years and who had exclusively attended Baluchistan schools.⁴³ The so-called '12 year rule' was found extreme in subsequent court cases and proof of domicile is becoming increasingly akin to the Sind procedure.⁴⁴

Perhaps because the stakes are lower in the Punjab and NWFP (after all the purpose of the Sindhi and Baluch procedures is to exclude unwanted Punjabis and Pathans from competition), the procedures for proving residency in the latter two provinces are far less stringent. The current practice consists of convincing the relevant DM of one's residence—the standards of proof are informal and left to the discretion of the individual officer.

Underlying such procedural safeguards against domicile fraud are the courts. Cases involving domicile are admissible

to the Superior Courts through writ jurisdiction, and any citizen aggrieved by the consequences of a domicile decision has standing to originate a suit. Therefore, suits are filed not only by candidates who have been denied requested domiciles or admissions, but can also be filed against the credentials of successful candidates already admitted. Though there have been hundreds of cases brought against the admission policies of educational institutions⁴⁵ there have been comparatively few cases brought against the decisions of the Federal Public Service Commission or Provincial Public Service Commissions.⁴⁶ Ostensibly such latter institutions screen domicile certificates very carefully before admitting candidates to examinations or interviews in order to avoid litigation.

In any case, the procedures for ascertaining domicile serve to reduce, if not eliminate, the incidence of domicile fraud. A would-be Sindhi, for example, not only has to find an accommodating DM, but also must pass the scrutiny of the Sind Public Service Commission, the PRC Appellate Tribunal, and most importantly must assuage the self-motivated suspicions of aggrieved rejected candidates.

Is the Bureaucracy of Pakistan Regionally Representative?

Is the Quota Observed in Admission Policies?

Is there Discrimination in the Career Prospects of
Established Administrators?

The Quota and Aggregate Regional Representation. The modest direct way to approach issues related to the representativeness of Pakistan's bureaucracy is to examine aggregate regional representation. Table 8.1 demonstrates that relative to the quota: (a) Urban Sind and to a lesser extent the Punjab are overrepresented in the bureaucracy while Rural Sind, Baluchistan, the Northern Areas, and Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and Azad Kashmir are underrepresented; (b) that such inequalities are positively correlated with rank; but (c) that such inequalities have been reduced since 1973. This latter finding suggests that the quota has been effective in dampening regional inequality over time. Table 8.2 approaches this latter hypothesis from a different

perspective by comparing regional representation within different sectors of the federal bureaucracy. Here it is demonstrated that there is a positive correlation between length of time under the terms of the quota and regional representativeness. That is, the secretariat subject to the terms of the quota for 25 years and the attached departments subject to the quota for approximately 15 years (in 1974) are more regionally representative than autonomous corporations, which at the time of the data were not subject to the quota.

A more detailed analysis is possible with respect to posts subject to the competitive examination. As has been demonstrated elsewhere, the mean score of candidates from the Punjab in the CSS Examination is consistently higher than the analogous scores of other regions.⁴⁷ Therefore, in the absence of the quota it can be presumed that Punjabis would dominate the bureaucratic system to an extent far greater than is currently the case. Specifically, it can be demonstrated that such domination would be particularly severe in the

TABLE 8.1
REGIONAL REPRESENTATION OF FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY,
1973-83
(Percentage wise)

Region	1973			1983	
	Quota	All	Gazetted	All	Grades 16 to 22
Punjab ^a	50.0	49.2	53.5	54.9	55.8
NWFP	11.5	10.5	7.0	13.4	11.6
Urban Sind ^b	7.6	30.1	33.5	17.4	20.2
Rural Sind	11.4	3.1	2.7	5.4	5.1
Baluchistan	3.5	2.5	1.5	3.4	3.1
Northern Areas/FATA ^c	4.0	2.6	1.3	3.6	3.4
Azad Kashmir	2.0	1.8	0.5	1.9	0.9
Total		84,749	6,011	134,310	11,816

Source: Government of Pakistan, *Federal Government Civil Servants Census Report, January 1983*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984 and Government of Pakistan, *Report of the Fourth Triennial Census of Federal Government Servants as on 1st January 1973*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1976.

^aIncludes Islamabad.

^bKarachi, Sukkur, and Hyderabad.

^cGilgit, Diamir and Baltistan Agencies, and FATA.

TABLE 8.2
REGIONAL REPRESENTATION IN SECTORS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY OF PAKISTAN, 1974

Region	Secretariat		Attached Departments		Public Enterprises	
	Grades 16 to 22	Grades 20 to 22	Grades 16 to 22	Grades 20 to 22	Salary greater than Rupees 1000 per month	
Punjab ^a	1205 (54.7)	128 (60.7)	4398 (62.1)	130 (54.9)	6810 (41.3)	
NWFP	168 (7.6)	18 (8.5)	522 (7.8)	28 (11.8)	1025 (6.2)	
Urban Sind ^b	663 (30.2)	44 (20.9)	1780 (25.1)	68 (28.7)	7721 (46.8)	
Rural Sind	95 (4.3)	11 (5.2)	185 (2.6)	7 (3.0)	592 (3.6)	
Baluchistan	33 (1.5)	6 (2.8)	95 (1.3)	2 (0.8)	194 (1.2)	
Northern Areas/FATA ^c	15 (0.7)	0 —	56 (0.8)	1 (0.4)	70 (0.4)	
Azad Kashmir	21 (1.0)	4 (1.9)	44 (0.6)	1 (0.4)	89 (0.5)	
Total	2200	211	7080	237	16501	

Source: Government of Pakistan, Statistics Cell, *Data on the Distribution of Federal Government Civil Servants By Grade, etc., as on 1-11-74*, xerox, Islamabad, 1976; Government of Pakistan, Statistics Cell, *Report on Distribution of Federal Civil Servants Employed in Attached Department and Subordinate Offices By Grade, etc.*, xerox, Islamabad, 1976; Government of Pakistan, Statistics Cell, *Provisional Data on Distribution of Employees of Autonomous Organizations and Taken-Over Establishments By Grade etc.*, xerox, Islamabad, 1976.

Figures in parentheses refer to relevant percentages.

^aIncludes Islamabad.

^bKarachi, Sukkur, and Hyderabad.

^cGilgit, Diamir and Baltistan Agencies, and FATA.

case of selection to the prestigious All-Pakistan Unified Grades.⁴⁸

Therefore, it appears from all available evidence that the operation of the quota has made the bureaucratic system of Pakistan more representative. However, there are two major caveats to this finding. First, as Table 8.3 demonstrates, district-wise representation in the bureaucracy is anything but equitable. Indeed five districts, each centres of education and culture, predominate—Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, and Quetta. In each district, representation is at least three times the mean district representation (controlling for population) prevailing in the state as a whole. Further as Table 8.3 demonstrates, less developed districts of Pakistan have remained woefully underrepresented, particularly in the NWFP, Sind, and Baluchistan, despite modest gains since 1973. One conclusion from this is that the urban educated, relatively Westernized elite of the society is favoured in selection to the federal bureaucracy. Another is that inequalities of intra-provincial representation are greater than inter-provincial inequalities. Finally, the quota system was not designed, and consequently has done little to bridge the 'developed'/'backward' gap within the state.

The second caveat is derivative of the first. Namely, the operation of Pakistan's quota has proven an imperfect tool to dispense compensatory justice. Since the criterion for favoured status is largely ascribed (domicile), and not based upon need nor achievement, it follows *et ceteris paribus* that the quota favours the relatively 'well-off' candidate from both backward and developed regions. It does not serve to select less favoured individuals to the bureaucracy, but rather relatively favoured individuals domiciled in relatively less favoured regions. Therefore, it can be argued that the quota system, rather than weakening class distinctions in the state, actually serves to reinforce such distinctions.

Regionalism and Career Patterns: The Case of the CSP. It is also useful to explore the related question of whether region plays a role in the career patterns of administrators after they have entered service. In other words, compliance with the terms of the quota for admission into the bureaucracy (as shown earlier) does not perforce translate into

equitable career patterns for members of minority ethnic communities. Therefore, it is important to test whether region is a discriminative factor in terms and conditions of service.

