PAKISTAN

The Enigma of Political Development

Lawrence Ziring

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Department of Political Science
Western Michigan University

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For My Mother and In Memory of My Father

'I do not want the Muslim League Movement to go up like a rocket and come down like a stone'

Mohammad Ali Jinnah

Contents

Preface
Foreword by A. Jeyaratnam Wilson

1 The Muslim Legacy in South Asia
2 Nationalism, Ideology, and the Islamic State
3 The Creators and Early Managers of Pakistan
4 The Civil and Armed Bureaucrats
5 Political Movements and Political Parties
6 The Submerged Nations: the Politics of Ethnicity and Tribalism
7 Incipient Constitutionalism
8 The Myth of Nation-Building
9 The Foreign Policy Dimension
10 The Future of Pakistan

Notes to the Text
Select Bibliography
Index

Preface

This volume was conceived to serve a variety of reader categories. It should meet the needs of teachers and students engaged in the study of Pakistan; it is hoped that it will offer area specialists an enlarged perspective from which to examine their own findings; and it ought to prove useful to the general reader who wishes to keep abreast of the forces and events shaping our time. Every effort has been made to define the essential themes, to provide the pertinent data, to analyze the significant events thoroughly, and to present the material in a lucid, fast-moving manner. Overall the book should be both informative and provocative. Given my long association with Pakistan, the many years spent investigating and experiencing its development, the unique opportunities I have enjoyed for personal contact with the country's passing leadership as well as its diverse population, I have taken liberties which less-involved scholars would no doubt avoid. I make no apologies for this somewhat personalized approach, or for the pointed comments that will be found throughout the volume. The Pakistan story does not lend itself to sterile description. It is an exciting and important chronicle and it ought to be presented in a fashion that stimulates debate in addition to making available the necessary facts. I trust I have succeeded in fulfilling both objectives.

Pakistan is worthy of our concern. Noble intentions breathed life into the Pakistan dream, but the country has been stalked by tragedy from its inception. Democratic purposes have been obscured by authoritative decision making, the quest for individual freedom apparently compromised by societal necessity. The desire to establish a libertarian state has not been reconciled with the realities of political culture that limits popular expression and emphasizes personal rule. Constitutional and liberal political experiments have failed to overcome the fundamental condition sustaining historic superior-inferior relationships. Moreover, the failure of western-styled democracy in Pakistan reinforces the impression that the country is

not suited for such experience. Attempts to return to the well-spring have prompted renewed interest in the Islamic state. The prevailing argument would suggest that the system inherent in the Islamic state is already known by the vast majority of Pakistanis, is acceptable in form and workable in practice. The decision to proceed with an Islamic system stems from the realization that democracy is elusive and could only lead the country into deeper and increasingly more calamitous pitfalls. Survival, the preservation of the Pakistan design, best explains the shift toward a more basic form of governance. Although it too is irrefutably authoritarian, the fact that it speaks to the population in terms that it can understand supposedly gives it greater credibility. It does not follow, however, that those who manage the Islamic state have any more legitimacy than those who have gone before them. In other words, there is no guarantee that because the Pakistan government more closely adheres to the tenets of Islam it will be better received and obeyed. It may well be that the present phase is but another transition and that still another destiny awaits the country and its people. Pakistan, after all, cannot be studied in a vacuum. It is part of, and intertwined with, the other states comprising the south and southwestern region of the Asian continent. While internal factors are highly significant in shaping Pakistan's future, external forces are no less important and at the present time these appear to be gaining in intensity. This book aims to explore these thoughts and the reader is advised to give the volume a full reading before drawing any conclusions.

Although this book is a direct extension of its author, it could not have been completed without the cooperation and support of a number of individuals and institutions. I am indebted to the American Council of Learned Societies which made it possible for me to conduct much of the research for this volume in Pakistan. I also wish to acknowledge receipt of a faculty fellowship from Western Michigan University which allowed me to continue with the project at a difficult time. I am also appreciative for the encouragement and assistance provided by my Department of Political Science and especially its chairmen, Dr Roy Olton and Dr Jack C. Plano. My special gratitude, however, is owed to my wife Raye who not only stoically accepted the fact that her husband was for long stretches of time essentially unreachable, but who also masterfully typed most of the manuscript. Both Raye and I are grateful to Kathy Grodus who appeared at the right moment to lend a hand in the preparation of the manuscript. Their

combined efforts as well as their remarkable patience no doubt contributed much to the completion of the work. Finally, I want to thank my children, Leona and Sarah, who in their own way also made this book possible.

As with all studies of this kind, and especially with this one, I am solely responsible for its contents. Any errors of fact or interpretation are inadvertant, but mine alone.

Lawrence Ziring

Portage, Michigan

December 1979

Foreword

The states of modern Asia in the past few decades have been the centre of great power competition, all the more so now (1980), with the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R., the People's Republic of China and to a limited extent Britain and the Commonwealth involved. These powers are all concerned in ensuring that the 'twilight regions' outside their immediate spheres of influence or control do not become a prey to the machinations of their rivals. The primary questions of military strategy, access to raw material and the stabilization and freezing of existing frontiers are a central preoccupation of the conventional West. For the Soviets, the problem is simpler: to them it is essentially when will the internal set-up collapse. But the position is somewhat complicated because of the interest of the People's Republic and even India to prevent destabilization in the regions around them.

How can these countries be understood in their specific context? The reason for the failure of American policy and to a more limited extent that of the other great powers, particularly Britain, has been the counter-productive attempts on their part to prop up inefficient regimes. Alternatively, alliances between compradore elements in the developing country and commercial interests (multinationals included) in the West have at best brought 'peace, order and good government' for a limited time in most of Asia. But modern Asia is not a hothouse plant. It is exposed to the vagaries of the international economic and political climate. Therein lies the dilemma. Professor Lawrence Ziring is no stranger to Pakistan's history and politics. He has written extensively on that country's defence, foreign policy and political future. He elaborates in detail and with greater depth on the country's experimentations with a number of political frameworks. He speculates on the ethnic problems that still plague this new nation. He anticipates the dangers that confront it from the Soviet Union and India.

In this study Ziring has utilized the approaches we have outlined. He is frank and straightforward in his assessment. Pakistan is in tenuous

equilibrium. His political analysis could be the last word on Pakistan before the country takes its next historic turn. Its genesis, its social structure, the economics of its struggle for survival, the foreign policies that its leaders have forged and its defence mechanisms, are unravelled in all their vivid detail by one of that country's most knowledgeable authorities. Students of the subcontinent will find it a standard work of reference.

Will Pakistan in such a hostile environment survive as a state? That is a question to which Ziring is somewhat hesitant to find an answer. Perhaps, as he conjectures, the future lies in a wider Islamic commonwealth comprising the neighbouring states of the Middle East with which Pakistan might discover affinities. But even they are not certain of their future. Where then will Pakistan look? And what will happen to her latest ruler and his attempts at Islamic political experimentation? The answers to all these questions are discussed with authoritativeness and objectivity by the writer in a study that could become a definitive work on the subject.

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A. Jeyaratnam Wilson

February 1980

Pakistan and its relation to the Middle East (adapted from Lawrence Ziring, *The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958–1969* (Syracuse University Press, 1971))



Pakistan and South Asia

1
The Muslim Legacy in South Asia

The Muslims of South Asia are the descendents of conquerors. This is the essential legacy of Islam in the subcontinent. It colours the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in the region, and fixes in Muslim minds notions of superiority and still greater achievement to come. Muslim conquest is an intrinsic article of faith, a faith in Allah and the conviction that what is perpetrated is God's will. Muslims do not recognize a division between the spiritual and the secular, righteousness and the profane. Religious experience cannot be separated from social, economic or political events. Islam is a total way of life and the obligations imposed on its devotees are explicit and beyond challenge or questioning.[1] Islam is not unique in weaving together military performance with holy purpose, but it is different from other contemporary orders in its reluctance to yield to the realities of a world seized and pressured by competing beliefs, philosophies and ideologies. In this regard, Muslims display difficulty in transcending their surroundings: the abstraction that grips them limits empathy with the larger world. In part, hard-pressed by non-Muslims and especially Christian forces over the last several centuries, Muslims perceive themselves in an unrelenting struggle against hostile elements. The general reaction has predictably led to the re-establishment and expansion of Muslim armies with stress on the advancement of military science and overall performance. This is true in virtually every Muslim country in this latter segment of the twentieth century; it is no less true in Pakistan where the military institution has been a centrepiece from the first moments after independence.[2]

Rise and Decline of Muslim Power in South Asia

The Arabs invaded South Asia in the eighth century bringing the teachings of Islam with them and forcing the Hindu inhabitants to make a permanent place for the new community. The Arabs were followed by the Persians, Afghans and Turks who having adopted Islam, now sought to press its message deeper into the heart of India. The Sultanate of Delhi was established in the thirteenth century and it ruled over much of northen India, while the Moghuls, who were bent on the establishment of their own empire, dominated almost the whole of the subcontinent from the sixteenth through the middle of the nineteenth centuries. Though far fewer in numbers than their indigenous Hindu opponents, the Muslim armies exhibited greater cohesiveness, organization and discipline, and fired by the obligations of their faith were singularly successful against the fragmented followers of Vishnu, Siva, Brahma and a whole host of other Hindu deities. Given the nature of Hindu culture and its political expression, the Muslims found a ready-made *divide and rule* situation prevailing within the subcontinent and they soon learned how to exploit it. But they were also victimized by it.[3] Division not unity is an historic condition in South Asia and the Muslim invaders were heavily influenced by their surroundings. Direct Moghul rule proved impossible as local leaders (predominantly military or the descendente of military officials) continued to hold sway over their distinct populations. This guaranteed protracted conflict between the central Moghul administration and the distant territories. Although allegedly under Moghul control, numerous independent and quasi-independent Muslim, as well as Hindu rulers, exerted their own authority and pursued their own ambitious programmes.

These were the prevailing circumstances when the Europeans filtered into the subcontinent. Arriving in the guise of traders, they soon revealed their political and military intentions and after a period in which they jockeyed for position, testing one another's determination, it was the British who emerged as the most potent force challenging Moghul authority. The British victory over the Moghuls at Plassey in 1757 at once marked the decline of the Muslim kingdom and the rise of English power. By 1858 the dominant Muslim political role in South Asia had been eclipsed, but the glories of the past were not forgotten and efforts to revive Muslim power

were instituted in the last quarter of the nineteenth century by members of the Muslim intellectual community. Indeed, the view that Muslims were a nation entitled to self-government and separate from the larger population was the principal idea behind their movement.

Great Britain and the Muslims

British Indian rule was largely bureaucratic. Civilian administrators predominated in the governing institution while the Army had the responsibility for enforcing and maintaining law and order. There was little political give-and-take with the Indian population before the beginning of the twentieth century, a situation that was dramatically altered with the onset of World War I. Britain's participation in that war heralded its loss of role as the balancer in the European balance of power, a role it had sustained for almost one hundred years.[4] Britain's involvement in World War I also necessitated drawing heavy reserves from its Indian Army which were deployed in Europe and the Middle East. The British promised their subjects on the subcontinent increased opportunities for self-government in return for their loyal services and this gesture not only signalled Britain's relative weakness *vis-à-vis* the forces influencing world events at the time, it also whetted the appetite of those Indians, both Hindu and Muslim, who sought to regain their political independence. But the Muslims were noticeably more wary over the sudden shift in fortunes and although anxious to be rid of the British, began to question the Muslim condition given the concerted efforts of the Hindus to shape unfolding events.

In 1857 elements of the British Indian Army had rebelled against their British superiors and a series of incidents ignited violent acts in a number of areas throughout northen India. The rebels used the Moghul Emperor as their symbol of legitimacy and sought to rally their troops behind his command. The British ruthlessly crushed the insurrection and banished the Emperor from the country.[5] As a result the Muslims bore chief responsibility for the disorder and the British developed their own form of *divide and rule* by seeming to favour the Hindu population, especially when recruitment procedures were relaxed and indigenous personnel were

accepted into the ruling organization. Largely demoralized and indifferent to British customs and educational opportunities, the Muslim community withdrew into itself, hence leaving the field to the Hindus who seized every opportunity to enter the governing circle.[6] When the Muslims awoke to their circumstances and realized they were being surpassed in all fields of endeavour by the Hindu population, attempts were made to correct the situation. But it was clearly too late to alter the pattern of events. The Hindus, with British encouragement, had given birth to a new form of popular leadership that was not only politically conscious and astute, but determined to give India its political renaissance.

It was this situation that the Muslims worried about as they began to entertain the view that the British capacity to control the subcontinent was diminishing and that eventually Hindus and Muslims would be left to sort out their destinies alone. The awareness that the Moghul dynasty was beyond re-creation, along with the rise of Hindu organization under British tutelage, particularly through the development of the Indian National Congress (1885), compelled the Muslims to realize that their ability to reimpose an essentially Muslim government over the country was nil.[7] The Muslims had to content themselves either with joining the Hindu-dominated Congress Party and working toward the development of a multinational and multi-religious state, or take a separate course which would exaggerate the importance of the largest minority group within the South Asian land-mass. In creating the Muslim League in 1906 the Muslims seemed to suggest that they had chosen the latter course. The Muslim sense of distinctiveness, isolation and superiority prevented any genuine move toward integration with the Hindu majority. Therefore, as it became clear that the British would one day vacate their Indian possession, many Muslims were convinced they could not live under a Hindu-controlled government and hence would have to manifest independent political views. The rallying cry for the establishment of a separate Muslim polity within the subcontinent was ‘Islam in Danger’ and to many of the faithful it was a cry they could not ignore.[8]

The Muslim Separatist Movement

The British had exploited differences between Muslims and Hindus and they were not surprised with the separate course promoted by the Muslim League. Nevertheless, their firm control over the Indian Army and the tradition which had long been in vogue of maintaining homogeneous units of Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs and their being further subdivided into distinct ethnic and regional units, seemed to insulate the military from the political forces that were slowly reshaping the larger communities. The Muslim military contingents were basically neutralized and non-participant in this phase of the Muslim reawakening in South Asia. Muslim politicians had the field virtually to themselves as they attempted to excite and enlist popular support. Muslim lawyers, teachers and medical practitioners, largely trained by the British, many actually in England, were in the Vanguard of the so-called 'Freedom Movement'. They attracted the support of the Muslim student community as well as that of a number of Muslim princes whose authority over local kingdoms had not been interrupted by British rule. Added to this élite circle were Muslim landlords, merchants and commercial entrepreneurs, who together comprised an important source of revenue from which the campaign was financed.

Noticeably absent from the *Freedom Movement* as conducted by the Muslim League were important members of the religious fraternity, the *ulema.* The *ulema* were teachers, learned in the scriptures and commentaries who played a significant role in the daily lives of the Muslim people. Although not quite a priesthood (orthodox Islam does not call for the establishment of a church or a religious hierarchy), their authority among the masses was considerable. In the period following World War I the more articulate and well-known members of the *ulema* did not ignore politics, nor the needs of their fellow Muslims, but they did see a necessity to work with the Hindus in an effort to force an early British withdrawal from India. Many important *ulema* joined the Congress Party in an attempt to allay Muslim fears of Hindu intentions by cooperating in a common endeavour to rid the subcontinent of its European masters rather than set a course for the partition of the region, which they argued only played into English hands. Moreover, a major problem perplexing the *ulema,* which they felt would only be exacerbated by the demand for a separate Muslim homeland, was the burden that would be placed upon those Muslims left behind in the Hindu-dominated portion of India. By all esimates these Muslims would represent tens of millions.

For the *ulema* the creation of self-governing Islamic polity would place Indian Muslims in even greater danger and they insisted that another formula had to be found other than that being pressed by the Muslim League. Among Muslim leaders, the *ulema* stood almost alone in their effort to thwart the establishment of an independent Muslim state, and they were criticized by the intellectuals for being too naive. They were also unaffected by the excitement that attracted the masses towards the Muslim League. All indications pointed to a popular shift from traditional to modern Muslim leadership. Rather than those previously most closely identified with Islam, it was the educated and modernist Muslim leaders whom the masses looked to for guidance. As I. H. Qureshi notes: 'Thus the ulema were left high and dry and were angry with the new leadership mostly out of jealousy because the people listened to it and had no use for the ulema who had gradually come to sing a tune that was completely out of harmony with the feelings of the community.'[9]

The creation of an Islamic state in South Asia therefore was not the work of clerics and religious divines but rather the determined effort by informed, westernized, materially conditioned elements who had the capacity to articulate the desires of a population that could feel but not necessarily express its desires. Cognizant of the larger Muslim awakening, the world-wide movement toward the establishment of national states, the universal cry for self-determination, and political forces at home and abroad, these leaders were drawn to take up the cause of separate nationhood for the Muslims of South Asia. But the masses who followed them had no clear idea about their objectives, nor could their leaders provide them with one. They came together more as a result of circumstances than design; they drew their inspiration from personal attachment and emotional involvement rather than objective fact; they had a clearer idea about what they opposed than about what they supported. But they were all Muslims and the call for a separate homeland for Muslims, free from Hindu influence, was all they needed to coalesce.

The absence of an Islamic church or priesthood in orthodox or Sunni Islam (as distinguished from Shi'a Islam as in Iran with its more prominent mullahs and ayatullahs) has already been noted. It is important to understand that the masses who followed the Muslim League rather than the *ulema* were not making a secular rather than a religious choice. Islam is not as dependent upon the *ulema* as it is on congregational prayer and such

prayer is a direct responsibility of the Muslim *umma* (community). Beyond this it is the state organized government which regulates the upkeep of holy places and houses of worship. But the primary responsibility falls on the leading members of the larger community who constitute a working body for the maintenance and condition of religious structures. They also support the small staff that oversees mosques and other sacred sites. Moreover, any Muslim can lead the community in prayer or even conduct holy rites such as marriage (which, by-and-large, is a civil contract). As Qureshi has commented: 'Thus, ulema do not, in any way, monopolize any function in any rites that non-Muslims would consider exclusively religious… even learning is not prerequisite for performing any of these functions: only the limited knowledge adequate for the purpose is needed.'[10] The essential point in this argument is that in following the modernist leaders of the Muslim League the community was neither rejecting tradition, nor committing an irreligious act. In point of fact, the Muslim League leaders were as much representative of the Islamic cause as any religious scholar in the flowing robes of the Arabian desert. The complications of the Muslim legacy in South Asia can be noted in this juxtaposition of political and religious forces, but it is even more complex when efforts are made to examine the stated Muslim objective of establishing a new Islamic state within the region.

The Muslim Legacy and the National State

Muslims identify with a universal brotherhood that supposedly draws people from distant corners of the globe into a single, unified community. In other words, nationalism (which is the subject of the next chapter) could be considered a violation of the basic objective of Islam, the union of believers in a covenant with God. Indeed, Muslims seem to be in agreement that sovereignty belongs neither to government nor people, but to God.[11] Those endowed with power therefore hold it in trust for God, the ultimate authority, and do not possess it themselves. The corporate state with fixed frontiers separating one political entity from another divides the faithful. It is therefore perceived as an alien and particularly Western contrivance,

imposed upon the Muslim world in a period of weakness. Pan-Islamism still claims many supporters drawn from all walks of life and they envisage a day when national frontiers between Muslim states will fade away. The many divisions among Muslims today, according to this school, are temporary phenomena which will be overcome as Muslims sense the real purpose of their actions and gather new strength from their joint inheritance. References to Pan-Islamism have been nourished by the Arab world (at least in the promotion of Arab unity) down to the present, but it is in South Asia where it has manifested its broadest appeal in modern times.[12]

No better example exists than the modern Khalifate Movement, whose origins can be traced to World War I. The Caliphate (Khalifate) has its institutional origins in the period immediately following the death of the Prophet Mohammad in the seventh century A.D. Not unlike the Catholic Papacy, the Caliphs (successors to the Prophet) had considerable religious and secular responsibilities. So long as the Caliphate existed, the entire Muslim community from the Atlantic to the Pacific could respond to one symbol, and *in theory* the institution was the embodiment of faith and sacred law. In practice, however, the independent rulers throughout the Muslim world suppressed any attempt to interfere in their affairs and tended to follow imperial traditions that long pre-dated the Islamic movement.[13]

The idea of a central authority for all Muslims was kept alive by the Muslim middle classes, the religiously-inspired legalists and the *ulema.* But they could not expect to achieve more than psychic fulfilment given the sweep of history and misfortune that coursed through the Muslim world. The raw struggle for power and position that gave the Umayyad kings of Damascus control over the Caliphate continued until the Abbasids of Baghdad wrested it from them in 750 A.D. The Abbasids were themselves all but obliterated five centuries later when Mongolian hordes sacked Baghdad in 1258 A.D. The Caliphate was then set up in Egypt and remained more or less in place until the early part of the sixteenth century when Ottoman conquerors invaded the country and brought the institution to Constantinople (Istanbul) where the Sultan made it his personal possession. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire in World War I brought Constantinople under the occupation of European forces and the Sultan-Caliph was made a prisoner of the Christian British, French, Italians and Greeks. Christian dominance in Asia Minor and their seizure of the holy places in Palestine

agitated the Muslims of South Asia who, unlike the Arabs, were crestfallen over the demise of the only surviving Muslim kingdom. Insisting that their faith was under attack they organized a program that aimed at freeing the Caliphate from Christian control.[14] Essentially a private undertaking, the Muslims of the subcontinent, again led by members of the intelligentsia, petitioned their British overlords to safeguard the integrity of the Muslim society by protecting the Ottomans from the vengeful Europeans. But in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres the Europeans liquidated the Empire and promoted the seizure of Turkish territory. Nowhere did these actions meet with more violent displays than in the subcontinent where the Muslims saw themselves engaged in a holy war (Jihad) against the Christian enemy. Mahatma Gandhi sensed an opportunity to exploit the emotional fervor of the Muslim population and to enlist it in his struggle against British imperialism. Thus the Indian National Congress lent its support to the Khalifate Movement and for a time Muslim-Hindu amity grew and spread.[15] But the Khalifate demonstrators, even with Congress support, were hardly in a position to overcome British power in India. While Gandhi counselled non-violent protest, thousands of Muslims decided they had no course open to them other than to leave the country. This mass migration was in keeping with the Islamic injunction that a Muslim who finds himself in a land of inequity and powerless to produce change has the right to shift his domicile to another land where conditions are more favourable. This doctrine of *hijrat* was adopted by thousands of sincere Muslim devotees who passed from India into Afghanistan only to find that they were not really welcome, nor was haven to be provided for them. Moreover, when Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the Turkish nationalist leader, took matters into his own hands and formally abolished both the Ottoman Sultanate and Islamic Caliphate, the Khalifate Movement foundered and soon broke up. The Muslims of South Asia still had their dream, but the tangible cause that they had sought to aid had suddenly evaporated.

The Khalifate Movement occurred almost sixty years ago but the sentiment behind it continues to influence Muslim behavior. When Mohammad Ali Jinnah led the Muslim League in its demand for an independent Pakistan state based upon what he called the *two nation theory*, many of his followers were not so much interested in constructing another territorial and politically independent country as they were in giving meaning to the Muslim idea of an expanding community.[16] The great

majority of Jinnah's supporters were Muslims living in areas of India where Hindus predominated. Jinnah had considerably less support from regions where Muslims formed the majority. The state of Pakistan, paradoxically, was to be formed in those areas of heavy concentration and not among those people who felt the most pressing need for it. Islam was in no danger on the Northwest Frontier or in Baluchistan - not even in Sind. In the Punjab, Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus had no special sense of urgency concerning their relations and had come to accept an arrangement which produced a degree of political coalescence.[17]

The picture in Bengal was different from that in the western portion of the subcontinent. Although Muslim-dominated governments had ruled the province from Calcutta, there was an undercurrent of unease about the superiority of Hindu economic and financial capacities. Moreover, the Muslim League was born in Dacca, the most important Muslim city in Bengal, and feelings ran deep there concerning Muslim needs in a largely Hindu society. Another important feature of life in Bengal was the realization that many of the prominent Muslims in the province were not Bengalis but rather members of Indian provinces where discrimination ran high. In any event, Bengal, unlike the predominantly Muslim provinces of northwestern India, was a strong and early supporter of the *two nation theory* and Jinnah's Muslim League.[18]

Pakistan became the immediate goal of this movement but it appears that many who labored for its achievement saw it as an intermediary step on the path to Muslim unity. It was never made clear that the goal was the establishment of the state of Pakistan. On the other hand, those Muslims who were to become Pakistanis, but who did not share the same enthusiasm or dreams, were not altogether pleased with the sudden influx of millions of their brethren into their provinces. In particular they feared that the Muslim League government would give emigres preference over themselves. It was also clear that the settled population of the provinces that were to become Pakistan had by and large little education and even less sophistication compared to those who moved there from India. Thus relationships between these subcontinent Muslims were not as harmonious as had been envisaged, and as the years passed the hostility between the local population and the *muhajir,* or refugee communities, intensified.[19]

The failure to live the Muslim dream of Pan-Islamism ultimately led to the civil strife which culminated in the dismemberment of Pakistan and the

creation of still another independent state, namely Bangladesh. In major part the Muslim legacy in South Asia was responsible for the East Pakistan tragedy, and it would appear to be similarly responsible for the separatist tendencies in Sind, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province (Pakhtunistan). South Asian Muslims are prone to fantasize the glories of Islam and to that extent tend to ignore the psycho-political and socio-economic realities of their immediate surroundings.

The Muslim Legacy in South Asia: An Hypothesis

The question must be asked concerning the thinking of intelligent people and how they have caused themselves to confuse the imaginary with the real world. One explanation may be found in the relationship between Muslims, Hindus and the British in South Asia. The triangular relationship is somewhat unique in the history of retreating European imperialism. It is customary to understand the struggle for independent statehood in the post-World War II era as a contest between the colonial overlord and a determined indigenous society bent on achieving its freedom. This conflict involves two sides, one reflecting alien values and interests, the other representing local genius, common aspirations and intertwined belief systems. The adversaries are clearly defined even if the underlying causes for which they struggle remain obscure. In each case it is a matter of ridding the country of its European rulers and turning responsibility for the management of society over to native personnel. South Asia is, however, an exception. As has been noted, the Muslims arrived in the subcontinent as invaders and empire builders, but they also came to settle there. In the course of time, given their military successes, larger movements of Muslims from Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia and the Middle East joined the armies of conquest and extensive settlements were erected. The co-mingling of Muslims with Hindus, especially through intermarriage and conversion, swelled the number of Muslims in the region and their community in South Asia was assured.[20]

Although Hindus were considered infidels and perceived differently from the protected scriptuaries (Ahl al-Kitab, People of the Book) i.e. Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians, apart from deviants like the eleventh century

warrior Mahmud of Ghazni and the austere Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb of the late sevententh and early eightenth centuries, they were not forced to modify their culture or beliefs, and their temples and sacred sites were largely spared. Indeed, the Muslims found the Hindus useful in consolidating their power, since they could perform functions that the conquerors were either ill-equipped or prohibited by their religious codes and doctrines to perform. But the capacity to inter-relate functionally, the marriage of Hindu women to Muslim soldiers and the conversion of some Hindus (particularly outcastes) to Islam did not mean the two communities integrated socially - they remained distinct and different from one another in every fundamental respect. Their food, clothing, language and concerns were all different. Most significant was the gulf between their religious practices and philosophies. It is true that sometime during the eleventh century a religious movement called *Bhakti* arose which appeared to aim at the merger of the Hindu and Islamic faiths.[21] This movement passed through a number of metamorphoses and finally died out in the seventeenth century after the Moghul Emperor Akbar sought to create his own version of a unified religion and failed. In the last analysis there was no possibility of blending the two religions, nor was it likely that one could replace the other. Of necessity, then, they had to coexist, as tenuous as that situation might be.

By contrast with Hinduism, Islam is a highly principled and therefore very rigid belief system. There is very little room for interpretation or individual discretion and the faithful must commit themselves to a set of rules and obligations which cannot be altered if Muslims are to be at peace with themselves and their God. Hindus, however, have greater flexibility and incredible absorptive qualities without necessarily changing their beliefs. In this respect pantheism is far more imaginative than monotheism. Hinduism has been described as something similar to a sponge. It can soak up whatever liquid it is immersed in. But squeeze it dry and it shows no changes in character or essential properties. It is still the same sponge. Islam is not like that, no less than other monotheistic religions. It cannot yield to alien influences without undergoing basic change, therefore it is resistant, insecure and defensive. The fear persists that if it adopts manners and methods deemed to be un-Islamic the central core of the religion will be affected and the condition may well destroy the total system. The capacity of Hinduism to survive the vicissitudes and vagaries of a changing world,

and the appearance of an Islam concerned with re-emphasizing the traditions of antiquity, are an important exercise in the Hindu adjustment to modernity and Muslim trepidations over the need for change.

The intimate juxtaposition of two large communities with different perceptions of the world around them, the Hindu community several times larger than the Muslim, gave the Muslims new reasons to fear a Hindu assumption of political power in South Asia. The Hindus of the twentieth century were not about to accept Muslim notions of superiority. In the campaign to force the British to transfer their authority to indigenous hands the Hindus proved to be well organized, astute and determined to set a course which would give them the voice that their larger numbers entitled them to. The Muslims would have to be content with constitutional guarantees, but they could not expect again to dominate the subcontinent.[22]

Therefore, when the days of British rule were drawing to a close, the Muslims were not all that eager to see them go - least not until they had secured a safe haven for themselves, from where they could not only reclaim their lost glory but hold out the hope of moving the larger Muslim world toward the unity and power that it promised. In the long run, the Muslims of South Asia were not meant to be a minority in a Hindu sea and the call for a separate homeland, namely Pakistan, was aimed at overcoming their more immediate problems.

The British wanted no part of this more recent competition between Hindus and Muslims and, drained of their vitality by World War II, made the clear decision to vacate India and leave the resolution of the communal problem to the communities themselves. Great Britain, however, was convinced by Jinnah and his associates that the Muslims had a proper claim to autonomy (at least), and after the failure of the 1946 Cabinet Mission to maintain the unity of India, they agreed to partition.[23] For the British and their last Viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, it was now a matter of leaving India as quickly as possible. *Divide and Rule* policies had degenerated into *Divide and Run* and as the British beat a hasty retreat to their home islands, Hindus, Muslims and in the Punjab, Sikhs as well, tore into one another with a savagery and vengeance of historic dimensions. India and Pakistan were not therefore the outcome of wars of national liberation, but the outgrowth of self-fulfilling prophecies in which the worst was forecast and the principals did everything in their power to make it a reality.[24]

Great Britain relinquished India gracefully amidst carefully orchestrated ceremony and ritual. In the background, however, the rival communities were determined to inflict as much harm on one another as time and resources permitted. Although the transfer of power to the Congress Party in India and the Muslim League in Pakistan was expected to be difficult, few, if any, of the leaders in the two states could have envisaged the carnage that ensued. This was no civil war, but rather a blood-bath of historic dimensions. Estimates of those killed in the communal war run from several hundred thousand to three million. More accurate figures are available for the number of people that were forced to shift their domicile from one country to another. In all, approximately twenty million people moved from India to Pakistan, and vice-versa. Although the leaders in the respective countries made strenuous efforts to terminate the fighting and killing, it was obvious the bloodletting would have to run its course.[25] Eventually it did, but the two neighbouring countries had commenced their independent existence in a manner that would leave them arch enemies and antagonists. For the Muslims of Pakistan, strangely enough, it was not only Islam that was *still* in danger, but Pakistan too. Moreover, the comments of reactionary Hindu leaders that Pakistan would not survive six months and that the territory would be reunited with India (Akhand Bharat) only served to reinforce Muslim fears and suspicions.

The magnitude of the clash between Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs had another effect. It quickly converted those indigenous members of the new Pakistan state who had been only casually committed, or not committed at all, to the idea of a separate Muslim nation in the subcontinent. After the civil strife there could be no returning to the single state concept. This was even more in evidence with the movement of tribal Pathans from the North West Frontier into Kashmir and their encounter with regular Indian Army units. This first Indo-Pakistani War served as a rite of baptism for the two new countries; it also was to provide the Muslims of Pakistan with the link they sought to forge with their brethren still in India. In this way too fantasies shrouding the idea of an ever-expanding, unified Islamic state were amply perpetuated.[26]

The Muslim Legacy and Constitutionalism

The creation of Pakistan as an Islamic state did not answer the question concerning its organization and conduct. The concept of the Islamic state involved something more than a refuge for the Muslims of South Asia. Certainly it went beyond the negative view that Muslims could not submit themselves to the whims and fancies of political leaders who were not themselves Muslims. The sense of being a religious community, an historic entity, a distinct cultural body, drove the Muslims to demand Pakistan. Toward that goal, religious symbols were more prominent than economic ones. But now that the objective had been achieved what course was the country to follow? By emphasizing the Islamic state were Pakistan's leaders opting for the erection of an edifice that had its foundation in religious dogma and doctrine? Indeed, was the state to be governed according to Islamic law and precept? Were mediaeval institutions to be resurrected and the society organized around them? Were the learned Muslim Scholars who opted for Pakistan and identified with it to be given political, juridical and socioeconomic responsibilities? Is this what was meant by the fashioning of an Islamic state, or did Pakistan's political rulers, the leaders of the Muslim League, have some other kind of Islamic state in mind, and if so, what was it? Clearly, the people of Pakistan required leadership and guidance as well as a comprehensible view of where they were going and how they would get there. This was no mean chore given Pakistan's multidimensional problems. To build a new country, establish a stable government and develop a sensible programme of development would be difficult under ideal conditions. But to do so in a Pakistan faced with civil strife, the struggle with India in Kashmir, the influx of millions of terrified, impoverished refugees, the lack of experienced administrators, a truncated and somewhat confused military establishment, an empty treasury, and almost no material resources, the task was almost impossible.[27]

Chapter three will discuss the personalities who made and managed Pakistan after independence. At this juncture it is important to focus on the political aspects of the Islamic legacy in South Asia and this means trying to understand the political course open to the country's leaders, which one was chosen, how it fared, and why. This leads directly to the question of constitutionalism and its place in a Muslim society.

Constitutionalism is the product of the European political experience. Its roots are in contract theory, a recognition that governments are derived from the will of people organized into societies who are mindful of their rights as

well as obligations. The contract implies that society manifests government and endows it with powers in order to protect and enhance the well-being of all. In its most important aspects, constitutionalism places limits on the powers of government, restricts its actions, corrects the tendency toward arbitrariness, and makes it accountable to the people who reserve judgment for themselves as to the government's legitimacy. Sovereignty in constitutional thought, therefore, resides ultimately with the people, but may be exercised by government in the name of society so long as the ends of government are synonomous with the ends of that society. Fundamental guarantees involving individual freedom, such as the right to free expression, merge with conditional grants of authority to those in positions of political power and the capacity to recall leaders who abuse their powers. Finally, government is subject to error and can be made to explain its performance through persistent and constant scrutiny of its public records and activities.[28] If this is what is meant by constitutionalism, how does it blend with or relate to the Islamic legacy? Could Pakistan develop its own Islamic state and this obviously western form of constitutionalism side-by-side?

It is important to note that Mohammad Ali Jinnah and his closest lieutenants were determined to build Pakistan into a constitutional democracy. To them there was no contradiction between the Islamic state and a polity governed according to modern democratic principles. Muslims tend to reason that what passes for democracy and hence constitutionalism is at the very heart of Islamic teachings. According to this body of opinion, fairness, justice, compassion and honesty are all tenets of Islam: therefore, Islam made it simpler not more difficult to build democratic structures. With this in mind Pakistan's Muslim League leaders sought to fit Islam into their contemporary constitutional design, not the reverse. In taking this course of action they could almost ignore Islam or, if need be, make reference to it in the conduct of their otherwise secular activity. In point of fact, the envisaged governmental structure made more use of European, and, especially, English experience, than it did of past Islamic practice. In this regard, the question of identifying a model governmental and political structure was all important.

Recalling what had prevailed before the British displaced Muslim power in the subcontinent, Pakistan's leaders surveyed the Moghul experience and other dynastic traditions that permeated the South Asian landscape. They

were not inclined toward the restoration of a monarchical/aristocratic order. Nor were they eager to lay claim to a new Islamic Caliphate or some other political experience drawn from the Muslim past. They neither had the capacity to replicate, nor were they so presumptuous as to want to recreate the system which Muslims venerate as the period of the 'Pious Caliphs,' the four disciples of the Prophet Mohammad who led the Muslim community in those early decades after his death. What was left? To attempt something totally alien, such as Marxism, was never considered. All that could be done in the circumstances, and the leaders were schooled in its ways, was to adopt a version of constitutionalism as they had come to understand it through British tutelage and exposure.

The Independence Act of 1947 passed by the British Parliament that transferred power to the Muslim League in effect transformed a political movement into a formal government.[29] The laws in force from which this new government drew its authority were essentially those laws, statutes, ordinances and directives prevailing under the previous colonial regime. The general structure of government was outlined in a modified version of the Government of India Act, 1935, also the work of the British Parliament. There was no reference in any of these legal arrangements to an Islamic state and if Pakistan was to establish one now the limits of its adoption were already drawn. Of course, all of this could be regarded as temporary, since a Constituent Assembly had been assembled through the Independence Act and its responsibility lay in drafting a permanent constitution for the country. If Pakistanis were determined to live by an arrangement more readily identifiable with their role as Muslims, this was their opportunity to act decisively. But this was to prove to be no simple matter. Although the non-Muslim minorities had little if any say in the writing of the first Pakistan constitution, there was little consensus among the Muslim delegates on how the country was to be organized.

The Objectives Resolution which was introduced in the Constituent Assembly by the Prime Minister in March 1949 was judged the cornerstone of the new constitution and is representative of the Muslim desire to realize their Islamic state. The resolution opens with the following passage:

> In the name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful;
>
> Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone, and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits Prescribed by Him is a sacred trust.[30]

While this section of the Resolution addresses itself to the belief of Muslims, the remainder of the document elaborates a doctrine which is essentially liberal democratic, not dogmatically theocratic. Equality, social justice, fundamental freedoms, and the safeguarding of cultural and religious preferences were intrinsic parts of the document. The Muslim League leaders believed that this was not only the Islamic way but the essence of their Islamic state. What they seemed to be suggesting was that under Muslim leadership minorities would be more secure than those residing within the Indian Union. Subconsciously, it no doubt reinforced their view that the partition of India and the creation of an independent Pakistan were justifiable acts. But the practical questions still required answers and no amount of rationalizing could avoid the hard choices that lay ahead.

Constitutionalism did not fare well within the Pakistan milieu. The modernist élite had enormous difficulty in drafting a constitution based upon the non-Islamic aspects of the Objectives Resolution and so contentious was the struggle between Muslims of varying minds and from different regions of the country that the Constituent Assembly itself became a casualty and was dissolved by an order of the then presiding Governor-General.[31] After considerable political and legal squabbling another body was assembled and it managed to complete the work that its predecessor began. But it was already nine years after the grant of independence and India had taken less than three to complete the same job. Moreover, only two years later this same constitution was suddenly scrapped by still another dictatorial head-of-state and the country was plunged into an extended period of martial law.[32] The military regime of General Ayub Khan placed responsibility for the 'failure' of the constitution on the politicians and society in general which, it was claimed, was not sufficiently experienced to manage a sophisticated parliamentary system. Thus, the military government drafted another constitution and *gave* it to the country in 1962. This one supposedly was closer to the genius of the Pakistani people but there was no mistaking its centralized and heavily bureaucratic nature.[33] After a limited period of calm, crisis again overtook the country. Ayub Khan was compelled to leave office and his constitution left with him.

Pakistan was subjected to still another extended period of martial law, this time under another general, Yahya Khan. It was during Yahya's presidency that the country was engulfed in a civil war which eventually

drew in India and brought about the country's dismemberment. The loss of East Pakistan forced Yahya and his military junta from power and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party took their place at the helm. Bhutto promised a return to civilian government and a new order which meant still another constitution. The Bhutto constitution was promulgated in 1973 amid considerable fanfare, but it did not require higher mathematics to realize that Pakistan had experienced three constitutions in seventeen years. Furthermore, the constitutions were not the promised bulwark against overbearing authoritarianism. They neither limited the arbitary power of government nor defended the population from the administration's monopoly of legal violence.[34]

Neither political nor military leaders respected the constitutions that they themselves prepared. The citizenry could not be expected to identify with doctrines that they barely understood, and given the antics of their leaders, they were driven to desperation. Demoralization and cynicism have long since overtaken the Pakistani population. The secession of East Pakistan and the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh with Indian assistance seemed to put an end to the *two nation theory* upon which the Pakistan dream rested. The demands heard from the Pathan, Baluchi and Sindhi populations for greater autonomy, and in some instances for national self-determination, re-emphasize this conclusion.[35] Constitutionalism has not worked in Pakistan and it may well be that it is not suited to the needs of the Muslims of South Asia.

It could be hypothesized that Muslims find it impossible to venerate a secular doctrine when their life experience is so intertwined with the articles of their faith and religious beliefs. Muslims learn at an early age that the only document worthy of their attention is the *Qur'an,* the holy book that is nothing less than God's message to the Prophet Mohammad. The *Qur'an* is Islam itself. It is the focal point for all the faithful who are called upon to memorize its contents and repeat its call five times each day. But the *Qur'an* is more than a prayer book. It lays down codes of behaviour in all human endeavour and where it is not explicit, commentaries and interpretations based upon the traditions of the Prophet (Hadith) are believed to provide answers to difficult questions. For the more liberal minded Muslims it is possible to expand upon these sources through the use of traditions called *Ijma* (consensus of the learned community) and *Qiyas* (reasoning by analogy). Together these sources of Islamic doctrine establish

the path or *Shari'a* that all orthodox Muslims are obligated to follow.[36] There is no toleration of deviationists, nor is it deemed possible to alter the character of a system which crystallized in the first three centuries of the Islamic era. By the same token it is impossible to expect Muslims, whether leaders or led, to give equal attention and respect to a constitution of limited quality.

The *Qur'an* is the only constitution a Muslim can genuinely subscribe to. The *Qur'an* is the word of God. A secular constitution is little more than a representation of political relationships between those who write it and those who are supposed to live by its rules and regulations. The *Qur'an* is forever. Constitutions come and go with the tides of history and the personalities who ride them. Moreover, once the first constitution is destroyed, it is doubtful that any succeeding one, no matter how successfully drafted, will ever be truly accepted. A tradition which makes it possible for new leaders to replace old documents with others that appear preferable to them, not only denies constitutionalism, but makes any reference to it little more than a charade.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did not live up to the standards of his own constitution, nor could the document protect his administration, his policies or his person. In July 1977, after an extended period of social disorder, the military again interposed itself between the public and a civilian government. Bhutto was arrested, later tried for the murder of a political opponent, found guilty, sentenced to death, and executed by hanging. The general who sanctioned the execution order was one that Bhutto had himself hand-picked to lead the Pakistani Army. Since assuming the leadership of the country, General Zia-ul-Haq has directed his attention toward the rebuilding of an Islamic State. One of the chief criticisms of Bhutto's five year rule was his deviation from the Islamic path, both in his public policies as well as in his private life. General Zia has called for a reaffirmation of faith. In essence, he sees the need for the government to move in step with the Muslim society. In the past, government saw itself more as a pace-setter and guide, causing the nation to adopt postures and attitudes which they were otherwise reluctant to subscribe to. But with the nation divided against itself, with external forces seeking to exploit its weaknesses, Zia, more so than any of his predecessors, had given new emphasis to Islam and the Muslim legacy in South Asia.[37]

In view of Zia's own propensities and the pressure on him from his colleagues and various segments of public opinion, it is not surprising that Pakistan's more secular edifice is being dismantled. A partial denationalization of the educational system is under way and the various Islamic sects have been granted the right to start or reopen their own schools. The government has pledged itself to follow the dictates of the *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (Order of the Prophet). The *Nizam-i-Mustafa* aims at legitimating Zia's policies and more conservative decisions have been rendered in social and economic affairs. Pakistan's latest military government has demonstrated its sensitivity to the issue of Islamic custom by adopting an austere life-style and by publicizing Muslim devotions. It reinstated aspects of Islamic law, and punishments for many criminal acts are being meted out in accordance with Quranic principle. Similarly, ordinances have been issued enforcing Islamic prohibitions on gambling and the use of alcoholic beverages. The general inference drawn from these policies is that the martial law government seriously intends to refashion Pakistani society along orthodox Muslim lines.[38] It is also evident that constitutionalism as it is known in the western world has little chance of surviving the current shift in Pakistan's fortunes.

Political Personalities and the Muslim Legacy

The Muslim Legacy in South Asia is a portrait in personalities not institutions. Paternalism, charisma, and magnetic leadership are inspired as much by the environment as by the individuals who seek to exploit it. The Prophet Mohammad was mortal and his life brief. Nevertheless, he fired a people and gave expression to a religious order which today consumes the lives of several hundred million people. He also created a condition wherein attention is riveted upon the coming of a gifted leader who alone has the capacity to lift society from its predicament. This is by no means unique to Muslims. Virtually all people can be similarly moved by leaders capable of grasping the opportunities that history from time to time makes available to them. It is, however, of particular importance in understanding the ebbs and flows of Muslim civilization and particularly the Muslims of South Asia. Great leaders cannot be separated from their historic epoch. Between the

sixteenth and twentieth centuries Islam could point to few leaders of distinction. During that period, Muslims were on the defensive. Assaulted on all sides, especially by the Europeans, the Islamic world with the exception of the Ottoman Empire (and it too succumbed to European advances in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century) was forced to submit to alien authority and culture. Every now and then a figure would emerge to challenge the strangers in their midst but their lack of success is recorded in the chronicles of the period. In his *Philosophy of the Revolution* Gama Abdul Nasser speaks of a role wandering in search of a leader.[39] He emphasized the need to fill that role so that the Muslim people could again be mobilized, their energies harnessed to a world-wide movement guaranteeing their preeminence. So too in South Asia where the Muslims found themselves in retreat, threatened and reduced to second class status, the call was again for a leader to guide the people. The elevation of Mohammad Ali Jinnah to the role of the *Quaid-i-Azam* (Great Leader), the designation he is remembered by, addresses itself to societal need as much as to the abilities of the man. Jinnah was the embodiment of the Muslim *Freedom Movement* and had he wanted a crown and a throne, the people who venerated him would have gladly made the offer.

It is true that the Hindu community (and indeed many Muslims followed him too) had Mahatma Gandhi. But Gandhi's role was essentially different from that of Jinnah. Gandhi was the proverbial saint-in-politics in the Hindu tradition of self-sacrifice and service. His was not so much a socio-political role as it was a personal test of his own inner discipline and capacity to demand emulation. There was nothing mystical about Jinnah. He was a practical politician and a gifted bargainer. He enjoyed exasperating the British as much as he liked frustrating Hindu leaders. At the same time he had the unusual talent of being able to articulate the sentiments of his Muslim constituency. The Muslims of India may not have always understood Jinnah's idiom but they seldom misunderstood his message. Moreover, unlike Gandhi who looked much like the people he was leading, Jinnah neither resembled the Muslim masses, nor behaved like them, nor acted like them. And still they loved and followed him, many, as noted, to untold misery and death.[40]

The legacy, however, does not end there. This volume examines the politics of Pakistan and it is Jinnah's impact on the political life of the nation that should be briefly noted before moving more deeply into the

subject matter. Jinnah, again unlike Gandhi, could not resist political office after independence had been achieved. Gandhi retired from political life and in his last days before an assassin took his life, struggled to reduce the suffering caused by communal warfare. Jinnah, however, became Pakistan's first Governor-General and head-of-state. Although the office was supposed to be strictly ceremonial so that parliamentary government could assume its proper place, the fact that Jinnah filled the post meant that nothing could be accomplished without first gaining his approval. Pakistan's first Prime Minister did not enjoy Jinnah's intrusions in the day-to-day deliberations of government, but as a loyal lieutenant he could not ignore the demands of his superior. Jinnah's role was in many ways similar to the one played by the British viceroys of India who reserved the power to veto or ignore acts taken by the Indian representatives. The capacity of a supreme ruler to nullify the actions of the institutional leaders was something that the Pakistani politicians hoped to correct. But with Jinnah holding the Governor-General's office there was little likelihood of accomplishing this objective. Personality proved to be more important than institutional development and although Jinnah was a strong believer in the rule of law, his role as Governor-General confirmed an older, more authoritarian Muslim pattern in the conduct of political affairs.

2
Nationalism, Ideology, and the Islamic State

Nationalism is a state of mind.[1] It represents the political sentiments of a people who sense their future is enhanced by membership in a particular collectivity, namely, the nation-state. Nationalism is both a constructive and destructive force. It leads people to demand the right to govern themselves while it accelerates the disintegration of heretofore intertwined, if not united, peoples. In its positive form nationalism is a demand for individual freedom and self expression. In its negative form it threatens a tenuous equilibrium. The struggle for national self-determination is traced to nationalistic motivations brought on by feelings of alienation, fear of personal loss, systematic abuse and outright persecution. Fulfillment, it is assumed, can only be realized in situations where people are free from intimidation and exploitation, rejection and subordination. And such can only be avoided when persons so pressured are capable of controlling their own lives, shaping their own policies, and directing their own destinies. A people may live among and with others over centuries, show loyalty to similar leaders and institutions, and accept the prevailing philosophy and still insist upon their uniqueness and separate indentity. Cultural differences do not suggest *ipso facto* the emergence of political nationalism. Indeed, it is possible to enjoy *cultural* nationalism without ever experiencing *political* nationalism. Cultural nationalism is the fusion of nationality with common notions of geography, history, language (or closely related dialects), culture, and religion. But it is only when such a cultural nationalism cherishes and extols an exclusive sense of community, and demands *political independence,* that political nationalism manifests itself.

Nationalism can be distinguished from ideology in that, in theory at least, it grows from within a people who are in the process of forming themselves into a community. There is something spontaneous about nationalism when it draws people with varied background and experience into a single, unified identity. In other words, in an ideal nationalistic condition the masses create their own dynamics. Society's leaders, therefore, are extensions of the community's will and must reflect its aspirations and purpose. Ideology, on the other hand, is fabricated by an élite in order to mobilize an otherwise disparate and fragmented polity.[2] The need to coerce unity reveals the absence of cultural fusion: it also explains the persistence of doctrinal teachings and the refusal of leaders to admit error. Ideology by contrast with nationalism denies individual expression. It refuses to sanction non-conformism and is essentially authoritarian and demanding in its adoption of total power. Ideological states are more like empires in their determination to impose their will and ensure that it prevails. Such states emphasize the dominance of government and persons who hold public office are beyond popular control or limitation. The power they wield is absolute and, though arbitrary in character, cannot be questioned, let alone challenged. Nationalistic states, however, are more dependent on voluntary associations and maximum opportunity for self-improvement must be given to individuals. Government is not as stable as in ideological states, but the promise of greater innovation and inquiry offer the possibility of varied growth, broader experimentation and deeper human satisfaction. Moreover, in nationalistic states human achievement is primary and sets the pattern for political development.

Territoriality is related to both nationalistic and ideological states. Human political organization requires land or geographic space to realize its potential. The acquisition of territory is asme *qua non* of independence and political sovereignty.[3] But the world is a closed political system, in that all of the habitable portions of the planet have been divided into separate and distinct political units. There is no more *terra incognita* and new states or geopolitical arrangements can emerge only as older ones decay or are absorbed by the more powerful.

It could be argued that the Muslims who first arrived in South Asia were ideologically motivated. They were highly regimented, singular in purpose and fully committed to the objective of taming Indian civilization and transforming the subcontinent into the Dar-ul-Islam (Territory of Islam).

Although never fulfilling their overall purpose they established their hegemony over the region and dominated its political life for several centuries. Those Indian rulers who continued to function exercised effective control over their domains and subjects, but they were also called upon to respect and pay homage to the Muslim fountainhead. In this respect they sustained the prerogatives of rulership but also accepted the existence of a higher authority. Attempts at overthrowing Muslim (essentially Moghul) rule were dealt with ruthlessly but neither side actually achieved outright success against the other. Moreover, the Islamic world had already developed the tradition wherein it was possible for different communities to live side-by-side without necessarily altering the power of the one or the cultural life of the other.

In the Ottoman Empire such a system was known as *millet* (nation). It was understood that peoples, particularly scriptuaries, had the right to organize their affairs according to their own traditions and values. They therefore identified with their own leaders who were responsible for keeping the customs and sustaining the community. It was also agreed, however, that non-Muslim groups living within the Muslim empire owed allegiance to the supreme Muslim ruler, in the case of the Ottomans, the Sultan.[4] Although the system in India was not identical, the existence of institutions which permitted different groups to share the same territory became general Muslim practice. Non-Muslim communities could live in relative peace so long as they paid a tax *jizya*) and did nothing to undermine authority. In effect, from the earliest period India was a land of many political expressions, and in a cultural sense, of at least two dominant nations and a number of lesser ones.

The arrival of Europeans in South Asia, and particularly the British, energized still another form of ideological empire. The British were more successful than the Moghuls in bringing the subcontinent under their command, but they too were disinclined toward replacing the belief systems of the indigenous population. What religious prosyletizing occurred was essentially private and although not discouraged was never seriously supported by the English rulers.[5] What the British sought was political influence not social transformation. The British were adept at manipulation not conversion. The ‘White Man’s Burden’ was more a condition than an aspiration. Thus when Britain withdrew from India, the communities were intact and even more committed to their individualized ways of life. The

call for a separate Muslim homeland in South Asia should have been a predictable outcome of the history of the region. The fact that the British appeared interested in leaving behind a unified political state, and the Indian National Congress was determined to maintain the geographic unity of the subcontinent in the face of the political and social realities of centuries of division and separatism, now seem most surprising.

Nationalism and the Creation of Pakistan

Mohammad Ali Jinnah touched a sensitive chord in articulating the Muslim demand for a separate nation. He also modified a dormant Muslim ideology by giving it limited national purpose. In this situation ideology and nationalism seem to interact and blend together: in point of fact they obscure one another and make it extremely difficult to sort out the real from the ideal, the desirable from the possible. In the struggle to achieve Pakistan, Jinnah and the Muslim League required support from the larger Muslim community, including those who would not enjoy the fruits of their labours. Pakistan could only be achieved if the British were convinced that there was adequate popular enthusiasm for the movement, and from their vantage point the Muslims were largely united behind their national leadership. The ideologists, as represented by the *ulema,* who did not go along with the Pakistan idea, and who continued to think in terms of the larger Islamic community, were disregarded or at least judged to have less of a following. Moreover, after World War II the British were more inclined to recognize national movements than ideological ones, in so far as the latter threatened an even greater rearrangement of the balance of power. Whether consciously or subconsciously, the British preferred Jinnah's more limited vision.

Nationalistic movements once set in train are difficult to control. In the initial struggle for independence there is usually a drawing together of all indigenous elements against the alien overlord. The principal objective is to force the withdrawal of the imperial power. But as has been noted in chapter one, in British India there was no such coalescence and the struggle for independence was more a matter of resolving Hindu-Muslim differences than a question of how to get the British to leave. Ultimately two

independent states were created and, it could be assumed, two substantial nationalisms came of age. Actually, however, the conundrum of nationalism in South Asia had only just begun.[6]

With Pakistan an actuality, the Muslim League nationalist movement had to transform itself into a viable political organization as well as assume responsibility for managing the country's affairs. While Muslims of Pakistan could still perceive a Hindu threat, what with the war in Kashmir, Indian army campaigns against the independent Muslim government in Hyderabad, and the forceful occupation of Junagadh (a Muslim entity near Bombay), the unity demonstrated prior to August 1947 could not be sustained. The regions and provinces of Pakistan sought to retain their individuality, and although joined together in a common faith, they insisted upon highlighting their more exclusive cultural characteristics. Efforts employed by the Muslim League central government to counteract these distinctive tendencies were judged high-handed and abusive, and a clash between the Centre and the local units was made inevitable.[7] Although the Muslim League government claimed that the provinces were being subverted by Indian agents bent on destroying Pakistan from within - that provincialism was a Hindu plot - there was no mistaking the demand from the different nationality groups that they be given every opportunity to fulfil their peculiar aspirations.

It is possible for nationalism to evolve into ideology, and conversely, for ideology to fragment into a number of nationalisms. For example, the Muslim League envisaged itself as a nationalistic movement but once independence had been won the Muslim League organization took on an ideological character. Instead of seeking to satisfy sub-national groups or diverse cultural nationalisms within the new country, the Muslim League felt the strong need to impose its will over the entire country. Thus, instead of becoming a national organization, the Muslim League took on the appearance of a vast bureaucracy, indifferent to the variety of cultures in the country, and insistent that the people adopt a singular way of life designed by its leadership. In these circumstances it did not take long for cultural nationalisms to become political nationalisms and for the new nation to be threatened with dissolution.[8]

The Socio-Political Configuration of Pakistan

At independence on 14 August 1947 Pakistan was formed from East Bengal (West Bengal had been give to India in the Radcliffe Award of 1947), West Punjab (also divided, the eastern Punjab was made a part of India), Sind, the Northwest Frontier Province and the tribal states of Baluchistan. Several small mountain kingdoms in the northwest also came under Pakistan government authority although initially they were given the option to remain independent. The more outstanding of these states were Swat, Amb, Dir, Chitral, Hunza, Gilgit and Kafiristan. In the Sindi-Punjabi region, individual princes ruled over Bahwalpur and Khairpur. The latter were merged in 1955 into the One Unit of West Pakistan whereas the others maintained their individuality but no longer possessed sovereign status. In Baluchistan the tribal states of Kalat, Makran, Kharan and Las Bela were also incorporated into the single administrative province of West Pakistan. What is significant here are the ethnic as well as political divisions that the Pakistan state inherited.[9] While the vast majority of people were devout Muslims, they shared little else in common. Their histories were full of conflicts between rival groups and neighbours, and their capacity to live in harmony under a centralized authority was doubtful from the outset. Moreover, ethnocentric tendencies caused them to fear any invasion of their domains and they displayed resistant qualities that could not be overcome quickly.

Unfortunately, the Muslim League government interpreted their determination to remain non-conformist and autonomous as anti-state and a threat to national consolidation and planned development. The Pakistan government's reaction, therefore, was not based on compassion and understanding, but rather on force and manipulation. The government did little more than imitate Britain's colonial policy in the tribal areas as it shifted its support from one group to another. In this way the tribes were played off against each other and the government was able to extend its control. The more settled provinces, however, posed a different kind of problem and the task of government required greater sensitivity to local issues as well as culture. But in each case the Muslim League leaders proved themselves ill-equipped to make the adjustment.

The Bengali Problem

The Bengalis who became Pakistanis were committed to the idea of a separate Muslim nation. The last Chief Minister of United Bengal was the Muslim Leaguer H. S. Suhrawardy, a successful lawyer and an astute politician. Moreover, Suhrawardy headed the only truly Muslim League government prior to the establishment of Pakistan. Bengal province was divided between Hindus and Muslims despite his opposition. He pleaded with Jinnah not to accept the Radcliffe Award as it would leave Pakistan with the poorest region of Bengal, a dependent, non-viable entity that could only drain the new state's meagre resources. But the partition of Bengal was already a *fait accompli* and Suhrawardy only provoked more conflict by arguing in favour of another course of action. When Pakistan was created Suhrawardy decided to remain behind in Calcutta which had been awarded to India. For this act, as well as his criticism of the Muslim League, he was forced out of the party and into the opposition.[10] After independence, political power in Bengal was conferred on those leaders who made Dacca their home, and a government was organized which supposedly represented the needs of the East Bengali population. As time was to show, however, these leaders were either inept, too aloof or simply too greedy to be able to articulate Bengali aspirations.

The central government housed in Karachi during Pakistan's early years had a particular view of the Bengalis which did not lend itself to building bridges between diverse ethnic cultures. East Bengal was almost a thousand miles from the western provinces and contained more than half of the country's population. But the Bengali voice in the halls of government was weak and often ignored. Moreover, the eastern province had a sizeable Hindu population, unlike the western provinces which had very few non-Muslims. The westerners argued that there were more Muslims in their wing of the country and hinted that Bengalis were not true Muslims, given their Hindu ancestry (many Bengalis were the descendente of Hindu untouchables who had converted to Islam), and were still heavily influenced by the more sophisticated Hindus in their midst. In other respects, abrasive conditions prevailed given the seizure of economic opportunities in the province by non-Bengalis, and particularly Muslim refugees from India. There were also very few Bengalis either in the bureaucracy or the Army,

the result of a reluctance on the part of the British to recruit from the Bengal hinterland. The Muslim League government did not alter this policy. After independence, both the ruling body and the military in East Bengal were largely made up of elements drawn from the refugee community, the Punjab, and the Northwest Frontier.[11] To the Bengalis this was little more than an alien army of occupation, no different from what had been experienced during the period of the British Raj. The Bengalis already had good reasons for rejecting the Muslim League, and an incident occurred in 1952 which finally forced them to withdraw their support from the party.

The issue which caused the gap to widen between East Bengal and the central government was the language question. Pakistan's national leaders were convinced that political integration was possible only if the country could be made to accept one language and English was judged unacceptable. The language chosen was Urdu which by all accounts was spoken by a mere 8 per cent of the total population of Pakistan. By contrast approximately 55 per cent spoke Bengali.[12] In pressing their language policy the Muslim League leadership insisted that Urdu was a Muslim tongue, it was written in the Persianized form of Arabic, and was widely understood by many Pakistanis even if they did not use it in common parlance. Bengali was not even considered because it was derived from Hindu culture, was written in the Devanagri script (a form of Sanskrit) and was not known at all by non-Bengali Muslims in the western provinces, or for that matter anywhere else in the Islamic world. The Bengalis were hardly content with this explanation and they let it be known that they would continue to agitate for the adoption of their language as one of two national languages for Pakistan.

