

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

5/ 9/18

CLEARANCE


\$ 2.00



GABRIEL A. ALMOND

G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.

ROBERT J. MUNDT



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2019 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics

A Theoretical Framework

Gabriel A. Almond

Stanford University

G. Bingham Powell, Jr.

University of Rochester

Robert J. Mundt

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Sponsoring Editor: Maria Hartwell
Project Editor: Cynthia Funkhouser
Design Supervisor: Mary Archondes
Cover Design: Delgado Design
Photograph by: Scott Morgan/Single Image
Modified in Adobe Photoshop by Delgado Design
Flags (left to right): France, United States of America, Honduras, Canada, Greece,
United Kingdom, Italy, Cuba
Production Administrator: Linda Murray
Compositor: Dignity, Inc.
Printer and Binder: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company
Cover Printer: The Lehigh Press, Inc.

Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework

Copyright © 1993 by HarperCollins College Publishers

All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information address HarperCollins College Publishers Inc., 10 E. 53 St., New York, NY 10022.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Almond, Gabriel Abraham, 1911 –

Comparative politics : a theoretical framework / Gabriel A.

Almond, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Robert J. Mundt.

p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-673-52282-2

1. Comparative government. 2. Political science. 3. Policy sciences.

I. Powell, G. Bingham. II. Mundt, Robert J.

III. Title.

JF51.A575 1993

320.3—dc20

92-32450
CIP

93 94 95 96 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Preface ix

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

- Chapter 1 The Study of Comparative Politics 3**
Comparative Systems: Structure and Function 4
An Illustrative Comparison: Russia in 1987 and 1992 12
A Second Illustrative Comparison: France under the Fourth and the Fifth Republics 15
The Policy Level: Performance, Outcome, and Evaluation of Political Systems 20
The Approach to Comparative Politics in This Book 21
Key Terms 22
- Chapter 2 The Environment of the Political System 23**
Old Nations, New Nations 23
Big Nations, Small Nations 25
Rich Nations, Poor Nations 26
Economic Inequality Within Nations 28
Cultural Heterogeneity Within Nations 30
International Interdependence 31
Key Terms 40

PART TWO: SYSTEM, PROCESS, AND POLICY 43

- Chapter 3 Political Socialization and Political Culture 45**
Political Socialization 45
Political Resocialization in Germany 47
Agents of Political Socialization 49
Political Culture 55

Mapping the Three Levels of Political Culture	55
Change in Political Culture	61
Key Terms	63

Chapter 4 Political Recruitment and Political Structure 65

The Recruitment of Citizens	68
How Much Participation?	75
The Recruitment of Elites	77
Democratic and Authoritarian Political Structures	82
Key Terms	84

Chapter 5 Interest Groups and Interest Articulation 87

Types of Interest Groups	87
Access to the Influential	95
Policy Perspectives on Interest Articulation	101
Interest Group Development	102
Key Terms	105

Chapter 6 Interest Aggregation and Political Parties 108

Interest Groups and Interest Aggregation	109
Competitive Party Systems and Interest Aggregation	111
Authoritarian Party Systems	120
Military Forces and Interest Aggregation	123
Trends in Interest Aggregation	125
Significance of Interest Aggregation	127
Key Terms	129

Chapter 7 Government and Policymaking 132

Decision Rules for Policymaking	133
Assemblies	140
Political Executives	144
The Bureaucracy	148
Key Terms	153

Chapter 8 Public Policy 155

Extractive Performance	156
------------------------	-----

Distributive Performance	159
Regulative Performance	164
Symbolic Performance	166
Outcomes of Political Performance	167
Domestic Welfare Outcomes	167
Domestic Security Outcomes	173
Outputs and Outcomes in the International Arena	174
Political Goods and Political Productivity: A System, Process, and Policy Approach	177
Strategies for Producing Political Goods	179
Tradeoffs and Opportunity Costs	184
Key Terms	185

<i>Index</i>	187
--------------	-----

Preface

Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework presents in the form of a separate book, the revised and updated chapters of Parts One and Two of *Comparative Politics Today: A World View, Fifth Edition*. Our purpose is to make our theoretical approach readily available to teachers of comparative politics who prefer to make their own selections of reading materials from the HarperCollins Comparative Politics Series and from the larger literature of country and analytical studies.

In publishing this book HarperCollins continues the tradition of *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (1966), and the later edition of this work which was published under the title of *Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy* (1978). This tradition of the functional approach to comparative politics, stresses the three levels of system, process, and policy. Understanding politics requires that we spell out how different kinds of political systems are formed, maintained, and changed through the cultural and structural processes of socialization and recruitment. These processes are treated explicitly in Chapters 3 and 4, although we emphasize throughout the book the themes of change and transition, which bulk so large in the 1990's. The processes of policymaking, and the structures which dominate them, are treated in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, dealing with interest articulation and interest groups, interest aggregation and political parties, and governments and policymaking. Chapter 8 deals with policy in the substantive sense, showing how the system and process functions affect the ways in which different kinds of political systems cope with the internal problems of welfare, security, and liberty, and the external ones of international security, welfare, and equity.

This threefold analytic structure enables the reader to move easily and logically from institution to institution, and from process to process without losing the essential thread of connection and meaning. In a discussion of political parties, for example, the reader is not simply confronted with descriptive detail but is led back to the socioeconomic and political phenomena which help explain the characteristics of a particular party system on the one hand, and led forward to some of the policy consequences of that party system on the other. In our approach we have avoided reductionism which seeks to explain politics as a consequence of social structure, or psychological and cultural characteristics. Governmental agencies and institutions as often become the independent variables—the initiators of socioeconomic and economic change—and the social and international environment the dependent ones.

From a methodological point of view, *Comparative Politics: A Theoret-*

ical Framework provides an interface for politics and public policy with the analytic approaches of sociology, psychology, and anthropology on the one hand and economics and philosophy on the other. Only this full range of interdisciplinary analysis makes it possible to capture the significance of the realm of politics, that which shapes and constrains it, but more important the choices and potentialities which it holds out to humanity.

With the addition of Robert Mundt, we are now three coauthors, instead of two, and have the benefit of his theoretical insights and knowledge arising out of his specialization in Third World and African studies. HarperCollins has encouraged us to undertake this venture and facilitated its completion, under the leadership of its Social Science Editor, Lauren Silverman, and its Political Science Editor, Maria Hartwell. Recognition is due to Tod Marvin for bringing up-to-date much of the quantitative data in this book, to Charlotte Simpson and Jan Thomas for help with the graphics, and to Cheryl Almond for help with word processing. In addition, a number of reviewers provided useful suggestions: Dr. Marguerite Bouraad Nash, University of California, Santa Barbara; Bertil L. Hanson, Oklahoma State University; John Keeler, University of Washington; and Jack Bielasiak, Indiana University.

Gabriel A. Almond
G. Bingham Powell, Jr.
Robert J. Mundt

PART
One

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

The Study of Comparative Politics

Without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed.

Alexis de Tocqueville

This quotation from the French social philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville tells us that comparison is fundamental to all human thought, as well as being the methodological core of the scientific method. Comparing the past and present of our nation and comparing our experience with that of other nations deepen our perspective on our own institutions. Examining politics in other societies permits us to see a wider range of political alternatives and illuminates the virtues and shortcomings in our own political life. By taking us out of the network of assumptions and familiar arrangements within which we usually operate, comparative analysis helps expand our awareness of the possibilities of politics.

Comparative political analysis also helps to develop explanations and to test theories of the way in which political processes work and in which political change occurs. Here the logic and the intention of the comparative methods used by political scientists are similar to those used in more exact sciences. The political scientist cannot design experiments to manipulate political arrangements and observe the consequences. It is possible, however, to describe and explain the different combinations of events and institutions found in the politics of different societies. Two thousand years ago, Aristotle in his *Politics* contrasted the economies and social structures of the many Greek city-states, in an effort to determine how the social and economic environment affected political institutions and policies. A modern political scientist, Robert Dahl, in his studies of democracy, compares the economic characteristics, cultures, and historical experiences of many contemporary nations in an effort to discover the combinations of conditions and characteristics that are associated with that form of government.¹ Other theorists, in their attempt to explain differences between

the processes and performance of political systems, have compared constitutional regimes with tyrannies, two-party democracies with multiparty democracies, and stable governments with unstable regimes.

The end of the cold war has left a world engaged in vast experiments in alternative approaches to economic growth, alternative strategies for transitions to democracy, alternative forms of controlling and using the powers of government. All governments are grappling with new issues of preserving our environment, old issues of opportunity and economic security for citizens, and ancient issues of conflicts of ethnic identities and religious values. In a world made ever smaller by instantaneous communication and interdependent economies, these problems and achievements spill across national boundaries.

Comparative analysis is a powerful and versatile tool. It enhances our ability to describe and understand political processes and political change in any country by offering concepts and reference points from a broader perspective. The comparative approach also stimulates us to form general theories of political relationships. It encourages and enables us to test our political theories by confronting them with the experience of many institutions and settings. The primary goal of this volume is to provide the reader with access to this powerful tool for thought and analysis.

COMPARATIVE SYSTEMS: STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION

We use three concepts throughout this book: system, structure, and function. *System* implies an organization that interacts with an environment, influencing it and being influenced by it. The word also suggests that there are many interacting internal parts. The *political system* is one important set of social institutions concerned with formulating and implementing the collective goals of a society, or groups within it. The decisions of the political system are normally backed up by legitimate coercion, and obedience may be compelled. Realistically, legitimacy may vary a good deal. For example, the legitimacy of the American system was quite high in the decade after World War II; it declined substantially during and after the Vietnam War. Low legitimacy may be the reason for breakdowns in political organization and failures in public policy. Policy failures in turn can be the cause of declining legitimacy. The dissolution of the Soviet system in 1991 came after a failed and costly war in Afghanistan, a nuclear power disaster in Chernobyl, and an apparently irreversible decline in economic productivity.

Political systems do many things. They wage war or encourage peace; cultivate international trade or restrict it; open their borders to the exchange of ideas and artistic experiences or close them; tax their populations equitably or inequitably; regulate behavior strictly or less strictly; allocate resources for education, health, and welfare, or fail to do so; pay

due regard to the interdependence of humanity and nature, or permit nature's capital to be depleted or misused. In order to carry on these many activities, political systems have institutions, agencies, or *structures*, such as political parties, parliaments, bureaucracies, and courts, which carry on specific activities, or perform *functions*, which in turn enable the political system to formulate and enforce its policies. System, structure, and function are concepts essential to our understanding of how politics is affected by its natural and human environments, and how it affects them.

Figure 1.1 suggests that a political system exists in both a domestic and an international environment, molding these environments and being molded by them. The system receives *inputs* of demands and supports




Figure 1.1 The political system and its environments.

from these environments and attempts to shape them through its *outputs*. In the figure, we use the United States as the central actor, and we include other major countries as our environmental examples—Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Mexico. Figure 1.1 is quite schematic and oversimplified. Exchanges among countries may vary in many ways. For example, they may be dense or “sparse”; United States–Canadian relations exemplify the dense end of the continuum, while United States–Nepalese relations would be at the sparse end. The United States has substantial trade relations with some nations and relatively little trade with others. Some countries have an excess of imports over exports, whereas others have an excess of exports over imports. With such countries as the NATO nations, Japan, South Korea, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, military exchanges and support have been of great importance.

The interdependence of nations—the volume and value of imports and exports, transfers of capital, the extent of foreign travel and international communication—has increased enormously in the last decades. We might represent this process as a thickening of the input and output arrows in Figure 1.1. Fluctuations in this flow of transactions and traffic attributable to depression, inflation, protective tariffs, war, and the like may work havoc with the economies of the nations affected.

The interaction of the political system with its domestic environment may be illustrated by the emergence of the so-called *postindustrial society* in the United States. The composition of the American labor force has changed dramatically in the last half century. Agricultural employment has declined to a relatively small percentage, employment in heavy extractive and manufacturing industries has decreased substantially, and the newer, high-technology occupations, the professions, and the service occupations have increased sharply as a proportion of the labor force. The last half century has also witnessed significant improvements in the educational level of the American population, although the quality of education particularly at the primary and secondary levels has come in for very serious criticism in recent years. These and other changes in American social structure have transformed the social bases of the party system. There are now as many independents among American voters as loyal Democrats and Republicans. Workers of the older, primarily European ethnic stocks have ceased being a solid support for the Democratic party, and they now tend to divide their votes almost equally between the two parties. On the whole, these changes in the labor force have been associated with a more conservative trend in economic policy and with efforts to cut back welfare and other expenditures. A more educated and culturally sophisticated society has become more concerned with the quality of life, the beauty and healthfulness of the environment, and like issues. In input-output terms, socioeconomic changes have changed the political demands of the electorate and the kinds of policies that it supports. Thus, a new pattern of politics results in different policy outputs, different kinds and levels of taxation, changes in regulatory patterns, and changes in welfare expenditures.

The advantage of the system-environment approach is that it directs our attention to the interdependence of what happens within and between nations and provides us with a vocabulary to describe, compare, and explain these interacting events. If we are to make sound judgments in politics, we need to place political systems in their environments, recognizing how these environments both set limits on and provide opportunities for political choices. The internal organization and procedures of a political system need to be understood within the framework of a basic question: what structures are most suitable for the policies pursued by that system?

The system-environment approach keeps us from reaching quick and biased political judgments. If a country is poor in natural resources and lacks the skills necessary to exploit what it has, we cannot fault it for having a low industrial output or poor educational and social services. Similarly, a country dominated and exploited by another country with a conservative policy cannot be condemned for failing to introduce social reforms.

The policies that leaders and political activists can follow are limited by the system and its institutions. However, in this era of rapid change, if the goals of the leadership and the political activists change, one set of political institutions may quickly be replaced by another. One of the most dramatic illustrations of such an institutional transformation was the breakdown of control by the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by multiparty systems, once the leadership of the Soviet Union lost its confidence in the Soviet system and the future of socialism. Once the Soviet leadership decided to give up the Communist party power monopoly in the Soviet Union and accept political pluralism and internal economic reform, it had no choice but to adopt a permissive and conciliatory policy toward its former satellites.

The notion of interdependence goes even further than this relationship between policy and institutions. The various parts of a political system are also interdependent. If a government is based on popularly elected representatives in legislative bodies, then a system of election must be instituted. If many people enjoy the right to vote, then the politicians seeking office will have to mobilize the electorate and organize political parties to carry on election campaigns. As the policymaking agencies of the political system enact laws, they will need administrators and civil servants to implement these laws, and they will need judges to determine whether the laws have been violated and to decide what punishments to impose on the violators.

Political Structures or Institutions

Figure 1.2 locates within the political system the familiar political institutions and agencies — interest groups, political parties, legislatures, executives, bureaucracies, and courts. The difficulty with this sixfold classification is that it will not carry us very far in comparing political systems with




Figure 1.2 The political system and its structures.

each other. Britain and China have all six types of political institutions, at least in name; however, they are organized differently in the two countries, and they function in dramatically different ways. Britain has a monarch—a queen—who performs ceremonial functions, like opening Parliament, conferring knighthoods and other honors. China does not have a specialized ceremonial executive. There is a president, elected by the National People’s Congress, who performs the ceremonial functions as well as some political functions. The political executive in Britain consists of the prime minister, the ministers assigned to the Cabinet, and the

larger ministry which consists of all the heads of departments and agencies. All these officials are usually selected from Parliament. There is a similar structure in China, called the State Council, headed by a premier and consisting of the various ministers and ministerial commissions. But while the British prime minister and Cabinet have substantial policymaking power, the State Council in China is closely supervised by the general secretary, the Politburo, and the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party. Both Britain and China have legislative bodies—the House of Commons in Britain and the National People's Congress in China. But while the House of Commons is a very important institution in the policy-making process, the Chinese Congress meets for only brief periods, legitimating and ratifying decisions made mainly by the Communist party authorities.

When we get to the level of political parties in the two countries, the differences become even larger. Britain has a competitive party system. The majority in the House of Commons and the Cabinet are constantly confronted by an opposition party or parties, competing for public support and looking forward to the next election when they may unseat the incumbent majority. In the Chinese case the Communist party is the dynamic and controlling political force in the whole political process. There are no other political parties. The principal decisions are taken in the Politburo and to some extent in the Central Committee of the Communist party. The governmental agencies implement the policies, which have to be initiated and/or approved by the top Communist party leaders. British interest groups are autonomous organizations that play important roles in the polity and the economy. Chinese trade unions and other professional organizations have to be viewed as parts of the official apparatus, dominated by the Communist party, that perform mobilizing, socializing, and facilitating functions.

Thus, an institution-by-institution comparison of British and Chinese institutions that did not spell out functions in detail would not bring us far toward understanding the important similarities and differences in the politics of these countries. It is only when we separate structure from function, and trace these activities through the inputs, the conversion processes, and outputs of the political system, that we can arrive at judgments of the significance of the various political institutions.

Structure and Function

Only when we begin to ask questions about process and *performance* can we attach meaning to structural characteristics. Only when we can say that specific institutions perform specific functions with specific consequences does our comparative analysis begin to make some sense. Figure 1.3 shows how we relate structure to function and process to policy and performance. (The functions and processes shown in the figure are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 3 through 8.)




Figure 1.3 The political system and its functions.

In the center of Figure 1.3 under the heading “Process functions” are listed the distinctive activities necessary for policy to be made and implemented in any kind of political system. We call these *process functions* because they play a direct and necessary role in the process of making policy. Before policy can be decided, some individuals and groups in the government or the society must decide what they want and hope to get from politics. The political process begins as these interests are expressed or articulated. The many arrows on the left of the figure show these initial expressions. To be effective, however, the inputs of interests must be

combined into policy alternatives—such as higher or lower taxes or more or less social security benefits—for which substantial political support can be mobilized. Thus, the arrows on the left are consolidated as the process moves from *interest articulation* to *interest aggregation*. Alternative policies are then considered. A coalition that commands substantial political resources such as votes backs one of them, and authoritative *policymaking* takes place. The policy must be enforced and implemented, and if it is challenged or violated there must be some process of *adjudication*. Each policy may affect several different aspects of a society, as reflected in the many arrows for the *implementation* phase. These process functions that we have been describing are performed by such political structures as parties, legislatures, political executives, bureaucracies, and courts.

The three functions listed at the top of the figure—socialization, recruitment, and communication—are not directly involved in making and implementing public policy but are of fundamental importance to the political system. The arrows leading from these three functions to all parts of the political process suggest their crucial role in underpinning and permeating the political process. *Political socialization* involves families, schools, communications media, churches, and all the various political structures that develop, reinforce, and transform attitudes of political significance in the society. *Political recruitment* refers to the selection of people for political activity and government offices. *Political communication* refers to the flow of information through the society and through the various structures that make up the political system. We refer to these three functions as *system functions*, because they determine whether or not the system will change or be maintained, whether, for example, policymaking will continue to be dominated by a single authoritarian party or military council, or whether competitive parties and a legislature will replace them.

The third set of functions, listed at the right of the figure, treats the outputs—the implementations of the political process. We call these the *policy functions*, the substantive impacts on the society, the economy, and the culture. These functions would include the various forms of regulation of behavior, extractions of resources in the form of taxes and the like, and distribution of benefits and services to various groups in the population. The outcomes of all these political activities, in a cyclical fashion, result in new inputs, in new demands for legislation or for administrative action, and in increases or decreases in the amount of support given to the political system.

These functional concepts describe the activities carried on in any society regardless of how its political system is organized, or what kinds of policies it produces. Using these functional categories, we can determine how institutions in different countries combine in the making and implementation of different kinds of public policy.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON: RUSSIA IN 1987 AND 1992*

Figures 1.4 and 1.5 offer a simplified graphic comparison of structures and functions in Russia before and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The figures demonstrate the effects of two revolutionary changes—the end of the single-party political system dominated by the Communist party of the Soviet Union which held together the vast, multinational Soviet state, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself as a state into its 15 member republics. The demise of the communist regime occurred over roughly a three-year period—1989–1991, while the formal collapse of the Union occurred with startling rapidity after the failure of the August, 1991, coup d'état against Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies of reform. In December, 1991, the Soviet Union was formally declared defunct.

As a result of these two remarkable events, Russia, the core republic of the old union, became an independent noncommunist state. Even before the August, 1991, coup, Boris Yeltsin—long a bitter rival to the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev—had been elected president of Russia in a popular election in June, 1991. After the coup, Yeltsin decreed a ban on the political activity of the Communist party, and he himself remained outside any organized political party. Besides the presidency, Russia was ruled by its legislature, called the Supreme Soviet, and the government (the heads of the ministries), which answered to the president. Organized parties competed for public favor but remained in their infancy as organizations linking the citizens to government. The mass media, free of the political and ideological constraints imposed under communist rule, were rapidly seeking commercial acceptance by selling advertising and seeking new sponsors. New organized interest groups, such as business associations and labor unions, were rapidly becoming part of the political landscape.

The two figures offer several sharp contrasts, therefore, reflecting the impact of these changes on Russia's political life. In 1987 the Communist party was still the dominant political structure, penetrating schools and media, the arts and public organizations, government and courts, with its influence. Through it, General Secretary Gorbachev was beginning to wage his campaign for "*glasnost*," or freer discussion and disclosure, but *glasnost* was a centrally mandated campaign through which Gorbachev intended to build support for his policy of restructuring (*perestroika*) of Soviet society. For this reason, all the cells of the chart in the column marked "Communist Party" are shaded dark, as are the cells under the column marked "Bureaucracy."

Although social institutions such as the family, occupations, arts, and

*This comparison of Russia in 1989 and 1992 was written by Thomas Remington.




Figure 1.4 Russia's political system in 1987.




Figure 1.5 Russia's political system in 1992.

hobby groups exercised some influence over such system-level functions as socialization, recruitment, and communication, it was the Communist party and state bureaucracy that dominated process-level functions. Under their tutelage, the mass media played an important role in giving voice to society's aspirations, grievances, and values. The media in 1987 were becoming a particularly important player in the political system under the impact of *glasnost*.

By 1992 the political system had undergone a peaceful revolution. The Communist party was outlawed and its property confiscated, although various minor splinter groups competed for the right to succeed to the Communist party's ideological heritage. The bureaucracy, however, remained an important element in the political system, although adapting itself to the new trend of movement toward a market economy by adopting quasi-commercial forms. Political parties and interest groups were proliferating throughout Russia though few had significant clout or scope of operation. Parties as such were not represented in the government and had virtually no local organizations to speak of. Two policymaking institutions had become very important in the system, the president and the Supreme Soviet. The presidency, occupied by Boris Yeltsin, was becoming the predominant institution: many feared that Yeltsin was accumulating uncontrollable power. The Supreme Soviet, on the other hand, retained the constitutional power to pass laws and review the performance of the executive branch, although in both functions it was regularly frustrated by the inertia of the vast state bureaucracy, its inability to compel compliance with its laws, its weak links with the electorate, and Yeltsin's tendency to rule by decree.

Nonetheless, the freedom enjoyed by ordinary citizens to articulate their interests and to organize to advance them had expanded enormously. Moreover, before the Soviet Union broke up, Russia, though by far the largest of the republics, had lacked the means of self-government, since it was ruled by the Union directly. Now, as a result of the collapse of communism, Russia had emerged as the principal successor of the economic and strategic assets of the Union. The great dilemma before Russia was whether the young structures of democracy could withstand the wrenching dislocations brought about by the breakdown of the old Soviet regime.

A SECOND ILLUSTRATIVE COMPARISON: FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH AND THE FIFTH REPUBLICS

Defeat and occupation in World War II changed France profoundly, paving the way for social and economic modernization in the postwar period. Yet, the prewar form of parliamentary government—that of the Third Republic—was largely reproduced in the Fourth. It took yet another jolt to break the political deadlocks characteristic of the Fourth

Republic. Comparing France before and after that break allows us to see that, while the nonpolitical environment was by then changing only gradually, the political structures of the Fifth Republic (1958–) were substantially changed from those of the Fourth. Figures 1.6 and 1.7 offer a simplified graphic comparison of structure and functions in France under the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

One of the most striking changes from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic was the increased prominence of the presidency in policymaking. The Fifth Republic followed the grand design of its chief architect, Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle, who led the Free French forces in the recapture of France from the Nazis, was frustrated with the *immobilisme* (stalemate situation) of French government under the conventional parliamentary forms of the prior republics. Central to the new system proposed by him and accepted by French voters was a president whose function was no longer merely ceremonial, but rather one who could control the grand design of policy. Independently elected by the voters for a seven-year term, the president names his own prime minister and cabinet, and has the power to dissolve the National Assembly and call for new elections.

The prime minister remains an important figure, and although subordinate to the president, has enhanced power in some senses in comparison with his Fourth Republic counterpart, whose options were always seriously limited by the narrow basis of parliamentary support. The prime minister's power rests in leadership of the Government (Cabinet), which the Fifth Republic makes relatively independent of Parliament, although the Cabinet's range of action is theoretically restricted by a parliamentary vote of censure that could cause it to resign. France is atypical of parliamentary systems in that simultaneous membership in the Cabinet and the Parliament is forbidden; this provision both symbolizes and reinforces the distance of the prime minister and Cabinet from Parliament.

The institutional “loser” in the shift was the National Assembly. The constitution specifies that the Parliament must deal with a substantive agenda prepared for it by the Government. Furthermore, in many cases Parliament is prohibited from voting on specific details in legislation; it is compelled to vote Government proposals up or down in their entirety. Under the Fourth Republic, powerful specialized committees of Parliament wielded great power, not only in making policy, but in its implementation. In the 1958 shift, the number of standing committees in the National Assembly was reduced from 19 to 6 and the committees were greatly increased in size (up to 144 members)—clear signs that Parliament would no longer be able to engage in “detail work.” Although the National Assembly can use the vote of censure to cause the Government to resign, the means by which it can influence the Cabinet and bureaucracy have been greatly reduced. The upper house of Parliament, the Senate, remained the lesser (but not insignificant) partner in policymaking that its predecessor (the Council of the Republic) had been in the Fourth Republic. The general decline of Parliament's role in interest aggregation




Figure 1.6 The French Fourth Republic.




Figure 1.7 The French Fifth Republic.

and policymaking and policy implementation is graphically demonstrated in the comparison of Figures 1.6 and 1.7.

Under the Fourth Republic, there was no structural framework for subjecting parliamentary actions to constitutional scrutiny. The Fifth Republic constitution created the Constitutional Council; although originally proposed in the Gaullist plan to keep parliament in check, the Council has assumed a role similar to judicial review in the United States, forcing the government to weigh carefully the constitutional implications of proposed legislation.

The Fourth Republic was also characterized by cozy relationships between interest groups and the specialized parliamentary committees, giving important labor, business, and agricultural organizations a direct voice in policymaking. This channel of influence was largely closed by the reduction of the parliamentary role in the details of policy, and interest groups have had to seek an alternative, but less effective, voice through links with the administration. Figure 1.7 shows the reduced direct involvement of interest groups in policymaking.

The multiplicity of parties in the Fourth Republic was often cited as a principal cause of *immobilisme*. De Gaulle showed a general disdain for parties, and the weakened role of Parliament in the Fifth Republic reduced their role in policymaking. The transition to a presidential system contributed to the emergence of a left and a right coalition of parties in presidential elections; by reducing the animosity and fragmentation in the party system, this should have enhanced the parties' ability to aggregate interests. However, with the exception of the French Communist Party (PCF), French parties have not had strong grass roots organizations, and support for the PCF has declined dramatically in recent years. The recent rise to prominence of the National Front, with its anti-immigrant platform, has caused confusion in the traditional left-right spectrum of parties, and the links between specific parties and given coalitions of interests are difficult to discern.

Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show that, besides the presidency, the other big "winner" in the constitutional transition was the bureaucracy. Always the most stable element in France's volatile political situation, the bureaucracy, and especially its top administrators, saw their influence on policy greatly enhanced. Civil servants have been appointed to a large share of Fifth Republic cabinet posts, and a policymaking process centered on the executive and giving the legislative initiative to the Government has inevitably enlarged administrative opportunities to plan new policies from the outset.

The brief comparisons presented here are meant to illustrate the use of the structural-functional approach. This approach enables us to examine how similar functions are performed in different countries, or in the same country at two different points in time. Similarly, we may examine changes or contrasts in the functions performed by the same structures over time or across different political systems. In a country undergoing as

rapid and dramatic transition as France in 1958 or Russia in 1991, this framework helps us to analyze changes in the distribution of power among the major institutions making up the political system. It also helps us to identify the similarities and differences in the present configurations of the French and Russian political systems. Neither the analysis of structures nor that of functions is complete without the other. A structural analysis tells us the number of political parties, or the organization of the legislature, and how the executive branch, the courts, the bureaucracy, the mass media, interest groups, and other elements of the political system are set up and by what rules or standards they operate. A functional analysis tells us how these institutions and organizations interact to produce and implement policies. In Part Two of this book we deal more specifically with the functions of the various social institutions, with the variety of interest groups and their functions, and with the structural-functional properties of party systems, legislatures, executives, and cabinets. Here we illustrate the method and its advantages.

THE POLICY LEVEL: PERFORMANCE, OUTCOME, AND EVALUATION OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The important question is what do these differences in structure and function do for the interests, needs, and aspirations of people? Figures 1.1 and 1.3 suggest the relationship between what happens in politics and in the society, and between what happens in the society and the international environment. The structural-functional differences we have been discussing determine the give-and-take between polity and environment, and the importance of that give-and-take for such goals and objectives as welfare, justice, freedom, equality, peace, and prosperity. At the left of Figure 1.3 are arrows signifying inputs of demands and supports from the society and the international system and inputs from the independent initiatives of political leaders and bureaucrats. At the right are arrows signifying outputs and outcomes, the end products of the political process, the things a government does for and to its people.

We have to distinguish between the efforts, the things a government does, and the actual outcome of these efforts. Governments may spend equal amounts on education and health, or defense, but with different consequences. Not only government efficiency or corruption, but also where a country starts from in terms of cultural, economic, and technological level, as well as changes in its environment, play a role in the effectiveness of performance. Americans spend more per capita on education than any other people in the world, but their children perform less well in important subjects than do children in some other

countries that spend substantially less. The United States and the USSR spent enormous sums on defense in the last decades, and yet both countries were held at bay by small countries resolved to resist at all costs, and because of these failed efforts, they were weakened internally. The outcome of public policy is never wholly in the hands of the people and their leaders in the various nations of the world. Conditions in the internal environment, conditions and events in the larger external world, and simple chance may frustrate the most thoughtfully crafted programs and plans.

Finally, we must step even further back to consider the whole situation of political system, process, and policy, and the environment, to evaluate what political systems are doing. Evaluation is complex because people value different things and put different emphasis on what they value. We will refer to the different things people may value as political goods. In Chapter 8 we discuss goods associated with the system level, such as the stability or adaptability of political institutions; goods associated with the process level, such as citizen participation in politics; and goods associated with the policy level, such as welfare, security, and liberty. To evaluate what a political system is doing, we must look at each of these areas and assess performance and outcomes. We must also be aware of how outcomes affect individuals and subgroups in the society, specific changes that may often be overlooked in presenting averages, and of the continuing problem of building for the future as well as living today. This last problem affects both poor nations, which wish to survive and alleviate suffering today, but also improve their children's lot tomorrow; and rich nations, which must deal with the costs to their children of polluted and depleted natural resources as the result of careless consumption patterns of the past.

THE APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN THIS BOOK

We approach the problem of comparison in this book in three ways. In the present chapter we have discussed comparative political analysis in general terms and have introduced the three levels of study: system, process, and policy. In Chapter 2 we continue our introductory remarks by discussing the main issues and problems of politics in the world today, problems established or shaped in the environments in which political systems operate. In Part Two we identify and analyze the processes and functions found in all political systems, thus making it possible to compare nations with one another and to evaluate their special features. We also introduce the principal varieties of political systems in the world today and discuss their policies and performance.

KEY TERMS

adjudication	polycymaking
function	political communication
implementation	political recruitment
inputs	political socialization
interest aggregation	political system
interest articulation	postindustrial society
outcomes	process functions
outputs	structure
performance	system
policy functions	system functions

END NOTE

1. Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); see also Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).

Chapter 2

The Environment of the Political System

The domestic and international environments of nations shape the issues of their politics. These environments confront the political system with sets of problems, such as unemployment, inflation, economic growth, ethnic conflict, and threats from foreign enemies. The resources that are available may be more or less adequate to cope with these problems. Large, industrial, wealthy societies, such as Japan, the members of the European Common Market, and the United States have problems and levels of resources that are very different from those of a smaller agricultural society, such as Tanzania or an oil kingdom such as Saudi Arabia. We may think of a nation's structural-functional arrangements as a basic organization for dealing with these issues. In this chapter we want to outline some of the most important contextual features that shape political issues.

OLD NATIONS, NEW NATIONS

Almost the entire land surface of the globe today is divided into independent national territories. Two centuries ago, at the time the United States was gaining its independence, most of the independent nations were in Europe (see Figure 2.1). Much of the rest of the world had been parceled out as colonies to one or another of the European empires. Figure 2.1 shows the explosive growth in the number of nations that took place in the nineteenth century, principally in Latin America when the Spanish and Portuguese empires broke up into twenty independent nations. Europe also experienced some of this movement toward national separation and independence as the Turkish Empire gave up Greece, Bulgaria, and Al-




Figure 2.1 Formation of nations since 1776. Source: For contemporary (1985–1992) members, Information Office, United Nations. Data to 1945 from Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 26ff.

bania, and Scandinavia and the Low Countries divided into their present form. During the period between the two world wars, the national explosion extended to North Africa and the Middle East, and Europe continued to fragment as the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires gave up Poland, Finland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. There was a brief period of independence for the three Baltic countries—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, countries that regained that independence in 1991.

But it was in the period since World War II that the national explosion really took off. Forty-five new nations emerged in North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Oceania; nine island countries were created in the Caribbean. The biggest surge of new nations came in the 1960s. This was followed by two decades of slower growth, in which most of the additions to nationhood were relatively small in area, population, and resources.

The 1990s have begun with a new wave, resulting from the breakup of the Soviet Union, with 15 republics arising out of the old Soviet shell. A similar process is now taking place among the constituent states of Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia has divided into its Czech and Slovakian parts.

More than half of the present membership of the United Nations (UN) came into existence in the decades since World War II. In September, 1991, the General Assembly formally admitted seven new members to the United Nations: North and South Korea, the three Baltic republics, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia; the ten remaining former Soviet republics (two Soviet republics—Ukraine and Belarus—were already UN members) will soon join them, bringing total UN membership to 176, but this is a tentative figure since the process is ongoing. All these nations—new as well as old—share certain characteristics. They have legal authority over their territories and people; they have armies, air forces, and in some cases navies; they send and receive ambassadors; they belong to the United Nations; they collect taxes; they seek to regulate their economies and maintain order through parliaments, ministries, departments, courts, police, and prisons, but they also vary enormously.

BIG NATIONS, SMALL NATIONS

One of the many ways in which nations vary is territorial size. Another is population size. Even without the rest of the former Soviet Union, Russia is still the largest country in area with more than 17 million square kilometers. China has the most people, with more than a billion. There are many countries at the other extremes, but the smallest independent political entity in both respects is Vatican City, with an area of less than half a square kilometer and under a thousand residents.

The political implications of these striking contrasts in population size and geographic area are not obvious or easily evaluated. It does not follow that only big countries are important and influential. Cuba successfully challenges the United States; Israel stands off the Arab world; tiny Vatican City has enormous power and influence. Nor does it follow that area and population size determine a country's political system. Both Luxembourg and the United States are democracies. Authoritarian regimes can be found in countries that are small, medium, or large. These enormous contrasts in size show only that the nations now making up the world differ greatly in their range of physical and human resources. Although area and population (as well as geographic location) do not strictly determine politics, economics, or culture, they are important factors affecting economic development, foreign policy and defense problems, and many other issues of political significance.

The geographic location of nations has strategic implications that have been of great importance in their development. A nation located in the center of Europe in the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries could not

avoid building a large land army to protect itself from the predatory action of its neighbors. Such a nation would be unlikely to develop free political institutions, since it would have to extract resources on a large scale and keep its population under control. England in the course of its development was protected by the Channel; it could defend itself through its navy. It could do with a smaller army, lower taxation, and less centralization of power. The United States was a similar case. The Atlantic Ocean and the relatively open continent were of crucial importance in shaping U.S. political institutions. Far removed from the centers of Western development, the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were colonized by the more powerful Western nations. Only in recent decades, having won their freedom, are these nations developing their economies and modernizing their societies, catching up and, in the case of Japan, overtaking the Western pacesetters.

RICH NATIONS, POOR NATIONS

As significant as physical size, population, and location are such factors as the availability of natural resources, the level of economic and social development, ethnic and cultural characteristics, and the rate of economic growth and social change. Furthermore, it may be misleading to distinguish among nations on the basis of total mineral resources, gross national production, and the like. Wealth, income, opportunity, and even historical memories and language are not evenly distributed within a nation. A high *gross national product (GNP)* may conceal significant inequalities in the distribution of economic and social amenities and opportunities. A high rate of national growth may benefit only particular regions or social groups, leaving large areas or parts of the population unrewarded or even less well-off than before. These regional, class, ethnic, religious, and historical differences may have great political significance.

Figure 2.2 gives the gross national product per capita for thirteen nations from all parts of the world. Gross national product is an estimate of the value of goods and services produced by the people in a country in a given year. Because it is only an estimate, the figure must be used cautiously. The figure for the GNP of poorer nations, for instance, tends to underestimate goods and services produced and consumed by individuals themselves, particularly when they are engaged in subsistence agriculture. Although we must be cautious in using these figures, there can be no question that the difference between the GNP of rich nations and poor nations is enormous. Here is Japan with an average product per capita of over \$25,000 per year in 1992 and Tanzania with \$110. The United Arab Emirates, awash in oil, averages almost \$20,000 per capita.

Let us compare Figure 2.3, which measures the proportion of the working population engaged in agriculture, with Figure 2.2, measuring GNP per capita. We find that the United States, with the second highest




Figure 2.2 Per capita GNP for selected nations (in U.S. dollars, 1992). *Source:* World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).




Figure 2.3 Percentage of labor force in agriculture, selected nations, 1989. *Source:* *Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook, 1991: A Compilation of U.S. State Department Reports* (New York: Yale Research, Inc., 1991); *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo RSFSR b 1988 g. Staticheski Yezhegodnik* (Moscow: Goskomstat RSFSR).

per capita national product in Figure 2.2, has the second smallest proportion of the *workforce in agriculture*. China, the third lowest in per capita national product, has two-thirds of its workers in agriculture. On the whole, the rich countries prove to be predominantly industrial, commercial, and urban, whereas the poor countries are predominantly agricultural and rural.

To be rich and industrialized also means to be literate and educated and to have access to the larger world of complex events, activities, and values. In highly industrialized countries such as Britain, France, Germany, the United States, Russia, and Japan, practically everyone over the age of 15 can read and write. In India, Tanzania, and Egypt only one-half the population or less has this minimal degree of education. Moreover, the countries with the fewest literate citizens are also most lacking in radios and other communication devices that do not require *literacy*.

Industrialization, education, and exposure to the communications media are associated with better nutrition and medical care. In the economically advanced countries, fewer children die in infancy, and people on the average live longer. In recent years the average citizen of Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States has had a life expectancy at birth of about 75 years. The average Chinese citizen, however, has had a life expectancy of around 70 years; the average Mexican, 66 years; the average Egyptian, around 60 years; and the average Nigerian or Tanzanian, little more than 50 years (see Table 8.3).