To test this hypothesis it was decided to gather information concerning the Civil Service of Pakistan in three time frames: 1965, 1971, and 1978. The CSP was chosen for analysis because of its prominence in the administrative system of Pakistan; the time frames because of their significance to the bureaucratic structure of Pakistan: '1965' was the heyday of CSP influence; '1971' preceded the Civil War and the administrative reforms; and '1978' post-dates the Bhutto years. Accordingly, data was gathered for the population (all) of the CSP officers in 1965 ($n=459$), 1971 ($n=501$), and 1978 ($n=243$).⁴⁹ Specifically, data was gathered for three relevant variables:

- *Domicile*—the most inclusive surrogate for regionalism in the context of Pakistani administration. An officer's domicile intercorrelates with linguistic, ethnic, and cultural factors relevant to regional differences.
- *Seniority*—measured by the length of time in the CSP.
- *Total pay of officer*—this is a surrogate for rank.

The most obvious approach to the questions posed above is to calculate the mean total pay of officers controlling for

TABLE 8.4
MEAN TOTAL PAY OF CSP OFFICERS BY DOMICILE

Domicile	1965	1971	1978
Punjab	1449 (133)	1862 (169)	2605 (137)
Sind	1480 (50)	1949 (62)	2780 (44)
NWFP	1184 (30)	1608 (39)	2583 (35)
Baluchistan	1163 (4)	1440 (6)	2466 (5)
'West Pakistan'	2480 (93)	2344 (25)	2935 (12)
East Pakistan	1181 (149)	1367 (201)	2514 (10)
West Pakistan, all	1734 (310)	1876 (301)	—

Source: Calculated by author.

Monetary units refer to mean total pay expressed in 1965, 1971, and 1978 Pakistan rupees.

Figures in parentheses refer to number of cases.

domicile. The fruits of this exercise are presented in Table 8.4. An examination of the findings resubstantiates the oft-repeated argument that West Pakistani officers held higher positions in the civilian bureaucracy than East Pakistani, hereinafter 'Bengali' officers.⁵⁰ For instance in 1965, the mean pay of West Pakistani officers was Rs. 1734; for Bengali officers Rs. 1181—a net difference of Rs. 553. By 1971, this gap had narrowed somewhat to Rs. 509. Of course, such gaps translate into significant rank differentials. Not expected, however, was the finding that the mean pay of Sindhi officers was greater in all three time periods than that of Punjabi officers, though this latter gap was much narrower than the East/West gap.⁵¹ Also interesting is the fact that mean pay levels of officers within West Pakistan (between provinces) have become considerably more egalitarian since 1965.

However suggestive these findings may be, a more meaningful measure of regional advantage or disadvantage would control for the effects of seniority. After all due to factors rooted in the British *raj* and not associated with public policy in Pakistan, individuals from certain regional or ethnic backgrounds may have been denied access to bureaucratic careers. For instance, only a handful of Bengali Muslims were members of the ICS.⁵² A rigorous method to approach questions of regional advantage controlling for seniority is to apply a multiple regression model to the data with total pay (an indicator of rank) serving as the dependent variable and seniority and domicile as independent variables. That is, the model assumes that rank is a function of seniority and domicile. That is:

$$Y \text{ (Total Pay)} = K + B_1 \text{ (Seniority)} + B_2 \text{ (Domicile)}$$

Table 8.5 presents the results of this exercise.

Questions concerning regional advantage or disadvantage encompass two major comparisons in the context of Pakistani administration: first, the comparison of West Pakistani or perhaps more specifically Punjabi officers with Bengali officers; second, comparisons of officers within West Pakistan. As mentioned above, the mean pay of West Pakistani officers and Punjabi officers were found to be considerably greater than the mean pay of Bengali officers in both 1965 and 1971.

This substantiates the orthodox perspective that Bengali CSP officers suffered from severe regional disadvantage. However, as Table 8.5 demonstrates, when the effects of seniority are controlled this disadvantage vanishes! For instance, the expected pay of a Bengali officer in 1965 with 15 years seniority in the CSP is identical to the expected level of pay of Punjabi officers with the same seniority—Rs. 1923. In fact in 1965, Bengali officers enjoyed a modest pay advantage over West Pakistani officers—Rs. 1923 *versus* Rs. 1903. The relative position of Bengali officers had deteriorated somewhat by 1971, when the comparable levels of Bengali officers have expected values of Rs. 1882 *versus* the more-favoured Punjabi officers with an expected pay of Rs. 1925. However, the latter gap is modest—it translates into a regional advantage of approximately 4 months. That is, in 1971 a Bengali officer could be expected to require 4 months longer in service to reach the rank of his more-favoured Punjabi counterpart (4 months in 15 years).

TABLE 8.5
MEAN EXPECTED PAY OF CSP OFFICERS WITH
FIFTEEN YEARS SENIORITY BY DOMICILE

Domicile	1965	1971	1978
Punjab	1923	1925	2267
Sind	1910	1903	2238
NWFP	1905	1930	2332
'West Pakistan'	1862	1911	2192 (12)
East Pakistan	1923	1882	2122 (10)
West Pakistan, all	1903	1920	2273
Range	61	48	94
$\bar{X}$ Yearly Increment	103	115	103
Relative Advantage	6 months	5 months	11 months

Source: Calculated by author.

Figures refer to predicted mean pay of CSP officers from specified domiciles in respective years with fifteen years seniority in the CSP.

Baluchistan is excluded from the table because of small n size.

'Range' is the difference between the highest and lowest expected value. The range in 1978 is calculated between NWFP and Sind because of the small n in 'West Pakistan' and East Pakistan.

' $\bar{X}$ Yearly Increment' is expected marginal yearly increase due to an additional year of seniority:

'Relative Advantage' = $\frac{\text{range}}{\bar{X} \text{ Yearly Increment}}$ expressed in months.

The second relevant comparison is between provinces within the geographical boundary known until 1971 as West Pakistan. It was found that the mean pay (See Table 8.4) of Punjabi and Sindhi officers was greater than the comparable level of pay for officers of the NWFP and Baluchistan, though such gaps had narrowed since 1965. When the effects of seniority are controlled, however, this gap also vanishes. In fact, in 1971 and in 1978, officers of the NWFP benefit from a modest advantage (perhaps interpretable as reverse discrimination) *vis-a-vis* Punjabi and Sindhi officers when the effects of seniority are controlled.

The implications of these findings are important. First, the highly politicized gaps that have existed between levels of regional authority or representation in the civilian bureaucracy have not been exacerbated by discriminative governmental policy. Of course, the fact that Punjabi officers have dominated important civilian posts is undeniable. However, this dominance was a consequence of an initial advantage which accrued to Punjabi officers at Partition.⁵³ The effects of this initial advantage have not been enhanced by governmental policy nor conspiracy. In fact, in the case of officers from the NWFP the outcomes of governmental policy have resulted in modest reverse discrimination against Punjabis. Second, the Punjabi dominance which obviously existed and has continued to exist within the CSP is a consequence of the 'institutional autonomy' of the CSP. Simply, the initial advantage enjoyed by Punjabi officers was greater seniority—they entered the service first. This advantage in seniority was translated into a corresponding advantage in rank. Governmental policy designed to secure equality of regional access at entry level positions did not touch this gap in relative levels of seniority. Nor was there any successful attempt to challenge the process of selection of CSP officers by direct entry level competition. When attempts were made to restructure the selection process of CSP officers, through the lateral recruitment programme (1973-5), they were resisted by officers of the CSP attempting to protect the autonomy of their service and their sanguine career prospects. (See Chapter 3.) This resistance came from both Punjabi and Bengali (as well as other sectors of) CSP officers.⁵⁴ In other

words, it was in the interests of all CSP officers regardless of seniority or regional background to maintain institutional control of career patterns. A byproduct of their success was the perpetuation of regional advantage within the service.

What are the Fixed Costs of the System?