In February 1952 major rioting erupted in Dacca over the language issue.[13] University students were in the vanguard of the demonstration and could only be subdued by police and the Pakistan Army, but not before several students lost their lives. The authorities blamed Hindu agitators for the unrest in East Bengal and banished many intellectual and professional Hindus from the country. This action did not terminate the disorder and a later government decision to accept Bengali on a par with Urdu did not satisfy Bengali demands. By this time Bengali nationalism had matured and nothing the central government did could return the province to the status quo ante.

The defeat of the Muslim League in the East Bengal elections of 1954 was attributed to the language issue. The election gave Bengalis an opportunity to develop a government of their own choosing. They seemed satisfied with this limited objective and there was no real desire for separation from Pakistan despite statements concerning secession by leaders like Maulana Bhashani. Fears in Karachi ran high, however, and after rioting erupted in commercial establishments south of Dacca, the central government dissolved the newly elected Bengali government and sent its own administrator to manage the province.[14] Although the government cited emergency powers for its actions, the Bengalis had more reason to suspect that they had not won Pakistan when the subcontinent was divided, but rather had fallen under another form of colonialism. In the years that followed Bengali cultural nationalism was transformed into a political movement with its aim the liberation of the province from the powers located in the western region of the country. Repeated references about the need for Islamic brotherhood in the face of Indian machinations could not alter a course which in 1971 led to civil war and from there to the formation of the independent people's republic of Bangladesh.[15]

Leadership, Nationalism and Ideology

By the time Bangladesh was formed the Muslim League had long ceased to function as a viable political organization. The rump organization that passed for the League underwent several transformations but it never again enjoyed the position that it had gained with the creation of the country. But the collapse and virtual disappearance of the original Muslim League did not produce a more nationalistic society. Deprived of the movement which organized a disparate people into a political force for the achievement of Pakistan, subsequent leaders of Pakistan could not restore the unity that Jinnah alone had produced. Given their lesser abilities, the tendency was to ignore nationalism for ideological commitment. Ayub Khan, who seized power in 1958 and clung to it until his fall in 1969, adopted ideological tactics in assembling his administrative state. Under the guise of a presidential constitution, the bureaucrats dominated the political process,

ignored the pleas of the politicians, and insisted that their decisions be implemented without hesitation. The formation of Ayub's Basic Democracies system sought to mobilize the rural population just as it aimed at neutralizing the intelligentsia, but the underlying socio-political problems went untreated and indeed were permitted to fester and spread. At the end of Ayub's decade of rule, the nationalities of Pakistan were even more keen to make their separate intentions known.

Yahya Khan's regime agreed to a Legal Framework Order in 1970 which called for the re-establishment of the separate provinces of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province.[16] In 1955, these provinces had been submerged in the integrated One Unit Scheme. Their individual governments had been dissolved for a single administrative centre located in the Punjab. Ostensibly developed to offset the demands of the East Bengalis, the One Unit of West Pakistan was condemned by non-Punjabis because it seemed to place them in a permanent condition of inferiority. The Punjabis had greater wealth and sophistication, and enjoyed a pre-eminent position in commercial, governmental, as well as military affairs. In other words they had the political leverage which the other nationalities could not hope to match. Yahya seemed to correctly read the clamour from the minority nationalities when he ordered the dissolution of the One Unit, but the gesture did not appease those who had long agitated for change. The civil war in East Pakistan and the loss of Bangladesh did nothing to reduce the intensity of the demand by the Pathans, Baluchis and Sindhis for a larger say in their own affairs. When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed the leadership of Pakistan, he sensed a dire threat to Pakistan's integrity from the border provinces, but there was no returning to the One Unit scheme.

Bhutto had little if any support in Baluchistan or the North West Frontier Province. His Pakistan People's Party could not compete with indigenous coalitions in those provinces. When the opposition took control and seemed to thwart Bhutto's ideological solution for a *new* Pakistan, he dismantled their provincial governments and installed others that were more tolerant of his rule.[17] In Baluchistan the result was armed struggle in which the tribal people fought a guerilla war from their barren hillside fortresses and tied down large contingents of Pakistan's regular army. By this time the meaning of Pakistani nationalism was completely obscured and a contest of wills commenced pitting Bhutto's quasi-socialist ideology against the tribal

people's sense of independence and ethnic pride. Although the Baluchis and Pathans failed to achieve their objectives, Bhutto never attained his either. When Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 by still another military coup, the future of Pakistan as a national entity was more problematical than ever.

Muslim Ideology and Pakistani Nationalism at the Crossroads

Despite frequent references to Pakistan as an Islamic State and successive constitutions calling for a council of Islamic Ideology to oversee conformity with Muslim teachings, especially in the conduct of the state's political affairs, Pakistan has always been governed according to secular rather than religious demands. The overthrow of the Bhutto administration, however, may have heralded the first genuine effort at creating an Islamic state, and Pakistan may yet move in a direction which would suggest a departure from the conventional nation-state design. Explanation for this course will not be found in the Iranian revolution which brought the Ayatullah Khomeini into the limelight, or his determination to create the Shia version of an Islamic state. Pakistan has long been the prototype experiment for the Islamic state and in its current phase has adopted policies not so much to excite the passions of Pan-Islamism as to maintain the integrity of Pakistan. It is, after all, Pakistan not Islam which is in danger, and the government of Ziaul-Haq must overcome the abuses of the past as well as ward off external threats.

No one assumes that ethnic fusion can occur in Pakistan, but the new leaders are gambling that symbols can be created which will draw the country's diverse peoples into an intimate embrace. Toward this goal they emphasize regional autonomy, local self-goverment and distributive justice. The latter aims at an equitable development programme which would help to raise the standard of living in the heretofore more deprived and backward areas of the country.[18] Material satisfaction and political independence are the twin themes of the government's secular programme. The basic assumption seems to be that coercion does not make for community, nor does fear generate meaningful interaction. If people are permitted to represent themselves, to make their own decisions and satisfy their primary

needs, they may well opt for cooperation with the central administration. They might also find it possible to relate more closely to their neighbours in the other provinces. But while this process is being primed it is necessary to expand upon the one element that all the parties hold in common - Islam.

Ideological Islam signifies community, the voluntary drawing together of diverse peoples to form a collectivity. It is Pakistan's only possibility for cultural fusion and hence for the creation of a dynamic community with similar instincts, duties and obligations. The question raised by the challenge is the capacity of a people to form a common solidarity without the assistance of outstanding leaders. Put in another way, will Pakistan's current and aspiring leaders allow the people to find their own levels of expression? No less important, is the Islamic state that they stress, the same *state* that the people identify with? The answer to these questions may well provide the answer to Pakistan's survival as a sovereign state. Piety and the ordering of one's life in accordance with Islamic teachings is the key to Pakistan's present emphasis on the Islamic state. In this regard, the rules are not man-made, but derived from the word of God as transmitted through his Prophet Mohammad.[19] To that extent no one is above the law, equality is manifested without lowering or raising stations in life, and all Muslims are made responsible to each other. It is also a time for reflecting on past performance and for a reaffirmation of religious belief by pledging to uphold the fundamentals of the faith. Obligatory duties of daily prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, providing charity (*zakat*) to those less fortunate, and where possible, making the pilgrimage (*haj*) to Mecca, are once more being stressed. Ancillary to these historically established requirements is the call to forego material pleasures and to devote one's life to social welfare, kindness, equity and cooperation. These devotions and actions have been stressed by General Zia-ul-Haq who on 10 February, 1979 formally announced the introduction of the Islamic system in Pakistan.[20]

Education has been a key institution in both the maintenance of nationalism and in the development of ideological commitment. Each generation must be exposed anew to the features and requirements of their way of life. The inculcation of particular values, the building of collective pride, the fostering of attitudes capable of generating work habits and civic consciousness, are usually the task of the educational system. If people do not instinctively perform constructive social roles, they must learn what is

expected of them and be taught how to conduct themselves. Patriotism, if it is not acquired in the family, tribal or local setting, can only be imparted through educational experience. Pakistani leaders understand this problem and changes in education policy have been introduced which are aimed at preparing 'a new generation wedded to the ideology of Pakistan and Islam.'[21]

The initial phase in the modification of heretofore secular institutions to quasi-religious orientation has been the revision of textbooks, which really means a purge of materials not considered germane to an Islamic society, and their substitution with books written for that specific purpose. Thus as with other ideologies, for example Marxism-Leninism, students at all levels are given foundation courses in ideological perspective before launching upon their more substantive studies. Officially sanctioned books are being produced for the occasion, and for a particular audience, by those charged with the disciplined indoctrination of the country's youth. The content may be different but the techniques of transfer are essentially the same for all ideologies, whether of the secular or religious variety. People do not automatically know something, they are taught and are expected to learn what they *must* know. What this method avoids is the random, shopping list approach where individuals are more or less expected to find their own path, develop their own interests and amass their own store of information. This latter course is the one Pakistani leadership now rejects as wasteful, directionless, and above all, anti-Islamic. Moreover, it has not produced a Pakistani citizenry with a sense of national responsibility.

The answer as to whether the Pakistani leaders will permit the people to find their own levels of expression seems to be yes and no. One response underlines the nationalist tendency, the Other is more expressive on the ideological side. The former comes from a new wisdom which calls for greater toleration of ethnic diversity. The nationalities of Pakistan will be given far more autonomy and they will be expected to develop systems of self-government that are in keeping with their genius. Their nationalism will be reflected in their regional condition, and instead of outsiders perceiving a threat to the unity of Pakistan, the new focus will permit the growth of unique but stable political institutions. The Pathans of the North West Frontier Province will live according to their customary codes, and the people of Baluchistan can give expression to their tribal rules. Pakistani nationalism will not be undermined by this redistribution of authority

because it too would have undergone significant reorientation. But Pakistan's leaders do not intend leaving everything to free choice. They intend to limit individual expression and thereby draw the population into a cohesive unit through ideological indoctrination based on Islamic principles and rules. Deviations from the established course will be more than a mere violation of secular authority; they will be judged an attack upon the religious order that underpins society. In other words, Pakistan's new leaders supposedly eschew personal power and stress the collective needs of the Muslim people residing in the Islamic state of Pakistan. An assault on the system, *ipso facto,* would be considered a strike against the faith. In this way too, the central authority, although cast in a different mould from previous Pakistan governments, would have the last word on the actions and policies of the individual provinces.

This also helps to explain the creation of Shariah Courts or Benches that supplement the Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Mohammadan Law that traces its origins back to the colonial era.[22] As General Zia-ul-Haq has noted, the Shariah or Islamic Law is supreme and therefore can annual or supersede other forms of law. Although made a part of the 1973 constitution (which remains in force despite Bhutto's execution) there is some question about the capacity of Shariah Law to augment or even bypass that document. Indeed there is considerable ambiguity on this matter. One view holds that any ordinary citizen can move the Pakistan judiciary to declare a law in part or totally un-Islamic, and therefore null and void. Another view contends that there are limits to such actions and that the constitution cannot itself be challenged by references to Islamic law. What prevails is something of a standoff with the 1973 constitution and Islamic law being declared dominant in their own contexts and hence in equilibrium, if not also equal. It is not so much a matter of one nullifying the other but rather that respect is due to both. The conclusion drawn is that a good Pakistani is a good Muslim and a good Muslim is a good Pakistani, and the two bodies of law are symbiotically related to one another and cannot be separated or made to appear in conflict.

This leads to a remaining question that asks wether this Islamic state is the one that the general masses also identify with. Responses are more direct, but they also contain substantial ambiguities that only time will resolve. It is first necessary to observe that Pakistan's current leaders have publicly argued that Pakistani society had been allowed to degenerate, and

that its purification and renaissance will take considerable effort, resources, sacrifice and time. Zia reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology from notable members of the scholarly religious community and brought them together with experts in the Ministries of Law and Religious Affairs as well as with members of the central Cabinet. After a year of study and deliberation this combined body presented its preliminary report to the President who proceeded to take action on several of its recommendations. Zia was aware that he did not have time to wait on a comprehensive programme and that his intentions would be evaluated in the light of his actions, hence the decision to go ahead in the area of *Zakat* (charity) and *Ushr* (the tax on agricultural produce).[23] Religious leaders were clamouring for an end to interest-taking, and Zia's policies were aimed at reordering the economic system. The administration, however, was reluctant to proceed too quickly in this area given Pakistan's ties to the world of international finance. But it was prepared to adopt policies that would help reduce the gap between the affluent and the deprived, and particularly to give publicity to its distributive justice policy.

A *Zakat* Fund has been established and divided into three parts.[24] The Local Account represents monies collected at the village or town level and deposited with local authorities. The next is the Provincial Account which is collected at the provincial level by drawing twenty-five per cent of the deposits from the Local Account. All of these revenues will be used within the province to serve the needs of that specific population. The third or Central Account draws money from the nation's banks and other financial institutions by levying a tax against deposits and assets. This money can be used for national projects or to supplement both the Provincial and Local Accounts as the need arises and merit is ascertained. In addition to this device which seeks to use individual wealth for social purposes, the government has authorized the more formal handling of charity and donations. A hierarchy of control involving members of the *ulema* and general public has been established and provided with local autonomy. There are also sufficient checks at different levels of government to ensure accountability and honesty. The hierarchy extends up to the President who appoints the Administrator-General for the entire *Zakat* Fund.

Ushr will be collected from *the zamindars* or landlords according to Islamic requirements.[25] Tenant-farmers will also be required to deduct an amount from their earnings, but this will be voluntary and left as a matter of

religious principle. The payment of *Ushr* will replace land revenue taxation although water taxes will be levied as in the past. The making of agricultural taxation a religious obligation removes all questions of favouritism and reduces the possibilities of corruption which have long sullied the Pakistan government's reputation. The collection of *Zakat* started on 1 July 1979 and *Ushr* commenced in October 1979. It is interesting to note that the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have provided Pakistan with substantial contributions to its new *Zakat* Fund, thus further crowning it with ideological rather than national purpose.

All money collected from the *Zakat* Fund is to be spent according to Muslim Shariah codes with contemporary auditing systems verifying expenditures of all funds. Annual reports are to be made to the Pakistan parliament thus again bringing the Islamic state's religious and secular institutions into harmonious interaction.[26]

Modifications in the economy at large are more complicated but the government has emphasized its support for private property as well as for public regulation of that economy. The dramatic, often arbitrary nationalization programmes introduced by the Bhutto administration have been rejected for a more cooperative system in which private property will not be seized except under unusual circumstances, and with full compensation paid to those whose property has been expropriated. Indeed, there seems to be real interest in encouraging free enterprise. At the same time, the question of interest looms large. Islamic practice prohibits usury and the government is hardpressed to meet this important injunction. As a beginning, government corporations such as the House Building Finance Corporation, the National Investment Trust and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan have been authorized to provide assistance to the less fortunate elements of the society so that they can find adequate shelter and 'make gainful investment without the curse of interest.'[27]

The punitive aspects of the Islamic state have received exceptional attention, particularly in the outside world. The Qur'an and the Sunnah identify four serious criminal offences: indulging in intoxicants, adultery, theft and bearing false witness. Together the crimes against Islam are known as *Hadd* and are treated forcefully by the Pakistan government. In the case of drinking, non-Muslim Pakistanis are exempt from the prohibition if the activity is connected with their religious ceremonies. Similarly, foreigners are permitted to imbibe liquors if done within the

confines of their embassies or residences.[28] The only intoxicants allowed to be produced within Pakistan will be for medical and scientific purposes and must have prior government approval. The prohibition on drinking not only destroyed Pakistan's pre-independence beer industry, it also closed down much of the entertainment sector that had developed in Karachi and some of the other cities over the last twenty-five years. Race courses and other forms of gambling that date back to the British Indian period, and which were also popular during the Moghul age, are no longer tolerated. Nightclubs and other after dark gathering places have either been sealed or their activities greatly curtailed. By and large people are urged to find their pleasure in prayer, family life or productive endeavour. Zia's admonition to his compatriots is 'simplicity in dress, simplicity in habits and simplicity in everyday life.'[29]

Penalties for violating the Islamic way of life are severe. The law reads that any Muslim found guilty of drinking alcoholic beverages will be given eighty lashes. Guilt will be ascertained if two 'reliable' Muslim adult male witnesses attest to the offence. In case of thievery, if the guilty party has committed a first offence his right hand will be severed. If repeated a second time, the left foot will be amputated. A third conviction requires imprisonment for life.[30] Parties found guilty of molesting or threatening others but not causing death will receive thirty lashes and not less than a three year term of rigorous imprisonment. Moreover, those found harbouring offenders or assisting in the theft of cattle are subject to fourteen years imprisonment or up to seventy lashes.[31] For the crime of adultery (*zina*) the penalty is death by stoning in a public place, and proof of such an offence is determined by four Muslim adult male witnesses which the Court is satisfied are truthful and have been eyewitnesses to the commission of the offence.[32] This law applies to non-Muslims as well, the difference being that the eyewitnesses in such cases may be non-Muslims. Kidnapping or selling persons for purposes of prostitution bring life sentences and whipping. Those who bear false witness or are judged to have falsely accused another (*qazf*) of adultery are punished with eighty lashes, or under certain circumstances two years imprisonment and no more than forty lashes.[33]

For acts of murder the penalty is death by hanging.[34] The conviction of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the crime of murder and his execution in April 1979

despite pleas for clemency from all over the world, including Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, must be seen against the backdrop of this renewed emphasis on justice in the Islamic state. Bhutto was not alone in paying with his life for this particular act and the Zia administration, whatever other reasons it may have had for carrying out the judgment of the Court, believed it could not spare him when others could not be so treated. To have done so would have violated the tenets of the system which emphasize equal justice, and equal punishment, irrespective of station or status.

Nationalism's Future in Pakistan

The question raised earlier which has yet to be directly answered asked whether the Islamic state that the present Pakistan government is in the process of establishing coincides with the Islamic state envisaged by Pakistani Muslims generally. Obviously there is no simple answer to this question. Nevertheless, there appears to be adequate support, at least among the *Sunni* Muslims, for the actions thus far taken. Discontent has been registered by the *Shia* Muslim minority, but this does not change the perception that the Zia administration's programme has broad support and that the dissenters are a minor element.[35] There is also no doubting the intent or the genuineness of this effort at creating a modern Islamic state. What is occurring in Pakistan is a reasonable facsimile of what the masses seem to want. And the government apparently intends to deliver on its promises. The days have passed when nomenclature and lip-service were sufficient. Pakistani authorities have been 'threatening' to build their Islamic state for more than thirty years and you cannot nourish an idea for that length of time without giving substance to something. Pakistan has been through numerous troubles, and the country is still in the process of formation. After all the trials and experiments, after all the borrowings and adaptations, an Islamic society is attempting to give meaning to an Islamic way of life, a form of ideological nationalism.

The latter point requires further analysis. Nationalism was spawned in the European world. Its roots lie deep in the history of Europe. It was spread by these same Europeans as they proceeded to colonize a sizeable portion of

the planet. But that which passed for nationalism in countries like India was not, nor could it be, the same type of nationalism experienced in Europe. The European nationalists were seeking a change in the authoritarian structure of their own societies; the non-European leaders of their respective independence movements sought the removal of an alien overlord. The former was concerned with democratizing their way of life; the latter were devoted to the re-creation of their past and the salvaging of their lost pride. Most important, the nationalist movement in Europe was a middle class enterprise; whereas the non-European version of the movement can only be described as an incipient mass activity led by a small middle class élite. The Europeans focused on superior-inferior relationships formed in earlier times and rejected them in favour of popular government. Middle class leadership implied a diffusion of power and responsibility. Consensus decision-making was a direct consequence of a pluralist society with varied interests and broader opportunities for individual growth and self-development.[36] By contrast, the non-Europeans endeavoured to remove their external inferiority with little concern for internal ruler-ruled relationships.

In chapter one it was noted that in Pakistan, as with other third world nations, personalities dominate the political scene. The popular expectation persists that a leader will emerge to guide the people into a 'golden age.' To the extent that such a figure can identify himself with the masses, his power is total: blind obedience, however, has its limits and power is often lost more quickly than it is won, given the fickleness of society. Deep rivalries between personal rulers leaves little opportunity for modern institution-building. Moreover, limited resources and general scarcity and poverty prevent the growth of countervailing power from the private sector. Despite frequent changes at the top, government monopolizes all aspects of the power equation and development programmes serve to enhance its control. In fact, given the extent of social and economic deprivation, the material success of society's few individual entrepreneurs provides governmental authority with a convenient 'whipping boy' in times of stress and social unrest.[37] The suppression of private sector activity in the name of social justice serves the purposes of government; it also prevents the growth of non-governmental influence, that is, middle class power. In the absence of significant middle class inputs, the likelihood of popular nationalism, albeit institutions representative of the popular will, is limited. It is not that the

masses are not capable of making demands, or that they do not possess sufficient volatility and latent energy, but it has yet to be shown that unsophisticated, essentially uneducated, tradition-bound people are capable of changing systems of social control that have endured for centuries. In the non-European world, authoritarianism remains the dominant form and that which passes for nationalism merely serves to reinforce the prevailing autocratic condition.

This contrasting view in no way ignores the realities of European history which records the tragedies attributed to nationalism. From Napoleon through Mussolini and Hitler, the Europeans have demonstrated the negative and aggressive dimensions of national emotion. It is no simple matter to sustain democratic experiments and a population charged by envy and despair becomes a willing tool of the passionate and articulate demagogue. Clearly, there are sufficient signposts to indicate that nationalism is hardly a one-directional highway. Perhaps this too explains why it has not been transferable in its ideal European form.

Whatever the theoretical explanations, it can be said that Pakistan is neither the nationalistic nor ideological ideal society described in these pages. It is still a country in the process of formation. After more than three decades of independence, Pakistan is one of the few nation-states deprived of a fictitious air of inevitability: it does not have the appearance of a country that was meant to be. Moreover, there are still the pessimists who concluded some time ago that Pakistan would not last. The loss of its eastern wing in 1971 would appear to confirm this attitude, and the unrest in its western frontier provinces only adds more fuel to the argument. This is the primary context in which Pakistan's ideological form of nationalism must be examined. The country does not have the time, nor the resources to wait upon the growth of a cosmopolitan middle class. The small middle class élite that gave substance to the Pakistan idea is gone and in its place are people with different backgrounds and concerns. The masses who followed the founding fathers have not disappeared, however. Their needs, expectations and desires are even more pronounced, and they can no longer be side-tracked or postponed. It may be impossible to substantially improve the material well-being of the masses, but it may still be possible to satisfy their emotional and psychological requirements- at least for the present. The current emphasis on the Islamic state serves both ideological and nationalistic purposes if it enables government to stabilize the socio-

political condition, allocate scarce resources in a more equitable fashion, and engender a love of country, even if the love affair is filtered through a spiritual devotion that transcends the nation-state. The tasks are formidable, and they cannot be accomplished without astute, dedicated, tactful leaders of unimpeachable integrity. Conditions in Pakistan have not prepared individuals with such traits to manage these tasks and it is this problem that will be examined in the chapters that follow.

3
The Creators and Early Managers of Pakistan

Religious communities and corporate communities share some things in common but are intrinsically different from one another. Religious communities do not *ipso facto* make for corporate communities. By contrast with the corporate, the religious community is more exclusive, although it may well prove to be larger than the corporate entity. The corporate community is restricted by frontiers and legal boundaries; the religious community transcends such limitations. In the contemporary world, corporate communities are more influential and action-oriented than religious communities. Corporate communities place greater immediate burdens upon their individual members than do religious communities. Corporate communities are more easily identifiable, more highly organized, more powerful in their physical performance than religious communities. Religious and corporate communities are not mutually exclusive. Individuals are usually members of each simultaneously, but they cannot give them equal attention. In a contest between religious and corporate identities it is assumed the corporate community will receive the higher loyalty. The modern corporate community often demands and obtains greater sacrifices from its membership than do religious communities. Moreover, corporate communities utilize coercive forms of organization. Religious communities today are based upon voluntarism, personal choice and relatively fragmented or disassociational forms of organization. Although the corporate entity may express itself in religious terms, indeed may identify with a particular religious order, it cannot ignore its corporate circumstances or how it relates to and must interact with other corporate

units that may or may not share its form of religious expression. Given the pre-eminence of the corporate over the religious community it is the former's responsibility to secure competent leadership and fashion policy capable of meeting the multidimensional needs of the conglomerate society. It is not surprising, therefore, for present-day leaders to be more associated with the temporal than the spiritual world, for persons trained in the mundane, practical arts to assume a higher order of importance than their counterparts in clerical robes and with theocratic experience.

Pakistan came into being as a land congenial to and protective of the Muslims of South Asia. A religious community in effect gave birth to a corporate state. The corporate state identified itself as an Islamic state but the latter was to be fitted to the former, not vice-versa. The result was the formation of a corporate Islamic state in which the key features of a secular corporate system took precedence over the religious without necessarily affecting the tenets of the latter. At least this was the intention of Pakistan's founders and the political managers who followed them. But Pakistan was also something of an anachronism in its corporate form. There was no symmetry between the corporate Pakistani state and the South Asian Muslim community; each was distinct, with the Islamic community more visible than the Pakistani. Pakistan was, by contrast, a new conception and fudamentally more abstract than that which passed for the Muslim community of South Asia. Islam was the life-force for the Muslims of South Asia. Pakistan had to be clarified, explained and made intelligible to a people who could understand challenges to their faith, but who did not sense how that faith would be or could be strengthened through the creation of a secular state. It could be hypothesized that the Muslim faithful who supported the Pakistan movement ceased to see any value in perpetuating the Pakistan idea once Islam had demonstrated its right to not only co-exist within the subcontinent, but for Muslims to reach out toward their co-religionists in other regions of the Islamic world. It was the task of Pakistan's leaders to explain to a far-flung population what the creation of the new nation-state meant. The story of Pakistan, in major part, is the failure of this leadership to accomplish that goal. It is also the theme for this chapter.

Genesis of the Pakistan Movement: Three Profiles in Leadership

Pakistan is linked with the Muslim demand for freedom and the right of political self-determination. It is a response to political weakness not strength; it reflects the fear of a minority for a majority that it could not trust or respect. As such the creation of Pakistan is not simply a twentieth century phenomenon. Pakistan's origins are rooted in the disappearance of the Moghul dynasty and the reluctance of the Muslims to adapt to a new order based upon English power and culture. The disapperance of the last Moghul emperor ended the period of Muslim rule in South Asia. Unable to cope with the new power relationships in the subcontinent, the Muslims neglected their more cosmopolitan activities and retreated to the familiar circumstances of their religious experience. It could be said that something similar to an Islamic state, though unofficial and undeclared, prevailed in this period. The Muslims closed themselves off from the world as the English conquerors of India, whom they saw, interestingly, as being aloof, consolidated their authority and enlisted members of the Hindu community to assist them in building their corporate state. This self-imposed isolation reinforced Muslim convictions about their Islamic community but it could do little to bring about the constructive interaction of the principals, or increase Muslim influence and power. Thus, when the Muslims were provoked into realizing the consequences of their own actions, the response was predictable. Instead of visualizing their future as an integral component of an expanding community, they developed a defensive strategy which signalled their willingness to accept certain contemporary teaching, but not to the extent that it would alter their separatist path. The modern Islamic state was already in its incubus.

The leader who is given principal credit for reviving the Muslims of British India is Syed Ahmad Khan (1817–98).[1] It was Syed Ahmad who instructed his brethren to hold to their way of life but not to neglect the essentials of modern education. He insisted that Muslims should make every effort to remain apart from the larger community and its organizations, but that they should experience and absorb as much learning as the more powerful English colonizers could impart. Education was

equated with power and Syed Ahmad sensed the Muslims could only defend themselves if they had the same capabilities as their Hindu antagonists. In other words, the Islamic state could only be protected if Muslims comprehended the methods and techniques of governance fashionable in the European world. Syed Ahmad was among the first Muslims to ponder the course of events in an India without the British. 'Now suppose,' he wrote,

> that all the English were to leave India… then who would be the rulers of India? Is it possible that under these circumstances two nations - the Mohammedan and the Hindu - could sit on the same throne and remain equal in power? Most certainly not. It is necessary that one of them should conquer the other and thrust it down.[2]

This negative reaction to the communitarian role of the Hindu and Muslim populations is mirrored in the comments of W. W. Hunter who in 1872 wrote:

> The educated Muhammadan, confident in his old training, sees himself practically excluded from the share of power and of the emoluments of Government which he hitherto had almost monopolized, and sees these and all the other advantages of life passed into the hands of the hated Hindu… we have failed in our duty to the Muhammadan subjects of the Queen. A great section of the Indian population, some thirty million in number, finds itself decaying under British Rule… To this day they exhibit at intervals their old intense feeling of nationality and capability of warlike enterprise; but in all other respects they are a race ruined under British rule.[3]

With the goal of lifting the Muslims of India from their tragic disadvantage *vis-á-vis* the Hindus, Syed Ahmad organized the Society for the Educational Progress of Indian Muslims. The organization founded the Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College at Aligarh which opened its doors in June 1875. Aligarh, as the college was to become known, attracted the flower of Muslim youth and in time produced many of the Muslim leaders of India, some of whom joined the Pakistan Movement. The college curriculum was a blend of Muslim culture and modern education. Special stress was given to the preparation of young men capable of taking up assignments in the public and private sectors of the colonial system. Syed Ahmad Khan preached one doctrine. Learning modern ways, albeit English and European customs and traditions, did not imply the loss of Muslim genius. His purpose was unmistakable. Study the ways of the British so that the integrity of the Muslim community may be preserved. In this connection, Syed Ahmad warned his coreligionists not to join the Indian

National Congress which he considered a Hindu organization. He also cautioned against the notion of open and free elections which many Indian reformers of the period were pressuring the British to conduct. Syed Ahmad noted that the elections for local Boards, District Boards and District Councils could only result in Muslims being oppressed by the more numerous Hindus. In this way Syed Ahmad was also among the earliest Muslim expositors of the principle of *Separate Electorates* which was ultimately adopted by the British colonial government in 1909.[4] Under separate electorates Muslims, and other minorities, were provided with separate lists of candidates. A quota system was established for the different communities in which weightage rather than proportional representation prevailed. The Hindus described the British decision to adopt separate electorates as another tactic in their divide and rule program, but Muslims saw it as an article of faith, and even after Pakistan became a reality, strenuous efforts were made to retain it. Syed Ahmad Khan was indeed a key figure in the promotion of an Islamic state in South Asia.

Syed Amir Ali (1849–1928) was yet another of this small band of Indian Muslims who shaped the destiny of Islam in the subcontinent. Amir Ali had completed his education prior to the establishment of Aligarh, but he knew, and spent long hours with, Syed Ahmad Khan discussing the future of the Muslim community in South Asia. Amir Ali endorsed the educational program at Aligarh but he insisted that Indian Muslims expose themselves to practical politics in much the same way as the Hindus. He was an astute interpreter on political forces and had concluded that a rising tide of nationalism was moving on India and the Muslims had better be prepared for the blow if they did not want to be submerged by it. Living up to his words, Amir Ali served in both judicial and legislative roles providing the Muslim community with a model that he hoped many others would emulate. He became a leader of the Muslim League when it was founded in 1906 and used it as the organizational bridge between the Muslim community and the British colonial government. In addition to his practical contribution, Amir Ali developed an international reputation as a scholar and author. Not only did he encourage Muslims to reflect upon their divine gifts, but his mastery of English prose enabled him to communicate the meaning of Islam to Europeans who read his works with particular fascination.[5] Through the combined endeavour of Syed Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali the Muslim community had not only been revived, but a course

had been established which led directly to the next stage in the development of contemporary Muslim consciousness in South Asia.

The inspiration for modern Muslim nationalism in South Asia can be traced to the writing and poetry of Mohammad Iqbal (1877–1938). Iqbal was the son of a Kashmiri, raised in the Punjab where he received his education. He was exposed to European manners, customs and thought at an early age. Iqbal displayed an interest in Oriental and English literature as well as philosophy and political theory, and after graduating from Government College in Lahore, he left India for an extended period of study in England and Germany. He obtained a bachelor of arts degree from Cambridge University, qualified at Lincoln's Inn as a barrister-at-law, and was awarded a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Munich. Iqbal's academic credentials, his poetry and philosophy soon earned him an international reputation and he was viewed by his contemporaries as one of the subcontinent's more outstanding intellectuals.[6] Iqbal, impressed by the work of Amir Ali, made his initial entry into the political world during his stay in England. He joined the British committee of the All-India Muslim League which had been set up by Amir Ali. On returning to India he affiliated with the Punjab Provincial Muslim League and soon became one of its leaders. He was as active member of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and, unlike so many other Punjabi Muslim leaders of the period who were convinced of the need to maintain a Hindu-Sikh-Muslim coalition, Iqbal felt such a union only worsened the plight of the Muslim community. For his staunch support of Muslim causes and his fame, Iqbal was elected secretary of the All-India Muslim League. He resigned from the position a few months later when the party Working Committee adopted the proposals of the British Simon Commission which, he judged, would neither serve the purposes of the Muslim Community nor provide the constitutional advances so necessary for the growth of self-government. Iqbal sensed a weakness in the Muslim League which he could not countenance. He was a man with strong convictions and an uncompromising attitude. Moreover, he had prepared himself to 'go it alone' if he found the Muslim organizational base ineffective or ambivalent.

In 1930 the subcontinent's most illustrious poet-philosopher was invited to preside over an open session of the All-India Muslim League which was holding its annual convention in Allahabad. Iqbal used the occasion to make a dramatic statement which most scholars of the period agree represented

the first clear call for the establishment of an independent Muslim state within South Asia. Iqbal, like Syed Ahmad Khan and Amir Ali before him, warned that a constitution based upon the conception of a homogeneous Indian polity could not succeed. According to Iqbal, such a constitution could only benefit the British and Hindus and the end-product would be a terrible civil war. To avoid such a calamity, Iqbal called for the establishment of a consolidated Muslim state in the northwestern portion of the subcontinent, the region where the Muslims formed the heavy majority. Islam was the key to Muslim rejuvenation in South Asia and Iqbal was certain the Islamic *Shariat* could only be enforced in a land where the Muslims were free from alien influence. Iqbal's bold manoeuvre paid off. It gave the Indian Muslims a central focus for their concerns, and articulated a position which they now believed to be attainable.

In 1933 three young Muslim students, who were studying at Cambridge, issued a pamphlet entitled *Now or Never.* Responding to Iqbal's idea, they demanded the partition of the subcontinent between Muslims and Hindus. One of these young men, Chaudhary Rahmat Ali, is credited with giving a name to the area that Iqbal had identified as a possible self-governing Muslim territory. The term Pakistan was an acronym derived from the names of the provinces falling within this region. In Urdu it also translated as 'land of the pure'. But of no less importance was Iqbal's influence on Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who in the 1920s had been frustrated both by Mahatma Gandhi's tactics and the intrigues of his fellow Muslims. Jinnah had taken up residence in London but maintained a correspondence with Iqbal, and it was Iqbal who encouraged Jinnah to return to India. Iqbal died in 1938 and the task of leading the Indian Muslims fell to Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) who even before Pakistan's emergence was given the title of Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader) by his devoted followers.

Jinnah and the Pakistan Movement

Mohammad Ali Jinnah was the son of a successful Shiite Khoja merchant. His father expected him to follow his example and sent him to London at an early age to improve his already impressive commercial experience. In England, however, Jinnah gravitated toward the legal profession and in

1895 was admitted to the bar at Lincoln's Inn. During his student years he came under the influence of Dadabhai Naroji whom he assisted in winning a seat in the British parliament. Thus began Jinnah's fascination with the world of politics. Through his acquaintance with Dadabhai, Jinnah was exposed to other Indian National Congress leaders and was most impressed with G. K. Gokhale, C. R. Das and Surendranath Bannerjea. These men represented the more liberal wing of the Indian nationalist movement at the turn of the century. They were essentially legal reformers who saw India's future in the rule of law and this had appeal for Jinnah who was considerably influenced by their teachings.[7] The fact that all of these political personalities were non-Muslims meant little at the time, and moreover, Jinnah joined the Congress to work for Muslim-Hindu unity and political freedom. He did not join the Muslim League (simultaneous membership in the Congress and League was possible), and even criticized the Muslim demand for *Separate Electorates*. Jinnah's major political objective before World War I lay in drawing the two communities and their representatives together, not in antagonizing them.

In 1913 Jinnah joined the League with the intention of unifying its programmes with that of the Congress. In 1915 he engineered a joint session of the Muslim League and Congress parties. In 1916 the two organizations entered into the Lucknow Pact and agreed to cooperate towards establishing representative government in the subcontinent. The Pact was accepted by the Imperial Legislative Council and it set the scene for the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms and the Government of India Act, 1919, which gave India's indigenous population its first real experience with self-government, albeit under controlled circumstances. In obtaining cooperation between the Congress and the League, Jinnah was pressured into accepting separate electorates and was able to convince the Congress leadership that it would be in their interest to agree to this Muslim demand. But the era of collaboration as envisaged by Jinnah was not destined to last long.

Mahatma Gandhi returned to India from South Africa where he had gained a reputation as a revolutionary leader. Gokhale and B. G. Tilak were dead and the leadership of the Indian National Congress was at a crossroads.[8] Gandhi quickly filled the void and with his tactics of passive resistance (*satyagraha*) began organizing India's masses for a concerted attack on the British colonial system. Jinnah disagreed with Gandhi's

approach which, he argued, was demagogic and destructive of the rule of law. His reluctance to accept Gandhi's tactics meant the League would take a different course from that of the Congress. After devoting his life and energy to Hindu-Muslim unity, Jinnah was compelled to recognize what Syed Ahmad Khan, Amir Ali, Iqbal and others had repeated so often, that Muslims and Hindus were two nations and must control their own political destinies. In 1920 the Congress Party met in annual session and Gandhi moved a resolution calling for noncooperation and street demonstrations. Jinnah rose to oppose the decision. Shouted down by the delegates, he resigned his Congress membership. In 1920 he went to England to represent the Indian Muslims at the First Round Table Conference. Mahatma Gandhi was now the driving force behind the Indian independence movement and Jinnah fretted over the course of events. He remained in England until 1934 when he was encouraged to return to India to give new life to the Muslim cause.

Jinnah did not look the part of an Indian Muslim leader. He was described by his critics as haughty, punctilious and stubborn. In bearing and dress he seemed to prefer the style of his British rulers. Moreover, his religious practices were meagre and as a member of a Shia sect he was judged to be distant from the overwhelming majority of South Asian Muslims. Compared with Gandhi, the saint-in-politics clothed simply in loin cloth or *dhoti,* Jinnah was the debonair statesman who refused to use popular symbols to entice his followers. But Jinnah was honest, confident, dedicated, articulate and experienced. He understood both the British and Gandhi and could deal with them as no other Muslim leader could, hence the call to Jinnah to again direct the Muslim campaign. The Muslim League was in disarray when Jinnah returned to India. The Government of India Act, 1935, was about to become law and elections for the provincial legislatures were scheduled for 1937. Jinnah had his work cut out to reorganize the League in time to fight the elections, but it was obvious the Congress had a big advantage. When the ballots were counted the Congress dominated the legislatures and the Muslim League, even under the separate electorate rule, only won 108 of 484 Muslim seats.[9]

The crushing Muslim League defeat convinced the Congress leadership that it had nothing to fear from Jinnah's party, and there being no other nationally organized Muslim movement, they behaved as if they alone represented the aspirations of India's vast population. The refusal on the

part of the Congress to concede issues of fundamental importance to the Muslims only moved India closer to socio-political rupture. At the Muslim League convention in 1940, a resolution was passed calling for the establishment of one or more independent Muslim states within the subcontinent. This Lahore Resolution (later known as the Pakistan Resolution) signified the irrevocable shift in favour of an independent Pakistan to which Jinnah now devoted himself.

World War II provided the backdrop for the developments that led directly to the creation of Pakistan. The British declared India a belligerent in the war despite the protests of the Congress leaders. In an act of defiance, they called upon their members to cease cooperating with the British and for Congress government officials in the different provinces to vacate their posts. Although India was thrown into confusion by this, the Muslim League was delighted with the sudden change in their fortunes. Jinnah described the moment as 'The Day of Deliverance,' and called upon Muslims to contribute what they could to the war effort. The tactic was a successful one. Congress leaders were imprisoned for sedition and obstructing the war effort while the Muslim League rose in stature. The British declared that they would withdraw from India at the conclusion of the war, and not before. This was acceptable to the Muslim League but opposed by the Congress which insisted upon a 'Quit India' movement. The Cripps Mission, which visited India in 1942 with the objective of preparing India for self-government, failed because the two communities could no longer accommodate one another. The conditions created by the war made any agreement impossible.[10]

Once the war was over, however, political events accelerated. Jinnah had completely revamped his party, travelling from region to region to speak on its behalf, and had convinced the British of the validity of the Muslim claim. Elections which were conducted in 1945 also revealed a significant change in voting patterns from the 1937 ballot. Campaigning on a platform that called for an independent Pakistan, The Muslim League was the overwhelming favourite of the Muslim population and there was no longer any chance of diverting the Pakistan movement.

In March 1946, India was visited by a Cabinet Mission which had been dispatched by the British parliament as one last desperate effort to salvage the unity of the country.[11] It too failed, however, and in March 1947 Lord Louis Mountbatten arrived in the subcontinent to take up his reponsibilities

as the last English viceroy in India. Despite his original intention of leaving India in 1948, Mountbatten altered the timetable and announced he would issue the withdrawal notice for August 1947. No one was prepared for so early a departure, especially the Muslim League, which had anticipated there being more time in which to organize itself for governmental responsibilities. But Mountbatten was eager to leave India to its antagonistic communities and to spare the British the burden of attempting to maintain an equilibrium between them. The British yielded to Congress demands that if the subcontinent was to be divided between Muslims and Hindus, those border provinces with sizeable concentrations of both communities should also be partitioned. Although the Boundary Commissions remained deadlocked on the matter, the chairman, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, took matters into his own hands and ordered the division of the Punjab and Bengal.[12] Jinnah was not pleased with this development because it meant the Pakistani section of Bengal would be deprived of the province's industrial region. In the case of the Punjab, it embittered the Sikhs who perceived the Muslims as chiefly responsible for their inability to establish their own state of Khalistan. Jinnah could not prevent the partition, however, and reluctantly agreed to the arrangement. What was really important to him was the formation of an independent Muslim nation, and given the arduous struggle to achieve this goal, even a truncated Pakistan was considered a great victory.[13]

The euphoria was short-lived. Pakistan was a reality but the country was without the rudiments of a government. It possessed neither a treasury nor resources. It was dependent upon the Indian government's division of stores and finances. The army and bureaucracy had to be quickly assembled from remnants of the British colonial system. Millions of refugees had to be cared for, riots had to be contained, particularly in the Punjab, and hostilities had commenced with India over the disputed kingdom of Kashmir. There was little wonder that sceptics believed the country would crumble, and indeed, had it not been for Jinnah's large presence and his capacity to motivate sacrifice on a grand scale, Pakistan may have collapsed within weeks of independence. Jinnah was taken up with the enormous problems facing the nation and could not, like Gandhi, remove himself from the political picture. Instead, he became Pakistan's first head-of-state or Governor-General, a position granted him by the country's Constituent Assembly. But his health was in a stage of precipitous decline and several

months after his greatest achievement he retired to the hills of Baluchistan where he continued to waste away. Jinnah was flown to Karachi on 11 September 1948 but died that same night. He lived long enough to give Pakistan breath and it was now the responsibility of his successors to see to it that the country was sustained.[14]

Political Forces in Pakistan

The British mid-wifed the birth of two corporate states from its Indian colony. Each country contained significant minorities and a secular political system was forecast for both of them. Although India immediately asserted its secular intentions, Pakistan had been won for the Muslims of South Asia and the country could not easily identify with a hybrid system. Pakistan's leaders, therefore, had a far more complicated task than their Indian counterparts in erecting institutional structures. After independence had been achieved, Jinnah found it necessary to plead with his co-religionists to accept the minorities within their midst as equals and fellow-countrymen. And for a brief period efforts were made to find a place for the Pakistani Hindus and Christians. But no pleas of this kind could control the forces that would dominate Pakistan's political life. Jinnah lived long enough to rally a diverse people behind his leadership and to give Pakistan a chance to consolidate its position in the subcontinent. But even before his death conflicts which lay just beneath the surface, pitting Muslim against non-Muslim, and more important, Muslim against Muslim, were becoming more obvious.

Those who succeeded Jinnah were so involved in political gamesmanship that they neither gave much thought to the meaning of Pakistan as a state for a dominant religious community, nor as a country with corporate responsibilities. Pakistan was not blessed with an abundance of selfless, sophisticated, national leaders. On the contrary, the country was left in the hands of men with limited governmental experience and deeply ingrained parochial attitudes. Just as the Muslims had been conditioned to suspect their Hindu neighbours of deceit and cunning, so too they perceived one another. In the circumstances, Pakistan was permitted to founder as politicians and bureaucrats engaged in petty in-fighting that was supposed

to eliminate the weak and elevate the stronger contestants for power and influence in the country. Few could have forecast in the Autumn of 1948 that this political squabbling would be so protracted that in time all the participants would be wiped out and Pakistan would still be faced with the question of its ultimate fate.

Jinnah's successor was Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (dubbed Quaid-i-Millet or leader of the nation). Liaquat was a loyal lieutenant in Jinnah's high command.[15] He was secretary-general of the Muslim League prior to independence and his home in Delhi was also headquarters for the party. Liaquat was also a displaced landlord who could not claim any particular constituency in Pakistan. He was groomed for the Prime Minister's office by Jinnah because of his loyalty, and because it was hoped his neutrality could bridge the conflicts between the various local politicians (essentially landlords and tribal leaders). After independence had been achieved, however, Jinnah sensed he had judged incorrectly. Liaquat showed himself to be a less than forceful personality and Jinnah assumed his powers. Although angered by this undermining of his office, Liaquat was in no position to challenge Jinnah's authority. Liaquat's inabililty to maintain the integrity of his office gave the Governor-General's position an importance that was not foreseen in the parliamentary condition that Pakistan sought to operate.

After Jinnah's death Liaquat tried to re-establish his authority, but found the earlier precedent a major hinderance. Khwaja Nazimuddin, a Bengali and a leading member of Dacca's commercial élite, had been appointed Chief Minister of East Bengal (East Pakistan). He was now selected by Liaquat to succeed to the Governor-General's post. By granting Nazimuddin the honor a symbolic gesture was made toward the large Bengali community, but Liaquat also preferred someone with a reputation for weakness and docility in the Governor-General's office.[16] Liaquat believed there was still time to make the post of Governor-General a ceremonial, non-political one. Unfortunately for him and for Pakistan it was already too late. Jinnah had proved that the parliamentary system was not sacrosanct and that the colonial tradition of the Viceroy, now in the office of the Governor-General, had not been discarded. An active and determined Governor-General possessed inherent powers which if he chose to use them virtually suspended the authority of the parliament and the Prime Minister.

Liaquat's problems, however, were not with Nazimuddin but rather with the provincial Muslim League leaders who saw an opportunity to exploit an inchoate political system. With no political constituency, Liaquat could not compete with these local personalities who were more concerned with protecting their private fortunes than in directing Pakistan's national purpose. Morover, there were considerable differences both between the provincial leaders and within their individual provinces. All these intersecting rivalries surfaced in the debates in the Constituent Assembly which centred on the writing of the country's constitution.[17] And it was in that forum that the question again arose concerning Pakistan's future as a Muslim state.

The Objectives Resolution led to the creation of the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) with the latter having key responsibility for the structuring of the country's political system. The issue which the BPC was principally concerned with was the distribution of National Assembly seats. Bengalis insisted on representation according to the population size of each province while the Punjabis argued in favour of weightage. This difference of opinion could not conceal the Punjabi claim of superiority over the Bengalis. The Bengali argument that the Punjabis, with less than twenty per cent of the population, were intent on dominating the country was echoed in the other provinces, but there was little inclination on the part of the Frontier and Sindhi leaders to join with the Bengalis in a common struggle. The language problem further aggravated the Punjabi-Bengali relationship and the BPC was jokingly referred to as the Bengali-Punjabi Controversy. While the conflict went unresolved constitution-making was allowed to drift and the country came more and more under the influence of the professional or career administrators who were chiefly responsible for the day-today management of government. These bureaucrats were members of Pakistan's higher civil service, namely the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP).[18]

The CSP was organized after partition from those members of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the ruling institution in British India, who opted for Pakistan. Others were brought in immediately after independence in order to meet the basic needs of the state. From their selection, training and experience this was the privileged element in government, protected by pre-independence statutes and apparently essential to the functioning of government. But the CSP and its sister services, for example the Finance

Service and Military Accounts, had little interest in politics and less patience with politicians. Therefore they were quick to establish their presence at the head of the decision-making process when the politicians became bogged down in internecine conflict.

The bureaucracy's formidable role in the decision-making process was the result of political instability of which Pakistan had more than its share from the first days of independence. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan was gunned down while addressing a throng in a public park in Rawalpindi, at that time the most important military staging area in Pakistan. Liaquat's assassin was killed on the spot by a police officer who was himself murdered several years later. Although Scotland Yard was brought in to assist in the investigation, nothing was ever uncovered which would point to high ranking officials being responsible for the Prime Minister's death. Nevertheless, before Liaquat made his journey into the northern areas of the country (and he made the trip in an effort to win support for the report of the first Basic Principles Committee) he was warned by his close associates that intelligence gathering units had detected a plot against him. Liaquat chose not to heed the warning.

Who was the likely candidate to succeed to the Prime Minister's office given the problems gripping the country? If Liaquat had been successful in reinforcing the office of the Prime Minister it might have been anticipated that a strong, nationally recognized and able Muslim League leader would have been tapped. But if this was the expectation it was quickly dashed. Within hours of Liaquat's death Nazimuddin had been requested to leave the Governor-General's office and assume the duties of Prime Minister.[19] Nazimuddin was known as a kind, pious gentleman but he was also considered an ineffective, naive and often bumbling administrator. He was hardly the best man for the job, and given the circumstances under which he was called to duty it was doubtful if his selection would be taken seriously. Moreover, in stepping down from the Governor-General's office, Nazimuddin left a vacancy which, surprisingly, was filled by the Finance Minister, Ghulam Mohammad, who it was said had earned the honour by building up Pakistan's treasury. Indeed, Jinnah had referred to Ghulam Mohammad as his 'financial wizard.' Ghulam Mohammad had never been a Muslim Leaguer, nor had he played a direct role in promoting Pakistan, but he had been called upon by Jinnah for advice and he did prepare a series of briefs concerning the organization of the new country's treasury and

accounts.[20] He was at the time of Liaquat's death in declining health and his appointment as Governor-General was declared to be a reward for his previous service. Ghulam Mohammad was a sick man, but there was sufficient life left in him to use his eminent, 'ceremonial' office to strike at his enemies, who were apparently concentrated in East Bengal.

If what was happening in Pakistan was more plot than random circumstance, it would be helpful to note that there was more than one conspiracy. The different actors, whether from the provinces, the bureaucracy, the military, or from within the central government itself, endeavoured to adjust to events that they only partially grasped and which none really controlled. It is doubtful that there was a grand conspiracy that would explain the unfolding story. It is more than likely that the participants sought to protect themselves and as a consequence intensified the situation and plunged the country into deeper problems. The *raison d'etre* for Pakistan as an Islamic state ceased to have much significance after Liaquat's death in October 1951.

It was unlikely that Khwaja Nazimuddin would succeed where Liaquat had failed. Constitution-making was not simplified by his becoming Prime Minister and those who wished to prove the inferiority of the Bengalis had a fine example in this meek, innocent figure. Nazimuddin found himself in deep controversy in his native province when he gave a speech in Dacca and carelessly mentioned the government's intention to make Urdu the *lingua franca.* Bengali passions were already at fever pitch when he dropped this remark and what followed was predictable. Rioting broke out all over the city with the university students in the forefront of the action. Nazimuddin pleaded with his compatriots for calm and insisted that the speech had been prepared for him and that he simply read it as it stood. But the Prime Minister had thoroughly discredited himself before his own people and they were not about to accept his apologies or explanations.[21] Only the Army could stifle the demonstrators, and although the rioting was brought under control, Dacca University closed, and the students forced to return to their villages, the Bengalis had sufficient evidence that a new imperialism had been imposed on them.

When Nazimuddin returned to Karachi he was faced with still another riot directed against one of his close confidants, the then Minister of Education, Fazlur Rahman. Students demanded educational reforms and felt that the government was too slow in satisfying their basic needs. It was one

more attack on the Nazimuddin administration, and again the government was called upon to use strong-arm tactics to suppress the disorder. But the most significant threat to the Nazimuddin administration was still to come.

In 1953 rioting precipitated by the Ahmediya controversy spread through the Punjab.[22] The Ahmediyas are followers of one Ghulam Ahmed, a nineteenth century religious figure who claimed divine revelation. Despite the Islamic principle which holds that the Prophet Mohammad is *khtm-i-nubawaat* (the seal of the prophets) or the last of the prophets, the Ahmediyas argue in favour of the prophethood of their patron saint. To orthodox Muslims this is nothing less than heresy and clashes between Islamic sects have been frequent. (During the Bhutto administration the Ahmediyas were legislated out of the Muslim faith and given status as non-Muslims.) The 1953 controversy centred on the question of Islamic purity. Zafrullah Khan who had served Pakistan as a distinguished Foreign Minister, and who was a devout Ahmediya, was called upon to resign or face dismissal. Nazimuddin vacillated in dealing with the issue and at one point seemed to favour the *ulema* who had judged the Ahmediyas to be anti-Islam. When the rioting broke out he was unable to act decisively and in a matter of days much of the Punjab was ablaze.

The destruction of public and private property as well as lives was of an especially high order and for the third time within a relatively brief period the Army had to be called in to quell the mayhem. Just when matters seemed to be returning to normal, however, Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad announced that he was relieving the Prime Minister of his responsibilities and would give another Bengali politician an opportunity to form a new government.[23] The inference in the Governor-General's statement was that he had ordered the total dismantling of the Nazimuddin cabinet. When it was pointed out that the Prime Minister still maintained the confidence of the legislature and could not be legally dismissed, Ghulam Mohammad indicated he was within his emergency prerogatives and that Nazimuddin could appeal the decision, but that he had no doubt that his order would be upheld. Ghulam Mohammad was correct. Moreover, he deftly eased out of office those members of the cabinet who were closest to the Prime Minister, such as Fazlur Rahman. But the bulk of Nazimuddin's ministers remained on in their posts and by their silence all but indicated their approval of the Governor-General's order.[24]

During this period there was sporadic fighting in the Northwest Frontier Province, particularly in the tribal areas which refused to yield to the intimidating style of its Chief Minister, Abdul Qayyum Khan. The Pakistan Army was in almost continuous contact with rebellious tribesmen and the Air Force flew numerous sorties against their defenceless villages. The Frontier Province had been visited by Mahatma Gandhi prior to independence, but Jinnah used Sardar Rab Nishtar (who incidentally was also dismissed from his cabinet post in the Nazimuddin purge), Sardar Abdur Rashid and Qayyum Khan to win over the Pathans. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his *Khudai Khidmatgar* (Servants of God) generally supported Gandhi and opposed Jinnah and the League, and they continued in the opposition after Pakistan's emergence. Although generally reconciled to Pakistan, neither this opposition group nor numerous lesser ones were content with Qayyum at the helm of affairs, and Ghulam Mohammad transferred him to a position in the central government in 1953.

In the midst of this unstable situation, East Bengal prepared to hold its first provincial election. The provinces of West Pakistan had already conducted their elections. (It is important to note that Pakistan had not experienced a national election and did not until December 1970, twenty-three years after gaining its independence!) In East Bengal, the Muslim League government was challenged by a United Front coalition consisting of a number of parties, the most important being the Awami League of H. S. Suhrawardy, Mujibur Rahman, Maulana Bhashani and Ataur Rahman Khan, and the Krishak Sramik party of Fazlul Huq and Abu Husain Sarkar. With the language controversy highlighting the United Front demand for more provincial autonomy, the Muslim League, led by Nazimuddin's successor Nurul Amin, was dealt a crushing blow. The United Front won 223 seats in the provincial assembly, the Muslim League 10.[25] Nurul Amin was defeated by a young student and the Muslim League which was founded in Dacca in 1906 ceased to have any appeal in the province from that day forward. The magnitude of the United Front victory should not have come as a surprise to Ghulam Mohammad and his cohorts. Not being Muslim Leaguers they had contributed greatly to the organization's swift decline. And even those so-called Muslim League members who collaborated with the bureaucratic types could not have cared less about the plight of the erstwhile party that created Pakistan.

Fazlul Huq was called upon to assemble a United Front government but, as with any coalition, ran into difficulty with his partners in the other parties who wanted a larger share of the spoils than he was prepared to deliver. Huq procrastinated in setting up his government and instead decided to visit Calcutta where his pre-partition colleagues were only too happy to celebrate his good fortune. During his brief visit to India, Fazlul Huq made some comments which were interpreted in Karachi as being anti-Pakistan and with the enmity against the Indian government, such remarks could not go unnoticed. Huq was denounced as a traitor to Pakistan and called to atone for his sins.[26] But this was not his only problem. Rioting overtook the industrial area south of Dacca and in and around Chittagong. The non-Bengali managerial staff became the prime target of terrorists who killed with reckless abandon. Before the carnage was over hundreds were dead and the Huq government was at a loss to explain the events. Sensing an opportunity to rid the country of Huq as well as the United Front, Ghulam Mohammad dismissed the United Front government and sent his personal emissary to East Bengal to rule over the province. Martial law was declared and Iskander Mirza, a former Army officer, political agent in the Frontier Province, and the nation's first Defence Secretary, became the supreme ruler of the Bengali people.[27] In the ensuing situation there was little popular support for Pakistan. For Bengalis, Pakistan represented neither a Muslim haven nor a corporate arrangement that could enhance their future.

The defeat of the Muslim League in the East Bengal provincial elections did not *ipso facto* change the make-up of the Constituent Assembly where the Muslim League continued to hold the great majority of seats. But the political character of the country had undergone radical change and the opposition parties demanded that the Assembly be brought into harmony with the political realities prevailing in the country. The Muslim League, however, refused to yield to this pressure and looked for a strategy that would reverse its decline. The central administration had been seized by the bureaucrats and through Ghulam Mohammad's leadership they became as the only organization in the country with potential countervailing power. For the Muslim Leaguers, therefore, the first objective was to strike at Ghulam Mohammad and it was concluded that only by reducing the powers of his office could this be done satisfactorily.

Mohammad Ali Bogra had succeeded Nazimuddin as Prime Minister and up to this time had been little more than an instrument of the Governor-

General. But Bogra was persuaded to follow the lead of his Muslim League confrères, especially as he was interested in preserving the party. A plan was devised whereby the Constituent Assembly, which also substituted for the National Assembly, would pass a series of enactments limiting the powers of the Governor-General. Ghulam Mohammad, however, was not one to tolerate such tactics, and armed with the knowledge that the political opposition would approve of any measure aimed at destroying the Muslim League, he plotted his own offensive. He gathered around him cohorts like Choudhri Mohammad Ali, the most distinguished administrator in the country and the man responsible for organizing the Pakistan bureaucracy, and General Mohammad Ayub Khan, the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army. They were informed of Ghulam Mohammad's decision to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and to rule the country through executive order. General Ayub Khan was also requested to declare martial law, but the record indicates that he refused to go so far with the plan. Nevertheless, the civil-military bureaucrats were impatient with the politicians and did not veto the overall project.[28]

The Constituent Assembly was to be dissolved in October 1954 and although it raised a storm of criticism, no one had the power and/or the inclination to reverse it.[29] The Muslim League argued that the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body and could not be dissolved until its constitution-making had been completed. This argument did not stand up in Pakistan's Supreme Court, although the justices were adamant that a new Constituent Assembly should be organized. By this time Ghulam Mohammad had suffered a stroke and was beyond governing effectively. Iskander Mirza had returned from his sojourn in Bengal and the responsibilities of the office devolved upon this strong man. Ghulam Mohammad had created a Cabinet of Talents, with Mirza as Minister of the Interior and General Ayub Khan holding the Defence portfolio. Although Mohammad Ali Bogra retained his post as Prime Minister, he had so discredited himself before his own party that it was a simple matter to ease him out and turn over the office to Chaudhri Mohammad Ali when the time was right. In the period immediately following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly it was Mirza who insisted that it would be some time before another constitution-making body could take up its assignment. In the meantime Pakistan would be governed through 'controlled democracy.'[30]

But even Mirza could not disregard the ruling of the Supreme Court given the Army's reluctance to play a larger role in the country's political affairs. Mirza was the personification of the autocrat. His experience lay in issuing commands and he was most comfortable in a climate where one will prevailed, namely his own. He was not one to conceal his preference for authoritarian systems. Democracy, according to Mirza, had 'run riot during seven years in Pakistan.'[31] But General Ayub Khan, Mirza's counterpart in the power equation, obviously had plans of his own and, in the circumstances, he was not convinced that he should follow Mirza's leadership. The rivalry between these two men was to intensify after the formation of a new Constituent Assembly.