These characteristics—material productivity, education, exposure to communications media, longer and healthier lives—are closely interconnected. Only when a country becomes economically productive can it afford better education, communications media, and nutrition and health care. In order to become more productive, it needs the resources to develop a skilled and healthy labor force and build the factories, productive farms, and transportation systems that material welfare requires. Preindustrial nations face most urgently the issues of *economic development*: how to improve the immediate welfare of their citizens, yet also build and invest for the future. Typically, these are also newer nations, and they also face the challenge of creating national awareness and building effective political institutions.

ECONOMIC INEQUALITY WITHIN NATIONS

The political processes of a country may be affected sharply by internal divisions of income, wealth, and occupation, as well as by economic dependence or poverty. Table 2.1 compares wealth and *income inequality* for those countries for which we have data. The former communist countries included are Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland. (Unfortunately, no data were available for the former Soviet Union or China.) The table makes the point that there tends to be a positive association between

Table 2.1 SELECTED NATIONS' WORLD RANKING BY PER CAPITA GNP AND INEQUALITY OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION, 1979–1989

Country	Date	Percent of national income to wealthiest 10%	Percent of national income to poorest 40%	GNP per capita (1989)
Japan	1979	22.4	21.9	23,810
United States	1985	25.0	15.7	20,910
West Germany	1984	23.4	19.5	20,440
France	1979	25.5	18.4	17,820
United Kingdom	1979	23.3	17.3	14,610
Yugoslavia	1987	26.6	17.1	2,920
Hungary	1983	18.7	26.2	2,590
Poland	1987	21.0	23.9	1,790
Brazil	1983	46.2	8.1	2,540
Malaysia	1987	34.8	13.9	2,160
Mexico	1986	38.8	11.6	2,010
Ivory Coast	1986–1987	36.3	13.0	790
India	1983	26.7	20.4	340
Bangladesh	1985–1986	23.7	23.2	180

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report*, 1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 204–205, 262–263.

economic development and equality of income, at least past a certain stage in economic growth. Wealthy nations like the United States, Japan, and the European nations tend to have more equitable income distributions than poorer countries like Brazil and Mexico. In the advanced industrial nations the wealthiest 10 percent of the households receive about one-quarter of the national income, while the poorest 40 percent receive around 20 percent. In the United States the poorest 40 percent get only 15 percent of the national income. In a middle-income country like Brazil, the wealthiest 10 percent get 46 percent of the national income, and the poorest 40 percent get only 8 percent.

The association of *industrialization* and high productivity with more equal distribution of income has been true historically and tends to be true today. The trend toward greater equality in industrial societies is more marked with respect to income—that is, wages, salaries, and the like—than to wealth—ownership of land or other forms of property. The first stages of industrialization and modernization may actually increase inequality in the distribution of income by creating a dual economy and society—a rural sector, with wide variation of landholding and status, and an urban industrial commercial sector, with its own differentials in income and consumption patterns. These inequalities, already present in most preindustrial societies, tend to increase at the same time as education and communication are spreading; this pattern helps explain the political in-

stability of many developing countries. It also helps explain their susceptibility to egalitarian political movements. Inequality, then, is an issue all developing nations must face. We will examine strategies applied to that problem later.

The fact that inequalities are often less extreme in the advanced industrial nations does not mean that the issue of inequality is unimportant there. Britain, among the countries with a more nearly equal distribution of income, is frequently agitated by intense conflicts between industry and labor over the distribution of wealth, income, and opportunity. The failure of British industry to grow rapidly has compounded these problems. In the United States in the last decade, income inequality has increased substantially, as taxation has become more regressive and more favorable to the rich.

CULTURAL HETEROGENEITY WITHIN NATIONS

Nations are divided not only in horizontal strata according to differences in income, wealth, and opportunity, but also by language, culture, and religion. One of the most culturally fragmented countries is Tanzania, with more than a hundred ethnic groups speaking different languages and dialects, although Swahili is commonly spoken throughout the country. The largest ethnic group contains less than 10 percent of the population. India is also divided into many linguistic-cultural groups, but a dominant language—Hindi—is spoken by almost 40 percent of the population. India has an acute conflict today between the Sikhs and the dominant Hindu majority in the state of the Punjab. There is a strong secessionist movement among the Sikhs.

With the decline and practical disappearance of Marxism-Leninism as a unifying ideology, the Soviet Union quickly came apart at its ethno-cultural seams. The Soviet Union included some 15 major nationalities, generally corresponding to the republics, and another 38 smaller ethnic groups which were represented in administrative subdivisions. Unfortunately, republic borders do not precisely coincide with cultural boundaries, and we have already begun to witness the potential of ethnic overlaps for bloodshed and political instability in the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan.

South Africa presents another case of acute racial-ethnic conflict. Seventy-one percent of the population is black, consisting of ten distinct linguistic-cultural groups. The whites, divided mainly into the dominant Afrikaner and a smaller English group, make up about 17 percent of the population. In addition, coloureds (mixed race) number some 9 percent and Asians around 3 percent. The system of Afrikaner-white dominance protected by apartheid (segregation) legislation and governmental arrangements that give the whites complete legal and political control is now in process of being modified. Whatever arrangements come out of

the present negotiations, it is clear that South African politics for the foreseeable future will be heavily burdened by ethnic conflict.

Racial conflict has agitated American politics since the founding of the Republic. In the 1960s, these tensions erupted into violence; although the United States went through over 25 years without a similar level of violent conflict, the 1992 outbreak in Los Angeles clearly demonstrated that race is still a serious political problem in the United States. In fact, cultural conflict is becoming more complicated by the increased presence of Hispanics and Asians as the United States wrestles with the effect of immigration on its "melting pot" ideal of assimilation into a common American culture.

The countries of Western Europe (in particular France and Germany) are experiencing strong political reactions to the immigration of workers from poor nations of different ethnic stock in search of economic improvement. Even a country as homogeneous as Japan has an "untouchable" minority—the Burakumin—who number about 2 million and who are confined to lowly occupations and segregated in ghettos. If we add to these problems the bitterness and irreconcilability of the Israeli-Arab confrontation in the Middle East and the Catholic-Protestant conflict in Northern Ireland, it is evident that ethnicity and religion are the most divisive and seemingly unresolvable causes of internal political conflict in the contemporary world.

INTERNATIONAL INTERDEPENDENCE*

In the twentieth century technological, economic, and political changes have drawn the nations closer to each other, sometimes for better (rising living standards in the world economy) and sometimes for worse (war). As we approach the year 2000, the effects of international *interdependence* will be increasingly felt in rich nations and poor, in democracies and dictatorships.

The logic of interdependence is simple: what one nation does also affects others in the same system.¹ The term *hegemony* describes an international system in which there is a fundamental asymmetry in the power of nations in relation to each other. In a hegemonic system, interdependence takes the form of one nation being dominant, and other nations having to follow. For decades after World War II the United States was such a leader. Europeans described having Americans as an ally as akin to being in bed with an elephant; when the elephant rolled over, everyone felt it.

Today, the United States is not the only dominant nation in the international arena.² Germany has recovered its earlier economic strength; it

*An earlier version of this section was written by Richard Rose.

has replaced the United States as the world's largest exporter. Japan has been transformed from an economy producing toys and handicrafts to a high-technology economy exporting capital and high-quality products throughout the globe; in the last decade the United States has been running a large trade deficit with Japan. The used car lots of the United States are a tangible example of interdependence, where American, Japanese, and European cars compete for consumer dollars.

The end of the cold war has removed the Soviet Union as a major military threat to Europe and the United States, but it has not removed all military threats. China, with a population more than four times that of the United States, has the capacity to mobilize far larger armed forces than the United States. The Vietnam War showed that on home ground a foreign army could defeat the United States in the field. Iraq thought itself sufficiently strong militarily in August, 1990, to occupy its oil-rich neighbor Kuwait. It took a major military effort under UN auspices to deprive it of its conquest. The United States remains a dominant country because it is both a major military and a major economic power. By contrast, Germany and Japan are major economic powers, but they are minor military powers, compared to Britain and France, because of their disarmament after their defeat in World War II. The Soviet Union has had a massive military force, but its economy proved too weak to sustain it. The successor regimes of the Soviet Union, and particularly Russia, are currently engaged in reducing and restructuring their armed forces.

National Security in an Interdependent World

Securing national borders against foreign attack or to protect other national interests abroad is a primary concern of every government; it is also a classic example of the importance of interdependence. The force that any one nation must mobilize depends on the forces that can be mobilized by nations that it perceives as threatening it.

For four decades after the end of World War II, the United States perceived the Soviet Union as the major threat to its national security, and the Soviet Union perceived the United States as its major threat. The United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance to deter Soviet aggression in Western Europe, and the Soviet Union formed the Warsaw Pact alliance to defend communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Because modern military strength depends on advancing technology, there was continuous competition in developing armaments at a cost of hundreds of billions. More and more sophisticated weapons systems were developed—but there was no armed conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations.

In the 1980s, the logic of interdependence was demonstrated in a novel way: agreement on arms control between the United States, under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, and the Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev. As long as both sides reduced their military capability

simultaneously, then the balance of power remained the same between them.

At the same time, the Soviet Union found that it could no longer maintain hegemony over Warsaw Pact countries in Eastern Europe. Communist regimes in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria were based on the presence and readiness to use Soviet troops, not on the support of national populations. But the Soviet Union could not use military force to crush opposition to communist dominance in these countries as it had done after 1945, without risking the recommencement of the cold war and another military arms race with NATO. In 1989 one Eastern European country after another regained its independence from the Soviet Union. Constitutions were revised to end the Communist party's monopoly of power, free elections were held placing noncommunist parties in office, and agreements were negotiated for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Moscow accepted these changes; a Soviet spokesperson even proclaimed the Sinatra doctrine (after singer Frank Sinatra's song about each person doing it his or her way); each country was free to govern itself in its own way.

The removal of the wall dividing East and West Berlin illustrates how events in an interdependent system can be linked in a chain reaction. The collapse of the Iron Curtain dividing Eastern and Western Europe led to the collapse of the German Democratic Republic; its people and territory became united as part of an enlarged Federal Republic of Germany. The addition of 18 million people makes Germany the most populous country of Europe (78 million) and the dominant country economically. Germany's central geographical position between Poland on the east and France on the west adds to its strategic importance.

Within each Eastern European country politicians have to create, more or less from scratch, new political institutions to maintain order, allow for popular representation, and introduce a market economy in place of a centrally planned economy. In most countries the transition from a Soviet regime was bloodless, but in Romania the fall of the communist dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, was achieved only after a short but bloody internal rising.

The persistence of nationality differences within Eastern European countries is one threat to national security and public order. In Romania there were conflicts between those who identified themselves as Hungarians and Romanians. In Yugoslavia, formed as a federation of ethnic groups after World War I, multiple ethnic tensions have already led to the secession of the Slovenes, Croats, and Bosnians, to bitter civil war over boundaries, and to the displacement of minorities.

The Middle East also demonstrates the importance of interdependence. At the end of the 1970s, the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran raised the prospect of Islamic fundamentalism and destabilized a region that was the major source of oil for many Western nations. Western nations thus backed Iraq, led by General Saddam Hussein, in a war against

Iran that lasted from 1980 to 1988. Iraq's unsuccessful effort to annex oil-rich Kuwait has already been mentioned.

As a global power, the U.S. government sees national security affected by any major change in a region that is deemed to be important to American interests. If a small Central American state acts in ways that Washington deems threatening to security in the Western Hemisphere, it may send troops there, as it did in the 1980s in Grenada and Panama. It has troops permanently stationed in Asia and Europe as well as North America, and now the Middle East.

Every phase of national security policy and implementation is affected by international interdependence: by the production of weapon systems as these are stimulated by military technological developments elsewhere in the world; by the deployment of military forces and material in different areas, or by the actual use of military force in the form of maneuvers or combat.

Economic Interdependence

The international economy today is far removed from the traditional marketplace in which producers and buyers worked and lived close at hand. Europeans watch American films on a Japanese television set after driving home in a German or Italian car; Japanese teenagers may walk down the street wearing American blue jeans while listening to Beatles' songs on their Sony Walkman; and an American may wear Italian-styled clothes while driving a Japanese car to a baseball game.

Money, manufactured goods, services, and people all move across international borders. A strong currency makes imports cheaper, thus lowering prices for domestic consumers, but it will make it harder for its manufacturers by raising its export prices. If a government wants to stimulate consumption to gain electoral popularity, this may lead to an increase in imports and a trade deficit. A company that is in the business of making money does not need to manufacture goods where its headquarters is located. It can operate as a *multinational company* employing people in other continents to make the goods it sells to earn profits.

The growth of national economies in the postwar era has been fueled by a growth in international trade, for no nation can or would want to produce everything that its people need. Middle Eastern countries can export oil to meet the cost of importing foreign cars, and Japan can export manufactured goods in order to meet the cost of importing petroleum. Because of its diverse natural resources and large population, the United States has exported less than a tenth of its national product; by contrast, France and Germany export a quarter of their national product and a small country such as Austria exports more than a third of its national product.

The development of the European Community illustrates the way in which politics and trade go together. The first step toward economic

integration was the European Coal and Steel Community, founded in 1951 by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The political objective was to integrate Germany's capacity for producing military materials into a supranational European framework. In 1957 these six countries also created a *European Economic Community*, popularly known as the Common Market. Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the Community in 1973. After replacing their dictatorships with democratic governments, Spain, Portugal, and Greece joined in the 1980s. Southern European nations have been motivated not only by economic advantage, but also by the hope that the Community will promote political stability where democratic institutions are still relatively youthful.

In 1992 the European Community was scheduled to complete the creation of a single European market with free movement of goods, services, and people throughout its twelve member states. To achieve a single market, the Community has had to develop some supranational political powers. In addition to removing tariffs, member states must agree not to adopt industrial policies that will give one nation's manufacturers a competitive advantage. In agriculture, where subsidies are the norm, member states must accept Community regulations that keep food prices above world market levels. Increasingly, European countries are also coordinating monetary policies in order to reduce inflation and wide fluctuations in exchange rates between currencies.

Collectively, the member states of the European Community have greater economic power than the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and Japan on the other (Figure 2.4).

Politically, the European Community is not a superpower but an alliance of states, with each state retaining its own national government, national armed forces, and national parliament. The multinational European Commission in Brussels proposes policies for the Community, but decisions must be approved by the Council of Ministers of the national governments of the member states. On most major issues the decision must be unanimous. The directly elected Parliament of the European Community does not exercise significant legislative powers; it questions and advises the Commission.

The Community relies heavily on legal regulations because it obtains very little revenue from national governments. Rich Northern European countries, such as Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands, are reluctant to be taxed to bring up living standards in the poorer Mediterranean countries, such as Portugal and Greece. Nevertheless the European Community does seek in a limited way to reduce disparities among its various regions primarily through development funds.

With the collapse of the Soviet model of centrally planned economies, Eastern European countries are turning to the European Community for technical assistance, financial aid, and political support. To admit more nations into membership in the Community would extend the geographi-




Figure 2.4 Comparative economic strength of the European Community, United States-Canada, and Japan. *Source: OECD in Figures, OECD Observer*, #164, June-July 1990, Data 1988. GDP measures the total output of goods and services for final use produced by residents and non-residents, regardless of the allocation to domestic and foreign claims. GNP adds in net income from abroad.

cal scope, but increase the diversity of its members, thus reducing the already weak level of political cohesion.

Viewed from inside Europe, the Community appears to be about as weak as the confederation of separate American states was before the adoption of the United States Constitution in 1787. Proponents of a United States of Europe would like to see a constitution adopted for a popularly elected government that would have more authority. The alternative vision is of a *Europe des Patries* (Europe of Nations), in which the Community would represent the lowest common denominator of agreement among member states.

Viewed from the outside, the European Community is important because it already has the power to exclude other nations from trading within a market of 325 million people. This power does not worry American multinational firms such as Ford Motor Company and IBM, which are already well established in Community countries. But it does worry Japanese manufacturers, who have only recently begun to assemble or manufacture products in Europe. It also concerns American farmers who see

their cheaper products excluded by Community barriers to free trade in agriculture.

The freer movement of money, goods, and services brings with it many problems. The free movement of people across national boundaries has increased the level of international terrorism. Planes can be blown up by bombs planted by terrorist groups or high-jacked by armed passengers. The free movement of goods and services can be exploited by traders in illegal products, such as narcotics. In Latin America drug dealers have amassed billions of dollars and financed illegal armies by producing hard drugs for export to the United States, where their sale and use exacerbates drug problems in American cities.

The free movement of capital has enabled Third World countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to amass tens of billions of dollars of debt from international lending agencies and from commercial banks in the United States and elsewhere. When these countries lack the money to pay interest on loans, this creates a financial crisis for major banks as well as for the debtor countries. The problem exists in Eastern Europe too, most notably in Poland, where a communist regime borrowed large sums from European and American banks which it spent in an unsuccessful effort to buy popular support.

Every nation both exports and imports goods and services. The global total of imports and exports between countries balances out. However, individual countries can run a trade surplus or a trade deficit. Germany and Japan have had big trade surpluses for more than a decade. France and Italy tend to have balanced trade, with substantial imports and exports almost equal in size. For decades after 1945 the American economy generated a large trade surplus, because there was little competition for manufactured goods produced in the United States. However, economic growth on other continents led to a reversal of this pattern in the 1980s. The trade deficit makes possible a more rapid increase in consumption by Americans, but it also means paying more in the future to finance the deficit.

National governments enjoy the benefits of an increasingly interdependent international economy, but they dislike the costs, and a government has the power to erect trade barriers designed to help one or more sectors for its national economy. European Community barriers to the import of cheap food are a benefit that it provides to agricultural interests. The structural barriers to the low-cost distribution of American consumer goods in Japan are a benefit the Japanese Liberal Democratic party produces for the various pressure groups that support it. The large contracts that the Department of Defense gives American aircraft manufacturers help subsidize the cost of developing planes for sale abroad.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) demonstrates how national governments can band together to produce the benefits of an international cartel. Instead of oil producers competing against each other in a free market, which would drive down the price of oil,

OPEC countries agree to set the price of oil much higher than in a free market. When the cartel is successful, it drives up the cost of imports for countries without oil, and it boosts the income of oil-producing nations.

The Constraints of Interdependence

Interdependence imposes constraints on every government in the world. Leaders of small countries have always known that they depend on what larger nations do militarily; governments in countries that depend on exports for their well-being have always known that world market conditions are a major determinant of national prosperity.

Interdependence is particularly constraining for the world's poor countries. With enormous lags in technology and with vast pools of unskilled labor, poor nations in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America cannot compete economically with the "cutting-edge" nations of North America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim. The world division of labor consigns them to the production of raw materials, but there has been a long-term decline in the value of most raw materials relative to that of manufactured goods, which contributes to a growing gap between the rich and the poor. In the first decades of independence, many of the new nations' leaders tried to overcome the constraints of market forces by cutting ties with the richer countries and attempting "go it alone" or "bootstrap" strategies of economic development. It seems clear now, however, that to cut themselves off from the richest sources of capital and technology meant to doom their countries to economic stagnation. Recently they have been forced to accept stringent limitations on their policy options as a condition of access to capital and technology, such limitations often appearing in the form of "structural adjustment policies" required by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as conditions for loans and investments in development projects. Thus, the limits imposed on national independence by international economic forces have proven to be a harsh reality for these countries.

However, the growth in international economic interdependence today means that even rich countries cannot dominate the world economy. The dollar is no longer the sole currency of international importance. Europeans look to the German deutsche mark as a more reliable and less inflation-prone standard of value than the dollar. The Japanese are constrained by the large American trade deficit to their country, for American success in reducing imports from Japan would threaten a major reduction in Japanese exports. American politics is conditioned by the presence of Mexico to our south, where the availability of cheap labor is seen by many American workers as a threat to their jobs, even though Mexico promises to be an important market for export-oriented firms in the United States.

In a world of interdependence, popularly elected democratic politicians cannot simply do what the people want or even what they them-

selves want to do, if these wishes go against strong international pressures. An incumbent government cannot easily stimulate a preelection boom if the result will be a rapid depreciation of its currency internationally, with unwelcome domestic consequences shortly afterward. Constraints affect dictators as well as democrats. Since the Gulf War, countries may think twice before embarking on aggressive military action against their neighbors.

Of course, nations are constrained by their own history as well as by their international interdependence. The governments of Eastern European countries would like to achieve a Western European standard of living as fast as they can. But it is far easier to change political institutions than to overcome the handicaps of more than 40 years of a centrally planned economy that sacrificed economic growth to the dictates of Communist ideology.³

The growing importance of transnational influences also places constraints on the study of national political systems through comparative politics.⁴ When countries are no longer completely insulated from each other, we must keep an eye out for what happens abroad as well as what happens at home. For example, the strength of a national economy, which is often reckoned an important influence on voting behavior, depends on whether there is a boom or recession in the world economy as well as on what national governments do. We can no longer compare the governments of Europe as if they were completely separate; membership in the European Community provides tangible institutional evidence of interdependence.

Modern weaponry, the independence of the world economy, the international character of problems of environmental pollution and conservation, and the internationalization of the media of communication—all challenge the autonomy and viability of the nation-state, at least as it has functioned historically. No one doubts the absurdity of a nuclear war in which universal destruction may be accomplished by a few simple operations, in which protectionist measures in one country can produce economic disaster in another, in which waste dropped in the Rhine River by a Swiss factory poisons German and Dutch water, or in which acid rain produced by American factories destroys Canadian forests. The modern media have turned humankind into what almost amounts to a single audience where all these absurdities play out and where it may be hoped, if not presumed, that some learning process is going forward. These international challenges may in time lead to a further development of international problem-solving mechanisms and even of international law. The rise of the nation-state, after all, was a response to challenges beyond the problem-solving capacity of petty principalities and kingdoms. The ending of the cold war encourages hopes that these urgent problems will no longer be obscured by the politics of international confrontation and stalemate.

There is evidence that the United Nations, condemned to ineffective-

ness in relation to the larger problems of international security during the cold war period, is now in the process of rediscovering its originally intended role. It provided international backing and legitimacy to the actions which forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and to discontinue its efforts to develop nuclear and chemical capabilities. It has mounted, or is in process of mounting, major peacekeeping efforts with multinational military forces in Lebanon, Angola, Cambodia, Yugoslavia, and Somalia. In its efforts to combat international terrorism, the UN Security Council took an active role in the effort to compel the Ghaddafi government's surrender of two Libyans accused of masterminding the blowing up of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. These developments may be ushering in a period of significant international institution building involving the implementation of international law, and the structure of the United Nations organization itself. The power structure of the United Nations in the long run will have to reflect the real redistribution of power in the international system, in particular the rise of Japan and Germany. Much will depend on the discretion and creativity of the United States, as the last remaining "superpower," in managing these changes, and in fulfilling the original hopes for the United Nations as international peace-maker and peacekeeper.

KEY TERMS

cultural heterogeneity	industrialization
economic development	interdependence
European Economic Community	literacy
gross national product (GNP)	multinational companies
hegemony	workforce in agriculture
income inequality	

END NOTES

1. See Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown, 1989).
2. For different views of hegemony, compare Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); Bruce Russett, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony. Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?," *International Organization*, 39:1 (1987), pp. 207–231; Susan Strange, "The Persisting Myth of Lost Hegemony," *International Organization*, 41:4 (1987), pp. 551–574; and Joseph Nye, *Bound to*

- Lead* (New York: Basic Books, 1990). The best-known historical discussion is the final chapter of Paul Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of Empires* (New York: Random House, 1987).
3. See John Clark and Aaron Wildavsky, *The Moral Collapse of Communism: Poland as a Cautionary Tale* (San Francisco: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1990).
 4. See Richard Rose, "Changing Forms of the Study of Comparative Politics," *Political Studies* (1991).

PART
Two

**SYSTEM, PROCESS,
AND POLICY**

Chapter 3

Political Socialization and Political Culture

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

We use the term *socialization* to refer to the way children are introduced to the values and attitudes of their society. *Political socialization* is the part of this process that shapes political attitudes. Most children acquire elementary but distinctive political attitudes and behavior patterns at a relatively early age.¹ While some of these attitudes will be elaborated and revised as the child develops, others may remain parts of the political self throughout life.

At any time an individual's *political self* will be a combination of several feelings and attitudes in varying proportions. At the deepest level there are general identifications and beliefs such as nationalism, ethnic or class self-images, religious and ideological commitments, and a fundamental sense of one's rights and duties in the society. There are also less emotional, more cognitive commitments to and knowledge about political and governmental institutions, such as the electoral system, the structure of the legislature and the court system, and the power of the executive. Finally, there are fleeting views of current events, policies, issues, and personalities. All these attitudes change, but those in the first group have often been acquired earliest and tend to be more durable.

Political socialization never really ceases; therefore, the political self is always changing. Many of life's most common experiences—becoming involved in new social groups and roles, moving from one part of the country to another, shifting up or down the social and economic ladder, becoming a parent, finding or losing a job—modify our political perspective. More dramatic experiences, such as immigration to a new coun-

try or suffering through an economic depression or a war, can sharply alter political attitudes.

Two general points about political socialization need to be emphasized. The first is that political socialization can take the form of either direct or indirect transmission and learning. Socialization is direct when it involves the explicit communication of information, values, or feelings toward politics. Civics courses in public schools are *direct political socialization*, as have been the efforts by Communist parties to inculcate the ideas of “the Soviet man” or the “Cuban socialist man.”

Indirect political socialization occurs when political views are inadvertently molded by our experiences. Such indirect political socialization may have particular force in a child’s early years. For example, the child’s development of either an accommodating or an aggressive stance toward parents, teachers, and friends is likely to affect the adult’s posture toward political leaders and fellow citizens in later life. Or, growing up in a time of deprivation and hardship may leave the future adult with a more materialistic set of value priorities.

The second major point is that socialization continues throughout an individual’s life. Attitudes established during childhood are always being adapted or reinforced as the individual passes through a variety of social experiences. Early family influences can create a favorable image of a political party, but subsequent education, job experience, and the influence of friends may dramatically alter that early image. Furthermore, certain events and experiences — a war or an economic depression — may leave their mark on the whole society. Such events seem to have their greatest impact on young people just becoming involved in political life, such as first-time voters, but most people are affected to some degree. When experiences bring about drastic changes in the attitudes of older members of the society, we speak of *political resocialization*.

Political socialization transmits and transforms a nation’s political culture. It is the way one generation passes on political ideas and beliefs to succeeding generations, a process called cultural transmission. It transforms the political culture when it leads the citizens, or some of them, to view and experience politics in a different way. In times of rapid change or extraordinary events, such as the formation of a new nation, political socialization may even create a political culture where none existed before.

Few societies have been exposed to more dramatic forces for political resocialization than Germany. The governments in both East and West Germany made massive efforts after World War II to shape the political culture through direct political socialization. In both East and West even larger transformations have been wrought by experiences of indirect socialization. A brief discussion of socialization and German political culture can illustrate these processes.

POLITICAL RESOCIALIZATION IN GERMANY

In post-World War II Germany those in authority deliberately sought to transform the national political culture. In West Germany the occupation forces of the victorious Allies and, over a longer period, the postwar government sought to alter German political values and behavior to make them more supportive of the democratic political structures created for the postwar era. They made deliberate efforts to use schools, political parties, and civic organizations to inculcate citizens in democratic values. Participation in competitive elections was encouraged, though not required.

In East Germany the Soviet-dominated communist regime used the typical socialization techniques of modern authoritarian societies to inculcate values of obedience, communist ideology (including acceptance of a one-party state and centrally controlled economy), equality, and support for the Soviet bloc in international affairs. Their approach involved coordinated control of the mass media and the school system. They also used the party and its linked organizations, such as the trade unions, to mobilize citizens into symbolic support activities, such as demonstrations and voting in noncompetitive elections.

In West Germany the transformation of political culture over four decades has been remarkable. Extraordinary changes have been documented, including greatly increased trust in government, commitment to democratic processes, and readiness to participate in politics. In addition, the Germans have exhibited increasingly moderate partisanship, and a consensus has emerged on the political and economic organization of society. Government efforts at direct political socialization have no doubt played a role, but students of contemporary German politics² attribute most of the change to four factors that are primarily indirect.

The first factor involves generational replacement rather than individual resocialization. Over the past 40 years the older generations, who had retained some identification with the prewar German regimes and whose political experiences had been largely disastrous, have been increasingly outnumbered by the younger age groups. These younger groups have been socialized in the peace and prosperity of the postwar period, as well as exposed to deliberate efforts to inculcate democratic attitudes.

The second factor shaping the political culture is said to be the absence of a credible alternative to the democratic Bonn regime. The experience of Hitler's Third Reich discredited fascism; the example of East Germany discredited communism. In the post-World War II world, Germany was militarily powerless and unification of East and West appeared impossible.

The third factor has been the postwar modernization of West Germany. With the loss of the eastern part of the country, West Germany

became more homogeneously urban and industrial. The rapid rate of growth in this period accentuated these tendencies. The German family became more egalitarian and parent-child relations more permissive. The educational level of the population increased. In most countries these changes are associated with a more attentive and participatory political culture.

Finally, the West German political and economic systems have performed successfully. Early legislation equalized the burdens of defeat and helped integrate the refugees from the eastern territories. Economic reconstruction rapidly turned West Germany into the leading European industrial power. Fiscal and social policies were effectively employed to maintain economic growth and stability, high levels of employment, and relatively high standards of education, health care, housing, and recreation. The political system has usually been able to combine fairly equitable representation, stable governments, responsiveness to popular pressures, and negotiated policymaking. Several smooth transitions of power—changes in political party control and political leadership—have now taken place. These successes have built a reservoir of confidence in the political system and its institutions.

We know less about the course of political socialization in East Germany. Public opinion poll data tracing attitude changes are not available. Political education was heavily stressed, and the education system was closely intertwined with political organizations. Sporadic expressions of discontent were quickly and brutally suppressed, and we now know that an elaborate system of informants—even spouse on spouse and sibling on sibling—was nurtured by the regime's security police, the *Stasi*, with telling effects on the expression of criticism. However, the family and various informal networks continued to function independently, and some observers saw a large gap between verbal acceptance of the official political culture and actual behavior.³

East Germany was generally considered one of the most successful of the Eastern European regimes under Soviet domination, achieving the highest level of economic development, remarkable successes in international athletic competition, and impressive levels of education and health. But in the end the regime's efforts to build a legitimacy that could carry it through hard times were outweighed by reports of the freedom and prosperity in the West, distaste for repression, and growing economic difficulties. When other Eastern European nations opened their borders to the West in the spring of 1989, hundreds of thousands of East Germans took advantage of the opportunity to flee the country. As the Soviet Union withdrew its backing from hard-line leaders and encouraged reform instead of repression as a response to the drain of citizens, the internal support for the communist regime seemed to vanish. When the freer press revealed abuses of power and privilege by the leadership (such as private hunting lodges), citizen anger was intensified.

In the first free elections parties with ties to West Germany dominated the results, and the (reformed) communists were routed. Despite some fears about the changes, support for reunification of the two Germanies in a context of democracy was overwhelming. It remains to be seen, of course, if the distinctive socialization experience of former East Germans (now referred to as the *Ossis* or “Easterners”), has created a subculture that might persist for decades among the presently mature generations of Germans.

AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Political socialization is accomplished through a variety of institutions and agents. Some, like civics courses in schools, are deliberately designed for this purpose. Others, like play and work groups, are likely to affect political socialization indirectly.

The Family

The direct and indirect influences of the family—the first socialization structure that an individual encounters—are powerful and lasting. The most distinctive of these influences is the shaping of attitudes toward authority. The family makes collective decisions, and for the child these decisions may be authoritative—failure to obey may lead to punishment. An early experience with participation in family decision making can increase the child’s sense of political competence, providing skills for political interaction, and encouraging active participation in the political system as an adult. By the same token, patterns of obedience to parental decisions can help to predispose the child’s future performance as a political subject. The family also shapes future political attitudes by locating the individual in a vast social world; establishing ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties and social class; affirming cultural and educational values and achievements; and directing occupational and economic aspirations.⁴

The feminist “revolution” of the last decades has profoundly affected the politics of advanced industrial nations. The trend toward gender equality in education, occupation, and profession has transformed the structure of the family. The attenuation of sharp differences between the sexes in self-images, in parental roles, and in the relations of men and women to the economy and the political system, is significantly affecting patterns of political recruitment, political participation, and public policy. A more open family, equality of parenting, and the early exposure of children to child care and preschool group experiences has modified the impact of the family in the socialization process in ways we still do not fully understand.

The School

Educated persons are more aware of the impact of government on their lives and pay more attention to politics. They have more information about political processes and undertake a wider range of activities in their political behavior. These effects of education have appeared in studies of political attitudes in many nations.⁵

Schools provide adolescents with knowledge about the political world and their role in it. They provide children with more concrete perceptions of political institutions and relationships. Schools also transmit the values and attitudes of the society. They can play an important role in shaping attitudes about the unwritten rules of the political game, as the traditional British public schools instill the values of public duty, informal political relations, and political integrity. Schools can reinforce affection for the political system and provide common symbols for an expressive response to the system, such as the flag and pledge of allegiance. And of course, when a new nation comes into being, or a revolutionary regime comes to power in an old nation, it usually turns immediately to the schools as a means to supplant "outdated" values with those more congruent with the new rulers' ideology.

In contrast, the educational system in South Africa up until recently has had as its main goal the development and perpetuation of differences between the races. The apartheid culture was supported both by inculcating attitudes of separateness and by providing different skills and knowledge. There was no mixing of white and black children. White children learned early that their parents and other siblings treated blacks as inferior people. As they grew older they learned that whites were different and superior to blacks. White children in South Africa were required by law to attend primary and secondary school, where the environment has been exclusive as it was at home. The school experience usually confirmed and strengthened the attitudes acquired by white children at home.

Education for the black majority has been different. After forcing most of the private mission schools to close, the government dealt with black education through a separate government department that provided segregated elementary education for most African children and secondary education for a few. In 1979, after several years of improvement, the government still spent more than ten times as much per student on white education as on black African education.⁶ Black dissatisfaction with the quality of education, as well as with the unsuccessful government efforts to force the use of Afrikaans (the native language of most white South Africans) as the medium of instruction in the 1970s and 1980s, was one of the major sources of the unrest that fueled the challenge to white-dominated politics in the 1990s.

Religious Institutions

The religions of the world are carriers of cultural and moral values, which inevitably have political implications, affecting politics and public policy. The great religious leaders have seen themselves as teachers, and their followers have usually attempted to shape the socialization of children through schooling and to socialize converts of all ages through preaching and religious services. While the frequency of church attendance varies greatly in different societies and religions, the presence of religious identity and organizations is felt in most political systems. Where the churches systematically teach values that are at least in part at odds with the controlling political system, as in the years of tensions between the communist regime and the Catholic Church in Poland, the struggle over socialization can be of the greatest significance in the society.

The emergence of aggressive religious fundamentalism in recent decades has had a major impact on the society and politics of countries as diverse as the United States, India, Israel, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Algeria and Nigeria. Fundamentalism is a defensive reaction against the diffusion of rational and scientific views of nature and human behavior, and the spread of secular and libertarian values and attitudes. While the influence of fundamentalism has been most visible in the Middle East and among Muslim countries, it is a factor of importance in Christian countries as well. There are both Protestant and Catholic versions of fundamentalism in the United States, and in European and Latin American countries. They are also to be found, though combined with ethnic and nationalist tendencies, among the Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu countries of East, Southeast, and South Asia. Broadly speaking the rise of fundamentalism has shifted the center of political gravity to the right, and has raised conservative social, moral, and religious issues to the top of the contemporary policy agenda.

Peer Groups

Although school, family, and religious movements are the agents most obviously engaged in socialization, several other social units also shape political attitudes. One is peer groups, including childhood play groups, friendship cliques, school and college fraternities, and small work groups, in which members share relatively equal status and close ties. Individuals adopt the views of their peers because they like or respect them or because they want to be like them. It may be awkward or painful to be "different." A peer group socializes its members by motivating or pressuring them to conform to the attitudes or behavior accepted by the group. An individual may become interested in politics or begin to follow political events because close friends do so. High school seniors may

choose to go on to college because other students with whom they identify have chosen to do the same. In such cases, the individual modifies his or her interests and behavior to reflect those of the group in an effort to be accepted by its members.⁷ The international youth culture symbolized by rock music, T-shirts and blue jeans may have played a major role in the failure of communist officials to mold Soviet and Eastern European youth to the “socialist personality” that was the Marxist-Leninist ideal. Likewise, groupings such as the “skinheads” that have sprouted up among lower-class youth in many Western countries have adopted political views that have no other source than peer interactions.

Occupation, Class, and Status

Historically, and still in some parts of the world such as Latin America, societies have been divided into landowning aristocracies, and peasants and other lower class groups. Even as recently as the Victorian age in Britain, the prime minister Disraeli could speak of England as consisting of “two nations”—the upper and lower classes, differing in height, health, dress, speech, life-style, attitudes, and values. Industrialization produced a new social structure in advanced countries such as Britain and Germany, where working classes emerged, concentrated in particular neighborhoods, developing their own forms of speech, dress, recreation and entertainment, and their own organizations, including powerful trade unions and political parties. One could speak of the emergence of a proletarian political culture in these areas. The rise of “postindustrial” society has meant the breakup of these large social formations. White-collar workers and professionals in Europe, North America, Japan, and other parts of East Asia now outnumber blue-collar workers, with the result that the political processes in these countries have become more complex, more fluid.

Mass Media

Modern societies cannot exist without widespread and rapid communication. Information about events occurring anywhere in the world becomes general knowledge in a few hours. Much of the world has become a single audience, moved by the same events and motivated by similar tastes. There is no part of the world so remote that its inhabitants lack the means to be informed almost simultaneously about events elsewhere: mass-produced and inexpensive transistor radios are omnipresent, even in third-world villages far removed from political power centers, and the mass media—newspapers, radio, television, magazines—play an important part in internationalizing attitudes and values around the globe. Television, enlisting the senses of both sight and sound, may have a powerful emotional impact on large public audiences. American disillusionment with Vietnam in the late 1960s and early 1970s was in considerable part

the result of the bringing of the battlefield into the living room, made possible by television coverage of military action.

In 1989 the movements for democracy throughout Eastern Europe fed on the knowledge of each others' tactics and successes, given extra impact by newspapers, television, and radio newly free to report these exciting events in and beyond their own nation. In addition to providing specific and immediate information about political events, the mass media also convey, directly or indirectly, the major values on which a society agrees. Certain symbols are conveyed in an emotional context, and the events described alongside them take on a specific emotional color. Mass media controlled by an authoritarian government can be a powerful force in shaping political beliefs, although citizens will soon ignore reports that are inconsistent with their personal experiences, and word-of-mouth transmission of inconsistent attitudes is often a powerful antidote to the effectiveness of direct mass-media socialization.

Interest Groups

Interest groups, associations, and organizations of one kind or another also play important roles in the shaping of popular attitudes. These include economic groups, such as trade unions, manufacturer and trade associations, chambers of commerce, and agricultural groups. Among these economic groups, trade unions may have had the most important consequences for politics. In most advanced industrial countries, the rise of trade unions has transformed political culture and politics, creating new political parties and ushering in the "welfare state." Other occupational and professional associations, such as peasant and farmer groups, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers, medical societies, and associations of lawyers, are important agencies influencing political attitudes in modern and modernizing societies. They enlist large numbers of trained professionals, and ensure their loyalty by defending their members' economic and professional interests. Because these associations relate to occupational strata, they promote and intensify occupational and class-related political values.

Also important in political socialization are ethnic societies, such as organizations of Americans of Polish, Italian, Greek, Chinese, or Jewish origin; civic associations, such as parent-teacher associations and leagues of women voters; and policy groups, such as taxpayers' associations, "pro-life," and "pro-choice" organizations. Groups such as these—relying on the use of the media and the mails—disseminate large quantities of information and exhortation on political, social, and economic issues to mass and elite audiences.