Regardless of the relative degree of success of the quota system in promoting regional equality, the introduction of quotas has had several unhappy consequences for the administrative system of Pakistan. The most obvious cost concerns the systematic frustration of the merit principle of selection to public sector posts. In regard to posts subject to competition some candidates are selected who would not be eligible in the absence of the quota and conversely others are denied positions for which they would have been eligible solely on merit. In regard to posts subject to interview, prospective candidates with requisite qualifications for particular posts are systematically excluded because of regional considerations. In both instances, the quota selects candidates who, according to whatever criterion of merit is employed, are not the 'best' available for appointment. Arguably, such a selection policy makes the bureaucracy less efficient.

Also the procedures for implementing the quota often result in significant delays in filling vacant posts. For example, if a post falls vacant in a federal department subject to FPSC rules, the notification of the vacancy is passed onto the FPSC both for advertisement and for the assignment of the quota. Then the post is listed, candidates with the requisite qualifications and domicile are interviewed, and ideally an individual is recommended for appointment. If all runs smoothly, this process takes approximately six months. However, if, as is often the case, it proves difficult to find an individual possessing both the requisite qualifications *and* domicile, the process can be delayed considerably. It is not unusual for a case of this type to drag on for two or three years, with the post left vacant or filled on an *ad hoc* basis by the relevant department. It is also not uncommon for vacancies to go unfilled because no candidates with the

requisite qualifications and domicile applies for the given job. In recent years, this latter phenomenon has occurred with increasing frequency, particularly in regard to technical vacancies.⁵⁵ Also, since 1977, the FPSC has had trouble filling vacancies through the competitive examination process. Indeed in 1982, the FPSC was forced to conduct an extraordinary competitive examination limited to candidates from Urban Sind, Rural Sind, the Northern Areas, and Azad Kashmir to address the shortfall.⁵⁶

Third, the complexities of the quota may discourage prospective candidates from standing for the competitive examination or from seeking other government employment. The opportunity costs of participating in the recruitment process to the Central Superior Services are great. A candidate must first prepare and stand for the examination, then wait for the results before knowing whether one has gained entry to a preferred occupational group.⁵⁷ Such costs are compounded by the uncertainty of the operation of the quota. From the perspective of an individual candidate there are two avenues to assure assignment to one's preferred occupational group: (a) score in the top 10 per cent of the successful recruits (i.e., within the merit range); or (b) score relatively high in comparison with one's domicile cohorts. However, it is impossible to adequately assess the probabilities of either of these outcomes given the limited amount of information available to candidates. Until group assignment takes place candidates do not know how they stand in relation to other candidates. Similarly, as mentioned above, recruitment by interview is a slow and uncertain process. Given such considerations would-be candidates are in effect encouraged to seek alternative careers.

Fourth, the quota system encourages the perception of wide-scale corruption in the bureaucracy. Obviously, the implementation of the quota has opened up new and potentially lucrative avenues of corruption, but as argued earlier, its prevalence is exaggerated at least in regard to federal posts and to domicile fraud.

Finally, the quota system, though demonstrably increasing regional representativeness in the bureaucracy, has also served to reinforce invidious distinctions between regions. The

system's reliance on a small merit reservation, coupled with the widely-publicized and oft-repeated theme of regional-based distinctions of performance on the examinations or of distinctions in relevant qualifications or levels of skill, leads to the perception that job-seekers from the more-favoured regions bear the brunt of the government's attempts to equalize access to the bureaucracy or to the professions. Indeed, hardly a day passes when one of the major Pakistani dailies does not run an editorial by a disaffected individual, usually a Punjabi, calling for greater reliance on merit in some phase of federal personnel policy, and implicitly claiming reverse discrimination. Conversely, individuals domiciled in less-favoured regions must reconcile themselves with the phenomenon that they are perceived less qualified than their counterparts from the Punjab or Karachi. Such perceptions are given added credence due to the quota's implicit paternalism, and reinforce the already formidable ethnic, cultural, racial, and linguistic cleavages between regions. Indeed, the very existence of the quota provides statutory verification of the hypothesis that some regions/peoples are superior/inferior to others.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite assessments of the cost/benefits of Pakistan's quota policy it is a near certainty that the policy or some close variant of the policy will continue for the foreseeable future. The quota was introduced in Pakistan with the expectation by its framers that the need for its operation would end five years after its commencement. Further, since the introduction of the quota, virtually every administrative report has called for its dismantlement. But even modest proposals calling for marginal modifications in the terms of the quota's operation have been ignored by successive governments.⁵⁸ The reason is that the quota has become a political bombshell. Any modification of the terms of the quota would likely be interpreted as favouring some groups at the expense of others, and would be attributed to ulterior motives of clever politicians. Given such considerations prudent policy-makers

in Pakistan are likely to continue to give the quota a wide berth.

* * *

This chapter is an extensive revision of Kennedy, C.H., 'Policies of Ethnic Preference in Pakistan', *Asian Survey*, XXIV, No. 6, June 1984, pp. 688-703. It also draws material from two unpublished papers: Kennedy, C.H., 'Policies of Redistributive Preference in Pakistan', delivered at the American Political Science Association Convention, September 1984 and 'Regionalism in the Civil Service of Pakistan and the Indian Administrative Service', delivered at the Wisconsin Conference on South Asia, November 1981.

NOTES

1. One prevalent interpretation of the causes of the 1971 War posits that grievances generated by such inequalities exacerbated the racial and linguistic gaps between the two Wings and made the civil war inevitable. See for instance Jahan, R., *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1972.

2. Approximate populations of provinces in 1984 are: Punjab 52.4 million, Sind 20.8 million, NWFP 14.5 million (including Federally Administered Tribal Areas, excluding Afghan refugees), and Baluchistan 4.7 million. Comparable figures for ethnic communities do not exist. Populations were calculated by the author by using 1981 census data and assuming 3 per cent annual growth in each province since that date.

3. Such individuals enjoyed a disproportionate amount of influence in the professions, civil bureaucracy, and business community of Pakistan, particularly during the early years of the state. However, as this group ages its influence has and will decline. See Wright, Theodore P. Jr., 'Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan', *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, 1974, pp. 189-201.

4. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, Statistics Division, *Main Findings of the 1981 Census*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1983, p. 15.

5. Calculated from *ibid.*, p. 5.

6. *Ibid.*

7. In Quetta Division (1981) there were 136,000 households who claimed Pushto as their mother language while only 32,000 claimed Baluchi or Brohi as their mother tongue. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, *1981 Census Report of Baluchistan Province*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1984, p. 107.

8. Husain, A.I., 'Introduction of Urdu in Administration', in Husain, A.I., (editor), *Studies in Public Administration of Pakistan*, Pakistan Administrative Research Centre, Islamabad, 1979.

9. Arguments gathered from a reading of *Muslim, Dawn*, and *Viewpoint* 1984-5.

10. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, *Main Findings of the 1981 Population Census*, MPCPP, Islamabad, 1983, p. 13.

11. Given such complexity, an assimilative linguistic policy is perhaps doomed to failure. It is interesting to note that ballot papers in the 19 December 1984 referendum were written in Urdu, English, and Sindhi. Responses, however, were to be recorded only in Urdu.

12. For the purposes of the federal quota Sind is divided into 'urban'—Karachi's three districts and Hyderabad and Sukkur Districts; and 'rural'—the ten remaining districts of the province.

13. Burki, S.J., in 'A Note on Perspectives on Economic Development and Regional Inequalities in Pakistan', presented to the 32nd Annual AAS Meeting, calculates that in 1977 the mean *per capita* income in the two richer provinces (Punjab and Sind), was 28 per cent higher than that of the poorer provinces, p.4.

14. In 1977 the mean life expectancy in rural Baluchistan was 42 years and rural NWFP 44 years. The mean life expectancy in the Punjab and Sind was 60 years. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

15. In 1977 there were 3,000 'registered factories' with over 20 employees in the Punjab and 2,889 in Sind. While in the NWFP there were only 262 such factories and in Baluchistan 9. Government of Pakistan, Statistics Division, *Enquiry on Labour Welfare*, 1977, GOPP, Karachi, 1981, pp. 1-15. Similarly in 1977, of all 'establishments with 20 or more employees excluding defence establishments' 7,859 were found in the Punjab, 2,673 in the Sind, 1,046 in NWFP, and 290 in Baluchistan. Government of Pakistan, *Report on Annual Establishment Inquiry*, 1976-7, GOPP, Karachi, 1981, p. 1.

16. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, *Housing and Population Censuses of Pakistan*, Islamabad, 1981, p. 1.

17. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, *Main Findings of the 1981 Population Census*, Islamabad, 1983, p. 11.

18. Government of Pakistan, Population Census Organization, *Housing Census of Pakistan*, 1980, Islamabad, 1982, p. 17.

19. Useful overviews of the nationalities question are found in Ziring, L., *Pakistan: Enigma of Political Development*, Westview, Boulder, 1980; Bin-Sayeed, K., *Politics in Pakistan*, Praeger, New York, 1981; Syed, A., *Pakistan: Islam and National Solidarity*, Praeger, 1983; and in Harrison, S., *In Afghanistan's Shadow*, Carnegie Endowment, Washington, 1980.

20. Major programmes of local government in order of original implementation include: *Panchayats*, *Village Panchayats*, *Basic Democracies*, *Integrated Rural Development*, and the *People's Works Programme*. Since 1979 the Local Government Programme has been in effect.

21. 'Proportionality recognizes the group basis of politics in communally divided societies and attempts to achieve rough equity among groups rather than among individuals.' Esman, M.J., 'The Management of Communal Conflict', *Public Policy*, Vol. XXI, 1973, p. 62.

22. The first quota system for which written documentation exists was implemented in 1950 with application to the entering batch of that year. Government of Pakistan, *Second Report of the Pakistan Public Service Commission for the Period 1st January to 31st December 1949*, MOP, Karachi, 1950, p. 7. However, according to members of the 1948 batch of recruits (those who entered service in 1949) the quota was in effect during their selection as well. The terms of the 1949 quota, slightly different from the 1950 quota were: 15 per cent merit; 43 per cent East Pakistan; 42 per cent West Pakistan. West Pakistan was further subdivided into Punjab 23 per cent; NWFP, Sind, Baluchistan, and Northern Areas and Tribal Territories 17 per cent; and Karachi 2 per cent. (Interviews.)

23. Braibanti, R., 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan', in Braibanti, *et al.*, *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1966, p. 265.

24. Interviews with Principals.

25. Article 17.

26. Article 240.

27. 367 candidates entered through competition (CSS Examination), 912 entered through Central Public Service Commission direct recruitment (by interview), and approximately 800 were admitted through departmental and attached departmental recruitment.

28. In January 1972, the quota read: Zone 1 = Quetta, Kalat, and Lasbela; Zone 2 = Hyderabad and Khairpur Divisions; Zone 3 = Lahore Division and the districts of Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Sargodha, Lyallpur, Multan, and Sahiwal; Zone 4 = Bahawalpur Division and the districts of Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Campbellpur, Jhelum, Mianwali, and Jhang; Zone 5 = Agencies, States and Tribal Areas, including Added and Special Areas Adjoining Settled Areas; Zone 6 = Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan Divisions (excluding Zone 5). Also recruitment was continued separately for the 'NWFP' (Zones 5 and 6), 'Sind' (Zone 2), 'Punjab and Bahawalpur' (Zones 3 and 4), and for 'Karachi'. Percentile bases for such recruitment during 1972-3 were never finalized.

29. Government of Pakistan, Establishment Division, O.M. No. F8/9/72 TRV, 31 August 1973.

30. In 1973 approximate populations were: Punjab 55.5 per cent, Urban Sind 6.8 per cent, Rural Sind 13.8 per cent, Baluchistan 3 per cent, NWFP 12.3 per cent, Northern Areas and Tribal Territories 3.7 per cent, and Azad Kashmir 4.4 per cent.

31. Government of Pakistan, *International Symposium on Economic Performance of Public Enterprises*, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, Lahore, 1981.

32. Zone 1 (developed) = Lahore Division and the districts of Rawalpindi, Gujrat, Sargodha, Lyallpur, Multan, and Sahiwal; Zone 2 (less developed) = Bahawalpur Division and the districts of Muzaffargarh, Dera Ghazi Khan, Campbellpur, Jhelum, Mianwali, and Jhang.

33. After reorganization the Punjabi quota reads: Zone 2 = Bahawalpur Division, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Mianwali, Bhakkar, Attock, and Jhelum. All other areas of the Punjab = Zone 1. *Pakistan Times*, 4 November 1983.

34. Individuals from the 'less developed regions' are allowed age relaxations. Also part of the NWFP quota is a 10 per cent provincial reservation for military personnel domiciled in the province.

35. O.M. No. 14/5/79-D III, 10 February 1980. Between July 1977 and February 1980 military officers were appointed at the entry stage on an *ad hoc* basis. Such appointments were regularized in an amendment dated 10 January 1980 to the *Federal Public Service Commission Act, 1977*, (Ordinance No. XLV of 1977).

36. Example drawn from Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Report for the Year 1976*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1978.

37. Establishment Division, O.M. Nos. 8/9/72-TRV., 10 November 1973; 8/9/72-TRV, 4 April 1974; F 8/9/72-TRV, 29 September 1973.

38. Muhammed Yar Khan *versus* Deputy Commissioner cum Political Agent 1980, *SCMR (Supreme Court Monthly Review)*, 456.

39. Abdul Hafiz Khan *versus* Deputy Commissioner, Khuzdar, *PLD (All-Pakistan Legal Decisions)*, 1983, Quetta, 20.

40. *Sind Permanent Residence Certificate Rules*, 1971 found in *PLD* 1972, Sind Statutes, 14-19.

41. Section 15 of the *Sind PRC Rules* reads:

'The applicant claims a certificate of permanent residence because:

i) he was born in Sind and at the time of his birth his father was domiciled in Sind

ii) he was born in Sind after the death of his father, who at the time of his death, was domiciled in Sind

iii) he was born in Sind of illegitimate birth, and his mother, at the time of his birth, was domiciled in Sind

iv) his parents are domiciled in Sind, and have resided in Sind for a period not less than three years

v) his parents are not domiciled in Sind, but he is domiciled in Sind and has resided or been educated in Sind for a period not less than three years

vi) his father or mother is in the service of the Government of Sind and have put in not less than one year's service as such.'

42. *Sind PRC Rules* Section 8(1).

43. Zahar Ahmed *versus* Province of Baluchistan, *PLD* 1979, Quetta 57.

44. For example Miss Riffat Parveen *versus* Selection Committee, Bolan Medical College, *PLD* 1980, Quetta 10, ruled that length of stay in a province was only one and not the exclusive factor in determining residency.

45. The intricacies of the determination of domicile are discussed more fully in Kennedy, C.H., 'Policies of Redistributive Preference in Pakistan', paper delivered to the American Political Science Association, Convention, September 1984.

46. An exception is Zahoar Mahmood Farooqui *versus* The Punjab Public Service Commission, *PLD* 1985, Lahore 358.

47. Kennedy, *op. cit.*, 1979, pp. 188-223.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

49. The sample of 1978 included 'CSP cohorts' (officers who entered the bureaucracy as members of the CSP). The CSP was disestablished in 1973.

50. Jahan, op. cit., 1972.

51. Due in large part to the *muhajirs* dominance of the bureaucracy of Sind, see Wright, op. cit., 1974.

52. Braibanti, R., 'Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan', in La Palombara, J., (editor), *Bureaucracy and Political Development*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, pp. 365-6.

53. This accords with Braibanti's argument, *ibid*.

54. For instance, service demands calling for the abolition of lateral recruitment and for the maintenance of the CSP were voiced by both the CSP Association, Rawalpindi as well as the CSP Association, Dacca. In fact, an analysis of the service demands made to various administrative reform commissions demonstrates that there is no relevant differences between views of regional CSP Associations.