The drama for the time being, however, was in the Second Constituent Assembly which was a fairly accurate representation of the political forces in the country. The Muslim League was only one of a number of parties, its prime opposition coming from the Awami League of H. S. Suhrawardy, who had clawed his way back and once again stood in the power circle. Given the Awami League's appeal in East Bengal it could not be ignored by the bureaucratic élite that ruled the country. Moreover, the Awami League could be used to keep the Muslim League from challenging the bureaucrats' authority. Thus Suhrawardy was brought into the Cabinet of Talents as Law Minister, and it was his responsibility to shepherd certain bills through the Constituent Assembly. Suhrawardy was made primarily responsible for the promotion of Choudhri Mohammad Ali's One Unit plan which aimed at amalgamating the provinces of the west wing. The One Unit, which established two provinces for Pakistan, a West Pakistan and an East Pakistan, had to be approved by the Assembly before the constitution could be completed. Although there was substantial resistance to the plan, it eventually passed and the way was clear to finish the work of the constitution. Iskander Mirza had become Pakistan's Governor-General before the constitution was officially proclaimed in 1956. With the constitution in force he was also the country's first President.

Mirza was required to work with the politicians, no matter how distasteful he found it. But when he ran into difficulty with Suhrawardy and his Awami League he shifted his support to Fazlul Huq and his Krishak Sramik party. These manoeuvrings, however, played into the hands of his enemies in the Muslim League, and he decided to form a party of his own, one that would be dedicated to the proposition of his longevity in office.[32]

The formation of the Republican Party was actually precipitated by personnel decisions involving the Governorship and Chief Minister's office of the new West Pakistan province. Mirza chose men who had supported the bureaucratic élite and had a basic antipathy for the Muslim League. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani was made Governor and Dr Khan Sahib, the brother of the leader of the Khudai Khidmatgar, was appointed Chief Minister. The latter choice infuriated the Muslim League which still claimed dominant influnce in the province. Dr Khan Sahib had never been a Muslim Leaguer, had not supported the Pakistan movement, always considered himself to be above politics and had definite authoritarian traits. Mirza, however, was of the same mind as Dr Khan Sahib and with assistance from Gurmani, they fashioned the Republican Party. It appealed to people of wealth who no longer felt the Muslim League represented their interests. It was said of the Republican Party that it had no philosophy or credibility and had been conceived merely to serve the interests of the landlord or feudal classes in the country.

The clashes at the centre were repeated in the provinces. In East Pakistan the Awami League fought constantly with the Krishak Sramik and again the struggle boiled down to a personality contest pitting Suhrawardy, Mujibur Rahman, Ataur Rahman Khan and Bhashani on the one side, and Fazlul Huq and Abu Husain Sarkar on the other. In 1957 this rivalry was made more complicated. Events that led to the organization of the Republican Party increased political tensions and one of the first casualties was Choudhri Mohammad Ali who had a nervous breakdown under the strain. Mirza was compelled to ease him out and his place was taken by H. S. Suhrawardy who was named Prime Minister in September 1956. Shortly afterwards France, Great Britain and Israel declared war with Egypt. Egypt suffered heavy losses in the encounter and the Pakistanis were so angered by developments that they insisted their country withdraw from its alliances with the West. Prime Minister Suhrawardy was virtually the only political figure to speak out in favour of continuing the government's policy. This position was a costly one, however. Maulana Bhashani had been unhappy with Suhrawardy over political and constitutional questions and he took this opportunity to break away from the Awami League and organize still another opposition organization. In 1957 the National Awami Party (NAP) was formed in East Pakistan.[33] Branches were also established in West Pakistan by political radicals such as G. M. Syed and Mian Iftikharuddin,

who was a declared communist. The NAP was especially strong in pressing for greater provincial autonomy and in East Pakistan it attracted a sizeable following almost from its inception. In time it became the main rival of the Awami League in the province. Above all the party was the idea of Maulana Bhashani whose mercurial personality appealed to emotional, more discontented elements.

Between 1956 and the autumn of 1958, the years in which the new constitution was put in force, Pakistan's institutional base proved to be so fragile that the political parties became an anachronism. Suhrawardy was dismissed by President Mirza much as Nazimuddin had been some years before, without a vote of confidence being taken in the legislature.[34] Mirza swiftly made and unmade coalitions and after a brief Republican-NAP alliance, he suddenly shifted his support back to the Muslim League and asked 1.1. Chundrigar to become the new Prime Minister. But after less than two months in office his government collapsed and Mirza called upon Firoz Khan Noon, an important landlord from the Punjab and a Republican, to form still another government. Noon was Pakistan's seventh Prime Minister in eleven years and it was obvious that he would wield no more power than his predecessors. Real authority remained with Mirza, the Army as represented by Ayub Khan, and Dr Khan Sahib, who now cultivated an alliance with his old nemesis, Suhrawardy, in order to put Mirza on the defensive, but the action only caused the President to question his loyalty. Mirza did not wait for circumstances to develop that might test his authority and he removed Khan Sahib and replaced him with another Republican, Abdur Rashid. Rashid lasted hardly eight months before M. A. Qizilbash, yet another Republican landlord, assumed the leadership of the province.

In East Pakistan things was slightly more chaotic. Abu Husain Sarkar and the Krishak Sramik were running the administration when the constitution was promulgated. In August 1956, however, Ataur Rahman Khan and his Awami League took over. In March 1958 Abu Husain Sarkar was back in office as a result of a power play by Governor Fazlul Huq. Huq's manoeuvre was soon nullified by Mirza who was then dependent on the Awami League, and Ataur Rahman was again called upon to form the provincial government. In the controversy Fazlul Huq also lost his position as governor of East Pakistan.

The turmoil in the provinces prevented the genuine implementation of the constitution. General elections were forecast but were constantly being

put off to a later date as political instability showed no sign of abating. The attentive population questioned whether the powers that dominated the country really wanted to hold elections. Democratic expression did not serve the purpose of those in authority, nor did the politicians reveal a capacity for fairness and compromise. Was there something in the psychological or cultural make-up of the Muslim people that prevented them from following a more orderly and constructive process? Why so soon after gaining its independence did Pakistan fall into such disarray? Why were the leaders of Pakistan unable to rise above their petty disputes, pool their talents, and create the institutional foundation so necessary to the growth and vitality, let alone the survival of the nation?

It is obvious that the Muslim leaders of Pakistan did not trust one another and therefore could not accommodate differences or cooperate in a common endeavour. Although lip-service was forever being made to the Islamic state, Pakistan was neither the re-creation of an old order nor the rallying ground for a contemporary community. The people of Pakistan knew they were living a sham and more and more they internalized their experiences finding solace and relief in private beliefs that had no real connection with the state around them. When General Ayub Khan in October 1958 brought the political charade to an end, terminated the parliamentary experiment, banned the political parties, abrogated the constitution, and banished Mirza from the country, there was little resentment, and quite a bit of relief. The people were proud of their armed forces and they wanted to believe that through their efforts the country might have another chance to find its true identity. Or was this only so much wishful thinking? As W. W. Hunter noted, were the Muslims of South Asia ‘ruined’ under British rule and therefore made incapable of self-government?

4
The Civil and Armed Bureaucrats

For all their pretensions about modernity, Pakistan's first generation of politicians took their cues and were primarily motivated by a romantic interpretation of their Islamic past. Their intimacy with a revered historical tradition provided men of minor stature with an opportunity to rise to heights undreamed of in their local surroundings. But these were persons with little, and in many instances, no real knowledge or experience in governing complex organizations. They failed miserably in promoting the corporate Pakistan design or in adapting Islam to contemporary political circumstances. Personal, regional, and professional rivalries, stereotyped impressions, and an undisguised lust for power and privilege inhibited the development of a kindred spirit. Nor could appeals to Islam conceal the many divisions among the political leaders. Moreover, if Pakistan's principal officials and personalities were incapable of patriotic displays, if they could not sink their differences and practice the art of cooperative and accommodative endeavour, how was a largely illiterate, impoverished and essentially primitive population to understand its higher loyalties and obligations? Indeed, was it possible for a regionally defined people to identify with a national ethos? The capacity of leaders to bridge a people's experience with their vision of the nation's future is the salient test of statesmanship. It is crucial to national survival. Given the history of Pakistan's initial eleven years as a sovereign state it must be concluded that its political leaders could not cope with issues that they themselves were responsible for. The seizure of the government by the Pakistan armed forces was not unexpected. Furthermore, the widespread sense of relief that spread over the country when General Ayub Khan announced that Iskander Mirza had been sent into exile and that political parties must suspend their activity was sufficient evidence that the politicians, given all their references to

Islam, had lost whatever confidence the people originally may have had in their leadership. The sister of the Qaid-i-Azam, Miss Fatima Jinnah, seemed to sum up the general disillusionment with the politicians when she stated:

> A new era has begun under General Ayub Khan and the Armed Forces have undertaken to root out the administrative malaise and the antisocial practices, to create a sense of confidence, security and stability and eventually to bring the country back to a state of normalcy. I hope and pray that God may give them wisdom and strength to achieve their objective… With Faith, Unity and Discipline let us march forward as one nation.[1]

The time had arrived for those more experienced in the craft of ruling to assume responsibility for Pakistan's political future.

It was obvious from the outset that Ayub Khan had no time-table for returning power to civilian hands. In his own mind, he had given the politicians adequate time to work out their misunderstandings. Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad had demanded the instatement of martial law during the political crisis in Autumn 1954 and Ayub refused to oblige him. Although lacking sympathy for the politicians, Ayub believed they had broad constituent support and that they needed more time to resolve their problems.[2] In addition, the Pakistan Army was only then beginning a process of modernization (after arrangements developed with the United States in 1953 and 1954) and it was not yet prepared to interpose itself between the people and their civilian leaders. By 1958, however, the military establishment was not only ready to intercede, it felt it had to in order to preserve the integrity of the country. Ayub's assumption of power heralded a greater emphasis on realism. Political integration and the stimulation of national consciousness was one side of the picture; the other stressed the material development of the country and the mobilization of all available resources. Islam ceased to be the central concern of the new administration as it proceeded to secularize the processes of government and make them palatable to society. Above all, the Ayub government held that the people should not be influenced by politicians of any stripe and, for several years following the declaration of martial law, political parties were prevented from organizing, and many of their leaders were disqualified from engaging in any form of political activity.[3] This ban on political activity also necessitated clamping controls on the country's newspapers and a Press Trust was organized to oversee the operations of those journals that the government agreed to sanction. The dual attack on the parties and

press affected the small but nonetheless important middle class intelligentsia which correctly interpreted the assault as limiting their societal role. The intelligentsia was of course pleased to see Mirza go but they did not approve of the abrogation of the constitution or the closing of the national and provincial legislatures. Although they took considerable pride in their armed forces they could not accept the army in a governing role. Thus Ayub's policies were also read as a direct attack on the country's intellectuals and the suspicion with which they viewed one another could never be overcome.[4]

Ayub was forced to give major consideration to groups that supported him, given the decision to bypass the enlightened middle class. In addition to the armed forces which dutifully followed his lead, Ayub forged strong links with the country's professional bureaucracy. After a limited purge of high administrative ranks, Ayub enlisted the support of renowned administrators and an alliance of civilian and military figures resulted in the fabrication of a full-blown administrative state. Schooled in an imperial tradition, the civil-military bureaucrats stressed authoritative decision-making and frowned upon debate and controversy. The judgment of higher leadership was considered final and subordinates were duty-bound to carry through the directives of their superiors. Although Ayub Khan's authority was less than absolute, there was no mistaking the centrality of the decision-making process. The nature of the system attracted to its support people with similar instincts if not identical experiences. The landlord class which was concerned with the perpetuation of its status and which had some reason to fear land reforms that would reduce their wealth and power as well as curtail their local authority, quickly lent its support to the martial law regime. Ayub's decision to accept them underscores his need for a larger base than that represented by the union of the bureaucracy and armed forces. It also reveals Ayub's suspicions concerning the peasant population which, he was to note, was barely ready for anything resembling self-government.[5]

Within months of his accession to the presidency of Pakistan, General and now Field Marshal Ayub Khan announced the creation of his Basic Democracies system. Ayub minced no words in stating that the largely peasant country was unprepared for a sophisticated, representative system. The parliamentary experience inherited from the British had had only a limited trial within the subcontinent before independence and the vast

majority of the population was untouched by the exercise. Those who sought to work it were either less than able to manage its intricate machinery, or they used it for their own aggrandizement. Ayub was emphatic in his belief that the country's illiterate millions would derive little benefit from the parliamentary system and that their interests would be better served if they could participate in a form of self-government that was closer to their genius and comprehension. Basic Democracies, argued Ayub, did not terminate Pakistan's democratic experiment. Nor did he accept the notion of revolutionary change. An independent Pakistan could not *ipso facto* produce a united, cooperative, and nationally inspired population with democratic tastes and pursuits. If democracy was to have a chance within the Pakistan milieu, order and stability had to be assured and the citizenry had to learn that material improvement was a slow and tedious process. In other words, change was to be induced incrementally. The population was to be tutored and guided in its pursuits, its energies harnessed to development programmes, and socio-economic uplift made the responsibility of the masses themselves.[6]

The Military-Bureaucratic Nexus

Although martial law remained in force for forty-four months (October 1958 to June 1962), the Army was returned to the barracks a few weeks after the initial declaration and government administration was made the responsibility of the higher civil service.[7] A few generals served in ministerial positions during this period, i.e. Lieutenant-Generals Mohammad Azam Khan, W. A. Burki and K. M. Sheikh, but between June 1962 and November 1966 not a single military representative was called upon to serve in a cabinet post (Admiral A. R. Khan is the only other military official to hold a minister's portfolio during Ayub's tenure). Ayub also used the military sparingly in his choice of provincial governors. General Azam Khan was governor of East Pakistan from April 1960 until May 1962. General Mohammad Musa was made governor of West Pakistan in September 1966 and was replaced in March 1969 shortly before Ayub announced his own resignation. Ayub's cabinets therefore were composed

mainly of civilians with administrative, legal, financial, industrial and agricultural experience. In the latter were several large landlords with whom Ayub had good rapport. In this regard, one of the country's more prominent landlords and a man known for his strong, uncompromising reputation, namely Malik Amir Mohammad Khan, was governor of West Pakistan from April 1960 until September 1966. In general, Ayub surrounded himself with apolitical established leaders or young men of promise and acknowledged loyalty, like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was brought into Ayub's first cabinet at the age of twenty-nine and who proceeded to occupy eight different positions from October 1958 until July 1966. In those early years of the Ayub administration the belief persisted that Ayub was grooming Bhutto to succeed him, but this was never verified.

It is doubtful that Ayub gave much thought to his successor. While in office he displayed some concern that his ministers or governors might become too ambitious. His system required skilled and decisive leaders in key posts but he was always on guard to protect himself from those who gave even the appearance of challenging his authority. This was the case with General Azam Khan who, although a Pathan, endeared himself to the Bengali population during his tenure as Governor of East Pakistan. When Azam's popularity appeared to rival Ayub's, and perhaps surpassed it, the general was replaced by Ghulam Faruque, an efficient bureaucrat.[8] The latter, however, lasted no more than four months. Abdul Monem Khan was Ayub's next choice and although he could be expected to remain loyal to his leader, the Bengali population despised him (he was a Bengali) and in the final accounting Ayub never regained his stature in the province.

The most significant example of ambition at this time, however, was that of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto was young and energetic. He was well-educated, articulate and capable of reaching those elements in the population that Ayub could never inspire, particularly young student intellectuals. After several years in lesser positions, Bhutto became Foreign Minister in 1963 and immediately capitalized on the border settlement with the People's Republic of China. Again, after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, the United States began providing India with significant quantities of military supplies which Bhutto was the loudest in condemning. And the more he chastised the United States and encouraged friendly relations with China, the more his young followers responded to his call. Bhutto relished the adulation and in a very short period acquired the confidence of a mature

leader. Between 1963 and 1966 Bhutto had become the key man in the Ayub government, his popularity was broad and growing, and he soon posed a genuine threat to the regime. Following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 Bhutto joined Ayub at Tashkent, in Soviet Central Asia, where they met with their Indian counterparts. The agreement terminating hostilities signed by Ayub and Lai Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister, proved unacceptable to Bhutto, as it did to many Pakistanis, and he wasted little time in making his complaint known to his volatile followers in Pakistan. Although Ayub prevented Bhutto from resigning his position in the government until tempers had subsided, there was no longer any doubt about Bhutto's desire to replace his once respected leader. Bhutto was out of office only a few brief months when he organized his Pakistan People's Party and launched a campaign which was to eventually topple Ayub.[9]

Ayub's dependence on strong personalities entailed risks but the system he contrived left no other option. This also explains his embrace of the higher civil service and particularly of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), the approximately four hundred civil officers who controlled the sinews of Pakistan government.[10] The CSP had been the target of considerable criticism both from within the larger bureaucracy and in the more sophisticated elements of the Pakistani population. The grievances expressed by the non-CSP officials involved the distribution of choice posts, the remuneration received for similar services, and the overall privileges awarded civil servants. CSP officers were better treated, more respected and endowed with greater powers and influence, and this distressed the personnel of the other services. Society at large was incensed, more with CSP behaviour than performance. CSP officers were accused of harbouring a colonial mentality, of being little more than 'brown Englishman' in the conduct of their duties. The CSP, by tradition, training and experience had become a closed corporation; a definite sense of superiority reinforced the notion that the CSP was the saviour of Pakistan and its dealings with the public only tended to exaggerate paternalistic instincts which grated the sensibilities of the attentive public.[11] The CSP served a useful and a necessary purpose within the Ayub administration but there is also no question about its deleterious effect on the regime.

Ayub's conscious decision to avoid the politicians, to emphasize the military and government bureaucracy and use only powerful landed and entrepreneurial personalities was prompted by a dichotomous perception of

Pakistani society. Ayub did not believe that Islam was sufficient to hold the country together. Nor did he feel that the politicians could rise above their local constituencies long enough to reflect national purpose and resolve. Pakistan's masses were another story. Their retarded state of development, their lack of political consciousness, and above all their easy manipulation by regional headmen, tribal figures, religious teachers and landlords, made it impossible to reach them with a sophisticated message involving national responsibilities. Ayub's other perception involved the discipline and training of the armed forces, and the education and experience of the higher administrators. These parts of society spoke his idiom, identified with his cause and pursued similar objectives. They were loyal both in their service and through it, to the country. They were also familiar with modern equipment and ideas, and had confidence in their ability as well as commitment to their calling. National consciousness was a characteristic of their profession and their patriotism was unquestioned. Ayub was drawn toward the services that he knew and understood; they were also the ones that he judged to have the interests of Pakistan in mind.

Ayub did not trust the politicians or the intelligentsia who from his vantage point, exhibited either parochial or extraterritorial loyalties and for whom Pakistan was merely a way-station on the road to some other goal. It was this philosophy and view of the world around him that inflenced Ayub to construct a presidential system and to emphasize crisis management and economic development. And none were more suited to pursue those objectives than the 'steel frame' of civil-military government.[12] According to Ayub, politics was a luxury the country could ill afford. Politicians were equated with demagogy and rabble-rousing, with controversy and indecision, with opportunism and corruption. Ayub staunchly clung to the opinion that the Pakistani people were children in the hands of unscrupulous power-seekers and that democracy as it is described in Western political theory and practiced in the North Atlantic nations was not transferable to Pakistan. Although he continued to speak on the subject of freedom, fundamental liberties and self-expression, Ayub was emphatic concerning the need for strong, centralized, authoritative government.

If the country was to survive and develop, financial and tax incentives had to be made available to the relatively small entrepreneurial élite while the government mobilized the general population for various developmental projects. Thus the business community was permitted to grow and expand

its operations unimpeded by government rules and regulations although in many instances those rules enhanced such enterprise. On the other hand, the bureaucracy was also enlisted in a major programme of socioeconomic enrichment in the rural areas of the country. The Works Programme which was linked with the Basic Democracies system channelled funds to local communities and previously neglected areas received attention for the first time.[13]

To upgrade the work of the administrators, Ayub ordered the establishment of numerous training institutes which were authorized to prepare curricula focusing on developmental activities. Law and order studies were not discarded, but new emphasis was given to constructive administration and the rendering of services to the needy. Education, health, family planning, social welfare were placed side-by-side with improved agriculture and infrastructural development. Middle level as well as senior officials were offered in-service training courses in these fields and serious efforts were launched with the help of foreign advisors to transform the conventional civil official into a modern, sensitive, innovative and helpful guide for the country's vast peasantry. Rural academies, institutes of public administration, and an Administrative Staff College were all set up in the early 1960s with this purpose in mind, and hundreds of officers moved through their programmes.[14] By bringing together members of the numerous services, including elements from the CSP, it was anticipated that some of the rivalry between them could be reduced and that they would be more likely to cooperate in joint schemes aimed at improving material conditions within the country. Rivalries, however, do not dissipate easily. Nor does a course in development administration imply that economic and social programmes will be more efficiently and effectively implemented.

The record reveals that Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan (1960–1965), the one that covered a good part of the martial law period, was a substantial success from a statistical point of view.[15] But there was little overall improvement in the life-style of the general population. The country's more fortunate segment, however, prospered. Industries sprouted in and around the major urban centres, especially Karachi. Ayub built his new capital at Islamabad (near Rawalpindi). Foreign investment expanded. But the rank-and-file revealed little in the way of higher living standards or other improvements. More and more their plight played into the hands of the politicians who after June 1962 (with the withdrawal of martial law) were

again actively engaged in rallying the people to their support. The central theme in their appeal to the masses and intelligentsia was the Ayub system which for all its good intentions, benefited the rich and the powerful at the expense of the poor and the weak.[16] Ayub Khan was condemned as a lustful, greedy dictator, concerned with family wealth and privilege and with enriching the nobility, his loyal bureaucrats and faithful members of the armed forces. The politicians insisted that only they showed sympathy for the deprived masses and that only their return to power could terminate corruption and make distributive justice a reality in the country.[17]

The Return to Constitutional Government?

Ayub could not deny the intelligentsia indefinitely. The martial law period did not resemble a police state and although ordinances were in force limiting public criticism, little effort was made to stifle individual criticism. Moreover, Ayub did not see himself as a dictator, but rather as a leader of a diverse, disoriented, confused and essentially backward people. He firmly believed that his method of governing was preferable from that experienced in the parliamentary period (1947–1958). He saw the administrators as better equipped to run the country's affairs and trusted the armed forces because he could count upon their dedication and readiness to make sacrifices for the public welfare. He could not draw the same conclusions about the politicians. But the politicians were intellectuals or identified with intellectuals. They were articulate and demanding, and capable of exploiting a variety of interests especially the one represented by the United States.

Ayub had been instrumental in allying Pakistan with the United States. Ayub made a deep impression on President Eisenhower and even more so on Vice-President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In 1954 the Eisenhower-Nixon administration signed its initial military assistance programme with Pakistan. That same year Pakistan joined SEATO and then the Baghdad Pact in 1955. As the Pakistani Army's first indigenous Commander-in-Chief, Ayub was committed to the modernization of the armed forces and he had turned to the United States at

a most opportune moment. The United States government was eager to meet Ayub's request for assistance and thus began a long period of mutual cooperation and goodwill between the two countries. When Ayub seized power in 1958, the United States government did not necessarily approve, but neither was it very upset. Relations between the United States and Pakistan became more intimate as military and technical assistance, commercial, health and educational programmes multiplied. Thousands of Americans were despatched to Pakistan by government directly, through its sponsorship, or under private auspices. Americans worked as advisors in the Pakistan government, they developed and managed major construction projects, assisted in reforming and staffing educational institutions, helped finance industrial development, engineered agricultural programmes and of course played a major role in updating the military establishment. In addition, thousands of young Pakistanis who otherwise might have gone to Great Britain for their higher education went instead to American colleges and universities. However, this heavy involvement of the United States in Pakistan's domestic life acted as a control on Ayub's power and he could no longer postpone the promised return to constitutional government. Moreover, the Americans were also sympathetic with the demands of the Pakistani intelligentsia and Ayub found it necessary to meet some of them, including the reinstatement of political activity, despite his misgivings.

The constitution which Ayub gave Pakistan in 1962 sought to reinforce his authority in the absence of martial law.[18] The President was elected through an indirect process in which the Basic Democrats, approximately 80,000 to start with but increased to 120,000 later, formed themselves into an electoral college. It was this body which elected the President. But because it owed its existence to Ayub, its critics concluded that it failed to measure true sentiment in the country. Moreover, the Basic Democrats were perceived as being influenced in all their decisions by the bureaucratic system with which it was enmeshed, hence the process merely served the interest of those in power. Slight modifications in the Basic Democracies system were made with the objective of minimizing some of this criticism, but there could be no getting away from the dominant role played by the bureaucracy in managing its operations. In this way Ayub was generally insulated from serious threats to his leadership and the opposition found it necessary to adopt other approaches in voicing their discontent or in seeking alternative solutions to the country's problems.

The political parties were in disarray but they still represented the only vehicles for the expression of legitimate criticism. The Muslim League had split into a number of fragments with different personalities laying claim to authenticity. The deaths of Khwaja Nazimuddin, H. S. Suhrawardy, Sardar Nishtar and Tamizuddin Khan also left the older opposition without an outstanding leader who could rally them to higher purpose. Nurul Amin, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hyat Khan, Malik Ghulam Jilani, Tufail Mohammad, Khawaja Mohammad Safdar and Mian Mumtaz Daultana were men of means and not without their followings, but they were hardly magnetic leaders and no match for the Ayub system. Nevertheless, they forced Ayub to organize his own political party, the Convention Muslim League, and to compete with them at their level, at least in the halls of the National Assembly.[19] It must be said, however, that the National Assembly was also securely fastened to the presidential system and proved to be little more than a symbolic ratification device for the policies of the administration. Ayub never seriously contemplated a party apparatus and his decision to organize the conventionists was prompted by the reinstatement of the National Assembly and his inclination to check the political opposition at their own game. Generally speaking, the failure to-develop a coherent party system also meant the failure to prepare young Pakistanis for leadership roles in the country's political arena. Political atrophy in the short term may have given Ayub's regime significant advantage but as revealed in the chapter to follow, it did not serve the long-range interests of Pakistan. In point of fact, the only paths to power and influence, and hence the only opportunity for a policy-making role during the more than ten years that Ayub Khan dominated the nation, was through the military, the bureaucracy, or special channels sanctioned by the president. This is a dominant aspect of the Ayub legacy and it has shown itself to be a negative and tragic factor in Pakistan's history. The Yahya Khan interregnum followed by the Bhutto period, with a tragic civil war and the secession of East Pakistan sandwiched between them, is testimony to this unfortunate legacy.

Constitutionalism clearly implied something quite different to Ayub. It did not limit the government's authority. On the contrary, it established the framework within which government was made responsible for the nation's security and the system's stability. Protected from internal forces, government planned, prompted and assisted the material improvement of

the Pakistani environment. Government tolerated an opposition but not in circumstances that were judged threatening to the system. The opposition was encouraged to join in the effort of development. Indeed, it was permitted to make constructive criticism, but it could not expect to be treated with equanimity if its objective was the destruction of the system.[20] The dialectical struggle inherent in this cannot be ignored. Ayub argued that the political opposition should accept and identify with his system or be considered enemies rather than mere opposition. And the opposition concluded that they could not adopt a system which reduced their role to meaninglessness. Hence the contestants were locked in mortal combat from the beginning. One could not really tolerate a 'loyal' opposition; the other could only view the system imposed upon them as alien, tyrannical and totally objectionable. Neither side was willing to compromise. Nor was there any serious effort at closing the gap of misunderstandings or salving bitter feelings. Self-fulfilling prophecies were again at work and another climactic struggle was in the offing.

The Ayub administration was not as harsh as it was made out to be.[22] By the same token the opposition politicians and their supporters were not the foes of Pakistan that the government constantly alluded to. But in their diametrically opposed philosophies and life-styles was fashioned a conflict which could not be resolved. Ayub's world began to disintegrate when he was taken ill with viral pneumonia and barely survived the ordeal. His long absence from the helm of affairs gave new leverage to his tormentors and when Ayub finally returned to his office the tide was already running against him. The military, especially among the lower officer ranks, had become disillusioned with his leadership when Ayub agreed to accept the 1965 United Nations ceasefire resolution and commence negotiations with Indian leaders. His decision to sign the Tashkent Agreement with the Indian Prime Minister only added to the discontent in the armed forces and the issue was not lost on the politicians who exploited it to the maximum.[21] It took more than a year to restore a semblance of order to his administration, but by that time Bhutto had joined the political opposition, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the leader of the popular Awami League in East Pakistan, was demanding greater autonomy for the Bengali people.

The government sought to distract the population with an elaborate celebration in 1968 hailing the 'Decade of Development'. The regime thought it wise to publicize its accomplishments, but the plan backfired.

Instead of joining in the festivities and singing the praises of the Ayub administration, criticism escalated into condemnation and soon degenerated into demonstrations and riots. Development had taken place, but only the élites had benefited. Mention was made of the twenty-two families that controlled the country's industrial and financial life. The landlords were still the dominant force in the rural areas. The tribal and frontier territories had received virtually no attention and neglect and squalor continued to stalk its population. The maintenance of the One Unit scheme which prevented the individual provinces from voicing their particular needs also rankled, and this question was not confined to West Pakistan. The rioting which broke out in West Pakistani towns and then swept the larger metropolitan areas provoked the Bengalis, who saw the attack on Ayub as an opportunity to rid the country of his entire system. In East Pakistan, therefore, the rioting reached an even higher intensitiy.[23] Many public officials were murdered and personal vendettas caused still more victims.

The administration and Army were hard-pressed to restore order and as the casualties mounted there was a clear reluctance to subdue the demonstrators by force. Although Ayub sought at the eleventh hour to come to terms with the opposition politicians and even offered to reinstate the parliamentary process, it was apparent he no longer had the physical strength or the institutional support needed to retain his authority. Bhutto in fact refused to negotiate with him, as did Mujibur Rahman, sensing his quick demise. Unable to close ranks, having lost the confidence of the armed forces and the administrative complex - literally abandoned - Ayub announced on 25 March 1969 that he was transferring authority to his Army head, General Yahya Khan.[24] The Ayubian system, like the one he had replaced in 1958, departed the stage in a moment of high drama.

The Military Junta

Ayub was beaten, humiliated and chased from his once lofty office, but his departure did not signify a return to civilian rule. While he preferred transferring authority to his comrades-in-arms rather than the politicians, there is little doubt he had much choice. Ayub's brother officers had

concluded months before the popular uprising that the president had lost his capacity to govern effectively, and that in the absence of a responsible, national political organization they would have to fill the vacuum. General Yahya Khan was no Ayub, however, and being dependent on his colleagues in the military hierarchy, he could be expected to follow their cues. Pakistan's high-placed military officers quickly dismantled parts of the system that Ayub had constructed over a ten year period. The administrative state was not dissolved but rather semi-militarized. Army and Air Force leaders seized control of the decision-making processes and the civil administrators were made accountable to them. Those administrators who had held important positions in the Ayub government were either purged or reduced in stature. The Basic Democracies system was scrapped, Ayub's constitution was abrogated, and new efforts were made to gain the confidence of the intelligentsia and the political leadership.[25] The almost total repudiation of Ayub, his philosophy and system, and the absence of a clear substitute, forecast a return to pre-Ayubian conditions. But more than ten years of intervening history could not be ignored. Attempts to re-establish the nation to its pre-1958 form played into the hands of those who did not share the vision of Pakistan's founders. The military junta failed to take into account their limitations in catering to those elements that Ayub chose to isolate, or how the politicians could react to their new opportunities. The destruction of the Ayub Khan system had only whetted their appetites. One phase had been completed and another was already underway. Yahya Khan's warnings to the politicians that they were expected to behave in a fashion acceptable to the junta were not, therefore, taken very seriously.

The politicians were riding a wave of popular support and the military junta was made more conscious of its own shortcomings than how it might perpetuate its rule. The junta's activities served to legitimate the claims of the politicians. Yahya's announcement that the West Pakistan One Unit scheme would be dissolved, the original provinces reconstituted, the parliamentary system reestablished, political party activity sanctioned, a new constitution drafted and general elections held, met all the major demands of the politicians, save the matter of East Pakistan's autonomy which was still seen as a code-word for secession.[26] In this latter connection it was obvious that the junta, with its West Pakistani bias, was reluctant to satisfy the citizenry in the eastern wing of the country. Prior to Ayub's fall,

Mujibur Rahman had been implicated in what was described as an Indian plot to subvert the country. Mujib had been charged with participation in a conspiracy to separate East Pakistan from the rest of the country and a trial had been underway to prove his guilt. When Ayub's world came crashing down around him the Agartala Conspiracy Trial was terminated, Mujib released, and the Bengalis were more willing than ever to rally behind their Awami League leader and his Six Point Programme (a series of fundamental demands which would make East Pakistan virtually independent in all matters except national security and foreign affairs).[27] The junta could not bring itself to treat Mujib like other politicians. From their vantage point, the West Pakistani politicians had legitimate grievances which the junta felt duty-bound to redress. But old suspicions about Bengali intentions persisted. Like those before them, the new group of Pakistani leaders could not overcome their distrust of the Bengalis. The large Hindu minority in the province continued to influence their psyches and whether consciously or subconsciously the junta continued to sense extra-territorial loyalties in Bengali behaviour. Mujib should have been offered the same opportunities for political activity as those granted the West Pakistani politicians, but the junta's divided perception made this impossible.

The most prominent politician in West Pakistan at the time of Ayub's demise was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. His long association with the government, his intimacy with the foreign policy apparatus and the defence structure provided him with opportunities that other politicians could not hope to equal. Bhutto was familiar with the officers of the junta and their thinking coincided on most issues involving Pakistan's strategic interests. Bhutto also sensed correctly that his only genuine political opponent was Mujibur Rahman, and given the junta's dislike for the Awami Leaguer, Bhutto judged it was in his interest to reinforce their fears concerning Mujib's true objectives. Bhutto ingratiated himself with the military élite and learned their weaknesses and differences. He was not averse to manipulating factional splits and as he planned to neutralize Mujib, he also plotted to exploit the differences within the ruling circle.[28] Yahya could not match the cleverness of Bhutto and subsequent events may have been solely providential, but Bhutto had little difficulty in capitalizing on them.

As a professional soldier, Yahya Khan was wedded to the principle of loyalty. As an expert administrator, he understood the imperative need for delegation. Together these principles had carried him to the pinnacle of

power and success. But as President of Pakistan Yahya also required political acumen that he did not possess. Yahya did not have absolute power. He could not manage without the top bureaucrats, and was especially dependent on his brother officers in the Army, particularly those who shared his decision-making authority and advised him on affairs of state.[29]

Yahya did not interfere with the general administration. Unlike Ayub, who reportedly insisted on reviewing the most mundane files and around whom the government revolved, Yahya found routine administrative chores monotonous. He left daily decision-making to the administrators in the secretariats, and let it be known that they would be held responsible for their mistakes. Yahya also encouraged wide-ranging conversation, and liked to spend his time in social situations. Clearly, he did not leave himself enough authority. In a country which has always responded to the vice-regal tradition, the Great Leader syndrome cannot be neglected. Despite their vocal support for representative government, Pakistanis have become enamoured of strong, decisive leadership. Yahya made an excellent Number Two; but in the context of Pakistan's political culture and the country's longing for a saviour, he could not fill the role of Number One. Yahya sanctioned full political activity in the country on 1 January 1970. Martial law, however, remained in force. General elections were scheduled for 5 October 1970, and a Chief Election Commissioner was appointed to see that the necessary preparations were conducted fairly and with despatch. A Legal Framework Order issued on 30 March 1970 outlined how the new National Assembly would be constituted and what its constitution-making duties would be.[30] The Legal Framework Order also provided for elections to the new provincial assemblies. The National Assembly's constitution-making powers, however, were severely circumscribed by the junta. It was the opinion of the military leadership that a majority of constitutional issues had already been resolved. West Pakistan had already been broken up into several administrative and political units; direct elections were agreed upon; a parliamentary system was envisaged. Hence, the new constitution was not expected to take an eternity to draft. The 1956 constitution had taken nine years to write, and Yahya made it clear that he would tolerate no delays this time. Yahya instructed the politicians that they would have 120 days to draft a new constitution. If the National Assembly could not comply with this order it would be dissolved and another round of elections held.

With this in mind some twenty-five parties campaigned for the National Assembly, and 1570 candidates competed for 300 seats. Without doubt the most controversial issue in the campaign was the Awami League's use of the Six Point Programme. The military junta interpreted the Six Point Programme as nothing less than a subtle form of secession. But Mujib had been martyred so many times in the past that the junta was reluctant to add to his already established popularity and they did not prohibit his use of the Programme in his party platform. The generals and their civilian advisors believed that so many parties would contest the election that no one of them would emerge with a majority. The probable outcome, therefore, would be a coalition government comprising a number of parties, no one of which would be dominant. Moreover, for coalitions to work it was mandatory that individual parties modify their programmes. And because coalitions are tenuous alliances, the country's continuing dependence on the civil-military bureaucracy appeared assured. Given this analysis, the junta agreed it had little to fear from the results, in spite of the passions aroused by the campaign.

Severe monsoon flooding in East Pakistan caused the government to put back the October date for the elections to a date in December. But on 12 November 1970, a tidal wave more than 30 feet high and cyclonic winds of 120 miles per hour lashed five of East Pakistan's coastal districts. The havoc wrought by the storm was inestimable. It was reputedly the worst natural catastrophe in modern history, perhaps of all time. The death toll was placed at well over a million, and property damage was incalculable. There was an exceptional need for all sorts of emergency relief, and the Bengalis looked to their military and bureaucratic leaders in West Pakistan for the necessary assistance. The Yahya Khan regime was slow to respond. Yahya was in China at the time and he did not visit the devastated areas until some days after the calamity. By then international relief activities were well under way. Reports filtering out of the country contrasted this help with the seeming indifference of Pakistani officialdom. Bengalis were more than ever convinced that their compatriots in the western half of the country had little concern for them. Bitterness had waxed into outspoken hatred.

It was at this juncture that Mujibur Rahman's Six Point Programme took on the appearance of an independence manifesto. And when Maulana Bhashani announced that his National Awami Party (NAP) would boycott

the election in order to protest government mismanagement of disaster relief, the Awami League became the natural beneficiary. By now, the junta must have realized that the time was not propitious for elections; but to postpone the proceedings again risked a violent reaction in both West and East Pakistan. The decision was therefore taken to proceed with the December schedule. The junta gambled that the elections would at the very least take some of the heat out of the tense situation prevailing in East Pakistan. Moreover, the National Assembly would have to write a constitution acceptable to the military leaders or face dissolution. Hence the regime still assumed it had little to lose in the outcome.

The results of the election came as a rude shock to the junta. Mujibur Rahman's Awami League swept the polls in East Pakistan taking 167 of the 169 seats. On the other hand, Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) did well in the Punjab and Sind provinces, amassing a total of 81 seats, or more than half those allocated to West Pakistan. But while the Awami League held a clear-cut majority in the new National Assembly, neither it nor the PPP had taken a single seat in the other's region. Mujib had a sufficient majority to form a government, but the fact that the Awami League had no representation in West Pakistan made the junta hesitate in calling upon him. The situation demanded an understanding between Mujib and Bhutto. But the latter, realizing Mujib's unpopularity with the junta, refused to discuss terms until Mujib agreed to dilute, if not publicly repudiate, his Six Point Programme. This Mujib would not do, and his elated supporters called on him to inform both the generals and Bhutto that the Six Points must form the basis for a new constitution.[31] This was an impasse that Yahya could not cope with but which Bhutto found opportune. Bhutto declared that he would boycott the National Assembly if Mujib did not yield and threatened to defer to the views of the military junta. In this way Bhutto incorporated himself into the ruling body. Mujib watched the Bhutto-junta alliance form and warned that he had been given a popular mandate to take control of the government. The junta had granted East Pakistan a majority of the seats in the National Assembly through its own Legal Framework Order. The people had registered their preference and there could be only one legitimate government in the country: the one organized by the Awami League.

Neither the junta nor Bhutto could dispute Mujib's claim, but they were not prepared to accept Bengali rule. At Bhutto's urging Yahya ordered the postponement of the National Assembly which had been scheduled for 3

March 1971. Mujib condemned the action as a blatant attempt to crush the Bengali autonomy movement and called for a general strike throughout the province.[32] Yahya then announced that the National Assembly would convene on 25 March and in the interim asked the principals to meet with him in an effort to thrash out their differences. But Yahya was clearly stalling for time to build up his forces in the province. General Tikka Khan, who had a reputation for ruthlessness, was given the post of Military Governor and Martial Law Administrator for East Pakistan. A military build-up began in earnest. Yahya flew to Dacca to meet with Mujib, as did other lesser political figures from West Pakistan. Bhutto, however, remained in West Pakistan and refused Yahya's request that he make an appearance. Bhutto's intransigence at a time of great national crisis can only be understood in political terms. Yahya's negotiations with Mujib were not supported by all members of the junta. Some of the military leaders wanted to teach Mujib a lesson and once and for all destroy the Awami League. Bhutto found this sentiment to his liking. His refusal to meet with Yahya and Mujib earned him the plaudits of the hardliners in the junta, the West Pakistan bureaucracy, as well as commercial interests who had much to lose if Mujib succeeded.

Yahya and Mujib conferred from 16 March to 21 March, and from the published reports it appears that Yahya yielded to a number of Bengali demands. A draft declaration called for the immediate end of martial law in both East and West Pakistan, and for the division of the National Assembly into two committees, one representing the East and the other West Pakistan. The future constitution, it was suggested, would reflect the integrated recommendations of these two committees. Autonomy for East Pakistan as outlined by the Six Point Programme would be assured.

Observing these negotiations with increasing apprehension, Bhutto raised the spectre of a betrayal of West Pakistan.[33] When Yahya again invited him to join the discussions, the PPP leader accepted with alacrity. Bhutto arrived in Dacca on 21 March and went immediately to Yahya Khan's quarters where the general told him that a PPP acceptance of the draft proclamation was all that stood in the way of a settlement. Bhutto indicated he and his advisors would study the document and meet with him and Mujib the following day. On 22 March, Bhutto announced he could not support the proclamation because, in his judgment, it would lead to the dismemberment of the country. In fact, Bhutto's high command in the PPP had worked out a

compromise settlement which was very close to the plan agreed to by Yahya and Mujib but Bhutto chose to veto that one as well. Bhutto's tactics were a determined 'go for broke' and he cast Yaha in the role of a lukewarm patriot. Cognizant of the discontent within the junta, Yahya concluded that he had no option but to side with his colleagues and Bhutto. The decision was taken to unleash the forces under Tikka Khan's command.

Without informing Mujib, Yahya left Dacca for Islamabad on the evening of 25 March. Units of the Pakistan Army manoeuvred into position as he left. Dacca University was surrounded and shelled in the middle of the night.[34] Mujib was seized in his home by commandos of the Special Service Group under the command of General Abubakr Osman Mitha, a member of the junta. He was flown secretly to a prison in West Pakistan. The civil war had commenced.

No single individual contributed more to the fall of Yahya Khan than Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Perhaps no individual was more instrumental in Ayub's collapse than Bhutto. But on his return to West Pakistan, where he learned that the Pakistan Army was in the process of crushing the Bengali 'secessionists', Bhutto was heard to exclaim that 'Pakistan is saved.'[35] Saved for whom was of course still to be determined. As the guerrilla war took its toll in the East and tensions mounted between India and Pakistan, Bhutto was stumping West Pakistan calling for an immediate transfer to civilian leadership, which in the circumstances, could only mean himself and his PPP. So effective were his speeches that on 12 October 1971 Yahya declared his intention to transfer authority to the political leaders by January 1972. But Yahya was running out of time. The Indian invasion of East Pakistan in December and the rapid collapse of the 90,000 man Pakistan garrison there, soon drove him from power. To no one's surprise, it was Bhutto who was called upon to pick up the pieces of a shattered nation.[36]

The Military in Retreat and its Resurrection

Yahya Khan has been widely portrayed as a ruthless, uncompromising, insensitive and grossly inept leader. The atrocities committed in his name by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, the eventual dismemberment of the

country, and the humiliating defeat suffered at the hands of the Indian armed forces reinforce these judgments. While Yahya cannot escape responsibility for these tragic events, it is also on the record that he did not act alone. Although Bhutto would appear to be the primary beneficiary of the débâcle in East Pakistan, not even he can be singled out for blame. All the major actors of the period were creatures of a historic legacy and a psycho-political milieu which did not lend itself to accommodation and compromise, to bargaining and a reasoned settlement. Nurtured on conspiracy theories, they were all conditioned to act in a manner that neglected agreeable solutions and promoted violent judgments. Thus it was not surprising that the scenario should not end here. The momentum created by the high drama of the Pakistan experience was to be sustained and tragedy continued to stalk the nation that Iqbal and Jinnah inspired. Although the Pakistan military establishment, its legions battered, its pride undermined, its high command in disarray, may have been forced to retreat to the rear, it was evident from its actions that it had neither changed its perception of the world, nor had it played its last political role.

Bhutto sought to consolidate his power by reducing the influence of the military and by again purging and drastically modifying the bureaucracy.[37] He retired a number of top military officers and promoted individuals who he believed would show absolute loyalty to him and the civilian government. He accused a number of members of the defunct junta of 'Bonapartism' and sent some of them abroad in ambassadorial posts. He endeavoured to develop a PPP para-military force as well as a special police agency which became known as the Federal Security Force (FSF). These latter bodies were to police political matters for the PPP leadership and hence avoid the use of the regular armed forces. The central idea in these undertakings was to maintain the neutrality of the armed forces and to prevent if from interfering again in, or taking advantage of, the political in-fighting. The military was none too pleased with these developments but in the immediate circumstances following the loss of East Pakistan it was unable to prevent them from going forward.

With the military removed from the decision-making process, Bhutto attacked the CSP and ordered the privileged service dissolved. Personnel were either to be retired or integrated into a new All-Pakistan Civil Service which was graded as to levels of work and seniority, but whose members owed allegiance to only one organization, namely the Pakistan People's

Party. As with the military officers, CSP personnel were unhappy with government directives, but powerless to resist the change. The neutralization of the armed forces and the politicization of the bureaucracy seemed to render a death blow to the only institutions with stable traditions predating the creation of Pakistan. The Army and bureaucracy were also the foundation, the 'steel frame', of Pakistan government, and their transformation opened the way to the fabrication of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's one-party state. But Bhutto's dreams were not yet realities and before they could be so transformed, events were to turn them into nightmares.

The handwriting seemed to be on the wall in the circumstances that overwhelmed Mujibur Rahman shortly after his triumphant return to the independent state of Bangladesh. Mujib had been freed from prison by none other than Bhutto and permitted to rejoin his people who immediately made him their supreme leader. But within less than four years Mujib, his family, and many of his close associates, would be dead, brutally murdered by the very people that he strove to govern.[38] And in Bangladesh, as in Pakistan, it was the military and the bureaucracy which seized power and imposed its will on the country. The lesson would not be lost on Bhutto, but events were to prove that one leader's gross misfortunes are seldom taken seriously by another, no matter how closely related.

Mujib had an inflated view of his role. He believed he was above criticism, the father of his nation, absolutely indispensable, loved by all, save a few self-indulging power-seekers. But Bangladesh was in even greater confusion than Pakistan after the civil war. The country was ravaged, its population destitute, and resources virtually non-existent. The quickly assembled government was a chaotic arrangement of semi-experienced individuals who sought to protect themselves from those who coveted their offices. The military was a congeries of fragmented units with little professional training. Regional bands of armed men staked out areas over which they claimed supremacy and defied the central government to interfere with their self-declared independence. Assassins roamed the countryside taking their toll of government officials. Brigandage, kidnappings and random acts of terrorism made any return to calm impossible.

Mujib pleaded with the anarchic elements to turn in their arms, to support their new government and to assist in rehabilitating the country. But his call met with little response. He hastily ordered the building of an Awami

League para-military force, the Rakkhi Bahini, and eventually unleashed it against the disruptionists. But the Rakkhi Bahini was a rag-tag outfit itself, and soon turned its power on the society that it was supposedly organized to defend. The intensification of the conflict caught the population of Bangladesh in the middle and neither Mujib nor the country benefited from the experience. Mujib suspended the constitution in December 1974 and in early 1975 announced he would govern by fiat.[39] But by this time his popularity was almost nil. He had sealed himself off in his family compound, cut his ties with once loyal party supporters, and sought to manage the country through only the most intimate acquaintances. The end came when elements of the regular army entered his home on 15 August 1975 and slayed him, his wife and other members of the family. Rakkhi Bahini headquarters was also surrounded and shelled. Within hours the special force had been eliminated. Mujib's political experiment died with him, as did Mujibism, a cult which he had hoped to expand into a national ideology. There were no mourners when Mujib was buried. The people of Bangladesh had by then experienced so much tragedy that even the loss of a leader like Mujibur Rahman was viewed in the fatalistic way that suggests real power is beyond the control of any one individual.

The subcontinent is not unique in this regard. But the greatest, along with the not-so-great leaders, seldom pass gracefully from power. Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated by a religious fanatic shortly after India gained its freedom; Liaquat Ali Khan was murdered a few years later; Iskander Mirza was chased from the country; and Ayub and Yahya departed the scene amidst considerable turbulence. Mujib's demise fits the pattern, as did the subsequent disaster that overtook Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The once powerful, admired by the crowds, praised by their followers, feared by their competition - were all destined to experience tragic ends.

Bhutto, perhaps even more than Mujib and his immediate contemporaries, believed in his longevity. The system which he had master-minded was aimed at transforming Pakistani society as well as stabilizing his regime. The details of this programme will be covered in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that he assumed his major political opposition had been neutralized, and that what remained could be treated with contempt. There was only one strong political force in the country, and given the politicization of the civil-military establishment, it was widely assumed that Bhutto could do more or less as he pleased. The decision to

hold elections in March 1977 was a reflection of Bhutto's confidence in his continuing success. He caused his followers and the people at large to identify him as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the People) and there was no mistaking his construction of still another cult of the personality. When moving among the people he wore the familiar Mao hat and the sherwani (suitcoat) he wore also resembled the tunic worn by that Chinese demi-god. Like other leaders before him, Bhutto permitted his ego to blind his view of the world around him; he also failed to understand the nature of perennial militarism and under what conditions it would again be activated. The hasty retreat to the barracks that the armed forces made after the tragedy of Bangladesh did not signify a permanent condition. The manoeuvre was tactical, not strategic. Five years after Bangladesh, men who were not tainted by the humiliating loss of East Pakistan were in charge of the armed forces. Their perspective was quite different from that of Bhutto, the PPP, and their now retired superiors. When the country was again faced with widespread disorder, with foreign and domestic forces threatening to divide the nation, and with important military units verging on insurrection, it was time for the armed forces to make their presence known. Bhutto's heavy-handed tactics, his shift toward absolute despotism, and his apparent anti-Islamic tendencies distressed some of the Army's élite cadres. Their intentions to overthrow Bhutto eventually became known to General Zia-ul-Haq. Zia was informed that he would have to lead the coup against Bhutto or expect to be swept away with him. On 5 July 1977 Bhutto was arrested by a force under Zia's command. His government was dissolved and Pakistan passed into still another phase of martial law. Bhutto was Pakistan's first civilian leader since the overthrow of the parliamentary experiment in 1958 but his rule was not a new beginning, only an intermission in the protracted rule of the civil-military establishment.

5
Political Movements and Political Parties

The foregoing chapters have set the scene for the remainder of this volume. Pakistan is the stage, Islam the theme, and the principal actors politicians, bureaucrats, and uniformed officers. Pakistan is threatened with dissolution, Islam's political role remains ambiguous, and the principals are no longer jousting. Pakistan is a young country by historical standards, but it is old beyond its years. Its independent experience has yet to deliver the promised satisfaction and the country no longer has freshness or innocence. A crossroads has been reached and the future is perhaps more uncertain today than at any time since the feedom movement commenced in earnest during World War II. At that time, Pakistan's true believers had a general idea of what they wanted. Today, noble intentions are treated with disdain. The central objective is preservation, the form may not be very important. Pakistan's difficulties are connected to political acivity which was never made routine, coherent, or popular. Politicians did their utmost to confine or fragment, not spread political organization. They were masters at particularism and exclusivity - unaware or indifferent that success or failure would be determined by the dimensions and depth of popular commitment. Pakistan was a house divided at birth and its dominant personalities aggravated the condition; few considered treatment that might have relieved the situation because little serious thought was given to the aspirations and desires of the nation's ordinary people. It can be argued that Pakistan exhibited no problems in forming political movements, but political movements do not necessarily evolve into national political organizations or parties.

The more readily identifiable political parties in Pakistan's history are the Muslim League, the Republican Party, the Awami League, the Pakistan People's Party and the National Awami Party. All are either dead, dying, or so splintered that at best they can be classified as factions rather than parties. The destruction of the larger organizations have left the smaller ones with a major voice in articulating purpose and in shaping events. All things are relative, however, and in the absence of more substantial groupings, today's otherwise minor parties loom large in presence and could impact on society with more or less the same degree of influence as more expansive ones. These small parties are the pre-partition and still quite active, Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, the Pagaro Muslim League, the Pakistan Democratic Party (actually the successor to the National Awami Party), the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan. The Pakistan People's Party is still the largest political organization in the country, but it has begun to split into a number of personal segments, given the death of its dominant leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. From all these lesser entities, the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq has favoured the Jamaat-i-Islami which has neither really considered itself to be a political party, nor reflected the concerns of the devout religious teachers.[1] The Jamaat has always been something of an ideological movement, addressing itself to strict Muslim practices, and in furthering its evangelistic programmes has enlisted the assistance of a small but disciplined cadre, particularly from university youth where it has had its greatest success. The Jamaat, it is often noted, did not support Jinnah or the *two nation theory* and therefore was not identified with the freedom movement. The survival of the Jamaat is the result of discipline and dedication as much as the self-destruction of the larger parties. The fact that it is at the centre of the decision-making operation today, however, does not mean that its organization intends to or could swell into a full-blown national party. National parties have not been very successful ventures in the Pakistan experience and in order to understand the reasons for this, attention should first be given to the party which created Pakistan, the Muslim League of Mohammed Ali Jinnah.

The Muslim League

The Muslim League was an organization plagued by contradictions from its inception. It was a communal grouping that pursued secular objectives. It claimed to be a mass party and yet catered to the desires and aspirations of a small élite.[2] It drew its strength and resolve largely from Muslims who were alien to the land that was to be called Pakistan, while the Muslims inhabitants of that land were either threatened by the policies of the League, or were not readily taken into its confidence. The Muslim League was formed as the dialectical adversary of the Indian National Congress. As an organization, it had one particular objective, to prevent the Congress from totally replacing British rule in India.[3] The Muslim League stood as a reminder to the British that the subcontinent had been dominated by Muslims before their arrival and that the community expected to play a formidable role in the region's future after their departure. The political future of the Muslims of South Asia would be influenced by a Muslim revival and not by still another alien (Hindu) culture. At the same time, the Muslim League was more a political movement than a religious renaissance. Islam had not lost its appeal. The Muslims of India were not drifting from the tenets of their faith. On the contrary, Islam as a religious force was potent and omnipresent among the Muslims of the subcontinent. It was the vitality of the religious experience which kept alive the idea of political independence. The notion that Islam was in danger did not stem from the temptations of modernity, but from a sense of political weakness. The Muslim League was therefore more a political movement than a political party in that it knew more clearly what it did *not* want to happen rather than what it should positively set out to do.

This was not as serious a matter before independence as it was after the country had been established as a sovereign nation-state. In a struggle for self-determination, political movements are essential instruments of change. The real test, however, lies in the capacity of such a movement to transform itself into a coherent political organization. Movements are energized by sentiment and passion, by symbols and generalities, by hopes and fantasies. Movements are always futuristic in that it is the promise that shapes events and conditions behaviour. Political parties, by contrast, are mundane affairs. This is especially so with parties that assume direct governmental responsibility. Practices are more significant than ideas, rhetoric is a poor substitute for policy. Efficiency and effectiveness, not piety and eloquence, are measures of progress. The present dominates both thought and action.

Most salient in Pakistan's case was the need to redirect a religious order, to restructure its role and performance without modifying its inner character. Political parties, unlike political movements, are more universalistic, hence more flexible and multi-dimensional. In essence, they are and must be more secular expressions of diversity, pluralism and difference. Their capacity to aggragate variety, to represent general need, to address multiple questions, to adapt to the unforeseen, and to promote change, are rods by which governmental parties are judged.[4] The Muslim League could not meet the acid test because it could not change the movement it started and led into a rational political organization. And although the reasons for its failure are numerous, perhaps the most important consideration concerns the fundamentals of building and inspiring such a party.

Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-i-Azam of the Pakistanis, was not a devout religious leader guided by some inner voice to lead the Muslims of South Asia into a promised land. At no time did he give any thought to Pakistan becoming a theocratic state.[5] Religious sentiment was undeniably important among the Muslims of South Asia, but he saw that sentiment as more *leitmotif* than functional. Jinnah was a nineteenth century nationalist operating in twentieth century circumstance with fifteenth century burdens. He was, after all, a practical, contemporary human being. He was cosmopolitan in his habits and tastes, in his manners and ideas. He was trained to appreciate directness and precision, and to labour for clarity and compromise. The record bears ample testimony that he was the chosen leader of the Muslim League membership and the venerated guide of the Muslim masses of South Asia. But Jinnah's position in the vanguard of the Pakistan Movement cannot conceal the difficulties in translating a statesman's vision into a people's experience. Jinnah died before he could make the transition from movement to party.[6] The collapse of the Muslim League shortly after the creation of Pakistan speaks of organizational weakness of a fundamental nature. It has been said that the Muslim League fulfilled itself with the creation of the country. It was consumed by the very act of achievement. But this is so much rationalization. The Muslim League did not expire because its work had been completed and it was no longer germane. It was more needed after partition. It failed because it could not make the transition. If it was going to transform a community into a national entity, it had to first transform itself from a communal movement into a heterogeneous organization. It had to become a secular party in a

secular state, reflecting the varied interests of a secular society.[7] It could not do this because secularism was judged more a threat to Islam than political frailty.

Ambiguity and confusion have plagued Pakistan from those first days after independence. The *two nation theory* obscured more than it clarified. Tens of millions of Muslims accepted Congress rule and continued to dwell in India. They no doubt found the conditions less than ideal, but they were not prepared to follow those Indian Muslims who felt more compelled to leave. Nor did Jinnah and his aides anticipate a complete and total shift of populations. It was a foregone conclusion that the vast majority of Muslims living in Hindu-dominant regions of India would remain in place. How Pakistan was to serve the interests of those remaining behind was unclear. By the same token, how the Muslim state would accomodate the Hindu minority living within its boundaries was similarly ill-defined. Jinnah believed, and his statements reinforce this interpretation, that Pakistan would develop into a model constitutional state in which the rule of law was pre-eminent. Minorities had no reason to fear the majority given their equality before the law, a law which was noticeably secular in substance and in meaning. At the same time, the different religious communities were free to pursue their individualized practices, to cling to customs and traditions that distinguish them from others in their midst.[8] But in political affairs, differences were to be sublimated or ignored and national well-being given prominence. This proved to be impossible for the ordinary citizen, however, and the Muslim League was shown to be no better equipped to cope with the problem.

Without Jinnah, the Muslim League was a mere extension of Muslim sentiment and emotional involvement. It was wedded to its amorphous constituency, fearful of experimentation, and more inclined to do what was expected of it rather than assume risks whose consequences it could not control. The Muslim League appeared to hold the view that Muslims could live in India under Congress leadership and amidst their more numerous Hindu neighbours and not fear for Islam; whereas a decision to fashion a secular polity in Pakistan would be considered a direct threat to their Muslim way of life. Because the Muslim League sustained this opinion, they did not see the need to modify their organization, to open its membership to non-Muslims, and to set an example for contemporary political performance that the larger society might be instructed to emulate.

The Muslim League leaders, in the main, were frightened and defensive people. Their appeal for a state of Pakistan was full of negativity.[9] They did not reflect either confidence or idealism. They did not get on well with one another and they had precious little wisdom in fashioning a state apparatus. They also inherited a complex situation with almost nothing in the way of material resources to relieve the pressure on themselves or the society. That they managed to hold the country together in that initial six-month period was due more to the excitement and momentum of the struggle for independence, than their own astuteness. If this is too harsh an appraisal, the question must be asked as to why the Muslim League could not rise above the experience of its constituents and assume the posture of a responsible political organization. Why did the Muslim League prefer sterility to dynamism in both its policies and performance?

Even before independence was achieved, but certainly afterwards, H. S. Suhrawardy, the last Chief Minister of undivided Bengal and a staunch Muslim Leaguer, addressed himself to this question. Now that there was a state of Pakistan, he said, it was time for all Pakistanis, Muslims, Hindus, and all minorities to come together in support of national programmes and purpose.[10] The Muslim League, he declared, must open its membership to non-Muslims. It must become the dominant representative of all the people of Pakistan, not just the Muslim community. Suhrawardy, however, was condemned for his statement. He was already judged to be an enemy of the Muslim League given developments leading up to partition, and this presentation was seen as little more than an attack upon an organization that he wished to destroy, not assist. Suhrawardy was suggesting a Trojan Horse tactic. The Muslim League would permit non-Muslims to join the party and this element would them proceed to destroy it from within. The result of such activity would be the destruction of Pakistan, because the Muslim League perceived itself as the personification of Pakistan. In other words, the League and Pakistan were inseparable. The Muslim League chose not to alter its membership policy or any of those features that had been developed prior to independence. People like Suhrawardy were considered enemies, indeed conspirators with the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha (an ultra-reactionary Hindu organization) in a programme to destroy Pakistan. Given the prevalence of such fears, Suhrawardy and other formerly devoted Muslim Leaguers were drummed out of the organization.[11]

Instead of expanding its vistas, broadening its expression, appealing to a wider cross-section of society, the Muslim League tightened its circle, rigidified its practices and left little room for manoeuvre or adaptation. The inability of the Muslim League to govern Pakistan can be explained in a multitude of ways, but the basic structure of the party remained the key issue. Structural weaknesses brought the bureaucracy and eventually the armed forces into the picture. Observing the ineptness and quarrelsome nature of the Muslim League politicians, it was left to the professional administrators to manage the day-to-day affairs of the country. The deeper the politicians plunged themselves into philosophical controversy and personal rivalry, the less time they had for administering the country. Insofar as the work of government goes on, decision-making responsibility is bound to gravitate toward the civil administrators. Moreover, given bureaucracy's historic ruling role in the subcontinent, there was nothing unusual with this turn of events.[12] No one considered the situation unique. But the politicians did not feel that they were abdicating their capacity to govern, rather that the termination of the colonial era transformed the role of the bureaucracy. Although the bureaucrats continued to hold influential positions, their subordination to the politicians was taken for granted. The politicians did not question this paradoxical thinking whereby bureaucrats could change their roles but they would not contemplate doing the same.