Political Parties

As specialized political structures, parties play a deliberate and important role in political socialization. Political parties attempt to mold issue pref-

erences, arouse the apathetic, and find new issues as they mobilize support for candidates. Political parties such as the Republicans and Democrats in the United States or Labour and Conservatives in Britain typically draw heavily on traditional symbols of the nation or a class and reinforce them. A competitive party system may focus criticism on the government's *incumbents* (officeholders), but it often reinforces support for the basic structures and processes. Parties also keep citizens in contact with the political structures. Most individuals are concerned with politics only in a limited way, but a steady flow of party activities, culminating in an election every few years, keeps citizens involved in their citizenship, their participant roles.

In competitive party systems, party socialization activities can also be divisive. In their efforts to gain support, leaders may appeal to class, language, religion, and other ethnic divisions and make citizens more aware of these differences. In the 1960s in Belgium, the small Flemish and French separatist parties emphasized language differences and split the traditional Belgian party system, which had been stable for 50 years; aroused massive political conflict; and brought about major policy changes, including constitutional revisions. Leaders of preindustrial nations often oppose competitive parties because they fear such divisiveness in their new nations. Although this is sometimes a sincere concern, it is also self-serving to incumbent leaders, and is becoming increasingly difficult to justify against widespread contemporary demands for multiparty systems.

In communist nations until recently and in many preindustrial nations, governments have used a single party to attempt to inculcate common attitudes of national unity, support for the government, and ideological agreement. The combination of a single party and controlled mass media is potent: the media present a single point of view, and the party activities reinforce that perspective by involving the citizen more directly and personally. Yet, as demonstrated recently in Eastern Europe and the USSR, years of directed socialization by media and party cannot compete with citizens' personal experiences in shaping underlying attitudes.

Direct Contact with Governmental Structures

In modern societies, the wide scope of governmental activities brings citizens into frequent contact with various bureaucratic agencies. One study found that 72 percent of adult Americans had interacted with at least one government agency in the preceding year; about a third had interacted with more. The most frequent contacts were with tax authorities, school officials, and the police.⁸ The scope of government intervention in daily life, and hence the necessity for contacts with government, is greater in many Western European nations than in the United States, and it is greater yet in the still surviving communist countries.

These personal experiences are powerful agents of socialization,

strengthening or undercutting the images presented by other agents. No matter how positive the view of the political system that has been taught in school, a citizen who is harassed by the police, ignored by welfare agencies, or unfairly taxed is unlikely to feel much warmth toward the authorities.

In their study of citizen attitudes in five nations, Almond and Verba found marked differences across countries in the expectations that citizens had of their treatment by police and bureaucrats.⁹ Italians, and particularly Mexicans, had quite dismal expectations as to equality and responsiveness of treatment. American blacks also reported quite negative expectations in these 1960 interviews. It is quite likely that these expectations were in large measure a response to actual patterns of treatment by government.

POLITICAL CULTURE

A *political culture* is a particular distribution of political attitudes, values, feelings, information, and skills. As people's attitudes affect what they will do, a nation's political culture affects the conduct of its citizens and leaders throughout the political system. We can compare aspects of political culture in different nations, and so understand the propensities for present and future behavior. In approaching any specific political system it would be useful to develop a map of the important contours of its political culture, as well as a corresponding map of its structures and functions.

MAPPING THE THREE LEVELS OF POLITICAL CULTURE

System Propensities

One way of mapping a nation's political culture is to describe citizens' attitudes to the three levels of the political system: system, process, and policy. At the *system* level we are interested in the citizens' and leaders' views of the values and organizations that hold the political system together. How is it and how should it be that leaders are selected and citizens come to obey the laws? At the *process* level we are interested in individuals' propensities to become involved in the process: to make demands, obey the law, support some groups and oppose others, and participate in various ways. At the *policy* level we want to know what policies citizens and leaders expect from the government. What goals are to be established and how are they to be achieved?

Perhaps the most important aspect of system propensities is the level and basis of *legitimacy* of the government. If citizens believe that they ought to obey the laws, then legitimacy is high. If they see no reason to obey, or if they comply only from fear, then legitimacy is low. Because it is much easier to get compliance when citizens believe in the legitimacy

of the government, virtually all governments, even the most brutal and coercive, try to make citizens believe that their laws ought to be obeyed and that it is legitimate to use force against those who resist. A government with high legitimacy will be more effective in making and implementing policies and more likely to overcome hardships and reversals.

Citizens may recognize a government as legitimate for many reasons. In a traditional society, legitimacy may depend on the ruler's inheriting the throne and on the ruler's obedience to religious customs such as making sacrifices and performing rituals. In a modern democracy, the legitimacy of the authorities will depend on their selection by citizens in competitive elections and on their following constitutional procedures in lawmaking. In other political cultures, the leaders may base their claim to legitimacy on their special grace, wisdom, or ideology, which they claim will transform citizens' lives for the better, even though they do not respond to specific demands or follow prescribed procedures.

Whether legitimacy is based on tradition, ideology, citizen participation, or specific policies has important implications for the efficiency and stability of the political system. These bases of legitimacy set the rules for a kind of exchange between citizens and authorities. Citizens obey the laws, and in return the government meets the obligations set by its basis of legitimacy. As long as the obligations are met, citizens should comply and provide support and appropriate participation. If customs are violated—the constitution subverted, the ruling ideology ignored—then authorities must expect resistance and rebellion.

In systems in which legitimacy is low and bases for legitimacy are not accepted, citizens often resort to violence as a solution to political disagreement. Three serious problems for legitimacy are the following: (1) failure of all citizens to accept the national political community, as in Northern Ireland; (2) lack of general acceptance of the current arrangements for recruiting leaders and making policies, as in South Africa; and (3) loss of confidence that the leaders are fulfilling their part of the bargain of making the right kinds of laws or following the right procedures.

The Soviet Union disintegrated because all three kinds of legitimacy problems appeared. There was no consensus on a communist state, nor on any basis for a national political community in the absence of common language or *ethnicity*. Shortages of food and consumer goods caused citizens to lose faith in the government's economic and political policies. Gorbachev failed in his efforts to deal with all three problems at the same time.

Process Propensities

As shown in Figure 3.1, in a hypothetical modern industrial democracy a sizable proportion (60 percent) of adults may be involved as actual and potential participants in political processes. They are informed about politics and can and do make political demands, giving their politi-




Figure 3.1 Models of political culture: orientations toward involvement in the political process.

cal support to different political leaders. We call these people *participants*. Another 30 percent are simply *subjects*; they passively obey government officials and the law, but they do not vote or involve themselves in politics. A third group (10 percent) are hardly aware of government and politics. They may be illiterates, rural people living in remote areas, or older women unresponsive to female suffrage who are almost entirely involved in their families and communities. We call these people *parochials*.

Such a distribution would not be unusual in modern democracies. It provides enough political activists to ensure competition between political parties and sizable voter turnout, as well as critical audiences for debate on public issues and pressure groups certain to propose new policies and protect their particular interests.

The second column in Figure 3.1 depicts a largely industrialized authoritarian society, such as the former Soviet Union. A rather small minority of citizens becomes involved in the huge one-party system, which penetrates and oversees the society, as well as deciding its policies. Most of the rest of the citizens are mobilized as subjects by the party, the bureaucracy, and the government-controlled mass media. Citizens are encouraged and even coerced to cast a symbolic vote of support in elections, and to pay taxes, obey regulations, accept assigned jobs, and so forth. Thanks to the effectiveness of modern societal organization and communications, and to the efforts of the authoritarian party, few citizens are unaware of the government and its influence on their lives. Hence, we see that most of the society is made up of subjects, rather than parochials

or participants. If such a society suddenly attempts democratization of its politics, many citizens must learn to become participants as well as subjects.

The third model is of an authoritarian system that is partly industrial and partly modern, exemplified by such countries as Indonesia or Egypt. In spite of an authoritarian political organization, some participants—students and intellectuals, for example—would oppose the system and try to change it by persuasion or more aggressive acts of protest. Favored groups, like businessmen and landowners, would discuss public issues and engage in lobbying. But most people in such a system would be passive subjects, aware of government and complying with the law, but not otherwise involved in public affairs. The parochials—peasants and farm laborers working and living in large landed estates—would have little conscious contact with the political system.

Our fourth example is the democratic preindustrial system, perhaps one like India, which has a predominantly rural, illiterate population. In such a country there would be many fewer political participants, chiefly educated professionals, businessmen, and landowners. A much larger number of employees, workers, and perhaps independent farmers would be directly affected by government taxation and other official policies. But the largest group of citizens would be illiterate farm workers and peasants, whose knowledge of and involvement with the public sector would be minimal. In such a society it is a great challenge to create a more aware citizenry that can participate meaningfully and shape public policies through democratic means.

Another relevant feature of process culture is people's beliefs about other groups and themselves as group members. Do individuals see the society as divided into social classes, regional groups, or ethnic communities? Do they identify themselves with particular factions or parties? How do they feel about groups of which they are not members? The question of political trust of other groups will affect the willingness of citizens to work with others for political goals, as well as the willingness of leaders to form coalitions with other groups. The governing of a large nation requires forming large coalitions, and there must be substantial amounts of trust in other leaders to keep bargains and be honest in negotiations. Beyond the question of trust, but related to it, is the question of hostility, an emotional component to intergroup and interpersonal relations. The tragic examples of ethnic, religious, and ideological conflict in many nations show how easily hostility can be converted into violence and aggressive action. One need only think of the terrible toll of civil war in Nigeria, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, El Salvador, or the former Yugoslavia.

Policy Propensities

If we are to understand the politics of a nation, we must understand the issues people care about and the underlying images of the good society

and how to achieve it that shape their opinions. Citizens in different nations attach different importance to various policy outcomes. In some societies private property is highly valued; in others communal possessions are the rule. Some goods are valued by nearly everyone, such as material welfare, but societies differ nevertheless: some emphasize equality and minimum standards for all, while others emphasize the opportunity to move up the economic ladder. Some cultures put more weight on welfare and security, and others value liberty and procedural justice. Moreover, the combination of learned values, strategies, and social conditions will lead to quite different perceptions about how to achieve desired social outcomes. One study showed that 73 percent of the Italian Parliament strongly agreed that a government wanting to help the poor would have to take from the rich in order to do it. Only 12 percent of the British Parliament took the same strong position, and half disagreed with the idea that redistribution was laden with conflict.¹⁰ Similarly, citizens and leaders in preindustrial nations disagree about the mixture of government regulation and direct government investment in the economy necessary for economic growth.

Consensual or Conflictual Political Cultures

Political cultures may be consensual or conflictual on issues of public policy and on their views of legitimate governmental and political arrangements. In a *consensual political culture*, citizens tend to agree on the appropriate means of making political decisions and tend to share views of what the major problems of the society are and how to solve them. In more *conflictual political cultures* the citizens are sharply divided, often on both the legitimacy of the regime and solutions to major problems.

In the United States, Britain, and Germany many citizens place themselves at the center of the ideological spectrum, with most of the rest at the moderate left or right. Very few place themselves at the extreme left or extreme right.¹¹ The more conflictual distributions in the political cultures of such countries as France, Italy, and Greece both encourage and reflect the more intense political debates in these countries. Such debates have been associated with disputes over a regime's legitimacy, as well as disagreements on political issues. In all three countries, however, the divisions seem to have gradually become less conflictual over the last 20 years.

When a country is deeply divided in political attitudes and values, we speak of the distinctive groups as *political subcultures*. The citizens in these subcultures have sharply different points of view on at least some critical political issues, such as the boundaries of the nation, the nature of the regime, or the correct ideology. Typically, they affiliate with different political parties and interest groups, read different newspapers, and even have separate social clubs and sporting groups. Thus, they are exposed to quite distinctive patterns of socialization. Such organized differences

once characterized the electorates in France and Italy, contrasting communist and Catholic subcultures, but these cleavages have declined substantially.

Where political subcultures coincide with ethnic, national, or religious differences, as in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, the divisions can be very enduring and threatening. Earlier expectations in the United States that all the immigrant groups would assimilate into a common American culture have proven to be unfounded. No matter how culturally assimilated, individuals of English, Scotch, Irish, German, Scandinavian, Jewish, Italian, Greek, African, Chicano, or Asian origins, for example, continue to share common political and policy propensities with their fellow ethnics. These influences are of course mediated by family, community, school, peer group, interest groups, political parties, and media of communication. The fragmentation of the Soviet empire, the breakup of Yugoslavia, and the impulses toward autonomy and secession among the Scots, the Welsh, the Bretons, the Basques, and the like, reflect the lasting power of language, culture, and historical memory to create and sustain the sense of ethnic and national identity among parts of contemporary states.

Figure 3.2 reflects the sharpness of subcultural division in Northern Ireland. In 1983 and 1987 five parties contested the national elections in Northern Ireland. Two of these parties appealed mainly to Protestants and stood above all for regaining Protestant domination over Northern Ireland politics that had prevailed from 1922 until direct British intervention in the early 1970s. The Democratic Unionist party, in particular, stood for




Figure 3.2 Voting polarization in Northern Ireland in the 1983 general election. *Source:* Calculated from data in Ian McAllister and Richard Rose, based on a 1983 election survey. The parties received very similar rates in 1983 and 1987. Data from Ian McAllister and Richard Rose, *Voters Begin to Choose* (London: Sage Publications, 1986).

direct resistance to any compromises. Two of the parties appealed mainly to Catholics. Sinn Fein called for both armed and electoral struggle leading to union with the Republic of Ireland, while the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP) called for negotiated compromises of Ireland, Britain, and the two communities in Northern Ireland. One party, the Alliance, tried to rally moderate forces in both Protestant and Catholic communities against continuing conflict.¹²

The parties are shown across the bottom of the figure, with the cross-community moderate party in the center and the most extreme parties at the respective far left (Sinn Fein) and far right (Democratic Unionist). The choices of Protestant voters are shown with an unbroken line, while the Catholic voters' choices are shown with a dotted line. The clarity of division between the Catholic and Protestant subcultures is dramatized by the huge gap in the center—neither community supported the only party appealing for support across religious lines. Protestants voted overwhelmingly (91 percent) for the two Protestant parties, and Catholics voted almost as overwhelmingly (87 percent) for the two Catholic parties. The citizenry is not quite perfectly polarized, for the more moderate of the two community parties won more support within each community. But a third or more of each community did support the most extreme party available to it. Conflictual subcultures of this kind pose very difficult problems for any political system. In Northern Ireland the conflicts between subcultures have destroyed local democratic politics, driven thousands from their homes, and cost nearly 3,000 lives in the last 20 years.

CHANGE IN POLITICAL CULTURE

A nation's political culture affects the behavior of citizens and leaders as they perform political actions and respond to political events. The system, process, and policy propensities are essential guidelines to understanding past and future political actions. The presence of more conflictual distributions of policy propensities, or even intensely divided political subcultures, indicates possible problems in resolving policy differences. Where these differences are firmly incorporated into the political self in many individuals, it may be difficult to overcome them. On the other hand, a strong and widely shared sense of legitimacy of the political regime may sustain the political system through hard times and help leaders to overcome policy divisions.

Industrialization, modernization, and the rise of the modern media of communication have effected similar changes in political culture across national boundaries. Alex Inkeles and David Smith's study of the development of modern attitudes in six nations emphasizes how factory experience can create an awareness of the possibilities of organization, change, and control over nature. They report how one Nigerian worker replied to

a question about how his new work made him feel. "Sometimes like 9 feet tall with arms a yard wide. Here in the factory I alone with my machine can twist any way I want a piece of steel all the men in my home village together could not begin to bend at all."¹³

They found that factory work, education, and mass media exposure all contributed in major ways to information on national issues and leaders, openness to new experiences, appreciation of technical skill, readiness for social change, and personal and political self-confidence. For almost two centuries now the secularizing influences of science and control over nature have shaped political cultures, first in the West and increasingly throughout the world. But this trend toward cultural modernization has encountered two countertendencies—an environmentalist reaction, and a religious fundamentalist reaction, which we have described above. The environmentalist reaction now manifested in interest groups protective of natural resources—forest, water, air, endangered species, and even in environmentalist political parties, has introduced a new dimension of cleavage in modern politics—pro-development versus pro-environment.

Recent studies of political culture in the United States and Western Europe report a number of significant changes in attitudes toward politics and public policy.¹⁴ One of the most significant of these changes is characteristic of the groups that came of age in the 1960s and 1970s, which tend to be less materialistic and less oriented to the work ethic than the earlier generations, and relatively more concerned about social and cultural issues than about economic policy. These studies suggest that even the retreat from political activism in the 1980s did not lead to a renewed focus on material questions, but rather toward more private, nonpolitical forms of expression. This trend seems to have been slowed by the more recent economic recessions, but it continues to alter the value priorities of the political agenda. Issues of the environment and equal opportunity for self-expression for all individuals have become more central, although traditional economic issues remain salient. Politicians in all pluralist democracies are struggling to identify the most important beliefs in contemporary culture, which seems no longer to fit a simple left-to-right spectrum of ideologies.

Of course, the legitimacy of any government rests on a complicated mixture of procedure and policy. In traditional societies the time frame is a long one. If crops fail, enemies invade, and floods destroy, then, eventually, as in Imperial China, the emperor may lose the mandate of heaven, or the chiefs their authority, or the feudal lords their claim to the loyalty of their serfs. In modern secular societies there is a more direct and explicit connection between acceptable policy outcomes and the granting of legitimacy to the government. The belief that human beings can shape the environment puts pressure on political leaders to perform well. If they do not, they will lose legitimacy, and their ability to govern will be undermined; perhaps the regime will even be threatened if the incumbents are not replaced. The ease with which communist governments were swept

away in Eastern Europe in 1989 shows how deeply their legitimacy had been undermined by their own performance, despite the efforts at direct socialization from above.

These events and studies reporting significant changes in basic political and cultural attitudes in the United States and Western Europe make it clear that political culture is not a static phenomenon. Although the evidence we have is insufficient to justify predicting fundamental changes in the political cultures of advanced industrial societies, it does remind us that our understanding of political culture must be dynamic. Not only the exposure of citizens to new experiences, but also the gradual change of generations means continuing modification of the political culture as new groups of citizens have different experiences on which to draw.

KEY TERMS

agents of political socialization	parochials
conflictual political culture	participants
consensual political culture	political culture
direct and indirect socialization	political resocialization
environmentalist	political self
ethnicity	political socialization
fundamentalist	political subcultures
legitimacy	subjects

END NOTES

1. See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), ch. 12; M. Kent Jennings, Klaus R. Allerbeck, and Leopold Rosenmayr, "Generations and Families," in Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase, et al., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), chs. 15, 16.
2. For a thorough analysis of these changes in German political culture in West Germany, see David P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, *Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); and Chapter 11 of Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, eds., *Comparative Politics Today: A World View* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).
3. See Christiane Lemke, "Political Socialization and the 'Micromilieu': Toward a Political Sociology of GDR Society," *International Journal of Sociology*, 18 (Fall 1989), pp. 59–76.

4. Richard E. Dawson, Kenneth Prewitt, and Karen Dawson, *Political Socialization*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), ch. 7.
5. For example, see Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Study* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*; Barnes and Kaase, et al., *Political Action*, ch. 4.
6. Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior, *South African Politics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 119.
7. Dawson, Prewitt, and Dawson, *Political Socialization*, ch. 9.
8. Robert G. Lehn, *American Institutions: Political Opinion and Public Policy* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1976), p. 183.
9. Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*, pp. 108–109. And see Dwaine Marvick, "The Political Socialization of the American Negro," *Annals of the American Academy*, 361 (September 1965), pp. 112–127.
10. Robert Putnam, *The Beliefs of Politicians* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 108.
11. See, for example, the data reported in Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, *Political Action: An Eight Nation Study 1973–1976* (Cologne, Germany: University of Cologne, 1979), pp. 35–36; and in Jacques-René Rabier, Helene Riffault, and Ronald Inglehart, *Euro-Barometer 28: Relations with Third World Countries and Energy Problems*, November 1987 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1989), pp. 325–326.
12. More detailed discussion of the positions offered by the parties, and of the fears and hopes of each community and its leaders, can be found in Pádraig O'Malley's *The Uncivil Wars: Ireland Today* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983).
13. Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 158.
14. Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Barnes and Kaase, et al., *Political Action*; Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).

Chapter 4

Political Recruitment and Political Structure

Political structures are the organized ways that people carry out political activities. The most obvious structures are familiar political institutions, such as parties, elections, legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies. The function of *political recruitment* determines which people are selected to become active members of these structures and how long they remain there.

The political election is one of the most common political structures in the modern world. Nations, such as Saudi Arabia, that hold no elections are unusual. The election's most obvious component, the act of voting by the individual citizen, is one of the simplest and most frequently performed political actions. The citizen enters a voting booth and indicates support for a political candidate or party. The number of voters can easily be counted and the votes determined.

Most elections are apparently about recruitment of political leaders, who become the incumbents of policymaking roles. Yet, elections vary greatly in the functions they perform in the political system. Few structures illustrate so clearly the need for a structural-functional approach to describing political systems. A brief discussion of contemporary elections can usefully introduce our treatment of political recruitment and political structures.

Figure 4.1 shows levels of voter participation in elections from the late 1970s to the present in several countries. As we see, in most of these countries most of the time, half to nearly all the citizens actually voted. In Britain, Germany, and the United States, as in most of the world's democracies, most citizens may participate, and they may choose between competing political parties and candidates. In the Western European democ-




Figure 4.1 Electoral turnout in recent national elections in selected nations—percentage of population 18 years and older. *Sources:* Turnout estimates calculated by the authors, using voter participation data from Thomas Mackie and Richard Rose, *The International Almanac of Electoral History*, 2nd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1982), *The European Journal of Political Research*, and *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*; and population of voting age calculated from United Nations *Demographic Yearbooks*. USSR 1990 turnout estimate generously made available from a survey conducted by Raymond M. Duch and James L. Gibson in conjunction with the Institute of Sociology, USSR Academy of Sciences, in European USSR in May 1990. Estimates for Germany are for West Germany only in 1976 and 1983; combined Germany in 1990.

racies at least three-quarters of the citizens usually voted; in the United States only about half the electorate went to the polls in presidential elections, even fewer in state and local elections. Citizens' choices affect the recruitment of leaders to the top offices of government. Shifts in citizen support bring to power new coalitions committed to new policies. Moreover, the desire for office, to attain or retain political power, encourages leaders to modify policies to meet citizen expectations. Despite its simplicity, the implications of the vote can be profound.

In the other countries in the table the implications are somewhat different. In South Africa *competitive elections* give white voters the opportunity to shape recruitment and policies to some extent. In contrast, the large black majority has been excluded from the electoral process.

The total voter turnout of about 10 percent reported in Figure 4.1 combines average participation by whites (around 70 percent), with no participation at all by blacks. Although inclusion of black voters in the electorate in some form seems a certain result of negotiations between the government and black organizations in 1991–1992, the form of that incorporation is the most difficult problem to be resolved. In Nigeria in the late 1970s and early 1980s all citizens had the opportunity to shape recruitment and policy through competitive elections. Participation included around half the citizens by 1983. Elections did not remain a significant recruitment structure for long. The new president elected in 1983 was in office only a few months before being deposed by a military coup. Seven years later, coincident with a surge in democratization in Africa, Nigeria began gradually moving back toward an elected civilian government with local balloting in 1990, state-level elections in 1991, and federal elections in 1992. If this transition is allowed to continue without a new military intervention, Nigerians will again have had the opportunity to vote. However, the military government under Ibrahim Babangida has mandated a restricted process under which politicians from former civilian regimes are disqualified (as tainted by corruption) and which offers voters a choice of only two parties which were created by Babangida's order. Turnout may be adversely affected by a spreading cynicism about the efficacy of participation under this format.

In the former Soviet Union until 1990 the people were able to vote for only one candidate, who was always a nominee of the Communist party. The very high levels of voter participation reflected government-pressured expressions of symbolic support for the regime. Elections and voting in that system, as in China and Eastern Europe, played a role in socialization. They had little to do with recruitment. In Mexico elections have been more significant. More than one party is allowed to compete, and elections have been important in recruitment at the local level. But the dominant party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), has controlled the national election process through a variety of means, and elections have not been important in the recruitment of top leaders. However, competition has become more serious, and the next elections in Mexico may play a different role.

In most of the countries, the average levels of voter participation are fairly stable over time. The two dramatic changes noted above—those in Nigeria and the Soviet Union—are both important but in opposite ways. In Nigeria the presence or absence of voter participation signifies the elimination and reestablishment of elections by military fiat. The dramatic decline in voter participation in the USSR in 1990, on the other hand, was actually a positive sign vis-à-vis the meaningfulness of Soviet elections in recruitment. It signified the withdrawal of coercion to show symbolic support for the one Communist party candidate, and it went hand in hand with genuine opportunities for choosing between candidates. Thus, in 1991 Russians participated for the first time ever in the choice of a

national-level chief executive: Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia on the basis of a 60 percent majority in an election in which 70 percent of the registered voters participated—a normal level of voter turnout in European elections.¹

Even this brief consideration of electoral structures and voting participation underlines three points. First, we must take a structural-functional perspective and look at what elections actually do, which depends on who is allowed (or compelled) to participate and what sort of competition is permitted for what offices. Second, the political system is a system, and the implications and workings of election structures depend on other structures and functions as well. Is there freedom to communicate new information and to organize new parties? How are public policies actually made—are the elections for positions that are important in policymaking? Third, recruitment is a system function that in many ways affects the working of the political process and the resulting public policies. Recruitment can directly bring to office policymakers committed to different policies. Competitive elections can also affect policy indirectly as elites work in their day-to-day policymaking to build election support or avoid election losses.

THE RECRUITMENT OF CITIZENS

Citizens become involved in the political process in two ways. *Participant activities* are those in which the average citizen makes some attempt to influence policymaking. She may write a congressman to urge passage of fair-housing legislation, or she may work to help a candidate favoring industrial development rather than environmentalism. *Subject activities* are those in which the average citizen is involved in policy implementation. Laws have been made, and the citizen responds to them, whether as taxpayer, welfare recipient, or simple law abider. Table 4.1 shows the major types of citizen involvement in politics and some examples of each type.

Citizens as Participants

In the next three chapters we will discuss the input functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, and policymaking. As we can see in Table 4.1, citizens can become involved in each of these functions. In *interest articulation*, citizens make requests, demands, and pleas for policies. Some interest articulation involves only a citizen and his family, as when a veteran writes to his congressman for help in getting his benefits approved, or when a homeowner asks the local party precinct leader to see if she can have her driveway snowplowed regularly. These are *personal interest contacts*, and they are universal in all kinds of political systems including the authoritarian ones. Citizens may also become in-

Table 4.1 TYPES OF CITIZEN INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

Participant activities	Subject activities
Interest articulation	Resource provider
Personal interest contacting	Taxpayer
Informal group activity	Military draftee
Formal group activity	Juror
Protest activity	Resource receiver
Interest aggregation	Social security recipient
Voting in competitive elections	Welfare recipient
Party work in competitive elections	Veterans' benefit recipient
Policymaking	Behavior regulatee
Voting in referendum	Obeyer of laws
Member of town meeting, workers' council	Parent sending child to school
	Manufacturer obeying safety regulations
	Symbol receiver, provider
	Giver of pledge, loyalty oath
	Listener to political speeches
	Voter in noncompetitive election

involved in politics as members of interest groups (discussed in detail in Chapter 5). They may include formal groups organized for interest articulation, such as professional groups like the American Medical Association, informal local groups like the signers of a petition submitted to a city council, or even the spontaneous gathering of outraged ghetto dwellers, whose smoldering resentment of poverty and injustice erupts in a sudden riot over an accusation of police brutality. Such interest group activity is also found in authoritarian systems, although it may be limited to methods of expression that are not openly confrontational with authorities.

Interest aggregation activities are those in which the citizen provides active political support—commits political resources—to a political leader or faction. The two major categories of citizen interest aggregation activities are voting and campaign activity in competitive elections. The great and ingenious invention of representative democracy makes these activities possible for the average citizen. By allowing freedom to organize and communicate and to form political parties and by making the recruitment of top policymakers dependent on winning elections, the structures of democracy allow citizens to affect policies. Citizens affect policies not merely by making requests or appealing to the conscience of leaders, but by being counted in the choice of leaders. Where citizens can take part in choosing leaders, other input activities, such as demands made by interest groups, will also receive more attention. A citizens' action group, labor union, or business lobby that can offer the votes of many members, or that can contribute money or stuff envelopes before election day, will receive serious attention when it raises policy issues.

Even in democratically oriented nations, of course, it is difficult for citizens to be very involved in direct policymaking. In the exceptional case, citizens may be directly involved when a referendum (a vote on substantive issues) is held. This either does not occur or is unusual in most nations, although in the state of California it has become quite common and rivals the state legislature in legislative impact. In general, however, because the average citizen does not make a living in politics, there is but limited time available to attend to political matters. But at the local level citizen involvement is somewhat more feasible, because citizens are better informed about issues and events. On one hand, there are some special forms of local self-government in which very broad participation does take place, such as the New England town meeting or apartment and house councils, workers' councils, and neighborhood associations. On the other hand, there are local policymaking roles that are part-time elite roles. American city council members, like other local officials in many societies, are not full-time in their public duties. They just cross the borderline between citizen and elite activity.

Who Participates?

Participation by citizens varies greatly by type of activity and types of political systems. Table 4.2 shows some types of citizen participation in five countries: the United States, Britain, Germany, France, and the former Soviet Union. At the top of the table we see the most ordinary and the most dramatic forms of citizen involvement in interest articulation: contacting officials and participating in lawful protest demonstrations. As already suggested, contacting local officials for help is found in all types of countries. In both the United States and the former USSR nearly a third of the electorate have contacted local officials at least sometimes. In the German and British democracies the degree of local activity is slightly less, but higher proportions of the electorate approach regional or national officials.

Participation in political protests, on the other hand, varies greatly within and across countries, depending on the types of issues, the skills of the organizers, and the acceptability of this type of action to citizens and governments. Peaceful protests have become an increasingly acceptable form of action to many citizens in the Western democracies over the past 30 years, although older citizens are still more inclined to view them suspiciously. By now 10 to 15 percent of the citizens in the United States, Britain, and Germany have at some time participated in such demonstrations. Although these protests have become increasingly a conventional form of participation, they are still more attractive to the young, the better educated, and the politically dissatisfied.² As shown in Table 4.2, France has had far more protest involvement than the other three democracies, with over a quarter of the population reporting having participated at some points. These numbers reflect both French traditions of popular

Table 4.2 CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN FIVE NATIONS (PERCENTAGE)

Type of Participation	Nation				
	(West) Germany	United Kingdom	France	United States	USSR
Interest articulation					
Ever contact local officials	13	21	NA	34	27
Ever participate in peaceful protest demonstration	14	10	26	12	4
Interest aggregation					
Average national voter turnout in competitive elections	85	75	78	54	76
Ever persuaded others how to vote	45	17	NA	40	31
Ever worked for party or candidate	21	8	NA	30	9

Sources: All USSR data were generously provided by Raymond M. Duch and James L. Gibson based on their survey in conjunction with the Institute of Sociology, USSR Academy of Sciences, in European USSR in May 1990. Local contacting estimates in other countries are based on data reported in Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, Henry E. Brady, Kay L. Schlozman, and Jane Junn, "Participation in America: Continuity and Change," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 1988; George Moser, Geraint Parry, and Neil Day, "Political Participation in Britain," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1986; M. Kent Jennings, Jan W. van Deth, et al., *Continuities in Political Action*, p. 55. Protest estimates from Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies*, p. 65. Voter turnout from G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective," p. 38. Estimates for persuasion and party work from Barnes and Kaase, et al., *Political Action*, pp. 541–542.

protest and the difficulties citizens have often found in getting the attention of majoritarian governments of both right and left under the Fifth Republic. The final column shows that only 4 percent of Soviet citizens reported having participated in protests, reflecting the strong government repression of such activities until very recently. Given their current circumstances of serious discontent, substantial education, the absence of regularized party competition, and much looser government controls, we may expect to see dramatic increases in protest actions in Russia and other successor states to the old Soviet Union, such as Ukraine and Belarus.

Citizens' membership and participation in formal and informal groups and associations may be a form of indirect interest articulation, when the groups of which they are members undertake to speak for their members on issues of public policy. Thus, an American might join the Sierra Club primarily because of a love of nature and outdoor activity, but will also be counted among supporters of environmental measures when that association articulates its policy concerns. It is difficult to provide comparative cross-national measures of such involvement, but most studies suggest that Americans are particularly likely to be active members of formal and

informal groups.³ These activities are discussed at greater length in Chapter 5.

Table 4.2 also shows direct citizen involvement in several forms of interest aggregation. Democracies are remarkable in that competitive elections offer important political resources to all citizens. First, we see the average turnout of citizens in competitive national elections, which was also shown for some specific elections in Figure 4.1. Among the democracies the United States stands out for its rather low levels of national voting participation: only around half of the potential electorate, rather than three-fourths or more as in the average democracy, votes. The last two lines of the table show, however, that this comparatively poor American performance in voting does not simply reflect relative apathy. Americans are much more likely to try to persuade others how to vote than are their British counterparts, and they are much more likely to work for a party or candidate than either British or German citizens. Thus, while there is a larger proportion of American citizens who are inactive to the point that they do not even vote, there is a higher proportion among active citizens who participate beyond the act of voting.

Russians participated in their first semicompetitive national election in the Soviet elections of 1990, and even here competition was allowed between candidates but not in a multiparty context. Their first experience with multiparty elections was in 1991. So the Russians have little experience with the broad opportunities for citizen involvement in interest aggregation. Nonetheless, turnout was a healthy 76 percent in the Soviet Union election of 1990, and 70 percent in the Russian election of 1991; in 1990, nearly a third of the Soviet electorate reported trying to persuade others how to vote, and 9 percent reported helping to prepare or distribute materials for candidates.

The paradox of American political participation, which contrasts low turnout in elections with relatively heavy involvement in other forms of political activity, results from the interaction of the two major factors that shape individual political involvement: the institutional setting and the resources of individuals. Voting participation is sharply affected by eligibility requirements and registration laws, by the organizational pervasiveness and mobilizing activities of political parties, and by the sharp contrast in party and candidate choices. In all these ways the American voting environment is less conducive to citizen turnout. Registration requirements mean that citizens who change addresses must make a new effort to reestablish their eligibility, while registration is automatic in many European nations. Party organizations are more centralized in Europe and are more extensive in many nations than in the United States. Traditionally, ideological contrasts between parties have been more dramatic in Europe, and parties often have strong, specialized links to economic or religious groups. For voting, such institutional factors outweigh the levels of citizen education and general interest, which are higher in the United States than in much of Western Europe.⁴

For other forms of activity, the citizen resources of education and interest, as well as the extensive networks of organizations, tend to pull Americans into politics at a higher rate than citizens in most democracies.⁵ In the case of campaign activity, the looser American electoral organizations, which are now centered on candidates more than parties, create both opportunities and needs for involvement by the general public. The rather low levels of campaign activity in Britain (8 percent in Table 4.2, as compared to 30 percent for the United States) reflect short campaigns, dominated by nationally linked party organizations, as well as lower levels of education and general political interest.

Citizen participation reflects, then, the way citizens with various participant attitudes utilize opportunities offered by institutions and issues. Citizens who are well informed, confident of their ability to influence others, or attentive to political affairs, or who think it their duty to get involved, will make use of opportunities for participation. Skill and confidence are especially important in complicated activities like organizing new groups or rising to be a leader in an organization. Much cross-national research has shown that better educated, wealthier, and occupationally skilled citizens are more likely, on average, to develop the attitudes that encourage participation.⁶ The personal resources and skills that such people develop in their private lives can be easily converted into political involvement when duty calls or need arises. Consequently, these studies have shown that the better-off citizens in a society tend to be more active in politics than the less well-off. This tendency is least pronounced in the easiest activities, such as voting participation and personal contacting, and most pronounced in forming groups.

The tendency for the better-off to dominate in the arenas of participation is also more pronounced in societies, such as the United States, with weak party organizations, weak working-class groups (such as labor unions), and without parties appealing distinctively to the interests of the lower classes. In nations with stronger working-class parties and labor unions, organizational networks may develop which to some extent counterbalance the greater information and awareness of the more affluent citizens.

Citizens as Subjects

One of the most pervasive of all citizen roles is that of taxpayer (see Table 4.1). This role has probably generated more citizen resistance to the efforts of authorities to promote compliance than any other. Tax revolts are a recurrent feature of political history in many nations and cultures. The demand of taxpayers to have a greater voice in policymaking in return for their assent to increased taxes is a prominent theme in the history of democracy. The American and French revolutions were in part precipitated by their governments' efforts to raise taxes. Antitax movements,

antitax campaign promises, and even antitax parties were a regular feature of politics in many democracies in the 1970s and 1980s.

Resources must be extracted from the society for a wide range of government activities. Modern nonsocialist societies extract from a quarter to half of the national income in taxes and levies of various kinds. Communist political systems in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe extracted from half to three-quarters of the national income through taxation and profits on nationalized industries, and this is still true of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba (see Chapter 8). Many devices are used to compel citizens to become obedient providers of the necessary resources. The United States relies heavily on direct income taxes. The government withholds the income of individual earners, as well as corporations, who must file annual statements to request refunds when they have overpaid or must make additional payments when they have underpaid. An agency of the government, the Internal Revenue Service, monitors citizen taxation. Many state and local governments also tax incomes or use a host of indirect taxes, such as sales taxes. Although the primary sanction for compliance is coercion, with severe penalties provided for tax evasion, a normative emphasis on obedience to the law and good citizenship supplements coercion. In fact, some European nations have much higher levels of tax evasion than the United States. In France, tax evasion is virtually a time-honored custom, and government budget forecasters always anticipate a substantial shortfall.⁷

Citizen roles as receivers of governmental benefits are assumed much more readily, although here too government agencies must typically engage in substantial public education campaigns to inform citizens of the availability of benefits and how to receive them. Aid to the handicapped, to war veterans, to the aged, to the poor, and to various special groups takes a great variety of forms. Patterns of bureaucratic implementation typically require citizens to register or to make special applications for the benefits in question, whether these are welfare benefits, medical care, or loans to small business or for disaster relief. The agency must then monitor the system to see that only eligible citizens receive the benefits.

Modern societies are also covered by networks of regulations. Parents are commonly required to send children of certain ages to school for specific periods of the year. Compliance is achieved by a combination of incentive and coercion. On one hand, education is emphasized as a positive benefit to children and families. On the other hand, penalties are provided for failure to comply, unless educational requirements are met otherwise. It is, indeed, difficult to think of occupational and other major social and economic roles in modern societies that are not somehow linked to a form of government regulation. From traffic regulation to antitrust laws, the citizen in a complex society faces regulatory action. Yet, here too there is variation. In authoritarian political systems the regulation is usually more pervasive and often more arbitrary, and it extends to the control of internal travel, public gatherings, and public speech.

A final form of citizen subject role is of particular interest: the symbolic involvement role. Most political systems attempt to involve citizens with symbols of the community, regime, and authorities. In some countries, schoolchildren must learn and recite a pledge of allegiance; such activities can be controversial, as in the United States where complex legal battles have been fought over the efforts of citizens to resist this requirement for religious or ethical reasons. The mass media are filled with efforts by political leaders to invoke and reinforce symbols of national history and unity.