55. Government of Pakistan, Federal Public Service Commission, *Annual Reports for the Years 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983*, Karachi/Islamabad, various dates.

56. There were 73 vacancies in all – Urban Sind 21, Rural Sind 36, Baluchistan 5, Northern Areas 9, and Azad Kashmir 2. For the special examination age limits were lifted from 25 to 35 years and Third Division graduates, normally barred from participation in the CSS Examination, were allowed to compete. 169 candidates were declared successful by the FPSC and President Zia directed that all should be inducted into the public service despite the fact that vacancies existed for only 73.

57. From 1974 until 1979 assignment to occupational groups was delayed an additional nine months due to the requirement, since discontinued, of a Final Passing Out Examination from the Academy for Administrative Training before assignment.

58. For example the Pay and Services Commission of 1978 examined the question of terminating the quota and recommended a modification calling for 20 per cent merit, instead of the current 10 per cent merit reservation. The proposal was not accepted by the government nor has the report of the Commission been released to the public. Indeed in March 1984, President Zia announced a 10 year extension of the federal quota until March 1994.

9

Prestige of Services and Bhutto's Reforms

It has been over a decade since Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto pronounced his self-styled 'revolutionary' administrative reforms. The avowed purpose of such reforms was to disestablish the system of 'service cadres,' a system introduced by the British in the eighteenth century, and embraced in Pakistan with certain modifications subsequent to Partition. One motive underlying such disestablishment, however, was the intent to weaken bureaucratic resistance to Mr. Bhutto's ambitious social and economic policies and specifically to challenge the kernel of such resistance—the CSP. Several policies introduced in 1973 and crafted to lead to this latter end included:¹ (a) the abolition of the CSP Academy; (b) the adoption of a uniform pay scale which reduced CSP officers comparative advantage in salary structure; (c) the elimination of reservation of posts for CSP officers; (d) the abolition of the CSP as a group; and (e) the introduction of lateral recruitment, designed in part to politicize the bureaucracy.

Much has happened in Pakistan since Mr. Bhutto's reforms were promulgated. Most notable from the perspective of the administrative reforms was the military "coup" of 1977 which installed General Muhammed Zia-ul-Haq as CMLA. One of the first things the new regime did was to attempt to legitimize its assumption of power through discrediting the policies of its predecessor. One victim of such a process was the administrative reforms, characterized in the *White Papers* as politically-motivated and a blatant attempt at control of the bureaucracy.² Accordingly, the new government abolished the lateral recruitment programme, reappointed several CSP

officers who had been dismissed by Bhutto, dismissed many officers (primarily through early retirement)³ who had been appointed during Bhutto's regime,⁴ and re-positioned former CSP officers at critical points within the bureaucracy.⁵ Indeed by 1978, a wizened senior bureaucrat and survivor of the tumults of the seventies, remarked that the 'CSP was back in the saddle' and that the 'natural comity of interests between civilian and military bureaucrats had been re-established.'

However, from the vantage point of 1985, we contend that the latter gentleman's observation needs amendment. The post-reform bureaucratic environment is far different from that which characterized the bureaucratic setting prior to Mr. Bhutto's purposeful meddling. Though former CSP officers still dominate key positions within the bureaucracy their dominance as well as numbers are dwindling, and more importantly the service cadre system of bureaucratic organization has undergone considerable transformation.

This chapter attempts to justify these latter contentions by examining the patterns of prestige within the bureaucratic system of Pakistan since 1970. First, it details the distinctions in career patterns and perquisites of office associated with cadre membership which characterized the pre-reform bureaucratic environment. Second, it introduces the conceptual and methodological foundation for the measurement of prestige within Pakistan's bureaucracy. And third, it reports the findings of the exercise described earlier, and relates such findings to the broader question of administrative development in Pakistan.

THE PRE-REFORM ENVIRONMENT

The bureaucratic environment which Mr. Bhutto and his 'reform-minded colleagues' encountered upon assuming power was dominated by two well-established traditions. First, the bureaucracy was divided, to perhaps a unique degree into multitudinous sub-bureaucracies, each with attendant and distinct career patterns. Second, the bureaucracy was dominated by the omnipresent reality of the CSP.

Both traditions are discussed as follows. (See also Chapters 1 and 2.)

The single most important determinant of an individual officer's career pattern in the bureaucracy was membership in one of the numerous semi-functional 'cadres' or 'services.' At the federal level there were two 'All-Pakistan Services' (the CSP and the PSP), and eleven Central Services. Also, there existed several technical services and paradoxically two 'services' whose members belonged permanently to other 'services.' Further, many of these cadres were divided into sub-cadres, variably dependent upon type of task performed, geographical region of such performance, type of recruitment to original service and/or relative status of occupation. The structure of provincial bureaucracies mirrored this pattern with attendant Byzantine complexities.

Two characteristics of such cadre membership are greatly significant to considerations of status and prestige within the bureaucracy. Namely, the prospects of individual officers closely correlated with the prospects of fellow cadre members. That is, the individual mobility of officers within the bureaucracy was determined by the general level of mobility of the cadre as a whole. Second, there was very little interchange of personnel between cadres. Once an officer became a member of a cadre, he was consigned to such membership for life. When it was necessary for an officer to be assigned to a post which did not fall within the ambit of his cadre's normal responsibilities, the typical solution was to borrow such an officer for the duration of the assignment. Such officers were considered to be 'on deputation,' or in the case of officers borrowed by the CSP, to be 'listed post holders' or 'ex-cadre officers.' In practice, such borrowing was not limited to temporary assignments. Indeed many officers were 'listed post holders' or were 'on deputation' for the bulk of their careers.

Complicating his pattern of organization were the so-called 'class' designation of officers; and the numerous pay schedules applicable to different types of employees. In pre-reform parlance all officers in the bureaucracy fell into one of four classes—unimaginatively termed Class I—Class IV. Roughly speaking, Class I officers were management level

personnel; Class II were supervisory level personnel; Class III skilled workers; and Class IV unskilled workers. Interacting with such designations and with the cadre system of organization and partially a consequence of such resultant complexity, were the numerous pay schedules applicable to public servants. Two factors interacted to determine an officer's level of pay: his cadre membership and his rank within that cadre. An indicator of the complexity of this arrangement is the fact that in 1971 there were over 600 distinct pay scales in the public bureaucracy of Pakistan. (See Chapter 4.)

Perhaps inevitably, membership in certain cadres afforded greater benefits than membership in other cadres. By far the most-favoured cadre was the CSP. The bases of such dominance were located both in the statutory provisions which favoured the CSP, and in the more subtle, though arguably more important, realm of the norms and practices governing behaviour within the bureaucracy.

The most celebrated advantage officers of the CSP enjoyed was the so-called 'reservation of posts' at federal and provincial levels. In 1970, two-thirds of the positions carrying a rank equivalent to Joint Secretary or above in the federal secretariat were reserved for members of the CSP, and 70 per cent of the posts at Deputy Secretary levels or above in the provincial secretariats were similarly reserved.⁶ Also, CSP officers dominated district and divisional administration, due in large measure to the customary practice of starting CSP probationers at posts of Assistant Deputy Commissioner. Further, when the Economic Pool was formed in 1959 (with the intention of attracting and organizing economic and financial talent in the bureaucracy), 60 per cent of such vacancies were allotted to members of the CSP.⁷ Indeed, so many posts were reserved for the CSP that its actual cadre strength never equalled the number of posts reserved for its members. In 1970, approximately 570 such posts were reserved for members of the CSP, while the actual cadre strength of the CSP, including probationers, was only 522.⁸ These reservations were given *de facto* sanction through relevant provisions of the 1956, 1962, and interim 1972 Constitutions of Pakistan concerning safeguards against dismissal, removal, reduction in rank, or compulsory retirement of public servants.⁹