Bureaucratic involvement in the political process only confounded an already difficult and perplexing situation when they seized control of the Muslim League, or at least lent a dominant presence to its proceedings. Neither Ghulam Mohammed nor Iskander Mirza joined the League, but Choudhri Mohammad Ali, who succeeded to the Prime Minister's office in 1955, was required to stand for a seat in the Constituent Assembly as a member of the Muslim League. Up until the time Mirza floated his Republican Party, administrators in political roles gave lip-service to the Muslim League; and given the dominance of bureaucratic decision-making, it was the Muslim League that also received the criticism that might well have been reserved for the administrators.[13] It was noted in Chapter three that some high-ranking administrators and disaffected politicians conspired to discredit the League. And it must be reported that the divided, somewhat leaderless organization could not prevent the bureaucrats from exploiting Muslim League inconsistencies. The bureaucrats did not believe the Muslim League was capable of organizing a sophisticated national political

organization and did their utmost to prevent it from altering the character of government which they inherited from the British. After the death of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan was rocked by one crisis after another. Each time the armed forces were called upon to restore tranquility. Once the provincial elections were concluded in East Bengal and the Muslim League ceased to be an effective organization in the province, it was only a matter of time before the party lost its ability to influence thinking in West Pakistan. The beneficiaries of this situation were, of course, the bureaucrats. The Muslim League was to make one last fatal mistake before its plunge into oblivion. Moreover, it was a blunder committed under circumstances that did not directly involve the bureaucrats. The episode reveals the myopia of the Muslim League leadership and its basic inability to adjust to changing circumstances or ward off heavy bureaucratic influence.

A Muslim League Prime Minister, 1.1. Chundrigar, replaced H. S. Suhrawardy's government in 1957 and for a few short weeks the Muslim League had an opportunity to regain some of its lost prestige.[14] But the organization gambled its life away on an issue which should have ceased to concern anyone after 1947. East Pakistan by this time was under the influence of the Awami League and the Krishak Sramik Party. H. S. Suhrawardy, Mujibur Rahman, and others promoted the idea that the separate electorate system, which was still in vogue in Pakistan, ought to be scrapped and replaced by joint electorates. Their argument, simply put, was that Pakistan was one nation for both the Muslims and minority communities and by accepting joint electorates, political discrimination would be eradicated.[15] Incidentally, the Awami League had already dropped its Muslim bias and had permitted non-Muslims to become members. The Muslim League saw this issue as its *cause célèbre.* Sensing that the Muslim population of Pakistan would denounce the elimination of separate electorates, and again seeing a Hindu plot in the controversy, the Muslim League insisted on holding its ground. When it was pointed out that separate electorates was only significant to Muslims threatened by the larger Hindu community, and that the overwhelming portion of Pakistanis were Muslims, the League merely restated its belief that the separate electorates were an integral part of the Islamic ideology that made Pakistan possible. The elimination of the separate electorates would lead to the destruction of the Muslim polity. When a compromise formula was offered in which West Pakistanis could maintain separate electorates in return for

their acknowledgement that the East Pakistanis could shift to joint electorates, the Muslim League leadership again said no. By this time, the Muslim League was dependent on a coalition with the Republican Party and when a Republican fact finding group visited East Pakistan and returned to report their acceptance of the compromise, the Muslim League government crumbled, never again to be reassembled.[16] From that time to the present, so-called Muslim League factions have cropped up, but they have never projected the broad interests of the country's founding organization.

The Muslim League was victimized by its original decision to hold to a course which had little utility once Pakistan became independent. It followed Jinnah at a time in history when the transfer of power from the British to the Muslim League was completed. But it did not pick up the new leads suggested by Jinnah, which also might explain why the Quaid-i-Azam resorted to extra-parliamentary methods during his brief stint as the country's Governor-General. The failure of the Muslim League to adapt to new circumstances may also have influenced the Pakistani bureaucracy to perpetuate its semi-colonial performance. Neither decision-making institution made the necessary changes to conform with the creation of Pakistan as a contemporary, developing, but nonetheless, democratic state. More than the Muslim League was at stake. Pakistan's survival seemed to hinge on the success of its contemporary democratic experiment, only no one at the time apparently realized it.

The Pakistan People's Party

The breakup of the Muslim League gave factional and regional organizations the opportunity to develop and spread their influence. The fragmented nature of Pakistan's political universe not only provided a base from which the civil-military bureaucracy could lead its assault on the governmental apparatus, it also led dramatically to the first general election in Pakistan's history, to the civil war and secession of East Pakistan, and finally to the crystallization of the only other political organization with national possibilities.

The Pakistan People's Party (PPP) of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was founded in Lahore on 30 November 1967.[17] Although Bhutto was the unanimous choice of the delegates to lead the party, he was not alone in establishing the PPP, in designing its ideology, structure or programme. Bhutto enlisted the support of disgruntled intellectuals who had been ignored, intimidated, or oppressed by the previous regimes, and especially by the government of Ayub Khan. The party's chief ideologist was J. A. Rahim, a graduate of Cambridge and the University of Munich and a former member of the Indian Civil Service. Rahim opted for Pakistan in 1947 and joined Pakistan's Foreign Service, holding numerous ambassadorships and other high diplomatic posts. Rahim was the real force behind the PPP. He had come to know Bhutto on an intimate basis when the latter took the Foreign Ministry in 1963. The two men shared common views concerning Pakistan's internal and external affairs and it was Rahim who counseled Bhutto after his departure from the Ayub cabinet. Rahim was impressed with Bhutto's oratorical gifts, his dynamic personality, driving ambition, and youthful following. He quickly concluded that with Bhutto's leadership and his tutoring, Pakistan could be transformed. What they needed was a political organization. Rahim retired from government service in July, 1967, and by November the PPP was a reality.

Rahim was a declared socialist. Bhutto was identified with socialist causes, but more so with the championing of socialist countries in their struggles with the Western nations. Rahim was committed to multi-dimensional, revolutionary change. Bhutto was seeking an approach to power and authority. Rahim was introspective, philosophical, artistic, urbane, and sophisticated. Bhutto was an extrovert, brooding, ambitious, articulate, and clever. Together, they comprised a formidable team, with Rahim looking upon the younger Bhutto as a father to a son. Bhutto was stamped for greatness. He was the only fresh political face to emerge from the Ayub years, and Rahim sensed the opportunity to work through Bhutto to recreate the Pakistan scene. Bhutto had been urged to join the established opposition to Ayub, to identify with one of the older political organizations, but he rejected all entreaties. Rahim had convinced him that what Pakistan needed and what was best for him was the creation of a totally new party. By building a new party, he would be unencumbered by previous records, would not have to share authority with already in-place leaders, and most important, could design a party structure that would draw the broadest

support.[18] The country's educated youth was in search of new directions, labour and the peasantry had never really been vital elements in Pakistan's party system, women had been treated with indifference. These large and important groups would support an appeal to change the prevailing order and Rahim urged Bhutto to lead the new organization. Bhutto did not need much convincing. His ego had been stimulated and the union was sealed between the two men.

Bhutto and Rahim turned to individuals with similar ideas and interests. Mubashir Hasan, a civil engineer with degrees from Columbia and the University of Iowa, and Sheikh Mohammad Rashid, an early supporter of the Muslim League who broke with the organization in 1950, were co-founders of the party. These men in turn selected persons close to them, and sympathetic with their positions to join the leadership ranks. Rahim turned to Mairaj Mohammad Khan, a well-known leftist and social critic; Bhutto attracted Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, like Bhutto, the scion of a landed family of Sind whose father was a Minister in Pakistan's first government. The young Pirzada was also a lawyer, having been called to the bar from Lincoln's Inn and having served in Bhutto's law chambers before the latter joined Ayub's government in 1958.[19] The two men were intimates. The same could be said for Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, a cousin of the PPP leader with a degree from Oxford and also a lawyer certified by Lincoln's Inn. Sheikh Rashid turned to Mustafa Khar, an influential young landlord from the Punjab with somewhat radical ideas; and Mubashir Hasan influenced Mahmud Ali Kasuri, one of Pakistan's most celebrated legal minds, and Hanif Ramay, a young, articulate, and outspoken lawyer from Lahore, to join the Peoples Party. At the outset, the PPP was dominated by members of the intelligentsia. They were well educated, industrious, possessed a flare for leadership, and were dedicated to the complete transformation of Pakistani socio-political and economic life.

The PPP leaders were hardly representative of Islamic orthodoxy, but they took pains to explain that they were guided in all their policies by the tenets of their religion. Capitalism, it was argued, was a manifestation of Judeo-Christian tradition. Islam, however, was linked with socialism, and if Pakistan was to find its true path, capitalist influences had to be purged from society.[20] The PPP sought to reinforce this doctrine through references to Mohammad Ali Jinnah, insisting that Jinnah envisaged a Muslim state in which harmony would reign supreme, and this was only possible in a

classless, conflict-free society. No reference is made to Marxism or its derivatives, Leninism or Maoism, in the PPP manifesto or other public documents. The legitimacy for the shift away from private property is not to be found in European experience, but rather in the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad and in the work of Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It is importatant to note, however, that initially the PPP did not intend to expropriate land. Big landlords were to be eliminated but their land was to be redistributed to peasant-cultivators. The public sector, however, was conceived as including banks, insurance companies, heavy industries, utilities, and transportation. Public ownership would seek to encourage worker participation in the management of the factories and profit-sharing schemes were also forecast.[21] In general, the PPP programme sought to exploit popular feelings against the country's politico-economic elites, as well as to destroy their base of power and influence. The PPP offered something for every identifiable group in the country, including the landlords who were promised protection in return for their support.

If they had difficulty in gaining influence, however, it was due to their regional appeal. Prior to the crisis in East Pakistan in 1970–71, the PPP sought to reflect the interests and grievances of the Bengalis. In Rahim's *Outline of a Federal Constitution for Pakistan* published in 1969, the PPP ideologue sympathizes with the plight of the Bengalis (he was born in Calcutta, West Bengal).[22] Rahim states that the difficulties between East and West were neither racial, nor ethnic, nor geographic, nor linguistic. The problem revolved around feudal control in West Pakistan and its dominance of the central government. East Pakistan suffered from exploitation by greedy property-holders in West Pakistan who, in fact, had imposed a colonial system on the country. East Pakistan was not alone in suffering this indecency. According to Rahim, the problems of the Pathans and the Baluchis could also be traced to the same origin. True Pakistani federalism, he concluded, can only be experienced when the exploiting feudalists and their supporters are eliminated, the One Unit of West Pakistan dissolved, and each of the nation's major ethnic groups given an opportunity for self-expression and fulfilment. Despite this strong appeal to the provincialists, Bhutto and his colleagues coud not get their message to the frontier people who turned to local leadership rather than the PPP.

In East Pakistan, events were to overtake the country such that no appeal, even if sincerely made, would have been successful. This deserves further

analysis. The PPP was not as well knit an organization as appeared on the surface. Even before Bhutto was given control of the government in December 1971, differences were developing in the party's ranks. Bhutto was the acclaimed chairman of the party, a role he hoped to fashion after the example of his idol, Mao Tse-tung. But Bhutto was more an opportunist than a committed ideologue. Doctrine was a means toward gaining, holding, and wielding power; it was not holy writ, unchangeable, and super-eminent. He agreed to adopt Rahim's philosophy because it suited the times and enhanced his position, but he did not appreciate the older man's parental advice or his critical judgment. Bhutto sensed the need to build a mystique around himself and this meant no one could question his actions, particularly in public and among his devoted subordinates. But it did not take long for this personality problem to surface. It was to prove the undoing of the PPP and Bhutto.

Bhutto credited himself with Ayub's fall. Having not only survived the Ayub era (he was, after all, an intimate Ayub associate for almost eight years), now even greater opportunities beckoned, and he was flushed by his popularity and durability. After the 1970 election he was the overwhelming political personality in West Pakistan. On the other hand, Rahim's overtures to the Bengalis had been ignored, indeed were not even heard given the province's love affair with its native sons, notably Mujibur Rahman. Thus when the election results required a compromise solution involving both Mujib and Bhutto, the latter chose not to become involved. An agreement with Mujib could not help Bhutto's cause, even if it might have served Pakistan's larger interests. Rahim and some of his colleagues did not approve of Bhutto's behaviour. They engaged in deliberations with their Awami League counterparts in the expectation that their efforts would sway Bhutto. But the arrangements which were hammered out in those talks were not acceptable to the PPP chairman, and with his intransigence, nothing could prevent the country from being plunged into a civil war. Bhutto apparently did not mind sacrificing the country's tenuous unity on the altar of his own ambition. He had underlined his special position *vis-à-vis* his colleagues and insisted the PPP was merely an extension of his own personality.

Bhutto assumed the presidency of Pakistan on 20 December 1971.[23]. He continued to hold the chairmanship of the PPP, however, and it was soon obvious that the country would be made to conform to the party, not vice-

versa. The country was in a state of near paralysis. The Indian victory had left the nation demoralized, its economy in shambles and the government in a condition of numbing confusion. The scene was set for a saviour and Bhutto moved to fill the role with enormous energy and self-confidence. He was an indefatigable worker and his domestic programme and foreign tours were all calculated to create a dynamic atmosphere as well as set a new course. Bhutto had assembled a coalition the likes of which Pakistan had not experienced since those very first days following partition. In a sense, it was a 'bom again' situation and Pakistanis were only too pleased after their ordeal to follow someone who appeared to know where he was going.[24] After almost a decade and a half of military rule, the country was excited with the prospects of civilian government. In the four months that followed Bhutto's swearing-in ceremony, reforms involving nationalization, general economic policy, labour, land tenure, education, the police and judiciary, sustained the nation.[25] The entrepreneurial elite saw their possessions seized, some were arrested, others fled the country. Armed peasants anticipated government actions and used the occasion to take land from their owners. In some cases, frontier PPP leaders instigated peasant seizures as a way of gaining political influence among the Pathans. All of these programmes and activities were aimed at benefitting the PPP and maximizing Bhutto's rule.

Bhutto and his colleagues were already at work on a new constitution for the country that would embody their new system, but a difference of opinion emerged over the form of political system that would be most suitable. The PPP, through Rahim and Mubashir, Kasuri and Mairaj, had all along pressed for a modified version of a parliamentary system, but Bhutto indicated he would prefer a presidential type. His party colleagues rejected this idea, recognizing that Bhutto was building a cult around himself rather than emphasizing the PPP's socialist programme. Mairaj Mohammad Khan and Mukhtar Rana, important PPP leaders on the radical left, suggested they could not countenance such behaviour, even from Bhutto. When the constitution was completed and presented to the country in 1973, Bhutto had grudgingly accepted the parliamentary system but both Mairaj and Mukhtar Rana were arrested and spent years in confinement.[26]

Curiously, Bhutto's initial opposition developed from within his own party. In those first three years following the loss of East Pakistan, there was no real challenge to the dominance of the PPP or the rule of Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto. The regime's difficulties were self-generated. Bhutto did not trust his colleagues and he developed para-military and police organizations to protect his person and operations. The Federal Security Force (FSF), somewhat modeled after Iran's SEVAK, was made up of military and police personnel, many of whom had been forcefully retired by previous Pakistani governments. Bhutto rehired them and gave them important jobs which they took seriously. Wherever Bhutto went, the FSF was at his side. Command posts were established to filter and analyze all information that might be judged a threat to the chairman or his administration. Opposition critics were silenced through intimidation or incarceration. There were also a number of political murders, allegedly committed by the regime on Bhutto's orders. (Indeed, Bhutto was to pay with his life for one of these acts.) It took considerable courage to defy the regime and most people dared only comment on the prevailing conditions in the privacy of their homes. Public places, like hotel rooms and meeting rooms were thought to be bugged. Newspapers were brought under severe restrictions, and in due course, permitted to publish only what the goverment sanctioned. In a brief period, and despite his considerable popularity, Bhutto had converted Rahim's socialist dream into a cultist police state.

The PPP lost its momentum as Bhutto moved to include landlords and industrialists in his organization. A modified socialist programme was retained because it gave the regime the power to control the nation's economy, but the PPP leftists were eventually forced from the party. In July 1974, Bhutto severed his ties with Rahim who had criticized his reorganizing exploits. Bhutto exclaimed: 'I am the People's Party and they are all my creatures.'[27] When Bhutto selected Aziz Ahmed, a long-time bureaucrat and former ambassador to the United States, to be his Minister for Defence and Foreign Affairs (after first making him a member of the PPP and getting him a seat in the Senate), Rahim exploded. He was familiar with Aziz Ahmed, given his own long career in the foreign service, and to Rahim the appointment was a serious blow to PPP morale. He chose to display the intensity of his dissatisfaction in a meeting of members of the cabinet. Bhutto was enraged by Rahim's verbal attack and ordered him to leave the meeting. Later, a contingent of the FSF descended on Rahim's residence in Islamabad with the express purpose of serving the PPP Secretary-General with a letter of dismissal. Rahim also held the portfolio in the Ministry for Production and Commerce, and it was this post that he

was ordered to relinquish. There was a skirmish in front of the residence, Rahim was beaten by the police, the bridge of his nose and several ribs were broken. In December 1974, without being notified, Bhutto named Mubashir Hasan as Rahim's successor as Secretary-General of the PPP. Mubashir had been removed from his ministerial position prior to this assignment and no one believed that he would prove to be a strong party leader. As A. W. Katpur, another PPP official was to comment, the PPP was a 'movement', not a party and owed its entire success to Bhutto.[28]

The PPP's central committe supposedly reached a consensus in January 1975 on such issues as the right of intra-party dissent, steadfast socialist programmes, and grassroots organization. But Chairman Bhutto made all the key decisions. The party was literally drained of independent views, and whatever initiative it once had was curtailed. In the course of time, almost every high-ranking PPP official was forcibly removed. Only Bhutto's closest confidant, Abdul Hafiz Pirzada, avoided his wrath and retained his confidence. Mustafa Khar, Hanif Ramay, Mubashir Hasan, Khurshid Hasan Meer all were subjected either to imprisonment, exile, or ridicule. Even Mumtaz Ali Bhutto suffered a period in ignominious retreat. As both the head of government and leader of the PPP, Bhutto was a picture of hypertensive activity, but it was obvious that even he could not perform at optimum levels with the workload he assumed for himself. It can be argued that Bhutto was concerned with the effectiveness of his party, but he also viewed it as only one of several vehicles that contributed to the stabilization of his regime.

PPP confusion and disorganization was inevitable. When first launched in 1967, the PPP's central purpose was the dislodging of Ayub Khan. Toward that goal, the party enlisted numerous dissident elements from among Pakistani society. Students and feudal aristocrats as well as factory workers, share-croppers, and representatives of the intelligentsia and professional classes found themselves in strange alliance. Ostensibly a leftist party, the PPP had to explain its willingness to admit so-called 'reactionaries' to its ranks. It was Chairman Bhutto who noted that 'the capitalists and feudal lords who have joined my party have already taken an oath before me to abide by all conditions laid down in the (PPP) Manifesto.'[29] If the chairman was satisfied that there were no contradictions in accepting the propertied class as members of the PPP, there need be no complaints from others. Initially, the broad-gauge coalition was acceptable, at least by leftist United

Front tactics, and because the party was preparing to fight the 1970 elections. The PPP coalition of right and left remained somewhat intact with the débâcle in East Pakistan and the need for unity at a time of great national peril and uncertainty. But after the PPP had consolidated its hold on the country, the more radical leftists called for Bhutto to purge the conservatives and particularly the property-holders. Basic industries, along with the national banks and insurance companies, had been expropriated and the country appeared to be steaming directly for a fully socialized economy. But somewhere along this channel, Bhutto ordered a slowing of the momentum and suggested taking a new course.[30] He now insisted that the country had to have a smooth transition to socialism and that the steps already taken needed consolidating before other new programmes were attempted. He was apparently concerned with the stabilization of the agrarian scene and he protected those landlords who had been subjected to arbitrary seizure of their holdings. Instead of permitting the landless to take matters into their own hands, he ordered the parcelling out of properties to those who were likely to lend their support to the rural PPP. In this way, he multiplied the number of landlords, but at the same time preserved their status.

This posture did not please the more vocal radicals in the PPP coalition who interpreted the chairman's policy as *wadera* (landlord) oriented. Indeed, there were those in the party hierarchy who concluded that Bhutto, who was himself a large *wadera,* had yielded to pressure exerted by his aristocratic compatriots.[31] The dissidents argued against the dilution of the PPP revolution and sensed they had been betrayed by their chairman. Bhutto's response to their complaints was decidedly unsympathetic. And as the national coalition began to come apart, provincial forces within the party asserted themselves.

The PPP's ideological cement had been poorly mixed. Disarray in PPP ranks implied an inability to reconcile ideological pronouncements with practical performance. As a result, those elements which began to assume important positions in the PPP administration often had little to do with or interest in original party principles. Except for Bhutto's looming presence, the PPP became a congeries of small provincial factions, each with its own accepted leader. These leaders surrounded themselves with elements that could provide for their protection and extend their power *vis-à-vis* the locally perceived opposition. Such was the case with Mustafa Khar, who as

Chief Minister of the Punjab, was reputed to have hired gangsters and convicted murderers to terrorize the province. Although Bhutto was forced to dismiss Khar, the Punjab was vital to his political survival and without the strong man in place, Bhutto feared the tubulent forces within the province.[32] Hanif Ramay, for example, succeeded Khar, but although an intelligent and articulate spokesman for the PPP, he could not control the anti-Bhutto demonstrations which the political opposition became more daring in organizing after 1974. In January 1975, Bhutto ordered the reorganizing of the PPP in an effort to shore up the party's defences. He prompted the drafting of a new manifesto, and long promised elections were again a topic of conversation.

While Bhutto had added to his authority and the trappings of majesty surrounded him, it was obvious that he no longer had the political base which gave him his grand opportunity in 1967. PPP members ceased to show much discipline, and personality, not institutional strength, held the organization together. As one observer noted: 'A national party is not something a leader can produce out of a hat. It takes years and years and years of hard painstaking work to establish it firmly.'[33] The PPP, under Bhutto's tight leadership, had been organized as a movement, not a party. A party suggested organization and hence delegations of authority and a diffusion of responsibility. Bhutto's suspicious mind could not permit this. He accepted no equals, dissent, or challenges to his authority. He was not only the key decision-maker, he insisted on being the *only* decision-maker in the country. His imperial style replicated his Sindhi landlord experience, and Pakistan was to be governed much like his ancestral estate in Larkana, a district of Sind province.[34] Fear, intimidation, repression, constant surveillance permeated Pakistani society as Bhutto's special forces inflicted their brand of punishment on the population. Bhutto relished being described as the Quaid-i-Awam (Leader of the People), but it was apparent that a good portion of the population found that designation offensive and intolerable.

The fissures in the PPP, the capacity of individuals to move from one party to another without any sense of commitment, gave the political opposition an opportunity to win more significant public support. While the opposition had been disassembled and scattered into a number of small groupings, Bhutto had not ordered their complete destruction. There was the realization that the Frontier province and Baluchistan had not voted for the

PPP in the 1970 elections. The National Awami Party (NAP), led by Wali Khan, a son of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, dominated the Pathan region. In Baluchistan, a coalition involving the NAP and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), had been formed.[35] Together, these frontier areas represented a substantial bastion of political opposition. Moreover, given the willingness of the Afghan government to interfere in Pakistan's political squabbles, the opposition would have an external source of help that might sustain it indefinitely. When Bhutto took over as Pakistan's supreme ruler, NAP-JUI coalitions formed the governments in their respective provinces. Bhutto, of course, found this an unsatisfactory arrangement, and after a brief honeymoon period, moved against these regimes claiming they were subverting the unity of Pakistan.[36] What ensued was a long drawn out campaign which, in Baluchistan, took on the proportions of an armed insurrection. With the overwhelming presence of the regular Pakistan army in the region, the Baluchis were suppressed, their leaders imprisoned and a puppet regime established in Quetta. In the North West Frontier Province, Wali Khan kept his forces under control and took up the constitutional role of leader of the opposition in the National Assembly. Using both this forum and the crowded streets of West Pakistan's cities and towns to appeal to the people, Wali Khan launched a blistering attack on Bhutto. These public sessions were often disrupted by the FSF and police, but Wali Khan refused to be silenced. Similarly, other opposition leaders, like Ashgar Khan, founder of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, utilized every opportunity to condemn Bhutto's policies, police state tactics, and personal behaviour. The more intense these attacks upon his person, the more was Bhutto compelled to go to the people and seek a vote of confidence. The elections could not be postponed much longer without serious questions being raised concerning Bhutto's legitimacy. The fact that this was still a concern pointed up the underlying weakness of the regime despite Bhutto's imperial posture.

The assassination of Hyat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, Bhutto's closest aide in the North West Frontier Province, provided the PPP chairman with an opportunity to rid himself of the NAP.[37] Wali Khan was held responsible for Sherpao's death and he and all the NAP leaders were rounded up by the FSF and imprisoned, pending a later trial. The NAP was dissolved, and its funds and assets seized by the government. Thus in one major move, Bhutto's prime political opposition was eliminated-or so it was believed. Conditions on the Frontier and in Baluchistan were, in fact, more tense. The

situation in the Punjab and Sind was less threatening, but political conditions also showed signs of deteriorating there. In particular, the armed forces were becoming restless and among the junior officers there was dissatisfaction with the regime and the role that they had been called on to play in it. Bhutto endeavored to disarm his critics and distract the public by a series of tactical manoeuvers which involved numerous overseas tours and country-wide celebrations for workers and peasants, for administrators and the military, especially on the centennial birth anniversary of Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. The elaborate festivities organized for the latter occasion lasted for several months in 1976, culminating with an impressive international symposium in Islamabad.[38] Bhutto was linked with Jinnah in every possible way in the hope that the population would see continuity in the PPP's leader's policies. Bhutto's real purpose was to link his political movement with the one that led to the creation of Pakistan. In this way, the PPP was supposedly the direct legatee of the Muslim League inheritance.

Bhutto must have been convinced that his popularity was secure. He did not have to be convinced that he possessed a monopoly of legal violence. On 7 January 1977, Bhutto announced a schedule for holding national and provincial elections, the first since those in 1970 which tragically led to the carnage in East Pakistan and the ultimate dismemberment of the country. With many of the top opposition leaders in remote prisons, and with no inclination to release them, Bhutto had reason to be confident about the results.[39] The PPP chairman did not really expect a contest. What he wanted was a mandate to complete his consolidation of power. With an overwhelming vote in favour of the PPP, Bhutto would conclude that the public supported his efforts to transform Pakistani society. In other words, the election results were to provide Bhutto with the justification to destroy *all* his critics once and for all. At least this was the perception of the opposition and they agreed that this was more than an election; it was a question of Bhutto's or their survival. Peaceful coexistence was judged impossible. The political game had evolved into a contest for the highest stakes. If Bhutto was successful, the PPP would be unceremoniously transformed into a one-party state-or a no party state. What stood out was Bhutto's apparent determination to eliminate, not simply neutralize, his detractors.

It was this general perception and the fears that it generated that led the small opposition parties to unify their programmes and establish a joint command for fighting the election campaign. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) was forced to labour with multiple handicaps, not the least of which was the government's capacity to restrict their appeal to the people.[40] The Press was almost totally in government hands, public speechmaking was often prevented, transport was unavailable to remote locations, leaders were incarcerated and the government could use its entire apparatus for the purpose of influencing votes. Frustrated by these impediments, the PNA could not get its message to the public and their strategy underwent a shift intended to maximize their opportunities. Instead of discussing alternative programmes, the PNA decided to focus almost exclusively on Bhutto, his personality, life-style, and his family's background and involvement. Bhutto had been supremely confident of winning the election. His new manifesto spoke of economic achievements and social improvements for the foreseeable future. His earlier socialist posture was underplayed. Moreover, he did not anticipate taking an active role in the campaign himself. Given the mystique which he still sought to emphasize, it was his intention to remain above the political in-fighting of the campaign. The chairman of the PPP did not have to mess with his inferiors. It was enough that they were given the chance to vent their ideas. But the number and ferocity of the personal attacks against him drew Bhutto out of this calm reserve. He was forced to respond to his detractors, especially as their statements had whipped up a flurry of excitement.

Bhutto sought refuge in the rhetoric that brought him to public attention. He condemned the PNA as 'capitalists' and declared that his PPP had adopted the sword as its symbol and that the sword would eliminate exploitation, cut down the chains on the poor, and bring an end to capitalism.[41] He also argued that the PNA harboured parties that fought against the Pakistan Movement and denounced Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He warned that they were still interested in the destruction of the nation and that many members of the opposition were collaborating with Pakistan's enemies in India and Afghanistan. Bhutto told his audiences to vote for the PNA if they wanted chaos and catastrophe. If the people preferred solidarity and wished to raise the integrity of the nation, however, they would not hesitate to cast their ballot for the PPP. The cards were all stacked in Bhutto's favour, given his control over the civil-military complex and the

greater resources and opportunities of the PPP. Nevertheless, Bhutto *was* concerned and many of his PPP followers were terrified with the perceived successes of the PNA. Their combined fears, mutually reinforcing, caused the PPP to over-react to the situation. Undoubtedly what they were witnessing was the surfacing of popular dissatisfaction long suppressed by the regime. They were also more aware of the weaknesses in their organization, weaknesses that had been there for some time and were constantly growing rather than diminishing. Thus, it was more their own circumstances, their own shortcomings and misadventures, rather than the opposition's campaign achievements to which they were really responding when the decision was taken that the elections must be won by any means, fair or foul.

A number of the organizations comprising the PNA were fundamentalist Islamic orders. The Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan did not have a *fatwa* (religious order) from the leaders of the religious community to use against Bhutto (they did have such an order in 1970 which condemned the PPP's socialist programme for concealing atheistic beliefs). But they did sense the volatility of a re-emerging Islamic sentiment in the country and they settled for a blistering attack upon Bhutto's anti-Muslim behaviour and proclivities.[42] The loss of East Pakistan had impacted on the intelligentsia more than on the majority of Pakistanis. At first disoriented, then placing their hope in Bhutto and his party, they now began to realize their circumstances and for the first time took stock of the direction in which they were heading. It was as if they had withdrawn into a confined area, waiting for the storm to blow over. Now having ventured forth, realizing they had survived the ordeal, the question before them was which course to follow. Bhutto had indicated one way and, in their stupor, they had followed his lead. Having regained their equilibrium, however, and cognizant that Bhutto may not be the answer to their prayers and that the times called for a definite reaction, the intelligentsia returned to the wellspring that was their Islamic tradition. The confluence of this reawakening with the election campaign proved to be the real undoing of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his PPP. It also established the parameters for the events that were to follow.

Bhutto defended himself against accusations that he was anti-Islam, that he indulged in intoxicants, behaved in a lewd and indecent manner, and encouraged irreligious activity, by eventually ordering the closing of

Pakistan's bars, gambling houses, and night spots. But neither these actions, nor promised reforms satisfied his opponents. When Ayub Khan was in serious difficulty and offered to make concessions, it was Bhutto who refused to accept them, stating that it was all a trick, aimed at keeping Ayub in power.[43] Now it was Bhutto's turn to suffer the same agony. He offered concessions only to find his opposition more intent on exploiting his weakness. But this was to become more evident after the election results were counted.

It came as no surprise that the PPP achieved a resounding victory, but the extent of that achievement was so enormous as to cast doubt on the integrity of the elections. It is more than likely that the PNA would have opposed the election results no matter how close or distant the vote. They were, afterall, in a life and death contest and the scenario had to be played all the way. There was no other course. But in this instance the PPP had played into PNA hands. Vote frauds were clearly identifiable.[44] The PPP had brazenly and foolishly stolen a number of seats in the National Assembly by stuffing ballot boxes, miscounting, or intimidating voters. The protestors, therefore, had reason to be incensed and used the opportunity to maximum advantage. There were demonstrations in almost all the major cities of the country. Bhutto was called upon to resign; the elections, they claimed, were null and void and a caretaker government should be assembled so that new, fairly conducted elections could be carried out. Bhutto, of course, brushed these demands aside and the battle was on in earnest. When the demonstrations degenerated into riots and could no longer be contained by the police and the FSF, the Army was called in to establish order and martial law was again invoked. It must be noted that the rioters were further provoked by the knowledge that Mrs Gandhi had been defeated in an electoral contest in India at precisely the same time and that she had yielded her powerful position without a crisis. The fact that Bhutto and his party had stooped to corrupt procedures to remain in office was not only in vivid contrast with Indian political behaviour, it was deemed to be anti-Islamic. Good Muslims, it was argued, did not perform that way. The PPP was a rot on Pakistani society and unless it was removed, it threatened to destroy the whole nation. Not all the dissidents were out in the streets. Bhutto and his PPP had attracted numerous foes. Not the least of these were elements within the armed forces, especially in those ranks just below the Bhutto hand-picked high command. These younger officers were devout Muslims and although

apolitical, were compelled to take sides, in many cases against the Bhutto government.

Even before the election campaign began, Army officers were plotting to overthrow Bhutto. These men no longer believed that he was the saviour sent to restore Pakistan to a place in the constellation of states. Many had family members and friends or acquaintances in civilian life who had been brutalized by the excesses of the regime. They were irate over the development and power of the FSF and the police state tactics that had been employed to sustain the administration. They were very concerned with Bhutto's frontier policies which were driving the Baluchis and Pathans into the hands of malcontents and foreign exploiters. They were disturbed with the mismanagement of the economy, the gross inflation and the destruction of the middle class. They saw a people being mesmerized by North Korean styled gymnastics displays and grandiose conferences that had no bearing on their well-being or future. They could not accept the cult that Bhutto endeavoured to build up around him; nor could they pay homage to him when their loyalties were directed to faith and country. When Bhutto called for the Army to restore order, he also signalled his weakness and the frailty of the FSF. Given the task of policing the country, the armed forces had to choose between maintaining Bhutto, his PPP, and its policies and practices, or once again assuming responsibility for leading the Pakistani people. Had Bhutto been more powerful than he proved to be, it is possible that a segment of the military would have launched a hundred per cent risk operation aimed at overthrowing him. As it was, however, all they had to do was place full pressure on their superiors to make a clean surgical removal of the affliction. The upper echelon understood that they had to choose between Bhutto and the unity of the armed forces. On 5 July 1977, the Chief-of-Staff of the Pakistan Army, General Zia-ul-Haq, ordered his troops to arrest Bhutto, his colleagues, and take control of the government. The action was taken with military precision, and although there were some momentary thoughts about Bhutto's return to high office, in a few short weeks it was evident that five and a half years of Bhutto and PPP rule had drawn to a firm end.

Epilogue

Political parties cannot develop in a political vacuum. Political leaders cannot emerge where there are no coherent political organizations. The symbiotic relationship between political parties and political leadership is rooted in historical circumstances and cannot be circumvented. Pakistan is an exceptional example of this problem. No doubt some fine men had grand intentions for Pakistan's democratic, political future, but they could not or would not give the country the experience it so desperately required. In the absence of a real test in competitive political activity, Pakistan's political system reflected its older monarchical and/or bureaucratic form. Personal rulers, some with limited vision, many harbouring great suspicions, almost all with large measures of arrogance, moved to the fore. Surrounded by sychophants, monopolizing legitimate violence and determined to press their peculiarities on the larger society, they propelled Pakistan from one crisis to another. Crisis management, not political development, describes the Pakistan condition. In the first thirty-two years Pakistan experienced only two national elections and both produced tragic consequenes. There is a special irony in these events. Sophisticated Pakistanis have always assumed that the holding of popular elections would resolve many of Pakistan's political problems. The fact that the reverse has occurred suggests two main ideas. The first is that the Muslims of Pakistan are incapable of working the election process. Their primary dilemma may be an obscure characteristic in their political culture. Islam may well be an impediment. The second involves the promise of political freedom of which the election process is but a part. Delays in providing Pakistanis with the liberties pledged to them by the country's founding fathers may have caused the build-up of so much socio-political hostility that the holding of elections has come to mean governmental weakness. Elections, therefore, may be viewed as opportunities to free the nation from the grip of alien authority, not as a means toward legitimating the political process. If either of these suppositions are correct, the cancellation of the November 1979 elections produced few surprises.

6
The Submerged Nations: the Politics of Ethnicity and Tribalism

While the *two nation theory* captured the headlines, it was obvious from its inception that Pakistan was not one, but a land of many nations.[1] The ethnic and tribal groups that constituted the Pakistan nation were exclusive, distinctive congeries of proud people that gave their allegiance to familiar local leaders. Tradition and custom guided their behaviour and their integration into a modern polity, their identification with a political abstraction that transcended their immediate surroundings, required tact, patience and wisdom. Even assuming the latter, there was no guarantee of success. Without it, it was a foregone conclusion that parochial interests would intensify.

The numerous ethnic and tribal people of the northwestern part of South Asia were associated with political environments of considerable durability. Organized along functional lines, superior-inferior patterns of behaviour and control were effectively sustained. The overwhelming belief system of this diverse population was Islam, but religion seldom caused either a diminution in regional, ethnic or tribal separateness, or promised much in the way of cooperation. Demonstrations of non-Muslim power in the area also failed to rally the many different groups into a collective defense of their joint inheritance. This may be explained by noting that neither the Sikhs, nor the British who followed their rule in India's northwestern sector, threatened the religious way of life of the indigenous population.[2] Despite their forceful intrusion into these domains, the alien invaders soon realized that their political influence in the area was dependent more on their capacity to adapt to prevailing conditions, than to challenge them. In this

way, the less sedentary elements were more or less free to continue their unique pursuits. In the settled regions, conformity was more in vogue, but even here systems of political control were imposed over traditional modes of operations that did not alter their fundamental character. Britain was not concerned with the creation of a modern nation-state in the subcontinent. English policies aimed at maximizing power with minimum expenditure. There was also some reluctance in applying European political theory to Asians who showed no acquaintance with its origin or meaning. Only in the first decades of the twentieth century was there an identifiable shift from this course, and even then the effort was limited to a few trained individuals and to specific areas. The British, in other words, did not assume the same responsibilties which the founders of the Pakistan state had taken upon themselves.

British power provided a veneer of unity to the affairs of the sub-continent. When they made ready their withdrawal, the multiplicity of regionally distinct groups asserted their independence, and it was left to their successors to inculcate notions of unity based upon a common national ideal and a single national purpose. The task assumed by the Muslim League and its leadership was enormous and fraught with dangers. The Muslim League was itself something of an alien body, for all its protestations concerning the common plight of Indian Muslims. The League's programmes and concerns were developed far from the experiences of the vast majority of people for whom they were meant. Moreover, without an adequate vehicle for the transmission of its views, somewhat lacking in its understanding of the methods and needs of the people, more or less contemptuous of those living in more primitive circumstances, the Muslim League leadership committed the cardinal sin of *forcing* unity on the country. Instead of building upon societal diversity, officialdom sought to contain it.[3] Instead of offering diverse expression, the League leaders insisted on the adoption of a uniform code of behaviour. Instead of engineering genuine federalism, Pakistan's new leaders emphasized centralized decision-making and authoritarian performance. To those in the rural and moutainous hinterland, an even more rigorous form of colonialism threatened their cherished traditions.

Nationality and Territoriality

The Bengali problem has been discussed in previous chapters and will not be examined here. Moreover, the theme of this chapter focuses on Pakistan in the aftermath of Bangladesh, hence the subject matter is confined to the settled territories of the Punjab and Sind, and the frontier borderlands of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP).

Of the four major regions in the northwestern part of the subcontinent, the Punjab was far and above the most developed, contained the largest concentration of population, exhibited the most wealth and exerted the greatest degree of socio-economic and political influence in the country. Sind was next in size and population, followed by the NWFP and trailed by Baluchistan. None of the territories were exclusively the domain of the ethnic group that gave the region its name. The Punjab had absorbed regions heretofore identified with each of the other entities. Sind was the home of a Baluchi population that rivalled the one in its original surroundings. Hundreds of thousands of Pathans from the NWFP settled in Karachi in the years following independence. And Pathans and Baluchis intermingled along their borderlands with the Pathan population encroaching on sparsely populated Baluchi territories to the south of the NWFP. All the provinces, especially Sind and the Punjab, became the home of millions of refugees (*muhajirs*) who fled their homes in India during the terrible months that followed the partition of the subcontinent. The tribal borderlands also witnessed the coming and going of nomadic peoples who settled there, as was their custom, and who were normally undisturbed in their habits by the creation of the Pakistan state. Irrespective of these cross-relationships, the four major geographic divisions retained their specific character, harboured special interests and endeared themselves to particular life-styles. Thus it could be said the regions of Pakistan were separate cultural entities up to the time Pakistan became independent. In speech, dress, diet, social customs and structure, values and interests, the regional folk shared little in common except their devotion to Islam. Each was proud of their peculiar heritage and generally speaking, reluctant to adopt what they considered to be alien ways.

Pakistan's creators drew heavily from the legacy of Islam, but were cognizant of the need to promote modernization, to establish Pakistan as a

full member of the international community and therefore, saw it as their task to play down the differences between the regions. The positive side of the Pakistan experience was stressed. The Muslim League was the centrepiece in their thinking, if only the excitement generated in creating the country could be perpetuated. The Muslim League was the filter through which Islamic identity and sentiment would continue to be expressed. It was also the instrument whereby unity would be sustained and strengthened. In this regard, it was necessary to establish the Muslim League as the only true political organization for the country.[4] To encourage political competition could only lead to the exploitation of differences, and invigorate centrifugal forces which were an inherent part of the Pakistan design. But to ignore displays of regional individuality was also a calculated risk. The impoverished masses possessed little beyond pride in their unique cultural and geographic circumstances. Nor could their political expression be separated from this ethnocentrism. Policies directed at, or interpreted as, muffling ethnic distinctiveness only intensified provincial feelings and heightened bitterness toward the League. Pakistan's leaders said their objective was the establishment of a federal Islamic republic, but their actions indicated they were more determined to concentrate power in their own hands. In point of fact this meant breaking the back of traditional, local leadership. Although the League was accused of offending indigenous life-styles, the principal targets were the prevailing political systems and the dominant personalities who controlled them. If Pakistan was going to develop into a modern nation, government had to speak with one voice. In Pakistan's early years this meant the voice of the Muslim League, and those local leaders who refused to join the organization, or to be bound by its directives, were *ipso facto* judged anti-state and anti-nation. This transition proved to be too abrupt in the frontier areas and conflicts could not be avoided. Nor could the Pakistan government prevent a hostile Afghanistan government from meddling in its internal affairs.

The Punjab

The Punjab's first political organization of stature was the Unionist Party, formed in 1924.[5] The Unionists were essentially large land-holders whose rural constituencies were, in many cases, totally dependent on their counsel and material support. This superior-inferior relationship pre-dated British rule and was eventually co-opted by colonial administration. The British-landlord relationship improved rural control. It was relatively cheap and highly effective. The landlords were rewarded for their cooperation by having local government reforms tailored to suit their needs. They were also made the recipients of protective legislation and guaranteed ready access to British officialdom. Under British rule the Punjabi landed elite expanded their influence and enhanced their tribal and/or *biradari* (kinship) relationships in the province. The Unionists sought to prevent the Muslim League from challenging their authority, but were eventually outwitted by the latter when it became obvious that the British intended to quit the subcontinent.

The Unionists included Hindus and Sikhs as well as Muslims in their ranks. It was by all accounts a non-communal party and its primary leader, Fazl-i-Husain, was the most astute politician in the Punjab prior to his death in 1936.[6] As long as he dominated the political life of the province, Jinnah had little opportunity to press his Muslim League cause. But in the years that followed his passing, the party came under the leadership of Sikander Hyat Khan, who proceeded to ignore the reorganization plan that Fazl-i-Husain intended to initiate. The Unionists weakened their position by first including the National Progessive (Mahasabha) Party in their coalition government. Later, an understanding between Jinnah and Sikander led to the Sikander-Jinnah Pact which permitted Muslim members of the Unionist Party to join the Muslim League without changing the designation of the former. Fazl-i-Husian had prevented any such merger through his opposition to communal based organizations such as the Muslim League. Nevertheless, the Pact put the League in a position from which it could convince the Punjabi Muslim landlords to join the movement. Moreover, the Unionists originally intended to build a mass organization of peasant proprietors, but it could never rise above the gentry phase. In the meantime, the Muslim League had gained popular influence in the countryside as well as in the towns and cities which had been neglected by the Unionists. The legislation in force in the Punjab favoured the large landholders so much that the peasantry was forced into a deperate state of indebtness. This too

the Muslim League sought to exploit. In general, economic development aimed at raising the standard of living of the masses failed to materialize under Unionist leadership, and in the post World War II years the League did not have to dig deeply to find issues that it could exploit.[7]

In 1946, when the British govenor of the Punjab called upon Sir Khizr Hyat Khan to form a new Unionist government in the Punjab, Jinnah and his supporters concluded that the order was aimed at frustrating League control. And without the Punjab in League hands, Pakistan was impossible. One of Jinnah's staunch lieutenants in the region, Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, wrote to Jinnah informing him that:

> In the Punjab where Muslims are in a majority their verdict is ignored and the government has been practically handed over to non-Muslims. In order to throw dust in the eyes of the Muslims, Khizr has been made a puppet premier. This seems to be a clear challenge to test our mettle. If we do not meet it successfully then I am sure that the… government conspiracy with the Hindu Congress and a few Quislings amongst the Muslims will enforce upon us the scheme of a federation of Akhand Hindustan [United India].[8]

It has been argued that the British had no choice but to ask Khizr to form a government around his Unionist Party because the Muslim League (which became the largest party in the province following the 1945–6 elections) could not get the other parties to cooperate with it in forming a coalition government. Undaunted, however, the League launched an agitation campaign which eventually forced Khizr's government to collapse, and at the time of independence the Punjab was still under govenor's rule. With no smooth transition to Muslim League government after partition, the Punjab was plunged into controversy almost immediately. Jinnah insisted on Khizr's isolation and he was prevented from engaging in politics. But other Unionists joined the League and they remained in important positions, and hence continued to influence the province's policies.

> The name Unionist was not to appear. Instead, new names emerged: the Noon faction of the Muslim League when he became chief minister of the Punjab in 19S3, the Republican Party later in 19S6, and the Pakistan Muslim League (Conventionist) of Ayub Khan in the 1960s. All enjoyed the open or covert support of the Unionist families. And the factions continued to be important.[9]

The Unionist pattern of control was in fact adopted by the Muslim League. The landlords continued in their pre-eminent position, making and

unmaking governments. Given the over-riding importance of the Punjab, it was also these individuals who influenced the policies in other sections of the country. Jinnah's chosen cabinet for his central government attempted to offset this influence, but it was to prove unsuccessful, particularly during his illness and after his death. Jinnah's cabinet included Liaquat Ali Khan, a refugee landlord with no landed constituency in the Punjab or elsewhere in the country; 1.1. Chundrigar, a celebrated Delhi lawyer and a member of the Muslim League Working Committee; Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar, a faithful and sophisticated associate from the northwestern portion of the country; J. N. Mandal, a Hindu leader of Pakistan's Scheduled Castes; and Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the only representative of the Punjabi landlords, but notably a landlord who found the Unionists completely unacceptable, and vice-versa. Although the cabinet was to swell in subsequent months, it is important to note that even before Jinnah's death, Chundrigar was asked to take up an ambassadorial assignment in Afghanistan, and Ghazanfar Ali became Pakistan's ambassador to Iran. Liaquat's assassination in 1951 and Nishtar's forced removal from the cabinet during the political crisis of 1953 (Mandal had quit Pakistan altogether) meant that Jinnah's first choices for political leadership at the Centre were all gone within six years of the country's birth.

By this time provincial forces were in control, and these were dominated by Punjabi landlords and members of the bureaucracy who were either Punjabis or sympathetic with their interests. These elements sensed no threat to their stations from the other provinces of western Pakistan, but they were deeply troubled by the Bengali constitutional claim that they were entitled to representation commensurate with their numbers. The Punjabis feared a threat to their own pre-eminence and could not conceal their contempt for the Bengalis who they judged to be weak, lazy and undependable.[10] They also held the view that Bengali Hindus continued to dominate East Bengal and any devolution of political responsibility to the eastern wing would provide the Hindus with the leverage to undo Pakistan. Culturally, physically and psychologically, the Punjabis claimed superiority over the Bengalis, and the province's leadership was not inclined to permit democratic processes to stand in the way of their determination to control the country's affairs. The intense debate over constitution-making addresses itself to this dilemma, as do the events described in chapters 3 and 4. The awareness that Bengali concerns were appreciated in other regions of

Pakistan addresses itself to the overall judgment of non-Punjabis that they were also being imposed upon. It did not require much arithmetic to realize that the Punjabis dominated the country's political life, the administrative services, the military establishment, the economy and the general decision-making process. This too was seen as a form of colonialism and it raised provincial passions to even higher levels of intensity.

It must also be stated that the Punjab, more than any other province which joined Pakistan, experienced considerable suffering. The carnage perpetrated in the Punjab by Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus, the slaughter of tens of thousands of innocent noncombatants, would suggest that the Punjab was deeply influenced by the struggle for independance. Undoubtedly it was also the appalling loss of life and property in that part of the Punjab that was linked with Pakistan that led those Punjabis to insist on a significant voice in the state's affairs. If the Punjabis were accused of imposing their customs, dress and dietary habits on the country, if they supported the effort to make Urdu the national language, if they seemed more ready to tolerate sudden changes in government, it may be because they had sacrificed so much to achieve Pakistan, and they were determined to preserve it.

Compared with the other nationalities of Pakistan, the Punjabis are considered more industrious and politically more stable. The fertility of their lands and their abundant yields give the Punjabis an independance and a sense of accomplishment that only a small number enjoy in the other provinces. The Punjabis are also tradition-bound, and their social structure is very much intertwined with their agrarian circumstances. The Punjab, more than other provinces, is heavily influenced by caste, and the division between Rajputs, Jats and Arains carried even greater significance than the distinction between Punjabi and Pathan or Punjabi and Sindhi. Perhaps this statement can be better understood when it is noted that the Punjab is multilingual. Urdu is acceptable and widely used in the urban centres of the Punjab, but in the rural areas the three Punjabi dialects are more likely to be heard. In central Punjab the language in common usage is Punjabi, in the Multan and Bahawalpur areas it is Saraiki, and in the region around Rawalpindi the spoken tongue is Potwari. As one observer has commented: 'Punjabis become Punjabis only when they are outside the province.'[11]

Just as the Muslim League raised the cry 'Islam in Danger' and mobilized a movement for the independence of a Muslim state in the

subcontinent, Sindhis, Baluchis and Pathans believe their way of life and particularly their distinctive cultures are in jeopardy, especially given their experience with the Pakistan Movement and their fear of the more numerous Punjabis. In some ways it is the same fear that Jinnah exploited to get the British to partition India. Only now that fear seeks to dismember what is left of the Pakistan that Jinnah created. It might well be asked whether that fear is real or imaginary. Many Pathans felt the Muslim League fear of a Hindu-dominant India was unjustified. Today, the Pakistani government would argue that Pathan fears are more a manifestation of attitude than factual experience. The point in all this lies not so much in the availability of tangible evidence as it does in the minds of those who feel deprived. In other words, it is academic whether the fear is real or imaginary: what is important is that it is there, and it is a threat to Pakistan's survival as a national entity. It cannot be wished away or forcibly purged. If the fear is to be allayed, authority will have to come to grips with the psychology as well as the practicalities of the federal question and foster a political structure and process that maximizes political expression. Toward this objective, current references to Islam are important, but they are more likely to buy time than offer solutions.

The Sind

Sind has been described as a backward province, dominated by feudal *waderas* (landlords) who kept the peasantry (*haris*) in bondage amidst abominable conditions of servitude. Central administration was of little consequence insofar as the estate-holders controlled the vital aspects of the province's socioeconomic and political life. The peasants were little more than chattel, serving their masters' desires and so intimidated by their private armies of brigands and opportunists that resistance was impossible. Although the British installed a rational government structure to see to the needs of the province, the plight of the Sind peasantry was never given serious consideration. In major part, this was due to the link between Sind and the Bombay presidency. The Europeans pressed their reforms in the metropolitan area of Bombay and its surrounding territories. But the Sind hinterland, to all intents and purpose, was a forgotten and hence neglected

area where the local lords reigned supreme. These potentates paid their respects to the fountainhead of power in the subcontinent but were left to their own devices in ruling their respective estates. Little if any social advances were possible beyond the circle of the feudal *waderas.* Education was beyond the reach of the masses. The popular picture was one of absolute deprivation, total subservience, and almost no exposure to the larger world. On the other hand, the rulers of rural Sind intermingled with the British, adapted their brand of administration, sent their children to English schools, and showed their appreciation for foreign ways and policies.[12]

The administrative separation of Sind from Bombay in 1936 tended to give greater attention to the internal affairs of Sind. *Waderas* moved into the provincial legislature and important steps were taken to provide the new province with stature and purpose. Earlier the British had extended their irrigation system from the Punjab into the Sukkur region of Sind and a major barrage was constructed there. Work was also begun on a second barrage to the south. The development of these water resources fed the parched lands of Sind with life-giving nutrients, and agriculture expanded. *Wadera* indebtedness to the British for providing this precious resource cannot be underestimated, nor can one overlook the increased power of the *waderas* who stood to gain most from these projects. Those whom the British favoured rose in influence, and with the establishment of Sind government, it was this element which sought to govern the affairs of the province. Karachi was developed as Sind's principal port. It was also a vacation spot for the English who sought brief refuge from the teeming overheated cities of India. It was therefore natural for the city to emerge as the province's capital.[13]

Although the *waderas* brought their political rivalries into the provincial legislature and intrigues and corruption continued unabated, the assembly managed to pass some significant legislation. The Sind Agriculturists Relief Act, 1940, The Debt Conciliation Act, 1941, and The Sind Moneylenders Act, 1944, were no small accomplishments in a province gripped by agrarian poverty. Sind's first university was also organized at this time, although, notably, it was meant to serve the affluent classes, not the poor. Indeed, there was no middle class of any consequence in the province in the period leading up to independence.

Sind, however, was one of the subcontinent's politically stable provinces. In spite of numerous ministerial changes, the chief minister's office was unaffected. In fact, in the ten years between the province's separation from Bombay and the creation of Pakistan, only two men served as chief minister, Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah and Khan Bahadur Allahbux. Political intrigue swirled around them, but their dominant personalities lent an aura of stability to the province's affairs. Unlike the Punjab and other Indian provinces, governor's rule was never imposed on Sind prior to the British withdrawal.

The Muslim League also made early inroads into Sind. The League had championed the separation of the province from Bombay, a British act which raised the party's prestige. The Muslim League played an important role in politicizing Sind. Although it was badly beaten in the 1937 elections by the Sind United Party, the Sind Muslim Political Party, the Sind Congress and the Sind Hindu Sabha, the Muslim League continued to establish branches throughout the region. By 1942 it had become an important organization, and given League success in by-elections, it gained a place in the provincial cabinet as well as in the assembly. By 1946, the year of the next provincial elections, the Muslim League was the most vital Muslim political organization in Sind, having absorbed into its fold the other provincial Muslim parties.[14] The union of Sind Muslims under the banner of the League gave Sind a prominent place in the Pakistan Movement. The Sind Congress and the Sind Hindu Sabha faded in the face of Muslim League success. But for all this achievement, Sind remained a land divided between the very affluent and the very miserable. The Muslim League could not change the relationship between *wadera* and *hari,* nor did it make strenuous efforts to do so.

Jinnah selected Karachi to be the nation's capital despite local resistance. Although this was first suggested as a temporary measure, the influx of refugees, most of whom moved into Karachi and its immediate environs, and the absence of suitable facilities elsewhere, prevented any quick change. In the meantime, Sind was called upon to make sacrifices. Its richest city, the province's capital, the only seaport on the western side of the country, was transformed into a federal area. The problems of the nation became the problems of Karachi and this meant Sind would have difficulty in projecting its peculiar needs. Moreover, the Karachi government was made up of essentially non-Sindhis, while muhajirs with commercial

backgrounds had moved into key positions in the private sector.[15] The latter element represented the wealthy, educated classes of central and western India and their talents and experience could not be matched by the Sindhis who were largely ignored. Within a year of independence, Karachi was a boom town, throbbing with excitement, attracting Muslim entrepreneurial skills and resources, and expanding to meet the economic needs of the young nation. But again, very few Sindhis profited from the experience.

The Sind capital was temporarily shifted to Hyderabad, a tired way station, approximately sixty miles to the north of Karachi. The province's business, however, was still conducted in the *wadera* estates and the conditions of the peasants showed no improvement. By 1955 Sind was amalgamated with the other western provinces into the single administrative region known as the One Unit. The capital for the province of West Pakistan was fixed at Lahore in the Punjab, and still the Sindhis were without an adequate voice to represent their aspirations and concerns. Lands which were reclaimed through additional barrage construction in these years were seldom reserved for the Sindhi population. Parcels were awarded to high placed civil servants and military officers. Their retirement was also made more advantageous through provisions which made barrage lands available to them.[16] Cut out of the commercial market by the muhajirs who dominated the private sector in Karachi, denied tillable land (despite land reforms and the repeated promises of several administrations) the Sindhi masses were left to the mercy of the *waderas*. But among the younger generation of Sindhis who grew up in Karachi, and to a lesser extent in Hyderabad, this situation proved intolerable. The move of the capital to Islamabad by Ayub Khan in the early 1960s did not alter the growing hostility of Sindhi youth toward those in authority as well as to those in key economic positions. Karachi University was developed shortly after independence and Hyderabad University was likewise expanded. Sensitive Sindhis attended classes in each of these institutions and their consciousness was directed toward the tragic circumstances of the peasantry as well as the overall neglect of the Sindhi urban population. Seeking scapegoats, the Sindhi complaint was directed at the Punjabis who dominated the government, the administration and the armed forces. They condemned the allocation of Sindhi lands to absentee, non-Sindhi landlords, and more immediately they expressed dissatisfaction with the muhajir community that had exploited the province's commercial wealth to satisfy

their personal desires. Muhajir prosperity and ostentatious living were abrasive issues and emotions ran high on the need to restrict wealth and raise the living standards of the province's impoverished masses. Through the first parliamentary period, the Ayub years, and the Yahya interregnum, Sind's politicians did little for the local inhabitants and the province's leadership devolved upon its young intellectuals, professional class and union organizers. Their sympathies appeared to be in the direction of socialist reform, and Karachi University became fertile ground for the development of a Pakistani form of Marxism.

The rise of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi *wadera,* to the highest political post in Pakistan appeared to herald a new day in the life of the Sindhi people. Bhutto was an able politician and a gifted orator. He was also a powerful individual and the Sindhis were prepared to follow his lead. Bhutto quickly grasped the problems troubling Sindhi youth and he signalled his support for their aspirations. When the Sindu Desh Movement (Sind for the Sindhis) was orchestrated, Bhutto did almost nothing to restrict it. Instead, he spoke to eager crowds of Sindhi well-wishers, acknowledging their grievances and promising to redress past inequities. He pledged to provide Sind with more resources and to assist in the uplift of the poor peasant. Lands were to be seized from non-Sindhis and redistributed, and new lands were to be made available to the province's inhabitants. Impediments were also placed in the way of the muhajirs who were now made to feel like aliens. Their commercial activities were restricted and in many instances expropriated. Bhutto's socialist programme seemed to dove-tail with the ideas of the radicals, and for the first time since partition the more sophisticated Sindhis sensed they had a spokesman who could meet their demands.[17]

Bhutto appointed a number of Sindhis to high positions in the cabinet and arranged for others to fill important posts in government, the public corporations and police forces. Development funds were earmarked for the Sind hinterland and especially for his native district of Larkana where many public projects were initiated. But his need to placate the Punjabis, to sustain their support, and his ultimate dependence on the armed forces, prevented any radical departure from previous policy. When he began to dilute his socialist programme, to include the traditional, landed elite in his select circle, he exposed himself to criticism concerning his *wadera* background. Bhutto was the scion of one of Sind's oldest landed families

with linkages in Baluchistan, the Punjab and Rajputana in India. Nor could he live down the Sindhi landlord's notorious reputation. A *hari* leader has described the landlord as one who must spread awe all around himself.