Contemporary authoritarian systems, particularly the one-party states, press the symbolic involvement of citizens much further. In major efforts to socialize citizen attitudes through symbolic role-playing, these systems typically mobilize every citizen to cast a vote for the single party's candidate on election day and to participate in parades, work groups, and the like. For the same purpose, many have instituted vast recreational programs, particularly to further the involvement of the young. The penetrative party and bureaucratic organizations in these regimes usually are highly effective in mobilizing citizens to perform these symbolic roles, although the effect on attitudes would seem to fall short of the expectations of the rulers.⁸ The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern European regimes suggest that decades of symbolic participation did not build a strong belief in their legitimacy.

HOW MUCH PARTICIPATION?

A central phenomenon of the cultural rebellions of the 1960s and 1970s was the "participation explosion." There was widespread belief, particularly among the "baby boomers," (the unusually large cohorts born in the 1950s and 1960s) in *participant democracy*. Although these age cohorts have matured, recent research shows that this "participationism" persists. This is also true of those age groups born more recently.⁹ The main thrust of this belief is that even in democratic countries political decisions are made by the establishment—the economically privileged and the politically powerful. The solution to this problem, claim the proponents of participant democracy, is to bring decision making down to the level of the community and small groups, back to the people. As a result, citizens would be able to grasp the issues and act politically in their own interest.

Other political theorists maintain that even in democracies there must be a division of political labor and influence, and that a country in which most people would be politically active much of the time would be impossible to govern.¹⁰

The fundamental question is whether a direct, participant democracy is possible in modern nations confronted with contemporary conditions and problems. Robert Dahl has faced this question and presented an analysis that merits some attention.¹¹ His argument starts with the idea

that the preferences, values, and interests of all members of political communities should be taken into account in the decisions of democratic political systems. If all or most members of the community have the same interests and preferences, then there is no problem. However, since this unanimity never occurs, some kind of rule of decision is essential. The majority principle would seem to be an ethically acceptable solution, but in some cases majority rule may be impossible, because the interests of some minority may be so important that its members would not tolerate rule by majority. Language, religion, and property rights are examples of issues over which the application of majority rule may result in civil war, national fragmentation, and the destruction of democracy. In democracies majority rule is normally limited in some areas, either through the acceptance of mutual guarantees protecting the interests of minorities (permitting free practice of religion, the right to speak and be educated in minority languages, and so forth) or through a reserved area of autonomous decisions in which government is prohibited from interfering (freedom of speech, press, assembly, petition, and so forth). But these limits on majority rule are only the beginning of sound democratic logic.¹²

Dahl argues that the ideal of participant democracy must confront the sheer numbers of people involved, the differences in interests and preferences, and the need for competence. It must also confront the economic aspects of participation—that is, what people must forgo in the way of time, energy, and money if they are active in politics. He concludes that its cost to the individual limits the role that direct participation can play in democratic government. Delegation of power to representatives (held accountable, to be sure, through elections) and to nonelected professionals and specialists is a necessary and desirable alternative.

Dahl concludes his discussion of the limits of participant democracy with the metaphor of Chinese boxes, the ancient toy consisting of a large box that contains smaller and smaller boxes. Just as there is a range of box sizes, political problems occur in all dimensions and at all levels. Problem-solving organizations must exist at each level if the problems are going to be solved at all. The big box is analogous to the international level, where, it becomes increasingly evident, problem-solving apparatus and capacity will have to develop if the human race is to survive. The tiny box is analogous to the local community, where direct participation of individuals in local political decisions like sewage disposal, education, and road maintenance is both possible and feasible, because many individuals not only want to solve these problems but are competent to judge the effectiveness of alternative solutions and are motivated to pay the costs of participating. As one moves from the tiniest box to the largest one, specialized competence becomes more important and the costs of participation become greater, necessitating reliance on elected representatives and appointed professionals.

None of this, however, argues that the ideal of participation has been fully realized in the contemporary nations characterized (properly) as

democracies. Recent experiments in local community participation and in participation by workers and their representatives in the decision making of economic enterprises suggest that there are still opportunities for democratic creativity. And the recent mobilization and politicization of members of underprivileged minority groups, women, and young people in industrial democracies show that there are still bastions of privilege and inequality to conquer.

THE RECRUITMENT OF ELITES

Becoming Eligible: Bias Toward the Better-off

Every political system has procedures for the recruitment, or selection, of political and administrative officeholders. In democracies such as the United States, Britain, and France, political and administrative positions are formally open to any candidate with appropriate qualifications, such as age, residence, education, and the like. But political recruits, like political participants, tend to be people of middle- or upper-class background or those coming from the lower classes who have been able to gain access to education.¹³ Of course, this somewhat overstates the case. The trade unions or leftist political parties in some countries may serve as channels of political advancement for people lacking in economic advantage or educational opportunity. Thus, the Labour party delegation in the British House of Commons and the Communist party delegation in the French National Assembly include a substantial number of workers. The workers have usually acquired political skills and experience, however, by holding offices in trade unions or other groups.

There is a reason for this bias in political recruitment. Political and governmental leadership, particularly in modern, technologically sophisticated societies, requires knowledge and skills hard to acquire in any way other than through education and training. Natural intelligence and experience in a trade union or cooperative society may, to a limited degree, take the place of substantial formal education. Even in leftist parties, however, the higher offices tend to be held by educated professional people rather than by members of the working class.

Communist countries, despite their ideologies of working-class revolution, have not been able to avoid this bias. To advance into industrialism, or seek to do so, they have inevitably had to depend on trained technicians. Even the running of an effective revolutionary party calls for technical competence and substantial knowledge. In the later decades of its existence, the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union was increasingly composed of persons with higher education who were recruited from the upper levels of the regional party organizations, the army, and the bureaucracy. The emergence in communist countries of an educated, technically competent, and privileged ruling class violates

their revolutionary populist ideology, and some friction results. Thus, we observe a cycle of recruitment of the technically competent followed by ideological and populist attacks on bureaucracy and privilege. Nowhere has this been more marked than in China, where the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s sought to destroy the powers and privileges of the party leadership and the governmental bureaucracy and bring power back to the people. Yet if the communist countries are to make and implement developmental programs, they cannot escape this dependence on education and competence. In recent years China has returned to an emphasis on education and technological development and even experimented with encouraging greater individual initiative, then turned sharply back toward repression when that initiative took on a political cast. When students or journalists protest against the system, party officials sometimes punish them by sending them off to live in some poor, remote village—a reminder of their need for solidarity with the peasants!

Selection of Elite Policymakers

From among those who have been recruited to lower levels of the political elite, a much smaller number must be selected for the top roles. Historically, the problem of selecting the individuals to fill the top policymaking roles has been critical for maintaining the internal order and stability of government. Monarchs, presidents, generals, and party chairs exercise great power over policy directions. A major accomplishment of stable democracies has been to regulate the potential conflict involved in leadership succession and confine it to the mobilization of votes instead of weapons. When we refer generally to “recruitment structures,” we are thinking of how nations choose their top policymakers and executives.

Table 4.3 shows these recruitment structures in a number of contemporary nations. The most familiar structures in the table are the presidential and parliamentary forms of competitive party systems. In the presidential form, as in the United States and France, parties select candidates for nomination, and the electorate chooses between these. The Mexican system is similar, but the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) has such control over the electoral process that for half a century the electorate has merely ratified the party’s presidential nominee. That nomination itself has been achieved after complex bargaining between party factions and other powerful groups.

In the parliamentary form, the chief executive is not selected directly by popular election. Rather, the parties select leaders, and the electorate votes to determine the strength of the party in the assembly. If a party or coalition of parties wins a majority, its leader becomes prime minister. Such elected assembly majorities usually support stable and effective governments, as in Britain and West Germany, and thus recruitment is

Table 4.3 RECRUITMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN SELECTED CONTEMPORARY NATIONS, 1992

Country	Chief executive structure ^a	Recruitment structures ^b	How often has type of government survived succession? ^c
United States	President	Party and electorate	Very often
Germany	Prime minister	Party and assembly	Often
Japan	Prime minister	Party and assembly	Often
France	President	Party and electorate	Often
Great Britain	Prime minister	Party and assembly	Very often
Russia	President	Electorate	Never
Mexico	President	Elites and party	Very often
Nigeria	President	Party and Electorate	Never
China	Party secretary	Party and military	Twice
India	Prime minister	Party and assembly	Often (one interruption)

^a“Party secretary” refers to that position or a similar one as head of party in communist regime.

^b“Party and assembly” refers to the typical parliamentary system.

^c“Often” means that at least three successions have taken place; that is, a new individual has assumed the chief executive role three times under that type of government.

tied directly to interest aggregation and policy creation. But in these systems party defections or a changing coalition can force a change in government if the assembly majority becomes too dissatisfied.

If no party or coalition wins a majority in the election, bargaining takes place among the factions in the legislative assembly to enable some prime minister to emerge who can command a majority of assembly seats—or who can at least receive passive support for the moment. Where the legislature does not include strong extremist or antidemocratic representation such negotiated coalitions can also be quite stable.¹⁴ Deeply conflictual party divisions can, however, lead to frequent changes in government in multiparty systems. In Italy, for example, the average prime minister has been able to govern for less than a year before being replaced. In both the competitive presidential and parliamentary systems the tenure of the chief executive is periodically renewed. In the presidential system this is through fixed terms of office for the chief executive. In the parliamentary system there is a maximum term for the parliament. New elections must be held before the end of this term and a prime minister selected by the majority party or coalition of parties.

Table 4.3 also illustrates the role of noncompetitive parties. In Mexico, as we have seen, selection takes place through a rather open process of oligarchic bargaining within and around the PRI and the incumbent president, who cannot succeed himself. Despite the somewhat closed recruitment process, the rule of no reelection forces periodic change in

personnel, and often in policy, and the party and the semicompetitive elections do bring about popular involvement.

In the former USSR, and in the other communist regimes, the Communist party long selected the first secretary or its equivalent, who was in effect the controlling force in the executive. Individual succession was not a simple matter. These systems provided no limited term for incumbents and no clear means of regularly assessing political support. The incumbents were difficult to oust once they had consolidated their supporters into key party positions, but they always had to be aware of the possibility of a party coup of the type that ousted Nikita Khrushchev from the Soviet leadership in 1964. As systems, however, the hierarchical party-selection structures seemed quite successful in maintaining themselves until the dramatic coup attempt against Gorbachev in August, 1991. Although he was briefly restored to power, the events surrounding the coup stripped the Soviet presidency of any power, and legitimacy based on electoral success passed to the presidencies and legislative bodies of the constituent republics, most importantly to President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. It remains to be seen how soon any of the republics, Russia included, will have in place stable systems of leadership succession.

The poorer nations, moving down the column of Table 4.3, show substantially less stability, and the regimes have usually had less experience at surviving succession crises. The regime in Nigeria is typical of governments in many nations not shown in the table. It experienced military rule from the civil war in the 1960s until 1979, then introduced a competitive presidential system, which was overthrown by a military coup shortly after its second free election in 1983. President Babangida, himself chosen through decisions of top military leaders, guided the country to a third system of civilian rule in 1992, but the success of that system in even its first attempt at creating a stable leadership is still in doubt. Many African nations are under military governments; some of them have experienced repeated coups against incumbent leaders. Military governments, stable or unstable, have also been common in Latin America and the Middle East. In China the Communist party has remained in power but has suffered several periods of internal strife, and the army has been involved in recruitment at all levels. India's democracy, having persisted through assassinations and other crises, has been an exception to the rule among poorer nations. It has provided a number of executive successions with a single interruption by authoritarian emergency rule that postponed elections for several years in the 1970s.

It is indicative of the great need to mobilize broadly based political support behind the selection of chief executives in contemporary political systems that political parties are important selection structures in so many cases. The frequent appearance of parties also reflects, no doubt, the nature of legitimacy in secular cultures: the promise that the rulers' actions will be in the interest of the ruled.

Control of Elites

Performance of the system functions is crucial for the stability of a political system. Elite recruitment is one of the most essential system functions. Traditional empires and dictatorships, in which self-perpetuation was a major goal of the rulers, seem to have focused on recruitment as the system function to be most carefully regulated. Lesser elites were controlled through the careful selection of loyalists to fill the supervisory roles in the military and civilian bureaucracies and through the provision of powerful inducements for continuing loyal performance. The conquering general or authoritarian dictator mixes rewards to favorites with severe penalties for failure or disloyalty.

Modern authoritarian systems have discovered that more efficient and effective control is achieved by simultaneous manipulation of political socialization, political recruitment, and political communication. Socialization efforts are made to instill loyalty, to recruit loyal activists, and to limit and regulate the flow of information.

But if recruitment is made a part of a larger pattern of control, it is hardly neglected. Selection in the USSR was accomplished through a device called *nomenklatura*. Under this procedure important positions were kept under the direct supervision of a specific party agency whose officials had the final word on the advancement of anyone to such an office. Moreover, a complicated set of inducements was offered to make sure that chosen officials performed as they were supposed to. These inducements made it difficult for any but the topmost officials to have much freedom of action. Maximum control was ensured with normative incentives, such as appeal to party, ideology, and national idealism; financial incentives, such as better salaries, access to finer food and clothing, better housing, and freedom to travel; and coercive control, such as reporting by police, party, and bureaucrats. Demotion or imprisonment, even execution, were penalties for disapproved actions. To avoid that bane of authoritarian systems, the coup by police or military forces, the varied layers of command and inducement structures were interwoven, so that no layer could act independently.

Democratic systems, too, use selection and regulation to attempt to control the performance of government officials. As we have emphasized, periodic renewal of the tenure of elected officials is a fundamental device for ensuring the responsiveness of democratic elites. But other recruitment and expulsion structures also exist. In many parliamentary systems the prime minister and cabinet can be replaced without a national election if they lose the confidence of a majority of members of a parliament. An example in Germany was the replacement of Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt by Helmut Kohl of the Christian Democratic party in October, 1982. A more recent illustration was the ouster of Prime Minister Thatcher by her own party in 1990. In the American system the Supreme Court has the authority to declare congressional or presidential

actions unconstitutional, and impeachment procedures can be used against the incumbents in top roles, even the president (as seen in the events forcing President Nixon from office) or a Supreme Court justice, if their activities stray too far beyond legal bounds. Military officers and civil servants are also subject to removal from office or demotion for violating their oaths of office or for failing to perform their duties. These devices to ensure that the powerful perform their duties as expected are an essential part of political recruitment.

DEMOCRATIC AND AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL STRUCTURES

The most important structural-functional distinction in classifying political systems is between *democratic systems* and *authoritarian systems*. Other important distinctions can be made at other levels, as between nations in preindustrial and industrial environments, or between nations with conservative or change-oriented policy tendencies. But in describing structures and functions we stress initially the degree of democratization. At the level of nation-states, democracy consists of political structures that involve citizens in selecting among competing political leaders. The more citizens are involved and the more meaningful their choices, the more democratic the system.

No simple criterion of democracy exists. The sheer number of citizens voting is no guide. Both citizen participation and meaningful choices between competing elites are essential. As political systems become larger, more complex, and more capable of penetrating and shaping the society, the probability of some form of citizen involvement increases, but the question of the meaningfulness of participation also becomes more serious. In a modern society it is possible for the government to control and shape the flow of information and communication, the formation of attitudes and culture, and the recruitment of elites at all levels. On the other hand, it is also possible for independent social and political subsystems to exert autonomous influence on politics. High levels of education and information can build a participant political culture. Specialized social, economic, and political groups of all kinds can be springboards for the average citizen to make political demands and mobilize other people into political activity, even to build new political parties and support new alternatives in leadership. Thus, more developed political systems, especially in industrial societies, have greater potential for authoritarian control of citizens on a mass scale, as well as for democratic control by citizens on a mass scale.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the democratic-authoritarian distinction in national political structures. The placement of the nations shows how that distinction becomes more dramatic and clear-cut as a national political system develops more specialized and inclusive organizations for control-




Figure 4.2 Democracy and authoritarianism in selected contemporary political systems: regimes and transitions.

ling the society. At the top right and top left of the figure are Britain and the former East Germany; both systems have many specialized structures for shaping their societies, including schools, mass media, party systems, and vast bureaucracies, and both are able to draw on literate and skilled populations. But in Britain and the other modern democracies these many structures and the involved population give citizens substantial ability to control their leaders. In the former USSR and East Germany the policies made by the top leaders controlled citizens, whose sources of information, freedom to form groups, and patterns of involvement with the government were carefully directed from above. As suggested by the arrows for both countries, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw important shifts toward democracy. East Germany has been incorporated into a democratic united Germany. The USSR was broken up into its constituent republics, most of which have introduced much more local autonomy, more freedom of information and activity, and electoral competition.

In such systems as India, China, Egypt, the Philippines, Tanzania, and Nigeria, the development of specialized and integrated structures is much less complete. They show significant democratic or authoritarian leanings, but both the citizens' capacity for input and the leaders' capacity for manipulation and control are less. The democratic opportunities or authoritarian constraints in such systems are often very meaningful to edu-

cated elites or to those living in areas near the bureaucratic centers, but less relevant to the average citizen in the countryside.

Transitions toward democracy have been a major feature of world politics in the last fifteen years, beginning with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, extending to regimes in Latin America and Asia, and most recently culminating in the dramatic developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The generally democratic direction of the arrows of transition in Figure 4.2 reflects those trends with some specific examples (Spain, Brazil, the Philippines, East Germany, and the USSR/Russia). Many of those transitions have been relatively peaceful and reflect a negotiated response of authoritarian rulers to citizen pressures. Military forces have frequently stood aside or even supported the citizens against the dictators. The legitimacy of authoritarian regimes has been undermined everywhere, especially since the collapse of the model (and support) of the Soviet Union.

Yet the table also shows us the case of Nigeria, where a democratic-leaning regime installed in 1979 was overthrown by a military coup shortly after its second competitive national election in 1983 and is only now turning again toward democracy. There has been a more recent case of democratic breakdown in Peru. The arrows of transition can move in either direction. It can be difficult to consolidate stable regimes, especially in the less economically developed societies. Immediately after World War II many of the newly independent colonial nations set up the formal institutions of democracy; only a few of these survived as long as a decade. The fate of the most recent wave of transitions may tell us much about the possibilities and problems of efforts at democratization.¹⁵

KEY TERMS

authoritarian system	participant activities
competitive elections	participant democracy
democratic system	personal interest contacts
interest aggregation	political recruitment
interest articulation	subject activities
nomenklatura	transitions toward democracy

END NOTES

1. *New York Times*, June 14, 1991.
2. Samuel H. Barnes and Max Kaase, et al., *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979);

- Russell Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988), ch. 4; M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth, et al., *Continuities in Political Action* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990).
3. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Sidney Verba, Norman N. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Barnes and Kaase, et al., *Political Action*.
 4. See G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review*, 80 (March 1986), pp. 17–44; and Robert Jackman, "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in Industrial Democracies," *American Political Science Review*, 81 (June 1987), pp. 405–424.
 5. See Verba, Nie, and Kim, *Participation and Political Equality*; Barnes and Kaase, et al., *Political Action*.
 6. In addition to the references in the previous notes in this chapter, see Robert Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); and Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).
 7. See High Heclo, Arnold Heidenheimer, and Carolyn Teich Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, 3rd. ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 191.
 8. Archie Brown and Jack Gray, *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), *passim*.
 9. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
 10. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Princeton University Press, 1961); Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture*.
 11. Robert A. Dahl, *After the Revolution*, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990). Also see his *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).
 12. For a description of the majoritarian and nonmajoritarian practices, see Arendt Lijphart, *Democracies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). For some evidence of the advantages of nonmajoritarian constitutions and party systems in inhibiting violence and channeling participation through legitimate political channels in democracies, see G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), chs. 4, 6, 10.
 13. See the general review of many studies by Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
 14. See Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, ch. 7; and Lawrence C. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Governments* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).
 15. There is a fascinating variety in the democratic transitions in historical background, culture, economic development, political structure, and the strategic decisions of elites. For some of the emerging analyses of these trends by political scientists, see Nancy Bermeo, "Rethinking Regime Change," *Comparative Politics* (April 1990), pp. 359 ff; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About*

Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Robert A. Pastor, ed., *Democracy in the Americas* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989); Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Renewal on the Left: A Comparative Perspective" (Washington, D.C.: Progressive Policy Institute, January 1990). Also see the essays in Myron Weiner and Ergun Ozbudun, *Competitive Elections in Developing Countries* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1987).

Chapter 5

Interest Groups and Interest Articulation

Every political system has some way of formulating and responding to demands. As we saw in Chapter 4, the simplest form of *interest articulation* is the individual making a plea or request to a city council member, legislator, tax or zoning officer, or, in a more traditional system, village head or tribal chieftain.

Interest groups have been organized on the basis of tribal membership, race, national origin, religion, and policy issues. Usually the most powerful, largest, and financially strongest groups are those based on occupation or profession, because the livelihoods and careers of men and women are affected most immediately by governmental policy and action. Most countries that permit their formation have labor unions, manufacturers' associations, farm groups, and associations of doctors, lawyers, engineers, and teachers.

During the last hundred years or so, as societies have industrialized and the scope of government activity has widened, the quantity and variety of interest groups have grown proportionately. Interest group headquarters, sometimes numbering in the thousands, are to be found in capitals like London, Washington, Paris, Bonn, and Rome. Some of these headquarters are in buildings as imposing as those housing major governmental agencies. In countries with powerful local governments, interest groups will be active at the provincial or local level as well.

TYPES OF INTEREST GROUPS

Interest groups vary in structure, style, financing, and support base, among other things, and the variation for any nation may greatly influence its politics, its economics, and its social life.

Individual Contactors and Patron-Client Networks

Individuals may act alone in contacting political officials, and under some conditions these activities may be quite important. We have seen in Table 4.2 that contacting officials about narrow personal or family matters remains common in the modern world. Indeed, it has probably increased in complex industrial societies with large government bureaucracies. So, too, there may be an increase in individuals' efforts to articulate their opinions on broader issues, as when they write to their senator on foreign policy or approach their local zoning board about neighborhood improvement. Purely personal efforts may become important when many people act on the same type of problem or when an individual contactor is too influential to be ignored, as when a wealthy campaign contributor brings a personal problem to the attention of a politician or when a dictator's ranking subordinate asks a favor for his child. Individual efforts to articulate interests on broader issues, however, become closely intertwined, typically, with group awareness and intermittent group activities, which we will discuss in the following sections.

More interesting is the creation of networks of individual supporters by political leaders, who try to build followings by exchanging favors and support with each citizen in the network. The politician provides benefits, such as cutting red tape or securing government loans or services, in return for the citizen's votes, campaign activities or contributions, or personal favors. Such networks, often called *patronage networks* or *patron-client networks*, may be especially prevalent in societies where many individuals survive on a narrow economic margin and where formal organizations to sustain them are not effective.¹ The existence of a large number of sets of personal arrangements between politicians and individual followers may make it hard to build broad and stable organizations, because leaders may move from one organization or party to another, taking their followers along.

In authoritarian societies, where a small elite makes most decisions, and in all societies where bureaucracies have much power, personal networks built by individual leaders take on importance. Students of the former Soviet Union have written of the patronage followings established by Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, and other leaders in their rise to power and the effects of these networks on the careers of both leaders and followers.² Networks of personal supporters are a special kind of political structure: their members are not drawn together by a shared interest in making policy demands (although they may draw on kinship or other personal ties); rather, they are held together by the skill and resources of the leader in satisfying the needs of the followers.

Anomic Groups

Anomic interest groups are the more or less spontaneous groups that form suddenly when many individuals respond similarly to frustration, disappointment, or other strong emotions. They are flash affairs, rising and

subsiding suddenly. Without previous organization or planning, individuals long frustrated may suddenly take to the streets to vent their anger as a rumor of new injustice sweeps the community or news of a government action touches deep emotions. Their actions may lead to violence, but not necessarily.

Particularly where organized groups are absent or where they have failed to obtain adequate representation in the political system, smoldering discontent may be sparked by an incident or by the emergence of a leader. It may then suddenly explode in unpredictable and uncontrollable ways. After a long period of domestic quiet, Egypt was swept by riots in 1977 as people protested an increase in government-regulated food prices. In the communist countries of Eastern Europe violent, generally spontaneous, protest occurred in East Berlin and Hungary in the 1950s, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 during the period of Soviet occupation, in Poland in the 1980s when the free trade union Solidarity was formed and then suppressed by the government, and in East Germany in 1989 when a mass exodus of citizens through Czechoslovakia into the West marked the beginning of the end for the German Democratic Republic.

From 1988 to 1990 pro-democracy rallies, protests, and riots spread rapidly across Eastern Europe. The long-suppressed discontent burst forth in many places as citizens realized that the Soviet Union would no longer support repressive local regimes and that many of these had lost the will and military support to crush dissent. News of other protests stimulated efforts and provided a model for similar action; each new success provided further encouragement.

Some political systems, including those of the United States, France, Italy, India, and some Arab nations, report a rather high frequency of violent and spontaneous anomic behavior (see Table 8.5). Other countries are notable for the infrequency of such disturbances. Traditions and models of anomic behavior help turn frustration into action. In France protestors draw on two centuries of street barricade experience since the great Revolution of 1789. In the United States, rioting and protests gathered momentum in the 1960s, and a decade of reported rioting and protests offered models for spontaneous political action that occurred in many African-American neighborhoods after the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1968. Los Angeles, which suffered severe damage from anomic violence in the 1960s, saw history repeated in April–May, 1992, when riots and looting broke out over a large area of the city following the acquittal of four police officers accused of excessive violence in the beating of an African-American suspect. The decayed centers of several British cities experienced similar upheavals in the mid-1980s. Wildcat strikes, long a feature of the British trade union scene, also occur frequently in such continental European countries as France, Italy, and Sweden.

We must be cautious, however, about characterizing as anomic political behavior what is really the result of detailed planning by organized groups. The farmers' demonstrations in France and Britain and at the

European Community headquarters in Brussels have owed much to indignation, but little to spontaneity.

Nonassociational Groups

Like anomic groups, *nonassociational groups* rarely are well organized, and their activity is episodic. They differ from anomic groups because they are based on common interests of ethnicity, region, religion, occupation, or perhaps kinship. Because of these continuing economic or cultural ties, nonassociational groups have more continuity than anomic groups. Subgroups within a large nonassociational group (such as blacks or workers) may, however, act as an anomic group, as in the spontaneous 1986 boycotts, protests, and riots in many black South African townships growing out of anger at the government's education policies. Similarly, in 1986 riots broke out in Kazakhstan in the USSR when the provincial Muslim party leader was replaced by an ethnic Russian.

There are two especially interesting kinds of nonassociational groups. One is the very large group that has not become formally organized, although its members perceive, perhaps dimly, their common interests. The best example may be the consumer interest group, such as all coffee drinkers, but many ethnic, regional, and occupational groups also fit into this category. The problem in organizing such groups is that with so many members sharing a rather small problem, it is difficult to find leaders who are willing to commit the effort and time needed to organize.

A second type of nonassociational group is the small village, economic, or ethnic subgroup, whose members know each other personally. Thus, in the Italian labor disorders of the 1960s and 1970s southern Italian migrants in northern Italian factories were often deployed as pickets in groups based on the villages of their origin.³ The small, face-to-face group has some important advantages and may be highly effective in some political situations. If its members are well connected or its goals unpopular or illegal, the group may prefer to remain informal, even inconspicuous. Examples of the action of such groups include work stoppages and petitions demanding better wages and hospital conditions by doctors in Mexico City in the 1960s,⁴ requests made by large landowners asking a bureaucrat to continue a grain tariff, and the appeal of relatives of a government tax collector for favored treatment for the family business. As the last two examples suggest, personal interest articulation may often have more legitimacy and be put on a more permanent basis by invoking group ties and interests. Leaders similarly invoke such connections in building personal support networks.

Institutional Groups

Political parties, business corporations, legislatures, armies, bureaucracies, and churches often support *institutional groups* or have members

with special responsibility for lobbying. These groups are formal and have other political or social functions in addition to interest articulation. But either as corporate bodies or as smaller groups within these bodies (legislative blocs, officer cliques, higher or lower clergy, religious orders, departments, skill groups, and ideological cliques in bureaucracies), such groups express their own interests or represent the interest of other groups in the society.

In France, as in most societies, civil and military bureaucracies do not simply react to pressures from the outside; in the absence of political directives they often act as independent forces of interest representation. In Italy, groups formed especially for interest articulation are forced to compete with many institutional groups. The Roman Catholic Church, especially, has used its influence in Italian politics, even if much of its intervention has taken the form of religious education. In 1948 the Pope and bishops repeatedly admonished Catholics, under penalty of sin, to use their votes to defeat Socialists and Communists. In 1978 the Permanent Council of the Italian Bishops' Conference denounced "Marxists and Communists" in a warning against allowing the Communist party to become a member of the governing coalition. Less overtly, the Church seeks influence by having members of the clergy call on officeholders.

Where institutional interest groups are powerful, it is usually because of the strength provided by their organizational base. In authoritarian regimes, which prohibit or at least control other types of groups, institutional groups play a very large role. Educational officials, party officials and factions, jurists, factory managers, officers in the military services, and groups composed of many other institutionally based members have had significant roles in interest articulation in communist regimes.⁵ In preindustrial societies, which usually have few associational groups and where such groups usually fail to mobilize much support, the prominent part played by military groups, corporations, party factions, and bureaucrats is well known. We pointed out the frequency of military coups in such societies (see Chapter 4), but even where the military does not seize power directly, the possibility of such action forces close government attention to military requests. In industrial democracies, too, bureaucratic and corporate interests use their great resources and special information to affect policy. In the United States the military-industrial complex consists of the combination of personnel in the Defense Department and defense industries who join in support of military expenditures.

Associational Groups

Associational groups include trade unions, chambers of commerce and manufacturers' associations, ethnic associations, religious associations, and civic groups. These organizations are formed explicitly to represent the interests of a particular group. They have orderly procedures for

formulating interests and demands, and they often employ a full-time professional staff.

In Great Britain, for example, the British Iron and Steel Federation, composed of directors of leading companies, negotiates with the government on matters affecting the steel industry. The chief political work of the Federation involves bargaining outside the channels of party politics. The Federation representatives meet with civil servants about regulations and legislative proposals. They also try to influence public opinion through advertising campaigns, like one mounted against nationalization of the steel industry.⁶

Associational interest groups—where they are allowed to flourish— affect the development of other types of groups. Their organizational base gives them an advantage over nonassociational groups, and their tactics and goals are often recognized as legitimate in society. By representing a broad range of groups and interests, they may effectively limit the influence of anomic, nonassociational, and institutional groups.

Some democratic theorists have been suspicious of associational “pressure” groups, stressing that the special demands and advantages of such groups may be contrary to the public interest or the interests of the less well-organized citizens. Students of American politics have sometimes emphasized the “business or upper-class bias of the pressure group system” in the United States.⁷ Surveys of citizen behavior support this argument of a bias in American group activity, but they also show that associational groups in the United States and in other countries can be an important route into politics for citizens with fewer individual resources.⁸ Even if initially organized for other purposes, the presence of associational groups can solve many of the problems of organization and mobilization faced by discontented, but scattered, individuals.⁹ Moreover, associational group activity can help citizens to develop and clarify their own preferences, provide important information about political events, and articulate the interests of citizens more clearly and precisely than parties and elections.¹⁰

In short, associational interest groups have an important role to play in democratic societies. One of the problems to be faced by the newly democratized nations of Eastern Europe is how to build a rich associational group life in societies in which organized groups have long been suppressed or controlled. These societies have long been shaped by institutional interest groups operating within the Communist party and the bureaucracies. With the collapse of the Communist party institutions, the bureaucratic groups could dominate interest articulation, with only sporadic input from anomic and nonassociational groups and within loose constraint from the new parties and legislatures. The process of building new, independent associational groups to articulate the specialized interests of different citizens is already underway and will be important to the democratic process.

Interest Group Systems

Research in comparative politics has drawn attention to systematic connections between interest groups and between the group and the government policymaking institutions. The differences in types of connections allow us to talk of different interest group systems in modern societies. All modern societies have large numbers of interest groups, but the patterns of relationship differ. It is useful to distinguish among *pluralist*, *democratic corporatist*, and *controlled interest group systems*.

Pluralist interest group systems are characterized by many kinds of autonomous associational groups. Not only are there different associational groups for different interests, such as labor unions, business associations, and professional groups, but also articulation is fragmented within each type of interest. Many different labor unions, many different employer and business associations, many different ethnic, professional, and local groups—all simultaneously press demands on policymakers and on the implementing bureaucracies. Typically, some sectors and segments of society are more densely organized and more coordinated than others, but extensive coordination between groups is fairly rare. The United States is the best-known example of a strongly pluralist interest group system; Canada and New Zealand are also typically cited as examples. Despite its greater labor union membership and somewhat greater coordination of economic associations, Britain tends to fall on the pluralist side in most analyses, as do France and Japan.

Democratic corporatist interest group systems are characterized by much closer coordination between organizations making demands for groups in a particular sector of society. Moreover, these densely and centrally organized groups are systematically involved in making and implementing policy. They regularly and legitimately work with the government agencies and, usually, with political party organizations as partners in negotiating solutions to policy problems. The best-studied democratic corporatist arrangements have been in the area of economic problems. Countries with large and unified “peak” associations of business and labor that negotiated with each other and the government had better records than more pluralist countries in sustaining employment while restraining inflation in the 1970s and early 1980s. The most thoroughly corporatist interest group systems are in Austria, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian nations of Norway and Sweden. Substantial democratic corporatist tendencies are also found in Germany and Denmark.¹¹

Because different sectors of a society may vary in their organized interest groups and in their government relations, we must be cautious about generalizing too much about interest group systems. However, Table 5.1 shows the striking differences in organization of the labor movements in some pluralist systems, as well as a more purely corporatist example. The countries are ranked by the average percentage of the total

Table 5.1 INTEREST GROUP SYSTEMS OF LABOR UNIONS

Type of system	Country	Average percent of labor force unionized, 1965–1980	Organizational unity of labor (10-point scale)
Democratic Corporatist	Sweden	70	8
	Austria	50	10
Mixed	West Germany	32	8
	Britain	45	4
Pluralist	France	24	2
	United States	21	4
	Japan	16	2

Source: Adapted from David R. Cameron, in John Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 165.

labor force that are members of unions. That percentage is shown in Column 3. We see that in Sweden about 70 percent of the labor force is organized into unions. These unions have close ties with the Social Democratic party. Moreover, as shown in Column 4, the labor movement in Sweden is relatively unified, scoring 8 on a 10-point scale. (Such countries as Norway, Denmark, and Austria also have half or more of their labor forces organized into highly centralized unions.)

In Britain about 45 percent of the labor force is unionized, but these unions are not as highly coordinated as those of the corporatist countries. The member unions in the British Trades Unions Congress have strong traditions of individual autonomy and are themselves relatively decentralized. Partially for that reason corporatist-type agreements to control wages and prices negotiated in the mid-1970s in Britain were not long sustained. The central negotiators could not get the local union organizations to honor the agreements, especially as real incomes fell. Soon thereafter, the Thatcher government moved away from direct negotiation with labor, and thus away from corporatism. West Germany had a somewhat lower level of union membership, around a third of the labor force, but the German unions are relatively well coordinated and have been able to negotiate national wage policies with representatives of business and government.

Table 5.1 shows that union membership in the United States, France, and Japan is relatively low, with less than one worker in four belonging to a union. Moreover, the union movements themselves are relatively fragmented and decentralized. In these countries there are few traditions of “social partnership” between government, unions, and employer associations. In the area of labor policy, at least, these are highly pluralist, not corporatist, interest group systems. However, corporatist-type arrangements among individual corporations, trade associations, and government-

tal bureaucracies (without organized labor involvement) are to be found in Japan.

In some democratic systems, for example France and Italy, associational interest groups such as trade unions and peasant associations have been controlled by the Communist party or the Roman Catholic Church. Usually, these groups tended to mobilize support for the political parties or social institutions that dominated them. This lack of autonomy had serious consequences for politics. Denial of independent expression to interest groups may lead to outbreaks of violence. Subordination of interest groups by parties may limit the adaptability of the political process. However, these structures of subordination seem to be breaking down, particularly with the weakening of the Communist parties of such countries as France and Italy.

Finally, in thoroughly controlled interest group systems, the organized groups are penetrated and dominated by other institutions, such as parties and bureaucracies. The best examples are the traditional communist systems in which the dominating party organizations penetrate all levels of society and exercise close control over all such associational groups as are permitted to exist. Unions and youth associations, for example, are completely subordinated to the Communist party, and only rarely are they permitted to articulate autonomous interests of their members. This control was exercised in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; it continues in China, North Korea, and Cuba. The authoritarian corporatist systems found in noncommunist nations like predemocratic Spain, Brazil, and Mexico also encouraged highly controlled interest groups. Interest articulation was limited to the official group leaders, who could use their positions in political institutions as a base from which to express their demands. As we have already noted, numerous institutional interest groups do emerge in these societies, especially from parts of the party and bureaucracy, such as the military, as do informal nonassociational groups.

ACCESS TO THE INFLUENTIAL

To be effective, interest groups must be able to reach key policymakers. Groups may express the interests of their members and yet fail to penetrate and influence policymakers. Political systems vary in the ways they organize and distribute political resources. Interest groups vary in the tactics used to gain access to the resource holders. Their tactics are shaped in part by the opportunities offered by the structure of policymaking, as well as by their own values and preferences.

It is useful to distinguish between *legitimate* or *constitutional channels of political access* (such as the mass media, parties, and legislatures) and illegitimate, *coercive access channels*. These channels correspond to the two major types of political resources that can be used in trying to get elites to respond. One type is established by the legitimate structures of

the government, which designate the resources to be used in policymaking. In a democratic political system, the appropriate resources may be votes in the national assembly. Various groups may attempt to gain control of these legislative votes by influencing the parties that win elections, or the voters who choose them, or through bargaining, persuasion, or promises of support to incumbents. However, direct violence remains as a second type of resource, a coercive channel of access for individuals and groups who feel that they are otherwise powerless.

If only one major legitimate channel of political access is available, as in a political system dominated by a single party, it becomes difficult for all groups to achieve access. Demands transmitted through that channel may be distorted as they work their way to key decision makers. The leadership thus may be prevented from getting information about the needs and demands of important groups. Over the long run, such misperceptions can easily lead to miscalculations by the leadership and to unrest among the dissatisfied groups, who may turn to violence.

Legitimate Access Channels

One important means of access to political elites in all societies is through *personal connections*—the use of family, school, local, or other social ties. An excellent example is the information network among the British elite based on old school ties originating at Eton, Harrow, or other “public” schools, or in the colleges at Oxford and Cambridge universities. Similarly, in Japan many alumni of the University of Tokyo Law School hold top positions among the political and bureaucratic elites and are able to act in concert because of these personal ties.

Although personal connections are commonly used by nonassociational groups representing family or regional interests, they serve other groups as well. Face-to-face contact is one of the most effective means of shaping attitudes and conveying messages. Demands communicated by a friend or neighbor carry much more weight than a formal letter from a stranger. In modern nations, personal connections are usually cultivated with special care. In Washington, D.C., the business of advising interest groups and individuals on access problems, for substantial fees, has become a profession, carried on often by former officeholders prepared to use their personal governmental contacts for their lobbyist clients.

The *mass media*—television, radio, newspapers, and magazines—constitute an important access channel in democratic societies. Many interest groups spend a great deal of effort trying to see that their interests receive favorable attention in the media. Interest groups such as the organizations of senior citizens encourage background reports on their needs, as well as coverage of their views on specific policies. When a cause receives national media attention, the message to policymakers has added weight because they know that millions of voters have been sensitized to the issue. Moreover, groups believe that in an open society,

“objective” news coverage will have more credibility than sponsored messages. However, the confusion created by the number of messages and by their lack of specific direction can limit the effectiveness of the mass media for many less important groups.