A second advantage enjoyed by members of the CSP was associated with the training opportunities afforded its members. A newly-selected probationer to the CSP was subjected to a lengthy period of training at the Civil Service Academy.¹⁰ Though other cadres had training programmes for their probationers, none approached the glamour of the Academy. Instructors at the Academy contained a sample of the best minds in Pakistan, and the Academy drew upon foreign scholars to buttress its status. Perhaps more important than the information conveyed during training sessions, however, was the implicit process of socialization, akin to the initiation of an individual to a guild or a fraternity, which the Academy fostered. Many of the practices undertaken at the Academy—horseback riding, 'games,' mandatory mess nights, complete with formal attire—were important components in the formation of a 'we-feeling,' a sense that the CSP was separate and better than other sectors of the bureaucracy.¹¹ Attendance at the CSP Academy opened the door to a web of affiliations, and provided avenues of informal influence within the bureaucracy. A well-timed call to a well-placed 'batch mate' often cut through resistance to a given action, better than working through the cumbersome channels of authority. Finally, a CSP officer was much more likely to receive additional much sought after foreign experience/training than a non-CSP officer.¹²

The most immediate consequence of the confluence of the reservation of posts and the advantages which accrued from the training process was a remarkable degree of positional dominance by the CSP. In 1971, 12 CSP officers were federal Secretaries, 5 others were Additional Secretaries; all 5 Chief Secretaries of the provinces were CSP officers, as well as 3 Additional Chief Secretaries; 18 Divisional Commissioners were members of the CSP, 38 were Deputy Commissioners; 5 others were High Court Justices; the administration of the national training institutions was dominated by 12 well-placed CSP officers; 12 others were Chairmen/Managing Directors of autonomous governmental corporations; and 8 members of the CSP were Advisors/Private Secretaries to major political actors.¹³ Compared to other sectors of the bureaucracy such dominance was overwhelming. In 1970, of

the 497 members of the CSP, 250 held posts with a monthly salary in excess of Rs. 2,000. 135 of these held a post whose rank was equivalent to, or greater than that of Joint Secretary. Of the remaining approximately 19,500 Class I officers serving in the bureaucracy of Pakistan, only 175 drew salaries in excess of Rs. 2,000, and only twenty officers held posts at the rank of Joint Secretary or above.¹⁴

A final consequence of the dominance of the CSP was the fact that its officers were subject to much more rapid promotion than other members of the bureaucracy. Even when compared with officers of other 'elite cadres' the comparative advantage enjoyed by CSP officers was awesome. In 1971, the average increment in salary per year of seniority in the public service for CSP officers was Rs. 98.¹⁵ The next highest increment among all cadres was found within the PFS with a rate of Rs. 76. Comparable figures for the next four most-favoured services were: PRAS, Rs. 65; PAAS, Rs. 60; PSP, Rs. 58; and the PMAS, Rs. 50. Another way to express this gap is to state that an officer of the CSP after ten years service could expect to be drawing a salary of approximately Rs. 1,500 per month; and officer of the next most-favoured cadre (PFS) Rs. 1,250; and an officer of the PMAS a salary of Rs. 1,000.¹⁶ The expected salary of all other members of the bureaucracy was still lower.

In the light of this description of the bureaucratic environment facing Mr. Bhutto, his blueprint for reform was very ambitious. As mentioned above, his policies called for the disbanding of the CSP, the abolishment of the cadre system of organization, elimination of training advantages heretofore enjoyed by CSP officers, the establishment of a unified pay scale, and the introduction of lateral recruitment. Combined these policies constituted very significant departures from the pre-reform system. The chapter will now focus on the extent to which such policies actually were incorporated and have penetrated the bureaucratic system. The indicator employed to measure such effects will be the most potent symbol of the pre-reform environment and the main target of the reform, the prestige of elite service cadres and particularly the CSP. Simply, if the reforms worked towards their desired outcomes one would expect that the prestige of the CSP and

other elite cadres would weaken; if not, that it would remain constant or increase. The choice of such an indicator also allows longitudinal comparison with the post-reform environment.

TOWARDS AN INDICATOR OF PRESTIGE

A fully satisfactory formal definition of prestige is not easily stated. But for the purposes of this study, prestige is the esteem, respect, or approval that is granted by an individual or a collectivity to individuals or groups because of performance, qualities or roles demonstrated by such individuals or groups.¹⁷ Analytically, prestige can be regarded either as positional or personal; i.e., prestige can be accorded to an individual either as a consequence of the position held by that individual or as a consequence of certain personal attributes of that individual. In any case, however, prestige is manifestly a subjective phenomenon.¹⁸ To find out how much prestige Actor X has, one must find out how other relevant actors perceive his role or position. This makes the measurement of prestige difficult. Obviously, opinions concerning the relative prestige of individuals or groups differ from individual to individual. Therefore, an adequate indicator of prestige must both take into account the perceptions of relevant actors concerning prestige, and make allowances for individual differences in such perceptions. The indicator employed in this study meets both of these criteria.

In order to join the federal bureaucracy as a direct recruit candidates must pass the CSS Examination, and then subject to the regional quota restrictions must undergo joint training at the Civil Services Academy. Eventual assignment to occupational groups is determined by the confluence of three factors: merit (the respective performance in the CSS Examination); regional quotas; and the individual probationer's preference for group membership. In regard to the latter factor, probationers rank groups in order of individual preference and submit this preference order on a special form to the Federal Public Service Commission. (See Chapter 5.)

By analysing such preference forms it is possible to create

a useful measure of prestige. Such an indicator is both 'reliable' and 'valid.'¹⁹ It is a 'reliable' measure because: (1) probationers were uniformly asked to state their preferences on an identical form designed for the purpose during each of the nine years studied; and (2) in all cases, probationers filled out the foregoing forms before they underwent training, and before their assignment, i.e., the effects of bureaucratic socialization are minimized. The indicator is 'valid' for three reasons. (1) Probationers are in a position to know a great deal concerning differential prospects associated with assignment to particular cadres. (2) Probationers are vitally concerned with their eventual assignment, and there is no logical rationale to misrepresent their preferences. And, (3) the measure of prestige has at least 'face validity' with our usage of the term 'prestige.' Indeed, probationers constitute a particularly significant relevant actor in the assessment of prestige. Probationers have a concrete basis for their ordering of cadres, the rationale for such orderings constituting perceived advantages or disadvantages associated with membership in such cadres. In essence, through the mechanism of preference order probationers are stating, all things being equal, which cadre they would like to be associated with during the balance of their careers. Such perceptions of advantages and disadvantages are the stuff of prestige.

Accordingly, data was collected from the relevant preference forms for nine batches of probationers, 1970-81. In each case the top five preferences of each probationer was noted (for example, for probationer A—first preference = Group X; second preference = Group Y, etc). The batches chosen for inclusion in the sample constitute all of the direct recruits to the federal bureaucracy over the relevant time frame. The strategy of including the nine batches also enables one to construct an informal 'time series experiment' with two relevant treatment effects—the administrative reform of 1973 and the assumption of power and attempted reversal of the reform by General Zia in 1977. That is, there are nine observations of prestige: two prior to the administrative reforms, four during the period of the reforms, and three subsequent to the reforms. As follows:

$$O_{71} \quad O_{72} \quad X \quad O_{74} \quad O_{75} \quad O_{76} \quad O_{77} \quad X \quad O_{79} \quad O_{80} \quad O_{81}$$

(where subscripts refer to year of examination and 'X' to the treatment effects)

Our design does not fit the time series paradigm precisely. A time series experiment assumes the same sample in each of the observations—each of our observations, rather, constitutes a separate population, comprised of all recruits for a given year. However, this anomaly does not violate the basis of comparison with the time series design. And in any case, there was no alternative but to use the data available, no control groups exist. In fact, an alternative design that tested one batch of recruits at various stages in their training would be subject to much more serious methodological problems than our design. For instance, how could one separate socialization effects of particularistic training from considerations of intergroup prestige? There would also be the attendant problems associated with 'maturation' and 'instrumentation' (prior to training recruits have a strong incentive to be honest and careful in their preference orderings).