> One way of doing this is to have in his command a gang of thieves and robbers, who would strike fear into the hearts of his rivals, the larger the number of thieves and dacoits at his command, the greater his awe and fear would be.[18]

Bhutto's critics argued that he was a typical Sindhi zaminder or landlord, and that he governed Pakistan with essentially the same perceptions and techniques developed on his estate at Larkana. Bhutto also harboured the familiar suspicions of a Sindhi zamindar who was always in competition with his fellows. Each household is an island unto itself and only the more clever and ruthless landlords are capable of sustaining their pre-eminence. Thus the Sindhi landlord is conditioned to mistrust his own kind, and particularly those in close proximity. Fear of one's neighbour unleashes a contest for power that sustains its own momentum. By the same token there is little to fear from the peasants who are confined to servile status, and made utterly dependent on the minimum gratuities dispensed by the ruling lord. It is evident from Bhutto's performance in office that his troubles began when he sensed he could no longer trust his closest advisors and colleagues, or when he felt they no longer served his purpose.[19] The heavy-handed tactics employed to remove his associates from their important positions was the beginning of the undoing of Bhutto's reign. With his compatriots out of the picture, Bhutto's Sindhi landlord characteristics became more apparent. Instead of people seeing in him the agent for change in Pakistan's modern transformation, he took on the appearance of a traditional feudal *wadera* and hence exposed himself to attacks from his bitter critics and adversaries, among whom were numerous disillusioned Sindhis.

> Bhutto also built an enormous account of personal hate…. Virtually every important political opponent has a story of being beaten or tortured or sexually abused, his home or business burned or ransacked, or his wife or daughter raped during periods of arrest and interrogation… Bhutto, despite the veneer of a British and American education, had deep roots in his base as a powerful landlord and feudal baron.[20]

The man who would remake Pakistan could not remake himself. A victim of his own environment and personality, Bhutto managed to pull the nation

together after the Bangladesh secession. He promised Pakistan's neglected poor a better life, he promoted socio-economic reform, and he seemed determined to root out administrative corruption. But when he was overthrown in July 1977, Bhutto had little except rhetoric and societal chaos to show for his more than five years in power. The Sindhis were particularly distressed. Their cry for equal treatment was lost in the desert winds and the new military government of Zia-ul-Haq was more inclined to address problems in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province. Moreover, it was in Sind where the chief opposition developed to Zia's vision of an Islamic State. Sind contains the largest concentration of Shia Muslims and Zia's Sunni orthodoxy distressed this group. Riots resulting in the loss of life and property were allegedly provoked by Shia resistance to rules and directives that were anathema to their own Islamic teachings.

The Zia government must be aware that during World War II, the tranquility of Sind was dramatically disrupted by the Hur uprising. The Hurs were dedicated to their hereditary saint, the Pir Pagaro, who had been imprisoned by the British as an enemy agent. The Hurs venerated their religious guide, sought his blessing and counsel, and were duty-bound to obey his every command, but above all, to protect his person. Like the majority of Sindhis, the Hurs were cultivators and herdsmen, but uncharacteristically they considered the Pir to be 'God on earth' and they would gladly 'lay down their lives to render him service.' The ties that bound the Hurs to the Pir Pagaro conjured up historic recollections of the relationship between the twelfth-century Iranian folk leader Hasan Sabbah and his coterie of self-sacrificers, the Hashishis (Assassins).[21] Moreover, the Hurs were the first Sindhis to rebel against British rule in the nineteenth century. That Pir was later influenced to assist the Crown and the fighting eventually petered out. All remained quiet until the exigencies of World War II required the imposition of tighter controls in the Sind region and the hereditary Pir chose to resist British encroachment on his domains. The resultant uprising proved to be a major threat to British security in the subcontinent. More important, it instilled in the Hurs and their Sindhi brethren visions of complete independence. Prior to partition the Hurs sensed that the future leaders of Sind (they had no real understanding of Pakistan) would not be men identified with their patron saints. Pledging undying loyalty to their Pir, who they claimed would one day be the true

ruler of the country, they showed no reluctance in challenging indigenous authority after the British departed India.

It is noteworthy that the Pagaro Muslim League was one of the small parties that banded together under the aegis of the Pakistan National Alliance, and assisted in the destruction of the Bhutto regime. There was also little doubt that Sindhi problems remain unresolved and that all 'distant' governments are judged illegitimate, let alone unsympathetic to Sindhi aspirations. In the case of the Sindhi Shias, orthodox references to Islam cannot bridge the gap that lay between the principals.

The North West Frontier Province

The North West Frontier Province represents the most troublesome sub-national problem for the Pakistan government. It also holds the key to the survival of the Pakistan nation. Coveted by Afghanistan even before Pakistan's birth, this Muslim neighbour never expressed real friendship for its partner on the subcontinent. Afghanistan did not accept the British-drawn Durand Line (1893) that separated India from the mountain state.[22] The Durand Line met some of the defensive needs of the British Indian Empire, but the Afghans were quick to point out that it divided people with common traditions and history, and deprived Afghanistan from acquiring a much desired outlet to the open sea. The creation of the Pakistan state was opposed by the Afghans who consorted with the Indian National Congress before partition, and who were led to believe they would gain the port of Karachi if the Pakistan Movement failed. Frustrated in this endeavour, the Afghans focused their attention on the North West Frontier Province with its overwhelming Pathan population, and appealed to these people to join with them in a common effort to free the region from colonial control. Anti-Pakistan groups like Abdul Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmatgar received sustenance and were provided with sanctuary by the Kabul government. The demand that the region be given separate statehood and renamed Pakhtunistan was voiced by the Khudai Khidmatgar and echoed by the Afghans. The call has never been muted.[23] The Afghan President, Mohammad Daud, was a staunch supporter of the Pakhtunistan Movement,

but his overthrow and death in 1978 did not calm Pakistani fears about Afghan intentions. On the contrary, the new Marxist regime in Kabul receives major assistance from the Soviet Union and the Pakistan government perceives an even larger threat to its security given Soviet machinations in the area. A more indepth analysis of this latter subject is explored in chapter 9.

The North West Frontier Province is demographically divided between sedentary and tribal peoples. Although the Pathans are numerically superior, the region is also the home for the Awans, Gujars, Jats, Punjabis and Baluch. The Pathans divide into numerous distinctive tribal units: the major ones in the mountain ranges are the Yusufzais of the Malakand Agency; the Mohmands and Afridis of the Khyber Agency and Kohat Pass; the Orakzais of Tirah; the Turis of Khurram; the Waziris of North and South Waziristan; the Masuds, the Bhittanis and Shiranis of the Dera Ismail Khan frontier. In the settled areas of the province are the Yusufzais of Mardan; the Khalils, Mohmands, Muhammadzias, Daudzais, Gigianis and Khattaks of Peshawar District; the Khattaks and Bangash of Kohat; the Marwats, Bannuchis and Wazaris of Bannu; and the Gandapurs, Kundies and Miankhels of Dera Ismail Khan. Some of the important minor tribes are the Jaduns of Hazara and Swabi, the Shinwaris and Mullagories of the Khyber and Babars, Turis and Dawars. The largest tribe is the Yusufzai which is also found in Swat and Dir. The Khattaks are next in number and both are known for their tall, lean physique and martial character. While all the Pathans have a reputation as warriors, the Afridis, Masuds and Waziris are reputed to be among the best guerrilla fighters.[24]

Of the non-Pathan elements, the Awans are supposedly the most important. They are known for their agriculture, are scattered throughout the province and are oftentimes difficult to distinguish from the Pathans. The Jats, Punjabis, Gujars and Baluch do not play important demographic roles, but their commercial and governmental activity cannot be overlooked.

The English were fascinated by the Pathans.[25] Although they never seriously entertained taming these free-wheeling mountain people, the security of their Indian colony demanded a defense perimeter which provoked a multitude of military campaigns and the forceful occupation of strategic stations in and near the Afghan border. The Pathans ferociously resisted all attempts at penetrating their isolated settlements and both sides

paid a heavy price in defending their interests. Although the British secured India from foreign attack, when they withdrew from the subcontinent in 1947, the Pathan population was basically unchanged. They clung to their rugged, barren terrain, sustained their traditions of hospitality, bravery, and frugality, and above all, insisted upon their liberty, independence, and essentially private life-style. Few Pathans took part in the Pakistan Movement, while some, as with the followers of Ghaffar Khan, sought to come to terms with Gandhi and the Congress Party. The vast majority, however, were largely unaware of the transformation caused by the British withdrawal and the partition of the subcontinent. Given their many tribal divisions, the remoteness of their settlements, their simple existence, the limited exposure to education, the Pathan population did not identify with a single leader. Their local headmen were all the governors they needed. The strange and alien government in Peshawar, the political officers in fortified stations, were more or less tolerated, so long as they did not upset a delicate equilibrium. But the Pathans recognized no superior authority.[26]

If there existed a common denominator it was their own common language, Pushtu, and their devotion to Islam. The latter is what the Muslim League sought to exploit and the success of its mission on the frontier can be read in the plebiscite which the League won in July 1947. At the time Dr Khan Sahib, the brother of Ghaffar Khan, headed a Congress ministry, and although his Muslim Nationalist party was far larger than the Muslim League in the region, sufficient numbers of independent tribals were influenced to support the League's call of 'Islam in Danger.'

Kashmir was of considerable importance to the Pathan population. The cause of the Muslim Kashmiris was propagandized by several people, but none more effectively than Abdul Qayyum Khan.[27] Qayyum had been an old Congressite and vehemently opposed Jinnah and the League. But observing Jinnah's successful campaign, he switched sides and in a brief period had established himself as an important Muslim League leader in the NWFP. Qayyum did not have to trick the Pathans into waging war in Kashmir, which is a natural extension of the Frontier Province since the Pathans were long interested in the plight of their co-religionists who had been compelled to live under Hindu rule. Although Jinnah was determined to integrate Kashmir with Pakistan, he was not prepared to take it by force. Pakistan, in his estimation, was in no position to engage India in war. But Jinnah's hand was forced by the Pathans who even before Pakistan's official

beginning were filtering across the border and attacking the Maharajah's forces. Qayyum announced his support for the thrust and, because he was a prominent Muslim Leaguer, it was generally assumed that the campaign was sanctioned by Jinnah himself. Be that as it may, Qayyum manoeuvred himself into a controlling position, and when Abdur Rab Nishtar reported to Jinnah that Qayyum would make a fine Chief Minister of the NWFP, the Muslim League called upon him to form the new government soon after Pakistan was declared independent. Not only did Qayyum succeed in gaining power in the province, but the test of arms in Kashmir had socialized the Pathans into the Pakistan design. While the tribal people had not put aside their parochial perspectives, Pakistan was now something to conjure with. Moreover, Jinnah ordered the Pakistan Army to withdraw from the tribal area and to leave the region's defense to the Frontier Scouts and locally recruited militia.[28] This tactic was most successful for when Jinnah visited Peshawar in April 1948, the headmen of the several tribes pledged their support to him and the new country.

The era of good feeling did not last long, however. Jinnah's death, Pakistan's failure to win Kashmir, and Qayyum's ruthless treatment of dissident tribals, turned the clock back to an earlier period when the Pathans had to struggle to preserve their independent way of life. Promised development programmes failed to materialize as major attention was given to costly ventures which did more for the established élite than the deprived masses. Qayyum's aggressiveness, which was at the source of much of the disaffection in the region, was not so much prompted by lust as it was by his concern for the province's economic growth. Qayyum could not see the tribal people playing a significant role in the early development of the region. They were unaccustomed to mobilized endeavour and unfamiliar with sophisticated methods of construction. These tasks had to be learned and that would take time. Meanwhile, Qayyum attempted to utilize the talents available in the province and that which could be brought in from other parts of the country. The Pathans would observe the work of others and after developing the experience, could assume larger responsibilities. Developmental projects arouse passions, however, especially when they require the acquistion of territory and resources which the Pathans were reluctant to part with. Moreover, the conflicts which such activities provoked were exploited by politically unreconciled elements and it was these groups that Qayyum rigorously opposed.

Development in the NWFP was slow and painstaking. Qayyum was eventually replaced but even though more congenial personalities were put at the helm of affairs, they were no more successful in drawing the Pathans into a national political scheme. The only exceptions were the Pathans who learned heavy construction skills or who were drawn into the Pakistan Army in large numbers.[29] These units were posted in different parts of the country thus heightening their political consciousness. After the completion of the Warsak Dam near Peshawar, a large group of Pathans, experienced in engineering skills, were despatched to different sectors of the country where they were quickly employed. Such a contingent was sent all the way to the Chittagong Hill Tracts in East Pakistan where they erected the steel and concrete forms for the Karnafuli Hydroelectric Project. And as has been noted, almost a million Pathans were settled in Karachi where they assumed the role of the dominant labour force. Despite these planned efforts at integration, however, the Pathans of the NWFP did not change significantly and given growing dissatisfaction with the Pakistan government, they continued to agitate for political change.

The Pathans have had even less exposure to formal political organizations than their confreres in the Punjab and Sind. The Khudai Khidmatgars, organized in 1929, was reputedly the first organization of a political type in the NWFP. Although it claimed several thousand adherents it was less a political party, and more an organization of local political protest. The NWFP was officially established by the British in 1901 and placed under the rule of a Chief Commissioner, a key colonial administrative officer. It was only in 1931, after the Khudai Khidmatgar spread political consciousness among the inhabitants of the province, that the British recognized the need to elevate it to a Governor's province and place it on a par with the other parts of India.[30] Abdul Ghaffar Khan identified the British as the Pathans' chief adversary and agreed to join the Congress and assist Gandhi in the struggle to force the Europeans from the subcontinent. The Muslim League, he argued, was an instrument of the British and Jinnah a conspirator who favoured and abetted their divide and rule policy. The Khudai Khidmatgar struggle with the British was stained in bloody encounter and Ghaffar Khan, his brother Dr Khan Sahib, and their supporters spent long periods behind prison bars as the British attempted to reduce the hostility to their rule. The British were hardpressed to release the

Pathan leaders, however, and at the time of partition Dr Khan Sahib was the choice of the Congress organization to lead the NWFP legislature.

The Muslim League replaced the Dr Khan Sahib regime after Pakistan achieved its freedom but it had shallow roots in the province and soon withered. Political organization of the sophisticated type did not suit the Pathan temperament. Pathan politics have been and continue to be a reflection of the personal rivalries carried forward by the landed patriarchs. These rivalries (*parajamba*) have institutional characteristics. In some regions these traditional groupings are purely local. Elsewhere, village factions combine into political blocs that spread over regions inhabited by a clan or a tribe.[31] Rivalries are perpetuated for generations, and leadership remains in the family and passes from father to son. Because of this, political alignments are generally predictable. This explanation also provides some insight into pre-independence political patterns which carry down to the present era.

Some frontier people were pleased when Dr Khan Sahib became the first chief minister of the One Unit of West Pakistan in 1956, but they soon realized that Iskander Mirza, not one of their own, was really in charge. Moreover, Khan Sahib's collaboration in assembling the Republican Party did not sit well with those who saw the new organization catering to the dominant Punjabi landlords. In some respects Dr Khan Sahib was judged to have violated the principles of *Pakhto,* the code that guides Pathan behaviour, by abandoning his original association. His assassination in May 1958 came less than a year after his forced removal from office, but it was never determined if it was caused by a Pathan blood feud, violations of the Pathan code, or political intrigues.

In this same period Abdul Ghaffar Khan joined with Maulana Bhashani in East Bengal, G. M. Syed in Sind, Mian Iftikharuddin in the Punjab and A. S. Achakzai in Baluchistan to form the National Awami Party (NAP). Organized in July 1957, the NAP registered its largest impact in the eastern wing of the country prior to the declaration of martial law in 1958, The NAP never amounted to very much in the Punjab and Sind but Ghaffar Khan and Achakzai continued to nurture it through the Ayub decade. Both personalities were well established political leaders and the change in nomenclature of their respective organizations in no way violated their trust or necessitated a change in course. The NAP's primary objective was regional or provincial automony, a cause that both men had dedicated their

lives to.[32] Ghaffar Khan's irresolute position distressed Ayub and again caused his arrest, and eventually his flight to Kabul and Delhi where he sought asylum and continued to plan his strategy. Generally speaking, however, there was little organized political activity on the North West Frontier during the Ayub years.

It was only when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto headed a new civilian government that the province was enlivened once again with political activity. As might be expected, the previously dormant NAP took the lead in the province's political life. As a matter of fact the party had already achieved something of a minor success when Yahya Khan permitted the holding of general elections in December 1970 and the NAP emerged as the most significant party in the NWFP. By this time the mantle of leadership had passed from father to son and Abdul Wali Khan sought to give the organization national stature.

The secession of Bangladesh and Bhutto's assumption of governmental responsibility forced Wali Khan into a broader leadership role than he first contemplated. The strength of his NAP in the Frontier province also gave him the opportunity to form and lead the provincial government, albeit with the assistance of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (*Hazarvi*) which had also won a number of seats in the 1970 election. Bhutto had first indicated his desire to work cooperatively with the NAP-JUI provincial government but once he had consolidated his hold on the country, his attitude and policies changed. Bhutto had invited Wali Khan to join his central cabinet but the Pathan leader declined the offer, sensing he would be forced to compromise his position much as had his uncle, Dr Khan Sahib, before him. Wali Khan was more interested in spreading his influence into Baluchistan where Achakzai had abandoned the NAP for another organization which he believed better represented the interests of the Baluchis. (Achakzai was assassinated in 1973.) Bhutto feared Wali Khan's growing popularity. He also found Wali Khan's opposition to government gubernatorial appointments troublesome. But most of all, Wali Khan had made some impassioned speeches suggesting that Bhutto was determined to build his Pakistan People's Party into a one-party state, and the continuance of martial law provided him with adequate cover for such a transformation. Bhutto did not enjoy being placed on the defensive, and in March 1972, Bhutto is quoted as replying: 'If I wanted a one-party rule would I have lifted the ban on the National Awami Party?' He added that under no circumstances would any injustice be done

to either the NWFP or Baluchistan where his PPP was in a minority.[33] Bhutto also entered into a Tripartite Accord with Wali Khan and the leaders of the JUI, but when the NAP leader indicated the PPP appointed governors would have no control over the provincial legislatures in the NWFP and Baluchistan, Bhutto decided he needed to protect his interests. In a new accord, drafted a month later, the NAP-JUI governments were given the opportunity to propose names for appointment as governors of the provinces, but even this arrangement did not satisfy Wali Khan.[34] The NAP, he declared, was in control of half of Pakistan and should be given equal representation in the central cabinet with the PPP.

> The fact that the half of Pakistan [the] NAP claimed to control and sought to rule was identical with the territory that Afghanistan called 'Pakhtoonistan' could not go unnoticed, and Mr. Abdul Wali Khan's frequent visits to Kabul and Jalabad - where his father, Mr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, lived in self-imposed exile from Pakistan - acquired a significance greater than the meetings of a dutiful son with his father.[35]

The confrontation between these two personalities, Bhutto on the one side and Wali Khan on the other, revived all the old fears about Afghan and Indian machinations against Pakistan. The country was still reeling from the loss of East Pakistan, and now there were new fears that Wali Khan was another Mujib, who with foreign assistance, was plotting the further dismemberment of the country.

> It is necessary here to refer to the ramifications of the conspiracy of which the NAP leadership had become a willing agent. Without such reference a deeper understanding of their motivation may be difficult. The elements in Baluchistan and NWFP that are at odds with the Government clearly draw their support from outside forces which seek to make their provinces secede from Pakistan.[36]

Bhutto ordered both NAP governments to be dissolved, and in the case of Baluchistan where an armed uprising had occured, its leaders were all arrested and imprisoned pending trial. The NWFP was relatively quiet, however, and Wali Khan continued to perform his role as leader of the opposition in the National Assembly although his speeches were by now even more hostile to the PPP government.

Wali Khan brushed aside the allegation that the NAP was intent on promoting secessionist movements. He declared it was 'a bogey raised by the centre to tarnish their image and deprive them of their right as the

chosen representatives of the people.'[37] Wali Khan visited the Loralai district of Baluchistan in the summer of 1974 and publicly charged the government with using indiscriminate violence, particularly airstrikes, against an innocent population. Although the Bhutto administration denied these accusations, Wali Khan's interests in Baluchistan convinced the authorities that he had joined forces with the Popular Front of Armed Resistance Against National Oppression and Exploitation in Baluchistan (PFAR). It was already known that PFAR was inducing young Pathans from the Pakhtoon Student Federation (PSF) to join the Baluchi 'independence movement,' and the government had concluded that the NAP was the force behind the operation which sought to fuse the Pakhtunistan Movement with the Free Baluchistan Movement. On 6 July 1974 *Outlook* interviewed Wali Khan (the goverment banned the publication soon after). The NAP leader condemned Bhutto's domestic and foreign policies, and refuted all charges that he and the NAP were collaborating with foreign powers to destroy Pakistan. He insisted that his objective was a democratic Pakistan, but that Bhutto only wanted personal power. He accused Bhutto of creating a situation which first demoralized and weakened the armed forces, thus bringing it under his influence. He noted that Bhutto had decimated the civil bureaucracy by dismissing approximately 1400 officials. His administrative reforms, he intimated, had not only politicized the bureaucracy but also required it to follow the interests of the PPP. The political parties had also been effectively side-tracked. Abdul Qayyum Khan's Muslim League was absorbed in the PPP when Qayyum was made a minister in the central government. Mian Mumtaz Daultana's party in the Punjab ceased to have any purpose when its leader accepted an ambassadorial position at the Court of St James. Having isolated these potential contenders, Bhutto, according to Wali Khan, turned his attention to the parties in the National Assembly.

When the National Assembly was convened in 1973, there were four minority parties in the House: the NAP, the Jamiat-i-Ulemai-Pakistan, the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam and the Qayyum Muslim League. The Muslim League was eliminated by Qayyum's defection, and the JUI and JUP were split and undermined by parliamentary members shifting to the PPP. This left only the NAP in the assembly and the Jamaat-i-Islami and Tehrik-i-Istiqlal outside it to contest the power and policies of Bhutto and the PPP. Moreover, the destruction of the opposition governments in the NWFP and Baluchistan and the arrest of Baluchi leaders, had weakened the NAP

appreciably. Bhutto, and not the NAP, he added, was fomenting division in the country.

> Starting off with Sind, we had the Urdu-Sindhi trouble, when one Pakistani cut the throat of another Pakistani. He tried the same trick in Baluchistan. He attempted to pitch Paktoon against the Baluch in the province. He tried to pitch the Punjabis against the Paktoons, having this drama played on 23rd March 1973 in Liaquat Bagh, Rawalpindi, where some people were killed and scores injured. Now all this was engineered so that the Punjabis fought the Paktoons… What he [Bhutto] wants to do is to rule everywhere…. I just refuse to accept that any government worth its name would create conditions where the honour of the people, life, property will be at stake.[38]

It was obvious from the Wali Khan interview and his subsequent speeches in the Punjab in December 1974 that there was no possibility of reconciling his views with those of Bhutto. With street demonstrations on the increase in and around Peshawar, with periodic bombings in the frontier province and the capital in Islamabad as well as other Pakistani cities, the government concluded that the political opposition, and particularly the NAP, were at the bottom of the disorder. In December 1974 and January 1975 a continuous stream of articles flowed from the government-controlled press citing the subversive nature of the opposition, how Wali Khan was advocating violence, and how the NAP was determined to undo Pakistan. Almost simultaneous with these revelations came the news that the National Assembly had passed the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Bill 'to curb the menance of urban guerrillas'.[39] Then while Bhutto was on a state visit to the United States, a bomb went off in a classroom at Peshawar University and NWFP Senior Minister Hyat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, the PPP leader in the province who had been officiating at a student function, was killed. Bhutto was informed of Sherpao's death in New York City, cut his tour and flew directly to Islamabad.

Abdul Wali Khan and his NAP lieutenants throughout the country were arrested by the police hours later, and on 10 February 1975 the government announced the banning of the National Awami Party, seized all its property and funds and ordered the security forces to crush all 'subversive activity.' On the same day, Bhutto called an emergency session of the National Assembly and in an emotional speech declared that the country was passing through 'another serious test.' He solemnly noted that Pakistan was facing the 'politics of violence' and he was duty-bound to liquidate all anti-national elements and forces. Bhutto concluded with the statement that

Pakistan must be saved from the 'scourge of secession.'[40] On the same day the National Assembly passed two amendment bills withdrawing the immunity from arrest and detention that members of the National and provincial assemblies had previously enjoyed. The National Assembly also amended the Political Parties Act empowering the government to declare a political party guilty of being organized for, or operating against, the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. The Law Minister explained that the amendment bills were necessary in order to counter anti-national elements. Whether or not this was the intended purpose, it was obvious by March 1975 that the NAP had been stifled and the remaining political opposition scattered in disarray. The problems on the North West Frontier and Baluchistan, however, would not dissipate. Wali Khan's words publicized in the 1974 interview echoed throughout the region:

> 'If you want to settle it bullet by bullet, you will find people who will meet your bullet with their bullet. You can't stop it. If you have legitimate means of political agitation here, people will go to legitimate means. But if you stop all conventional and traditional methods of constitutional and legal agitation, people will pick up unconstitutional, illegal methods for futhering their political cause. It is so very simple.'[41]

Wali Khan was accused of ordering the death of Mohammad Sherpao and was brought to trial after an extended period of incarceration. In his defense Wali Khan insisted that Bhutto had planned Sherpao's death in order to justify the destruction of the NAP. It was pointed out that the security police who are authorized to be at the minister's side in such public affairs absented themselves from the dais. Moreover, the device which took Sherpao's life was judged to be far too sophisticated for the simple Pathans. In previous bombings on the Frontier none showed the instrumentation or the precision that this one displayed. Indeed, many devices were so clumsily made that they often went off before they could be placed, killing or maiming the would-be terrorists. The case was still being tried when Bhutto was overthrown in July 1977. Whatever issues it raised were left unanswered when the new martial law regime ordered the proceedings closed and Wali Khan unconditionally released. Like the Bengali, Mujibur Rahman, who had been freed from a court proceeding some years before, Wali Khan returned to the North West Frontier and was greeted excitedly by his compatriots.

Bhutto's subsequent arrest by the military authorities, his own trial, conviction and execution, was not mourned on the Frontier. The NAP was not re-established but surfaced this time in the form of the National Democratic Party. The government of General Zia-ul-Haq pledged non-interference in NWFP affairs in return for Pathan loyalty and Wali Khan agreed to accept the offer so long as it was deemed genuine. It was also at this time that political conditions deteriorated in Afghanistan, caused by the Marxist takeover of the Kabul government, and thousands of Afghan refugees sought refuge across the Pakistan frontier. The Kabul government accused Pakistan of arming and training as well as providing sanctuary for religiously inspired Afghan insurgents and tensions on the frontier were never more severe. In these circumstances, the intentions of Wali Khan and his political movement, which had by now passed through numerous transitions, were destined to become more clear.

Baluchistan

Of Pakistan's four major divisions, Baluchistan is the largest, the most desolate, least populated and most backward. At the time of partition it was not a fully established adminstrative unit. During the British period the 'province' was a vast buffer area tthat separated the North West Frontier Province and Afghanistan from the more active princely states in the southern portion of the region. In 1947 there were actually three different Baluchistans: the buffer zone governed by the British; another sector including border territories obtained after the original settlement, also under British colonial administration; and the Baluchistan states governed by their local rulers (Sardars), the most powerful being the Khan of Kalat. The tribal states formed the Baluchistan States Union and were self-governing when Pakistan was created. The British recognized their independence and endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Sardars by minimizing involvement in their domestic affairs. It was anticipated that the Pakistan government would continue that policy, but the region was considered too vital to be left in such a primitive form. Moreover, the North West Frontier Province with its adjoining tribal belt presented the Karachi government

with enormous problems of assimilation and it was not thought wise to leave the Baluchis to their own designs.

The original Baluchistan states were Kalat, Makran, Las Bla and Kharan. In January 1955, the rulers of these states entered into an agreement with the Governor-General of Pakistan, creating the Baluchistan States Union. By the same instrument the rulers also agreed to cede their territories to Pakistan so that they could be merged into the One Unit of West Pakistan. In the 'Merger Agreement' the Khan of Kalat, the supreme ruler in the region and the spokesman for the other tribal leaders, agreed to give up

> all his rights, authority and powers as President of the Council of Rulers of the Union, together with all his territories including the territories known as the leased areas, and… shall vest in the Governor of the Dominion [Pakistan]… all powers, authority and jurisdiction for the governance of said Union and territories in such manner and through such agency as it may think fit.[42]

In return for his cession of sovereignty, the Sardars were to be provided privy purses covering all their expenses, family needs, personal staff, bodyguard, tours, hospitality, maintenance of their residences, marriages and all family ceremonies. The Sardars did not enter this pact willingly. The Pakistan government threatened to use force to achieve their ends and the rulers were ill-prepared to ignore the offer. The Khan of Kalat, having the most to lose, delayed accepting the arrangement, but when the other Sardars yielded, he also was forced to capitulate. The last British advisor to the Khan of Kalat, D. Y. Fell, at the time his Foreign Minister, noted that the Pakistan government was abandoning a 'sound conservative attitude based upon years of successful British political experience for an aimless and rather childish excursion into power politics.'[43] In a letter to an American scholar of the area Fell wrote: 'They [the Baluchis] can be treated either by repression, as in Ireland, or by conciliation, as in Scotland. It [the Baluchi problem] cannot be solved in the context of the present world order of national, economic units at loggerheads with each other.'[44] What Fell was suggesting was that the Baluchis would have been more valuable to Pakistan in their semi-autonomous state than by their forceful inclusion in a centralized administrative state.

The Sardars did not cease wielding power following the 1955 pact. Nor did the central government necessarily weaken their hold over their dependent subjects. Nevertheless through its intervention the Pakistan government raised expectations in the region which they were neither able,

nor intended, to satisfy. It was, as Fell said, a foolish manoeuvre, done more to prove who was the more powerful than to benefit the larger population. Militarily, it was seen as important to the country's security. Economically, Baluchistan had resources which the government wished to tap. Natural gas deposits, for example, were found in the Sui area and have been used to fuel the needs of people in the Punjab and Sind. The Baluchistan coast also provided Pakistan with new port possibilities and the harbour of Gwader was developed in the 1960s. The benefits to the Baluchis from these projects, however, was negligable, and as their consciousness expanded, they began to sense the nature of the exploitation they were forced to suffer. In the 1960s they also came under the influence of radicals who were keen to apply Marxist-Leninist theory to the region.[45] The leftists pointed to the perpetuation of the Sardari system which appeared to sanction the central government's policies. Despite their remoteness, therefore, the Baluchis were suddenly exposed to a rather sophisticated campaign of socialist indoctrination.

The population of Baluchistan is less than fifty per cent Baluchi. In the northern area of the province Pathans predominate. In the Sibi and Las Bela districts Sindhi or Saraiki languages are common. In Quetta-Pishin and Loralai the languages most in use are Punjabi and Pushtu. The vast Kalat district is Brahui speaking. The dominant Baluchi-speaking tribes are to be found in the border area with Iran. These are the districts of Kharan, Makran and Chaghai. Interestingly, more Baluchi live in Karachi and western Sind than in their native province. The ethnic mixture in Pakistani Baluchistan seems to belie a concerted drive for Baluchi independence, and this makes the linkage with the Iranian Baluchi more significant. This also helps to explain why many Pathans have urged the integration of Baluchistan with their call for Pakhtunistan. Clearly, Pathans and Baluchis claim some of the same territory, and this makes them suspicious of one another and often brings them into conflict. The transcending of these narrower nationalisms, however, has been attempted more by local people than by the Pakistan government which has, over the years, gained some advantages from these tribal rivalries. But these accomplishments have been costly.

In 1958, at a time of considerable political instability, Iskander Mirza was looking for justification to declare martial law in the country. His autocratic nature finally got the better of him, and it was his clear intention to govern

the country by decree. In his background was graduation from the British military academy at Sandhurst, a role as political officer on the North West Frontier, a successful tenure as the country's first Defence Secretary, an honorary major-general in the Pakistan Army, a stint as the absolute ruler (Governor) of East Pakistan, a powerful Minister of the Interior in the Central Government, and the hand-picked successor of Ghulam Mohammad to be Pakistan's next Governor-General. In 1956 he became Pakistan's first President. Mirza had considered a form of 'guided democracy' for some time. Viewing the fragility of the political process, the fundamental ineptness of the country's politicians, and the political backwardness of his countrymen, he decided to take direct action. Only strong decisive leadership could save the nation, he concluded, and he moved to impress the Army commanders with the need to declare martial law.[46] Apparently General Ayub Khan had come to a similar conclusion independent of Mirza's thinking, or perhaps he knew Mirza's mind and intended to prevent him from achieving his personal goal. But whatever the explanantion, Ayub agreed to go along with the scheme that called for the abrogation of the constitution, the banning of political activity and the closing down of all representative assemblies. An incident in the East Pakistan legislature which resulted in the death of the Bengali Deputy Speaker of the House is reputed to be the major reason for the declaration of martial law. But there was also an incident in Baluchistan which may have been the real trigger for the *coup*.

The Khan of Kalat continued to reside in his palace while his domains were transformed into a district in the One Unit of West Pakistan. He enjoyed the loyalty of his subjects who saw little if any physical change in their surroundings. Except for the administrative personnel stationed in the area and the government legal directives which they were required to enforce, everything was more or less as it had been when the Khan reigned supreme. The Khan was not among the more worldly luminaries, however, and when word was passed to him that the country's political system was about to crumble and that he would be restored to his throne, he quickly accepted the bait. It was his understanding that Mirza had sanctioned the re-establishment of his kingdom and that it would be advisable to move with immediate speed to demonstrate his capacity to govern the state. The Khan had no idea that he was being duped, that his action would be publicized as a secessionist plot, and that the whole affair would be used to justify not

only military action against his person, but throughout the entire country. There is still controversy as to the extent of the 'rebellion' in Kalat, whether indeed the Khan had raised his ancestral flag over the fort, whether he had ordered his 'army' to take charge of the situation, or whether he truly contemplated secession from Pakistan. But the record shows quite clearly that Iskander Mirza ordered regular Pakistan Army forces to seize the Kalat palace and arrest the Khan on 6 October 1958. On 7 October Iskander Mirza announced he was abrogating the constitution, assuming all political power in the nation, and had appointed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Mohammad Ayub Khan, to be Chief Martial Law Administrator.

The Khan of Kalat was declared to be an enemy of Pakistan and it was expected he would be tried for treason. But in the ensuing weeks Mirza was banished from the country by Ayub who made himself Pakistan's President. Ayub released the Khan of Kalat from prison, the bill of particulars against him was modified substantially, and he was placed under house arrest in Hazara district near Rawalpindi. In 1960 his privy purse was restored, and some of the dignities of his office were also resurrected. When Ayub declared an end to martial law in 1962, there was agitation for the Khan's full release. Ayub saw no real purpose in holding him; he was permitted to return to his state, his subjects, and his throne - though Kalat remained a district of West Pakistan through Ayub's presidency.

The Baluchis remaining in Baluchistan are divided into more than a score of major and minor tribes and clans. The Marri and Bugti are supposed to be the largest and are believed of Arab origin. By contrast, it is speculated that the Mengals, another large order, are descendants of early Mongolian invaders. The Brahui, who live among the Baluch, are often thought of as the original inhabitants of the area. They are Dravidian and as such relate culturally to the dominant racial group in southern India. Because of their close and long intimacy with the Baluch, however, the Brahui have developed affinities with their immediate neighbours. What tends to give coherence to this otherwise confused ethnic picture has been the semi-feudal Sardari political system. The Sardars are not given to cooperative ventures and their divisions have been perennially exploited by outsiders. The persistent conflict between them has also taxed the resources of the region, and while the Sardari system may well offer a degree of security, it

has also smothered programmes aimed at raising the Baluchis from their backwardness and poverty.

Baluchistan did not become a full-fledged province until after the fall of Ayub Khan and Yahya's decision to break up the One Unit.[48] The reconstitution of the original provinces established Baluchistan as an equal unit with the Punjab, Sind and NWFP. It also gave the Baluchis their first elected legislative assembly and government. But Bhutto, who followed Yahya, still intended to exploit the Sardari system, and immediately began playing off the Marris and the Mengals against the Bugtis, and then in a *volte face,* the Bugtis against the others. When the Bugtis were no longer helpful, he moved to the side of the Khan of Kalat and proceeded to throw the Pakistani military against the tribes, claiming that they were in open rebellion. Bhutto's actions were precipitated by the failure of his Pakistan People's Party to make any headway in Baluchistan. As in the North West Frontier Province, Baluchistan was governed by a coalition of the National Awami Party and the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam. Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo was installed as Governor and Sardar Ataullah Khan Mengal was made Chief Minister of the province after his election to the leadership of the provincial legislative assembly. With these tribal leaders in decision-making roles, Bhutto was forced to bargain for powers which would enable him to 'institutionalize coordination,' in other words to impose his will on the area.[49] Mengal and Bizenjo were jealous guardians of their prerogatives: they were also linked politically with Wali Khan and hence determined to resist Bhutto's power play. The Central Government was faced with a difficult set of circumstances. The loss of East Pakistan was still fresh in the thinking of Bhutto and those in his administration. Fears persisted that the country's dismemberment had only began and that nefarious forces were at work aimed at destroying the country altogether. Bhutto's harsh reaction to the Baluchi leaders' defiance of his commands stemmed from their insistance on making their own policies. Moreover, he interpreted their posturing as a rebellious act. The historic role of the NAP as an anti-Pakistan, divisive movement, and its control by Wali Khan, only reinforced this attitude.

Tribal raids are nothing new in the border regions of South Asia. The more primitive people historically live off the booty taken from the sedentary population. Generally, it is the responsibility of the tribal leaders to control the excesses; however, this matter more and more devolved upon

the central government which was primarily responsible for policing the region. Tribal brigandage at the end of 1972 was extensive but the federal authorities over-reacted. Claiming that they had been requested to take action against the marauding tribesmen by the Baluchistan provincial government, significant contingents of Frontier Corps troops were poured into the region, When the NAP-JUI government leaders indicated their dissatisfaction with the military movement, the Bhutto administration accused them of smuggling arms to tribal dissidents in preparation for a tribal *lashkar* (tribal offensive). At the same time the Mengal ministry was charged with weakening law inforcement in the province and with engineering its own pre-eminence. The PPP government reported that 'some tribal chiefs had informed the Federal Government of their apprehensions. They had been opposed to the NAP and they feared that it wanted to wipe out the opposition.'[50] The Jamote sardars of Las Bela were apparently put under heavy pressure by the Bizenjo-Mengal government, and when a *lashkar* was directed against them, Bhutto used the occasion to send in the regular Pakistan Army and declare martial law in Las Bela. Bizenjo, seeing his rule undermined, condemned the government action as unwarranted interference and demanded that the troops be withdrawn from Las Bela. Bhutto had no intention of withdrawing the Army. Instead he dismissed the Bizenjo-Mengal government and installed Nawab Mohammad Akbar Bugti as the new governor. At this point Marri tribesmen were in various stages of rebellion in the Sibi district of Baluchistan and the Army was ordered to expand its campaign against the dissident tribesmen. In time the Pakistan Army would be engaged in a sizeable programme of counter-insurgency involving no less than four of its crack divisions. Bizenjo, Mengal and Khair Baksh Marri were all arrested and secreted in remote prisons in Azad Kashmir. By 1975 the Pakistan government claimed that Baluchistan was calm but few persons who understood the nature of the problems in the region really believed the official announcement. Bugti's later resignation from the government and his replacement by the Khan of Kalat underlined the government's continuing difficulties.

Before losing his office, Bhutto declared an end to the Sardari system and claimed the people of Baluchistan would freely choose their new leaders. This was in 1976 and Bhutto was clearly looking ahead to a time when his PPP would dominate the province. This objective, of course, was not to be achieved and Bhutto's passing has left Pakistan's leadership with substantial

tasks. The Baluchis are more politically conscious today than at any other time in their long history. Many of their old leaders are gone or too infirm to carry on. (Marri, Bizenjo and Mengal, along with 11,000 other political detainees, were released by Zia-ul-Haq's government, *5,522* from the Punjab, 4,184 from the NWFP, 1050 from Sind and 353 from Baluchistan.) Younger men are moving into the limelight, but they are generally people with a modern education and radical ideas. Zia-ul-Haq and those who will come after him understand this shift and how it may change the political formula in the region. More autonomy is forecast for Baluchistan as for the NWFP. But it remains to be seen if the mistakes of the past can be rectified in time.

7
Incipient Constitutionalism

Constitutional government in Pakistan has been more façade than substance. Constitutions say almost nothing about prevailing political systems, their processes, or problems. Constitutions are charters or primary documents reflecting historical experience and projecting futuristic objectives. Ideally, a constitution is an outline of governmental intentions. It describes structural arrangements and identifies essential components. It supposedly establishes limits for authority, thus assuring individual freedom. A constitution should provide for predictability, help avoid arbitrary decision-making, and preserve popular expression. But constitutions are only as sound as the societies they represent. A weak, divided, conflicted society cannot overcome its deep-seated problems through constitution-making, no matter how eloquent and sophisticated the rendering. Constitutions are influenced by the political environment; they do not, of their own accord, constitute that environment. Constitutions, therefore, are mirror-images of the world around them, not ideal models to be adopted and operationalized. If the document does not conform to conditions prevailing in the nation, it will not survive. This is the lesson of constitutional experience. Pakistanis have treated constitutions as though they were experimental devices. If dissatisfied with the original, try another. If something goes wrong, the document is at fault. Discard it and attempt something else. Unfortunately, constitutions are not subject to experimentation, to trial and error. They are, after all, paper documents, man-made, and subject to all the frailties that human beings suffer. They are not sacred. They bear no special qualities which place them above reproach, criticism, or attack. If they show strength, it is because they serve a peculiar purpose and fulfil basic needs for an extended period of several generations. But respect for a constitution cannot be coerced or pressured. It is either

envisaged as an agreeable set of understandings, freely entered into, or it is doomed to failure. All constitutions must show some capacity for flexibility. Either the amendment process must be made simple, or the document must always be open to scrutiny and interpretation. Failure to move with the times only focuses excessive attention on the constitution and causes dissatisfaction to swell. Few countries have spent more time and energy discussing, drafting, and implementing constitutions than Pakistan. The sincerity of the Pakistan quest is not disputed. But the record shows that the country has had precious little success in managing the constitutional process. Nor is the country likely to fare better in the future. The intense activity concerned with the establishment of a viable Islamic state is in direct conflict with predilections aimed at the development of constitutionalism. Despite Pakistani efforts at balancing off Islamic requirements with constitutional principles, the two systems are diametrically opposed and one must invariably take precedence over the other. And where such is the case, it is pointless to speak of constitutional intentions.

Pakistan has passed through four constitutional experiences in less than thirty-five years. Each experience has reflected the power relationship of a particular period. Each has emerged with much fanfare and considerable promise. But none have accomplished what constitutions proclaim.[1] They have neither been appreciated by those whose duty it is to protect them, nor understood by those who must live by them. In point of fact, these constitutions have been feared, condemned, and abused. None were fully implemented, and when discarded by successive regimes, there was little public outcry, and even less desire to cling to them. The whole exercise suggests a certain disingenuousness, especially on the part of officialdom. It can be argued that Pakistan's leaders never intended to rest the national foundation on constitutional rock. It was fashionable and perhaps even necessary to pay lip-service to constitutional enactments, but it is doubtful that many were serious about their commitment to such abstract, legal contrivances. Constitution-making and breaking was a game in which the players were confined almost exclusively to the power manipulators. The population were mere spectators who seldom followed the activity on the field, let alone grasped the rules of the contest.

The Constitutions of Pakistan

Pakistan's first constitution was the Government of India Act, 1935, as modified by the Indian Independence Act which was made necessary by the nature of the transfer of power. The Pakistan Movement, like the Indian demand for independence, was essentially non-violent in so far as the ruling circles were concerned. The British did not resist the demand for self-determination once the consequences of World War II were realized. Recognizing the need to return authority to indigenous hands, they sought to make the transition as quick and painless (for them) as possible. The main area of struggle, therefore, did not pit the colonial overlord against the determined native adversary. In India, it was more a case of culturally unique and distinct populations squaring off, to see which one could subdue the other and hence lay claim to the mantle of authority. In one way, both the Hindu and Muslim communities emerged triumphant from the encounter; in another, they each lost something in the process. The problem was Solomonian in magnitude, but this time neither of the main parties was prepared to yield to the other to save the whole.[2] Each concluded that even a part was better than nothing. The cutting of the subcontinent - its partitioning between India and Pakistan was accomplished in the distant, antiseptic halls of the British parliament. But the real dissection occurred in the dusty streets of Lahore, in the crowded neighbourhoods of Delhi, and along the Hoogly in Calcutta. In the end, it was the people of the subcontinent who really parted the country. Unfamiliar or indifferent to the ceremonial activities of their leaders, they unleashed a vicious and senseless attack on their neighbours, as if the ritual of independence required an orgiastic sacrifice of human blood. In the darkness of communal conflict, Great Britain withdrew from the subcontinent. They left behind the only institutions capable of restoring the subcontinent to sanity, and the new leaders of India and Pakistan were eager to adopt the alien legacy. All things are relative, and in the carnage and misery of Hindu-Muslim-Sikh hostility, the European inheritance was a refuge in the storm.

1947–1956. Pakistan, like India, was initially declared a free, sovereign Dominion guided by a Constituent Assembly which was called upon to write an official constitution for the country. In the interim, the Constituent Assembly also substituted for the national legislature and passed laws and

issued enactments necessary to the governance of the nation. In these latter responsibilities, the Constituent Assembly was to operate in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935, as amended by the Independence Act.[3] The Constituent Assembly was empowered to alter that legislation as it saw fit, in order to meet the needs of the new nation. The combination of pre-partition legislation and Constituent Assembly enactments were judged paramount constitutional law. The role of the Governor-General, however, was somewhat ambiguous. The Governor-General was prevented from using his discretionary powers, granted under the 1935 Act. But he still had full power to assent to any laws passed by the Constituent Assembly. What remained unclear was whether this latter authority could be used both when the Constituent Assembly met as a constitution-making body and as the national legislature. If he did not perform such a role when the Constituent Assembly was meeting as a constitution-making agency, the Constituent Assembly was a sovereign body, and thus beyond the control of the Governor-General.

This ambiguity was to surface in the 1953–5 political crisis, as Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad pitted his powers against those of the Constituent Assembly. In that contest, the Governor-General won, and the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, in spite of the argument of its leadership that it was sovereign. The Constituent Assembly rested its case on the pre-independence charge that had been given to produce a constitution for the nation. According to this interpretation, it could not be dissolved until that work had been completed, and then it dissolved itself. The Governor-General, however, insisted that the Constituent Assembly could not take action without his assent, irrespective of the role being played by the Assembly. Therefore, if the Constituent Assembly was judged by the Governor-General to be acting in a manner that ignored his assent, it was the Assembly which stood in violation. Moreover, if the Constituent Assembly was unable to produce a constitution and was judged to be prolonging its life to the detriment of the nation, the Governor-General had the right to disband it. Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly on 24 October 1954, and this act set in motion a series of judicial proceedings which was to test the two opposed interpretations.

The most important case before the federal courts was presented by the Government of Pakistan. In *Federation of Pakistan* v. *Moulvi Tamizuddin*

Khan, it was revealed that the Constituent Assembly had misinterpreted the Independence Act by passing forty-four acts without seeking the Governor-General's assent.[4] In noting that assent was necessary, the court ruled that Pakistan had been conferred Dominion status, was a member of the Commonwealth, and hence subject to practices prevailing within that organization. The forty-four acts, therefore, could be judged invalid, which raised even greater implications. If the Constituent Assembly was acting illegally, then everything passed by it since 1950 would also have to be declared unconstitutional. Such blanket judgment threatened Pakistan with legal chaos and almost forced the country to suspend its operations and to begin anew. In the confusion it was thought preferable to emphasize 'The Rule of Law' whereby it was possible to expand upon the emergency powers of the 1935 Act. But while the courts were examining the alternatives, the Governor-General took matters into his own hands. Ghulam Mohammad issued a proclamation declaring that the constitutional machinery had broken down, that the Constituent Assembly no longer had the confidence of the people, and that there would be fresh elections for a representative body as soon as possible. In the current crisis situation, however, he had declared the existence of a state of emergency and was prepared to act decisively to return the country to a condition of legal equilibrium. The Governor .General also rejected the ruling by the Sind High Court that he did not have the power to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and his government appealed to Pakistan's Supreme Court for their judgment in the case. The Supreme Court rendered its ruling on 26 March 1955, and it upheld the constitutionality of the Governor-General's action terminating the Constituent Assembly. Under the declared state of emergency, the laws considered invalid were held to be in force, thus providing a measure of stability in a very uncertain period. But the Governor-General was not simply interested in rectifying previous errors. The same state of emergency was intended to grant the Governor-General the right to constitute the One Unit of West Pakistan by decree. Moreover, the Governor .General assumed all constitution-making authority.

> The Governor-General shall by order make such provisions as appears to him to be necessary or expedient for the purpose of making provision as to the constitution of Pakistan and for purposes connected therewith, and any such order may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as the Governor-General may deem necessary or expedient.[5]

The only institution standing between Pakistan and the formation of an absolute dictatorship was the Supreme Court. Although it had upheld the Governor-General's action in dissolving the Constituent Assembly, the Court refused to sanction the Governor-General's attempt to concentrate all power in his person. In a subsequent ruling, the Supeme Court informed the Governor-General that he had no power to make constitutional provisions. Nor was the Court prepared to justify the Governor-General's action in validating all the laws that had been illegally passed by the now defunct Assembly. The Supreme Court insisted that the only possible solution was the convening of another Constituent Assembly.[6] The Pakistan government accepted this judgment, but the Governor-General was the clear victor in the encounter. The Constituent Assembly was judged not to be a sovereign body. It had failed to fulfil its obligations, it ceased to represent the new political formations in the country, and it could not ignore the role of the Governor-General in the making of the laws. The Governor-General was notified that he could not act arbitrarily, but he was within his prerogative in dissolving the Assembly and in calling for the creation of a new one. Although he could not pre-empt the legislative function, the Governor-General was endowed with special powers in times of emergency. The Supreme Court also gave quasi-acceptance to the government argument that the Governor-General was a representative of the King, or as Head of State, had certain powers that were outside the written constitution. This was done in order to permit the validation of the impugned laws until such time as the new Assembly could formally pass them. Chief Justice Mohammad Munir, who spoke for the majority, cited the choices before the judiciary: (1) to return to the beginning; (2) to provide a legal bridge over the prevailing dilemma; and (3) 'To hurtle into the chasm beyond any hope of rescue.'[7] The Chief Justice was aware of the multidimensional aspects of the problem. The legal issue could not be separated from the political situation. The country was at an impasse. The court was bereft of coercive power. To have sided with the Constituent Assembly would have intensified the conflict, and quite possibly destroyed any possible return to parliamentary government. Risking the criticism that the Supreme Court was collaborating with the Governor-General and the executive arm of government, Munir sustained the Governor-General's action but also preserved the only chance for the resurrection of representative government in the country.

But the preservation of the national legal framework was not without cost. No matter how constrained the Governor-General was said to be, he was clearly not the figurehead that had been envisaged in drafting the constitution. The Pakistan Supreme Court had, by its own acts, reinforced the vice-regal tradition, and set the chief executive off from the rest of the political machinery. The convening of the Second Constituent Assembly and the completion of the constitution-making task, could neither cancel out nor obscure the events of 1953–5. The country had seemingly opted for strong centralized leadership, despite the effort that went into the construction of a parliamentary system. Moreover, when the Constituent Assembly convened, it could do no more than follow the guidelines already established by the executive wing. There would be no more challenges of the Governor-General's authority and the scene was set for the transition to presidential, not decentralized government.

1956–1958. Pakistan's first indigenous constitution was promulgated on 23 March 1956. It established Pakistan as a Republic and removed it from dominion status. By the same token, the Governor-General was replaced by a President. The constitution was heralded as federal in form and parliamentary in composition, but events had already conspired to modify that design. The amalgamation of the western provinces into a single administrative unit and its juxtaposition with East Pakistan did not suggest a viable federal experience. With only two segments to the federation, and with one holding overwhelming influence over the other, the possibility of a workable federal state was almost zero. The forces that controlled Pakistan's destiny could not conceal their unitary preferences. By the same token, the parliamentary situation necessitated a creditable party system. But by the time the 1956 constitution was given to the nation, the only party with a significant national following had lost its appeal and was in an advance state of deterioration. The necessity for coalition government, with all its inherent weaknesses, merely gave validity to the argument of the centrists that the country was unprepared for a full-blown experiment in parliamentary government and would be better served by knowledgeable administrators with a flair for governing.[8] The administrative argument could not be ignored, given the politicians' tendencies to develop provincial or special interest parties. Moreover, political controversy seldom transcended parochial objectives, thus intensifying bitterness and division in the country as well as in the national and provincial legislatures. In the

absence of a coherent two party system, or even a one-party dominant system, Pakistan was exposed to political squabbling which was hardly capable of addressing the country's real needs. Someone, it was argued, had to project national concerns. No constitutional structure, no references to law, no declarations of intention could change what, in substance, was a deeply divided polity.

The 1956 constitution described Pakistan officially as an Islamic Republic, but even here there was, except for the added nomenclature, little in the way of practical application. The constitution stated the Head of State must be a Muslim, even though it was very doubtful a non-Muslim could ever aspire to the office. Neither of these references made Pakistan into more of an Islamic state than it had been before the constitution was drafted. The return of an Islamic state, however, did raise expectations which Pakistan's leadership was not prepared to satisfy. Although a Council of Islamic Ideology was to be given authority to scrutinize legislative enactments, to ensure they conformed with the teachings of Islam, almost nothing was done to comply with this pledge. Although never succinctly stated, Pakistan's rulers were inclined toward a secular model and their policies were aimed at giving it substance. Financial considerations, economic needs, commercial interests were paramount in their thinking, and they made no secret of their belief that in these matters, Islamic teachings were an impediment to the nation's progress. Thus, even the attempt to link Islam with the constitutional order suffered from a lack of sincerity. And as noted above, a secular constitutional order and an Islamic system are scarcely compatible.

The separate electorate question examined in chapter five illustrates a related weakness of the 1956 constitution.[9] It can be hypothesized that the constitution could have avoided the pitfalls into which it stumbled in 1958, had it not been for the Muslim League's insistence on the maintenance of separate electorate. The League's determination to preserve the separate electorate as holy writ in the face of mounting political opposition, prevented the party from staging a comeback. The Muslim League, emphasizing Islamic principles, refused to come to terms with forces shaping political life in East Pakistan. Nor could it impress the power holders in West Pakistan that the policy was in any way meaningful. Given the opportunity to emasculate the Muslim League, the opposition in both the eastern and western portions of the country used the separate electorate

issue to eliminate the League from serious political contention. Little did they realize that the destruction of the Muslim League would not aid their own cause. The apolitical personalities that controlled Pakistan's destiny owed nothing to these rival political formations. Only the Muslim League was a 'legitimate' party in their view, the others mere opportunists, provincialists, and malcontents whose limited perspective was suspect and threatening. This helps to explain why the promised general elections were never held: why after less than two years of constitutional experience, President Iskander Mirza could abrogate the constitution, suspend political activity, close the legislatures and impose martial law on the country. In the end, the 1956 constitution was never fully implemented, nor could it have been without national elections. The constitution had been the work of the Muslim League and the party's demise signalled the constitution's early collapse.

It is important to note that H. S. Suhrawardy led his Awami Leaguers out of the Assembly while the vote on the constitution was being taken. They never gave their approval to the document. Although Suhrawardy was later called upon to uphold the constitution as Prime Minister, it was a simple matter for Iskander Mirza to dismiss him without a vote of confidence being taken in the National Assembly. The lack of public outcry over Suhrawardy's dismissal indicates the weaknesses in the constitutional environment, especially the absence of support from partisan political groups which, were more concerned with personal retribution than preserving constitutional principle. Given their intense hatred for one another, the politicians missed every opportunity to sustain the 1956 constitution. Few politicians grasped the importance of the document to themselves, let alone the nation. In the final analysis, the politicians destroyed their options and left the field to the civil-military élite which quickly filled the political vacuum.[10]

1958–1962. The governing of a country is the work of professional administrators, not politicians. The latter are responsible for identifying popular need, for making public policy, and in seeing to it that the intentions of government, as well as the programmes which they initiate, are effectively and efficiently implemented. In other words, those politicians holding public office have decision-making powers. The administrative arm of government is the transmission belt for those

decisions. The administrators are required to carry out the directives of their political superiors and to assure that the public's interests are served in accordance with the laws in force. They must be especially mindful of their service status so as not to interfere with the political process. Moreover, administrators are required to follow a calling, not a political organization. As apolitical officials, they serve the party in power, irrespective of their personal preferences which remain unstated. Many countries have found it necessary to pass laws or statutes affirming the non-political role of the bureaucracy. Some have found it possible to gain almost total compliance. Others, however, have had enormous difficulty in confining career administrators to non-decision-making roles.

Pakistan is a primary example of a country that has never been successful in limiting the activities of its bureaucrats. Pakistan is a new country with an old and varied past. Almost up to the moment of its emergence as an independent nation it knew little about contemporary political organization and responsibility. The British did not promote political activity until some time after World War I and few Indian politicians served in decision-making roles. What political activity existed was of an oppositional or non-government character. The institution of colonialism was criticized, albeit pressurized, by the political organizations of the period, but the responsibilities of day-to-day governing did not fall upon their shoulders. India was bureaucratically administered prior to and during the period of British rule, under whom the system was up-dated and invigorated. Great Britain was concerned with the efficient management of its colonial possessions and systems of governmental administration were fitted to the environment and circumstances in which they were to operate. In so far as India was essentially agrarian and rural, the form of administration was influenced by the demands of a pre-industrial, and almost non-urban society. The British built upon the earlier Moghul experience which had divided the Empire into provinces (*subas*) and districts (*shiqq* or *sarkar).* The district was of little significance under the Moghuls, but the British made it the primary instrument of their rule.[11]

The general purpose of Moghul administration was the collection of revenue and the recruitment of personnel for the Army. The Governor of the province was given responsibility for transferring funds to the state treasury and meeting the periodic demands of the central administration. When the Moghul system collapsed, its record-keeping was disrupted and eventually

fell into disuse. The British came upon the scene amidst considerable chaos. Land was being seized by the strongest party in the region, thieves were preying upon a defenceless peasantry, and a general speculation in agrarian transfers made it almost impossible to identify the legal owners of disputed property. Different systems of land ownership were identified and sanctioned by the colonial authority in various parts of the country but the form of administration was largely uniform throughout. With very few Europeans, the British fashioned an administrative system which focused importance on the district as the key unit.[12]

British India was divided into provinces, each headed by a governor appointed by the colonial authority. The province was then sub-divided into numerous districts which were governed by administrative officers who had almost total power within their respective domains. Only in periods of considerable unrest did governors interfere with the methods or techniques of the district officials. Each British district officer was something like a petty monarch and although some consideration had been given to reducing his authority, after the 1857 Mutiny all such talk ceased. The district officer made it possible to both decentralize government administration as well as personalize the role of the leading decision-maker in the district. The central government was pleased in that it could depend upon the resourcefulness of one rather than a group of officials with inter-related tasks, and the local people could identify more intimately with a ruler who had almost immediate presence, and to whom they addressed their needs. Although the British brought government into close proximity with the people of India, they were also responsible for undermining what little local government existed in the villages of the district.[13] The peasants looked to the district officer for virtually all their needs and even gave up the age-old responsibility of policing their surroundings. Law and order, like revenue collection, was the direct responsibility of the district officer. Village elders lost their function as agents of the British government replaced their authority. In time, the colonial administrators were dividing the land between cultivators, issuing parcels to chosen individuals, taxing according to set procedures and meting out justice in accordance with laws and processes only dimly comprehended by the population.

To improve upon the efficiency of administration each district was divided into a number of sub-districts (*tehsils* and *talukas*) and a junior officer given responsibility for the subdivision. The chief official in each

subdivision was directly accountable to the Deputy Commissioner in charge of the district. Although these smaller units of administration were often a breeding ground for future district leaders, they did not possess the same autonomy from the district as the district enjoyed from the province. The activities of the region, therefore, continued to revolve around the district with subdivisions facilitating the collection of revenue and the upholding of law and order.

This was the administrative system which the Pakistanis inherited from their British overlords and it has more or less prevailed to the present day. Prior to partition, the colonial government had admitted indigenous members of the population to the public service. Although the highest stations were reserved for Europeans, some of the Indian recruits found it possible to rise into important posts.[14] The vast majority, however, were confined to lesser positions and at the time of partition few had substantial experience in key decision-making roles. Nevertheless, these were the men who inherited the British bureaucratic legacy. It was also these individuals that the Muslim League government came to depend upon for the everyday management of public affairs.