The mass media can play an important part in mobilizing support for interest group efforts, leading to donations of time and money, as well as spontaneous expressions of similar demands from sympathizers. The loosening of government control from the media in the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union gave a huge boost to the democracy movement. Reports of policy failures in economic policy, the environment, and social services helped undermine the legitimacy of the incumbent regimes. Reports of successful protests and demonstrations in other parts of the country, or in other countries, enhanced the confidence of demonstrators everywhere. The multitude of spontaneous, as well as coordinated, actions encouraged by mass media reports helped convince the incumbents that their support had vanished.

Political parties can be important legitimate channels of access, but a number of factors limit their usefulness. Highly ideological parties with a hierarchical structure, such as most Communist parties, are more likely to control affiliated interest groups than to communicate the interest groups’ demands. Decentralized party organizations, like those in the United States, whether inside or outside the legislative organization, may be less helpful than individual legislators or blocs would be. In a nation like Great Britain, on the other hand, the various components of the party organization, particularly parliamentary committees, are important channels for transmitting demands to the cabinet and the party in power. In nations like Mexico, where one relatively loosely structured party dominates the political system, the party provides a vital channel for the articulation of many interests.

Legislatures are a common target of interest group activities. Standard lobbying tactics include appearances and testimony before legislative committees, providing information to individual legislators and similar activities. In the United States political action committees raise campaign contributions for individual members of Congress and can usually be sure of some political attention in exchange. In Britain and France the strong party discipline in the legislature and in its committees lessen the importance of members of Parliament (MPs) and parliamentary committees as access channels for interest groups. In Germany and many other European democracies the presence of strong committees and/or power divided among multiple parties encourage interest groups to use them as access channels. The combination of loose party discipline and decentralized committees as a source of much legislation makes the U.S. Congress a major target of group efforts.

Government bureaucracies are major access channels in most political systems. Contacts with the bureaucratic agencies may be particularly important where the bureaucracy has been delegated policymaking au-

thority, or where interests are narrow and directly involve few citizens. A bureaucrat sympathetic to a group may try to respond to its demands without leaving bureaucratic channels, by exercising administrative discretion; he or she may also be very helpful in speeding consideration through the most appropriate channels of communication, or may help frame an issue in a manner most likely to receive a sympathetic hearing in the political arena. This is only possible, however, when focused opposition is insufficient to force open public discussion. Thus, a study of access channels used by groups in Birmingham, England, showed that on broad issues involving class, ethnic, or consumer groups, the associations tended to work through the political parties. On the many narrower issues, involving few other groups and less political conflict, the associations tended to turn to the appropriate administrative department.¹² In countries having “corporatist” regimes, such as France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, certain interest groups may receive official recognition as representing certain groups in negotiations with the bureaucracy over wage, price, and other matters.¹³

Protest demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of nonviolent but dramatic and direct pressure on government may be regarded by authorities as legitimate or illegitimate tactics, depending on the political systems involved. Such demonstrations may be either spontaneous actions of anomic groups or, more frequently, an organized resort to less conventional channels by organized groups. In democratic societies, protest demonstrations may be efforts to mobilize popular support—eventually electoral support—for the group’s cause. The civil rights and anti-Vietnam War demonstrations in the United States were examples of such activity, as have been more recent pro-life and pro-choice rallies on the Mall in Washington, or to block or prevent the blocking of entry into abortion clinics. In nondemocratic societies such demonstrations are more hazardous and represent perhaps more extreme dissatisfaction with alternative channels. As we saw in Chapter 4, the use of peaceful protest is more frequent in democratic societies, no doubt because of the greater control on activity and on reporting about it in authoritarian systems.

Protest demonstrations have been aptly described as a tactic of society’s powerless, those who do not have access or resources to influence policymakers through conventional channels of party, legislature, and bureaucracy.¹⁴ As a tactic of the powerless, protest activity is especially attractive to young people and minority groups, who are not among the elite. Protests have also been a favored tactic of groups whose ideological commitments focus on challenging the established social and political order.¹⁵ Yet, since the 1970s protest demonstrations have increasingly been accepted as legitimate and used as a conventional channel for interest articulation by those who feel that disciplined parties and bureaucratic agencies are deaf to their complaints. Protests can supplement other channels, especially in gaining the attention of the mass media in an age when television comes to every household. Thus, we find doctors in Paris,

civil servants in Sweden, and “gray panthers” (the elderly) in America using a tactic once limited to students and minorities.

Coercive Channels and Tactics

Most scholars who have written on the subject see acts of collective violence as closely associated with the character of a society and the circumstances that prevail there. In his studies of civil strife, Ted Robert Gurr has developed the concept of *relative deprivation* to explain the frustration or discontent that motivates people to act aggressively. Gurr defines relative deprivation as a “discrepancy between people’s expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are entitled, on the one hand, and, on the other, their value capabilities—the degree to which they think they can attain these goods and conditions.”¹⁶ The sense of relative deprivation leads to frustration and anger; aggressive violence releases those feelings.

Feelings of relative deprivation are only a source of frustration, discontent, and anger. The more such discontent and anger persist, the greater the chance of collective violence. But other conditions are important also. People will tend to turn to violence if they believe it is justified and if they believe it will lead to success. If they believe that their government is illegitimate and the cause of their discontent, they will readily turn to political violence if there are no other means of bringing about change. To this end, it is the responsibility of the government and its institutions to provide peaceful alternatives to violence as a means of change.

This general analysis of violence should not blind us to the differences between types of violent political activity. A *riot*, for example, involves the spontaneous expression of collective anger and dissatisfaction by a group of citizens. Though riots have long been dismissed as aberrant and irrational action by social riffraff, modern studies have shown that rioters vary greatly in their motivation, behavior, and social background.¹⁷ Most riots in fact seem to follow some fairly clear-cut patterns, such as confining destruction or violence to particular areas or targets. Riots are often directed against property rather than persons, as seen in most American urban riots, where casualties are often caused by untrained troops attempting to restore order, not by rioters. Relative deprivation seems to be a major cause of riots, but the release of the frustrations is not as aimless as is often supposed.

In the 1992 riots in Los Angeles and elsewhere, although the destruction began within hours of the acquittal of Rodney King’s assailants, there was consensus among those involved that the trial outcome was only a proximate cause, a “spark” that ignited already volatile ingredients. The direction of violence against the property of Korean shopowners reflected widely felt ethnic hostility unrelated to Rodney King. There were at least a few who justified looting through comparison with the massive thefts

from savings and loans and insider trading in the previous few years. Many more simply felt that society had moved on and left them in poverty and decay; clear examples of relative deprivation abounded. The immediate results were to make matters worse: over 50 people dead, mostly African-Americans (and, as an exception to the assertion just stated, not at the hands of police or soldiers); tens of thousands of businesses destroyed, with a loss of 14,000 jobs; and thousands of people left without access to necessary retail outlets. Although much of the mayhem seems poorly related to effective political action, it was a poignant cry for attention; and the slogan that emerged — “no peace without justice” — was a clear political message.

While deprivation may help fuel the discontent, *strikes* and *obstructions* — as well as many violent demonstrations that are called riots but should not be — are typically carried out by well-organized associational or institutional groups. According to Ann Wilner, for example, public protests in Indonesia during the rule of Sukarno were largely stage managed, “instigated, provoked, and planned by one or several members of a political elite,” in order to test their strength, gain support from the undecided, frighten others from joining the opposition, and challenge higher authorities.¹⁸ James Payne suggests that in Peru, violent demonstrations and riots under the civilian regimes of the early 1960s were “fully a part of the Peruvian pattern, not merely distasteful, peripheral incidents.” The labor unions, in particular, found such tactics crucial to their survival.¹⁹

The influence of strikes and obstructions has varied, depending on the legitimacy of the government and coercive pressure from other groups. General strikes in Belgium were instrumental in bringing about expanded suffrage early in the twentieth century, but were disastrous failures for the sponsoring organizations in Italy in 1922 and Britain in 1927. Like the massive truckers’ strike that helped bring down the government in Chile in 1972–1973, these unsuccessful actions left deep bitterness in the societies. French peasant farmers’ tactics of seizing public buildings, blocking roads, and the like, won major concessions from their government in the early 1960s, in part because the government was threatened by terrorism from right-wing army groups and discontent elsewhere and badly needed peasant support. By the late 1960s, a stronger regime was able to ignore or suppress peasant obstructions,²⁰ but had to yield major concessions to the strikes by workers that virtually shut down France for a month in 1968. Most spectacularly, the strikes and obstructions and demonstrations in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990, like the earlier people’s power movement in the Philippines, had massive success against regimes that had lost legitimacy.

Finally, terrorism, including deliberate assassination, armed attacks on other groups or government officials, and provocation of bloodshed has been used as an interest articulation tactic in some societies. The use of terrorism typically reflects the desire of some groups to change the rules

of the political game. The tragedies in Northern Ireland, the frequent kidnappings and attacks by groups in the Middle East seeking to dramatize the situation of the Palestinians, and the assassinations carried out by the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerillas in Peru since the mid-1980s demonstrate the continuing use of such tactics.

The use of *political terror tactics* has seldom been successful without large-scale backing of terrorist groups from many citizens, as in some independence movements. Massive deadly violence may destroy a democratic regime, leading to curtailment of civil rights or even military intervention when many citizens and leaders come to feel that any alternative is preferable to more violence. President Fujimori and military leaders in Peru justified their suppression of democratic institutions in April, 1992, as necessary to their battle against the Shining Path and cocaine lords. An authoritarian, repressive response often promises quick results against terrorists; however, it is also true that small-group terrorism usually fails when confronted by united democratic leadership.²¹ In a democratic society, violence often forfeits the sympathy that is needed if the group's cause is to receive a responsive hearing.

POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON INTEREST ARTICULATION

As we pointed out in Chapter 1, we need to look at the structures performing political functions from both a process and a policy perspective. If we are to understand the formation of policies, we need to know not merely which groups articulate interests, but what policy preferences they express. Many associational interest groups specialize in certain policy areas. The concerns of other interest groups, such as anomic or institutional groups, may be less easily discerned, but they are equally important for the policy process.

Table 5.2 provides an overview of interest articulation. The far left column indicates the types of groups that commonly articulate interests in modern societies. The next columns provide examples of interest articulation by each type in respective policy areas: extractive, distributive, and regulative policies in the domestic arena, and a few examples of international policies. Another dimension is provided by the footnotes, which indicate when coercive, illegitimate channels were used, rather than legitimate ones. Careful examination of each case will provide a more precise classification of the access channels, such as elite representation by American black congressmen, use of party channels by the Italian Catholic Church, and use of terror by the Algerian French in the 1950s. In this table we have used examples from many nations in order to suggest the varied possibilities, as well as to fill in all the categories with reasonably obvious cases. If we were studying interest articulation patterns in one nation, of course, we should attempt to build up the table showing the structures, policies, and channels involved during a particular period.

Table 5.2 PROCESS AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES ON INTEREST ARTICULATION

Types of interest groups	Examples of interest articulation in various policy areas			
	Domestic extractive policy	Domestic distributive policy	Domestic regulative policy	International policy
Individual	Peasant family seeks patron's aid with tax law.	Austrian worker asks party official for housing aid.	US family business seeks relief from pollution standards.	British worker writes MP against EC.
Anomic groups	Nigerian women riot over rumor of taxes (1950s). ^a	Polish workers strike to protest bread prices.	Venezuelans strike against dictatorship, 1958. ^a	US students demonstrate against South African policy.
Nonassociational groups	Mexican business leaders discuss taxes with president.	US Black Caucus Congress calls for minority jobs.	Soviet Jews demand freedom to emigrate from USSR.	Saudi royal family factions favor oil embargo.
Institutional groups	American universities urge that charitable contributions remain tax deductible.	US Army Corps of Engineers proposes new river locks.	Anglican church leaders ask an end to apartheid in South Africa.	USSR politburo faction favors withdrawal from Afghanistan, 1986.
Associational groups	French student groups protest government-imposed tuition increases. ^b	British Medical Association negotiates salaries under Health Services.	National Rifle Association lobbies against Brady Bill.	Middle Eastern groups launch terror attacks to protest US and Israeli actions. ^a

^aUse of coercive, unconstitutional access channels and tactics.

^bUse of coercion by some elements or subgroups.

INTEREST GROUP DEVELOPMENT

One of the consequences of modernization is a widespread belief that the conditions of life can be altered through human action. Modernization also usually involves education, urbanization, rapid growth in public communication, and in most cases improvement in the physical conditions of

life. These changes are closely related to increases in political awareness, participation, and feelings of political competence. Such participant attitudes encourage more diverse and mass-based interest articulation.

At the same time that participant attitudes emerge in the political culture of societies undergoing modernization, the specialization of labor as people become involved in many types of work beyond agricultural production leads to the formation of large numbers of special interests. The complex interdependence of modern life, the exposure provided by mass communications, and the wide-ranging role of government further multiply political interests. The processes by which these interests and attitudes are organized into associational interest groups are complex. The barriers to coordination and cooperation are overcome in many different ways. The emergent interest group systems, pluralist or corporatist, autonomous or controlled, dominated by the better-off or more equally mobilized, are shaped by the history of interest group development during modernization.

Successful democratic development requires that complex interest group systems emerge to express the needs of groups and individuals in complex modern societies. Yet, this process is by no means automatic. Societies vary widely in the extent to which people engage in associational activity. One element is the trust that is generally shared among members of the society. Edward Banfield pointed to the extreme case of an Italian village within which almost no associational activity occurred, with people unwilling to trust anyone outside their immediate families.²² Robert Putnam and his colleagues found evidence that such attitudes show continuity over long time periods and were strongly related to political successes of regional governments in Italy.²³ Ronald Inglehart has shown similar continuity in political trust levels over a decade in the national political cultures of Western Europe.²⁴ Thus, in some societies, modernization may weaken traditional structures but fail to foster the development of effective associational groups because of the inhibition of social attitudes. Their ability to achieve either stability or democracy will be hindered as a result.

In other cases, as we have noted, authoritarian parties and bureaucracies may control and penetrate associational groups and choke off the channels of political access. Eastern Europe offers a situation in which forty years or more of authoritarian domination suppressed autonomous interest groups. On one hand, the processes of economic modernization had put great pressure on these authoritarian systems to allow more open organization and expression of political interests. On the other hand, the opening of these societies has led to an explosion of interest articulation activity and a great need for associational groups to provide regular and organized expression for citizens' interests. They are also needed to counterbalance the demands from institutional groups in the civilian and military bureaucracies.

The English publicist and scholar Timothy Garton Ash has captured

the mood and flavor of the emergence of "civil society" in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. In the autumn of 1988, as movements and associations began to bubble up in such countries as Poland and Hungary, he wrote:

A comprehensive map of the opposition in East Central Europe today would resemble nothing so much as one of those kaleidoscopic multicolored maps of ethnic groups in this region before the war. In both Poland and Hungary, groups or grouplets whose identities or programs arise from specific postwar realities overlap or combine with groups raising almost every flag, slogan, aspiration, or prejudice of the prewar political spectrum (except communism): populists, reform economists, radical sociologists, Smallholders, Lutherans, Catholic "base groups," Evangelical sects, democratic opposition, democratic youth, democratic academics, Solidarity, Fighting Solidarity, national Democrats, liberal democrats, Christian democrats, social democrats, liberal Catholics and conservative Catholics, Christian socialists, Jews, anti-semites, advocates of workers' self government, apostles of free enterprise, "Neo-realists," "neopositivists": you name it, we have it. And this is merely the surface of the explicit opposition. One could produce another rich catalogue of official or semiofficial projects for "reform." Hungarian political scientists have coined the delightful term "paradigm ecstasy."²⁵

Such an extensive list should not, however, lead us to conclude that every conceivable group now has equal standing in Central European interest group systems. We noted above the caution, based on American experience, that the articulation of interests is frequently biased toward the goals of the better-off, who are also often better organized.²⁶ It is often pointed out that the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) is an effective group that is not counterbalanced by a "Young Taxpayers Group," and that the traditional labor-management competition leaves consumers unrepresented. We might test this notion more broadly by evaluating systems in terms of their *inclusiveness*: what proportion of the population is represented to what degree in national-level politics? In South Africa we have had the extreme case where the majority were prevented outright from forming associational groups. In the Third World competing interests in the capital rarely involve the interests of rural peasants; sometimes, as in Peru, the situation is not unlike that in South Africa: peasant organizations are brutally suppressed, while urban middle- and upper-class groups are able to petition authorities. It seems to be no coincidence that the bias in group inclusion appears greatest where the gap in income and education is widest. We have postulated above that, pushed to the extreme, those excluded from the process will engage in anomic activity or resort to violence. Even in less extreme cases, the presence of different levels of political awareness means that every interest group system is somewhat biased. Democratization involves not only the provision of competitive elections, but also the reduction of the bias in interest representation.

Some observers have argued that even the free postindustrial societies of Western Europe and North America need more innovation among

interest group organizations.²⁷ Many interests may be based on social values or on material interests that no longer correspond to occupational categories. Citizens interested in the environment, peace, consumer protection, and participatory values may be too scattered and too mobile to be easily mobilized by traditional associational groups. Some of these citizens believe that the challenge they want to pose to society cannot be expressed through ordinary associational organizations using conventional channels of access. On the organizational side, the new social movements in Western Europe have sought more fluid and dynamic organizations, with constantly changing leadership and members who move in and out of organizational involvement. Some of the parties and organizations have made great efforts to ensure continuing turnover of leaders to avoid becoming like the bureaucratic society they wish to alter. Where participation and self-expression are themselves among the most important values being articulated, the group structure must be always in change.

On the tactical side, the new social movements have used a wide range of approaches and often disagree over the value of partisan campaigning, conventional lobbying, and radical protest. The "green" movements in several nations, especially West Germany, have sometimes acted as or sponsored political parties, if only to gain a better forum for protest. Some of these parties have had striking success. It is too soon to say if the new social movements will add a new category, with elements of anomic, nonassociational, and associational groups all intertwined, to our classification of interest groups. But their efforts remind us that political change is the theme of our time.

KEY TERMS

anomic interest groups	legitimate access channels
associational groups	mass media
channels of political access	nonassociational groups
coercive access channels	patron-client networks
controlled interest group systems	pluralist interest group systems
democratic corporatist interest group systems	political parties
government bureaucracies	political terror tactics
inclusiveness	protest demonstrations
institutional groups	relative deprivation
interest articulation	riots
legislatures	strikes

END NOTES

1. These clientelist or patronage structures are discussed further in Chapter 6 in terms of their role in interest aggregation.
2. See the essays in G. F. Skilling and F. Griffiths, eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971).
3. See Charles Sabel, *Work and Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), p. 162.
4. Evelyn P. Stevens, "Protest Movements in an Authoritarian Regime," *Comparative Politics*, 7:3 (April 1975), pp. 361–382.
5. See Skilling and Griffiths, *Interest Groups*; the essays by Frederick C. Barghoorn and Skilling in Robert A. Dahl, *Regimes and Oppositions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1973); and Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 2:3 (April 1970), pp. 445–472.
6. Richard Rose, *Influencing Voters* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 110–114. On associational group activity in Britain more generally, see J. J. Richardson and A. F. G. Jordan, *Governing Under Pressure* (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1979).
7. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1960), p. 30; also see Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966).
8. Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), ch. 11; Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Study* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), chs. 6, 7.
9. Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).
10. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 300–322; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959).
11. For cross-national comparisons, see the essays by Gerhard Lembruch and by David R. Cameron in John Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Philippe Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability," in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 12.
12. K. Newton and D. S. Morris, "British Interest Group Theory Reexamined," *Comparative Politics*, 7 (July 1975), pp. 577–595; also see Richardson and Jordan, *Governing Under Pressure*.
13. See John T. S. Keeler, *The Politics of Neo-Corporatism in France* (New York: Oxford, 1987).
14. James Q. Wilson, "The Strategy of Protest," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 5:3 (September 1961), pp. 291–303; Michael Lipsky, "Protest as a Political Resource," *American Political Science Review*, 62:4 (December 1968), pp. 1144–1158.
15. See the essays in Russell J. Dalton and Manfred Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order: New Social and Political Movements in Western Democracies* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

16. Ted Robert Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in Hugh David Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *The History of Violence in America* (New York: Bantam Press, 1969), pp. 462–463; more generally, see Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).
17. See James F. Short and Marvin E. Wolfgang, eds., *Collective Violence* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972); and see Anthony Oberschall, *Social Conflict and Social Movements* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973).
18. Ann Ruth Wilner, "Public Protest in Indonesia," in Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind Feierabend, and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 355–357.
19. James Payne, "Peru: The Politics of Structured Violence," in Feierabend, Feierabend, and Gurr, eds., *Anger, Violence, and Politics*, p. 360.
20. Suzanne Berger, *Peasants Against Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).
21. On violence and democratic survival, see G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), ch. 8; and the contributions to Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
22. Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958).
23. Robert Putnam, Roberto Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti, and Franco Pavoncello, "Explaining Institutional Success: The Case of Italian Regional Government," *American Political Science Review*, 77 (March 1983), pp. 55–74.
24. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 34–36. Also see Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, ch. 11.
25. Timothy Garton Ash, "The Opposition," in *The New York Review of Books*, October 13, 1988, p. 3. For a broader and more comprehensive treatment of the emergence of interest groups and political movements in Eastern Europe in 1988–1989, see his *The Magic Lantern* (New York: Random House, 1990).
26. Schattschneider, *Semi-Sovereign People*.
27. This discussion of the new social movements and the issues they raise draws heavily on Dalton and Kuechler, *Challenging the Political Order*.

Chapter 6

Interest Aggregation and Political Parties

*I*nterest aggregation is the activity in which the demands of individuals and groups are combined into significant policy proposals. The proposals become significant as they are backed up by substantial political resources, such as popular votes, commitments of campaign funds, seats in the legislature, positions of executive influence, media access, or even armed force. Political parties are particularly important in interest aggregation. They nominate candidates who stand for a set of policies, and then they try to build support for those candidates. Modern political parties first took shape as excluded groups strove to compete for power and dominant groups sought public support to sustain themselves.

In a democratic system two or more parties compete to mobilize the backing of interest groups and voters. In authoritarian systems one party tries to mobilize citizens' support for its policies and candidates. In both systems interest aggregation may well take place within the parties, as party conventions or party leaders hear the demands of different groups — unions, consumers, party factions, business organizations — and create policy alternatives. In authoritarian systems, however, the process is more covert and controlled.

The structural-functional approach draws our attention to the fact that parties may perform many different functions and that many different structures may perform interest aggregation. Parties frequently affect political socialization, shaping the political culture as they organize thinking about political issues and strive to build support for their ideologies, specific issue positions, and candidates. Parties affect political recruitment as they mobilize voters and are involved in selecting would-be officeholders. They articulate interests of their own and transmit the demands

of others. Governing parties are also involved in making public policy and even overseeing its implementation and adjudication. But the distinctive and defining goal of a political party, its mobilization of support for policies and candidates, is especially related to interest aggregation.

Even a single individual can evaluate a variety of claims and considerations in adopting a policy position. If he or she controls substantial political resources, as an influential party leader or a military dictator, his or her personal role in interest aggregation may be considerable. But large national political systems usually develop more specialized organizations for the specific purpose of aggregating interests and resources behind policies. Political parties are just such organizations. In this chapter we compare the role of parties with that of other structures in interest aggregation.

INTEREST GROUPS AND INTEREST AGGREGATION

A well-nigh universal political structure is *the patron-client network*. It was the defining principle of feudalism. The king and his lords, the lord and his knights, the knight and his serfs and tenants, all were bound by ties of personal dependence and loyalty. The political machines of Boss Tweed of New York, John F. ("Honey Fitz") Fitzgerald of Boston, Richard Daley, Sr., of Chicago, and the like, were similarly bound together by patronage and loyalty. But clientelism is not confined to relationships cemented by patronage only. Every president of the United States has had his circle of personal confidants, his "brain trust," his "California or Georgia or Arkansas mafia," bound to their chief by ideological and policy propensities as well as by interests in jobs and power.

Kremlinologists—an obsolete breed of scholars and journalists who followed shifts in personnel in Soviet politics—identified for us the personal networks of the various Soviet leaders, showing us how the rise of a Khrushchev, a Brezhnev, or a Gorbachev was accompanied by the rise of a personal network from the same region or the same governmental agency. Using the analogy of mountain climbing for the rise (and fall) of political leaders in the former Soviet Union, some Soviet specialists referred to these personal networks as *Seilschaften* ("roped parties of climbers").

Contemporary patron-client theory was pioneered by students of East, Southeast, and South Asia, where this phenomenon seems to dominate the political processes of such countries as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Japan, and India. It is related to recruitment to political office, interest aggregation, policymaking, and policy implementing. Indeed, it would seem to be like the cell in biology or the atom in physics—the primitive structure of all politics, the human interactions out of which larger and more complicated political structures are composed.¹

Domination of interest aggregation by patron-client ties, however,

typically means a static pattern of overall policy formation. In such a political system, the ability to mobilize political resources behind unified policies of social change or to respond to crises will be difficult, because doing so depends on ever-shifting agreements between many factional leaders. In modern societies, as citizens become aware of larger collective interests and have the resources and skills to work for them, personal networks are regulated, replaced, and incorporated within broader organizations. As we see in Table 6.1 extensive performance of interest aggregation by such personal networks is confined mainly to the least economically developed countries.

The subtle dividing line between interest articulation and aggregation can easily be crossed by organizations with powerful resources. Although often operating merely to express demands and support major political contenders, such as parties, associational groups can occasionally wield sufficient resources to become contenders in their own right. The power of the labor unions within the British Labour party, for example, has rested on the unions' ability to develop coherent policy positions and mobilize the votes of their members to support those positions. In many European nations, national decision-making bodies have been set up outside the normal legislative channels, bodies with substantial authority to make national policies in special areas, such as the Dutch Social and Economic Council or the Austrian chamber system. These bodies incorporate labor unions' and employer associations' representatives.

As we discussed in Chapter 5, the set of arrangements called demo-

Table 6.1 STRUCTURES PERFORMING INTEREST AGGREGATION IN SELECTED CONTEMPORARY NATIONS^a

Country	Extensiveness of interest aggregation by actor				
	Patron-client networks	Associational groups	Competitive political parties	Noncompetitive parties	Military forces
United States	Low	Moderate	High		Low
West Germany	Low	High	High		Low
Japan	Moderate	High	High		Low
France	Low	Moderate	High		Low
Great Britain	Low	High	High		Low
Russia	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate
Mexico	Moderate	Moderate	Low	High	Low
Nigeria	High	Low	Low		High
Egypt	High	Low	Low	Moderate	Moderate
China	Moderate	Low	Low	High	Moderate
India	High	Moderate	Moderate		Low
Tanzania	High	Low	Low	High	Low

^aExtensiveness of interest aggregation rated as low, moderate, or high only. Rating refers to broad-level performance and may vary in different issue areas and at different times.

cratic corporatism has in some countries been especially effective in aggregating the interests of both labor and business groups into economic policies controlling unemployment and inflation. These arrangements include continuous political bargaining among large, relatively centralized labor and business interest groups, political parties, and state bureaucracies. They have often been closely linked to political domination by a democratic socialist political party. Such corporatist systems, then, include and link organizations that in other political systems play very different, often-antagonistic, roles.²

Institutional groups like bureaucratic and military factions can also be important interest aggregators. Indeed, the bureaucracy acts as a kind of interest aggregator in most societies. Although established primarily for the implementation of policies whose broad outline is set by higher authorities, the bureaucracy may negotiate with a variety of groups to find their preferences or mobilize their support. Agencies may even be “captured” by interest groups and used to support their demands. The desire of bureaucrats to expand their organizations by the discovery of new problems and policies, as well as to increase their ability to solve problems in their special areas, often leads them to create client support.

Military interest groups, with their special control over the instruments of violence, have great potential power as interest aggregators. If the legitimacy of the government breaks down and all groups feel free to use coercion and violence to shape policies, then the united military can usually be decisive. One study showed that in the 1960s around two-fifths of the nations of the world had been confronted with military coup attempts, and these were at least partially successful in changing leaders or policy in about a third of the nations. Less than half of these coup attempts, however, were concerned with general political issues and public policy. Most coups seem motivated by grievances and fears that the professional or career interests of the military will be slighted or overlooked by civil authorities.³

COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEMS AND INTEREST AGGREGATION

In analyzing parties it is especially important to keep in mind the sharp distinction between competitive party systems, seeking primarily to build electoral support, and noncompetitive or authoritarian parties. This distinction does not depend on the closeness of electoral victory, or even on the number of parties. It depends on the primacy of winning votes as a prerequisite for control of policymaking, on one hand, and on the possibility for several parties forming and organizing to seek those votes, on the other. Thus, a party can win most of the votes in a given area or region, or even a given national election, but nonetheless be a competitive party. Its goals involve winning elections, either as a primary objective or as a means for policymaking; its dominance at the polls is always subject to

challenge by other parties; its organization thus involves arrangements for finding out what voters want and getting supporters involved.

In analyzing the role of competitive parties in interest aggregation, we need to consider not only the individual party, but also the structure of parties, electorates, electoral laws, and policymaking bodies that interact in a competitive party system. Typically, interest aggregation in a competitive party system takes place at one or more levels: within the individual parties, as the party chooses candidates and adopts policy proposals; through electoral competition, as voters give varying amounts of support to different parties; and through bargaining and coalition building in the legislature or executive.

Competitive Parties and Elections

At the first level, individual parties develop a set of policy positions. Typically, these positions are believed to have the backing of large or cohesive groups of voters. In systems with only two parties, it is important for a party to win a majority, so targeting the “center” of the electorate is crucial strategically.⁴ In systems with many political parties, where none has much chance of winning a majority, it may be more valuable to seek a distinctive and cohesive electoral base. Party policy positions may well reflect the continuing linkages between the party and interest groups, such as labor unions, business associations, or religious and ethnic groups.⁵ Historical issue commitments and ideological traditions also play a role.

The procedure for developing policy positions varies greatly from country to country and from party to party. In the United States the national party conventions are the focus of developing policy positions, both through the formation of party platforms and, perhaps more important, through the selection of candidates committed to certain policies. In other countries, more often party platforms or manifestos are issued by centralized party program committees or in speeches by party leaders.⁶ Whatever the procedure, the final party position is usually a mixture of strategic electioneering and aggregation of interests expressed within the party.

The parties then offer their chosen candidates and policies to the electorate. They not only present candidates, but they also attempt to publicize them and mobilize electoral support through rallies, mass media promotion, door-to-door campaigning, and systematic efforts to locate sympathetic voters and get them to the polls. In the elections citizens directly participate in interest aggregation by voting for different parties. Such votes are converted into legislative seats and, in presidential systems, control of the chief executive by the electoral rules. In the last 30 years political scientists have done a great deal of research on the dynamics of citizens' voting decisions, including the role played by issue and ideological positions, group-party connections, learned “identification”

with parties, and evaluations of the performance of the current incumbents.⁷

Figure 6.1 offers a comparative “snapshot” of interest aggregation by parties and voters in several democratic countries. It uses the device of the left-right scale, which in many countries and for many voters acts as a kind of summary of the issues that voters find most important. Voters are shown a scale of numbers, with 1 identified as left (or liberal in the United States) and 10 identified as right (or conservative in the United States). They are then asked to place the parties and themselves on this continuum. In Figure 6.1 we see the left-right scale and where the voters for




Figure 6.1 Interest aggregation by competitive parties and voters: percent of voters for each party and their average self-placement on left-right scale in legislative elections in five countries. *Source:* Surveys of voters in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy from *Eurobarometer 25*, April 1986. USA from 1986 Gallup Survey reported in Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, *Vital Statistics on American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1988), p. 131; USA uses liberal and conservative instead of left and right; adjusted 9-point scale.

each party placed themselves on the scale. The height of the column above the scale shows what percentage of the electorate voted for that party.

Several interesting differences in *party-electoral aggregation* in different party systems are illustrated by Figure 6.1. First, we can see that in the countries at the top of the figure, especially in the United States, most voters support only a few parties. Moreover, those parties are close to the center of the continuum, where the bulk of voters place themselves. The left-right “gap” between the average party supporters is rather small. Democrats are somewhat to the left and Republicans somewhat to the right, but on average they are not far apart. If the full distribution of voters were displayed in the figure, rather than just the averages, we would see that there is a lot of overlap in the self-placement of voters supporting different parties. Thus, aggregation implies concentration of political resources behind the “centrist” policies of both parties.

In the countries toward the bottom of the figure, especially in Italy, many parties receive support from voters. The Communist and the Christian Democratic parties have the most support, but many other parties receive significant voting support as well. The figure for Italy has many short bars. Moreover, here the bars are spread well across the spectrum. Each party is aggregating the support of a more limited and more cohesive group of voters. The ideological gap between the right-most and left-most parties is quite great. The dispersed aggregation of the party-electoral system means that a much more diverse range of ideological interests will be represented in the legislature.

Britain, Germany, and France fall between these more extreme cases. Britain looks more like the United States in its pattern of voter support, but the parties are further apart and the smaller Liberal/Social Democratic Alliance (since 1987, the Liberal Democratic party) falls between them. Germany looks rather like Britain, except that the center party is smaller and there is a notable Green party on the left. France looks more like Italy. But France has one interesting feature that sets it apart from other countries: there is no party whose supporters’ average position is near the middle. There are still substantial numbers of French voters whose position is toward the center, although fewer than in the United States, Germany, and Britain, but the party offerings pull them sharply to the right or the left. If we were to look at the offerings of the parties as placed by expert observers on a similar scale, we would see that they gave voters no option of center choice.⁸ This aggregation reflects and encourages the confrontation between coalitions of right and left that has been typical of Fifth Republic France.

Competitive Parties in Government

If a competitive party wins control of the legislature and the executive, it will be able to pass and implement its policies. Sometimes this control will

emerge directly from the electoral process, as a single party wins a majority of the vote. Far more often, no party wins a majority of votes. In many countries the working of the election laws benefits some parties at the expense of others. If these distortions are sufficient, less than 50 percent of the vote may be converted into more than 50 percent of the legislative seats. In Britain, none of the legislature majorities won by either the Labour party or the Conservatives in the 1970s and 1980s were based on support of a majority of voters. For example, Mrs. Thatcher's Conservative party won a solid majority of legislative seats in 1983 and 1987 with the backing of only about 42 percent of the voters. With almost exactly the same level of support in the 1992 elections under John Major's leadership, the Conservatives remained in power, but their parliamentary majority was reduced from 99 to 21 seats. In all these elections, the quarter of the electorate supporting the center parties received only a handful of legislative seats.⁹

In other countries, the combination of parties, voter choices, and election laws does not create single-party majorities, but *party coalitions* formed before the election still offer the voters a direct choice of future governments. The parties in alliance encourage mutual support from the electorate, often taking advantage of special provisions of voting laws, and agree that if they jointly win a majority of legislative seats they will govern together. In Germany and France, many governments in the 1970s and 1980s came to power in this fashion. Voters are thus given a major role in choosing the direction of government policy through party and electoral aggregation. Single-party and, sometimes, preelection coalition governments also provide voters rather clear targets if they choose to hold the incumbents accountable for their performance in office.

The importance of such majoritarian aggregation through the election process has been demonstrated by studies showing that very often parties do fulfill their electoral promises when they gain control of government. For example, British parties take pride in carrying out their manifesto promises while in office. When Socialist and Social Democratic governments have come to power in Europe, they have tended to expand the size and efforts of the governmental sector. Studies also suggest that Republicans and Democrats in the United States have been fairly responsible in keeping their promises.¹⁰ However, opposition parties that have been out of office a long time and developed programs of radical change often find these difficult to implement when they come to power, as demonstrated by the experiences of the new left-wing governments that came to power in France and in Greece in 1981.

If no party or preelection coalition wins control of the legislature and the executive at the election, then the final stage of interest aggregation by parties takes place as parties bargain to form coalitions within the assemblies and the executive. In presidential systems this bargaining between parties may occur when one party gains control of the executive and the other gains control of the legislature, as has been true in the

United States in most of the years since 1968. In the United States, as in Japan, the complexity of the bargaining is enhanced by the lack of internal cohesion or discipline of the parties. Aggregation must take place between party factions within and across party lines.

In parliamentary systems, when no party wins a majority, the result is either a minority government or a majority coalition of several parties. In the minority case, the executive must continually bargain with other parties to get policies adopted and even to remain in office.¹¹ In the case of majority coalitions, the bargaining will be focused primarily on coalition partners, who may divide up the policy areas or develop some other processes of aggregation. Such coalitions tend to be fairly stable in some countries, such as the Netherlands, and much less so in others, such as Finland and Italy, depending on the party makeup of the legislature and other factors.¹² In any case the process of interest aggregation continues through the parties in the legislature and executive. The continuation of interest aggregation at this stage is also enhanced when different parties gain control of different houses of the legislature (as in the United States in 1980–1986 or frequently in Germany in the 1970s and 1980s), when parties share power in strong legislative committees, or when internal party factions such as those in Japan's Liberal Democratic party lower the level of party discipline.

The factors that encourage less decisive electoral aggregation and more aggregation within the legislature and the executive have both costs and benefits.¹³ On one hand, the connection between voter choice and government policy is made less direct, which can be frustrating and disillusioning to voters. Moreover, the fact that interest aggregation is still going on so "late" in the political process, that new coalitions of interests and resources are constantly emerging on different issues, is confusing to citizens (and even informed observers). It is difficult to assign clear responsibility for government policy when power to shape it is shifting and widely shared. Thus, the value of the vote is lessened as an instrument either directly to shape policy through electing future governments or to punish parties clearly responsible for undesirable policy. Elections as instruments of accountability and manifesto choice are diminished by shifting coalitions after the election.

On the other side, this continuing aggregation can mean that voters for *all* parties, not only the election winners, will have their elected representatives taking part effectively in interest aggregation and policy-making. Such a representative connection can be especially important for citizen minorities. All citizens are minorities on some issues, and some are notable minorities on many issues. If the rules of election and representation are fair, the possibility of continuing influence on interest aggregation between elections is a valuable protection for minority interests. Finally, even elected governments that won a majority of votes, which few elected governments have, will typically not have majority support for their policy proposals on all issues. British politics offers a number of

examples (such as the Labour party's renationalization of the steel industry in 1966) of majority parties implementing manifesto promises that public opinion polls showed were not supported by a majority of voters. So a more flexible pattern of interest aggregation at the legislative level, if based on fair representation, may be helpful to many, and not just the minorities. Bargaining between equitably represented groups may even enhance the possibility that policies will reflect different citizen majorities on different issues. Elections as instruments of representation may be enhanced by postelection aggregation, even though they are diminished as instruments of accountability.

Classifying Competitive Party Systems

In Figure 6.2 *competitive party systems* are classified by type, with examples given for each type. We distinguish between *majoritarian* and *multi-party systems* and rate them according to the relative antagonism between and among parties.¹⁴ The number and strength of parties influences legislative activity and the business of forming government. Either the majoritarian systems are dominated by just two parties, as in the United States, or they have two substantial parties and election laws that usually create legislative majorities for one of them, as in Britain and New Zealand. The purely multiparty systems have combinations of parties, voter support, and election laws that virtually ensure that no single party will win a




Figure 6.2 Classifying party systems by number of parties and antagonism between parties.

legislative majority. Interest aggregation by party bargaining after the election will be critical for shaping policy directions. Germany and France, as we have already mentioned, are multiparty systems in which voter support of party coalitions at the electoral level has major impact on forming governments and policies.