FINDINGS

The findings of this exercise are summarized in Tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3. In Table 9.1, we find that the patterns of prestige accord with expectations implied by the description of the pre-reform environment stated earlier. The CSP dominates—82.9 per cent of the probationers before the reforms expressed a first preference for membership in the CSP. The next most prestigious service was the PFS, with 14.8 per cent of the first preferences and 73.2 per cent of the second preferences, the third most prestigious the PSP, the fourth the PAAS, with the PMAS, PCES, and PTS vying for fifth place. The remaining five services were clearly less prestigious. It is very likely that this pattern of prestige is long-standing. The only other existing compilation of prestige levels of services was provided by the Central Public Service Commission in its *Annual Report* of 1963. In regard to first preferences of probationers this report stated that 78 per cent of

TABLE 9.1
SERVICE PREFERENCE OF PROBATIONERS BEFORE REFORM (1970-1)

Service	First Preference		Second Preference		Third Preference		Fourth Preference		Fifth Preference	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
CSP	325	82.9	54	13.9	0	—	0	—	0	—
PFS	58	14.8	287	73.8	15	4.0	1	0.3	0	—
PSP	1	0.3	30	7.7	244	64.4	15	4.1	3	0.8
PAAS	6	1.5	4	1.0	71	18.7	176	47.7	26	7.2
PCES	0	—	5	1.3	25	6.6	70	19.0	62	17.3
PTS	0	—	3	0.7	11	2.9	52	14.1	105	29.2
PMAS	0	—	5	1.3	2	0.5	36	9.8	130	36.2
Others	2	0.5	1	0.3	11	2.9	19	5.1	33	9.2
None	0	—	3	—	13	—	23	—	33	—
N Population = 392: 1970 Batch = 202, 1971 Batch = 190										

Key: CSP = Civil Service of Pakistan; PFS = Pakistan Foreign Service; PSP = Police Service of Pakistan; PAAS = Pakistan Audits and Accounts Service; PCES = Pakistan Customs and Excise Service; PTS = Pakistan Taxation Service; PMAS = Pakistan Military Accounts Service.

'Others': Central Information Service; Telephone and Telegraph (Railways Branch); Central Secretariat Service; Pakistan Postal Service; Pakistan Military Lands and Cantonment Service.

'None': No preference was given by probationer.

TABLE 9.2
SERVICE PREFERENCE OF PROBATIONERS DURING REFORM (1974-7)

Service	First Preference		Second Preference		Third Preference		Fourth Preference		Fifth Preference	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
DMG	380	63.0	131	21.7	22	3.6	12	2.0	5	0.8
Police	41	6.8	184	30.5	165	27.4	63	10.4	24	4.0
Customs	31	5.1	75	12.4	167	27.7	154	25.5	86	14.3
FAG	99	16.4	94	15.6	80	13.3	76	12.6	53	8.8
TAG	41	6.8	67	11.1	52	8.6	53	8.8	31	5.1
Income Tax	3	0.5	22	3.6	58	9.6	138	22.9	187	31.0
Commerce	1	0.2	17	2.8	21	3.5	40	6.6	82	13.6
Accounts	5	0.8	5	0.8	12	2.0	24	4.0	46	7.6
Others	2	0.3	8	1.3	26	4.3	43	7.1	89	14.8
N Population = 603: 216 (1974); 167 (1975); 112 (1976); 108 (1977)										

Key: DMG = District Management Group; Police = Police Group; Customs = Customs Group; FAG = Foreign Affairs Group; TAG = Tribal Areas Group; Income Tax = Income Tax Group (Direct Taxes Group); Commerce = Commerce Group; Accounts = Accounts Group.

'Others': Information Group, Office Management Group; Cantonments Management Group; Railways Group; and Postal Group.

TABLE 9.3
SERVICE PREFERENCE OF PROBATIONERS POST-REFORM (1979-81)

Service	First Preference		Second Preference		Third Preference		Fourth Preference		Fifth Preference	
	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage	N	Percentage
DMG	476	63.4	117	15.7	33	4.5	11	1.5	10	1.4
Customs	56	7.5	132	17.7	225	30.6	156	21.3	77	10.6
Police	35	4.7	211	28.4	161	21.9	72	9.8	43	5.9
FAG	116	15.4	110	14.8	110	14.9	99	13.5	115	15.8
Income Tax	11	14.6	46	6.2	85	11.5	171	23.3	181	24.9
TAG	15	2.0	68	9.1	31	4.2	62	8.5	45	6.2
Commerce	10	1.3	17	2.3	30	4.1	43	5.9	68	9.4
Accounts	7	1.0	8	1.1	16	2.2	23	3.1	27	3.7
Others	25	3.3	35	4.7	45	6.1	96	13.1	160	22.0
None	0	—	7	—	15	—	18	—	25	—
N Population = 751: 281 (1979); 241 (1980); 229 (1981)										

Key: DMG = District Management Group; Customs = Customs Group; Police = Police Group; FAG = Foreign Affairs Group; Income Tax = Income Tax Group; TAG = Tribal Areas Group; Commerce = Commerce Group; Accounts = Accounts Group; 'Others': Information Group; Office Management Group; Cantonments Management Group; Railways Group; and Postal Group. 'None': No preference was given by probationer.

the probationers ranked the CSP first in 1961, 80 per cent in 1962; while the next most prestigious service was the PFS with 15 and 14 per cent respectively; followed with less than 3 per cent per year for the PSP, and less than 2 per cent for the PAAS. No other service received more than 1 per cent of the first preferences in either year.²⁰ Therefore, the pattern of prestige in 1970-1 is almost identical to the pattern which existed a decade earlier.²¹

Given such long-standing precedent, the changes in the prestige orderings subsequent to the reform are dramatic. Table 9.2 demonstrates that the functional analogue of the CSP, the District Management Group (DMG) commanded only 63 per cent of the first preferences during the period of the reform's implementation. This change is partially attributable to the prestige accorded to the newly-constituted TAG which received 6.8 per cent of the first preferences, but to an even greater extent, it is due to the relative increase accorded to the Police Group and to the Customs Group.

Table 9.3 demonstrates that the effects of Bhutto's administrative reform have persisted beyond the lifetime of their architect. An examination of the table reveals that the

TABLE 9.4
PRESTIGE OF CADRES, 1970-81

Service	Before Reforms 1970-1	During Reforms 1974-7	Post- Reforms 1979-81
CSP/DMG	.94	.84	.79
PFS/FAG	.76	.44	.44
PSP/Police	.45	.53	.45
PAAS+PMAS/Accounts	.44	.05	.05
PCES/Customs	.15	.45	.50
PTS/Income Tax	.13	.24	.27
TAG	—	.26	.16
Commerce	—	.10	.10
Others	.10	.10	.18

Computed by incorporating information found in Tables 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3 as follows:

$$\frac{(5)p_1 + (4)p_2 + (3)p_3 + (2)p_4 + (1)p_5}{(5)n}$$

(where $\hat{p}$ = preference and subscripts refer to preferences 1 through 5 respectively).

patterns of prestige found in 1979-81 closely resembles the pattern found in 1974-7 and that both of the latter differ markedly from the pre-reform pattern.

However suggestive the information found in the tables may be, it does not lend itself to easy analysis. To simplify the data and to allow direct longitudinal comparison it was decided to construct a 'prestige index.'²² This index provides an unbiased measure of prestige, directly comparable between cadres, and between populations, with a range of 0 to 1. The interpretation of such scores is straightforward—simply, the higher the prestige score, the higher the prestige of the relevant cadre. Table 9.4 summarizes the exercise.

We find:

- The prestige of the CSP, through its lineal descendant the DMG, has declined significantly. Prior to the reform the CSP dominated the prestige rankings with an index measure of .94, during the course of the reforms the DMG's index dropped to .84 and since 1978 the prestige ranking has dropped still further to .78. These are important findings for three reasons. (a) The CSP was a main target of the administrative reforms of 1973. The decline in the prestige scores of the service therefore means that the reforms have been at least partially successful in meeting their ends, i.e., the bureaucracy is more egalitarian and the power of the CSP/DMG has been weakened. (b) The persistence of the decline since 1978 demonstrates that the outcomes of the reforms have taken root in the bureaucracy. This is despite the widely held perception that the policies of the Zia regime have served to bolster the status of the CSP.
- Similarly, the prestige of the heretofore second most prestigious cadre—the PFS—has also suffered rapid decline, though the decline has levelled off since 1978. This decline can also be attributed to the effects of the administrative reform. The Foreign Affairs Group was the single largest recipient of lateral recruits, 146 officers were inducted into the group during the course of the programme. One consequence of such massive induction was to block the avenues of promotion to

would-be entrants, hence making the cadre less attractive to join.