The professional administrators were organized into an effective body by Choudhri Mohammad Ali, a senior bureaucrat in the Audit and Accounts Service under British rule, and Jinnah's choice for Secretary-General for ministerial coordination.[13] He also held the key administrative positions of Secretary to the Cabinet and Establishment Secretary. The combined assignment meant that Choudhri Mohammad Ali, more so than any other individual in Pakistan, was responsible for the structuring of the Pakistan civil service. Choudhri Mohammad Ali was devoted to Jinnah and a firm believer in the Pakistan dream, but after the death of the Quaid-i-Azam he had great fears about the course the country was following. His primary concern centred on the absence of genuine national leadership at the political level. The politicians were not loyal to Muslim League objectives and were simply using the party for personal aggrandizement. This disturbed and offended Mohammad Ali who understood better than most people that the country's political plight conferred extensive reponsibilities on his administrators. There was no getting away from the conclusion that the British administrative system had to be sustained despite all the criticism directed against it as an aloof, autocratic, domineering, paternalistic form of government. Moreover, the delay in constitution-

making meant the politicians would be immersed in political controversy and too preoccupied to lead the nation. This also suggested that the direct rule of the bureaucrats, their having been cast in decision-making roles, would continue indefinitely.[16]

Choudhri Mohammad Ali eventually joined the politicians in 1951 by accepting the portfolio of Minister of Finance. In 1955, he was made Prime Minister by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad. He became a member of the Muslim League and was even pressured to assume the presidency of the party which he rejected. Mohammad Ali was a significant force behind the One Unit scheme. He also played a prominent role in framing the 1956 constitution. But the tensions of the period weighed heavily upon him, and his poor health caused Iskander Mirza to replace him in 1956. During the Ayub years, Choudhri Mohammad Ali took up other political causes, and for a time he led the Nizam-i-Islam organization. Although physically weak, he continued to labour in the cause of party unity and he urged his compatriots to merge their political organizations into a single party in order to counter the power of the Ayub regime.

This later political posturing by Pakistan's most successful bureaucrat cannot obscure Mohammad Ali's complicity in assisting Ghulam Mohammad and to a lesser extent, Iskander Mirza, to subvert the political forces in Pakistan. Choudhri Mohammad Ali wanted a strong, viable, unified country but was unsure as to the measures necessary to realize this dream. Unlike Ghulam Mohammad and Iskander Mirza, he was not enticed by power or personal gain. Nevertheless, he was compelled to realize that the country could ill afford to discard its bureaucratic heritage. Although Choudhri Mohammad Ali was to become one of the most outspoken critics of Ayub's administrative state, the role that he played and the policies that he helped shape in Pakistan's formative years, set the scene for Ayub's subsequent seizure of the government.

Like Choudhri Mohammad Ali, Ayub Khan was a senior official in the Pakistan government from Pakistan's earliest years. He was selected by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to be the Pakistan Army's first Commander-in-Chief and from the vantage point of that post he had an intimate view of political activities within the nation.[17] Ayub was similarly distressed with the performance of the politicians. Shortly after assuming charge of the army, Ayub was called upon to put down a conspiracy in his command. Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated a short time later, not far

from Ayub's headquarters in Rawalpindi. The country was being torn apart by rioters and malcontents in East Bengal, the Punjab, Sind, and in the North West Frontier Province. In each instance, the Army was called upon to stem the unrest and return the region to a more tranquil state. His view as a soldier told Ayub that the politicians were primarily responsible for the disorder and that the country could be lost if drastic measures were not employed. Ayub was a believer in centralized, authoritarian government. He was convinced that the people of Pakistan were too diverse, too under-educated, too impoverished, too dependent on traditional leadership, too make a success of sophisticated, representative government of the parliamentary type. Nor did he believe the politicians capable of sacrificing their private interest for national purpose. The system of government which he envisaged did not at first involve constitutional forms. Pakistan required selfless leadership and the best government was that which was developed through the utilization of the most experienced and astute individuals in the country.

If government ruled in a convincing fashion the people would accept it. Ayub called upon his government to direct, guide, and teach as well as dominate and control and the people most fitted to do this were not the politicians or the people's traditional leaders, but the informed, cosmopolitan, trained, and talented administrators. Government was not to be limited by constitutional constraints but expanded, reinforced and given supreme authority over all affairs.

The martial law years, 1958–1962, provided the foundation for the Ayubian system. The administrators were given direct responsibility for economic development and social uplift.[18] Educated young people were induced to join the administrative services and to share their skills and talents with those concerned in improving the material well-being of the country. A Second Five Year Plan was announced and it became a focal point for the regime's policies. International institutions and foreign governments were approached and asked to provide assistance. Efforts were made to invigorate the private sector. Incentives were given for private investment and government regulations were relaxed. By 1962, there were indications that the various schemes were paying off. Statistically, there was no mistaking the economic advances. The problem which continued to plague the country, however, was how to generate sufficient resources so that the masses could sense an improvement in their otherwise depressed

life-style. The Ayubian system promised more stability than had been experienced during the parliamentary period; it had generated considerable excitement among Pakistan's élites in commerce and education as well as in government; but it had yet to prove itself successful in changing Pakistan from a tradition-bound into a progressive society. Moreover, the intelligentsia which refused to see the positive aspects of the Ayub administration and felt disenfranchised by its heavy emphasis on authoritarian structures and procedures, refused to be won over and sought to sustain an embryonic political opposition by emphasizing the need to return to constitutional, representative government.[19]

This intelligentsia had its cause célèbre in the Basic Democracies System which Ayub proclaimed in 1959. Basic Democracies was said to be a throwback to the conventional local government that prevailed in India prior to the British restructuring of the subcontinent's administrative system. In point of fact, it was a scheme for the mobilizing of village folk so that: (1) they could be insulated from the influence of local politicians; and (2) could be enlisted in cooperative projects aimed at raising their humble living standards. Overall, the Basic Democracies were to be integrated in the larger administrative structure. The idea was expressed that the politicians could promise but never deliver on what they pledged; the Ayub government, however, had the means, the know-how, the energy and the determination to assist the population to help itself. The Rural Works Programme, which was initiated through a grant allocated by the United States government was eventually fused to the Basic Democracies scheme, thus enhancing its material well-being.[20] But intellectuals and scattered political opposition were outraged by the whole exercise. Describing the BD system as outright hypocrisy, they declared it was done more to isolate them than to improve the conditions of the poor. They had an eager audience in East Pakistan where the Ayubian stress on centralization raised new fears about West Pakistani overlordship of East Pakistan. When Ayub moved the capital to the Potwar plateau outside Rawalpindi and raised Islamabad, a new city, from the dry wasteland between the Frontier and the Punjab, the Bengalis were confirmed in their belief that an alien government was imposing its will over them. Ayub's emphasis on the administrative state also involved Bengalizing the bureaucracy in East Pakistan. Significant strides had been made in placing Bengalis in sensitive posts in the province while other Bengalis were given positions in the

central government. But the Bengalis were unimpressed, at least those elements that followed Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his Awami League and Maulana Bhashani and his National Awami Party. The Bengalis had always reflected a higher intensity of political consciousness than their compatriots in West Pakistan and the denial of political activity, a primary pastime in the province, was most objectionable. Moreover, despite Ayub's decision to go ahead and build a second or legislative capital outside Dacca, and the renewed interest in rural uplift and industrial expansion, East Pakistan continued to experience gross poverty.

The Bengalis wanted a larger political voice, they wanted constitutional guarantees, they wanted an equal share of the decision-making process, and nothing the Ayub government did could compensate for the frustrations that they experienced on all these counts.[21] Therefore, the opposition was better organized in East Pakistan and, when it began to coalesce with the politicians and intelligentsia in West Pakistan, Ayub recognized that he would have to modify his administrative state. The opposition demanded a constitution. He could not ignore this demand without being stigmatized as an unrepentant dictator, and this he was not prepared to accept. In the end, then, he sought to legitimate his rule, bolster his authority, and proclaim his democratic intentions by giving Pakistan a new constitution.

1962–1969. Ayub's constitution was promulgated on 1 March 1962. It was drafted largely under the supervision of Manzur Qadir, one of the nation's more distinguished lawyers and an avid follower of the military president. The new constitution incorporated the essential features of the Ayubian administrative state in that it emphasized presidential over parliamentary government. Pakistan's president was to be both chief-of-state and head-of-government. Essential decisions were to flow from his office and the administrative state was to provide the data with which these decisions were to be taken. It was also to be the instrument whereby the decisions were implemented. Basic Democracies were an integral part of the constitutional process with the elected Basic Democrats forming themselves into an electoral college for the purpose of electing the nation's president. At the same time, the Basic Democrats had their developmental reponsibilities and continued their close association with the governmental bureaucracy. It was the prevailing assumption that the Basic Democrats would remain apolitical, in other words, beyond the network of political

parties which were permitted once again to publicize their separate programmes.

The new constitution established a National Assembly but it was clear from the outset that it would be something less than a legislative body. Ayub wanted to avoid bringing political parties into the assembly but that proved impossible. As parties began to line up for and against the government in the assembly, Ayub instructed his colleagues to form an official party and the Conventionalist Muslim League was the result.[22] The Conventionists dominated the proceedings and the National Assembly was little more than a rubber stamp for decisions already taken at the executive level. The government issued ordinances and the National Assembly later affirmed their validity. Seldom did the assembly display any initiative. Nor did the opposition have much opportunity to do more than harrass the government. Although Ayub felt he had fulfilled his promise to restore constitutional government to the nation neither the politicians nor the intelligentsia were prepared to accept an arrangement which provided them with so little room for manoeuvre. Moreover, they saw no chance of gaining political power through constitutional processes given Ayub's strenuous efforts at confining their expression. This raises an important point: Pakistan's administrators were protected by legal statutes that had their origins in the British colonial period. Privileges and powers granted to the administrators at that time had been embellished not reduced by subsequent Pakistani regimes. On the other hand, the politicians had little, if any, protection. The politicians had been cast in an anti-state posture before independence was achieved. They were often reduced to using the streets in an effort to raise popular support for their demands. It was the bureaucracy which had been called upon to curtail this political activity, to imprison the protestors, and to treat them with disdain. With this legacy, the bureaucracy already had a pre-determined opinion of the politicians: that they were still opposed to law and order, desirous of revolutionary change, and unconcerned with the social unrest they provoked. They therefore had to be restricted, contained, and if necessary, jailed for offences against authority and the public order. It was no wonder that dissident politicians concluded that the Ayubian constitution was more a guarantee of absolute dictatorship than popular democracy.

Ayub had supreme confidence in his 'constitutional' system and agreed to permit an election campaign in which candidates for the presidency would

place their names before his electoral college of Basic Democrats. The opposition at first indicated a reluctance to join in an unequal contest, insisting that such an election be conducted on the basis of direct franchise so that all the eligible voters of Pakistan might register their preference. Ayub, of course, refused to entertain such a process and called for the election on 1 January 1965. The opposition were in disarray having lost their principal leaders, but they managed to coalesce, at least long enough to pursue the campaign under the name of the Combined Opposition Parties (COP).[23] Realizing that they had no chance of defeating Ayub in a one-to-one situation, the COP agreed to support Miss Fatima Jinnah, Mohammad Ali Jinnah's sister and closest confidant, as their candidate. Ayub was surprised by the manoeuvre. Miss Jinnah had applauded Ayub's takeover in 1958, especially his ouster of Iskander Mirza. At the time, she had commented on the greed of the politicians and had offered the thought that they did not deserve to rule. By 1964, however, she had apparently lost faith in Ayub, sensing that he too was little more than an opportunist and power-seeker, and agreed to be the COP's candidate.

In the ensuing debate, Miss Jinnah cut into Ayub's lead and the administration feared the elections might not go the way they were intended. Moreover, there had been a new election for the Basic Democracies and persons who had shunned the first election insisted on running in this one. As a result, the new Basic Democrats were generally better educated, more politically conscious, and somewhat less dependent of government than the previous body. While there was no way to foretell how the electoral college would cast its ballot, the odds were still heavily in favour of President Ayub Khan.

Ayub's victory was hardly a landslide affair. The military president received a slim vote of confidence but hardly the mandate he was seeking. The opposition may not have been successful, but neither was it any weaker from the experience. Ayub was made aware that political activity was alive in the country and that nothing short of totalitarianism would prevent future assaults on his authority. Understanding that Ayub was tough, not brutal, the political opposition sought every opportunity to exploit his weaknesses. It was agreed that he had been wounded. Before he could overcome his wounds the politicians hoped to be able to inflict more blows.

In the late summer of 1965, the dissatisfied elements had their second opportunity. War broke out with India over Kashmir and after an intense

military encounter that took a heavy toll on both sides, Ayub and the Indian Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri agreed to accept a United Nations resolution calling for a ceasefire.[24] The urban communities of West Pakistan had been whipped to a passion by the hostilities and it would not subside quickly. When the opposition publicized that Ayub was selling out to the hated enemy on the one side and wanted to placate his American friends on the other, the frenzy increased and overflowed into the streets of the major cities and towns. Ayub was vilified and condemned, it being argued that Pakistan was on the verge of a great victory. This popular belief could not have been further from the truth but given the demonstrators' emotional state, and their general unhappiness with Ayub, there was no way to set the record straight. Ayub defied the politicians and the crowds and proceeded to normalize his relations with India. He accepted an invitation by the Soviet Premier to attend a peace conference in the Uzbek city of Tashkent. After several days of indecisive activity, it was suddenly revealed that Ayub and Shastri had signed an agreement calling for the mutual withdrawal of their forces and a return to the status quo ante.[25] Kashmir, the Muslim objective, was all but written off. Within hours of the announcement West Pakistan's principal metropolitan districts were again teeming with malcontents. Rioting, arson, and violent acts punctuated the next few days.

Ayub was defiant. The military was called upon to maintain law and order. Political leaders were apprehended. Political organizations were restricted in their public activities. Ayub was firm but realized how unpopular his action was and chose not to be overly harsh with his detractors. This permitted the political opposition to continue their campaign, albeit at a subdued level. The politicians were taunted and intimidated but nonetheless refused to yield to the administration. The Tashkent Agreement was too useful an issue to ignore in their struggle with Ayub. Furthermore, Bhutto left the Ayub government, ostensibly to demonstrate his displeasure with Ayub. He, too, joined the opposition, and with the addition of his voice the West Pakistani politicians had a spokesman of national stature to project their cause.

In February 1966, a meeting of opposition parties was held in Lahore.[26] All the West Pakistan organizations attended but only Sheikh Mujibur Rahman appeared from East Pakistan. Mujib was unimpressed with the anti-Tashkent agitation but was no less interested in bringing Ayub down

although his objective went beyond giant-killing. Mujib wanted a radical change in the constitutional order and used the occasion to publicize his Six Point Programme for the first time. Briefly, the six points were:[27]

1. Pakistan should be a federation under the Pakistan or Lahore Resolution of 1940, which implied the existence of two similar entities. Any new constitution, according to the Bengalis, had to reflect this reality.
2. The federal government should deal solely with defence and foreign affairs.
3. There should be two separate, but freely convertible currencies. East Pakistan would have separate fiscal and monetary policies.
4. The federated units would have the sole power to tax. The central government would be granted funds to meet its expenditures.
5. Separate accounts of foreign exchange earnings would be maintained. The federated units would be free to establish separate trade links with foreign countries.
6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia.

The majority of West Pakistani politicians refused to entertain Mujib's Programme and the Bengali leader withdrew from the conference and returned to East Pakistan to announce his go-it-alone policy. Mujib's Six Points suggested the reformation of Pakistan as a confederation with the two wings of the country essentially free from the influence of the other. Both East and West Pakistan would have separate constitutions, and a third document would loosely attach them to an ill-defined, and essentially weak centre. Even the West Pakistani opposition showed little interest in this design. With the exception of the National Awami Party which had its own programme for regional autonomy, the Six Points were condemned as being anti-Pakistan and a Hindu plot. The Ayub government recognized an opportunity to exploit this feeling and remove some of the attention that had been directed at his administration. Mujib was arrested and charged with conspiring with Indian officials to destroy Pakistan. Manzur Qadir was called upon to fight the government's case. In the meantime, Ayub urged his countrymen to band together to ward off the Indian threat to their national survival.[28]

The tactic was useful in so far as the Tashkent agitation subsided. The government now had time to take stock of its position and to plan for the future. Ayub's sudden illness, however, upset all the projections. As Ayub lay near death, the government entered a stage of semi-paralysis. It was never more clear how weak the constitutional system was, or how dependent the government was on a single individual. Ayub's miraculous recovery did not terminate the crisis. He no longer had the physical strength necessary to run his personalized system. Moreover, the opposition was demanding significant changes, especially in the electoral process. Many called for the dissolution of the Basic Democracies and the establishment of genuine local government. The bureaucracy came in for particular criticism. The CSP had developed into a ruling institution and the opposition wanted it disbanded. Corruption was widespread, and government policies were blamed for the general malaise in the country. East Pakistan was seething with discontent. The Agartala Conspiracy Trial was protracted, adding to the tensions in the province. Development was at a virtual standstill in both wings of the country after the syphoning of resources in the 1965 war. In the midst of these dilemmas the government moved ahead with preparations to celebrate Ayub's *Decade of Development.* It proved to be poor timing.

The country exploded in protest. Rioting spread from West to East Pakistan where different issues fuelled the violence. After attempts to appease his detractors a beaten Ayub was forced to admit defeat. The politicians wanted the termination of the presidential system, the administrative state, the Basic Democracies system, the indirect election process; they called for the break-up of the One Unit in West Pakistan, the reinstitution of the parliamentary system and a return to political party activity. Ayub was prepared to compromise. He ordered that Mujib be released and sought consultations with him, Bhutto and the other politicians. He virtually agreed to reinstate the parliamentary system but balked at the idea of both destroying the One Unit and permitting Mujib to execute his Six Point Programme for regional autonomy. Tired and unable to control events, abandoned by many of his administrative and military colleagues, Ayub agreed to step aside. On 25 March 1969, he transferred authority to General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan who promptly announced the abrogation of the 1962 constitution, the termination of Basic Democracies and the imposition of martial law. Although the constitutional edifice that Ayub had erected to lend legitimacy to his system was kicked

on to the garbage heap of history, the administrative state had not been abandoned, merely militarized.

1969–1971. Yahya declared his intention to return government to civilian hands. In the meantime, the country was to draft a new constitution and hold general elections. He agreed with the demand to terminate the One Unit and issued a Legal Framework Order reconstituting the original provinces of West Pakistan. Yahya also purged the bureaucracy, imposed heavy penalties on the country's economic élite and attempted to reform the local self-government sector. He also appealed to the intelligentsia to join with him in a collective endeavour to revitalize the nation.[29] Although the politicians were quick to take advantage of the opportunity to voice their independent views they were none too pleased with the perpetuation of military rule - even if it claimed to be temporary. The politicians, led by Bhutto in the West and Mujib in the East, continued to press for the reinstatement of civilian government. Yahya and the military junta to which he was responsible, however, were not prepared to yield their authority until the country was on stable ground. Yahya outlined the new constitution in an address to the nation. He told the politicians that the military would give them 120 days to complete their work. If at the end of that period they were still unable to deliver the document to the nation, he would disband the body and call a new convention.[30] He noted that there were few matters to be resolved. It had already been agreed that the parliamentary system would be reinstated. The old provinces had been reconstituted. He had sanctioned an investigation of the civil services and he was prepared to entertain the dissolution of the CSP. Political parties were free to publicize their views, and the country's first general election was imminent. Yahya fancied himself as a conciliator and his efforts were directed at placating the critics of the Ayub administration without seriously jeopardizing the *steel frame* of the administrative state.

Pakistan's first general election was conducted without real incidence in December 1970, but the nation did not reap the advantages that it hoped to achieve from the exercise. The elections were, in fact, prologue to a tragic drama that was to be played out in the deltaic regions of East Pakistan. In point of fact, the elections proved to be a referendum on the Pakistan state that was constituted in 1947. The Bengali people voted *en masse* to adopt Mujib's Six Point Programme for regional autonomy.[31] Had the military not

been in charge of the government it is possible the politicians would have found a *via media* through the morass. But the junta was in power, and its perception of conditions conjured visions of a Hindu plot to destroy the country. Even the venerable Choudhri Mohammad Ali was convinced that the Hindus were behind Mujib and that the elections were not a clear demonstration of the Bengali Muslim position. In November 1971 Mohammad Ali wrote:

> The result of thel970 elections *cannot* be regarded as a definitive verdict of the Muslim masses, for it was brought about by the united support of Hindu votes for the Awami League and the division of the Muslim votes among so many Muslim parties. *Nor was the support of the Six Points clear to anyone except to Hindus and a tiny minority of Muslim intellectuals*.[32] (Italics mine)

Needless to say, myopia was not an affliction that only affected the military. Few people have played as important role in Pakistan's political history as has this erstwhile professional administrator, teacher, and sometime politician. Mohammad Ali was a genuine representative of West Pakistan thought concerning the Bengalis. He adamanatly opposed giving the Bengalis deserved representation in the early political life of the Pakistani nation and even in the dark hours of 1971 he was unable to change his views. Constitutions are contractual arrangements based upon trust and accommodation. Mohammad Ali, like so many other Pakistan leaders, could not bring himself to accept the realities of Pakistan as a nation-state. Despite his broad experience, his fine education, his intellectual capacity, he could not rise above his innermost fears. Pakistan had emerged in the context of a negative experience and Choudhri Mohammad Ali, along with many confrères, was victimized by that condition. The country which they led was ushered to the very brink of disaster.

The civil war in East Pakistan and the Indian intervention in December 1971 caused the dismemberment of the country. India, however, merely played out a scenario blueprinted by successive Pakistani governments. The savage violence that was perpetuated by the Pakistani Army against the East Pakistani population addresses itself to the fundamental differences between the two wings.[33] Most important, it dramatized the West Pakistani claim to superiority: the belief that a dominant power can lord it over a weaker client. The Bengalis clearly had every right to feel like second-class citizens or worst still, exploited colonials. The fact that only self-determination

could satisfy their needs was written large in the bloodletting that inundated the province. It also could not be ignored that the imperialism inherent in Islamic ideology negated nationalistic orientations, and in the absence of the latter, constitutionalism was made possible.

1972–1977. The military establishment was a shambles after the capitulation of the garrison in East Pakistan to Indian forces. Discredited as well as humiliated the Army beat a hasty retreat and gladly passed authority to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Pakistan People's Party. Yahya was condemned and placed under house arrest and Bhutto headed the first civilian government since the 1958 coup. Bhutto promised to heal the nation's wounds, to draw the people into a tight community, to provide for its general welfare, and most important, to give it a constitutional order that reflected their aspirations. Bhutto, however, was a creature of events. He was better able to manipulate conditions than to create them. He rightly understood that the times demanded a saviour and although obliged to support a programme of national reform, he was more inclined to emphasize his indispensable leadership. Bhutto equated his personality with Pakistan itself. Without him Pakistan would cease to have any meaning, and no one believed this more than Bhutto. But such thinking can hardly lead to a *new* Pakistan, let alone create a durable order. Pakistanis have displayed substantial need for a supreme ruler, but self-proclaimed leaders have not fared well. Pakistanis appear to derive satisfaction from the destruction of their more powerful symbols. And Bhutto was to be no exception.

Bhutto became Pakistan's President under the state of emergency that had been declared in 1971 and which continued during his tenure. In 1973 the country was given its third constitution. Once more it described a parliamentary system in a federal state. Unlike previous constitutions, however, the power of the President was circumscribed and limited to ceremonial functions. Real power was wielded by the Prime Minister and Bhutto gave up the presidency for that office. The drafting of the constitution proved to be a divisive affair. The Constituent Assembly which had been organized for that purpose comprised members of the different parties that had achieved status in the 1970 election. The PPP was the dominant force in the assembly and Bhutto presided over the sessions as its president, but even this could not prevent a heated debate.

The loss of East Pakistan did not have the effect of drawing the people of Pakistan into a solid community.[34] Moreover, the controversies in the constituent assembly focused on the many issues dividing the country, the regions, and the politicians. High on the agenda was the question of Pakistan as an Islamic State. Bhutto and the PPP wanted to underplay this feature but conservative elements were suspicious of PPP intentions and they insisted on the inclusion of rigid Islamic provisions. Representatives from the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan called for the reinstatement of Islamic penalties, such as corporal punishment for thievery. They also demanded that the veil be made compulsory for all women. Bhutto recognized the need to adapt to the climate and in calling for 'Islamic Socialism' reassured the Muslim fundamentalists that the constitution would include Islamic provisions. When it was promulgated, however, there was little more in the 1973 constitution concerning Islam than had appeared in the 1956 orl962 versions. All three constitutions made reference to the 'sovereignty of Allah' but the application of the phrase was left in an ambiguous state.

As with the previous constitutions, the 1973 document cites 'all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah… and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to injunctions of Islam.'[35] The clause had broad implications but it was obvious that the PPP meant to limit its implementation. The same could be said about the Islamic Council which bore curious similarity with the same institution in the Ayub constitution. The Council was given advisory powers and could not order changes in the secular performance. Moreover, the National Assembly and provincial legislatures were not obligated to accept the advice of the Council and nothing could prevent them from acting without the sanction of the Islamic Council. As in the previous constitutions, this one too declares that the President must be a Muslim, an even more meaningless gesture in light of the loss of East Pakistan. Present-day Pakistan has only a very few non-Muslims and no one from this minority can aspire to high office. Other sections in the constitution refer to Islamic principles and policy and suggest that ideologically Pakistanis will be free to order their lives in accordance with the basic concepts of Islam. Article 40 also says the State 'shall endeavour to preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among the Muslim countries

based on Islamic unity'. Indeed, more emphasis is placed upon the solidarity of Muslims all over the world than in any previous constitution.

Article One of the 1973 constitution describes Pakistan as an Islamic Republic. The same phrase was utilized in the 19S6 document, although initially Ayub omitted references to an Islamic Republic in his 1962 constitution and only relented under great pressure to reconsider his position. Article Two of the 1973 constitution declares: 'Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan.' The phrase did not appear in the 1956 or 1962 constitutions and the implications of its inclusion are only being realized since the removal and execution of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.

Bhutto's attempts to exploit Islamic sentiment were scarcely different from those of his predecessors. What he wanted was absolute power and the 1973 constitution does not obscure Bhutto's efforts at forming a totalitarian system, something his predecessors considered but rejected as unsound. Bhutto's refusal to permit an unqualified parliamentary system led to the resignation of his astute Law Minister, M. A. Kasuri. It also caused the political opposition in the National Assembly to boycott the proceedings leading up to the finalization of the document. Although Bhutto worked out a compromise formula concerning the powers of the Prime Minister and received the grudging support of the opposition, the powers conferred upon the office meant that there could be no real challenge to PPP rule in the National Assembly for at least ten years. Bhutto insisted that all his suggestions and enactments were aimed at avoiding political instability. Parliamentary systems, he opined, can be extremely weak. Moreover, the lessons learned from the first parliamentary period, 1947–1958, necessitated corrective procedures. Bhutto would have preferred a strong presidential system and a submissive legislature, but, if he had to accept the parliamentary system, then he wanted to be certain that the powers of the Prime Minister could not be undermined by political manoeuvres in the Assembly. Bhutto's opposition, however, was unimpressed with this explanation. To Wali Khan and others, Bhutto was blatantly erecting a political system that placed him above reproach or scrutiny.

The 1973 constitution was in force approximately four years when Bhutto was overthrown, his dream of total power smashed, and the country once more placed under military rule. Neither the constitution nor any other statutes or traditions could save Bhutto from a tragic end.

1977 to the present. Constitutions continue to reflect the times in which they operate. This is particularly true in Pakistan. The military regime headed by General Zia-ul-Haq did not choose to abrogate the 1973 constitution when it deposed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Article Six of the 1973 constitution contains a clause which prevents its being abrogated by military coup-as was the case with the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. According to a constitutional provision, such abrogators will be committing acts of 'high treason'. It is doubtful that the military leaders have been restrained by Article Six. It is more likely that the 1973 constitution has been retained because the present government is not yet certain about its direction. They must have grasped the idea that constitutions cannot be made and unmade each time a political crisis occurs. In ridding the country of Bhutto, they also placed emphasis on his misdeeds rather than on the government's overall failure. Moreover, Zia and those who support him were integral members of the Bhutto system and a repudiation of the whole edifice would reflect ingloriously upon their own roles. Governments of men imply that the men are responsible. In this case, Pakistan's new rulers wish to publicize the fact that institutionally the country is intact. It was only certain erring individuals that had to be removed.

The constitution of 1973 belongs to the people of Pakistan. Bhutto tried to shape it to suit his peculiar ambitions. Given his demise that concern is no longer warranted. It can be assumed that the 1973 constitution will be continually amended so as to satisfy the needs of Pakistan's present and future leaders. Whether it will also prove meaningful to Pakistan's diverse population remains to be seen.

In the latter area, the Zia regime has attempted to invigorate those ambiguous sections of the constitution that make reference to Islamic principles and policy. These are the provisions which hold the greatest interest for the society at large. It is also clear from the actions of the post-Bhutto rulers that their references to an Islamic state form the foundation for their legitimacy. Pakistan's rulers have stated that the employment of Islamic law does not supercede the 1973 constitution. The constitution and Islamic law coexist and interact with each other in a way that strengthens both the Muslim polity as well as the Muslim community in Pakistan. Nevertheless, there is more than a hint in this presentation of a dual socio-legal system. The problem is not so much with that dichotomy, but rather how it impacts on an overarching political system that remains inchoate.

8
The Myth of Nation-Building

Some scholars believe the military intrusion into national politics, its forcible seizure of governmental authority, is a predictable phase in the nation-building process of third world countries.[1] Others tend to see such activity as a retrogressive, but nonetheless, inevitable occurrence.[2] A smaller number see the frequency of military coups in third world countries as evidence of the absence of political development and confirmation that political progress is essentially myth.[3] While none of these theories speak the whole truth, it is reasonable to hypothesize that all three explanations are useful in attempting to understand current problems in the third world. The prevalence of military coups and the omnipresence of military regimes in the relatively new nations addresses itself to fundamental inadequacies in the composition of these nation-states. It also suggests their emergence as independent sovereign entities was more the result of negative forces than constructive purpose. In other words, states like Pakistan did not emerge from the fusion of interrelated cultures and experiences, but from a general condition that only marginally affected the larger population. The general condition in this case was the collapse of a prevailing world order fashioned from European power. The retreat of Western colonialism left in its wake literally scores of new countries, the majority of which knew little about the evolution of the national state. Moreover, these new political entities were inchoate at the time of their independence, beset with extraordinary socio-economic dilemmas, and led, for the most part, by political amateurs. Although pulsating with excitement, their dynamism could not be translated into positive national achievement. Instead, popular enthusiasm only served to heighten expectations, create more tensions, and ultimately promoted crisis conditions. In these circumstances, survival not progress became the

essential concern. And the military establishment showed itself to be the more effective institution in managing critical events.

The Pakistani military is the only institution that has weathered the storms of the post-independence period. It has been reasonably successful in adapting to changing circumstances, in modernizing its performance, without undermining tradition. The bureaucracy which Pakistan inherited from Great Britain has been irrevocably transformed and is still in the process of evolving. Political organizations are constantly being spawned but these bear little resemblance to the Muslim League which breathed life into the nation. Pakistan continues to lack a national political organization and those of current note represent limited or local constituencies. In most instances, such parties are extensions of the personalities who dominate them. They seldom emphasize issues or concrete programmes.

The condition that places the military at the helm of affairs in Pakistan has its roots in the immediate post-independence period. The interposition of the armed forces between the masses and the political leadership, and the active suppression of the latter, prevented the development of a coherent political foundation. Neither politicians nor parties were given an opportunity to grow and deepen their experience. The politicians never overcame the colonial legacy which made them outsiders in their own country. Mistrusted, intimidated, controlled by those possessing physical power, political organizations were permitted to atrophy. For a while, the bureaucrats were advantaged by this situation. They assumed key decision-making roles and were buttressed in their actions by a military not yet ready to assume major political responsibility. But bureaucratic dominance was short-lived. The armed forces eventually pre-empted its role, forced its subordination, and ultimately dominated the entire administrative-political system. The momentary retreat of the armed forces after the loss of East Pakistan heralded a return to a form of civilian government. But the politicians, like the bureaucrats, could not prevent the uniformed officers from reasserting their authority. In a period of considerable social disorder, the armed forces returned to their familiar political role and once again extended their rule over the country.

The Pakistan military establishment, for all its strength *vis-à-vìs* the politicians, often seems embarrassed by its power and influence. Seldom has it appeared comfortable in a political role. This behaviour can be traced to military professionalism, a legacy which it inherited from the pre-

partition era. Therefore, instead of governing the country according to their own rules and precepts, the 'praetorians' have been obliged to adopt the mannerisms of the politicians that they so much despise. Moreover, rather than entertain the possibility of transforming the military into a formal political institution, the generals insist the country must be returned to civilian hands.[4] The problem which defies solution, however, is how to restore civilian government and at the same time avoid the reinstatement of political party activity. In other words, the military leaders hint that it is not the civilians that they find unacceptable, but their political organizations which are suspect, not because they espouse ideas which deviate from military practice, but because they represent fragmented groupings which seem to threaten not enhance national security. Military officials understand the functional relationship between the political leadership, the civil service and themselves. Pakistan's future rests on the capacity of the three groups to effectively integrate their responsibilities, and no one of them can adequately perform the tasks of the other two. But it has yet to be shown that they are capable of genuine cooperation.

Pakistan has not been successful at nation-building because it has failed miserably at state-building. A disparate people cannot be made into a solidary community if the government which supposedly represents their interests is itself riddled with contradictions and unable to lead. Pakistan is not the only country suffering from a crisis of leadership, but thus far no other country since World War II has been dismembered through the instrument of an internationalized civil war. Interestingly, neither the politicians nor the bureaucrats held power when East Pakistan seceded. The military establishment prides itself on being the defender of the nation's territorial integrity; nevertheless, a military junta had total command of the government when Bangladesh was created. No matter how ineffectual, quarrelsome, or corrupt the civilian regimes, they did not preside over so grievous a national loss. The record reveals that the Pakistan military has not been free of error. As a matter of fact, it has shown itself to be indecisive, vacillating, and inept. Factions within the Army and Air Force have encouraged rivalries that undermine confidence and weaken authority. Military leaders have permitted themselves to be deluded by political figures - Ayub Khan failed to weather a concerted effort by politicians to remove him and Yahya Khan permitted himself to be hamstrung by Bhutto

and Mujib. Despite their frail circumstances, the politicians found they could play the generals against one another.[5]

Zia-ul-Haq: Martial Law Politics

Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq was the Pakistan Army's most junior Lieutenant-General when Bhutto selected him to be Chief of the Army Staff in 1976. His appointment was prompted by a desire to retire those senior officers who had a long and intimate knowledge of Bhutto's performance and who were perceived as posing a threat to the government of the Pakistan People's Party. Zia was devoted to the military and all through his career never became involved in the political life of the nation. He served with British forces in Burma, Malaya, and Indonesia during World War II, and received his commission in 1945. As a native of the East Punjab he may be described as a member of the refugee (muhajir) community, having opted for Pakistan when the subcontinent was partitioned. After more than twenty years in the lower echelons of the Army hierarchy, Zia was promoted to Colonel in 1968, Brigadier in 1969, and Major-General in 1972. Identified as a heavy armour specialist, Zia was sent to Jordan to train King Hussein's troops in the use of their new equipment. In 1975 he was promoted to Lieutenant-General and appointed a Corps Commander. Zia was a proper soldier and a devout Muslim. He was reserved, somewhat introspective, and not given to outward displays of personal gratification. He appeared to be the perfect choice of a military leader who under no circumstances would interfere with his civilian superiors in the political system. Indeed, it is widely held that Zia was reluctant up to the last minute of decision to move against Bhutto.

A directive by Zia to his troops issued on 7 May 1977, just two months before the coup, ordered his forces to refrain from becoming embroiled in politics. After Bhutto ordered martial law in Karachi, Lahore, and Hyderabad, Zia sent secret communications to his high command reiterating the army's non-political role and got the joint chiefs of the various services to issue a public statement:

> We wish to make it absolutely clear that the Pakistan army, navy, and air force are totally united to discharge their constitutional obligations in support of the present legally constituted government.[6]

Zia had been trained to respect the chain of command and Bhutto was his superior officer. Moreover, he was convinced that any overt military involvement in the political turmoil would only lead to factions that would split the armed forces. Fearing exploitation of Pakistan's internal weaknesses by foreign powers, Zia concluded he was duty-bound to follow the dictates of the PPP government. Zia, therefore, had to be pressured into taking action against Bhutto. It was only when his corps commanders impressed upon him the necessity for action that he gave the order to seize Bhutto and dismantle the PPP regime. The six corps commanders were five Lieutenant-Generals: Mohammad Iqbal, Arbab Jehanzeb, Sarwar Khan, F. A. Chisti, and Ghulam Hassan; and one Major General: Gulam Mohammad. Of this group, General Iqbal, Chisti, and Jehanzeb were considered most influential. The consensus of the corps commanders was that the Army was on the verge of a mutiny. The disorder in the streets and Bhutto's order that the troops fire on demonstrators were opposed by many field officers. They balked at the order to shoot their countrymen, especially when many of the younger officers shared the views of the protestors. Among these younger men were officers whose families had been intimidated or harmed by the repressive tactics of the Bhutto administration, and they had personal as well as more general reasons for disliking the PPP and its leadership.

Zia's initial refusal to accept the complaint against the Bhutto regime cast him with the PPP and for a while made it more than likely that an attempt at overthrowing the government would also be directed at terminating his control of the Army. The Army had turned on the politicians before, but it did not have the tradition of turning against its own kind. (Ayub Khan had crushed an attempt by senior officers to oust him as army chief in 1951. The event became known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy.) Ayub and Yahya were permitted to retreat from public life and to retire to the contemplative life. The possible overthrow of Zia therefore opened a pandora's box of unforeseen problems. It would have meant the military high command had sacrificed its professional neutrality and had become so politicized that only a wider purge could satisfy the potential coup leaders. And if this was the plausible scenario, it followed that the Pakistan military establishment would be radically changed from essentially a fighting force to a more

political organization. Zia was a loyal subordinate in the Bhutto administration, but given the alternatives of maintaining his support or preserving the integrity of the armed forces, he ultimately agreed to follow the dictates of his colleagues.

Within twenty-four hours of the *coup d'etat* Pakistan returned to a calm not experienced since the period prior to the election campaign. Bhutto's pictures were removed from all public offices and a martial law government headed by Zia announced their limited goals. Democracy, Zia said, would be returned to the country in the autumn, just three months hence. New elections would be held and a legitimate civilian government installed. Zia said he had no interest in political power and wanted to transfer authority to civilian leadership as quickly as possible. In the meantime, the country would be stabilized, the economy revived and the social scene brought into conformity with Islamic principles. Zia had already introduced reforms in the Army which had eliminated many liberal western practices. He was now determined to press for the observance of Islamic rules throughout the country. Not only did he believe this was what the overwhelming majority of Pakistanis desired, but he was convinced it was the only way to restore the country's sense of purpose. It was notable that Zia's actions as Chief Martial Law Administrator were first applauded by Mian Tufail Mohammad, the leader of the Jamaat-i-Islami with whom Zia shared affinities. Tufail was also a relative of Zia's although this latter point was not considered significant. The Jamaat never postured itself as a full-blown political party and Zia's attachment to the organization stemmed more from his perception of its philosophical and disciplinarian activities which more or less coincided with his own thinking and attitude.[7]

For a brief period following the new military takeover, the politicians, PPP officials as well as leaders of the political opposition, were arrested but housed in relative comfort in the mountain resort village of Murree, a relatively short distance from Islamabad. Meanwhile the Pakistan Election Commission began drawing up plans for an October election and the politicians were told to clean up their act prior to this event. The military establishment, it was stressed, wanted an honest, short campaign. Attempts by any political party to upset the peace would not be tolerated. Most important, the politicians were notified that Islamic laws would be enforced and that they were duty-bound to observe the rules in scrupulous fashion.

Probity, piety, and service were expected of all officials and deviants could not anticipate holding public office.

With the ground rules in place, Zia released the politicians who immediately began to prepare for the scheduled elections. Bhutto was most eager to return to the political wars. His PPP was recognized as the dominant political organization and in a straight election he saw no chance of losing at the polls. Although Zia was apparently ready to see Bhutto return, the officers who had earlier forced his hand were not prepared to entertain that possibility. Zia was on record as wanting to see Bhutto run in the October election. During his first public interview following the coup he declared it was 'in the interest of the nation' that Bhutto test his political strength with the other political leaders. When cries of indignation were expressed by members of the ulema, insisting Bhutto not only be disqualified from participating in the elections, but also be tried for crimes against Islam and the nation, Zia used a Friday prayer service to defend the erstwhile leader of the country. 'We have toppled Mr Bhutto from the skies to the earth. Let us not be emotional but practical. Before you propose a punishment for someone, ask yourself if you would like such a punishment if you were in the same predicament.'[8] Zia stressed that his was merely a caretaker operation which would be over in ninety days. After this period the civilian leaders would again be given control over the nation's political affairs and he anticipated returning to his post in the Army. 'I will never in my life accept a political office,' he said.[9] According to Zia, the Army's role was to guarantee the holding of fair elections and to transfer power as quickly as possible.

Zia's public statements, however, could not conceal a political condition which continued to pose a genuine threat to the country's well-being. Bhutto's removal had not altered the political makeup of the various factions nor had it convinced the opposition politicians that they should merge into one permanent party. Although a consensus existed on the establishment of an Islamic system, there was little else to sustain the disparate coalition of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). The PNA's divided state gave Bhutto an excellent opportunity to regain office. Only the military stood in his way. And those members of the armed forces who were not prepared to see Bhutto reinstated, joined with the dissident politicians and together they publicized stories about the brutalities and excesses of the Bhutto administration. Zia could not ignore the accounts of gross abuse of

power that were levelled at Bhutto. Moreover, the Army had launched an investigation of Bhutto's Federal Security Force (FSF), had arrested its head Masud Mahmood and disarmed his troops. Records uncovered in the seizure of FSF files revealed numerous acts, supposedly taken on Bhutto's orders, against the political opposition. In a number of cases the regime's antagonists had been violently killed. The arrest of Viqar Ahmed, the bureaucracy's Establishment Secretary and Rao Rashid, Chief of Bhutto's National Intelligence Bureau also led to further disclosures. With the political opposition sustaining its demand that Bhutto be tried along with his associates for atrocities commited against the Pakistani nation, Zia was again confronted by his corps commanders. After an intense discussion it was agreed to rearrest Bhutto, to examine the charges being levelled against him, and to try him if the evidence warranted it. It was also decided to cancel the planned October election and to perpetuate rule by martial law into the indefinite future.

Special tribunals were established to review the actions and policies of the former political leaders and many were disqualified from participating in political activities. Initially six cases were filed against Bhutto, namely: rigging the 1977 elections, filing a false declaration of assets under Martial Law Order No. 21, misusing public funds, abusing his official powers, misappropriating secret service funds to unauthorized expenditure of foreign exchange and illegal importation of foreign goods. More important than these charges, however, was the government's decision to open a three year old criminal case in which Bhutto was accused of ordering the murder of a political rival. Although the alleged target was Ahmed Raza Kasuri, the would-be victim's father died in an attack reputedly carried out by members of the FSF. The Kasuri family brought charges against the former Prime Minister and after studying the evidence it was agreed to prosecute Bhutto and the perpetrators of the act. By this time Zia had drastically changed his views. He publicly denounced Bhutto as a 'Machiavellian' and an 'evil genius' who was bent on destroying the country. His open criticism of his once respected leader did not calm the tense atmosphere, nor was it likely to aid the defendant.[10] But it did confirm the prevailing belief that the military establishment had made up its collective mind never to permit Bhutto to wield political power again, The government therefore took the decision to proceed immediately with the trial.

Once Bhutto had been rearrested and the decision to try him for murder had been taken, Zia seemed to change his approach. In one exchange he was reported as saying:

> Have you ever heard of a Prime Minister of a country being accused of murder? Where is the morality? This person, by being Prime Minister of this country, has sold us out. He has left no standard of political morality. Is this the type of leader we want? He was running this country on more or less Gestapo Lines, misusing funds, blackmailing people.[11]

In that same conversation Zia let it be known that he would not retire early from his political responsibilities, as first had been believed. 'I am running this country now, and it will be run the way I say.' While stressing his authoritarian powers, Zia also commented that the survival of Pakistan 'lies in democracy and democracy alone.'[12] The democracy of which he spoke, however, was less the text book version and more a system suitable to the needs, culture and aspirations of the Pakistani nation as interpreted by its leadership, and particularly the military establishment.

The Military Regime

Bhutto's trial commenced in the Autumn of 1977 and continued well into the following year, capturing most of the attention during the military regime's first year in power, but the government was not inactive. General Zia made several foreign journeys, visiting with Middle Eastern leaders who were supporters of Pakistan. He endeavored to show them that the country was stable under his rule and that Pakistan's policies had not been altered by Bhutto's fall. Zia also sought to have Pakistan's debt repayment schedule changed so that the country could meet its international obligations without affecting his government's efforts to resurrect the economy. Pakistan's foreign debt was estimated to be $7.4 billion dollars in 1979, approximately forty per cent of the nation's gross national product. Meeting payments on this enormous sum was virtually impossible and economic progress could not be envisaged without the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium agreeing to a temporary moratorium.[13] American reluctance to revise the payment schedule was judged only a temporary obstacle and the

Pakistani leaders were optimistic about the outcome of their efforts. The Pakistan government also gave new support to the free enterprise system and endeavored to attract more private investment by denationalizing many industries and other commercial and agricultural enterprises. In a similar move, numerous educational facilities were returned to private hands and new schools, especially religious institutions, were given encouragement to open their doors.

Moreover, the Zia administration looked favourably on the advice of Mahbub ul-Huq who envisaged a broader decentralization of the economic decision-making process. Huq, the Director of the Policy Planning Department of the World Bank (located in Washington D.C.) and Ayub Khan's economic chief of perspective planning in the 1960s, urged that the individual provinces be provided with more autonomy to plan their economic future. The Federal Government, according to Huq, should continue to collect customs duties, income taxes and corporate taxes, but other taxes should be the prerogative of the provinces and monies collected could be allocated for projects deemed significant by local bodies. If these and other measures were followed, and it would appear that the Pakistan government seriously contemplated such a sharing of responsibilities, the World Bank economist was convinced that despite its debt problems, Pakistan was 'one of the most viable regions in the world on a long-term basis.'[14] Zia, apparently influenced in part by Huq's analyses, called for power to be returned to the grass-roots before it was transferred to civilian authorities at the centre.

Government bureaucracy was again overhauled. A commision was organized to investigate the civil service and the Federal Security Force was disbanded. Civil administrators who had shown themselves to be intimate with the PPP government were retired and younger officers were promoted into the coveted senior posts. But with all this activity attention was still riveted on the Lahore courtroom where Bhutto was not only fighting for his political life, but for his very survival. Begum Nusrat Bhutto, the former Prime Minister's wife, had petitioned the Pakistan Supreme Court claiming her husband was illegally held by the authorities because martial law was itself an illegal act. The Supreme Court, however, ruled unanimously that the martial law imposed on the country in July 1977 was an extraconstitutional step stemming from *necessity* and as such had legal validity. Therefore, Bhutto's trial was also proper and legal. Moreover,

noted the Court, the regime of Chief Martial Law Administrator Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq enjoyed both *de facto* and *de jure* authority. This ruling cleared the way for the consolidation of Zia's power and early in 1978 he explained how his government intended to restore the nation's socio-economic vitality as well as its political stability. Zia envisaged certain changes in an address to the nation:

> For many years now the country's economic development has not been based upon a medium term plan, and this has led to *ad hoc* decisions and an uncoordinated portfolio of projects and programmes. The resulting wastages and lack of direction needed to be corrected, and the Planning Division has been directed to prepare a Five Year Plan for the period beginning with the first of July this year [1978].[15]

Zia did not sound like a leader who was planning imminent retirement from political life.

In addition to efforts aimed at reviving the economy and managing Pakistan's development programme, Zia was eager to maintain a working relationship with the politicians. On 1 January 1978, he stopped the work of the Hyderabad Special Tribunal which had been trying the cases of a number of political leaders, particularly Wali Khan. He also used the occasion to release from detention more than eleven thousand persons held by the Bhutto regime for alleged political crimes. More than five thousand of the detainees were from the Punjab, slightly more than four thousand from the North West Frontier Province, approximately one thousand from Sind and about 350 from Baluchistan. A few days later Zia installed a Council of Advisors and included in the body some of the nation's more prominent and respected professional and political leaders as well as members of the armed forces and bureaucracy. The martial law government also gave renewed attention to the agricultural sector and Pakistan's extensive farming population.

The Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) was revitalized. It was intended to divide the nation into 600 marketing regions (marakez) rather than return to Ayub Khan's union council scheme with its heavy emphasis on 'basic democracy'. Zia reiterated his government's intention to improve the administration of the rural sector and to raise agricultural yields. Toward this goal, the government promised to mobilize all available resources, promoted the formation of *ad hoc* Rural Development Councils at the District Level, demanded close coordination between field and

secretariat administrators, and where possible called for the establishment of agro-based industries through people's cooperatives and IRDP bodies. Training for rural development was not neglected and a National Training Centre for Rural Development was opened in Islamabad. This institution was given responsibility for developing and overseeing the work of the existing rural education institutions that had been established in the 1960s and had remained operative. As during the Ayub Khan era, Zia called for training in rural development for policymakers, government officials as well as workers and peasants.

In July 1978, marking the first anniversary of the military coup, Zia's Council of Advisors was replaced by a federal cabinet. The change was more in nomenclature than personnel, however, as many of the same persons who had filled posts in the previous body were retained. The swearing in of the cabinet gave the appearance of normalcy, and the ceremonial President of Pakistan, Fazal Elahi Chaudhury (who also served in that post during the later Bhutto years) officiated. As Chief Martial Law Administrator, Zia continued to hold a number of portfolios, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Defence Production, Information and Broadcasting, Health, Population Planning and Social Welfare, Science and Technological Research, Atomic Energy, and Youth and Student Affairs. The activities of these ministries were managed by specialists directly responsible to Zia and there was little doubt of the military's intention to rule Pakistan with a firm hand.

Having overcome his initial difficulties, particularly his earlier indecisiveness, Zia consolidated his power and exuded substantial personal confidence in his capacity to govern. Surrounded by willing assistants from the civil-military bureaucracy in addition to the professional class, he did not hesitate to describe his blueprint for a new Pakistan. The centrepiece in his grand design was the Islamic State and the Nizam-i-Mustapha wherein all Muslim Pakistanis would be expected to live their lives in accordance with the principles of their religion. Islamic ideology was judged the nation's *raison d'etre* and alongside the Prophet of Islam, Zia emphasized the teachings and performance of the country's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah. 'If we follow these teachings with zeal and dedication, we will, Insha-Allah reach our destination… we will devote all our thoughts and actions to serve the cause of Islam and reinforce the Islamic Foundation of Pakistan.'[16] Zia's blend of the religious with the profane can be seen from

his decision to revitalize the separate electorate system. The elections which he now scheduled for November 1979 were to be conducted under separate lists, arranged according to religious preference. The fact that the separate electorate system was considered a vital aspect of the Pakistani Muslim code did not obscure the fact that it had nothing to do with Islam and was completely unknown outside the subcontinent. Moreover, the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) not only encouraged the disqualification of many important politicians from running for public office, he also promulgated an order empowering the Election Commission to bar any political party from competing in the election campaign if it did not believe in the ideology of Pakistan or in the country's national integrity. Politics was also forbidden in the nation's educational institutions, where the students had historically treated it as a national pastime. Pakistani journalists were told they would be given favours so long as they did not challenge the authority of those in power. Zia's admonitions to the student population and members of the press corps, his determination to control their behaviour, also explains his decision to retain in his person the portfolios of Youth and Student Affairs and Information and Broadcasting. All through this period, the Bhutto trial was a constant reminder of the country's political ills. The Lahore tribunal found the former Prime Minister guilty and sentenced him to be hanged. In May 1978 the Pakistan Supreme Court began hearing appeals on the verdict and death penalty, a process which was to consume many more months. Bhutto's attorneys used every legal tactic available to them in pleading for the life of the discredited national leader. Bhutto was also given the opportunity to speak in his own behalf before the Supreme Court. In the meantime the Zia government was busy producing one White Paper after another describing Bhutto's abuses of power and the corruption and stealth of his defunct administration.[17] In the end, the government won. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and Bhutto's ultimate fate devolved upon Zia. Zia could have commuted the death penalty if he desired, but once again he was not alone in making the final decision.

With rumours circulating that Bhutto's execution would produce a violent upheaval in the nation, the military leaders met to examine their options. The outcome of their conference sealed Bhutto's fate. In spite of pleas for clemency from governments in every quarter of the globe, and especially the intercession of Pakistan's staunch Arab Supporters in Saudi

Arabia and on the Persian Gulf, the military decided to proceed with the execution. Bhutto was hanged on 4 April 1979, and his body immediately dispatched for burial at his ancestral home in Larkana. Zia took full responsibility for the decision citing Islamic law and stressing that no one was above the law and that justice had been done. Although there was momentary grieving in a number of Pakistani cities, the anticipated wide-scale rioting never materialized. Some months later Zia was to comment that some of his countrymen considered him a traitor and an usurper. He, however, was strengthened in his conviction that he had restored democracy to the country. In a typical statement, he declared that if the evidence was available to prove his misbehaviour a subsequent government 'would be free to try him and even send him to the gallows'.[18]

By the time Zia reportedly made this statement he had become the sixth President of Pakistan. Fazal Elahi Chaudhury's term expired in August 1978 and on 16 September Zia took the oath of office. Again Zia explained his action as temporary and that he would step down as soon as a suitable replacement could be installed. While reiterating his lack of interest in political office, he explained that his acceptance of the presidency was the least controversial option. Indeed he insisted there was no other way to fill the vacancy. The other likely candidate was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court but Zia emphasized his preoccupation with the Bhutto appeal which, was still being heard at that time. In a later legal interpretation A. K. Brohi, the Minister of Law, explained that Zia was not being conferred any more power than he already possessed as Chief Martial Law Administrator. The President's role was strictly ceremonial and given the prevailing conditions in the country it was judged proper to concentrate both the ceremonial and operative functions in a single person. Irrespective of these explanations, however, it was reasonable to conclude that the military command wanted Zia in the President's office when the Supreme Court completed its deliberations in the Bhutto case.

The Zia-ul-Haq Presidency

President Zia-ul-Haq and his colleagues showed no inclination to lift martial law. Pakistan continued to be ruled by strict, disciplinarian rules

pronounced and enforced by the military establishment. Nonetheless, plans moved forward to hold general elections in November 1979. In the meantime Zia's government busied itself in placating the demands of the provinces, and pledging full support for their development schemes. Zia also announced a new educational policy which forecast compulsory universal education for all boys by 1982 and for girls by 1987. 13,000 new primary schools were to be constructed, and 17,000 existing institutions expanded. In addition, thousands of mohalla or village schools were to be opened to impart basic training in shop skills for boys and home economics for girls. The government plan also envisaged serving the handicapped and retarded as well as encouraging adult education. Religious schools (*madrassas, maktabs,* and *darululoom*) were given full government recognition and training in Islamyat was emphasized at all levels of instruction. In addition, the administration announced its intention to open thirty Arabic teaching centres. Considerable financial resources had been pledged or received from a number of Arab countries for the latter programme.

Zia also dealt with the needs of the farming population when he announced new subsidies for the construction of tubewells, the importation and distribution of tractors, abolition of the water tax on new or additional acreage put under wheat cultivation, and government support to help pay the increasing price of fertilizer. Pakistan's wheat production had been seriously affected by rust and the government reported that the United Nations Development Programme had agreed to supply the country with $300,000 with which to purchase rust-resistant wheat seed for future crops. In the interim, however, the government was dependent on imported wheat to compensate for its domestic losses. In 1978–9 Pakistan was required to obtain approximately two and a half million tons of foreign wheat in order to meet its domestic requirements. Even India supplied Pakistan with several thousand tons of wheat seed. Despite the problems facing the economy the government reported a substantial increase in the gross national product. The relative calm that followed the 1977 coup and the new incentives provided private investors were judged contributing factors to the improvement.

President Zia continued to speak about his intention to return the government to civilian hands but it was obvious he wanted to reform Pakistani society in every respect before such a transfer of authority took

place. The official creation of Islamic Canon Courts (Shariat Benches) in December 1978 fulfilled a promise Zia made to the Muslim public that religious legal codes would have equal if not superior standing with established secular law. The Shariat Benches were given the power to determine whether any laws in force in the country were un-Islamic, in other words, in opposition to the teachings and principles of Islam. According to the declaration, the decision of the Shariat Courts could not be challenged in any secular court or tribunal and would be binding on the government which must act to amend the law in question.

Pakistan's political scene, however, remained ill-defined. The cabinet which was created in the summer of 1978 included representatives from the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). But the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan and the National Democratic Party decided to withdraw from the PNA and the government and thus maintain their independent identities. Subsequently, the remaining PNA group in the cabinet resigned their positions in order to prepare for the election campaign and to avoid being labelled as instruments of the military government. Left to their own designs the politicians quickly divided into their separate groupings and it was apparent that a unified national party could not be assembled by the scheduled polls on 17 November 1979. Observing the fragmentation Zia laid down the ground rules for the conduct of the electoral campaign. The campaign was to be brief and debate was to be reduced to a minimum. Every effort was to be made to prevent popular emotions from overwhelming the basic issues. Politicians were to confine themselves to a form of pedagogy and were to instruct their supporters in the merits of the question rather than arouse their passions against authority. Moreover, government was to be appreciated rather than made the target of abuse. Political leaders who ignored these guidelines ran the risk of arrest and imprisonment. Most important, however, the Zia administration sought to cope with the traditional methods of political exploitation and the tendency toward negative campaigning.

The people were impressionable and easily led astray by local politicians and the government frowned on demagoguery in all its forms. Thus Zia endeavoured to define the parameters for political exchange. Pakistan's Islamic ideology, the federal parliamentary system and provincial autonomy identified with the 1973 constitution were judged complete and no challenge was permissable. Zia also made mention of the relationship

between the President and the Prime Minister. He argued the Prime Minister should wield less power than Bhutto and that the President should have more prerogatives than those bestowed on Fazal Elahi Chaudhury. In order to get at the root cause for corruption, in part a reflection of the imbalance in this power equation between the former Prime Minister and President, the government assembled a Commision on the Eradication of Corruption. The commission was given the power to study all levels of government as well as the various sectors of society. The broad mandate involved seeking to understand the nature of corruption in the country, why the laws in force were not successful in limiting its growth and what could be done to remedy the problem. Anti-corruption commissions and conferences were hardly an innovation. But it was obvious from the character of the charge that Zia and his colleagues actually contemplated reclaiming Pakistan as the 'land of the pure' and what better place to start than with the chief office-holders in the country. In addition, a code of behaviour was developed for all officers, whether political or bureaucratic. Deviations from these principles would provide the military establishment with sufficient justification to remove officials, irrespective of their claims of popular support.

The politicians were less than pleased with Zia's public pronouncements concerning their probity and honesty. They also sensed that his promised grant of civilian leadership had too many restrictions to be considered a genuine transfer of authority. Despite Zia's constant refrain that he was not interested in holding public office and only wished to restore civilian authority in the country, sceptics and critics saw in his performance an overriding interest in politics and a strong desire to sustain his power. A number of politicians compared Zia to the late Ayub Khan. When Zia showed hesitation in holding the general elections until local elections could be completed, many of his detractors concluded that the martial law authorities were determined to reinvigorate the defunct Basic Democracies system. Zia responded that he never entertained reinstating that discredited local government arrangement but felt strongly that the people at the grassroots should have the opportunity to select their representatives in the union and district councils and the municipal committees. Only after such an expression of preference could the masses register their support for officials at a higher level. Zia wanted to be assured that the people of Pakistan were led by officials of their choosing.

In May of 1979 the Pakistan Election Commision had delimited the constituencies for both the national and provincial assemblies. It was agreed that the National Assembly would comprise 218 members- 200 Muslim seats, 8 for non-Muslims, and 10 for women. The provincial breakdown gave 115 to the Punjab, 43 to Sind, 26 to the Northwest Frontier Province, 7 to Baluchistan, 8 to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and one to the Federal Capital. The number of seats in each of the provincial assemblies also reflected the distribution of the country's population. The Punjab provincial assembly was to have 240 seats, the Sind assembly was given 100, the NWFP would have an 80-member house and the Baluchi body would be the smallest with 40. At the same time Zia streamlined his cabinet, reducing the number of ministers from 21 to 13. Anyone desirous of contesting the elections was required to leave the cabinet by 31 May. Therefore, no cabinet officials would be eligible to stand for election. Zia reiterated his intention to return power to civilian control but reaffirmed his intention to make certain changes in the constitution before that transfer was completed. He again stressed the need to have a strong elected president who in an emergency could run the country, albeit with the assistance of the armed forces. Parliamentary politics would continue to be unpredictable and Zia was convinced that only the institution of the presidency with its built-in safeguards provided stability in trying situations. Similarly, he cited the armed forces as the only force capable of uniting the nation in time of trouble. These concerns Zia felt had to be made a part of the nation's constitutional structure.

One of the more controversial issues disturbing the politicians was Zia's insistence that the elections be conducted on the basis of proportional representation. The plan was directed at preventing a particular party, more than likely the PPP, from gaining more seats than the size of its popular vote seemed to warrant. Zia was concerned that the PPP could emerge as the largest and most powerful national organization in the country. Although perplexed over the weaknesses inherent in a fragmented political order, he was apparently more prepared to experience the latter (which he assumed the military could control) than countenance the revival of the PPP. Hence, the suspicions he aroused concerning his own ambitions tended to expand not diminish. Zia's scheme for proportional representation was as follows:

Under the existing system the winner of an electoral contest, irrespective of the percentage of his vote, gained control of that particular constituency

and the office that it represented. This meant a political party could obtain less than fifty per cent of the popular vote but substantially more seats in the assemblies. In India, for example, where this system also prevails, the Congress Party up until 1977 was the overwhelming winner but never received more than forty-five per cent of the popular vote. It was this situation which Zia sought to prevent. The PPP was still recognizably the most sophisticated party in the country. Under the old system it could expect to win control of the government even though its proportion of the total vote was less than a majority. Zia stressed that this was the problem in both the 1970 and 1977 elections which gave the PPP a position of superiority and left the numerous smaller parties without an adequate voice in governmental affairs. Under Zia's system of proportional representation a return to this type of unbalanced representation would be avoided.