A large number of parties does not itself cause government instability. More important is the degree of antagonism or polarization among the parties. We refer to a system as *consensual* if the parties commanding most of the legislative seats are not too far apart on policies and have a reasonable amount of trust in each other and in the political system. These are typically party systems like those shown toward the top of Figure 6.1. If the legislature is dominated by parties that are very far apart on issues or are highly distrustful and antagonistic toward each other and the political system, we would classify that party system as *conflictual*. If a party system has mixed characteristics of a certain kind—that is, both consensual and conflictual—we classify it as *consociational* or *accommodative*. Arend Lijphart in particular used those terms to describe party systems in which political leaders are able to bridge the intense differences between antagonistic voters.¹⁵

The United States and Britain are contemporary examples of consensual majoritarian systems, although they differ in the degree of consensus. They are not perfect two-party systems. Britain, in addition to the Labour and Conservative parties, has the Scottish Nationalist party, a smaller Welsh party, and, at the center, the Liberal Democratic party. However, in Britain a single party usually wins a legislative majority and controls the legislature and the executive with disciplined party voting. The United States has had third-party movements and candidates intermittently. Shifting orientations of presidential party candidates alter the degree of consensus somewhat from election to election. Moreover, the loose cohesion of American parties and the frequently divided control of legislature and executive lead to postelection bargaining that is in some ways similar to consensual multiparty systems. Germany has two large parties, and an alliance between one of those parties and the Free Democrats has usually won legislative control. Good examples of consensual multiparty systems have been found in Norway and Sweden. In these countries there are four or five parties—socialists, agrarian/center, liberals, conservatives, small communist movements. The three or four larger parties have usually been able to construct long-lived governments, singly or in coalition.

Austria between 1918 and 1934 is the best example of a majoritarian conflictual system. Antagonism between the Socialist party and the other parties was so intense that in the mid-1930s it produced a brief civil war. This conflict resulted in suppression of the Socialist party, the collapse of democratic government, and the creation of an authoritarian one-party system. The case of Austria also illustrates how change can take place in party systems over time. After World War II the leaders of the two major parties negotiated an elaborate coalition agreement of mutual power

sharing—and mutual checks and suspicion—as the country sought to control its conflicts while rebuilding its economy and seeking freedom from occupying Soviet forces in the eastern regions. After some 20 years of the consociational “Grand Coalition,” party antagonism had declined to the point that more normal majority politics could be tolerated, although some consociational elements remained. In recent years the Austrian party system has appeared to be closer to the more ordinary consensual system, with some single-party majorities and some coalitions.

France, Italy, and Weimar Germany have been good examples of conflictual multiparty systems, with powerful Communist parties on the left and conservative or fascist movements on the right. Cabinets had to be formed out of centrist movements, which were themselves divided on many issues, thus making for instability, poor government performance, and loss of citizen confidence in democracy. These factors contributed to the overthrow of democracy in Weimar Germany and the collapse of the Fourth French Republic. More recently, the French and Italian party systems have become somewhat less antagonistic. Some signs of accommodation appeared in Italy in the 1970s when the Communists rallied together with other parties against Red Brigade terrorism, and in France when the Communist party lost ground to the more moderate Socialist party.

The mixed system we call consociational arises in countries in which considerable conflict and antagonism exists on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or social class. Through historical experience the leaderships of competing movements in such countries as the Netherlands have found bases of accommodation that provide mutual guarantees to the various groups. In the consociational systems of Austria and Lebanon after World War II, groups—the socialists and Catholics in Austria, and the Christians and Muslims in Lebanon—worked out a set of understandings making it possible for stable governments to be formed. Austria’s accommodation was based on a two-party system, and Lebanon’s on many small, personalistic religious parties. These two examples have gone in opposite directions in recent years. Since 1966 Austria has begun to move toward a consensual two-party system, while after 1975 Lebanon was penetrated and fragmented by the Middle Eastern conflict and fell victim to civil war.

All this suggests that, although the number of parties is of some importance in relation to stability, the degree of antagonism among parties is of greater significance. Where multiparty systems consist of relatively moderate antagonists, stability and effective performance seem possible. Where systems consist of highly antagonistic elements, collapse and civil war are ever-present possibilities, regardless of the number of parties. When crises develop, the commitment of the leaders of major political parties to work together to defend democracy can be critical for its survival. It may be easier to arrange such commitments in a multiparty, representational setting.¹⁶ Prewar Austria, Chile, and the Weimar Republic of Germany are tragic examples of the absence or failure of such

cooperation. Some of the new democracies of Eastern Europe and Latin America and Asia, especially those divided by language or ethnicity, face similar challenges.

AUTHORITARIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

Authoritarian party systems are also specialized interest aggregation structures. They deliberately attempt to develop policy proposals and to mobilize support for them, but they do so in a completely different way from the competitive party systems we have been discussing. With authoritarian party systems, aggregation takes place within the ranks of the party or in interactions with business groups, landowners, and institutional groups in the bureaucracy or military. The citizens have no opportunity to shape aggregation by choosing between party alternatives.

Authoritarian party systems can be distinguished on a range of exclusiveness, according to the tightness of control from the top down within the party and the degree of control over other groups by the party. At one extreme is the *totalitarian party*, which insists on total control over political resources by the party leadership. It recognizes no legitimate interest aggregation by groups within the party nor does it permit any free activity by social groups, citizens, or other government agencies. As we discussed in Chapter 5, even interest groups are totally controlled. The totalitarian party tries to preempt any autonomous interest articulation by social groups. It penetrates the entire society and mobilizes support for policies developed at the top. These policies are legitimated by an encompassing political ideology that claims to know the true interests of the citizens, whatever their immediate preferences.¹⁷

Exclusive Governing Parties

Few parties have long maintained the absolute central control, penetration, and ideological mobilization of the totalitarian model. However, the ruling Communist parties of the USSR before 1985, of Eastern Europe before 1989, and of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cuba today certainly fall toward that end of the authoritarian party scale. The Chinese regime, for example, has not typically recognized the legitimacy of any large internal groups. Interest articulation by individuals, within bounds, may be permitted; the mobilization of wide support before the top elite has decided on policy is not permitted.¹⁸

Even at early stages of totalitarian mobilization, the *exclusive governing party* may be the focus of more internal aggregation at various levels than is commonly recognized or legitimately permitted. Internally, various groups may coalesce around such interests as region or industry, or behind leaders of policy factions. Generational differences or differences of temperament may distinguish hard-liners and soft-liners on ranges of

policy. Either openly or covertly, beneath the supposedly united front, power struggles may erupt in times of crisis, with different leaders mobilizing backing for themselves and their positions. Succession crises are particularly likely to generate such power struggles, as demonstrated at the death of Stalin in the USSR and at the death of Mao Zedong in China.

Whether thoroughly totalitarian or merely as exclusive governing parties, the penetrating and controlling single parties can play important roles in mobilizing support for policies. An unchallenged ideological focus provides legitimacy and coherence; the party is used to penetrate and organize most social structures in the name of that ideology and in accordance with centralized policies. As these parties have aged, many have seemed to enter a stage of more “mature” totalitarianism that maintains penetration and control, but places less emphasis on mobilization. Finally, as shown by events in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if and when the party leaders lose faith in the unifying ideology, it may be difficult to maintain party coherence.

As an instrument designed for unified mobilization, the exclusive governing party has seemed attractive to many leaders committed to massive social change. The party that successfully mobilized a colonial people behind independence, for example, might be used to penetrate and change an underdeveloped society. As the experiences of many new nations have shown, however, the creation of an exclusive and penetrating governing party that could be used for social transformation is extremely difficult. The protracted guerrilla warfare that contributed to the development of the Chinese and Cuban parties is not easily replicated. The exclusive governing parties attempted in some African states have had limited penetrative capacity. In Ghana, the Convention People's party of Kwame Nkrumah seemed a successful example of the exclusive governing party in the early years of independence (1960–1966), but was easily toppled by a military coup. By 1990 the loss of confidence in Marxist-Leninist ideology and in the Soviet model of totalitarian development led all eight of the African regimes that had once invoked it to abandon that approach.¹⁹ Even in China the party has been forced several times to rely on the army, even on coalitions of regional army commanders, to sustain its control.

Inclusive Governing Parties

Throughout the Third World, especially in nations with notable ethnic and tribal divisions, the more successful authoritarian systems have seemed to be *inclusive authoritarian party systems*, rather than exclusive. That is, they have recognized the autonomy of social, cultural, and economic groups and have tried to incorporate them or bargain with them, rather than penetrate and remake them. In the more successful African one-party systems, such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Ivory Coast, aggregation around personalistic, factional, and ethnic-based groups was permitted

within decentralized party organizations. In recent years, the tightening of control under President Daniel Arap Moi has been coincident with increasing ethnic conflict in Kenya.²⁰ The indigenous communism in Yugoslavia took a more decentralized and corporatist form than in other Communist party states, as a matter of policy and in recognition of the party's linkage to peasant supporters.²¹ The successor regime in Belgrade was unable to maintain that formula for integration of the country's constituent states as tragic events there demonstrated.

These party systems have sometimes been labeled authoritarian corporatist systems. Like the democratic corporatist systems (see Chapter 5), they encourage formation of large organized interest groups whose representatives can bargain with each other and the state. Unlike the democratic corporatist systems, however, these authoritarian party systems provide no political resources directly to the citizens. Efforts at independent protest and mobilization outside the official channels are suppressed. They do permit some autonomous formation of demands within the ranks of the party and by groups associated with it.

The degree of legitimate aggregation permitted below the top leadership in the inclusive authoritarian systems may be substantial and take many forms. The party will typically try to gather various social groups under the general party umbrella and also negotiate with more or less autonomous groups and institutions outside the party. Some of these inclusive parties have attempted aggressive programs of social change. Others have been primarily arenas for aggregating various social and institutional interests. At the extreme of loosest and least exclusive control, such parties may even permit other parties to offer candidates in elections, as long as they have no real chance of winning.

The oldest and one of the most elaborately inclusive authoritarian parties has been the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico. The PRI dominated the political process and gave other parties no realistic chances of winning elections for over 50 years. The PRI maintained general popular support after the creation of a broad coalition within the party by Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s; it was also careful to control the counting of the ballots. Its actions were not shaped by electoral competition, at least until the late 1980s. However, the party incorporated many associational groups within it, with separate sectors for labor, agrarian, and popular interests. While some discontent was suppressed, other dissatisfied individuals were deliberately enticed into the party. The party also gave informal recognition to rather distinct and well-organized political factions grouped behind such figures as ex-presidents.

Various Mexican leaders mobilized their factions within the PRI and in other important groups not directly affiliated with it, such as big business interests. Bargaining was particularly important every six years when the party chose a new presidential nominee. The legal provision that the incumbent president could not succeed himself guaranteed some turnover of elites and may have facilitated more legitimate and open internal

bargaining. Recently, however, rising discontent has emphasized the difficulties in coordinating all interests through the party. Those of the urban and rural poor who have not shared in Mexico's general growth have joined with others who want a more fully democratic system. Mexico seems at long last to be moving toward increasing party competition.

The relative stability of some inclusive authoritarian party systems does not hide the frequent failures to build stable authoritarian party systems. In many countries the governing authoritarian party coexists in uneasy and unstable coalition with the armed forces and the civilian bureaucracy. In some countries the party has become relatively unimportant window dressing for a military regime or personal tyranny.²² The loss of confidence in authoritarian party solutions to problems of economic development and ethnic conflict has seriously weakened their ability to aggregate interests. As the memories of a unifying struggle against colonialism have faded, and the leaders of independence movements have departed or been forced from office, the ties of ideology and experience that held such parties together have unraveled. This trend has been encouraged by the general loss of legitimacy of the single-party model. In some cases the failure of authoritarian parties has permitted the emergence of party competition. In others the consequence has been enhanced resort to naked coercion by government agencies or private forces, with the military serving as final arbiter.

MILITARY FORCES AND INTEREST AGGREGATION

During the last decades the number of single-party and *military governments* in the world has been declining. In the period after World War II parliamentary and democratic governments were instituted among most of the nations of the Third World. But the lack of effectiveness and authority of these new civil institutions in many cases led to their breakdown and their supplantation by one-party and military regimes. With its control of instruments of force, and in the absence of a strong constitutional tradition, the military was an effective contender for power. Even in those regimes where civilian authority was reestablished, the military generally constituted a significant power contender, and exercised influence in the political process. In Brazil the military played a crucial interest aggregation role in the democratic processes before 1964 and played the dominant aggregating and policymaking roles for 20 years after. In Nigeria, the collapse of democracy into civil war resulted in military rule until 1979. In 1983 another military coup deposed an elected Nigerian president. In Ghana the overthrow of Nkrumah was followed by military rule interspersed with experimentation with competitive parties. In Chile military government ruled for 15 years and has only recently been replaced. And in many other nations, including Syria, Pakistan, Indonesia, Guinea, Zaire, Paraguay, Haiti, and Argentina, the military has been the

dominant, or at least a major, interest aggregator. In fact, the armed forces are the dominant interest aggregation structure in over one-fifth of the world's regimes, including almost half of those in Africa. (See Figure 6.3.)

The military's virtual monopoly of coercive resources gives it great potential power as a political contender. Thus, when agreement fails on aggregation either through democratic or authoritarian party systems, the military may emerge by default as the only force able to maintain orderly government. The soldiers then remain the basic force underpinning the personal tyranny of a civilian president or a military council. Or the armed forces may use coercive power to further institutional or even ideological objectives. Military rulers may use control of the state to attempt to create military and/or bureaucratic versions of authoritarian corporatism, linking organized groups and the state bureaucracy with the military as final arbiter of disagreement. They may undertake "defensive" modernization in alliance with business groups or even undertake more radical restructuring modernization.²³ In Latin America almost all the corporatist ver-




Figure 6.3 Change in predominant interest aggregation structure — moving toward democracy in the world? *Source:* Adapted from Raymond D. Gastil, *Freedom in the World 1979, 1988-1989, 1990-1991* (New York: Freedom House, 1979, 1989, 1991).

sions of authoritarian aggregation have had a strong military component and only rarely a dominating role for the authoritarian party.

The major limitation on the armed forces in interest aggregation is that their internal structures are not designed to mobilize support across a range of issues or outside the coercive arena. The military is primarily organized to facilitate downward processing of commands involving the implementation of coercion. It is not set up to aggregate internal differences and effect a compromise or to mobilize wide support of all components behind policy. Moreover, military organizations are not easily adapted to rally or communicate with social groups outside the command hierarchy. Thus, the military lacks those advantages in mobilizing support held by party systems. These internal limitations may be less serious when the military is dealing with common grievances and putting pressure on—or seizing power from incumbent authorities. These limitations become a major problem, however, when a military government needs to mobilize backing for, say, economic development policy. Legitimate authority and communication of the regime's political and ideological goals to many social sectors are then needed. For these reasons military governments frequently prove unstable, are forced to share power with other institutions, or encourage the formation of cooperating authoritarian parties.

TRENDS IN INTEREST AGGREGATION

We have noted in Chapter 4 and elsewhere the *democratic trend* that began in the mid-1970s and gained important momentum with the collapse of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the 1980s. Figure 6.3 attempts to classify the world's regimes by the predominant interest aggregation structure at three points: the end of the 1970s, the end of the 1980s, and the early 1990s. The percentages we report have to be viewed as estimates, often based on limited information. But the figure provides a rough idea of the frequency of the three major forms: competitive parties and elections, single-party regimes, and military-dominated regimes. The "residual" category of traditional governments consists mostly of small kingdoms in the Middle East, South Asia, and the Pacific.

As shown in Figure 6.3, in 1978 about one-third of the world's 150-plus independent countries were reported to have competitive party and electoral systems as their predominant interest aggregation structures. These regimes were the main form in Western Europe and North America (including the Caribbean), not uncommon in Latin America and Asia, but rare in Africa and the Middle East. Nearly as many countries had one of the versions of single-party regimes. They were the main form in Eastern Europe and relatively common in Africa and Asia, though rare in the Western Hemisphere and Western Europe. In slightly less than a quarter

of the countries the armed forces dominated interest aggregation, either formally (military governments) or in practice (military-dominated civilian governments). The military-dominated regimes accounted for about a third or more of the countries in Africa and Latin America.

A decade later, the trend was obviously away from single-party governments. Across the world they declined from 30 to 24 percent of the regimes, although still accounting for nearly 40 percent of African nations. As we already know, the decline of exclusive governing party regimes was even more striking. As expected, the democratic trend toward competitive party and electoral systems was notable, with an increase from 36 to 41 percent of the world's political systems (and more experimenting with some competition). The proportion of military governments actually increased slightly, from 23 to 26 percent of the world's countries.

The trend toward democracy took off beginning in 1989, as shown by the rate of change in 1990–1991; it was much more dramatic than what we observed in the prior decade. The proportion of competitive regimes is now over 50 percent, with declines in the proportions of all other forms. The majority of the remaining single-party systems are loosely corporatist, with a few exceptions such as China and Cuba. The decline of ideological underpinnings for authoritarian governments, as well as the withdrawal of support from the Soviet Union, has contributed to this trend, especially in Africa. The president of Zambia, an erstwhile one-party state, was replaced through elections, and other authoritarian leaders were forced to open up to at least some degree of competition. Malawi and Kenya remain among the few remaining holdouts against this trend; even there, Kenya's President Moi has reluctantly given in to multiparty elections, and open opposition has emerged against President Banda's tight control in Malawi.

Perhaps in deference to the decline in the legitimacy of authoritarianism, the military is now more likely to dominate from behind the scenes than through direct rule, especially in Latin America. Latin America also has seen the genuine replacement of military regimes by competitive party regimes in such important countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Although one-party systems have been opened up in Africa, the proportion of military-dominated governments increased notably in the 1980s, from 36 to 46 percent of the total, and remains at that level. Of 30 military regimes enumerated in the world in 1990, 24 are in Africa, with the rest scattered through the other regions of the developing world. The recent casualties to military intervention include competitive governments in Suriname and Haiti in Latin America (1991), and Sierra Leone in Africa (1992). Although the era of confidence in military government as a solution to development seems to have passed, military domination remains a likely outcome when other types of government are unable to solve internal conflicts. Where there has been "backsliding" on the road to democracy, such as in President Fujimori's shutting down of the Peruvian Parliament or the imposition of tight control on political activity in

Burma, the military has usually been at least part of the antidemocratic movement. With such examples in mind, we cannot assume that the democratizing trend will continue relentlessly. Multiparty regimes that seem unable to cope with economic and social problems often lose their legitimacy. Such is now the challenge facing the new experimentally competitive regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as the Third World.

SIGNIFICANCE OF INTEREST AGGREGATION

How interests are aggregated is an important determinant of what a country's government does for and to its citizens. The factors that most interest us about government and politics—stability, revolution, participation, welfare, equality, liberty, security—are very much a consequence of interest aggregation. Through interest aggregation the desires and demands of citizens are converted into a few policy alternatives. In terms of policy, the consequence is that many possible policies have been eliminated and only a few remain. In terms of process, the consequence is that political resources have been accumulated in the hands of relatively few individuals, who will decide policy. The remaining policy alternatives are serious or major alternatives, because they have the backing of numerous political resources. Policy alternatives such as the government taking over all heavy industrial production in the United States are not serious, because no set of leaders commanding major political resources favors them, even though these policies are implemented in those countries in which monopolistic, authoritarian parties favor them.

Narrowing and combining policy preferences can be seen easily in the working of competitive party systems. Of the many possible policy preferences, only a few are backed by parties, after the parties choose leaders and establish platforms to run on. In the elections, voters give backing to some of these parties and thus shape the strength of party representation in the legislature. Even at the legislative stage, some further consolidation and coalition building takes place between party factions or party groups. At some point, however, most of the policy possibilities have been eliminated. Either they were never backed by parties or parties supporting them did badly in the elections. In noncompetitive party systems, military governments, and monarchies, aggregation works differently, but with the similar effect of narrowing and combining policies and resources. It may be that on some issues, aggregation will virtually determine policy, as when power is held by a military government, a faction of an authoritarian party, or a disciplined party majority in a competitive system. In other cases the legislative assembly, military council, or party politburo may contain several factions of similar strength.

One characteristic of interest aggregation in all systems is its degree of polarization. In Chapter 3 we discussed consensual and conflictual or

polarized political cultures. We mentioned that the United States, West Germany, and Britain were consensual, with most citizens preferring moderate positions. Italy, France, and Greece were more polarized cultures, with larger concentrations of citizens on the left and fewer in the center.

Polarization in the policymaking body should look pretty much like polarization in the political culture. In a consensual society like Germany, the Bundestag is made up of mainly moderate and tolerant parties. In conflictual Italy, the stalemated Parliament was long dominated by two deeply divided parties—the Communists and the Christian Democrats. The collapse of international communism contributed to the electoral downfall of the Communists—rechristened the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS)—and also took fear of communism away from the Christian Democrats. Only 16 percent of voters in the April, 1992, election voted PDS, and only 29 percent voted CD. Italy emerged still conflictual, but fragmented by even more complex divisions, such as the anti-South, anti-immigrant feelings upon which a regional northern Italian party was able to capitalize.

But politics shapes its environment as well as reflecting it. Interest aggregation often alters the amount of polarization that the political culture might be expected to project into policymaking. That is one reason politics is so fascinating. Well-organized and well-led political parties might, at least for a while, be able to dominate politics and limit the strength of extremist groups in the legislature, as in the consociational model we mentioned earlier. Conversely, well-organized extremists might be able to appeal to the fears and prejudices of some groups and get them more effectively to the polls, thus gaining more legislative strength in an otherwise consensual country.

Of course, authoritarian interest aggregation structures tend to create a political power balance that does not reflect popular opinion. In a highly divided and conflict-ridden society, such unrepresentativeness may be viewed as a great virtue. Leaders of military coups in many nations have justified their overthrow of party governments by claiming to depolarize politics and rid the nation of conflict it cannot afford. Similarly, heads of authoritarian parties typically claim that their nation must concentrate all its energies and resources on common purposes and that to allow party competition would be too polarizing. One justification for democracy is that it leads political leaders to act as the people wish. In a polarized political culture, the cost of interest aggregation that reflects division and uncertainty may be seen as too high a price to pay for citizen control. As the frequent instability in authoritarian and military governments indicates, however, it may be easier to do away with the appearance of polarization than the reality. Cultural divisions may end up being reflected through military factions or intraparty groups, instead of through party competition, and the citizens may end up without either freedom and participation or stability.

KEY TERMS

authoritarian party systems	interest aggregation
competitive party systems	majoritarian party systems
conflictual party systems	military government
consensual party systems	multiparty systems
consociational party systems	party coalitions
democratic trends	party-electoral aggregation
exclusive governing party	patron-client network
inclusive governing party	totalitarian party

END NOTES

1. Steffan Schmitt, James Scott, Carl Lande, and Laura Guasti, *Friends, Followers and Factions* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1977); S. Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981); John W. Lewis, *Political Networks and the Chinese Policy Process* (Stanford, Calif.: Northeast Asia Forum, 1986); Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); T. H. Rigby and Bokdan Harasimin, *Leadership Selection and Patron Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1981).
2. See Philippe Schmitter, "Interest Intermediation and Regime Governability," in Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), ch. 12; David Cameron, "Social Democracy, Corporatism and Labor Quiescence: The Representation of Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society," in John Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 7; and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985).
3. William Thompson, *The Grievances of Military Coup-Makers* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973).
4. The large literature on party strategies owes its largest debt to Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). More generally, see Dennis C. Mueller, *Public Choice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
5. Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: Macmillan, 1967); Richard Rose, ed., *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (New York: Free Press, 1974); Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Societies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
6. Ian Budge, David Robertson, and Derek Hearl, *Ideology, Strategy and Party*

Change: Spatial Analyses of Post-War Election Programmes in 19 Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

7. In addition to the references in note 5 above, see Michael Lewis-Beck, *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Ian Budge, Ivor Crewe, and Dennis Farlie, *Party Identification and Beyond* (London: John Wiley, 1976); Russell J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1988).
8. For example, the survey of "experts" by Castles and Mair in 1982 shows a center gap of over three points between the Socialist party and the nearest conservative party (UDF), although between a quarter and a third of voters regularly place themselves at the center. See Francis G. Castles and Peter Mair, "Left-Right Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments," *European Journal of Political Research*, 12 (1984), pp. 73–88. Also see Dalton, *Citizen Politics in Western Democracies*, p. 196.
9. For analyses of the implications of election laws for party representation and government majorities, see Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Election Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967, 1971) and Arend Lijphart, "The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–1985," *American Political Science Review*, 84 (June 1990), pp. 481–496.
10. For Britain, see Richard Rose, *Do Parties Make a Difference?* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984), ch. 5; also see Colin Rallings, "The Influence of Election Programmes: Britain and Canada, 1945–1979," in Budge, Robertson, and Hearl, *Ideology, Strategy, and Party Change*, pp. 1–14. More generally, see David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy," *American Political Science Review*, 72 (December 1978), pp. 1243–1261; and Francis G. Castles, ed., *The Impact of Political Parties* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982). For the United States, see Gerald Pomper, *Elections in America* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968), chs. 7–10.
11. See Kaare Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
12. On cabinet stability, see Lawrence C. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), ch. 7; Gary King, James E. Alt, N. E. Burns, and Michael Laver, "A Unified Model of Cabinet Dissolution in Parliamentary Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science*, 35 (1991).
13. On these issues of citizen control, see G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1 (April 1989), pp. 107–130; G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Holding Governments Accountable," Paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, San Francisco, 1990.
14. This classification is adapted from Arend Lijphart's *Democracy in Plural Societies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977) and *Democracies* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984). Also see Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, and Powell, "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control."
15. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*.
16. On the role of parties in the defense of democracy, see Powell, *Contemporary Democracies*, chs. 8, 10; and the contributions in Juan J. Linz and Alfred

- Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
17. On totalitarian parties see, for example, C. F. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956); Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), Vol. 3, pp. 175–412; Amos Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), especially pp. 62–114.
 18. See Franz Schurman, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).
 19. On the efforts in Africa, see Crawford Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), ch. 2.
 20. See Henry Bienen, *Kenya: The Politics of Participation and Control* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), and Jean-Francois Medard, "The Historical Trajectories of the Ivorian and Kenyan States," in J. Manor, ed. *Rethinking Third World Politics* (London: Longman, 1991).
 21. See Bogdan Denis Denitch, *The Legitimation of a Revolution: The Yugoslav Case* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976).
 22. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982) and Young, *Ideology and Development in Africa*.
 23. Perlmutter, *Modern Authoritarianism*, pp. 114 ff.; see also Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978) and the essays in David Collier, ed., *The New Authoritarianism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Chapter 7

Government and Policymaking

*P*olicymaking is the pivotal stage in the political process. The lineup of political forces has taken shape, and now authoritative policies must be enacted: bills proposed and passed by the legislature or edicts issued by the ruling council. Later, policy goals must be implemented, their consequences reviewed.

To understand how policies are made, we must know what the decision rules are. What kind of power is effective and legitimate in different political systems? Is it a simple majority vote in the legislature or such a vote plus approval by an independently elected executive? Or is it a decree issued by the monarch, a signed unanimous agreement by military field commanders, or the official backing of the politburo? Or is it merely the whim of the military dictator?

We must also recognize the governmental agencies' leading position in policymaking. The demands of interest groups for tax decreases or for the protection of endangered species cannot become effective unless they are transformed into laws by policymaking institutions and implemented by government officials according to some accepted decision rule. Economic, societal, and personality influences become important when they impinge on or manifest themselves within the institutions of government: parliaments, cabinets, ministries and executive departments, and courts. Much of public policy is initiated within government agencies, by department ministers or secretaries, by powerful senators or congressmen, and even by judicial authorities. The picture of government as a flow from society to government and then from government back to society is oversimplified. The process may begin from within the government itself.

This chapter focuses on decision rules and on the policymaking role of

governmental structures such as legislatures, executives, and bureaucracies. Many scholars feel that in the 1960s and 1970s political science neglected these issues while concentrating on citizen attitudes and party politics. Their movement to reaffirm the centrality of institutions has now gained wide recognition. We draw here on many of their insights.¹

DECISION RULES FOR POLICYMAKING

All governments must have some set of working rules for making decisions. They must have a working constitution. Even a military government or a dictatorship based on coercion attempts to have a working set of arrangements for having decrees proposed, considered, and adopted. *Decision rules* are the basic rules governing how decisions are made, spelling out the policymaking roles, dividing them territorially and functionally, and the like.

The decision rules set the terms of the political contest. Individuals and groups seeking to influence policy have to operate within the framework of these rules. If a nation decentralizes policymaking authority, so that to preserve the environment it is necessary to get majority votes in many state legislatures, a great effort will be needed for groups to initiate new conservation measures. If the working constitution merely requires a formal decree from the commander of the armed forces, or a declaration by the politburo, a different approach will be needed to influence these crucial policymakers. The decision rules shape political activity because they determine what political resources to seek—whether legislative seats or the support of regional military commanders—and how to acquire and use them.

The importance of the stability of a nation's basic decision rules was suggested by Thomas Jefferson in his introduction to the first Manual of the House of Representatives: "A bad set of rules is better than no rules at all." In the absence of a legitimate set of arrangements for formulating issues, deliberating and debating them, and deciding among points of view, government may break down and issues may be decided by force.

Making Constitutions

Constitution making is a fundamental political act: it creates or transforms the decision rules. Basic changes in constitutional rules tend to take place in the aftermath of defeat in war, the success of independence movements, or significant social or revolutionary change. Thus, the defeated powers and the successor states of World Wars I and II all adopted new constitutions or had new constitutions imposed on them.

Most of the constitutions that are in force today were formed as the result of some break, often violent, with the past—war, revolution, colo-

nial rebellion. In these situations decision rules have to accommodate new internal power distributions or external power contexts. Britain is unusual in not having a formal written constitution, but rather only a long-accepted and highly developed set of customs, buttressed by major statutes. This practice reflects the gradual, incremental, and, on the whole, peaceful history of Britain. Nevertheless, the major changes in British decision rules, such as the shifting of power from the Crown to Parliament in the seventeenth century, and the Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, which established party and cabinet government based on broad electorates, followed on periods of civil war, mass mobilizations, and disorder. Perhaps the greatest exception to the association between disruptive upheavals and constitution creation is the peaceful development over the last 30 years of the constitution of the European Community, an emergent political unit whose growing powers are altering the decision rules affecting 350 million Europeans. But while there has been no violence associated with the formation of the European Community, its origins cannot be separated from bitter national conflicts of World War II.

The decades since World War II have seen much constitutional experimentation. Japan, Germany, and Italy—the defeated powers—introduced new political arrangements that have proven durable. France has had two constitutions in this period, and it appears that its second effort—the Fifth Republic—will be successful. Both Germany and France have undertaken some interesting constitutional engineering intended to overcome the weaknesses of their earlier constitutional arrangements—the Weimar Republic and the Fourth Republic. The German constitutional framers sought to overcome the political fragmentation and instability of the Weimar Republic by combining proportional representation with single-member district plurality voting and by eliminating splinter parties with less than five percent of the vote. These arrangements encourage the German voters to make their choices among the larger political parties, hence reducing party fragmentation. They also introduced a novel arrangement intended to cope with problems of cabinet instability. A government may be overthrown after the loss of a vote of confidence in the Bundestag only if it is a “constructive” vote of no confidence. That is, a vote of nonconfidence in the incumbent government must be accompanied by presentation of an alternative majority in the Bundestag. The French experiment is a combination of parliamentary and presidential government. The Fifth Republic introduced a separately elected powerful presidency, along with the institutions normal to a parliamentary system, that is, a prime minister and cabinet responsible to the National Assembly.

Despite the success of the most recent German and French experiments, it is difficult to determine political processes by reshaping decision rules according to rational plans and intentions. As March and Olsen have argued, “[T]he contemporary record with respect to intentional change does not encourage boundless confidence in the possibilities for deliberate controlled change.”² They point out that it is possible to “shock”

institutions into change, but the outcome of the shocks may turn out to be quite different from what was intended.

The 1990s are an important period of constitutional experimentation that will test to the utmost the ability of constitution framers to engineer political processes. Gorbachev attempted to revise the Constitution of the Soviet Union by eliminating the Communist party monopoly and by establishing a powerful presidency, a representative Supreme Soviet, and a decentralized federal system. That process came to a halt with the coup attempt of August, 1991, but is now at various stages of transformation in each of the former Soviet republics. The Eastern European communist constitutions have been replaced by democratic parliamentary constitutions, providing for competitive electoral and party systems. The South African constitution is in process of being revised in the direction of equality regardless of race. The Gulf crisis of 1990–1991 has produced cracks in the patrimonial monarchic constitutions of the Arabian peninsula. In all these cases the outcome of constitutional change is far from certain.

Geographic Distribution of Government Power

The basic decision rules or constitutions of political systems differ along three dimensions: (1) geographic distribution of authority; (2) structural separation of authority; and (3) limitations on governmental authority.

Classifying systems according to the geographic division of power gives us *confederal systems* at one extreme, *unitary systems* at the other extreme, and *federal systems* in the middle (see Table 7.1). The United States under the Articles of Confederation was a confederal system. The central government had power over foreign affairs and defense, but it had to depend on financial and other support from the states to implement this power. Under the Constitution, adopted in 1787, the American government changed from confederal to federal; that is, both central and state governments had spheres of authority and the means to implement their power. Today, the United States, Germany, and India are federal systems in which central and local units each have autonomy in particular spheres of public policy. These policy areas and powers are, however, divided among central and local units in varying ways.

Great Britain, France, China, and Japan are unitary governments with power and authority concentrated at the center. Regional and local units have those powers specifically delegated to them from the central government, which may change or withdraw the powers by central decision.

In comparing confederal, federal, and unitary systems, however, we must keep in mind the distinction between formal and actual distribution of power. In unitary systems, in spite of the formal concentration of power at the center, regional and local units may acquire authority that the central government rarely challenges. In the American federal system over the last century power has steadily moved from the states toward the center. Thus, the real differences between federal and unitary systems

Table 7.1 DIVISION AND LIMITATION OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY

Geographic distribution of authority				
Centralized <—	—> Decentralized			
Unitary	Federal		Confederal	
France	United States under Constitution		United States under Articles of Confederation	
Japan	Germany			
Great Britain	India		European Economic Community	
China	Nigeria			
Structural separation of authority				
Concentrated <—	—> Separated			
Authoritarian	Parliamentary	Mixed	Presidential	
China	Mexico	Germany	France	United States
Egypt	Tanzania	Great Britain		Venezuela
Iraq		Japan		
Saudi Arabia		India		
Judicial limitations on governmental authority				
Unlimited <—	—> Limited			
Nonindependent courts	Independent courts	Power of judicial review		
China	France	United States		
Egypt	Great Britain	Germany		
Iraq	India	Japan		
	Tanzania			

^aParliamentary and presidential

may be considerably less significant than their formal arrangements suggest. An extreme example of the discrepancy between formal and actual federalism was the Soviet Union in the pre-Gorbachev era. It consisted of some fifteen republics, each of which had substantial formal authority. In practice the governing apparatus was the Communist party, a highly centralized body that exercised authority at both the center and the periphery. Similarly, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico has centralized control in a system that is formally federal. If Mexico were to develop a truly pluralistic political system, it would undoubtedly be truly federal as well.

Separation of Governmental Powers

Comparing governments according to the structural concentration or separation of policymaking authority reveals several types. These are illustrated in Table 7.1. In *authoritarian regimes*, such as China, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, there is no fully settled delegation of authority to legislatures, courts, or similar structures outside the office of chief executive. In such systems, power may either be concentrated in a political bureau or

military council, or, typically, it may consist of an uneasy balance of military factions, bureaucrats, and party leaders. But none of these groups, as they bring their political resources to bear on policymaking, is faced with an accepted need to compete for citizen support. Such systems vary greatly in the extent to which they attempt to regulate all aspects of social and economic life. They also vary in the amount of debate and even in contestation allowed within the party or military. Mexico, as shown in Table 7.1, is relatively more open in this respect. In all the authoritarian systems, however, the rules of governmental policymaking involve a concentration of power at one point.

Parliamentary regimes, such as those of Germany, Great Britain, Japan, and India, are characterized by a combination of the political executive and the assembly. However, prime ministers and cabinets in parliamentary governments do not lack settled spheres of authority and power. Rather, the executive (usually called a cabinet or council of ministers) is selected from the assembly and holds office only as long as it can command the support of a majority in the assembly.

Policymaking authority is most sharply separated in the *democratic presidential regime*, of which the United States is the outstanding example. The principal characteristics of this regime are that the political executive is independently elected, holds office for the entire term whether or not he or she has the legislature's support, and has substantial authority in policymaking, as in the American president's power to propose and veto legislation. At the same time, the executive must deal with an independently elected legislature that also has policymaking authority; this factor distinguishes the democratic presidential regime from many authoritarian regimes called presidential. Of course, if the same party controls both presidency and legislature and if the party has internal agreement, this effective aggregation of political resources will create a situation much like that in parliamentary regimes with stable party governments or coalitions.

France under the Fifth Republic (since 1959) is an interesting example of a *mixed parliamentary-presidential regime*. The president of France, who has substantial power, is elected by popular vote and holds office for a seven-year term, whether or not he is supported by the National Assembly, which is reelected every five years. The French premier and Council of Ministers, on the other hand, depend on a majority in the National Assembly. For the first time in the life of the Fifth Republic, the 1986 election gave France a National Assembly, and consequently a premier and Council of Ministers, controlled by political parties different from the party of the president. This situation in which the president of the republic and the Council of Ministers were of different political parties (called "cohabitation") lasted two years and was viewed as a successful test of the viability of the constitution of the Fifth Republic.

In Russia, President Boris Yeltsin is in a struggle with the Congress of People's Deputies over the relative strength of executive and parliamentary roles in a revision of the 1977 Constitution. In its present form, the

system is rather like that of France, with an independently elected president (Yeltsin) who shares control of the prime minister and cabinet with the national parliament. (In the first year of his leadership, Yeltsin was both president and prime minister.) However, the ultimate character of the Russian system is yet to be determined.

Limitations on Government Powers

Unlike the authoritarian regimes, parliamentary, presidential, and parliamentary-presidential regimes are characterized by some form of legal or customary limitation on authority. Systems in which the powers of various government units are defined and limited by a written constitution, statutes, and custom are called *constitutional regimes*. Constitutional regimes typically restrict government power. Citizens' rights—such as the right to a fair trial and freedom to speak, petition, publish, and assemble—are protected against government interference except under unusual and specified circumstances. The courts are crucial institutions in the limitations of governmental power.

Governments may be divided into those, at one extreme, in which the power to coerce citizens is relatively unlimited by the courts, and those, at the other extreme, in which the courts not only protect the rights of citizens but also police other parts of the government to see that their powers are properly exercised. The United States is the best example of a system in which political power is limited by the courts. Its institution of *judicial review* allows federal and state courts to rule that other parts of the government have exceeded their powers. Most other constitutional regimes have independent courts that can protect citizens against the improper implementation of laws and regulations but cannot overrule the assembly or the political executive. The substantive rights of citizens in these systems are protected by statute, custom, self-restraint, and political pressure. The constitutional courts of Germany and Japan have limited powers of judicial review of the decisions of other agencies of government. A limited form of judicial review has been in place in France since 1974, when a constitutional amendment was passed providing that 60 members of parliament can submit actions of the National Assembly to the *constitutional council* for binding decisions on constitutionality.

All written constitutions provide for amending procedures, since it is generally recognized that there must be some adaptability and flexibility in basic decision rules, as problems arise with existing institutions, or as social structure changes and new groups demand access. Those procedures can be an important limitation on governmental power. Many constitutions provide that certain arrangements may not be amended, as, for example, the provision in the U.S. Constitution granting each state equal representation in the Senate.