- The prestige of the accounts cadres has declined even more precipitously. The PAAS and the PMAS had a combined prestige index of .44 prior to the reforms, during and subsequent to the reforms the prestige of the newly formed Accounts Group had declined to .05. This development was clearly an unintended consequence of the administrative reforms. Indeed, Bhutto's administrative strategy singled out the accounts services, and particularly officers of the PMAS, to replace CSP officers in key administrative positions.²³ Further, the encadrement of the Accounts Group was an attempt to form a cadre which would challenge the predominance of the CSP.²⁴ Obviously, this attempt failed.
- Also unforeseen by the framers of the reform has been the ascendancy of the financial cadres. Before the reforms the PCES and the PTS had a combined prestige score of .28, during 1974-7, the Customs and Income Tax Groups had a combined score of .69 and since 1978, .77. In fact, during the past 3 years, due to the relatively small numbers of vacancies in the Customs Group, competition for entry into its ranks has been more severe than for entry into the DMG.²⁵
- The prestige of other cadres, constant during 1970-7, has increased rapidly since 1978.

Together these findings demonstrate that the ends of Bhutto's administrative reforms have been met partially. First, the bureaucracy in 1986 is more egalitarian than in 1973. The prestige of the most prestigious cadres has declined, while the prestige of the less prestigious cadres has increased. Second, the prestige of the CSP and its analogue the DMG has been weakened. The DMG does not dominate the bureaucracy in 1986 to nearly the extent the CSP dominated the bureaucracy in 1973. Third, both of these developments have persisted and accelerated since Bhutto left power in 1977.

However, the wider and more important goals of Bhutto's administrative reform: to create a classless bureaucracy which is comprised of 'one service'; to make the bureaucracy more

efficient; and to make the bureaucracy more technically proficient are as far away from realization in 1986 as they were in 1973. Further, the limited successes of the administrative reform have been paid for dearly by the bureaucracy of Pakistan. Most fundamentally Bhutto's policies served to increase the politicization of the bureaucracy. Such politicization has had several unhappy effects. One has been the decline in morale among public servants. A universal complaint of administrators in Pakistan is that they are uncertain of their future career prospects in a system in which they lack protection against arbitrary dismissal or retirement. Unfortunately, this uncertainty is directly related to the rank of the public servant. A second consequence has been a persistent shunning of responsibility for making administrative decisions. In a politicized environment it is best to 'lie low', to not draw undue attention to oneself. In the bureaucratic context of Pakistan this often means the avoidance of decisions. Hence the prevalent complaint by senior administrators that even the most mundane matters are 'duly noted' all the way to their desks. Third, by weakening the cadre system, Bhutto also weakened the informal channels of authority through which much of the business of government flowed. Zia's continued ban on the formation of service associations has continued this process. Fourth, the politicization of the bureaucracy has in turn made bureaucratic decision-making far less independent. 'Noddies' are more prevalent in 1986 than in 1973.²⁶ Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the administrative reforms have further eroded the perception that choosing a career in administration is a valid career choice. No longer are the 'best and brightest' in Pakistan preparing for a career in the CSP/DMG. Rather their attention is being drawn to the professions or to business. Indeed the shift in prestige towards financial cadres may be part of this phenomenon. This depletion of the gene pool of public servants in Pakistan is likely to have a long-term negative effect on all aspects of administration in Pakistan.

* * *

This is a revised version of Kennedy, C.H., 'Prestige of Services and Bhutto's Administrative Reforms in Pakistan, 1973-1984', *Asian Affairs*, 1985, Vol. 12:3, Fall 1985, pp. 25-42.

NOTES

1. Government of Pakistan, *Speeches and Statements of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Prime Minister of Pakistan, August 14-December 31, 1973*, MPCPP, Karachi, 1975, pp. 13-14.

2. Government of Pakistan, *White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime*, 4 Vols., MPCPP, Islamabad, 1979.

3. Section 13 of the *Civil Servants Act of 1973 (Act No. LXXI of 1973)* empowers the 'competent authority' to dismiss public servants at ranks of Additional Secretary (BPS 21) and above if such competent authority deems it to be in the public interest. The Federal Shariat Court has declared this section of the Act 'un-Islamic' and hence has ordered its amendment. The decision of the FSC is currently under appeal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. See *PLD* 1984, FSC 34.

4. Such actions were regularized in an amendment to the *Civil Servants Act of 1973*. Section 12-A introduced on 3 July 1980 empowers the President to remove any civil servant appointed or promoted from 1 January 1972 to 5 July 1977 (Bhutto's tenure in office).

5. For instance former CSP officers replaced non-CSP officers as Secretary, Establishment Division; Secretary, Cabinet Division; Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College; and Director General, Civil Services Academy.

6. CSP Association Rawalpindi, 'Memorandum to the Services Reorganization Committee', 1969.

7. Government of Pakistan, President's Secretariat (Establishment Division), *Report of the Administrative Reorganization Committee*, GOPP, Karachi, 1963, pp. 323-6.

8. Computed by author from data provided in CSP Association, Rawalpindi, 'Memorandum to the Services Reorganization Committee', 1969, Annexure I.

9. These safeguards were modified in the 1973 Constitution. See Munir, M., *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Law Publishing Company, Lahore, 1975, pp. 519-21.

10. Officers of the PFS also periodically underwent a separate training programme at the Civil Service Academy.

11. There are a number of excellent accounts of the style of training at the Civil Service Academy. Among the best are Braibanti, op. cit., 1969; and Nazim (Hassan Habib), op. cit., 1973.

12. In 1971, 21 CSP officers were on deputation abroad.

13. Compiled by author from *Civil List*, 1971.

14. 'Class I Officers Memorandum,' to the Services Reorganization Committee, 1969.

15. Computed by the author by deriving mean length of service and mean total pay for the populations of the CSP $n=494$; PFS, $n=180$; PSP $n=125$; PAAS, $n=142$; PMAS, $n=71$; and PRAS, $n=46$. The raw data was gathered from *Civil List*, 1971 and transformed as under:

Increment per year, service seniority, =

$$\frac{(\bar{X} \text{ total pay} - \text{minimum pay of officer [i.e. Rs. 500]})}{\bar{X} \text{ years service}}$$

16. Computed by using 'increments' as above.

17. This definition accords with William Goode's usage of the term. See Goode, W., *The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Social Control System*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1978, especially, pp. 7-8; pp. 66-72.

18. Bell, D.V.J., *Power, Influence and Authority: An Essay in Political Linguistics*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1975, pp. 26-7.

19. Campbell, D.T., and Stanley, J.C., *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1963.

20. Braibanti, R., 'The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan,' in Braibanti, (editor), *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Duke University Press, Durham, 1966, pp. 289-90.

21. Braibanti surmises that a similar pattern of prestige existed even earlier than the sixties. Ibid., p. 289.

22. The 'prestige index' =

$$\frac{(5)p_1 + (4)p_2 + (3)p_3 + (2)p_4 + (1)p_5}{(5)n}$$

(where p = preference and subscripts refer to service preferences, 1 to 5 respectively, and n = sample size.)

23. Accounts officers were appointed to the posts of Secretary, Establishment Division; Principal, Pakistan Administrative Staff College, and Secretary, Cabinet Division. The post of Special Secretary for Administrative Reforms was also held by a former PMAS officer.

24. Interviews with Principals, 1976.

25. Several probationers have actually been passed over for their first preference, the Customs Group, and assigned to the DMG instead.

26. The term 'nodder' (yes-man) was invented by P.G. Woodhouse and is widely used in Pakistan's bureaucracy.

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