Zia argued that his plan was far more democratic than the previous arrangement. All shades of opinion would be represented in the assemblies and the legislatures would be more accurate reflections of the political interests of Pakistan's disparate population. Moreover, the Zia administration was eager to raise the level of political consciousness among the country's elected representatives. Under the single-member constituency system representatives reflected parochial issues. The proportional representation plan aimed at creating national awareness and making the elected officials responsible to the nation rather than their more limited constituents. It was also an attempt to prevent the drawing of district constituencies to benefit the dominant party. But most significantly it meant that large groups of voters who did not identify with the winner, but whose votes had been split into fractions by the multi-candidate nature of their district would be assured of some representation.

The form of proportional representation chosen for use in Pakistan was a modification of the West German system which combined the single transferable vote and the list system. Described as the *mixed* system of proportional representation it involved the following:

(1) Fifty per cent of the seats were filled by the relative majority system using single member districts.
(2) Fifty per cent of the seats were filled from party lists.
(3) Political parties that had not secured at least three seats or failed to obtain less than five per cent of the valid votes cast would not be

entitled to participate in the proportional representation scheme.

In order to give the plan direction it was necessary to reduce the 200 Muslim seats in the National Assembly from 200 to 100 constituencies. In other words two adjoining constituencies, previously delimited, were to be combined in one. Each constituency would then elect one member by relative majority and the other by the list system. All political parties would file two nomination papers: one seeking election on the basis of relative majority, the other to be drawn from a list prepared by the individual party which had its own order of preference. The Election Commission would have the responsibility of scrutinizing the nomination papers of each candidate in both the individual nomination as well as the list. Any candidate deemed unacceptable by the Commission could be disqualified. This latter process was supposed to prevent persons previously prevented from holding public office from participating in the elections.

The overseeing of the elections was judged essential by the Zia administration, given the widespread illiteracy in the country and the demagogic appeals that could be made to an unsuspecting public. Thus it was agreed that voters should cast one vote for a candidate seeking election on the basis of relative majority and that this same vote would be considered a vote for the candidate's political party. After all the votes had been counted on a national basis for candidates in the constituencies and parties, a quota would be developed dividing the total number of votes cast in the elections by the total number of seats available on the list basis. The quotient formed the quota. The Election Commission was to determine how many seats were due each party from the lists and these were to be apportioned according to the pre-arranged quota. Parties failing to obtain three seats or polling less than five per cent of the valid votes were not entitled to any seats from the list although they could retain those seats won on the basis of relative majority. Similarly, independent candidates retained seats won on the basis of relative majority but were not entitled to any list seats.

Finally, the system of proportional representation allowed for coalitions of parties but in such circumstances coalitions were to be treated as single parties and controlled like any other political organization. According to the government, the proportional representation system avoided the abuses found in past political situations and offered the country institutions that

were more broadly representative. While it appeared to prevent the development of a one-party dominant system by establishing a lower limit for obtaining seats in the legislatures, it also appeared to avoid the excessive splintering of party organizations.

In putting forth his electoral plan Zia again reiterated his desire to not only retire from political life once the elections were over and a new government installed, but also to retire from the Army. His term as Army Chief of Staff was to expire in March 1980 but in his view the country would be better served if the new government also had a new Army Chief when it took up its responsibilities. Scepticism over Zia's real intentions, however, did not diminish. Zia perceived himself a 'law-giver' and he was not content to leave his post until sufficient safeguards had been erected. Mindful of the disarray in the political parties, the criticism levelled against his administration and his personal style, Zia called for elections to local units of government prior to the holding of general elections. Suspecting an old ploy which would prevent the political parties from forming the government, the politicians were vocal and virtually unanimous in their opposition to such an approach. They argued that first the martial law government must return power to civilian hands before it would be proper to hold elections to local bodies. Faced with this resistance Zia announced his intention to proceed with the general elections but as Chief Martial Law Administrator he would be duty-bound to postpone them if the country was threatened by renewed unrest.

On 23 August 1979, Zia revealed he would ignore the protests of the politicians and would indeed call for local elections before those for the national and provincial assemblies. 'We have to reach the grassroots first and hand over power on that level before going on to general elections.'[19] He also informed the politicians that they would not be able to tamper with the local elections, since they would be contested, said Zia, by individuals who would not be identified with any particular party. When some political leaders registered their displeasure with the arrangement and threatened to have their candidates for local office boycott the elections, Zia was disturbed but determined to follow his plan. He was especially mindful of the opposition from the PPP. Bhutto's party, now under the leadership of the dead chairman's wife and daughter, refused to cooperate with the administration. Mrs Bhutto had been charged with numerous violations of martial law and the government insisted it would try her in a court of law.

In the meantime she was disqualified from participating in political activity. When her daughter Benazir assumed the leadership of the party and publicly denounced Zia as the murderer of her father and called for the overthrow of the regime, she too was charged with unlawful activity. The PPP's overall response was to defy government regulations concerning the official conduct of the political parties. The PPP refused to register their intention to run candidates in the election, to open its organizational activities to public scrutiny, to describe the rules under which it operated, or to submit its finances to an audit. While Zia was reiterating his belief that the elected politicians would not retain his services as President once the elections were over, it was also apparent that the 17 November polls might yet be postponed and military rule perpetuated. Indeed there was no evidence as yet available to show that power would be transferred to the country's civilian leaders.

On 4 October the Pakistan People's Party accused Zia of rigging the November polls. The office of the party's Acting Secretary had been assumed by former General Tikka Khan, the man most closely identified with the atrocities in East Pakistan prior to the creation of Bangladesh. Tikka Khan had also been called upon to serve Bhutto as chief enforcer of the PPP's martial law edicts in the period immediately preceding the July 1977 coup. After retiring from the army, Tikka became one of the more outspoken critics of the Zia regime. With older PPP leaders either co-opted, dead, discredited, incarcerated, disqualified, or simply intimidated, he moved into the key party post in an effort to prevent the organization from completely disintegrating. It was Tikka therefore who called a news conference to declare that Zia was preventing candidates who could challenge his authority from running for election. 'This is no doubt the worst form of rigging and fraud, aimed only at keeping the Pakistan People's Party out of the field,' he said.[20] The erstwhile military leader insisted that the PPP would gain control of the national and provincial legislatures despite the impediments placed in its path. He hinted that candidates identified with other parties or independents would really be PPP representatives. Or barring this, successful candidates from small, nondescript parties would be eventually won over to the PPP position. Reiterating the PPP's refusal to comply with government demands and rules concerning the conduct of the parties and the elections, Tikka revealed that his party would nominate candidates anyway. PPP defiance of government

directives increased tensions as the date for the elections drew close. The PPP was gambling that Zia could not postpone the elections given his commitment to the other parties from the Pakistan National Alliance and the attentive public which had been primed to expect a political test at the polls. But Zia and his colleagues in the junta were not about to yield to these pressure tactics. Sensing that the date for the election was premature and that the campaign was likely to produce considerable law and order problems, the government put new restrictions on political parties which provoked the PPP into saying it would not register for the elections. Many of the opposition parties followed suit, remarking that the government did not want a genuine contest. It is also reasonable to suggest that many of the smaller political parties did not want to hold the scheduled elections since they did not stand to win very many seats and the form of coalition government that would have been required to manage the nation's affairs presented even more menacing prospects.

It is doubtful therefore that many people were surprised when Zia announced on 16 October that the elections would be indefinitely postponed. The President and Chief Martial Law Administrator ordered the immediate banning of all political parties and meetings, both public and private. Anticipating socioeconomic dislocation, strikes were declared illegal. And aware that a number of newspapers would condemn his decision, newspapers and magazines suspected of bias against the administration were seized by the government and closed. Those still allowed to function were placed under tight supervision and censorship. As other Pakistan leaders had done before him, Zia justified his action by saying the politicians were exploiting democratic prerogatives for nefarious personal gain. In his judgment their real intention was 'to destroy the country.'[21] In a get tough statement, Zia proclaimed that martial law would be tightened and that military tribunals would no longer permit their rulings to be tested in the civil courts. Zia also alluded to attempts to undermine the Islamic state which his administration had given new emphasis. Anti-Islamic socialist forces continued to pose a threat to the Pakistani way of life and these too found the democratic opportunities provided by the election useful in pressing their programmes of division. Zia was particularly disturbed over rising tensions with Afghanistan and the civil war in that country which was spilling across the Pakistani frontier (see chapter 9.) At the close of his declaration, Zia called for calm and obedience

in a time of significant national crisis. He still insisted he was committed to democracy and that he stood by his earlier promise to return the country to civilian leadership. But he reiterated his belief that Pakistan had neither restored the health of its economy, nor controlled corruption, nor stabilized its political order. Only the military stood between chaos and anarchy and prevented the nation from falling prey to alien powers. This was not the moment for the Pakistan armed forces to return to barracks.[22] Nation-building in Pakistan remained an uncertain and very painful process.

Nation-Building and State Building

Pakistan's emergence as an independent entity was not the outcome of an historic process of cultural fusion wherein numerous distinctive cultural and regional groups formed themselves into a solidary community. There was no voluntary association of otherwise disparate people with a political abstraction demanding their highest loyalty. Political consciousness did not transcend local environments and the people who became Pakistanis did not feel their future was enhanced by membership in an expanding community. There was no Pakistani nationalism prior to the grant of independence and very little emerged in the decades that followed. In absence of national communitarian instincts or motivations Pakistan was and remained an inchoate nation. But it was still a recognized state in the international arena. Paradoxically, it was accepted in the international community while still misunderstood by its own citizenry. Time was to show that its leadership could more successfully project the country's international image than it could interpret what Pakistan meant to its inhabitants.

After thirty years of experimentation with a variety of political designs the military establishment sensed the need to start the process of building the nation anew. The country's nationality groups were beyond coalescing into a community of Pakistanis. It was obvious that they would remain distinct, separate, and introspective. Cosmopolitanism would be confined to a small urban element with no capacity to alter the prevailing condition. National integration was possible within specified limits in professional endeavour, and possibly in the armed forces, but neither this nor the opportunity to become mobile, to travel and work in different surroundings

could produce national unity. Pakistan was destined to remain an idea whose time had not yet come and the country's military governors were required to come to grips with that reality. Hence their emphasis on Islamic ideology. Islam was the only force capable of sustaining a nation whose population either rejected or was oblivious to the meaning of a secular state. Moreover, various forms of ideology had been attempted by the Muslim League in the initial years after independence, by Ayub Khan later, and more recently by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. All these efforts came to nought. They were viewed as other-directed, imposed from the top and beneficial only to those who promoted their principles. These doctrines and programmes were resisted by the common folk as well as the more sophisticated who interpreted them as an assault on the very essence of their belief, values, and tradition. Through it all the notion of Islam as a binding and healing force remained intact. Islam was the wellspring from which the nation sprung, it was the life-force that sustained it, it was the single phenomenon relating governors to the governed.

Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq did not have the striking presence of an Ayub Khan, nor the erudition of a Bhutto. By contrast, he was a simple, colourless, often pedantic personality. There was little in Zia that endeared him to the populace. He possessed neither charismatic nor creative qualities. But in a way this may have been the type of leadership the country could respond to for the immediate future. The people of Pakistan seemed to have had enough of grand designs, exaggerated promises, and complex programmes. They appeared more inclined to follow leaders with views and perceptions similar to their own. They were suspicious of visionaries and sages and proved more receptive to those who spoke their idiom, who fashioned policy on the basis of popular experience, who emphasized the familiar and adhered to established convention.

Zia was ridiculed and condemned by his opponents and elements of the intelligentsia who preferred civilian bungling to military politics, but there was also ample recognition that the country required a long period of stability if it was ever going to find its true destiny. Military systems may or may not promote political development and modernization; nevertheless, their monopolization of coercive power guaranteed their dominance in Pakistan as in Bangladesh and so many other third world nations.

9
The Foreign Policy Dimension

Pakistan's foreign policy has been relatively constant and hence predictable. In spite of gross domestic instability there has been little substantive change in its overall international performance or outlook. The country has been obsessed with questions concerning its survival and has always assumed that inimical forces from without threatened its territorial integrity and sought its eventual destruction. The bangladesh episode did not calm Pakistani fears. The loss of East Pakistan is judged the work of India more than the result of overwhelming contradictions within the Pakistan design. Pakistanis are convinced that India never reconciled itself to the partition of the subcontinent and will exploit every opportunity to subdue the country and eventually absorb it.[1] Pakistan's foreign policy therefore was cast in a defensive mould from the earliest days following the grant of independence. Moreover, there is very little inclination to discard that posture. Since 1972, some efforts have been directed toward normalizing relations between the two large subcontinental neighbours, but suspicions remain unchecked and hostility has become a way of life.

India's detonation of a nuclear device in May 1974 did not ease the relationship. After an initial unfavourable reaction from numerous governments around the world, Pakistan was left alone to decry India's atomic prowess. On the one side, it has led a drive in the United Nations to have South Asia declared a nuclear free zone; on the other, it gave special attention to its own atomic programme and increased global fears that it will soon join the select circle of powers with nuclear weapons. There is little doubt that the urgency Pakistan attaches to the development of its nuclear capacity is linked to a perception of India as its number one enemy. Matching India in military capability has been a persistent theme, but the

desire has always been greater than the reality.[2] Although Pakistanis pride themselves on their warrior tradition, they have had little success in humbling their more powerful neighbour. Moreover, Pakistan's internal dilemmas, notably the loss of East Bengal, has not only reduced its military potential, it has also caused the people it seeks to rescue from Indian domination to question whether Pakistan really offers a meaningful alternative. Such is the case with the Kashmiri Muslims who have seldom displayed an eagerness either to join Pakistan or to identify with that country in making their own claim of self-determination. Every Pakistan government, including the current one, has publicized the right of the Kashmiris to determine their own future. Each administration has flatly announced that relations between Pakistan and India will be amicable once the Kashmir dispute is resolved. Nevertheless, India shows no indication of yielding to Pakistani demands, nor have the Kashmiris organized a liberation movement of any character or substance. In these circumstances, Pakistan has been left with few options. In 1956, as in 1947–8, it considered 'liberating' Kashmir through force of arms. Since that time, however, it has confined its tactics to propagandizing a Muslim cause, indeed one it readily equates with that of the Palestinian Arabs under Israeli overlordship. In the absence of genuine international pressures, India has thus far ignored this cause and in several tests of arms has proven itself quite capable of holding its territorial acquisitions. Pakistan's frustrations are also written large in its failure to enlist the Muslim world behind its 'great crusade'.

Patterns of Power

Pakistan has sought to compensate for its weakness by appealing to and/or aligning with countries and organizations that it believed could best serve its peculiar interests. Between August 1947 and May 1954, Pakistan looked to the Commonwealth and the United Nations and hoped those international bodies could assist it in gaining its political objectives. When India succeeded in flaunting their resolutions, Pakistan was compelled to look elsewhere for support. The Islamic world was either semi-dormant in the period immediately following World War II, or so plagued by its own problems, that it was fruitless for Pakistan to expect meaningful aid from

that quarter. This of course did not prevent the country from identifying with Muslim causes, especially in the matter of the Arab-Israeli conflict. But identifying with a common Muslim concern and promoting particular national interests were hardly synonymous. The Muslim states were reluctant to condemn India. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a respected third world leader and no other Muslim nation had reason to quarrel with India's activities. Pakistan, therefore, did not receive even the verbal support that it so willingly provided its co-religionists in the Middle East. Left with few options, and understanding that the United States was in search of Asian partners for its communist containment programme, the Pakistan government signalled its desire to join in the effort to construct a *cordon sanitaire* around the Soviet Union.[3] It never gave the same commitment to the confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC), however.

Pakistan was to become the United States' most trusted ally in Asia. The Eisenhower-Nixon-Dulles team was unusually enthusiastic about Pakistan's potential role in the alliance system that it was then in the process of building. They were impressed with General Ayub Khan, who, as the Pakistan Army's commander-in-chief, was determined to modernize and expand his military establishment. With the assistance of Iskander Mirza and Ghulam Mohammad, and the affable Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, Mohammad Ali Bogra, Ayub convinced the American leaders that Pakistan would be a useful and loyal ally. In May 1954, the two countries entered into a Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and a few months later Pakistan became a signatory to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).[4] The following year Pakistan joined Iraq and Turkey, and later Iran, in the Baghdad Pact (in 1958 renamed the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO). But it was obvious from the outset that Pakistan was never very serious about containing Soviet power and at no time was it suggested to Soviet leaders that they were unreconciled foes. Diplomatic relations were developed with Moscow, as with Peking, even before the alliance arrangements were entered into. They were further cultivated by successive Pakistani administrations which often went out of their way to prove their non-aggressive intentions.

Pakistan succeeded in communicating a message to the communist countries, and generally to the world at large that it had one essential concern, and that was India. Pakistan had room for the western states and

especially for the United States because it required leverage with which to combat India, it became the recipient of significant stores of relatively modern military equipment. In return, Pakistan pledged joint defence of the region and provided the Americans with a few strategically-placed military installations from which remote portions of the Soviet Union could be brought under surveillance. A principal base of operations was located outside Peshawar on the Northwest Frontier. For several years in the late 1950s the base was used by high-flying U-2 reconnaisance aircraft overflying the Soviet Union. The Soviet interception of a U-2 flight that had commenced its journey from Peshawar brought the first open criticism of the Pakistan government. In 1960, the Soviet Premier, Nikita Khrushchev, publicly announced that 'a red ring' had been drawn around Peshawar and he demanded that the flights cease at once or retaliatory action might be taken.[5] So far as can be determined no further flights were authorized by the United States government from Peshawar and even an American-manned radar station there was abandoned in the late 1960s.

The American alliances were materially beneficial to Pakistan. Not only did the country obtain large supplies of United States arms, it also became one of the leading recipients of American technical and economic assistance. Under United States government contracts, American industrial contractors, agricultural experts, educationists, medical practitioners, and social workers inundated the country in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Other European governments followed suit as did many private foundations, the most prominent in Pakistan being the Ford Foundation which conducted a varied and expensive programme aimed at national uplift. This heavy United States involvement in Pakistan was treated suspiciously by India and nothing could change this attitude despite similar, if not larger, American contributions to India's economic development. While charging the Americans with neo-imperialism, the Indians did not prevent United States material aid from filtering into the country. Nevertheless, India felt obliged to condemn American actions. It held to the argument that the weapons supplied Pakistan would be used against the Indian nation, not international communism. Moreover, it wished to emphasize its own non-alignment by developing intimate relations with the Soviet Union. The 1955 visit to India by the top Soviet leadership symbolized India's displeasure with the United States for including Pakistan in the Baghdad Pact and SEATO.[6]

Pakistan, of course, gained from this Indo-American controversy. By contrast with India's 'anti-American' behaviour, Pakistan was perceived by the United States government as a staunch ally. Pakistan's Second Five Year Plan was virtually an American enterprise and the liberal economic policies which promoted the growth of the private sector were in large measure due to United States influence. At the same time the United States committed itself to raising the standard of living of Pakistan's poverty-stricken population. Programmes in which Americans were involved ranged from the development of hydro-electric power, land reclamation, and irrigation projects to family planning, rural development, and education at all levels of instruction. This widespread use of American personnel, as well as financial and material resources, was accelerated after Ayub Khan's 1958 coup. It did not take long for the political opposition in Pakistan to conclude that the United States was the real power behind the Ayub 'putsch' and that the military had taken control of the country because the Americans feared the politicians were veering to the left.[7]

Ayub made no excuses for his close association with the United States. The Pakistani leader also indicated his desire to sustain good relations with China and a border agreement was signed by the two governments in 1963. The Soviet Union was also treated with equanimity and caution. But Ayub identified with western tastes, customs, and experience. Moreover, he recognized that only the United States was in a position to offer massive technical and material aid to his poor country. If Pakistan's growth was to be enhanced, it was his opinion that the western world was the more likely partner. Neither did Ayub see Pakistan playing a non-aligned role. Fear of India was one very important consideration and Pakistan had only limited means with which to provide for its own defence. But other considerations had to do with Pakistan's friendship with the Shah of Iran, and to a lesser extent with Turkey. Both Iran and Turkey were committed to western causes, were dependent on American military and economic support, and Ayub believed Pakistan had to follow their lead. Although the three Muslim countries all joined in accepting the Baghdad Pact and CENTO, in 1964, under Ayub's prodding, these same countries found it useful to organize their own grouping in the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD).[8] Anything which tended to solidify this northern tier of Muslim States was certainly satisfactory to the United States. The fact that all these

arrangements gave Pakistan a greater sense of security cannot be minimized. But Ayub

Table 1 —U.S. Economic Assistance to South Asia, Fiscal Years 1977-9 [In thousands of dollars; fiscal years]

Country and programme	1977 (actual)	1978 (estimate)	1979 (proposed)
Afghanistan:			
Development aid	20,011	18,621	21,350
Peace Corps	746	877	1,080
Public Law 480:			
Title I			
Title II	669	6,139	1,166
Total	21,425	25,637	23,596
Bangladesh:			
Development aid	60,796	64,839	87,000
Peace Corps			
Public Law 480:			
Title I	44,753	47,475	45,900
Title II	17,337	16,577	11,851
Total	122,857	128,891	144,751
India:			
Development aid		60,000	90,000
Peace Corps			
Public Law 480:			
Title I	41,789	27,800	30,900
Title II	103,930	94,071	99,337
Total	145,719	181,871	220,237
Nepal:			
Development aid	6,759	12,106	17,000
Peace Corps	1,203	1,417	1,341
Public Law 480:			

Country and programme	1977 (actual)	1978 (estimate)	1979 (proposed)
Title I			
Title II	894	2,030	483
Total	8,856	15,553	18,824
Pakistan:			
Development aid	52,715	51,805	69,000
Peace Corps			
Public Law 480:			
Title I	51,400	57,600	52,300
Title II	227	1,887	1,113
Total	104,342	111,292	122,433
Sri Lanka:			
Development aid	20,900	23,000	25,000
Peace Corps			
Public Law 480:			
Title I	36,281	31,400	16,800
Title II	3,729	3,881	4,660
Total	60,910	58,281	46,460
Grand total	464,109	521,525	576,301

Source: Agency for International Development. Reprinted in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, ***The United States, India, and South Asia: Interests, Trends, and Issues for Congressional Concern*** (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 19.

still had to contend with the domestic forces that perceived all these activities as the machinations of a greedy military dictator, concerned solely with his personal aggrandizement.

Ayub's intimacy with the United States proved to be a mixed blessing. The country strengthened its military capability, accelerated economic development and enhanced the lives of the entrepreneurial and bureaucratic élites. The masses, however, were largely untouched by the efforts to expand the country's material base. They were also easy prey for the alienated intelligentsia and the disaffected politicians who had been treated with such indifference by the regime. Thus when China and India engaged

in a limited border war in 1962, and the United States rushed military assistance to the latter, the Pakistani opposition had the issue that they long sought.[9] Ayub was forced to criticize his American allies for their support of India. The prevailing view in Pakistan was that China had no intentions of seizing Indian territory, let alone replacing the Congress government with a communist system. The Americans, however, were conditioned by their Korean War experience and were convinced that the Peoples Republic of China was the primary cause for international instability. They therefore rushed assistance to India without really contemplating its impact on Pakistan, or indeed, on Ayub Khan. The American arms being supplied to India, so the Pakistani explanation went, would only be used against Pakistan. At the very least, the Pakistan government believed the United States should pry a commitment from India to resolve the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan in return for military assistance. But the Americans did not do this. Many Pakistanis felt Ayub should have used the Chinese invasion of north eastern India to march his armies into Kashmir, but they quickly concluded Ayub was hamstrung by his ties to the United States. In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the period anti-Americanism flowered full-blown in Pakistan. Ayub's stock began to decline. For the first time, his administration appeared weak and challengeable. The Sino-India conflict almost coincided with the promulgation of Ayub's constitution and the revitalization of political activity in the country. There was no turning back to the martial law period with its stringent controls. Ayub still anticipated he could out-manoeuvre the politicans by continuing to strengthen the administrative state. He soon found, however, that he could not insulate the masses from the country's political leaders. More and more the dissidents juxtaposed the plight of the many with the affluence of the American-connected few. Government programmes had been launched to ease the conditions of the poor, but no serious effort was given to distributive justice, or closing the gap between the wealthy and the country's impoverished.[10] In the face of growing opposition, the Ayub government sought to re-establish itself as the popular guide of the masses. The scene was set for an epoch-making confrontation with India over Kashmir.

Ayub's somewhat slim victory over Miss Fatima Jinnah and the Combined Opposition Parties (COP) on 1 January 1965, gave the administration little to celebrate. Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had delivered a series of passionate speeches in the midst of the campaign and

seemed to promise that once the election was over, Pakistan would give full attention to the Kashmir question. The volatile elements wanted delivery on this campaign promise and the Ayub administration decided not to disappoint them. During the summer of 1965 there was skirmishing between Indian and Pakistani forces on the Kashmir front. Each side accused the other of frontier crossings and indiscriminate shelling. In September, the shadow-boxing ceased and the two sides went at one another with a vengeance. Pakistani forces were initially successful in slicing through Indian defences and the reports filtering back to Pakistan were optimistic about the ultimate victory of Pakistani arms. The population greeted the news with great displays of joy and excitement and the general belief persisted that Kashmir would at long last be liberated from Indian occupation.[11] The election campaign and Ayub's tight victory were all but forgotten. There was effusive praise for the Pakistani armed forces with enough left over for its supreme leader, Ayub Khan.

India, however, was not ready to yield to Pakistani pressure. In a sudden manoeuvre, regular Indian forces attacked key points all along the India-West Pakistan frontier, and especially in the Punjab between Lahore and Sialkot. The Pakistanis had hoped to confine the war to Kashmir and the Indian decision to spread the conflict, to send aircraft against targets as far as Peshawar in the north and Karachi in the south, changed the character of the hostilities. When India also mounted an air assault and threatened ground attacks against East Pakistan, Ayub realized he had miscalculated. Pakistan, for all its American supplied armaments, could not match India's arsenal. Pakistan had one small ordinance factory processing minor weapons, whereas India had a significant industrial base from which to produce the needed hardware. In addition, the United States government was distressed by the war in the subcontinent and immediately announced a 'hands off policy and declared

Table 2 —Military Forces of India and Pakistan, 1977

	India	Pakistan
Population	622,375,000	74,190,000
Military service	Voluntary	Voluntary

	India	Pakistan
Total Armed Forces	1,096,000	428,000
Estimated GNP 1975	$89,700,000,000	$10,100,000,000
Defence expenditure 1977-78	$3,450,000,000	$820,000,000
Army	950,000	400,000
Armoured divisions	2	2
Infantry divisions	17	14
Mountain divisions	10	
Indep armoured bdes	5	3
Indep inf bdes	1	3
Para/AD bdes	1	2
Indep arty bdes	14	
Aviation sqdns		5
Medium tanks	180 ‘Centurian’	250 M-47/-48
	900 T-54/-55/-62	50T-55
	700 ‘Vijayanta* Med	700T-59
	(Indian built)	
Navy	46,000 (inc Air)	11,000
Submarines	8 (Soviet F class)	3 (Fr ‘Daphne’ class)
Aircraft Carriers	1(25ac)	
Cruisers	2	1(tng ship)
Destroyers	3	4

	India	Pakistan
Frigates	25 (4 Indian built ‘Leander’ class, 10 Soviet ‘Petya’ class)	1
Fast guided missile boats	8 ‘Osa’ class with Styx SSM	
Patrol boats	8 (incl 5 ‘PoluchaDclass)	19 (ex-chinese)
Minesweepers	8	7
Landing ship/craft	1/6	
Naval Air Force	2,000	
Attack Sqdn	1(25‘Sea Hawk’)	
MRSqdn	2 (incl 12 ‘Alize’ and 9 Super ‘Constellation,’ 3 11-28)	
Hel sqdns	2 (with 22 ‘Alouette’ III)	
ASW sqdns	2 (with 12 ‘Sea King* Hel)	
Air Force	100,000	17,000
Lt bmbr sqdns	3 (50 ‘Canberra’)	1(11B-57B)
Fgt/gnd attk sqdns	13(100 Su-7B, 50 HF-24 ‘Maru’ 1A, 65 ‘Hunter F56)	8(60F-86,100Mig-19/F-6)
Fighter sqdns		4 (30 ‘Mirage’ III, 28VPA)
Interceptor sqdns	18(270 Mig-21F, 130 ‘Gnat’ Mk 1)	
Recon sqdns	1 (6 ‘Canberra’ PR57)	1 (13 ‘Mirage’ IURP)
MR sqdns		1 (3 ‘Atlantic,’ 2HU-16B) (60 various tpt acft)
Transport sqdns	11(118acft)	
Helicopter sqdns	12 (323 acft)	

	India	Pakistan
SAM sites	20w/120 SA-2	

Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, ***The Military Balance, 1977-78*** (London, 1977). Reprinted in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, ***The United States, India, and South Asia: Interests, Trends, and Issues for Congressional Concern*** (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 22.

it would embargo arms to both countries. The American decision fell hardest on Pakistan which was completely dependent on United States supplies.[12] India was less affected, given its limited acquisition of American arms. Moreover, India was already the recipient of Soviet military supplies, and Moscow did not opt for neutrality in the conflict. The American decision raised a storm of anti-American activity in Pakistan and United States installations were assaulted by angry mobs, The United States Information Service Libraries receiving the brunt of their displeasure. Relations with the United States were not broken off, however, because the regime continued to depend on their economic aid, as did Ayub more generally. His attitude was not appreciated by his countrymen who blamed the United States for the nation's predicament. Rumours circulated that the Americans had conspired with the Indians to defeat Pakistan.

The intensity of the fighting meant that military stores were used up at a rapid rate. Neither side managed to achieve a decisive victory, and even in Kashmir, Pakistan was forced to remove sizable contingents in order to defend its Punjabi heartland. The result was something approaching a stand-off, except that Pakistan was less able each day to keep its troops fully supplied. Sensing the need to terminate the fighting before a serious imbalance developed, Ayub reluctantly agreed to accept a United Nations resolution calling for a ceasefire. This act was heatedly opposed by the urban population of West Pakistan which had been led to believe their forces were winning one striking victory after another and that Pakistani forces would soon be on their way to New Delhi. Moreover, China had issued an ultimatum to India to withdraw its forces or face still another Chinese invasion of the subcontinent.[13] Word of the Chinese announcement was met with great delight in Pakistan and seemed to assure total victory over the Indian armed forces. Ayub's decision therefore was a blow that the Pakistanis had not been prepared for. All the latent hostility for Ayub now exploded in a series of riotous displays throughout West Pakistan. Wild,

uncontrolled throngs destroyed public property and renewed their attacks on the American embassy, consulates, and reading rooms. Ayub, it was said, had once again capitulated to his American mentors.

Neither Ayub nor the United States was ever the same again in Pakistani eyes. Ayub was compelled to accept the invitation of the Soviet leadership which convened a peace conference in the Central Asian city of Tashkent. Ayub met with the Indian Prime Minister in an effort to find a *via media* that would satisfy their respective constituencies. When their deliberations reached an impasse, the Soviet leaders drafted a document which called for a return to the status quo ante and both Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri were pressured to put their signatures to it. Shastri died a few hours after the signing ceremony and Ayub returned to Pakistan, but instead of addressing the nation, went into seclusion. In the meantime, Radio Pakistan announced the details of the agreement and this again set off a major display of dissatisfaction.[14] The war had proven costly in lives and material and the Pakistanis had nothing tangible to show for their sacrifice. It was a simple matter to blame Ayub Khan for the unfortunate results and the opposition lost no time in mobilizing the alienated and the disaffected whose ranks had swelled markedly, and who would not be content until Ayub agreed to vacate his high office. The Kashmir gamble was the beginning of the end of the Ayub era.

Not only had Ayub been exposed to unprecedented criticism, the Pakistani armed forces now began to question his leadership and their loyalty to the government was thrown into question. Moreover, the United States had shown itself to be a poor ally. Pakistanis did not try to evaluate their own failings in the Kashmir fiasco. They insisted that both the CENTO and SEATO organizations should have assisted Pakistan in its war with India. Neither alliance had come to Pakistan's aid because international communism was not involved. Moreover, while India had attacked Pakistan proper, it was widely believed that Pakistan had provoked the Kashmir conflict. Both CENTO and SEATO declared their non-involvement, but Iran and Turkey did attempt to transfer some of their military stores to Pakistan. When word of this activity reached the United States, however, the plan had to be abandoned. Clearly, Pakistan had no chance of obtaining the extensive supplies it so badly needed. Ayub cut his losses at the appropriate time, but the overall situation did not favour him or the United States.

In the mid-1960s China was the most popular nation in Pakistan. The United States had become bogged down in a war in Indochina which supposedly involved SEATO but the Pakistanis were disinclined to support the United States role in that distant corner of Southeast Asia. Moreover, China's support for the communist forces in the region necessitated Pakistan's non-participation. Given the overall circumstances of the conflicts in South and Southeast Asia, the United States did not expect Pakistan to make a contribution to the war effort and once again alliances proved to be useless devices. Member states worked at cross purposes and the alliances merely served to estrange them, one from another. In the circumstances, Pakistan began giving serious thought to terminating its membership in both SEATO and CENTO.

Civil War: International Implications

Ayub's demise was in part prompted by his relationship with the United States. Ayub could not divorce himself from the Americans and Pakistani resentment over United States actions only tended to increase the burdens of his administration. When he was finally forced from office the prevailing intellectual view in the country was that the country should reduce its dependence on the United States and seek more profitable arrangements, particularly in the Muslim world. China was judged another source that might be more adequately tapped. But before a new foreign policy could be developed the country was consumed by political controversy emanating from the December 1970 elections.[15] An inability to resolve the problems raised by the rivalry between Mujibur Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto ultimately led to the tragic night of 25 March 1971, when the Pakistan Army was ordered to turn its guns on its own people. The civil war that raged over East Pakistan, which eventually provoked the Indians to intervene on the side of the Bengali rebels, destroyed the Yahya Khan regime and left the task of resurrecting Pakistan's foreign as well as domestic policy to Bhutto and his People's Party.

Pakistan suffered grievous losses in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971. East Pakistan seceded and with it almost three-fifths of the country's population. The eastern province had also been a prominent foreign exchange earner

and the Pakistani economy was seriously destabilized. The Pakistan armed forces had been badly humiliated and more than ninety thousand men, approximately one-fifth of its fighting force, were in prisoner-of-war camps in India and Bangladesh. The consequences were significant. Pakistan's *two nation theory* had been struck a mortal blow. If there had been any reason to question the theory in the past, it was now much clearer that the Muslims of the subcontinent did not perceive themselves as one united, inseparable community. The impact of the Bengali Muslim drive for self-determination would not be lost on the other Muslim ethnic groups of Pakistan. From the position of foreign and national security policy, the country was forced to resign itself to a lesser posture. No longer could Pakistan claim that it was the equal of India, that it was entitled to comparative capacity in military arms and political influence. The Indian victory was decisive, and only domestic problems could prevent India from reaping advantages from its military achievement. Pakistan's warrior image was also tarnished and the pride that Pakistanis had so enthusiastically nurtured seemed to evaporate. In their demoralized state, the Pakistanis were compelled to grasp the realities of their new circumstances.

The United States embargo on military shipments to Pakistan and India had never been lifted. Although Pakistan remained in SEATO and CENTO and the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was never repudiated, the United States Congress, incensed by the atrocities committed in East Pakistan, refused to sanction the sale or transfer of arms to Pakistan. Pakistan was required to seek what it could purchase in the way of military hardware from other sources. These, however, could not make up for the absence of American supplies. Moreover, equipment on the ground proved to be useless without the spare parts that only the United States could make available in quantity. The Yahya Khan regime hoped to deal with this problem and gain the lifting of the embargo by offering to assist the Nixon administration in its determination to open relations with China. In the summer of 1971, Henry Kissinger, then President Nixon's National Security Advisor, made a secret trip to Peking by way of Pakistan. General Yahya Khan not only made the trip logistically possible, he also used his good offices with the Chinese leaders to arrange the contact.[16] In return for this aid, Pakistan had reason to expect the Nixon government would reconsider the 1965 embargo. The civil war was already raging in East Pakistan, however, and the climate in the Congress and the country opposed the

restoration of military programmes. India exploited the propaganda advantage and received a good press in the west, not least in the United States. Nevertheless, the Indian leaders moved to shore up their defences and shortly after Kissinger's visit to China was made public, India entered into a Peace and Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union. Thus when India sent its forces into East Pakistan in December 1971, it was already assured of assistance from the Soviet Union. Pakistan, on the other hand, received no material assistance from the United States and even its anticipated support from the Chinese proved to be wishful thinking. It has been noted that India signed the agreement with the Soviet Union as insurance against Chinese aggressive tendencies. China's reluctance to become embroiled in subcontinent affairs as in 1971 is in contrast to its more bellicose attitude in 1965 and the change may well be attributed to Indian diplomacy.

The United States government condemned India's invasion of East Pakistan and its support for a free Bangladesh, but attempts to use the United Nations were frustrated in the Security Council by the use of the Soviet veto.[17] The Nixon administration made one dramatic play during the conflict. It dispatched the nuclear carrier *Enterprise* and a small flotilla of other warships into the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to aid in the evacuation of American personnel from the battle zone. The ships were never used for that purpose, however, and India condemned the move as an unfriendly act aimed at intimidating the country. The American gesture was received in Pakistan with considerable excitement, but the Indians were not deterred in their drive to dismember Pakistan.

When Bhutto received the transfer of power from Yahya Khan he made it clear that his government would make some important changes in Pakistan's foreign policy. The loss of East Pakistan made Pakistan's continuance in SEATO meaningless and he announced the nation's withdrawal from the alliance. He also commented on the lack of support from the Commonwealth countries and took the drastic step of removing Pakistan from that organization as well. While CENTO commitments were under review, the membership of Iran and Turkey in that body prevented Pakistan from taking any precipitous action. Pakistan, therefore remained a member of CENTO, and Iran and Turkey renewed efforts to supply the country with needed military assistance. Iran also gave Pakistan financial resources which were used to purchase basic commodities on the world market. Bhutto expressed the view that the loss of East Pakistan altered the

nation's political orientation. South Asia was no longer the primary arena. Pakistan was judged a Middle East country, anchoring the eastern segment of that vast and important Islamic region.[18] Hereafter, revealed Bhutto, Pakistan would be more concerned with Middle Eastern affairs and the principal concerns of its diplomacy and international activity would be directed toward brotherly Muslim nations, not only in Iran and Turkey - but in the increasingly more influential Arab world.

By 1973 Bhutto's vision of a collaborative Muslim world seemed to take on more concrete form. The Arab-Israeli War of that year and the subsequent oil embargo imposed on the western states, altered the politico-economic picture. The activation of a moribund OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and its dramatic emergence as the world's most powerful international cartel almost overnight, made previously minor nations into virtual economic superpowers.[19] The wealth accumulated by the OPEC countries, particularly the Arab states on the Persian Gulf, and the political leverage that they enjoyed caused a re-evaluation of political as well as economic policies, associations and prospects. Bhutto recognized that by appealing to common Muslim interests, by offering more active support to Arab causes, notably in the conflict with Israel, Pakistan could be the recipient of large gifts and loans, but he did not play the role of supplicant easily. In return for financial backing, Pakistan was prepared to send its skilled and semi-skilled labourers, medical personnel and engineers, teachers and military experts to those countries in need of trained and experienced manpower. The Gulf states wanted rapid development and Pakistan stood ready to assist with its large reservoir of development-oriented personnel. The relationship between Pakistan and the oil-rich countries would be reciprocal. The combined efforts of Muslims from several nations would help to accelerate the growth process and ensure the proper utilization of available resources. It was also recognized that the remittances to Pakistan of money earned abroad would greatly bolster the nation's economy.[20]

Bhutto was a tireless worker and revelled in international activity. Numerous trips were made to the Middle Eastern countries and relations were cultivated with Muslim rulers like King Faisal, Muammar Qadafi and Yasir Arafat. Bhutto's tactics paid off. His oratorical abilities, his broad educational experience, his familiarity with virtually all the world's leaders, his long experience in the political limelight, his still young, dynamic

posturing raised him quickly to a position of third world leadership. What Pakistan did not possess in material advantage, it more than made up for in trained and experienced personnel - and Bhutto was the epitome of an erudite, sophisticated, informed, and capable Muslim leader. Moreover, he seemed to sense his value to the larger Muslim community, if not the third world itself. At every opportunity he spoke of the need to combine Muslim energies and integrate third world efforts. The real division, he insisted, was not between East and West, but between the industrialized and non-industrialized states - in effect, the haves and the have-nots. And Bhutto wished to be the latter's spokesman.

In Februaryl974, Bhutto hosted a summit meeting of the world's Muslim leaders in Lahore.[21] The conference lasted three days and was attended by the representatives of thirty-seven countries, including Arafat who was accorded the honours normally reserved for a head of state. Among the conferees were King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt, Houari Boumedienne of Algeria, Muammar Qadafi of Libya, Hafiz el-Assad of Syria, and Sheikh Sabah al Salim al Mubarak of Kuwait. Even Mujibur Rahman travelled to Lahore for the festivities. Bhutto used the occasion to announce Pakistan's formal recognition of the independent state of Bangladesh and intimated that the decision was one urged on him by the other Muslim leaders. In the name of Islamic unity he could not do otherwise. The Lahore Declaration issued at the close of the conference paid tribute to the 'solidarity of the Islamic peoples' and their ''identification with the joint struggle of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America'. It saluted the cause of the Palestinians which was the 'cause of all those who believe in the right of a people to determine its own destiny'; and asserted that 'no agreement, protocol, or understanding which postulates the continuance of Israeli occupation of the holy city of Jerusalem or its transfer to any non-Arab sovereignty… will be acceptable to the Islamic countries.'[22]

Both Pakistan and Bhutto profited from the Lahore Summit. Pakistan found it easier to acquire needed funds from the oil-rich Arab states and Bhutto had placed himself in the forefront of world Muslim leaders. The exercise had only ephemeral value, however, as Bhutto continued to find difficulty with his domestic opposition. The loss of East Pakistan had caused considerable introspection in Pakistan and the result was a new surge of Islamic fundamentalism. The conference of Muslim leaders fanned

the embers of this passionate movement which had already been reflected in the legislation declaring the Ahmediya and Qadiani communities to be non-Muslims. This act only whetted the appetite of those who seemed more determined than ever to transform the nation into a living example of an orthodox state. Bhutto sensed the power in this movement and was quite capable of making adjustments to it, but was insistent on following his own lights and to that extent the more extremist Muslim elements had to be contained. When accused of anti-Muslim acts, Bhutto could point to his close associations with the power élites in the Islamic world. Although the Shah of Iran was a mainstay for his regime and Bhutto sought to model his system somewhat along the lines developed in Iran, the Pakistani leader could just as easily point to his intimacies with the Saudi family, the leaders of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Libya. The constant flow of Arab dignitaries to Pakistan, particularly for pleasure, reinforced the belief that Bhutto had made the country a focal point in the Islamic world and that he was respected in the highest chambers of Muslim government. For a Pakistan nation that only a few short years before lay broken and isolated, this was no mean achievement.

The Afghanistan Problem

Bhutto met with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at Simla in India in the summer of 1972 and the two leaders agreed to a declaration which offered the possibility of peace between their two nations.[23] Unlike the reaction to Ayub's signing of the Tashkent Declaration, the Pakistanis were generally tolerant of Bhutto's actions. The 1971 war with India had ended differently from the one in 1965. Pakistan had been soundly defeated, East Pakistan had been lost, and India held thousands of Pakistani prisoners. India had succeeded in gaining a pre-eminent position in the subcontinent and the Pakistanis realized the futility in calling for equal standing. Few Pakistanis believed India could have been repulsed had it wished to continue the war. At best, the Pakistan government needed time to reestablish its military forces and rally its demoralized and divided people. It would serve no sensible purpose for Pakistanis to sustain a belligerent posture *vis-à-vis* their more powerful neighbour. The Simla Accord formed the framework

for a new relationship with India. Initially, it enabled Pakistan to gain the release of its troops. Those members of the armed forces that Bangladesh wanted to try as war criminals were also pardoned and permitted to return home. Territory along the West Pakistan border held by each side as a result of the hostilities was returned and negotations were instituted at the Foreign Minister's level that looked forward to a more extensive normalization of relations. Trade and commerce were promoted with the easing of travel between the two countries, and in 1976 India and Pakistan agreed to exchange ambassadors, an act which had not been performed in more than a decade. Although Pakistan continued to call for a solution to the Kashmir dispute it was evident the government intended to do little more than keep the cause in public view.

Pakistan's principal problem in the mid-1970s stemmed not from India but from the northwest where Afghanistan was again making overtures about Afghan irredenta and national rights.[24] Afghanistan had never reconciled itself to the Durand Line which separated Pakistan from itself and divided the Pathan population whom Afghanistan claimed, were never identified with British India and should either be citizens of Afghanistan or permitted to form their own sovereign state of Pakhtunistan. Afghanistan never clarified its position, however, and it seemed satisfied with beating the drum of secession. It should be noted that Afghanistan was-the only country to cast a vote in opposition to Pakistan becoming a member of the United Nations. Despite common Muslim traditions, the two countries treated one another with suspicion and often unconcealed bitterness had degenerated into armed skirmishes along their mutual frontier.

The Afghan perception of Pakhtunistan is illustrated in a postage stamp issued in 1969, which has all of the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan within its boundaries. Pakistanis have ridiculed this version in so far as it does not take into account the Pathans of Afghanistan but does include the Baluchis of Pakistan. They also point to the divisions in Afghanistan between the rulers who are largely Persian-speaking, the Afghan Tadjiks, Turkmen, Uzbeks and Hazaras who have little in common with the Afghan Pathans on their eastern border. Pakistanis would appear to be correct in their analysis that Pakhtunistan for the Afghan government means the incorporation of a Pakistani province in an expanded Afghanistan. Along with the Afghan rejection of the 1893 Durand Line, they also refused to recognize the 1878 Treaty of Gandamak. Taken

together, it meant Afghanistan claimed territory as far as the Indus River in the heart of Pakistan. The Afghan argument was that the treaties establishing the frontier between Pakistan and themselves were entered into under duress and fashioned by Great Britain in an effort to safeguard the latter's Indian empire. When the British withdrew from the subcontinent all that territory should have reverted to Afghan sovereignty. This then was the core of the Afghanistan-Pakistan controversy.

Afghanistan, more so than India, became Pakistan's *bête noire.* In 1973, Mohammad Daud chased his cousin, the Afghan King Zahir Shah, from his throne and almost immediately declared his intention to press for an independent Pakhtunistan.[25] Daud did not attend the Lahore Summit although he did authorize the Afghan ambassador in New Delhi to join the conference. Daud's emissary embarrassed Bhutto by propagandizing a cause for all 'oppressed minorities' and pointed out the plight of the Pathans and the Baluchis who were struggling against the armed forces of Pakistan at that very moment. The Lahore Summit managed to bring Mujib and Bhutto together. The Simla Conference did the same for Indira Gandhi and Bhutto. But Daud was not yet prepared to meet with Bhutto. It was only when Daud realized how deeply the Soviet Union had penetrated Afghanistan, had gained influence in the Afghan Army and Air Force, and was keenly interested in constructing a Marxist political organization, that he began to reconsider his relations with Pakistan. Bhutto's capacity to overcome his differences with India's leaders impressed Daud. The latter was also influenced by the Shah of Iran who visited Kabul in order to ameliorate the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Shah expressed his fears about Soviet machinations in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa. He noted Soviet activity in Afghanistan and how it could be used against Daud when the time was right. Afghanistan, the Shah noted, had nothing to fear from Pakistan, but the Soviet Union was determined and had the capability to transform Afghanistan into an active satellite. Daud had reason to be impressed with the Shah's presentation. He was aware that it was the Soviet Union in 1971 that had restrained elements of the Afghan Army from launching an invasion of Pakistan's northwestern region. If the Soviet Union could keep the Afghan Army from taking advantage of a prostrate Pakistan, it also had the capacity to deal with Daud.

The Shah of Iran urged Daud to meet with Bhutto and to settle their differences before conditions deteriorated to a point where the Soviet Union would be capable of dominating Afghanistan. The success of the Shah's intervention is mirrored in the exchange of visits by Daud and Bhutto in 1976. Although there was little in the way of concrete results, the visits signalled a relaxation in their long conflict. The militaty coup that forced Bhutto from office did not affect this effort at reconciliation. General Zia-ul-Haq went to Kabul soon after his assumption of power and Daud returned the visit in March 1978. The developing intimacy between the Shah of Iran, Daud, and the Pakistani leaders apparently raised key concerns in Moscow. The Soviet Union had been shut out of the Middle East dialogue involving the Israelis and Egyptians. They were not faring well in Iraq. The situation on the Horn of Africa was cloudy. Any settlement between Pakistan and Afghanistan would enhance the interests of the Shah, and therefore the United States. Moreover, the Soviet leaders concluded that Bhutto had been overthrown by an American engineered plot and that the United States was again interested in propagating a military arrangement on their Central Asian frontier.

On 30 April 1978, only a few weeks after his return from Islamabad, Daud was confronted in his government quarters by dissident members of the Afghan armed forces. What followed was something of a bloodbath. Daud, his brother Mohammad Naim, and their families were brutally murdered. Government officials and members of the military high command were also shot at their desks or while trying to escape.[26] The coup was carried out with precision. Key positions in and around Kabul were seized by contingents of the disaffected Army. Within three days, whatever resistance had been mounted by Daud's loyal guard was broken and a new government with indisputable Marxist orientation was established. The new government comprised members of the very political organization that the Shah had cautioned Daud about. The Soviet Union had played its trump card.

Daud should not have needed the Shah of Iran to convince him about Soviet interest in his country. Daud had served as Afghanistan's Prime Minister from 1953 to 1963, and because of his animosity for Pakistan, he had agreed to accept Soviet military assistance. Afghanistan was the first third world country to receive such aid from the Soviet Union following World War II. Pakistan sealed its border with Afghanistan in 1950, 1955,

and again in 1961. Each time, Afghanistan was forced to turn to the Soviet Union for the transit of its goods or the receipt of necessities.[27] Moscow was generous in its help and the Afghans were encouraged to allow the Soviets to improve the network of communications between their two countries. By 1966, the Soviet Union had constructed a massive roadway from the Soviet Uzbek border north of Herat through the principal towns of Afghanistan and back to the Soviet frontier at the port of Qizil Qala on the Oxus River. The United states, seeking to maintain a toehold in Afghanistan, completed the roadway by linking Kabul with the Khyber Pass, the traditional gateway to Pakistan and the plains of India. The Soviet Union also constructed a road from Qizil Qala to Kabul which put Russian convoys in Uzbekistan within eighteen driving hours of Peshawar. The Soviet Union's involvement in Afghanistan, did not focus on roads alone. Kabul's airfield, irrigation, and hydro-electric stations at Jalalabad, the development of the natural gas fields ar Mazar-i-Sharif (which exports two billion cubic meters of gas annually to the Soviet Union), were only a few of the more than a hundred-odd projects engaged in by Soviet engineers and technicians. Moreover, by 1967 the Soviet Union accounted for more then fifty per cent of Afghanistan's trade and commerce. And given the massive military aid programme and the stationing in Afghanistan of thousands of Soviet servicemen, the country had become an appendage of Soviet Central Asia. King Zahir Shah, like Daud, awoke to the circumstances of his heavy dependence on the Soviet Union too late.

Zahir Shah also tried to link his security with that of Iran's and in 1973 he signed the Helmand Waters Treaty with the Shah of Iran, terminating a dispute of historical dimensions. Afghanistan also muted the Pakhtunistan demand and entertained improvements in relations with Pakistan. Iran pledged the use of the port of Bandar Abbas for Afghan trade, intending to lessen Kabul's dependence on the Soviet Union. Zahir Shah's activities were not appreciated in Moscow. The Shah had begun to assemble his large military establishment and the United States was eager to transform Iran into the sentinel of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet authorities feared a link-up between Afghanistan and Iran that could be exploited by the United States in the vicinity of the relatively soft underbelly of the Soviet Union. Pakistan's domestic problems provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to rid itself of Zahir Shah and to strengthen its basic position in Afghanistan.

Bhutto had moved against the NAP-JUI regimes in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province and had provoked a hostile reaction from the tribal population. Daud saw an opportunity for Afghanistan to exploit the situation in those Pakistani provinces, but Zahir Shah's new independent foreign policy stood in the way. With Soviet encouragement, Daud moved to displace his cousin, to banish him from the country, to declare an end to the monarchy, and to establish himself as the nation's first President. Daud, like those who destroyed him in 1978, complained about Pakistani and Iranian interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs. From a posture of reconciliation, Daud stressed confrontation. Tensions increased in the region and the Soviet Union was once again in firm control.

The Afghans pride themselves on their long history of independence. No nation had ever been able to conquer these mountain people. Nevertheless, Afghanistan has seldom avoided the heavy influence of Great Powers. Its leaders were used and abused by Britain during its long reign in the subcontinent.[28] And the Soviet Union had been the driving force behind Afghan policies since shortly after World War II. Given the country's strategic value, the Soviet Union will not permit the Afghan government to play an independent role and Daud's sudden death and the implantation of a Marxist regime in Kabul gives particular credence to this perception.

Daud insisted he was interested in building a modern republic in Afghanistan but his policies were hardly different from those of the previous monarchs. Political party activity was virtually nonexistent, and the politicians were treated harshly and effectively contained.[29] But government policies could not prevent the organization of political followings. The Soviet Union was most successful in attracting dissident Afghan intellectuals and, through their joint efforts, the People's Democratic Party or *Khalq* (masses) was spawned. Armed with Marxist-Leninist Ideology, the *Khalq* recruited members of the military establishment and the government bureaucracy into its ranks. In a country as primitive as Afghanistan, these two institutions attracted the majority of the country's thinking population. But the politicizing of these elements also meant the country's leadership would remain divided and its primary rulers under constant threat. It was this variety of divide and rule policy which served the purpose of the Soviet Union and proved the undoing of Mohammad Daud.

The Marxist *Khalq* under the leadership of Noor Mohammad Tarraki and Hafizullah Amin declared solidarity with the Soviet Union and immediately began a campaign to transform Afghanistan into a Socialist Republic.[30] Islam became a prime target for the new government. The attack upon Muslim teaching and precepts caused a violent reaction in the countryside and a guerrilla war soon enveloped the country. Support for the insurgents came from many quarters of the Muslim World. Even in strife-torn Lebanon there were expressions of dissatisfaction with the turn of events in Afghanistan. The Grand Mufti of Beirut authorized all mosques to include in their sermons the need to aid the Afghan people in their struggle against atheism.[31] Major assistance emanated from Iran, however, which offered sanctuary as well as supplies to the insurgents. The massive popular uprising in the winter of 1978–9 which ultimately brought an end to the Shah of Iran's long reign, did not terminate this support for the Afghan rebels, but it did confuse the situation. While Iran was tom between the devotees of the Ayatullah Khomeini and the Marxist fedayeen, between Shia and Sunni, between the Persian-speaking majority and the ethnic minorities, it was in a poor position from which to assist the Afghans in their struggle with the Tarraki-Hafizullah regime. Thus the larger impact was felt by the Pakistanis.

General Zia-ul-Haq made a hurried visit to Kabul in September 1978 in order to reassure the Tarraki administration that Pakistan wished to have friendly relations with its northwestern neighbour. Tarraki, however, declined to visit Pakistan. In the months following the Zia journey, the guerrilla war in Afghanistan intensified and spread. The Afghan government and their main supporters in Moscow singled out Pakistan as the main base of operations from which the attacks were being launched. Afghan refugees were flooding into Pakistan by the thousands, approximately 150,000 were reported in the country by the summer of 1979.[32] With Afghan rebels dominating vast mountain areas of the country, the Tarraki Government sent its Deputy Foreign Minister to Pakistan in July 1979. The Pakistani and Afghan negotiators reiterated their support for the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence arrived at in the Bandung Conference of 1955. The Principles addressed themselves to non-aggression, non-interference in their respective internal affairs, and respect for one another's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Afghan emissary indicated that his government would issue a blanket amnesty to all political defectors and he urged

Pakistan to return the refugees in their midst. The Pakistani government showed willingness to cooperate, but emphasized that Pakistan's role had been influenced by purely humanitarian motives.

The improvement in relationships between the two neighbours did not reduce the fighting. Pakistan reported intermittent Afghan shelling and strafing of its border settlements. It denied it was intent on launching an invasion of Afghanistan, but it re-emphasized its determination to defend its territory and population. The Soviet Union was alleged to have pressured Tarraki to slow his 'reform' programme, to shore up his defence structure which had been weakened by military desertions, and to commence a reconciliation programme with Pakistan. In September 1979, however, after his return from Moscow, Tarraki was ousted and his place taken by his powerful colleague Hafizullah Amin. The doctrinaire Amin had been the real power in the Marxist regime and his surfacing as the principal leader in Afghanistan merely confirmed the course that had been taken several months earlier. The situation suggested an intensification of tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Hafizullah Amin, however, proved unsuccessful in crushing the rebellious Afghan tribesmen who opposed his anti-Islamic policies and intimacies with the Soviet Union. The Kremlin therefore was determined to take full command of the situation and the Soviets reinforced their military contingents already in the country. The heavier involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghani affairs caused more desertions in the Afghanistan armed forces and Amin showed himself to be sympathetic with those who sensed the smothering embrace of their giant neighbour. It was clear to the Kremlin leadership that Amin demanded more 'independence' than they were prepared to recognize. Moreover, the Russian leaders were riveted by the situation in Iran which entered a new stage of turmoil after the seizure on 4 November 1979 of the American Embassy and its personnel in Teheran.

The militant students who held their American hostages under the threat of death received the full support from the Iranian Government headed by Ayatullah Khomeini. The Ayatullah, his followers, and those among the Marxist fedayeen directed all their criticism at the United States which was described as the most 'satanic' nation on earth. Although the Ayatullah and his more devout Muslim followers were reputedly opposed to 'atheistic communism' there was little if any condemnation of the Soviet Union. Indeed, the communist Tudeh Party of Iran and the Marxist organizations

exploited the widespread hatred for the United States, intensified by the American refusal to trade the Shah for the hostages. By the same token the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the heightened anti-Americanism in Iran, as well as the incidents in other areas of the Islamic world which forced the United States to reduce its diplomatic missions in fourteen Muslim countries.

The sacking of the United States Embassy in Pakistan on 21 November 1979, was allegedly caused by inflammatory broadcasts, some of which emanated from Iran, that the United States and Israel were responsible for the attack on the Great Mosque housing the Kaaba in Mecca, the holiest shrine in the Muslim world. Although there were demonstrations condemning the United States in Bangladesh and India too, it was only in Pakistan that an organized, concerted effort was made to not only destroy the last vestiges of American activity in the country, but to also discredit the Zia-ul-Haq regime. Simultaneously with the assault on the American Embassy, mobs attacked and destroyed the American information installations in Rawalpindi and Lahore. A similar move on the American consulate and library in Karachi, however, was beaten back. Given doubts about the Zia government's intention to protect American lives in the country (two American marines were killed in Islamabad), the United States immediately withdrew several hundred members of its diplomatic mission and their dependents. Although Zia pledged to protect foreign missions, promised to rebuild the American Embassy, and arrested several students who were implicated in the fire-bombing, the strain in Pakistan-United States relations was severe. Moreover, the anti-American sentiment that coursed through seemed to point to a full break in American-Pakistani cooperation.

Zia's role during the attack on the United States Embassy suggests that he and his government were aware of a planned demonstration but that they did not calculate the capacity of his political opposition, namely the PPP and the Marxist groups in the country to seize control of the movement and turn it to their own advantage. As in Iran it was reasonable to conclude that the leftists had combined with the Islamic fundamentalists and were intent on reducing the American presence in the country.

With the United States under heavy pressure throughout the Islamic world, but especially in Iran and Pakistan, the Soviet Union move into Afghanistan was predictable. On 27 December 1979, the Soviet Union sent

massive forces down their superhighway to Kabul. Paratroopers were airlifted into Kabul, and a major deployment of Soviet power quickly gained control of the capital. Hafizullah Amin was seized and executed along with his family and loyal advisors and armoured and infantry columns fanned out over the country in an all-out effort to crush tribal resistance. The leader of the communist party, Babrak Karmal was declared Afghanistan's new head of state but it was obvious he was a puppet of the invaders and could survive only so long as the Kremlin found him a useful instrument of their rule.

The implications of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan were viewed as an immediate threat to Pakistan and Iran, but India on the one side and the Arab states on the other, along with Turkey, had reason to fear the consequences of the military *putsch.* Sensing that only China and the United States were capable of countering the Soviet move, the situation also signalled the intensification of rivalries between the superpowers.