Amending procedures vary widely, ranging from the complex to the simple. Perhaps the simplest case is that of New Zealand where an act of

Parliament can change the New Zealand Constitution Act of 1852. Some constitutions prescribe an absolute majority of all legislators, rather than the majority of a quorum which is sufficient for ordinary statutes. Others require that an amendment be approved twice with an interval of time between passages. In some cases a popular referendum is added on to the legislative action. The U.S. Constitution has the most difficult formal procedure, requiring initiation by two-thirds of both houses of the Congress (or by the never-employed procedure of a national convention called by two-thirds of the states); and approval by three-fourths of the state legislatures, or three-fourths of specially elected conventions held in the states.

Constitutions that have more complicated amending procedures, such as the American, are called “rigid” constitutions; the simpler ones are said to be “flexible.” Here again, however, we have to distinguish between law and practice. Some flexible constitutions such as those of Norway and Denmark have rarely been amended, while rigid ones like the American and Swiss have frequently been changed.³

Table 7.1 emphasizes very general differences and tends to obscure significant differences within categories, as, for example, among democratic political systems. Arend Lijphart, in an important recent study of types of democracy, divides democratic regimes into two major categories: majoritarian and consensual.⁴ The institutions of the majoritarian type of democracy are relatively simple, designed to give power to the representatives of the majority of the voters. The political executive—the cabinet—is chosen from among the leaders of a unicameral legislature, or from the dominant of two chambers in a bicameral legislature. Hence, power is concentrated at a single point, not divided as in a *separation of powers* system. The party systems of these majoritarian democracies tend to follow a simple left-right division, and their electoral arrangements are of the single-member district, plurality variety.

According to Lijphart, consensual democracies are designed to break up and limit the exercise of power. They typically provide for power sharing in the executive, often requiring that ethnic and religious groups be represented in the cabinet. They are also characterized by bicameral legislatures in which one of the chambers is representative of regional and ethnic groups. Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands are good examples of consensual democracies; New Zealand, Britain, and Sweden are good examples of majoritarian systems. The United States falls in between with a majoritarian electoral and party system, a majoritarian executive, a federal distribution of power among the central government and the states, and a consensual bicameral legislature with a powerful Senate, representative of the states.

Clearly, majoritarian systems are typical of homogeneous, culturally unified societies, as in Britain, New Zealand, and Sweden, while consensual democracy is more typical of religiously and linguistically heterogeneous societies such as Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands.

The Democratizing Trend in Decision-Rules

In the last decades there has been a trend toward democratization outside the North American-European area. In some of these new and transitional democracies the changes may be more formal than real. Neither our Table 7.1 nor Lijphart's distinctions captures the differences. They have to be compared according to the extent to which basic civil liberties are accorded, elections are genuinely free, the media of communication are open to competition, and the like.

In a recent paper surveying the democratic trend around the world, Larry Diamond offers a sevenfold typology of regimes according to the extent to which they accord the rights and permit the institutions that make genuine pluralism and effective participation possible. At the extreme nondemocratic level Diamond includes such countries as China, Cuba, Libya, and Iraq. In the middle categories are such countries as Egypt, Yugoslavia, Chile, and Mexico. Among the countries in the category of not fully institutionalized democracies are Brazil, Venezuela, Israel, and Argentina. The stable liberal democracy group includes the countries of Western Europe and North America, as well as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and one or two others.

In the almost two decades between 1972 and 1989, according to Diamond, the percentage of countries falling into the democratizing or the democratic categories increased from roughly 40 to 50 percent. This is hardly a landslide. However, in Chapter 6, we saw that this trend had increased its momentum between 1989 and 1991, at least in terms of party competition (see Figure 6.3.) Democratic progress is real; yet, as of 1989 more than 40 percent of the nations included in Diamond's calculation (130) were still in the two least democratic categories.⁵ Changes since that time are so recent that we cannot be sure the trend will not be reversed under adverse conditions.

ASSEMBLIES

In addition to political parties, which we discussed in Chapter 6, three important types of institutions are involved in policymaking: the executive, whether elective or appointive; the higher levels of bureaucracy; and the assembly. Political executives—presidents and their appointees in presidential systems; prime ministers and cabinets in parliamentary systems; and politburos or presidia in communist systems—tend to be the main formulators of public policy. But the distribution of policymaking predominance among the three institutions varies from country to country and from issue area to issue area.

Almost all contemporary political systems have assemblies, variously called chambers, senates, diets, and the like. Today more than 80 percent of the one-hundred-seventy independent countries belonging to the United Nations have such governmental bodies. Assemblies are generally elected by popular vote and hence are accountable at least formally to the citizenry. Thus, they are legitimizing agencies. The almost universal

adoption of legislative institutions suggests that in the modern world a legitimate government must formally include a representative popular component.

The Functions of Assemblies

All assemblies⁶ have many members—ranging from fewer than a hundred to more than a thousand—who deliberate, debate, and vote on policies that come before them. Most important policies and rules must be considered and at least formally approved by these bodies before they have the force of law. Although legislative approval is needed to give authority to policy, in most countries legislation is actually formulated elsewhere, usually by the political executive and the upper levels of the bureaucracy.

When we compare assemblies on the basis of their importance as political and policymaking agencies, the American Congress, which plays a very important role in the formulation and enactment of legislation, is at one extreme. The other extreme is represented by the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, which meets infrequently and does little more than listen to statements by party leaders and legitimize decisions made elsewhere. Roughly midway between the two is the House of Commons in Britain. There legislative proposals are sometimes initiated or modified by ordinary members of Parliament, but public policy is usually made by the Cabinet or ministers (who are, to be sure, chosen from the members of the parliamentary body). The typical assembly primarily provides a debating forum, formally enacts legislation, and sometimes amends it.

A recent study of European legislatures classifies them according to power in the decision-making process and popular perception of their importance. The judgment of power is that of academic experts; estimates of citizen perception are based on samples of popular opinion made through recent surveys. It is of interest that, while the Italian legislature is rated first in terms of expert estimates of power (see Table 7.2), among

Table 7.2 THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN SELECTED EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Policy influence ranking	Importance to citizens ranking
Italy	Britain
Holland	Ireland
Sweden	West Germany
West Germany	Holland
Britain	France
France	Italy
Ireland	

Source: Adapted from Philip Norton, "Conclusion: Legislatures in Perspective," *West European Politics*, 13 (July 1990), p. 146; and *Eurobarometer*, 19 (April 1983), p. 110.

the European populations surveyed, popular Italian opinion rates its legislative body lowest in importance. Britain, on the other hand, is third from the bottom in expert judgment of influence in the policymaking process, but comes out on top in terms of "importance" in popular opinion. Ireland moves from the lowest expert evaluation to a high public ranking. The legislature's prestige in a nation does not accurately reflect its policymaking influence; it is more a reflection of the general esteem in which governmental institutions are held. Thus, frequent cabinet crises and changes in Italy reduce popular respect for government in general, but they create opportunities for policy initiatives by groups in the legislature and a more important role in the making and unmaking of cabinets.

Assemblies perform a wide variety of functions other than policymaking. Debates in assemblies can contribute to the socialization process, shaping citizens' and elites' perceptions not only of political issues, but also of the appropriate norms and procedures of the political system. Assemblies can also play a major role in elite recruitment, especially in parliamentary systems where prime ministers and cabinet members typically serve their apprenticeships in the assembly. The committee hearings and floor debates in legislative assemblies may be important sites for interest articulation and interest aggregation, especially if majority party control is absent or loosely exercised.

However, as in policymaking, the assemblies of different nations play very different roles in their respective political systems. The British House of Commons is ordinarily of little importance in policymaking, because it is controlled by the ruling party's majority, but the Commons and its debates are central to socialization and elite recruitment. The American Congress and its committees play a major role in interest aggregation and policymaking; they must share other functions with many other institutions in the decentralized American system. Thus far, at least, the People's Congress in China has played only a limited socialization role in China's political process.

This brief comparison of the functions performed by assemblies should set to rest the simplified notion that assemblies legislate. All assemblies in democratic systems have an important relationship to legislation, but not a dominant one. Their political importance lies not just in this relationship, but also in the great variety of other political functions they perform.

Differences in Structures of Assemblies

Assemblies differ in their organizational patterns as well as in their powers and functions. About half the parliaments or congresses consist of two chambers, which have different powers and different ways of selecting members.

In Europe, parliaments developed out of "estates," bodies representing different sociopolitical groups intermittently called together by kings

or other hereditary rulers for consultation and gathering revenue. In France there were three estates: the clergy, the higher aristocracy, and the so-called third estate, representing other classes. In England in the early period, estates were organized in two chambers—the lords spiritual (the bishops) and temporal (the “barons”) in the House of Lords, and knights and burgesses elected from the counties and boroughs to the House of Commons. Today this basis of parliamentary organization persists only in England, where the House of Lords (its powers greatly diminished) is still dominated numerically by the hereditary aristocracy.

Most of the democratic countries, and some of the authoritarian ones, have bicameral (two-chamber) assemblies. Federal systems provide simultaneously for two forms of representation: one chamber for constituencies based on population, and the second for constituencies based on federal units. Even in unitary systems such as France *bicameralism* is a common practice, but the purpose of the second chamber is to break up the process of policymaking and provide for longer and more cautious consideration of legislation. The emphasis in these systems is on separation of power rather than distinct representation of special geographic entities.

The formation of the American Congress reflected a desire for both federalism and separation of powers. The House directly represents the citizens, with districts made up of roughly equal numbers, giving a voice to various local interests and, in the aggregate, the popular majority. The 50 American states are equally represented in the Senate; thus, federal units have special access to one of the two legislative chambers and are in a position to protect their interests. The American congressional system is also connected with the other branches in the federal separation of powers and checks and balances. Thus, the Senate must approve treaties and executive appointments as a way of checking the executive, and all measures involving taxation and appropriations must be initiated in the House.

The American system, in which the two chambers seem practically equal in power, is unusual. In most bicameral systems one chamber is dominant, and the second (the British House of Lords and the French Senate) tends to play a primarily limiting and delaying role. As we have pointed out, cabinets in parliamentary systems are usually chosen from the majority party or parties' leadership in the more popularly representative chamber. Governments in parliamentary systems depend on majority support to continue in office. If the cabinet is chosen from among the majority party in one of the chambers, then the cabinet is responsible to that chamber, which will consequently acquire a more important position in policymaking than the second chamber.

Assemblies also differ in their internal organization, in ways that have major consequences for policymaking and implementation. There are two kinds of internal organization in assemblies and parliaments: party organization and formal organization (presiding officers, committees, and the like). A party system in a presidential government may function differ-

ently from that in a parliamentary government. Parliamentary parties in Britain, as in most parliamentary systems, are disciplined in that members of Parliament rarely vote in opposition to the instructions of party leaders. Because cabinets generally hold office as long as they can command a majority of the assembly, deviating from party discipline means risking the fall of the government and new elections.

In presidential systems, the executive and members of the assembly are elected for definite terms of office, and the fate of the party and of its members is less directly and immediately involved in voting on legislative measures. In American legislatures, party discipline operates principally with respect to procedural questions, like the selection of a presiding officer or the appointment of committees. On substantive legislative and policy issues, Democratic and Republican legislators, federal and state, are freer to decide whether or not to vote with party leaders. A comparison of roll call votes in the American Congress and the British House of Commons would show much more consistency in party voting among British members of Parliament.

All assemblies have a committee structure, some division of labor permitting specialized groups of legislators to deliberate on particular kinds of issues and recommend action to the whole assembly. Without such a sublegislative organization, it would be impossible to handle the large flow of legislative business. As we have seen, however, the importance of committees varies. The committee systems of presidential regimes, such as the American, tend to be very influential in the legislative process, highly specialized and matching the executive departments in subject matter, and tending to dominate the legislative process. In parliamentary regimes the situation varies. Countries such as Germany, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, and Italy have specialized committee systems that match the ministries and exert some influence over the legislative process. In the United Kingdom, Ireland, and France, committees are less developed and influential.⁷

POLITICAL EXECUTIVES

Political executives have many names and titles, and their duties and powers also vary enormously.⁸ Even the functions and authority of the world's few remaining monarchs are strikingly different. Some political executives are called presidents, but their powers and functions may differ substantially. Some political executives are called prime ministers or premiers, and others chairmen or chairs. Political executives can also be collective, with such titles as cabinet, council of ministers, politburo, or presidium.

Titles do not specify the functions these officials perform, but executives may be distinguished as shown in Table 7.3. Political executives are *effective* only if they have genuine powers in the enactment and imple-

Table 7.3 TYPES OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVES: EXAMPLES FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES

Effective	Ceremonial
Individual	
President of the United States	Swedish king
Prime minister of Sweden	President of Germany
President of France	British queen
Chancellor of Germany	Japanese emperor
British prime minister	President of India
General secretary of the Central Committee, PRC	President of the PRC
President of Mexico	
Prime minister of India	
President of Tanzania	
Collective	
British Cabinet	British royal family
Japanese Cabinet	
Politburo, China	
Swiss Federal Council	

mentation of laws and regulations. If they do not have these powers, they are symbolic or *ceremonial*. In presidential systems the ceremonial and effective roles are almost always held by the same person, the president. The two roles are almost always separated in parliamentary systems, where a distinction is made between the “head of state” and the “head of government.”

Individual effective executives include the American presidency, an office with very substantial powers affecting all processes of government. Although the American executive includes collective bodies such as the cabinet and the National Security Council, they advise the president instead of acting as collective decision makers. The French president is also a powerful individual executive, who appoints the premier and may dissolve the Assembly and call for new elections.

Saudi Arabia is a surviving traditional kingship in which a large concentration of power is regulated and limited by custom and tradition. Ministerial councils or cabinets may be part of these systems, but they tend to be dominated by the monarch. The general secretary of the Central Committee of China’s Communist party is also an individual political executive and tends to be an important political figure.

Sorting out political systems on the individual-collective scale is a bit more complicated. In Britain the prime minister tends to dominate the Cabinet in time of war or emergency. Strong prime ministers even in less

troubled times may dominate their Cabinets, but for the most part the British executive is a collective unit. The Cabinet meets regularly, makes important decisions, and acts on the basis of group deliberation. The Federal Council of Switzerland is an extreme example of a collective executive. The chair of the Federal Council is elected annually and seems to be little more than a presiding officer.

Although we may speak of the political executive as being individual or collective, we are talking about the distribution of power and authority in it, not simple numbers. All executives have many members. They consist of elective and appointive officials who have policymaking power. A British prime minister makes some 100 ministerial and junior ministerial appointments; a German chancellor may make a similar number. In the United States, on taking office an incoming president may have to make as many as 2,000 political appointments, of which 200 are key policymaking positions in the executive branch.

A word or two about ceremonial executives is appropriate. Monarchs like the British queen and Scandinavian kings are principally ceremonial and symbolic officers with very occasional political powers. They are living symbols of the state and nation and of their historical continuity. Britain's queen opens Parliament and makes statements on important holidays and anniversaries. When there is an election, or when a government falls, the queen formally appoints a new prime minister. She is the symbol and the transmitter of legitimacy. Normally she has no choice in selecting a prime minister, since she picks the candidate likely to have a majority in the House of Commons, but if there is doubt about which leader has a majority or who leads the party, the queen's discretion may be an important power.

In republican countries with parliamentary systems, presidents perform the functions that fall to kings and queens in parliamentary monarchies. German and Italian presidents issue statements, make speeches on important anniversaries, and designate prime ministers after elections or when a government has resigned.

A system in which the ceremonial executive is separated from the effective executive has a number of advantages. The ceremonial executive tends to be above politics and symbolizes unity and continuity. The American presidency, which combines both effective and ceremonial functions, risks the likelihood that the president will use ceremonial and symbolic authority to enhance political power or that involvement in politics may hamper presidential performance of the symbolic or unifying role. Communist countries have tended to separate the ceremonial and the effective executives. The president of the People's Republic of China, elected by the Congress, is a ceremonial officer. He greets distinguished visitors, and opens and presides over meetings of the People's Congress.

Britain's royal family is an example of a collective ceremonial executive. So many occasions call for the physical presence of the monarch that members of the royal family share appearances. The activities of the royal

family are reported daily in the press, giving legitimacy to a great variety of events. There is much riding in carriages, parading, and ritual in British public life. In contrast, the Scandinavian monarchies are more humdrum, and, because members of the royal families have occasionally been seen using the more humble means of transportation, the Scandinavian countries are sometimes called “bicycle monarchies.”

Functions of the Executive

Political executives typically perform important system functions. The executive is the locus of leadership in the political system. Kemal Ataturks, Roosevelts, de Gaulles, Reagans, and Adenauers may hold the chief executive positions, and their energy, ideas, imagination, and images may provide stabilizing and adaptive capacity to the political system.

Studies of childhood socialization show that the first political role perceived by children tends to be the top political executive—the president, prime minister, and king or queen. In early childhood the tendency is to identify the top political executive as a parent figure; as the child matures he or she begins to differentiate political from other roles, as well as to differentiate among various political roles (see Chapter 3). The conduct of the political executive affects the trust and confidence that young people feel in the whole political system and that they carry with them into adulthood. People who experienced Roosevelt, Churchill, de Gaulle, or Adenauer in their childhoods bring expectations into their adult political lives that are different from those of people who were children under Carter or Reagan, Callaghan or Thatcher.

The role of the political executive in recruitment is obviously important. Presidents, prime ministers, and first secretaries have large and important appointive powers, not only of cabinet and politburo members and government ministers, but of judges as well. Typically, the political executive is the source of honors and distinctions to members of the government and private citizens—they give distinguished service medals, knighthoods and peerages, and prizes of various kinds.

The political executive plays a central role in political communication, the top executive having the crucial one. Presidents’ press conferences, prime ministers’ speeches in parliament, cabinet members’ testimony in committees, and the party leaders’ speeches at the party congress may communicate important information about past, present, and future trends of domestic and foreign policy. These high-level communications may be appeals for support or for improved performance in various sectors of the society and economy, or they may outline new policies.

The executive is of primary significance in the performance of the process functions. The executive may serve as an advocate of particular interests, as when a president supports the demands of minority groups or the business community or a prime minister supports the interests of pensioners or depressed regions. Cabinet members typically speak for

particular interests, such as labor, business, agriculture, children, and minority groups. They may play a crucial role as interest aggregators as they seek to build coalitions favoring legislation. Typically, the executive is the most important structure in policymaking. The executive normally initiates new policies and, depending on the division of powers between the executive and the legislature, has a substantial part in their adoption. The political executive also oversees the implementation of policies and can hold subordinate officials accountable for their performance.

Whatever dynamism a political system has tends to be focused in the executive. The central decisions in a foreign policy crisis are generally made by the top executive: the president (George Bush in the Gulf crisis) or the prime minister (Margaret Thatcher in the Falklands crisis). In domestic policy, too, a bureaucracy without an executive tends to implement past policies, rather than to initiate new ones. Without the direction of politically motivated ministers, bureaucracies tend toward inertia and conservatism. The decision of a president, prime minister, cabinet, or politburo to pursue a new course in foreign or domestic policy will usually be accompanied by structural adaptations—the appointment of a vigorous minister, an increase in staff, the establishment of a special cabinet committee, and the like. Where the political executive is weak and divided, as in Fourth Republic France or contemporary Italy, this dynamic force is missing. Initiative then passes to the bureaucracy, legislative committees, and powerful interest groups, and general needs, interests, and problems may be neglected. In a separation of powers system when the presidency and the Congress are controlled by different parties, even a strong president may be hampered in carrying out an effective policy.

Although the executive consists of the cabinet heads for all the policy areas, its policy thrust will be reflected by its composition. New departures in foreign policy or welfare policy may be reflected in new appointments or rearrangements, and sometimes by the direct assumption of responsibility for a policy area by the chief political executive.

THE BUREAUCRACY

Modern societies are dominated by large organizations, and the largest organizations in these societies are the government *bureaucracies*. As governments increase efforts to improve the health, productivity, welfare, and security of their populations, the size of government organizations keeps increasing.

Structure of the Bureaucracy

Of course, not all government employees are equally significant in the political process. Most important are the highly trained expert personnel of the top *civil service*. Students of policymaking in Britain point out that

the British “Government” consists of approximately a hundred “front-bench” members of Parliament, some twenty of whom serve in the Cabinet, with the remainder named as ministers, junior ministers, and parliamentary secretaries in charge of the government departments. This relatively small group of political policymakers confronts some 3,000 permanent higher civil servants largely recruited from the universities directly into the *higher civil service*. They spend their lives as an elite corps, moving about from ministry to ministry, watching governments come and go, and becoming increasingly important as policymakers as they rise into the top posts.

The importance of the permanent higher civil service is not unique to Britain, though perhaps it has been most fully institutionalized there. In Sweden and France, too, the higher civil service is filled with powerful generalists who can bring long tenure, experience, and technical knowledge to their particular areas. In the United States, many top positions go to presidential appointees rather than to permanent civil servants. Despite this difference and despite a greater emphasis on technical specialization, there are permanent civil servants in the key positions just below the top appointees in such agencies as the Internal Revenue Service, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Institutes of Health, and all the cabinet departments. These people tend to be specialists, such as military officers, diplomats, doctors, scientists, economists, and engineers, and they exert great influence on the formulation and execution of policies in their specialties.

Bureaucracies may present special problems in revolution and in counterrevolution. When the Bolsheviks originally took power in Russia in 1917, they had to depend on some of the military officers and officials of the Czarist regime until they could train their own. The secretariat of the Communist party attempted to oversee their loyalty. In the 1990s with the disestablishment of the Communist parties in the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, bureaucratic resistance and inertia have hampered the implementation of new policies. Although bureaucracies are supposed to be politically and ideologically neutral agencies, in fact they are influenced by the dominant ideologies of the time and tend to have conservative propensities and institutional interests of their own.⁹

Functions of the Bureaucracy

A functional analysis of the bureaucracy may suggest why this governmental organization has acquired such enormous significance in most contemporary societies. We have often stressed that most political agencies and institutions perform a number of functions. The bureaucracy is almost alone in carrying out its function—enforcement or implementation of laws, rules, and regulations. In a sense bureaucracies monopolize the output side of the political system. (Occasionally, of course, policymakers

take the law into their own hands. The establishment of the “Plumbers” unit in the Nixon White House, the Colonel Oliver North operations in the Reagan White House, and their performance of what are normally policy, security, and other operational functions are examples of policy-makers attempting directly to control implementation.)

In addition to this near monopoly of enforcement, bureaucracies greatly influence the processes of policymaking. Most modern legislation is general and can be effectively enforced only if administrative officials work out regulations elaborating the policy. The extent to which a general policy is carried out usually depends on bureaucrats’ interpretations of it and on the spirit and effectiveness with which they enforce it. Moreover, much of the adjudication in modern political systems is performed by administrative agencies with power to hold hearings and enforce regulations whether organized as independent regulatory bodies or as units in regular operating departments.

In Chapters 5 and 6 we discussed how bureaucratic agencies may serve as articulators and aggregators of interests. Departments like those for agriculture, labor, defense, welfare, and education may be among the most important voices of interest groups. And when an agriculture department obtains agreement on policy among different agricultural interest groups or a labor department draws together competing trade unions around some common policy, bureaucrats are performing a significant interest-aggregating function.

Finally, bureaucracies are instrumental in performing the communication function. Even in democratic systems, the bureaucracy is one of the most important sources of information about public issues and political events. News reporters are constantly knocking at the doors of administrative officials in search of the latest information on all spheres of foreign and domestic policy. Although an aggressive press in a modern democracy may force considerable information out of the bureaucracy, bureaucrats clearly have some control over the amount of information they divulge and the way it is interpreted. Leaking information is an important way in which members of the bureaucracy can influence policy. In the Watergate scandal, “Deep Throat” was the code name given to one of the most important sources of information used by the journalists in revealing the violations of law committed by the White House. Cynicism about the obligations of secrecy and confidentiality in the executive is reflected in the comment sometimes heard, “our information is growing by leaks and bounds.” The decisions made by political elites, whether executives or legislators, are also based to a considerable extent on the information they obtain from administrative agencies. Similarly, interest groups, political parties, and the public depend on the information transmitted by administrative officials.

The truth of the matter is that modern, complex societies cannot get along without bureaucracies, and it also seems to be practically impossible to get along with them. The title of a book, *Implementation: How Great*

Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland, and the development of a new field of research—implementation studies—express this dilemma.¹⁰ Public policies are statements of intent enacted by the executive and the assembly. They allocate resources and designate responsibility for the realization of these goals. But realization depends on the bureaucracy and the responsiveness of the groups affected by the policies. Policies may be lost in the thicket of bureaucratic misunderstanding or opposition.

Creating and maintaining a responsive and responsible bureaucracy is one of the intractable problems of modern and modernizing society—capitalist or socialist, advanced or backward. It is a problem that can never be solved thoroughly, but only mitigated or kept under control by a variety of countervailing structures and influences.

Mark Nadel and Francis Rourke suggest the variety of ways that bureaucracies may be influenced and controlled externally or internally, through government and nongovernment agencies and forces (see Table 7.4).¹¹ The major external government control is, as we have suggested, the political executive. Although presidents, prime ministers, and ministers formally command subordinate officials and have the power to remove them for nonperformance of duty, there is actually mutual dependence and reciprocal control between executives and bureaucracies. The power of the executive is typically expressed in efforts at persuasion; rarely does it take the extreme form of dismissal or transfer. Centralized budgeting and administrative reorganization are other means by which

Table 7.4 TYPOLOGY OF CONTROLS FOR BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY

Formal	Informal
External	
Directly or indirectly elected chief executive: president, prime minister, governor, etc.	Public opinion Press
Elected assembly: congress, parliament, city council, etc.	Public interest groups Constituencies
Courts	Competing bureaucratic organizations
Ombudsman	
Internal	
Representative bureaucracy where legally required	Perception of public opinion (anticipated reaction)
Citizen participation where legally required	Professional standards
Decentralization	Socialization in the norms of responsibility

Source: Taken from Mark V. Nadel and Frances E. Rourke, "Bureaucracies," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 5. 1975, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., p. 416. Reprinted with permission.

the executive controls bureaucracy. The reallocation of resources among administrative agencies and changing lines of authority may bring bureaucratic implementation into greater conformity with the aims of the political executive.

Assemblies and courts also exercise significant external controls over the bureaucracy. Committee investigations, questions put to administrative agencies by assembly members, judicial processes controlling administrative excesses—all may have some effect on bureaucratic performance. The invention and rapid diffusion of the institution of the *ombudsman* is another indication of the problem of controlling the bureaucracy from the perspective of injury or injustice to individuals.¹² In the Scandinavian countries, Britain, Germany, and elsewhere the ombudsman investigates claims of injury or of damage made by individuals as the result of government action, offering a procedure more expeditious and less costly than court action. Ombudsmen report to the legislative body for remedial action.

Among the extragovernmental forces and agencies that attempt to control bureaucracies are public opinion and the mass media; interest groups of various kinds, particularly public interest groups like “Nader’s Raiders”; and the constituencies of bureaucratic agencies, such as business, labor, farmers, and minority groups.

Bureaucratic responsiveness and responsibility are affected by internal controls, such as advisory committees formed by people representing many parties and many interest groups, and decentralization, which brings the bureaucracy closer to the groups it affects. Finally, the attitudes and values of the bureaucrats themselves affect their responsiveness and responsibility. Different bureaucracies have different attitudes toward public opinion, the media, and political parties. The norms and values that bureaucrats bring as they are recruited into public service, and the standards and obligations they are taught to respect within public service, have an important bearing on bureaucratic performance.

The variety and kinds of controls we have been discussing operate in the advanced industrial democracies. Authoritarian systems lack many of these controls, particularly the external ones of elected political executives and legislators, independent courts, mass media, and interest groups. Authoritarian systems are particularly prone to bureaucratic inefficiency and conservatism in the absence of free and competitive elections, autonomous interest groups, and a free press. And in most nonindustrial countries the agents of control are not well developed, the proportion of participants among the population is low, and lower-level government employees are poorly trained and poorly paid—all conditions that encourage bribery and extortion as a frequent mode of interaction between citizens and public officials whether the system is authoritarian or not.¹³

“Bureaucracy,” in the sense of inefficiency and inertia, is pandemic. It is truly a dilemma because we are unlikely to invent any schemes for carrying out large-scale social tasks without the organization, division of

labor, and professionalism that bureaucracy provides. Its pathologies can only be mitigated. The art of modern political leadership consists not only in the prudent search for appropriate goals and policies, but also in the attempt to learn how to interact with the massive and complex bureaucracy—how and when to press and coerce it, reshuffle it, terminate its redundant and obsolete parts, flatter and reward it, teach it, and be taught by it.

KEY TERMS

authoritarian regime	federal systems
bicameralism	higher civil service
bureaucracy	judicial review
ceremonial executive	mixed parliamentary- presidential regime
civil service	ombudsman
confederal systems	parliamentary regime
constitutional council	policymaking
constitutional regime	separation of powers
decision rules	unitary systems
democratic presidential regime	
effective executive	

END NOTES

1. As March and Olsen put it: "Political institutions simplify the potential confusions of action by providing action alternatives; they simplify the potential confusions of meaning by creating a structure for interpreting history and anticipating the future; and they simplify the complications of heterogeneity by shaping the preferences of participants." James G. March and Johann P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 171–172. See also Alfred Stepan, *State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Peter Evans, Jurgen Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
2. March and Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*, p. 58.
3. On comparative constitutions, see Ivo Duchacek, *Power Maps: Comparative Politics of Constitutions* (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC Clio Press, 1973), pp. 210 ff.
4. Arend Lijphart, *Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,

- 1984), chs. 1 and 2. Also see Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).
5. Larry Diamond, "The Globalization of Democracy: Trends, Types, Causes, Prospects," unpublished paper, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution, 1990. In making this classification and classifying countries, Diamond draws on the work of Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang Reinicke, "Measuring Polyarchy," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 25:1 (Spring 1990), pp. 51–72; and Raymond D. Gastil, ed., *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1988–1989* (New York: Freedom House, 1989).
 6. On functions of legislatures, see Robert Packenham, "Legislatures and Political Development," in Arthur Kornberg and L. D. Musolf, eds., *Legislatures in Developmental Perspective* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970); Jean Blondel, *Comparative Legislatures* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), pp. 144 ff.; Gerhard Loewenberg and Samuel Patterson, *Comparing Legislatures* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), ch. 2; Michael Mezey, *Comparative Legislatures* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979); Philip Norton, "Parliaments: A Framework for Analysis," and "Legislatures in Comparative Perspective" in *West European Politics*, 13 (July 1990), pp. 1–9, 143–155.
 7. See Kaare Strom, *Minority Government and Majority Rule* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 72 ff.
 8. For detailed information about the organization and recruitment of the modern political executive, see Jean Blondel, *World Leaders: Heads of Government in the Post War Period* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1980); Jean Blondel, *The Organization of Governments: A Comparative Analysis of Governmental Structures* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1982); Jean Blondel, *Government Ministers in the Contemporary World* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1985).
 9. See Joel D. Auerbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).
 10. Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973).
 11. Mark V. Nadel and Francis E. Rourke, "Bureaucracies," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 373–440.
 12. See Frank Stacey, *The British Ombudsman* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971); and Roy Gregory and Peter Hutchesson, *The Parliamentary Ombudsman: A Study in the Control of Administrative Action* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975).
 13. On the difficulties involved in reducing administrative corruption in developing countries, see Robert Klitgaard, *Controlling Corruption* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

Chapter 8

Public Policy

In the past century Western nations have been transformed from authoritarian or oligarchic regimes with limited suffrage to democratic systems. The power of the state has increasingly been used to meet popular needs and demands. The democratic political process has produced *welfare states* with programs of social insurance, health, public education, and the like. As the level of expenditures has grown to between one-third and one-half of the national product in most industrialized democratic countries, a number of problems have arisen. The increasing cost of the welfare state in taxes has produced a welfare backlash or tax rebellion in some countries—efforts to prevent further increases in welfare programs and to roll back those already in effect. The size of the government budget and its effects on savings, investment, inflation, and employment has been the central issue in the politics of advanced industrial societies in recent years.

Thus, the simple relationship between democratization and welfare characteristic of the earlier decades of the twentieth century has given way to a more problematic situation. The study of public policy has become a growth industry in the social sciences. Among the interesting themes being explored in this growing field of study are the varieties of welfare states and their causes. The United States is an example of a welfare pattern that stresses equality of opportunity through public education. In contrast, on the European continent, social security and health programs have taken precedence over educational programs.¹

The crisis of the welfare state has provoked a conservative reaction that stresses setting limits on public expenditures and labor costs.² An alternative corporatist approach, which has had some success in small European countries, involves regular bargaining relationships among

labor, business, and government over issues of wage, price, and investment policies.³

The data we present in this chapter are intended to provide background for understanding these and other contemporary controversies over *public policy*. We will compare in general the policy performance of countries with differing characteristics in different parts of the world. The public policies of nations may be summarized and compared according to their *outputs*, that is, the kinds of actions governments take in order to accomplish their purposes. We can classify these actions or outputs under four headings. First is the *extraction* of resources—money, goods, persons, and services—from the domestic and international environments. Second is *distributive* activity—what money, goods, and services are distributed, and to whom? Third is the *regulation* of human behavior—the use of compulsion and inducement to enforce extractive and distributive compliance or otherwise bring about desired behavior. Last is *symbolic* performance—the political speeches, holidays, rites, public monuments and statues, and the like—used by leaders to exhort citizens to desired forms of conduct, to provide inspiring examples, to edify the population, and to socialize the young.

EXTRACTIVE PERFORMANCE

All political systems, even the simplest, extract resources from their environments. When primitive peoples go to war, specific age groups may be called on to fight. Such direct extraction of services is still found in the most complex of modern states, in the form of military duty, other obligatory public service like jury duty, or compulsory labor imposed on those convicted of crime.

The most common form of resource extraction in contemporary nations is taxation. Taxation is the extraction of money or goods from members of a political system for governmental purposes, in consideration for which they receive no immediate or direct benefit. Figure 8.1 shows the revenue extracted by the central government as a percentage of the *gross national product* (GNP), defined as the total value of goods and services produced by a country's residents in a year, for a selection of nations in North and Latin America, Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. We have included Hungary as reflecting the communist pattern of Eastern Europe. The data reported in the figure are for 1989, hence just before economic reforms began to take effect in Hungary and the other Eastern European countries. (Comparable data for surviving communist countries—China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba—were not available.) Hungarian central government revenues as a proportion of the GNP were the largest for our selection of countries. The state extracted 56.5 percent of the GNP from its economy in 1989, down slightly from the 58.2 percent of the GNP it took in 1988, the last full year of the




Figure 8.1 Central government revenue as a percent of GNP and by source, 1989. Source: World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 226–227.

communist regime. It is of interest that the size of government revenue in some countries of the advanced capitalist world is not radically smaller than that of Hungary and other Eastern European countries when they were under communist control. Thus, the Swedish central government extracted over 44 percent of its GNP; Israel more than 40 percent; and the United Kingdom more than 35 percent.

We should observe that Figure 8.1 reports *central government revenues* only. In such federal systems as the United States and Germany we would have to add the state and local revenues to the central revenues to get an accurate picture of the extractive burden borne by these countries. A substantial proportion of government revenue in the United States is collected by states and localities. The total for all revenues for the United States would run to more than 30 percent. Similarly for Germany, the states (called *länder*) and municipalities collect substantial amounts of revenue, which would raise the total to more than 40 percent. Even unitary countries such as Britain and Sweden collect some of their revenue through local governments. British total revenue would come to more than 45 percent, and Sweden would reach a total of over 50 percent. The difference in revenue as a proportion of the GNP between command

socialist economies and advanced welfare economies has been one of degree.⁴

Outside the European-North American area the size of central government revenue rarely exceeds 20 percent. Syria's revenues amount to 24.4 percent of its GNP, but more than half of this total takes the form of income from government-owned property and facilities, and grants from Arab oil countries. The central government revenues of Nigeria, Korea, and Mexico are all in the range of 18 percent of GNP or less. Revenue levels are high in Nigeria and Mexico because both countries have large government-owned oil sectors, and income from these sectors is reported as revenue. Bangladesh has a total central government revenue of 8.8 percent of its GNP; India 15.4 percent; Uganda 5.3 percent; Ghana 13.8 percent; and so on.⁵

Japan is the least heavily taxed of all developed countries, with a proportion of central government revenues to GNP of only 14 percent and an expenditure level of 17 percent. Factors contributing to Japan's ability to keep extraction low include a very small defense budget and limited government participation in welfare programs (although the difference between Japan and other industrialized countries has greatly decreased recently), as well as reliance in recent years on deficit financing through the sale of government bonds to financial institutions.⁶

Figure 8.1 also reports the sources of revenue as a proportion of the GNP for each country. Sources of revenue are important because they determine who pays how much of the taxes. Personal and corporate income taxes and taxes on capital gains and wealth are called *direct taxes*, in that they are directly levied on persons and corporations. They tend to be *progressive* in character; that is, the tax rates are higher for richer than for poorer citizens. *Indirect taxes* such as sales and value added taxes, excise taxes, and customs duties are levied on transactions or services, and their welfare distributive effects depend on who purchases the commodities and services. Thus, direct taxes on luxury goods may not be regressive, since the poor rarely purchase them. But general sales taxes or value added taxes that affect necessities such as food and clothing are *regressive*; that is, those who are less able to afford them share an equal burden with those who can. Social security contributions often are regressive because they are usually paid disproportionately by the poor, although this need not be the case. Also, it may be argued that, in many countries, the poor are the principal recipients of the sums thus raised.

In 1988 Hungary received almost half of its revenue in indirect taxes—taxes on turnover in the process of manufacture, sales, excises, and customs duties. Nine percent of its GNP was extracted in direct taxes primarily on income, and 14 percent was taken in transfers from firms and employees for social services. By 1989, as Hungary's transition to a market system began, the share of revenue from indirect taxes had declined to 38 percent, while that from taxes on income had increased to 10 percent of the GNP and social security to 16.6 percent. As former communist

regimes move toward a pluralist, capitalist system, we can expect them to adopt the extractive patterns common to that system. In Germany and the United Kingdom most of the revenue comes from transfer payments and income taxes, but Germany relies far more heavily on transfer payments and Britain more on income taxes. Countries such as Mexico and Korea obtain most of their revenue from indirect taxes, which has the effect of burdening the poor more substantially.

The composition of the revenues of nations is quite complex, depending on the kinds of taxes imposed, the distribution of income and wealth, the consumption patterns of different strata of the population, and deliberate government efforts at distributive equity. Heidenheimer, Hecló, and Adams classify the tax systems of the *Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development* (OECD) countries. The OECD includes some 26 free-market economies, primarily in Europe and North America. They divide the countries into the following groupings: First, heavy social security tax systems include Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, France, and Italy, which receive one-third to one-half of their revenue from social security, which is imposed more or less equally on both employers and employees. In a second category, the United States and Japan are farthest below average in total tax burden, but they rely more heavily on direct taxes and transfers rather than on sales and consumption taxes. Finally, countries such as Sweden and Norway impose the highest tax burdens of all the OECD countries, and they rely on all three types of taxation—direct, indirect, and transfer payments. Both countries impose the greatest burden of social security payments on the employers, with Sweden levying the entire social security tax on employers and Norway taking three-quarters of it.⁷

Tax rates have been decreasing in all Western countries in the last decade, and there has been a shift from the more visible direct income taxes to less visible indirect consumption taxes and a sharp decrease in higher income tax rates. From 1975 to 1990 British top marginal rates declined by 43 percent, the U.S. rates by 42 percent, Swedish by 35 percent, and Japanese by 25 percent. The average decline in top tax rates for all OECD countries in the last 15 years has been 18 percent.⁸ These trends in revenue policy have been associated with the spread of monetarist and supply-side economic ideology, stressing the importance of entrepreneurial incentives for productivity. This change in patterns of taxation has accentuated income inequality in the advanced industrial countries.