Pakistan's Nuclear Quest

The Zia administration has attempted to portray Pakistan as a tranquil country in the process of restoring its equilibrium, and certainly disinterested in foreign adventures. On 12 March 1979, the Pakistan foreign office announced the country was withdrawing from its one remaining alliance with the western world and in February 1980 Pakistan officially removed itself from CENTO. This action was precipitated by events in Iran. Khomeini's decision to sever all military associations with the West also prompted the Turkish government to call for the total dissolution of CENTO. The organization had failed to live up to its billing and more often raised expectations among its member states that could not be satisfied. It had little more than symbolic value, but with the dramatic events of 1979, even the semblance of regional unity had disappeared. While Zia was in the process of paring Pakistan's military commitments, he and his colleagues gave considerable attention to the nation's diplomatic posture. Indeed, there was ample evidence that Pakistan would request reinstatement as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. Meanwhile, the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium seemed inclined toward raising the amount of financial

assistance and Pakistan was also optimistic that the international monetary community would look favourably on the government's request to reschedule existing debts which ranged in the billions of dollars. Additional assistance was forecast from Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait which were already financing numerous development projects throughout the country. Although the nation was not yet on a sound economic footing, the government proudly revealed that 1978–9 earnings from commodity exports had increased by 34 per cent over the previous year.[33] This report was aimed at reassuring external investors that Pakistan was being restored to a condition of growth and economic progress.

The emphasis on economic well-being and peaceful intentions could not conceal the controversy as to whether Pakistan was or was not in the process of building nuclear weapons. India's explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974 registered a major impact on the Pakistan armed forces and Bhutto was compelled to go in search of the resources as well as the technology to match the Indian exercise. Bhutto talked about an 'Islamic bomb' and asked why other nations could be trusted with such weapons while Muslims were denied them. Although Bhutto managed to get the United States to lift the long-imposed arms embargo in February 1975, the Americans were emphatic that Pakistan must not proceed with their contemplated nuclear weapons programme. The inference was that the United States would protect Pakistan's security *vis-à-vis* India and that nuclear proliferation was not the answer to the country's defence needs. Pakistan, however, had reason to be suspicious of American promises. Moreover, Bhutto was not only less inclined to lean on the United States, he had to satisfy the military establishment. The decision was therefore taken to go ahead with the nuclear programme no matter how severe the American criticism.

The Bhutto Government signed an aggrement with France which promised to build a nuclear-processing facility in the country.[34] When that contract became public in 1976 the United States put enormous pressure on the French to break the agreement. The French were irritated by this and at first insisted they would honour their contract, but later, however, appeared to yield to United States demands. The Pakistanis were furious over the American action and compared this treatment with that of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission which sanctioned the sale of more than 5,000 pounds of uranium to India. The United States noted the Indians had

agreed to submit to safeguards and intimated Pakistan might not be so agreeable. Given the confrontational aspects of the controversy, the juxtaposition of India and Pakistan, and the Carter administration's tendency to show more confidence in India, the Pakistanis were even more determined to proceed with their programme.

Rumours that Pakistan had managed to obtain vital scientific plans through clandestine means and was being sponsored in its nuclear programme by funds made available by Libya's leader Muammar Qadafi were publicized world-wide. The Pakistan government of Zia-ul-Haq, like that of Bhutto earlier, defended its right to build nuclear power plants and to conduct research. It held to its argument that there were no plans to produce nuclear weapons and that all its nuclear efforts were aimed at the peaceful uses of the atom. The administration in an obvious note of pique issued a statement denouncing its critics as hypocrites.

> The danger of nuclear proliferation, however, cannot be met by unprincipled, discriminatory, and coercive policies and a holier than thou attitude. To ignore about ten other countries which today have the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons and to single out Pakistan - which is nowhere near the capability - for discriminatory treatment is unfair and unjust.[35]

The Pakistan government said it was prepared to sign a general agreement, involving all nuclear and non-nuclear nations, renouncing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Or barring this, Pakistan was equally ready to sign an agreement with India banning nuclear weapons from the subcontinent. The fact that neither of these offers were being entertained convinced the Pakistanis that they were being singled out because they were a Muslim country; the implication being that Muslims were less stable than other peoples and therefore should not be permitted to store nuclear weapons. Muammar Qadfi, who has a reputation as a fanatic not only in the West but among Arabs as well, is perceived capable of rash acts, and his links with the Pakistan nuclear programme gave these external fears new dimensions. Pakistan tried to dispel such concern by insisting that Libya was not supporting Pakistan's nuclear programme, and no promises had been made to supply him with an atomic bomb.

Pakistan's advisor on Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, refuted charges by Western governments that Pakistan was building a secret nuclear facility near Multan. He also labelled Soviet claims that Pakistan was planning to test a nuclear device in the Himalayan state of Chitral as 'utterly false'.

When confronted with Pakistan's reasons for keeping its nuclear research facilities from public view, Agha Shahi asked why other countries were not being so pressured. Pakistan's defense of its nuclear programme did not silence the debate or the concern, and the United States took the unprecedented action of cutting all economic aid to Pakistan, while West European countries were encouraged to follow the American lead. The Soviet Union suggested that the region would be even more unstable if Pakistan did not reconsider its determination to explode an atomic bomb. India's Prime Minister Charan Singh, before his government collapsed in August 1979, declared that India would have to reconsider its decision not to construct nuclear weapons if Pakistan proceeded with such plans. An international debate also grew concerning the necessity of destroying Pakistan's capacity to experiment with nuclear components. A number of countries, including the United States, were alleged to be contemplating action to eliminate Pakistan's nuclear reactors and research facilities. Although there were denials from all quarters, Pakistanis proved to be just as sceptical as their critics who did not believe the Pakistan government was telling the truth when it claimed that it had no intention to build nuclear weapons.

General Zia-ul-Haq used every occasion to deny reports about Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. In August 1979 he visited Saudi Arabia and categorically declared his government was only concerned with meeting Pakistan's energy requirements. It was pointed out that the high cost of petroleum represented one-third of Pakistan's annual expenditures and that the percentage was likely to grow rather than decline in the years ahead. Zia was quoted as saying that 1983 was the crucial year. If the country did not have alternate sources of energy by that time, the Pakistan economy would be beyond salvage. Citing the United States as the principal source of criticism, Zia described the intense American pressure on Pakistan to abandon its nuclear programme; not only had its economic assistance been cut but all efforts by his government to acquire a rescheduling of Pakistan's debt to the consortium of Western aid-donors had been blocked.

> General Zia-ul-Haq said that the U.S. efforts were discriminating against Pakistan. 'It is unfair of the United States to discriminate against us - and they do it openly.' He said American diplomats have told him that they were singling out Pakistan because it had no nuclear capability yet, 'unlike other countries that already possess it' - an apparent reference to India… 'Even our friends who used to help us are being pressured by the U.S. to curtail aid.'[36]

Pakistan's foreign policy remains a manifestation of the nation's weakness not its strength. Successive governments have attempted to give the country status commensurate with its numbers and geopolitical position, but internal dilemmas have prevented any real progress in this area. Foreign policy remains an extension of domestic conditions and this is true of Pakistan as it is for other nations. The country has proven to be its own worst enemy on numerous occasions. Failure to develop a rational programme based upon cooperation and accommodation with its near neighbours have provided opportunities for distant powers as well as neighbours to exploit contradictions within the national design.

South Asia's more sophisticated Muslim population has always displayed an extraterritorial loyalty and instinctively identifies with religious causes that, in major part, are more imaginary than real. Only in the past decade have they gained the interest of other Muslims to their plight and concerns. Only in the last five years is there any indication of a more intimate arrangement evolving between the Muslims of Pakistan and Muslims elsewhere. Pakistan's renewed emphasis on the creation of a genuine Islamic state is a conscious effort to create the conditions, not only for its own survival, but for the tighter development of the Muslim community. The uncertainties caused by the Iranian revolution, the Marxist movement in Afghanistan, socio-economic frustrations in Turkey, and radical thinking in the Arab world, however, do not seem to point to Pakistani successes. Moreover, Pakistan's emergence as a nuclear power is more likely to induce disintegrative rather than integrative forces.

10
The Future of Pakistan

All existing states have a fictitious air of inevitability about them. Because they exist it is assumed they were meant to be and will always be. History, however, challenges these assumptions. States that once were are no more, and it is beyond question that currently recognized states will in time join those that have gone before them. Despite their pretensions about immortality, states and nations reveal life cycles that take them from one stage to another, ultimately causing them to disappear from the active world. In their passing some of these actors leave behind legacies and experiences that future entities inherit or adopt, and in so doing the past always influences the present. But synthesis is not the same as survival: continuity of expression does not signify rebirth. When political orders crumble they usually disintegrate: one political experience is terminated and another begins. Some states reveal longer life-cycles, others are comparatively brief. A few leave indelible impressions, most are scarcely remembered. Nevertheless, all states have, and continue to struggle to preserve themselves, indeed the struggle for self-preservation remains the one issue of overriding importance. Rivalry, antagonism, suspicion and hostility describe fundamental relationships between political units. The threat to existence betrays weaknesses which are otherwise obscured by action and declaration, by allusions to a glorious past and protestations concerning a more purposeful future. In sum, individual states are the abstract extensions of the persons who manage and identify with them. They are after all human contrivances, created to serve human needs and satisfy human ambition. States are therefore subject to the maladies that afflict people. Their denouement, like their emergence, is a consequence of human interaction, perception, behaviour and information. The symbiotic relationship that ties people to states, and states to people, implies the

success of one is the achievement of the other, the failure of one is the tragedy of the other. There is no escaping this reality.

The Pakistan Experiment

Pakistan must be classified with the weaker political entities. It was a premature, feeble offspring at birth and although it survived a critical infancy, it never gained the strength necessary to combat its inborn ailments. The amputation of East Pakistan is evidence of this condition. Although it is possible to rationalize the secession of East Pakistan and to assert that the country is healthier as a result of that episode, continuing domestic problems in Sind, the North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan attest to the gravity of the situation. Moreover, the country is plagued by economic problems that defy resolution. Efforts to relieve deprivation have borne little fruit and the nation is confronted with the spectre of increasing indebtedness and eventual bankruptcy. Pakistan's neighbours have only added to its multidimensional dilemmas. India, it is argued, never subscribed to the 'permanence' of the Pakistan national design. Pakistanis believe India is determined to destroy their independent statehood and absorb the country within their larger union. Some outside observers agree with this perception and point to India's role in the partial dismemberment of the country in 1971. Perhaps a smaller number are convinced that India had serious intentions of breaking up the western wing of the country as a prelude to its total dissolution.[1] Those holding to this view contend that only external conditions and international repercussions prevented the culmination of this sequence of events. But regardless of the accuracy of this conviction, the fact remains that Pakistan's frontiers are for the most part crisis-prone, its neighbours largely bellicose, and the fear persists that foreign machinations aim at exploiting the country's inherent weaknesses.

Pakistanis, however, have proven to be their own worst enemies. The inability to coalesce as a nation is mirrored in the failure of the country's leadership to transcend personel rivalry, internecine conflict, and regional or professional pride. Cooperation and accommodation, development and progress, national awareness and political integration were deemed less

significant than the configuration and manipulation of power and the aggressive expression of authority. Experiments with a variety of constitutional systems have thus far provided few benefits. Expectations have been raised concerning the country's democratic objectives, but episodic displays of violence and socio-political disequilibrium have prevented genuine attempts at institution-building commensurate with the promise. 'Basic Democracy' and 'Islamic Democracy' appear as surrogates for the real thing and despite the assumed decent intentions of those programming such intermediary devices, they have neither bridged essential differences, nor reduced hostility between rulers and ruled, or between those in power and those aspiring to replace them. There is little opportunity for give and take, for flexibility and compromise in Pakistani politics. This is by no means unique but it must be judged important in a country that professes fairness, justice, egalitarianism and human freedom. Pakistanis have displayed considerable difficulty in reconciling purpose with practice.

The decision to postpone the November 1979 elections was pre-ordained. The country has had a miserable record in conducting national elections. Those few that have been held led to calamitous results. It is simple to conclude, as Ayub Khan did many years ago, that Pakistanis are not prepared for a full-blown experiment in political democracy. It is also unrealistic to suggest that the mere election process will usher in a period of political stability and, more important, 'good government.' Elections are infrequent events in Pakistan because the institutional underpinnings for such experience is lacking. Thus when they do occur it is less a contest of prevailing preferences than a ritual sanctifying the termination of the old order. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the immediate beneficiary of the only two general elections that Pakistan has yet experienced. But the one prompted a civil war and the other ultimately cost Bhutto his life and plunged the country into deeper problems. Elections can only place specific personalities in institutional slots. If the institutions are inchoate, weak or unpopular, the election process can only be interpreted as a conferment of authority, a mandate to govern. The natural consequence is the accretion and projection of personal prerogatives, not the inculcation of social responsibility. Over the years Pakistanis have deceived themselves into believing they were establishing coherent democratic structures: in point of fact they did little more than reinforce their 'Great Leader' tradition.

‘Great Leaders,’ however, bear impossible burdens in an era of expanding communication, large-scale social mobilization, and complex organization. Mystique no longer sustains them. Efficiency and effective management are measures by which they are judged. And they can only be successful in these contemporary roles if they are provided with and are capable of directing the institutional setup created for that purpose. In the absence of such apparati, ‘Great Leaders’ are exposed to the condemnation of their opponents, to the criticism of those with legitimate grievances, and to their sometime supporters, many of whom sense they can do a better job. Appeals to conventional patterns of tradition cannot insulate such leaders from abusive assaults on their person. They are not held in awe; they do not command blind obedience; they will not convince a diverse people that a higher destiny, not practical circumstance, endowed them with superordinate powers. Jinnah was perhaps the last of the breed where Pakistan is concerned. Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Mohammad, Iskander Mirza, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto all wielded significant powers but their capabilities were linked to mundane activities, not to charismatic charm. They all failed in the effort to transform themselves into figures bigger than life and none of them departed the scene amid cheers and popular acclaim. Zia-ul-Haq is only the latest in this line. His references to the Prophet Mohammad and Mohammad Ali Jinnah are aimed at placing him in another perspective, but he cannot avoid the imprint of those who immediately preceded him. Even if he should ignore this reality, the people of Pakistan are bound to remind him. As much as Pakistanis pine for ‘Great Leaders’ they are just as eager to question those who pretend to lay claim to the title, and ultimately to subdue them.

Zia-ul-Haq has done more to magnify the Islamic factor in Pakistan’s national life than any of his predecessors. Traditional values have been elevated to positions of primary distinction. Alien borrowings and impositions have been discarded or significantly eroded. The latter have been judged impure and a contaminant of Islamic society and its practices. The initial affect has been a more austere, conservative life-style for those members of society with cosmopolitan tastes and desires. For the majority, however, the change is barely noticeable. Their adherence to tenets of faith and belief have never been shaken. They have continued to conduct themselves more or less as they always have. It is not this faceless mass which posed problems for previous regimes and it is not likely they will be

of special concern for the present leadership. If there is a threat to the Zia administration it will be manifested by elements from that fractional segment of the population that is reasonably attentive, politically conscious and essentially dissatisfied with the status quo. This is by no means a monolithic group, but it does share a common cause: it is opposed to uniformed rulers! Zia's Islamic fundamentalism cannot obscure his military circumstances nor his relationship and ties to other military figures who seized political power. Despite all his references to Islamic reform, Zia will always be viewed as the latest in a lengthening line of civil-military dictators. Given the inability to reconcile this opposition, to direct their energies to productive activity, Zia, like those before him, will find himself under growing pressure. Moreover, without the necessary institutional support to control and dissipate discontent, crisis is unavoidable. But the next period of turbulence is not likely to resemble anything which went before it. More than the leadership of Zia-ul-Haq is at stake. Pakistan's quest for identity, the forty year attempt to recreate a solidary, political Muslim community in the subcontinent may well be in mortal jeopardy.

Forces of Change

The fate of Zia-ul-Haq is of minor consequence in the large scheme of things. Nevertheless, he is an important character in the life of the Pakistani nation. His administration comes at a critical juncture in the history of the country. Forces are at work within and beyond the territorial confines of the state. They cannot be wished away, nor handled in a conventional manner. Political stability may be paramount but it is not a substitute for innovative political organization. Moreover, stability is both a relative and ephemeral condition. All governments are stable until overthrown, all leaders are powerful up until the time they fall. In the last five years of the 1970s the world witnessed the passing of an unusually large number of leaders previously seen as strong men. In most instances their political systems were interred with them. Mention need only be made of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Haile Selassi, Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi, Mohammad Daud, Noor Mohammad Tarraki, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Idi Amin, Anastasio Samoza, Chung Hee Park, Pol Pot, Francisco Nguema and Jean-Bedel

Bokassa. The list is far from exhaustive but it does illustrate the tenuousness of power and the basic fragility of domestic as well as international order in the latter half of the twentieth century.

Pakistan cannot escape the turbulence of its own history. Neither can it master the external influences that play upon it. The collapse of the Shah's imposing edifice eliminated the one real ally on the country's far-flung borders. Iran today is an uncertain neighbour beset with enormous problems and buffeted by competing movements and factions. The Iranian monarchy is not likely to be resurrected. Nor is Iran destined to become a model Islamic state. The long-term beneficiaries will be those capable of assimilating foreign assistance and, from past western experience in the country, it is doubtful that such assistance will stem from the United States or its European associates. The supporters of the Ayatallah Khomeini prefer a go-it-alone policy and while it may suffice for a limited period, it will not last. The Soviet Union considers Iran too vital to its geopolitical interests to allow it to drift. Its active support of Iranian social revolutionary elements will increase as opposition expands against those holding power. A full-scale civil war is a virtual certainty after Khomeini, and Pakistan cannot ignore the impact of such a conflict in its volatile Baluchistan region.

With Iran in turmoil the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border can only become more threatening. Irrespective of who is in power in Kabul, the Soviet Union is determined to sustain its influence over the country. Moreover, the Kremlin is prepared for a long drawn-out struggle against Islamic dissidents in the mountain state. The hundred year presence of Russian power in Muslim Central Asia provides the Soviets with the experience necessary to tame the more ferocious tribesmen. The submission of Afghanistan to the power of Moscow is not unrelated to the way in which the Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tadjiks, Turkmen, and Kazaks were eventually absorbed within the Soviet Union. The Kabul government's absolute independence on Soviet support and Soviet dominance in Afghanistan were both generally taken for granted before the massive use of military power against the tribal dissidents. Suggestions to the effect that the Soviet Union will meet its 'Indochina' in Afghanistan may offer comfort to those in the non-communist world who argue a no-win situation, but it does little for Pakistani security. The Soviet role in Afghanistan is quite different from American involvement in Indochina. Afghanistan is a contiguous territory and the Soviet Union is prepared for a long engagement. Furthermore, the

political system that the Soviets are helping to erect in Afghanistan is simple in its totalitarian structure and character. The authoritarian nature of that system is also more in keeping with popular tradition. It does not require the sophistication inherent in the democratic process, nor must the population imbibe doctrine which is totally alien. Marxism is adaptable and Leninism speaks a language of total power. With the death of Mohammad Daud in 1978 Afghanistan ceased to be an independent country. Pakistan's support for Afghan resistance fighters is recognition of this fact; it is also meant to purchase time in order to establish a more acceptable balance of power for the region. But coming to terms with Soviet power is a costly affair, and the price for Pakistan may well be its more conservative posture.

The Soviet Union has the capacity to enflame Pakistan's frontier regions. Disaffected Pathans and Baluchis have shown themselves prepared to accept Soviet assistance in their conflicts with the Islamabad government. In this regard, the Pakhtunistan question has never been more alive. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the Zia regime is not confined to the frontier areas. Sindhis do not mourn Bhutto's memory for personal reasons. Rather Bhutto's death is but one more sign that the Punjabis again wish to assert their authority and lord it over the entire country. The inferiority-ridden Sindhis sense a particular loss: they feel that the regime will attempt to placate the Baluchis and Pathans, but that they will be singled out for special punishment. Furthmore, Sind is home to the more doctrinaire Marxists. Student radicals from Karachi and Hyderabad Universities along with labour leaders from the industrial areas in and around Karachi have been cultivated by the Soviet Union over an extended period. The Marxists may have achieved very little tangible advantage during Bhutto's tenure, but they did have the opportunity to spread their doctrines and attract new recruits. They will certainly seek to exploit the ill-will generated by Zia's policies and actions. The Punjab is by no means free from such influence. The backbone of the country's intelligentsia is located in Lahore. Their demands for democratic, civilian government cannot be effectively suppressed. Frustration with the military junta will provoke alienation and could transform the intellectuals into willing allies of the Marxists.

The key to Pakistan's future, however, may lie in India where the situation is more confused than at any time since the country's independence from British rule. India has not been immune to the tumultuous events in neighbouring Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. More

than ever it shows signs of succumbing to Soviet influence. There appears to be evidence to support the view that the Soviet Union undermined Morarji Desai's coalition government. Desai defied Soviet entreaties and was judged a threat to secure Indo-Soviet relations. The Kremlin, it is alleged, reached into the President's House and won over Sanjiva Reddy who was expected to call upon Jagjivan Ram, the Janata leader controlling the largest bloc of votes in the Lok Sabha (the all-important lower house in the Indian parliament). Ram was bypassed, however, and after Y. B. Chavan failed to form a workable coalition, the task for establishing a government fell to Charan Singh. Charan Singh had broken with Desai, and had formed his own Janata (Secular) Party. He was momentarily successful in forming a new government with the help of Mrs Gandhi and M. N. Bahuguna's Congress for Democracy, a socialist faction with extreme radical policies. Charan Singh's government, however, collapsed after less than four weeks in office after the defection of these same coalition members. The Prime Minister called upon the President to prorogue the parliament and call new elections. Jagjivan Ram opposed this move insisting he should be given an opportunity to form a new government and that there was no need for a mid-term election. President Reddy, however, chose to ignore Ram, closed the assembly, ordered new elections and requested Charan Singh and his cabinet to continue in office as a caretaker adminstration until such time as another government could be established. There was little doubt that India's political system was in the process of being radicalized. Mrs Gandhi's re-election in January 1980 confirmed this observation as did her victorious comments which appeared to blame the United States for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Indian armed forces were seen as a prop for the emerging leftist pattern. Their association with the Soviet Union and heavy dependence on Soviet weapons over a long period seemed to guarantee their support for a reinvigorated socialist/secular system.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Pakistan's leaders must be alert to the fundamental shifts in the political life of the region. Since 1978, in Afghanistan and Iran, as in India, conservative, traditional regimes have dramatically been replaced by revolutionary movements which promise significant metamorphoses. The murder of Daud, his replacement by Marxists, and the Soviet policy to establish Afghanistan as a satellite; the demise of the Shah, the emergence of radical forces in Iran, and the possibility of a Soviet intrusion on behalf of ethnic and political elements

that have no particular loyalty to Iran as a distinct national entity; the failure of Morarji Desai's coalition government and India's growing tilt to the political left; all bear upon Pakistan's future. Zia-ul-Haq's decision to discard western-type parliamentary democracy will do more than write an end to the 1973 constitution. The intention to create an Islamic state solely responsive to Islamic principles in some way aims at parallelling the call for an Islamic state in Iran and continues to provide encouragement for the hard-pressed resistance movement in Afghanistan. It also is an effort to tie Pakistan more closely to the Arab states.

In Pakistani eyes, the United States has shown itself to be a poor friend and the controversy over Pakistan's nuclear programme has further damaged American-Pakistani relations. The destruction of the American Embassy in Islamabad only added to the bitterness on both sides. The United States, however, was constrained to announce its support of Pakistan's security in the wake of the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan. This was not the first time the two countries found themselves in intimate association despite their mutual suspicions of one another. 'The enemy of my enemy is my friend' may be too harsh a statement but it addresses itself to the predicament that both the American and Pakistani governments find themselves in with the unleashing of the Red Army. Moreover, the awareness that the United States intends to cooperate with the People's Republic of China and supports Chinese involvement in Pakistan's defense illustrates how far the world has come since 1975. Nevertheless it remains to be seen how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan will ultimately affect Pakistan-American relations. Despite the United States' decision to provide Pakistan with an updated and more substantial military arsenal, government officials in both countries have reason to be suspicious about their long-term relationship. The cumulative impact of events on American-Pakistani relations cannot be ignored; there will be no return to the innocence of the 1950s and early 1960s.

Zia therefore can only try to establish the semblence of an Islamic order which will permit closer associations with other Muslim nations. The view persists that only a return to the tenets of Islam will encourage more intimate cooperation between and among Muslim countries. Given time there is the added hope that such intimacies can lead to the recreation of an Islamic polity, guided not by territorial nationalism but by the promises of an all embracing theocratic doctrine. The development of an Islamic

commonwealth would be an answer to the western nation-state on the one side and to Marxist-secular multinationalism on the other. Indeed there is in this quest the germ of the original Pakistan idea, that the creation of an independent Muslim state in the subcontinent was merely a way-station on the road to world-wide Islamic unity.

The formation of an Islamic commonwealth, however, appears far from realization. The Arab world is divided and everywhere in conflict. Domestic problems exert enormous pressures on all the states. Relations between them are largely unstable. Iran shows no real interest in inter-regional political integration, and Afghanistan will not support Pan-Islamism under its present leadership. Turkey is too proud a nation to opt for a union of Muslim states despite its current malaise. Pakistan can only pretend that such an ideological community is possible. In the meantime, Zia anticipates obtaining legitimacy for his regime by emphasizing Pakistan's connection to and association with other Islamic states. It is the policies and programmes that the government promotes at home, however, which ultimately will determine the destiny of the Pakistan nation. The Islamic state is an important manoeuvre. But as in Iran, it is not likely to last - at least not in the rigidly vindictive political form that it has thus far shown. It is not that Islam is not strong enough to sustain the experiment. It is simply that Islam must adapt to an age of super-industrial and post-industrial states.[2] The technotronic era imposes complex demands on peoples everywhere and neither Pakistan nor Iran can avoid its impact.

The repudiation of western ideas and institutions puts an increasing burden on more traditional structures and methods of government. In time that burden may prove to be greater than the leaders of the Islamic system can manage. Although the assault will be upon those in authority, when it materializes it could also force an epoch-making change in the political form of society. Pakistan has not yet experienced a Marxist-cum-socialist system but such a system seems to be very much in its future. As with Iran and to some extent with India too, bridges to the West are being destroyed. Afghanistan never really erected such a bridge. The winds of change are blowing throughout the region and the radicalization of these countries must in time influence Pakistan. A socialist Pakistan would not be the end of the process. Given the impact of the change, Pakistan could cease to exist in its sovereign nation-state form. With the approach of the twenty-first

century Pakistanis may at last find their elusive commonwealth, only it may not be the one envisaged by the nation's creators.

Notes to the Text

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Index

Abbasids, 26
Abu Dhabi, 244
Achakzai, A. S., 154, 155
Administrative State, 87, 97, 175–87, 188, 225
Afghanistan, 29, 126, 129, 140, 150, 159, anti-Islamic policies, 240; civil war in, 216, 241; covets NWFP, 148–9, 155, 253–4, 255, 256, 257; Khilafate Movement and, 27; Marxist coup in, 237–8; organize leftist political parties, 240, 247; Soviet Union assists, 238; Soviet Union invades, 243; threat to Pakistan, 235–43, 238; U.S. economic assistance to, 225
Afghans, 20, 149, 155, 159
Agartala Conspiracy Trial, 98, 186–7
Ahmed, Aziz, 123
Ahmed, Ghulam, 76
Ahmed, Viqar, 200
Ahmediya Controversy, 76, 234
Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium, 202, 244
Akbar, Emperor, 30
Algeria, 234
Allahbux, Khan Bahadur, 143
Amb, 46
Americans, 184, 202, 222–3, 225, 226, 228, 242, 244–5, 247; *see also* United States
Amin, Hafizullah, 240–1, 242, 243
Amin, Idi, 252
Amin, Nurul, 78, 94
Amir Ali, Syed, 65, 66, 68
Arabs, Arab World, 20, 25, 26, 220, 232, 233, 234, 243, 246, 247, 256, 257
Arab-Israeli Conflict, 221, 232
Arafat, Yasir, 233, 234
Arains, 141
Asia Minor, 26
Assad, Hafiz el-, 234
Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal, 27
Aurangzeb, Emperor, 29
Awami, League, 80, 82, 83, 96, 100, 101, 102, 103, 106, 110, 116, 121, 175, 181, 188
Awans, 149, 150
Ayub Khan, Mohammad, 36, 49, 79, 80, 82, 118, 119, 121, 124, 130, 145, 154, 162, 164, 179, 198, 202, 204, 210, 217, 230, 235, 250, 251; accepts UN resolution, 228; and administrative state, 87–9, *see also* administrative state; and Basic Democracies System, 94, 181–3, 186–7, *see also* Basic Democracies System; at Tashkent, 228–9; builds his coalition, 90–1; constitution of 1962, 182–7; establishes martial law, 83, 86, 163, *see also* martial law; forms political party, 95; illness of, 96,

186; legacy of, 95; mistrusts politicians and intellectuals, 91, 96, 117; opposed by intelligentsia, 87, *see also* intelligentsia; perception of politicians, 91, 93; politicians' view of, 93, 96, 184–7; problems as army chief, 179–80; problems with United States, 225; resigns, 97, 107, 187; restores constitutional rule, 93; self-perception, 93, 95–6; United States impressed with, 221, 223; used by politicians, 197; war with India, 90
Baghdad Pact (CENTO), 93, 221, 222, 223, 229, 230, 232, 244
Balance of Power, 21, 254
Baluchis, 120, 127, 131, 136, 141, 149, 150, 155, 159–66, 236, *254 see also* Baluchistan
Baluchistan, 27, 28, 36, 46, 49, 50, 53, 71, 127, 136, 146, 147, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 190, 204, 210, 236, 239, 249, 253; Political overview of, 159–66
Baluchistan States Union, 159–60
Bandung Conference, 241
Bangladesh, 28, 36, 49, 50, 105, 106, 107, 136, 147, 154, 196, 214, 218, 219, 230, 232, 234, 235, 242; U.S. economic assistance to, 225; *see also* Bengalis, East Bengal, East Pakistan
Bahaguna, M. N., 255
Bahawalpur, 46
Bannerjea, Surendranath, 67
Basic Democracies System, 49, 87–8, 204, 210, 250; as electoral college, 182–184; condemned, 187–8; description of, 94; rationale for, 181; terminated, 98
Basic Principles Committee, 73–4
Battle of Plassey, 20
Bengal, 27, 28, 46, 47, 71, 98
Bengalis, 46–9, 73, 74, 103, 120, 136, 181–2, 230; and nationalism, 48; and the language controversy, 48–9, 75; demand adequate representation, 140; demand autonomy, 96, 97, 98–9, 188–9; resent West Pakistanis, 47–8, 50, 79, 102; suffering of, 101
Bhakti, 29–30
Bhashani, Maulana, 48, 78, 81, 82, 101, 154, 181
Bhutto, Begum Nusrat, 203, 214
Bhutto, Benazir, 214
Bhutto, Mumtaz Ali, 119, 124
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 36, 37, 50, 54, 55, 76, 95, 96, 97, 146–7, 148, 204, 209, 214, 217, 226, 230, 232, 237, 250, 251, 252; accused of murder, 201; ambitious, 88–90; and People's Party, 117–32; and the NWFP, 154–9; and Zia-ul-Haq, 197; as a Sindhi, 145–6; as supreme ruler, 189–90; assumes leadership of Pakistan, 104–5; assumes presidency, 189–90; becomes Prime Minister, 190; contemplates return, 199–200; executed, 38, 57, 107, 110, 159, 191, 192, 206; foreign policy, 232–45; gives new constitution, 190; in Baluchistan, 164–5; leaves Ayub, 185; opposition in the military, 131–2; opposes Tashkent Agreement, 90; overthrown, 108, 199, 201; popularity of, 99; prefers presidential system, 192; promotes Muslim Summit, 233–4; rival of Mujibur Rahma 102, 103; role in the Civil War, 103–4; sentenced to hang, 206; tactics, 107–8, 187
Bizenjo, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh, 164, 165
Bogra, Mohammad Ali, 79, 80, 221
Bokassa, Jean-Bedel, 252
Boumedienne, Houari, 234
British, 64, 65, 69, 111; among the Pathans, 150, 153; and constitutionalism, 34; and imperialism 27, 31; and military experience, 197; and partition, 141; emulated by Muslims, 64; gain power in the subcontinent, 63; govern India, 20–3, 29, 39, 43–4, 46, 56, 176–8, 183; in Baluchistan, 159–60; in Sind, 142–3, 147, 148; in World War I, 26; on the Frontier, 134–5, 148–9; recruited Hindus, 63; retreat from India, 31; role in creating Pakistan, 70–2; rule in the Punjab, 137–9; transfer power, 169; *see also* Great Britain
British Indian Army, 21, 22–3, 176

Brahui, 163
Brohi, A. K., 207
Bugti, 163, 164
Bugti, Nawab Mohammad Akbar, 165
Bureaucracy, 80, 99, 101, 103, 104–5, 156, 200; and Basic Democracies, 94; and constitutionalism, 36; and military-administrative relationship, 87–93; assumes dominance, 74; Bhutto creates new service, 105; British structure in India, 21; cooperates with military and politicians, 196; controls Pakistan government, 49; CSP privileges, 90; during British rule, 175–82; engaged in development, 91–2; in transition, 195; joins with Army, 79; purged and repudiated, 98, 186–7; reformed, 203; replaces politicians, 115–16, 117, 173, 175, 183; training institutions for, 92
Cabinet Mission, 31, 70
Cabinet of Talents, 80
Caliphate, 27, 34
Caliphs, 26–7, 34
Capitalism, 119, 124, 129
Carter, Jimmy, 245
Catholic Papacy, 26
CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) *see* Baghdad Pact
Central Asia, 29, 237, 239, 253
Chaudhury, Fazal Elahi, 204, 206, 209
Chavan, Y. B., 255
China, Peoples Republic of, 89, 101, 221, 223, 225, 228, 229, 230, 231, 243, 256
Chisti, F. A., 198
Chitral, 46
Christianity, Christians, dominance of 26–7; with Islam, 29, 72
Chundrigar, I.I., becomes Prime Minister, 116; in first cabinet, 139, 140
Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), 74, 105, 186, 188; privileges of 90
Civil War, 1971, 49, 50, 103–4, 106, 117, 121, 189, 230, 231, 250
Combined Opposition Parties (COP), 183–4, 226
Commission on the Eradication of Corruption, 209
Commonwealth of Nations, 220
Communal Conflict, 169
Congress for Democracy, 255
Constantinople (Istanbul), 26
Constitution of Pakistan, 1956, 36, 100, 179, 190, 192; analysis of, 173–5
Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, 36, 94, 98, 190, 191, 192, 225; analysis of 182–7
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, 36, 54, 122, 209, 210, 256; analysis of, 189–93; Islamic provisions, 190–1
Constitutionalism, 33–4, 35, 36–7, 38, 40, 94–5, 102, 106, 113, 140, 211–12; critically appraised, 167–93
Convention Muslim League, 95, 139, 182–3
Council of Islamic Ideology, 54, 174, 190–1
Cripps Mission, 70
Daud, Mohammad, 239, 240; antagonistic towards Pakistan, 149, 236; attempts reconciliation with Pakistan, 237; senses Marxist threat, 237; murdered, 238, 252, 254, 255
Daultana, Mian Mumtaz, 95, 156
Das, C. R. 67
Decade of Development, 96
Desai, Morarji, 255
Dir, 46, 150

Divide and Rule, 20, 21, 25, 31, 46, 65, 153
Dravidian, 163
Dulles, John Foster, 93, 221
Durand Line, 148–9, 235, 236
East Bengal, 45, 47, 48, 73, 75, 76, 78, 80, 116, 140, 179, 220; *see also* Bangladesh, Bengalis, East Pakistan
East Pakistan, 28, 36, 81, 82, 83, 95, 96, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 116–17, 120, 124, 128, 152, 155, 164, 173, 174, 181, 182, 185–7, 188, 189, 190, 191, 195, 196, 214, 219, 226, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 249
East Punjab, 197
Egypt, 26, 82, 234, 237
Eisenhower, Dwight David, 93, 221
Europe, Europeans, 20, 21, 26, 33–4, 39, 58–60, 64, 65, 119, 135, 153, 169, 177, 178, 246, 253
European Imperialism, 29
Faisal, King, 232, 233, 234
Faruque, Ghulam, 89
Fazl-i-Husain, 138
Federal Security Force (FSF), 105, 122, 123, 127, 131, 200, 201, 203
Federation of Pakistan v. Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, 171
Fell, D. Y., 160–1
First Constituent Assembly (Pakistan), 35, 71, 79, 80, 169–70
First Indo-Pakistani War, 32
First Round Table Conference, 69
Ford Foundation, 222
France, French, 26, 82, 245
Free Baluchistan Movement, 156
Freedom Movement, 23–5, 27, 39, 109, 110
Gandhi, Indira, 131, 235, 237, 255
Gandhi, Mahatma, 27, 39–40, 67, 68, 69, 71, 77, 107, 150, 153
Germany, 66, 212
Ghaffar Khan, Abdul, 77, 126, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155
Gilgit, 46
Gokhale, G. K., 67, 68
Government of India Act, 1919, 68
Government of India Act, 1935, 34, 69, 169, 170, 171
Great Britain, 20–3, 31, 44, 67, 70, 82, 94, 135, 169, 176–8, 181, 183, 195, 236, 239; *see also* British
Greeks, 26
Gujars, 149, 150
Gurmani, Muchtaq Ahmad, 81
Haris, 142, 144, 146
Hasan, Mubashir, 119, 122, 123, 124
Hassan, Ghulam, 198
Helmand Waters Treaty, 239
Hidayatullah, Ghulam Hussain, 143
Hindu Mahasabha, 114, 138
Hindus, 20, 63, 65, 66, 72, 111, 114, 138; and Gandhi, 39; conflict with, 140–1, 151; cooperate with Muslims, 27; dominate East Bengal, 140; gain independence, 169; Muslim antagonism for, 24, 27, 30, 32, 40, 44; Muslim fear of, 28, 29–31, 45, 99, 116, 141, 186, 188; reassert power, 21–3; *see also* India
Hitler, Adolph, 59

Horn of Africa, 237
Huq, Fazul, 78, 81, 83
Huq, Mahbubul, 202–3
Hunter, W. W., 64, 84
Hunza, 46
Hurs, 147–8
Hussein, King, 197
Hyderabad, 45
Hyderabad Special Tribunal, 204
Ideology, 41–59, 174–5, 190–1, 205, 209, 217, 257
Iftikharuddin, Mian, 82, 154
India, 22, 27, 31, 33, 35, 36, 43, 47, 58, 64, 68, 71, 78, 89, 129, 131, 141, 146, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 169, 176–7, 208, 211, 228, 236, 243; and Akhand Bharat, 32, 45, 139; and Bangladesh, 230; and early Islam, 20–1; and future of Pakistan, 254; and Kashmir conflict, 226–7, 228–9, 242; and Khilafate Movement, 27; and Marxism, 257; and Muslim states, 221; and Simla Conference, 235; and United States, 255; anti-Americanism in, 232; as nuclear power, 244–5, 246; as a secular state, 72; dismembers Pakistan, 189; fear of, 219–20, 221–2, 223; good Press in West, 231; never accepted Pakistan, 249; normalizes relations with Pakistan, 185; occupies East Pakistan, 104; ridiculed by U.S., 232; seeks USSR assistance, 222; U.S. economic assistance to, 224
Indian Army, 45, 228, 231, *255*; *see also* India
Indian Civil Service (ICS), 74, 118
Indian Independence Act, 1947, 34–5, 169, 170, 171
Indian National Congress, 64, 67, 68, 69–70, 111, 113, 211, 225; and Afghanistan, 149; and independence movement, 23, 31, 44; and the Khilafate Movement, 27; and the NWFP, 150–1, 153; formed, 22; in the Punjab, 139
Indochina War, 229, 253
Indo-Pakistani War, 1965, 90, 184, 186, 226, 235
Indo-Pakistani War, 1971, 121, 189, 230, 235
Integrated Rural Development Programme, 204
Intelligentsia, 87, 98, 180–1, 254; American support of, 94; and political atrophy, 95; and the PPP, 119, 130; appealed to by Yahya, 187; attack Zia-ul-Haq, 217–18; Ayub's perceptions of, 91; involved in politics 93; oppose Ayub Khan, 183, 223–5
Iqbal, General Mohammad, 198
Iqbal, Mohammad, as poet-philosopher, 65–7, 68, 104
Iran, 122, 140, 148, 161, 221, 223, 229, 232, 234, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 247, 253, 254, 255, 256, *251*; *see also* Shah of Iran
Iraq, 221, 237
Ireland, 160
Islam, and Bhutto, 200; and constitutionalism, 37, 169, 174, 190–1; and correct path, 37–8; and nation-state, 25–8, 34; and socialism, 119, 216; and the Pathans, 150; and the tribal population 134, 136–7; and tolerance, 43; and Zia-ul-Haq, 205, 257; as a political impediment, 133; as ideology, 52, 111; as unifier, 51; contrasts with Hinduism, 29–30; deemphasized, 86; in conflict, 148; in decline, 39; in election campaign, 130, 131; in India, 20, 22–5, 28; legal protection for, 208; resurgence of, 234–5; *see also* Islamic State
Islam in Danger, 22–3, 26, 27, 31–2, 51, 111, 112, 114, 141, 151
Islamic Canon Courts (Shariat Benches), 208
Islamic Commonwealth, 256–7
Islamic Socialism, 190
Islamic State, 75, 83, 137, 215, 253; and Bhutto, 190; and constitutions 168, 174, 190–1, 192–3; and legal system, 208; and Nizam-i-Mustapha, 38; and Pan-Islamism, 25; and religious education,

207; and the national state, 25–8, 58; and western constitutionalsim, 33–4, 37; and Zia-ul-Haq, 52–7, 147, 205, 216–8, 251–2, 256, 257; described by Iqbal, 67; origins in sub-continent, 63, 65; recreated in the subcontinent, 24–5, 32–3, 35, 38, 50–1; some theoretical comparisons, 61–2; *see also* Islam, Muslims
Israel, 82, 220, 234, 237, 242
Italians, 26
Jamaat-i-Islami, 110, 129, 157, 199
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, 110, 126, 129, 154, 155, 157, 164, 165, 239
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Pakistan, 110, 129, 157, 208
Janata Party, 255
Janata (Secular) Party, 255
Jats, 141, 149, 150
Jehanzeb, Arbab, 198
Jews, 29
Jilani, Malik Ghulam, 95
Jinnah, Miss Fatima, 86, 184, 205, 226
Jinnah, Mohammad Ali (Quaid-i-Azam), 104, 110, 127–8, 129; and bureaucracy, 178; and Freedom Movement, 27, 28, 31, 33, 49; and leadership, 39–40, 44, 117, 251; and Liaquat Ali Khan, 72–3; and PPP, 119; and Radcliffe Award, 47; as nationalist and visionary, 112–3; background, 67–71; first Governor-General, 71; illness and death, 71; in exile, 67; in NWFP, 151, 153; in the Punjab, 138–41; in Sind, 144; in tribal territory, 77; joins Congress and Muslim League, 68; opposes satyagraha and Gandhi, 68; pleads for unity, 72; praises Ghulam Mohammad, 75; resigns from Congress, 69; revitalizes Muslim League, 69
Jordan, 197
Judeo-Christian Tradition, 119
Junagadh, 45
Kaaba Incident, 242
Kafiristan, 46
Kalat, 46, 160, 161–3
Karmal, Babrak, 243
Kashmir, 32, 33, 45, 71, 151, 184, 185, 220, 225, 226–7, 229, 235
Kasuri, Ahmed Raza, 201
Kasuri, Mahmud Ali, 119, 122, 191
Katpur, A. W., 123
Khairpur, 46
Khalifate Movement, 26–7
Khan, A. R., 88
Khan, Abdul Wali, 126, 127, 154–9, 164, 192, 204
Khan, Ashgar, 127
Khan, Ghazanfar Ali, 140
Khan of Kalat, 159–160, 162–5
Khan, Khizr Hyat, 138–9
Khan, Liaquat Ali, 76, 251; assassinated, 74–5, 107, 140; background of, 72–3; first Prime Minister, 72; in first cabinet, 139; party difficulties, 73; selects Ayub Khan to head Army, 179
Khan, Mohammad Azam, 88, 89
Khan, Sardar Shaukat Hyat, 95
Khan, Sarwar, 198
Khan, Sikander Hyat, 138
Khan, Syed Ahmad, 63–5, 66, 68
Khan, Tamizuddin, 94

Khan, Tikka, 102, 103, 214–5
Khan, Zafrullah, 76
Khan Sahib, Dr, 81–3, 150, 153–4, 155
Khar, Mustafa, 119, 124, 125
Kharan, 46, 160
Khomeini, Ayatullah, 51, 240, 242, 244, 253
Khrushchev, Nikita, 222
Khudai Khidmatgar, 77, 81, 149, 152–3
Kissinger, Henry, 231
Korean War, 225
Krishak Sramik Party, 78, 81, 83, 116
Kuwait, 234, 244
Lahore Islamic Summit Conference, 233–4, 236
Lahore Resolution, 69
Las Bela, 46, 160, 165
Lebanon, 240
Legal Framework Order, 1970, 49, 100, 102, 187
Leninism, 119
Libya, 234, 245
Lucknow Pact, 1916, 68
Mahmud of Ghazni, 29
Mairaj Mohammad Khan, 119, 120
Makran, 46, 160
Mandal, J. N., 140
Maoism, 119
Mao Tse-tung, 107, 120
Marri, 163, 164, 165
Marri, Khair Baksh, 165
Martial Law, 225; and Mirza, 161–3; explanation of, 85–6; under Ayub Khan, 88, 154, 180–2; under Bhutto, 131, 155, 165, 214; under Yahya Khan, 97, 100, 102, 187; under Ziaul-Haq, 201, 203, 207, 210, 213, 215; withdrawn, 92
Marxism, 34, 119, 145, 149, 159, 237, 238, 239, 240, 242, 243, 254, 255, 256, 257
Marxism-Leninism, 52, 161, 240, 254
Meer Khurshid Hasan, 124
Mengal, 163
Mengal, Sardar Atullah Khan, 164, 165
Middle East, 21, 221, 232, 237
Military Junta, 97–101, 102, 103, 105, 187–9, 196, 215
Mirza, Iskander, 78, 80, 82, 115, 153, 251; abrogates constitution, 175, 179; background, 161; becomes Governor-General, 80; conspires against Khan of Kalat, 161–3; first President of Pakistan, 81–2; personality, 80; sent into exile, 83, 86, 107, 184; supports United States, 221
Mitha, Abubakr Osman, 103
Moghuls, 20, 21, 22, 34, 43, 56, 63, 176
Mohammad Ali, Choudhri, 79, 81, 82, 115; becomes Prime Minister, 178–9; organizes the Pakistan bureaucracy, 178; suspicious of Hindu plot in East Pakistan, 188–9
Mohammad, General Ghulam, 198
Mohammad, Ghulam 78, 86, 115, 162, 251; becomes Governor-General, 75; fights limitations on his power, 79–80, 170–2; ousts Nazimuddin, 77; suffers stroke, 80; supports United States, 221; undermines constitutionalism, 179
Mohammad Khan, Malik Amir, 89

Mohammad, Mian Tufail, 95, 199
Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College (Aligarh), 64
Monem Khan, Abdul, 89
Mongolians, 26, 163
Montague-Chelmsford Reforms, 68
Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 31, 70
Muhajir, 28, 47, 136, 144–5, 146, 197
Munir, Mohammad, 172
Musa, Mohammad, 88
Muslim League, 66, 69, 73, 79–80, 94, 110; and Bengali problem, 46–9; and bureaucracy, 178–9; and the constitution, 34–5, 173, 174–5; and ethnic diversity, 46; and Islamic state, 32–3; and the PPP, 128; as nationalistic movement, 45; East Bengal elections affect, 48–9, 78–9; formation of, 22, 28; first call for Muslim state, 66; in the NWFP, 150–1, 153; in Punjab, 138–41; in Sind, 143–4; on ideology and nationalism, 44–5, 217; on the frontier, 135, 137; overview, 111–17, 195; revamped, 70; with freedom movement, 23–5, 27, 28, 31, 44; *see also* Muslims
Muslim National Party, 150–1
Muslims, 62, 65, 135; and constitutionalism 33, 37; and guerrilla war in Afghanistan, 240–3; and Hindu amity, 27; and Kashmiri problem, 220; and leadership, 39–40; and Muslim League, 111–17; and the nation-state, 25–8; and the Pakistan Movement, 63–72; and the Umma, 24–5, 32, 33, 53; as muhajirs, 28; communal warfare involving, 31; early history in South Asia of, 20–1, 29, 43; fears of, 23, 28, 44–5; gain independence, 169; in Unionist Party, 138–9; reawakening of, 23–5; remaining in India, 113; solidarity, 247; South Asian character of, 19, 30–1; stability questioned, 244–6; support Bhutto, 233–4; under stress, 19, wary of Hindus, 21–2, 44; *see also* Freedom Movement, Muslim League
Mussolini, Benito, 59
Mutiny of 1857, 21, 177
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, 221, 231
Naim, Mohammad, 238
Napoleon Bonaparte, 59
Naroji, Dadabhai, 67
Nasrullah Khan, Nawabzada, 95
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 39
National Awami Party, 101, 110, 126, 127, 154, 155, 156, 157, 164, 165, 181, 186, 239; banned by Bhutto, 158; formed, 82
National Democratic Party, 110, 159, 208
National Elections, 100–2, 107, 117, 124, 126, 127, 128–33, 154, 175, 188, 190, 199, 201, 205, 207, 208–9, 210, 211–6, 230, 250
National Intelligence Bureau, 201
National Progressive Party, 138
National Training Centre for Rural Development, 204
Nationalism, 25, 41–59, 161, 216–8, 256; contrasted with Ideology, 41–2
Nazimuddin, Khwaja, as controversial leader, 76; becomes Governor-General, 73; becomes Prime Minister, 75; death of, 94; removed from office, 77
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 221
Nepal, 225
Nguema, Francisco, 252
Nishtar, Sardar Rab, 77, 94, 139–40, 151
Nixon, Richard, M., 93, 221, 231, 232
Nizam-i-Islam, 179
Nizam-i-Mustapha, 205

Noon, Firoz Khan, 139; becomes Prime Minister, 82
North Korea, 131
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), 27, 28, 32, 46, 47, 49, 53, 77, 126, 127, 136, 147, 160, 162, 164, 166, 179, 190, 204, 210, 222, 239, 249; and Pakhtunistan, 236; established as province, 153; political forces in, 148–59; *see also* Pakhtunistan
Objectives Resolution, 35, 73
One Unit, 46, 49, 81, 96, 98, 100, 120, 144, 153, 160, 162, 164, 171, 179, 187
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 232–3
Ottoman Empire, 26, 27, 39, 43
Pagaro Muslim League, 110, 148
Pakhtoon Student Federation, 156
Pakhtunistan, 28, 149, 155, 156, 161, 236, 239, 254; *see also* Afghanistan, Northwest Frontier Province
Pakistan Administrative Staff College, 92
Pakistan, Afghanistan dilemma, 235–43; allied with the United States, 221; and Baluchistan, 160; and 'great' leaders, 251; and idiological nationalism, 58–60; and nationalities, 46, 47; and political parties, 111–33; and the Islamic State, 32–3; and the pro vinces, 134–66; anti-Americanism in, 242–3; as homeland for Muslims, 62; as prototype for the Islamic State, 51–7; as secular state, 33–6, 50; communal warfare in, 31–2; constitutionalism in, 167–93; critical analysis of, 216–18; dismembered, 104, 106; dividend country, 249; emerges with great problems, 71–2; failure of democracy in, 250–1; foreign policy of, 219–47; future of, 142, 148, 257; growing insecurity of, 253–4; large-scale U.S. aid to, 222; military capability of, 227; name derived, 67; normalizes relations with India, 235; nuclear development in, 219–20, 243–7; origin, 27, 28, 31–2, 40, 44; penetrated by India, 104; political conspiracies, 75, 78–9; problems of leadership in, 109–10, 249–50; promotes Muslim solidarity, 247; U.S. economic assistance to, 225; U.S. relations strained, 226–8, 256
Pakistan Army (Armed Forces), 47, 48, 75, 77, 80, 82, 83, 86, 88, 96, 97, 99, 103, 104, 115, 116, 127, 131–2, 151, 152, 156, 162–3, 164, 165, 179, 185, 187–9, 197, 210–12, 216, 221, 229, 230–1, 244; analysis of, 194–218; critique of soldiers in politics, 195–6
Pakistan Election Commission, 210, 212
Pakistan Movement, 62, 64, 112, 129, 141, 144, 149, 150, 169
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), 128–30, 200, 208, 215
Pakistan People's Party, 36, 50, 90, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 110, 164, 165, 189, 190, 191, 197, 198, 199, 203, 211, 214–15, 230, 243; and the one-party state, 128, 155, 156–7; critical analysis of, 117–32; internal conflict of, 122–3; leftist orientation, 124–5
Pakistan Press Trust, 87
Pakistan's Foreign Debt, 202
Palestine, 26, 220, 234
Pan-Islamism, 25, 28, 51, 257
Park, Chung Hee, 252
Pathans, 53, 120, 122, 126, 131, 136, 141, 161; and Afghanistan, 236–43; at partition, 32; demand for self-determination, 36, 50, 254; frontier issues, 149–59; tribal divisions of, 149–50; *see also* Afghanistan, Northwest Frontier Province, Pakhtunistan
People's Democratic Party (Khalq), 240
Persia, 29; *see* Iran
Persian Gulf, 206, 233, 237, 239
Pir Pagaro, 147–8
Pirzada, Abdul Hafiz, 119, 124
Pol Pot, 252

Popular Front of Armed Resistance Against National Oppression and Exploitation in Baluchistan, 156
Prophet Mohammad, 26, 34, 37, 39, 52, 76, 119, 205, 251
Punjab, 27, 31, 46, 47, 49–50, 66, 71, 74, 101, 127, 136, 143, 144, 146, 152, 154, 157, 161, 164, 166, 179, 204, 210, 226, 228, 254; politics in the, 137–42
Punjabi, 149, 150; caste among, 141, dominance of, 140–1, 145, 146; landed elite in, 138–40, 153; *see also* Punjab
Qadafi, Muammar, 233, 234, 245, 246
Qadiani, 234
Qadir, Manzur, 182, 186
Qayyum Khan, Abdul, 77, 151–2, 156
Qayyum Muslim League, 156, 157
Qizilbash, M. A., 83
Quisling, 139
Quit India Movement, 70
Qureshi, I. H., 24–5
Radcliffe Award, 45–6, 47, 71
Rahim, J. A., as advisor to Bhutto, 120–21, 122; as author, 120; as PPP organizer, 119, dismissed by Bhutto, 123; PPP ideologist, 118, 123
Rahman, Fazlur, 76, 77
Rahman Khan, Ataur, 78, 81, 83
Rahman, Mujibur, 78, 81, 96, 97, 100, 116, 121, 155, 159, 230, 234, 236, 252; accused of treason, 98; as rival of Bhutto, 99, 102, 103; arrested by military junta, 103; killed, 105, 106, 107; opposes Ayub Khan, 181–2; presents six point programme, 185–7, 188; problems governing Bangladesh, 106; released from prison, 105, 187; self-perception, 106
Rahmat Ali, Chaudhary, 67
Rajputana, 146
Rajputs, 141
Rakkhi Bahini, 106
Ram, Jagjivan, 255
Ramay, Hanif, 119, 124, 125
Rana, Mukhtar, 122
Rashid, Abdur, 83
Rashid, Rao, 200–1
Rashid, Sardar Abdur, 77
Rashid, Sheikh Mohammad, 119
Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 198
Reddy, Sanjiva, 255
Regional Cooperation for Development, 223
Republican Party, 81, 110, 115, 116, 139, 153
Rural Works Programme, 92, 181
Sabah al Salim al Mubarak, Sheikh, 234
Sadat, Anwar-el, 234
Safdar, Khawaja Mohammad, 95
Samoza, Anastasio, 252
Sardari System, 163, 164, 165
Sarkar, Abu Husain, 78, 81, 83
Saudi Arabia, 55, 206, 234, 244, 246
Scheduled Castes, 140
Scotland, 160

Second Constituent Assembly, 80–1, 123, 172, 173
Second Five Year Plan, 92, 180, 223
Secular State, as corporate community, 61–2; in Pakistan, 174, 217, 255
Selassi, Haile, 252
Separate Electorates, 65, 68, 69, 116–17, 174, 205
SEVAK, 122
Shah of Iran, 223, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240, 252, 253, 255
Shahi, Agha, 246
Shastri, Lai Bahadur, 90, 96, 184–5, 228–9
Sheikh, K. M., 88
Sherpao, Hyat Mohammad Khan, 127, 157, 158
Sikander-Jinnah Pact, 138
Sikhs, 27, 31, 32, 66, 134, 138, 140, 169; denied independent state, 71
Simla Accord, 235
Simon Commission 66
Sind, 27, 28, 36, 46, 49, 50, 101, 119, 126, 127, 136, 152, 154, 161, 164, 166, 179, 204, 210, 249, 254; conditions in, 142–8
Sind Agriculturists Relief Act, 1940, 143
Sind Congress, 144
Sind High Court, 171
Sind Hindu Sabha, 144
Sind Muslim Party, 144
Sind United Party, 143
Sindhis, 141–8, 161, 254
Sindu Desh Movement, 145
Singh, Charan, 246, 255
Sino-Indian War, 1962, 89, 225
Six Point Programme, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 185–7
South Asia, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, 45, 62, 63, 65, 72, 111, 112, 134, 164, 219, 229, 247; *see also* sub-continent
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 93, 221, 222, 229, 230, 232
Soviet-Indian Peace and Friendship Treaty, 1971, 231
Sri Lanka, 225
Subcontinent, 21–2, 23, 26, 29, 30, 34, 43, 106, 111, 115, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 148, 150, 153, 169, 197, 205, 219, 226, 228, 230, 231, 235, 236, 239, 245, 257
Suhrawardy, H. S., 46–7, 78, 80–1, 94; dismissed as Prime Minister, 82; Prime Minister, 82; role in constitution of 1956, 175; wants secular Muslim League party, 114
Sultanate of Delhi, 20
Suppression of Terrorist Activities Bill, 157
Supreme Court of Pakistan, 80, 171–2, 173, 203, 206, 207
Swat, 46, 150
Syed, G. M., 82, 154
Tarraki, Noor Mohamad, 240, 241, 252
Tashkent Agreement, 90, 96, 185, 235
Tehriq-i-Istiqlal, 110, 127, 157, 208
The Debt Conciliation Act, 1941, 143
The Sind Moneylender's Act, 1944, 143
Third World Development, an analysis of, 194–5
Tilak, B. G., 68
Treaty of Gandamak, 236

Treaty of Sevres, 26
Tripartite Accord, 155
Tudeh Party, 242
Turkey, 221, 223, 229, 232, 243, 244, 247, 257
Turks, 20, 26
Two Nation Theory, 27, 28, 36, 110, 113, 134, 230
Ulema, and Caliphate, 26; and freedom movement, 23–5, 44; in the Islamic system in Pakistan, 55; oppose Ahmediya, 76
Umayyads, 26
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 149, 185, 221, 222, 223, 228, 231, 232, 237–9, 240, 241, 242, 246, 253, 254, 255, 256; invade Afghanistan, 243
Unionist Party, 137, 138, 139, 140
United Arab Emirates, 55, 234
United Front, 78, 124
United Nations, 96, 184, 208, 219, 220, 228, 232, 236
United States of America, 147, 157, 237, 239, 243; aid to India, 89; aid to Pakistan, 86, 93–4; allied with Pakistan, 221; analysis of relations with Pakistan, 221–30; and crisis in Iran, 242; and Indira Gandhi, 255; criticizes India, 231; economic aid to Pakistan curtailed, 246; enters treaties with Pakistan, 93; imposes embargo on Pakistan, 228, 231; Islamabad embassy sacked, 242; questionable friend of Pakistan, 256; neutral in Indo-Pakistani conflict, 226–7; opposition to, 93; opposes Pakistan nuclear programme, 244–7
Vice-Regal Tradition, 100, 173
Wadera System, 125, 126, 142–3, 144, 145, 146–7
West Bengal, 45, 120
West Pakistan, 81, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 116, 120, 121, 127, 144, 162, 163, 171, 174, 181, 182, 184, 185–7, 188, 189, 226, 228, 235
White Man's Burden, 43–4
World Bank, 202, 203
World War I, 21, 23, 26, 68, 176
World War II, 29, 31, 44, 109, 138, 147–8, 169, 196, 197, 220, 238, 239
Yayha Khan, Agha Mohammad, 36, 49, 50, 95, 101, 145, 154, 164, 198, 232, 251; and civil war, 230; assumes leadership, 97–8, 187; criticism of, 104; difficulties of, 101, 102, 103, 104; helps U.S. open relations with China, 231; personality of, 99–100; restores political activity, 100; used by politicians, 197
Zahir Shah, King, 236–7, 239
Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad, 38, 51, 57; and Afghan problem, 240–3; and anti-Americanism, 242–3; and leadership, 251–2; and nuclear programme, 244–7; attacks Bhutto, 201; background of, 197; compared with Ayub Khan and Bhutto, 217; consolidates power, 201–3; favours Jamaat-i-Islami, 110; in Baluchistan, 165–6; introduces Islamic system, 52–7, 205, 251–2, 256; maintains 1973 constitution, 192; needs legitimacy, 257; negotiates with Afghanistan, 237; opts for the armed forces, 198; overthrows Bhutto, 132, 147; plans coup, 108; policy in NWFP, 159; postpones elections, 215–16; protects Bhutto, 197–8; protects Islamic principles, 193; rejects political involvement, 200, 209, 210, 213; replaces president of Pakistan, 206; suspicious of United States, 256; unpopular, 254
Zoroastrians, 29