DISTRIBUTIVE PERFORMANCE

The *distributive performance* of the political system is the allocation by governmental agencies of various kinds of money, goods, services, honors, and opportunities to individuals and groups in the society. It can be

measured and compared according to the quantity of whatever is distributed, the areas of human life touched by these benefits, the sections of the population receiving these benefits, and the relationship between human needs and governmental distributions intended to meet these needs. Government expenditures do not measure all these distributions, but they give us a quantitative measure of this distributive effort. Although these figures are drawn from a variety of sources especially from data released by the governments, and their accuracy cannot be guaranteed, they are rough indicators of the countries' efforts.

Figure 8.2 reports central governmental expenditures as a percentage of the GNP, as a total, and as percentages for defense, welfare, and other purposes, for a selection of nations roughly representative of areas and levels of development. As we glance across the figure, it is clear that the level of central government expenditures varies substantially from country to country—depending primarily on level of economic development and political ideology. Central government expenditure accounts for more than 58 percent of Hungary's GNP, almost 50 percent of that of Israel, over 40 percent of Swedish GNP, and so on down to 23 percent for the United States and less than 17 percent for South Korea. (Japan, not shown in Figure 8.2, is also at less than 17 percent.) Again state and local




Figure 8.2 Central government expenditure as a percentage of GNP, 1989. *Source:* World Bank, *World Development Report 1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 224–225.

expenditures create a problem. If we were to add them to central figures, the total for the United States would rise to more than 30 percent and that for Germany to more than 40 percent. They would also raise the total for such countries as Sweden and the United Kingdom, for even in these unitary systems local governments have some expenditures based on their own revenues.

The crosshatched segments of the bars represent the proportion of the GNP spent by the central government on welfare. The size of this segment for Israel, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Germany, and relatively for the United States justifies our calling these countries welfare states. More than 17 percent of the GNP for Israel, 26 percent for Sweden, over 17 percent for the United Kingdom, about 20 percent for Germany, and 10 percent (almost half of total central expenditures) for the United States, represent expenditures for education, health, social security, housing, and the like. If we were to add state and local expenditures to these central figures, the welfare proportion would be even greater, since state and local functions generally include, in addition to public safety, roads, and transportation, such welfare functions as education, health, and sanitation. In Third World countries such as Syria, Mexico, and Nigeria, while welfare needs are great, the welfare effort of central governments is relatively small. South Korea, a rapidly modernizing country, also has a growing welfare sector, principally in education—one-third of its expenditures are for welfare purposes.

The darkly shaded sections of the bars in Figure 8.2 represent the defense and military efforts of these countries in 1989 as percentages of their GNP. Israel was the most burdened of these countries, spending almost 13 percent of its GNP for military purposes in 1989. It is interesting that this total did not come at the expense of welfare expenditures. Despite its heavy military loading, Israel maintained its membership among the welfare democracies. Syria spent almost 11 percent of its GNP for military purposes and only 4 percent for welfare in 1989. The United States spent 5.7 percent of its GNP for defense in 1989 and almost twice that amount for welfare at the federal level. South Korea spent almost equal amounts for defense and welfare. Japan, not listed in the figure, spends very little for defense but an increasing amount for welfare.

Figure 8.2 fails to capture the actual magnitude of the effort made by government for defense and welfare purposes. With a large GNP per capita, a country like the United States spends substantially more on military, educational, and health purposes, even though this represents less of a burden on the economy as a whole. Table 8.1, showing expenditures per capita on military, educational, and health purposes, displays the dollar magnitude of these expenditures for the countries included in this volume. The United States with over an \$18,000 GNP per capita in 1987 spent over \$1,200 per capita for military purposes and also had the highest per capita expenditures for education and fourth highest for health. Still it was not as heavily burdened as the other advanced indus-

Table 8.1 PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PER CAPITA FOR DEFENSE, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES IN 1987 (IN DOLLARS)

Country	GNP per capita ^a	Military expenditures per capita	Education expenditures per capita	Health expenditures per capita
United States	18,595	1,204	989	852
United Kingdom	12,091	555	618	617
France	15,806	627	885	1008
West Germany	18,483	561	813	1161
Japan	19,582	198	979	987
Soviet Union	8,562	976	462	265
China	285	13	8	4
Mexico	1,616	6	33	37
Nigeria	229	2	3	<1

^aGross national product (GNP) is the value of goods and services produced by a nation's residents, whether in the country or abroad, minus the value of production in the country for which the factors of production are owned by nonresidents.

Source: Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1991).

trial countries. In that same year Japan spent only \$198 per capita for defense but \$979 per capita on education, an amount roughly equal to per capita educational expenditures for the United States, France, and West Germany, and significantly more than that spent in the United Kingdom. Because of strong tendencies by Soviet authorities to report better performance than actually occurred, with little or no independent auditing, data on production and distribution in the USSR were highly suspect. The figures used in Table 8.1 are based on estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but it is now argued that the CIA overestimated Soviet productivity in the last decade or so. Thus, the figures reported in Table 8.1 on the Soviet Union must be treated with great caution. Nevertheless, even if the reported GNP per capita (\$8,562) and the expenditures for defense (\$976), for education (\$462), and health (\$265) are exaggerated, they show that the leading socialist country in 1987 was trailing the Western countries in welfare expenditures.

The vicious circle affecting the poorer nations is suggested by the figures for China, Mexico, and Nigeria. Mexico, classified by the *World Development Report* as "a lower middle income economy" with a GNP per capita in 1984 of a little over \$3,000, spent \$79 per capita on education (less than one-fifth of what France, Britain, and Germany spent), and \$48 per capita on health (about one-tenth that of the Western European countries). Table 8.1 shows that, by 1987, Mexico's GNP had fallen, and with it the Mexican system's already meager public expendi-

tures in the listed categories. The same happened in Nigeria, another Third World country heavily dependent on petroleum sales.

Although China did not experience the same economic setbacks as Mexico and Nigeria in the mid-1980s, its economy and public spending levels were essentially stagnant. The tragedy for these very low-income countries is that, while they are confronted with the urgent challenge of upgrading the skills and improving the performance of their workforces, their resources are insufficient to make rapid headway. The striking differences in these rankings and in the economic and governmental performance which they reflect are not reported in the mood of winners or losers in a contest, but rather to emphasize the great differences in the conditions of material life that prevail in the world today.

Table 8.1 and Figure 8.2 show that defense is one area in which per capita wealth has little relation to spending efforts. Nations locked in tense international confrontations or those undertaking efforts at widespread influence, make extraordinary defense efforts, even at the cost of the education and health of their inhabitants. Education, health, and welfare expenditures, on the other hand, are affected by levels of wealth. Poor nations, with their limited budgets and many demands, cannot easily spare the resources for these programs (see Harold Wilensky's study of 64 nations).⁹ In both absolute and relative terms expenditure on social security in poor nations tends to be limited. This limitation is due in part to their rather youthful populations and the role of the extended family in caring for the elderly and infirm. All the wealthier nations make efforts to assist the aged and unemployed; however, differences in expenditures reflect policy and historical experience. The United States made a much greater effort, and much earlier, in mass education than did most European nations; on the other hand, Americans began spending on social insurance and public services much later, and still do less in this area. Americans have historically put much more emphasis on equality of opportunity and less on welfare obligations than Europeans. Wilensky also found that centralized governments, well-organized working-class parties and movements, and low military expenditures were all associated with stronger efforts in welfare.

Prior to the watershed year of 1989, the communist countries of Eastern Europe were spending less on education, health, and welfare than the democracies of Western Europe. As Table 8.1 shows, the Soviet Union was also substantially behind in education and health expenditures. In addition, in the last decades their growth rates fell substantially behind. It is easy to see how confidence in the future of socialism dissipated in these countries even within the inner circles of the Communist parties. It is impossible to predict the rates and patterns of change among these countries, but in all of them we observe the emergence of larger private economic sectors. We can also anticipate that levels of revenue and expenditure will become more similar to Western patterns.

REGULATIVE PERFORMANCE

Regulative performance is the exercise of control by a political system over the behavior of individuals and groups in the society. Although we usually associate regulation with legal coercion or its threat, political systems commonly control behavior by exhortation and by material or financial inducements as well.

The regulative activities of modern political systems have proliferated enormously over the last century or so. Industrialization and urban concentration have produced interdependence and problems in traffic, health, and public order. Growth in industry has created problems with monopolies, industrial safety, labor exploitation, and pollution. At the same time, the growth of science and the development of the attitude that humanity can harness and control nature have led to increased resort to governmental action. Recent history has been marked by the proliferation of regulatory activities.

The pattern of regulation varies not only with the broad socioeconomic and cultural changes associated with industrialization and urbanization, but also with changes in other cultural values. Thus, in recent years regulation in the United States has extended to include protection of voting rights, correction of racial segregation, prohibition of discrimination against minority groups and women in employment, control of pollution, and the like. At the same time, in most modern nations regulation of birth control, abortion, divorce, and sexual conduct has lessened.

In characterizing the regulative performance of a political system, we answer these questions:

1. What aspects of human behavior and interaction are regulated and to what degree? Does the government regulate such domains as family relations, economic activity, religious activity, political activity, geographic mobility, professional and occupational qualifications, and protection of person and property?
2. What sanctions are used to compel or induce citizens to comply? Does the government use exhortation and moral persuasion, financial rewards and penalties, licensing of some types of action, physical confinement or punishment, and direction of various activities?
3. What groups in the society are regulated, with what procedural limitations on enforcement and what protections for rights? Are there rights of appeal? Are these sanctions applied uniformly, or do they affect different areas or groups differently?

All modern nations use these sanctions in varying degrees. But the variety of patterns is great and reflects values, goals, and strategies. Governments have taken over various industries in many nations, but the range is very different. In 1960, one study shows, government in the United States employed only 1 percent of the persons engaged in mining and manufacturing and 28 percent of those working for public utilities

supplying gas, water, and electrical power; in France, the corresponding figures were 8 percent and 71 percent.¹⁰

Although we must treat the critical area of regulative performance briefly, one more aspect must be emphasized: government control over political participation and communication. We saw in earlier chapters that the presence or absence of political competition was an essential structural feature of political systems. Political systems vary all the way from authoritarian regimes that prohibit party organization, the formation of voluntary associations, and freedom of communication, to democratic systems, where such rights are protected. Government regulatory performance in this area has a crucial effect on political processes.

Table 8.2 shows the political rights and civil liberties ratings for a selection of countries for 1990-1991. Political rights refer to the opportunities people have to participate in the choice of political leaders—voting rights, the right to run for office, and the like. Civil liberties refer to the substantive areas of human behavior, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion, as well as procedural protections, such as those of trial by jury and against arbitrary governmental action. Those countries receiving rankings of 7 in the second column are assumed to exercise

Table 8.2 POLITICAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES RATINGS FOR
SELECTED COUNTRIES,
1990–1991

Country	Political rights ^a	Civil liberties ^b
Japan	1	1
United States	1	1
France	1	2
Germany	1	2
United Kingdom	1	2
Israel	2	2
Mexico	4	4
Soviet Union	5	4
Nigeria	5	5
China	7	7
Iraq	7	7

^aRatings range from the highest of 1 to the lowest of 7. Political rights here refer to the right to participate in determining who will govern one's country.

^bCivil liberties refer to those freedoms that make it possible to mobilize new opinions and to the rights of the individual vis-à-vis the state.

Source: Raymond D. Gastil, ed., *Freedom in the World* (New York: Freedom House, 1991, pp. 454–455).

complete control over the communications media and to set no limits on government regulatory activity vis-à-vis the individual. The rankings are based on indicators evaluated by a number of referees.

There is an important correspondence between rankings for political and civil rights. No country that scores high on participatory rights is very low on civil liberties, and no country low on participatory rights is high on civil liberties, suggesting that there is a strong relationship between popular participation and the rule of law and equitable procedure. The evaluations range from a high of 1 on both aspects of rights for Japan and the United States to the lowest possible scores of 7 and 7 for China and Iraq. These rankings, of course, vary over time. Nigeria's rose with the reestablishment of democracy in 1979, but plummeted after the military coup in 1983. Ratings for the United States have improved since the civil rights movement of the 1960s. The ratings for Israel depend on whether the occupied territories are included and may have been compiled before the onset of the Palestinian disorders.

Lest the impression be given that regulation is only negative in value, as in the suppression of rights, we should be reminded that our civilization and our amenities are dependent on governmental regulation. Such matters as safety of persons and property, prevention of environmental pollution, provision of adequate sanitation, safe disposal of toxic wastes, maintenance of occupational safety, and equal access to housing and education are commonly covered by governmental regulation and implementation. The revolt against overregulation in the last decades should not be permitted to obscure this fundamental point.¹¹

SYMBOLIC PERFORMANCE

A fourth category of political system outputs is *symbolic performance*. Much communication by political leaders takes the form of appeals to history, courage, boldness, wisdom, and magnanimity embodied in the nation's past; or appeals to values and ideologies, such as equality, liberty, community, democracy, communism, liberalism, religious tradition, or promises of future accomplishment and rewards. Political systems differ in citizens' confidence in their leaders and faith in their political symbols. Symbolic outputs are also intended, however, to enhance other aspects of performance: to make people pay their taxes more readily and honestly, comply with the law more faithfully, or accept sacrifice, danger, and hardship. Such appeals may be especially important in times of crisis. Some of the most magnificent and most successful examples are to be found in Winston Churchill's stirring speeches to the British people during the dangerous moments when Britain stood alone after the fall of France in World War II, but symbolic performance is also important in less extreme circumstances. Political leaders seek to influence citizens' behavior in energy crises or in times of drought, famine, and disaster.

“Jawboning” —exhorting business executives and labor leaders to go slow in raising prices and wages—is a frequently employed anti-inflation measure. Public buildings, plazas, monuments, holidays with their parades, and civic and patriotic indoctrination in schools all contribute to the population’s sense of governmental legitimacy and its willingness to comply with public policy.

OUTCOMES OF POLITICAL PERFORMANCE

Our comparisons of the levels and composition of taxation, governmental expenditures, and regulation in different countries do not tell us how these measures affect welfare and order. The functioning of the economy and the social order as well as international events may frustrate the purpose of political leaders. Thus, a tax rebate to increase consumption and stimulate the economy may be nullified by a rise in the price of oil. Increases in health expenditures may have no effect because of rising health costs, or health services may be so distributed as not to reach those most in need.

DOMESTIC WELFARE OUTCOMES

In Tables 8.3 and 8.4, we compare nations on a number of welfare, health, education, and equity indicators. The first three columns of Table 8.3 report measures of economic well-being. Then we attempt to show the connection between these economic patterns and health conditions reflected in life expectancy, infant mortality, and the daily per capita caloric intake. Table 8.4 compares education policy and level in different countries in terms of educational aspirations, the effort expended, and the educational level attained including the educational status of women. Our purpose in presenting these socioeconomic data is to show how governmental and private efforts in different kinds of societies affect human life chances—the availability of economic opportunity, the equity of income distribution, the health and longevity, the skill and creativity of their populations. Although the natural resources, the socioeconomic structure, and the cultural and historical backgrounds of these countries constitute constraints and opportunities, politics and government are the purposive and collective goal-setting and problem-solving institutions in the pursuit of economic growth, social welfare, and equity.

The range in per capita GNP (a rough measure of the income available to the average citizen of a country) reported in Table 8.3 staggers the imagination. Japan’s GNP is more than one hundred times that of Tanzania. The United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom also have per capita GNPs that are more than one hundred times larger than that of Tanzania. The economy of Hungary, the only then socialist country

Table 8.3 WELFARE OUTCOMES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1989

Country	GNP per capita in dollars	Average Annual Growth Per Capita GDP ^a		Life expectancy	Inf. mortality per 1,000 live births	Daily calories
		1965–1980	1980–1989			
Japan	23,810	6.6	4.0	79	7	2,848
USA	20,910	2.7	3.3	76	10	3,666
FR Germany	20,440	3.3	1.9	75	8	3,514
France	17,820	3.8	2.1	77	7	3,310
United Kingdom	14,610	2.9	2.6	76	9	3,252
Hungary	2,590	5.6	1.6	71	17	3,601
Mexico	2,010	6.5	0.7	69	40	3,135
Egypt	640	7.3	5.4	60	68	3,213
China	350	6.9	9.7	70	30	2,632
India	340	3.6	5.3	59	95	2,104
Nigeria	250	6.1	-0.4	51	100	2,039
Tanzania	130	3.9	2.6	49	112	2,151

^aGross domestic product (GDP) is the value of goods and services produced in a nation, without regard to the nationality of owners of factors of production.

Source: World Bank, *World Development Report, 1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Tables 1 & 2, pp. 204–207, Table 28, pp. 258–259.

Table 8.4 EDUCATION POLICY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: EFFECT, OUTPUT, AND OUTCOMES (1987)

Country	Years of required education	Goal and Output		Outcomes (percent)			
		Percent of GNP for public education	Expenditures \$ million	Expenditures per capita \$	6-17-year-olds in school	Literacy female/male	Women's share in university enrollment
Japan	9	5.0	119,367	979	93	99/99	27
USA	11	5.3	240,820	989	100	99/99	51
France	10	5.6	49,211	885	87	99/99	54
FR Germany	12	4.4	49,455	813	79	99/99	38
East Germany	10	3.8	6,879	413	74	99/99	45
UK	11	5.1	35,081	618	89	99/99	42
USSR	10	5.4	130,140	462	94	98/99	50
Hungary	10	3.6	2,476	233	71	98/99	49
China	9	2.7	8,235	8	80	56/82	33
India	8	3.5	8,808	11	64	29/57	30
Mexico	6	2.1	2,777	33	82	88/92	42
Egypt	9	5.9	1,704	34	74	30/59	33
Nigeria	6	1.5	349	3	51	31/54	26
Tanzania	7	3.6	116	5	42	88/93	15

Sources: Columns 1 and 7, *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1991* (Paris: UNESCO, 1989), pp. iii-1 ff.; columns 2 to 6, Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1991).

included in the table, is a little more than one-tenth that of Japan and about one-eighth that of the United States. While the economies of Nigeria, China, India, and Egypt are more productive than that of Tanzania, there is an enormous economic asymmetry between all the advanced and developing societies. Household services, subsistence agriculture, and other forms of household productivity do not get properly included in national income accounting, so that the figures for the lower income economies are somewhat exaggerated—but only somewhat.

Part of the explanation for these disparities is reported in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 8.3, which give the rate of growth in *gross domestic product* (GDP) from 1965 to 1980, and then for the 1980s. (GDP differs from GNP in that it shows the value of a country's output, including that resulting from investment by foreigners, rather than the value of outputs derived by inhabitants of a given country from investments anywhere in the world. In practice they are usually not very different). Japan has been running a strong and steady economic development race since its rise from defeat in World War II. While its rate of growth receded somewhat in the 1980s, it still has the highest rate of growth among all the advanced industrial societies listed in the table. Along with this pattern of growth goes the best record in life expectancy and infant mortality. It is intriguing that with the highest GNP per capita, the average caloric intake of the Japanese is substantially lower than that of all the other advanced industrial countries, and the medium-income developing societies as well. The difference is a dietary-cultural one—South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore, all East Asian, have similarly low caloric intakes.

Comparison of rates of growth in the 1965–1980 period and the 1980s reveals a number of interesting differences. The United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, under the conservative Reagan and Thatcher regimes increased their economic momentum somewhat during those years, in contrast to all the other advanced market economies. Hungary's decline was precipitous from 5.6 percent over the 1965–1980 period to 1.6 percent in the 1980s. Mexico and Nigeria also experienced radical declines in rates of growth, explained by the fall in oil prices. China and India showed strong growth rates during the 1980s.

The relationship between economic level and health is dramatically demonstrated in the figures for Nigeria and Tanzania where life expectancy is about age fifty, and one out of ten infants fails to survive the first year of life. The importance of culture and public policy is suggested by the figures for China and India. With the same GNP per capita, Chinese life expectancy is 70 years and infant mortality is 30 per thousand live births, while those of India are 59 years and 95 per 1,000, respectively. China has a much larger number of physicians per capita than India and a larger per capita caloric intake.

Other kinds of data also demonstrate the strong effect of economic level on health expenditures, health facilities, and sanitation. One authority reports that in the 1980s the average public expenditure per capita for

health for the economically developed countries was \$469 and compared with \$11 for the developing countries. The average number of persons per physician in the developed world was 398, as compared with 2,043 for the developing world. While 97 percent of the people of the developed world had access to safe water, this was true for only 53 percent of the population of the less advantaged areas.¹²

Gross national product per capita figures are averages; they do not tell us how the economic product is distributed in different societies. Data on income distribution are not easy to come by, but the data in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 gave us some impression of how income distribution varies in four kinds of nations: (1) advanced market societies, (2) socialist (excommunist) societies, (3) medium-income developing societies, and (4) low-income developing societies. Looking back at Table 2.1, we can see that in advanced capitalist societies the top 10 percent of households get around one-fourth of the income and the bottom 40 percent get about 15 to a little more than 20 percent. For the three socialist countries included in Table 2.1—Yugoslavia (1987), Hungary (1983), and Poland (1987)—the data are rather surprising. Yugoslavia turns out to have a more unequal distribution than Japan, while Hungary has the most equal distribution of all—more than one-fourth of the income goes to the poorest 40 percent of the households and only 18.7 percent to the top tenth of the households. Poland's figures are nearly as equal as Hungary's. All three countries have a wealth level well below that of the advanced market societies.

The two Third World patterns are particularly interesting and illustrate the operation of the well-known Kuznets curve. In his studies of European economic history, Simon Kuznets pointed out that in the early stages of industrialization income distribution became more unequal as the more advanced industrial sector outpaced the rural agricultural sector. In the later stages of industrialization, income distribution came closer to equality. The data in Table 2.1 tend to support this theory. Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico with GNPs per capita between \$2,160 and \$1,690, at a midpoint in economic developmental level, have the most unequal income distribution among the countries in the table. India and Bangladesh, lower down, have more equal distributions, while the Ivory Coast with a GNP of \$770 has a distribution pattern much like that of Mexico.

The Kuznets curve is explained by the common trends of economic and political modernization. In the early stages of modernization the large, traditional rural sector is left behind as industry and commercial agriculture begin to grow. At higher levels of economic attainment, the rural agricultural sector is penetrated and reduced in size by comparison with the growing industrial and service sectors of the economy. In addition, the development of trade unions and political parties in democratic countries results in legislation that affects income distribution through taxation, wage policy, and social security, health, and other benefits.¹³

The data in Tables 8.3 and 2.1 show how public policies affect welfare in some respects. A more thorough picture of the way policy may affect outcomes is shown in Table 8.4, which focuses on education, an important aspect of welfare. In Column 1 we see each country's educational goals — the number of years children are required to attend school. The next three columns describe performance in educational policy. First, we see the expenditure on public education as a percentage of the GNP, a rough measure of proportional effort. The next column shows how that effort translates into actual dollars. Then we see those dollars relative to population size, a crude measure of the amount available for the children who must be educated. Countries such as Tanzania and Egypt devote similar percentages of the GNP to education as do the advanced industrial societies. If you examine the per capita expenditure column, however, you will see that the differences in dollar expenditures are enormous.

Columns 5 and 6 show the policy outcomes in the short run and the long run. The short-run effort is the percentage of the 6 to 17 year olds in school. This percentage is greatly affected by the dollars actually spent, although differences in efficiency and emphasis on mass or elite education also shape this outcome. Then, we see the long-term outcome measured in literacy, comparing literacy rates for women and men. Literacy is affected by education programs, but slowly, unless very substantial adult education programs are undertaken. In countries like India and Nigeria most of the older people are illiterate, and it will take a long time for the education of the younger generation to have its effects as reported in the general statistics. China and Tanzania have made more of an effort in adult education, although these data must be treated with caution, because they are merely estimates. The figure of 99 percent literate in the United States conflicts with studies showing substantial functional illiteracy among American adults, probably because such literacy figures are based on the number of school years completed, not on actual tests of reading ability. The discrepancy between male and female literacy rates, and the female proportion of university students (the last column) both tell us something of the status of women in these societies. The range in the proportion of students who are women is from approximately half in the United States, the former Soviet Union, and France to less than one-fifth in Tanzania. Yet the adult literacy programs in Tanzania have reduced the literacy gap there to a modest five percent, while India and Egypt show wide gaps between men and women on both measures.

Table 8.4 reveals the sobering difficulties of trying to change societies, even in an area such as literacy, where modern methods and technology are available. It is hard for a poor country to spend a high percentage of its GNP on education, because to do so means that sacrifices must be made elsewhere. In any case, the country's revenue is probably limited, because much of its productive effort simply goes to feed the producers. No matter how large the country's percentage of effort may be, it does not translate into much per child, because the resource base is small and the

population is growing rapidly, pouring children into the new schools. The older population is mostly illiterate, so that the net effect on literacy is slow. Tanzania's level of success in increasing literacy has few equals in the nonindustrial world.

Finally, the relationship between outputs and outcomes in educational policy is complex. For example, a comparison of the (former) two Germanies shows substantial difference in output measures, but much less difference in outcomes, which may have implications for successful integration of policies in a united Germany.

DOMESTIC SECURITY OUTCOMES

Maintaining order and national security and protecting persons and property are the government's most fundamental responsibilities. Despite the general rise of crime in many modern societies, we have relatively little in the way of comparative data. Statistics are more reliable and up-to-date for the United States, a very crime-prone country indeed. While the increase in crime has been worldwide, in 1989 the crime rate in the United States was 15 percent over the 1980 level.¹⁴ Murder rates are usually considered the most reliable statistics. Table 8.5 shows a great variation in murder rates for countries for which we have data, but the United States and Mexico have much higher murder rates than other

Table 8.5 CRIME AND DISORDER IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

Country	Murders per 100,000 (mid-1980s)	Criminal offenders per 100,000 (mid-1970s)	Riots 1948–1977
United States	8.9	4,251	861
West Germany	1.1	1,597	143
Japan	0.8	519	195
France	1.2	1,358	207
United Kingdom	0.7	762	372
Mexico	17.0	ND	177
Egypt	0.5	19	99
Hungary	2.5	ND	32
Czechoslovakia	1.1	ND	68
Poland	1.7	ND	92
Nigeria	2.8	80	194
India	3.4	216	678

Sources: Column 1, United Nations; *Demographic Yearbook, 1988* (New York: United Nations, 1989); column 2, Interpol Crime Statistics reported in George T. Kurian, *The New Book of World Rankings* (New York: Facts in File Publications, 1984); column 3, Charles Taylor and David Jodice, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 3rd ed., Vol. 1, chs. 2–4 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).

countries. The United States was also highest in the proportion of criminal offenders (these data are for the mid-1970s), having more than 4,000 criminals per 100,000 population compared with under 1,600 for West Germany, around 1,300 for France, and around 750 for the United Kingdom. We do not know much about the causes of these differences. Although the greater availability of handguns and other firearms in the United States is probably part of the explanation for its particularly high rate of violent crime, the United States also leads most other industrial nations in violent crimes in which firearms were not involved.

Column 3 shows the number of incidents of riots in a selection of countries from 1948 to 1977. The absence of riots indicates the ability of groups in society to resolve issues short of violence and the degree of satisfaction with government. It also reflects the extent to which nations successfully impose discipline on their populations, the amount of freedom they accord them, and the amount and incidence of policing. All these data must be viewed with great caution, because they are taken from the public press, which is more reliable in some nations than others.

The figures for the United States are relatively high, reflecting the disturbances of the 1960s and early 1970s over civil rights and the Vietnam War. The high figures for the United Kingdom are mostly for Northern Ireland, but racial disturbances in other parts of Britain also helped push the figures up. The large number of riots in India reflects the high level of ethnic-linguistic conflict in that subcontinent.

OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

Nations typically engage in a great variety of international activities in order to enhance their welfare and security—economic, diplomatic, and military—and these activities affect prosperity and depression, war and peace, stability and change in the international political economy. These developments in turn affect the internal politics and policies of nations in a never-ending process. The interplay of international political and economic conditions and the political processes and public policy outputs of nations has been described and analyzed in a recent series of studies by Peter Gourevitch. He traced the political and policy responses of five Western industrial nations—Great Britain, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States—to the three world depressions of 1870–1890, 1930–40, and 1975–1985. Gourevitch also shows how these crises affected business, labor, and agriculture differently in each country, tracing the preferences and responses of interest groups, their interaction with political parties in each country, through to changes in political structure and policy. These changes in political structure and policy in individual countries are attributable to the impact of international depression and can be seen as creating the basis for equilibrium or breakdown in the last

century of Western international relations. Thus, the world depression of the 1930s produced a conservative reaction in England, a moderate left reaction in the United States, a polarization and paralysis of public policy in France, and a radical polarization, a breakdown of democracy, and the emergence of an aggressive nationalism in Germany. While the causes of World War II were complex and in considerable part resulted from international interactions, the pacifism of Britain, the demoralization and defeatism of France, the isolationism of the United States, and the nihilism and aggression of Germany were fed by the economic devastation of the world depression of the 1930s.¹⁵

The most important and most costly outcome of the interaction among nations is warfare. Table 8.6 reports the incidence of warfare for a variety of nations since the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1816—reporting the number of wars and battle deaths incurred by each country. Russia has averaged more than 127,000 military and civilian deaths per year in international warfare alone in the last century and a half, and Germany more than 46,000. These costs of international warfare have gradually escalated. Most of the deaths are concentrated in the twentieth century, and civilian deaths have risen even more rapidly, especially in those countries the location of which makes them likely battlefields. According to one authority, more than 90 percent of the deaths in war since 1700 have occurred in our century. Wars have occasioned as many

Table 8.6 INTERNATIONAL SECURITY OUTCOMES IN SELECTED NATIONS, 1816–1990

Country	Years in international system	Number of wars ^a	Battle deaths ^a	Civilian deaths ^a	Total deaths per year
Russia	175	19	9,700,000	12,500,000	127,000
Germany ^b	166	6	5,353,500	2,293,000	46,000
China	131	11	3,128,500	2,086,000	40,000
France	173	22	1,965,000	490,000	14,000
Japan	124	9	1,371,000	501,000	15,000
U.K.	175	19	1,295,000	131,000	8,600
U.S.A.	175	8	665,000	201,000	4,900
Egypt	54	5	25,000	53,000	1,440
India	44	5	14,000	16,000	680
Mexico	160	3	19,000	5,000	150
Tanzania	30	1	1,000	0	30

^aDoes not include civil wars.

^bFigures are for Prussia before unification in 1871.

Sources: Calculated from data made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The data up to 1980 were collected by J. David Singer and Melvin Small for their book, *The Wages of War 1816–1965* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972), pp. 275ff. Data on civilian deaths and all data from 1980–1990 are from Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991* (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1991) pp. 22–25.

civilian as military deaths. The number of concurrent wars peaked in 1987 at 27, the highest number since 1700, with a death toll in that year of over 2 million, more than 80 percent of them civilian. These included the wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Vietnam, and others. By 1989, the number of ongoing wars had dropped to 15, but in that year alone there were 300,000 war deaths in the world.¹⁶ With the development of nuclear weapons large-scale war threatens to become far more destructive to lives and property and far more random in its choice of victims, threatening the very survival of humankind and life on our planet. Until 1914 the incidence and magnitude of war seemed to bear some relationship to public policy; at least leaders of nations acted as though these costs in human and material destruction were appropriate and acceptable in relation to national goals. The alliance that defeated Napoleon in 1815 viewed the Europe which the Treaty of Vienna established as an outcome worth the cost in blood and treasure of the long Napoleonic Wars. Victorious Prussia under Bismarck could view the Austrian and French wars of the midnineteenth century as reasonable costs for German unification under Prussia. It is well to recognize, however, that the Franco-Prussian War was a prelude to World War I, as World War I was a prelude to World War II. The relationship between war as a means and the importance of its objectives began to grow apart in the twentieth century. With the creation and use of nuclear weapons at the end of World War II and the accumulation of enormous nuclear arsenals in the last decades, leaders of nations and "security professionals" have come to the conclusion that there would be no victors in such a war and that the sole purpose of a nuclear arsenal is to deter an antagonist.

The Gorbachev revolution led to significant steps in the reduction of nuclear arsenals and of armaments generally. The United States and the Soviet Union no longer confront each other militarily through client states in the Third World—in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. There has been a similar abatement of confrontation between China and capitalist countries. But while the sharp bipolar capitalism-communism tension in international relations has abated, and the deliberative and authoritative role of the United Nations organization in international disputes has been enhanced, warfare and even large-scale warfare, as the Gulf War demonstrates, is an expected feature of international relations. The Gulf War involved a coalition of 32 countries, organized by the United States to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions ordering Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait after it had invaded and annexed that country in early August, 1990. The Security Council imposed sanctions, embargoing all exports and imports out of and into Iraq. It also authorized the use of all means (including force) to implement its order to withdraw. The coalition forces under United States command, consisting of more than half a million troops, thousands of aircraft, tanks, armored vehicles, and hundreds of naval vessels, started aerial bombardment of

Iraqi forces on January 17, 1991. After a brief campaign of only 100 hours the Iraqi forces were defeated and compelled to withdraw from Kuwait. Whether this first-time experience of successful military action under UN auspices leads to a new collective security order preventing military aggression, as President Bush declared, remains to be seen.

For the foreseeable future substantial budget allocations for armaments, the design, production, and sale of more versatile weapons, and the deployment and use of such military means will no doubt continue to be a crucial component of international relations.

POLITICAL GOODS AND POLITICAL PRODUCTIVITY: A SYSTEM, PROCESS, AND POLICY APPROACH

Our approach to political analysis leads us from process to performance to evaluation. If we are to compare and evaluate the working of different political systems, we need a checklist to direct our attention to the variety of desired goals that can be implemented by political action. One society or one group of citizens may value order and stability; another may value participation and liberty. They may value these political “goods” with different intensity, and their preferences and the intensity of their preferences may change with time and circumstances.

Evaluation of political performance is inescapable, even when we think we are being completely unbiased. A long tradition in political analysis has emphasized the system goods of order, predictability, and stability. Political instability—constitutional breakdowns, frequent cabinet changes, riots, demonstrations, and the like—upset most people. Another school of thought has emphasized goods associated with process—citizens’ participation and freedom of political competition. Democracy is good and authoritarianism is bad, according to this school of thought, which directs research to maintaining democracy. Systems rejecting it or failing to sustain it are considered unsuccessful. Recent interest in human needs, in the quality of life, and in the tremendous problems of economic development has led to concentration on policy goods, such as economic welfare, quality of life, and personal security. A political system that improves welfare, decreases inequalities, enhances public safety, or cleans up its environment becomes the model.

All these schools of thought are preoccupied with important practical goods valued by most people in varying degrees and under varying circumstances. Without accepting any particular theory about basic human needs and values, we can say that each of these goods, and others listed here, have been valued by many people in many societies. Table 8.7 draws on our three-level analysis of political systems and on the work and thought of a number of scholars and thinkers to present a checklist of goods or values that are produced by political systems.

We cannot deal with these items at great length, but we can empha-

Table 8.7 PRODUCTIVITY OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Levels of political goods	Classes of goods	Content and examples
Systems level	System maintenance	Regularity and predictability of processes in domestic and international politics
	System adaptation	Structural and cultural adaptability in response to environmental change and challenges
Process level	Participation in political inputs	Instrumental to domestic and foreign policy; directly produces a sense of dignity and efficacy, where met with responsiveness
	Compliance and support	Fulfillment of citizens' duty and patriotic service
	Procedural justice	Equitable procedure and equality before the law
Policy level	Welfare	Growth per capita; quantity and quality of health and welfare; distributive equity
	Security	Safety of person and property; public order and national security
	Liberty	Freedom from regulation, protection of privacy, and respect for autonomy of other individuals, groups, and nations

size a few of the ideas involved. System goods have to do with the regularity and predictability with which political systems work and with the ability of systems to adapt to environmental challenges and changes. Regularity and adaptability are typically somewhat in conflict. On the one hand, most people feel anxiety if serious interruptions and changes affect the routine and behavior of political life. Successions of military coups or continuing collapses of cabinet governments or resignations of presidents create unease and unpredictability. On the other hand, as conditions change—as wars, rebellions, and economic disasters occur—or as aspirations change, people feel that the political system needs to adapt.

At the process level, we identify such goods as effective, satisfying participation, which most citizens typically desire if given a choice, and which produces generally positive views of the political system. Participation is not merely valued instrumentally, as a means to force political elites to respond, but for its own sake, because it increases the individual's sense of competence and dignity. Compliance can also be a good, as individuals seek to avoid penalties or to respond to the powerful impulse to serve others, which can be one of humanity's most gratifying experiences. President John F. Kennedy in his inaugural address called on such

impulses to serve and sacrifice when he said, "Ask not what your country can do for you, but what you can do for your country." Winston Churchill's homage to the Royal Air Force in the "Battle of Britain" similarly appealed to nobler human instincts: "Never have so many owed so much to so few." In national crises in many countries, young people especially have almost always volunteered their services with an enthusiasm that cannot be explained by simple calculation of the individual benefits from increasing effectiveness of policy. Procedural justice (trial by jury, habeas corpus, no cruel and unusual punishment) is another crucial process value, whose deprivation is a severe blow to citizens and without which other goods may be impaired.

At the policy level we come to the values of welfare, its quantity, quality, and equity; personal and national security; and freedom from interference in a life of reasonable privacy. We have discussed, indirectly, some of the welfare and security goods, but more must be said about liberty, which is sometimes viewed only as a purely negative good, a freedom from governmental regulation and harassment. Freedom is more than inhibition of government action, because infractions of liberty and privacy may be initiated by private individuals and organizations. In fact, liberty may be fostered by government intervention, when private parties interfere with the liberty of others. Much recent legislation on racial segregation may be understood as impelled by this purpose. Here, of course, different groups and perspectives may come to conflict over liberty, and liberty feeds back into many other goods. Liberty to act, organize, obtain information, and protest is an indispensable part of effective political participation. Nor is it irrelevant to such policy goods as social, political, and economic equality. Prior to the recent breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it was a common view that the communist countries were trading liberty for equality, by contrast with capitalism which was said to trade off equality for liberty. It will take historians and social scientists a long time to digest and evaluate the communist experience, but what has come to light in the aftermath of 1989 is the extent of corruption and privilege in communist societies, and the relatively low level of productivity of these countries in the last decades. It does not appear to be an exaggeration to say that, while they had surely traded off liberty and had provided a basic security of employment, it was primarily the failure of their economies to enhance productivity and welfare that led to the ideological demoralization.

STRATEGIES FOR PRODUCING POLITICAL GOODS

A Typology of Political Systems

All political systems embody strategies for producing political goods. The strategies may be oriented to goods on one level or another, or to goods

intended for the few or the many. The strategies may be shaped primarily by challenges imposed from the environment, by inheritance from the past, or by the self-conscious efforts of present-day politicians. We can in any case classify political systems by policy strategies. We saw in Chapter 2 that the major environmental feature of the political system was its economy, either preindustrial or industrial. All preindustrial nations face a host of similar problems, the most challenging being increasing welfare goods. Because of similarities in challenges, resources, and goals, we usually treat the preindustrial nations as a major category for study, further subdividing them by the political structures and strategies they adopt in their effort to increase welfare goods.

The industrial nations face a somewhat different set of problems. One of the major questions they must consider is how to handle process goods, particularly participation. We saw in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 that socioeconomic development brings increased citizen awareness of and participation in politics. In the industrial nations political input structures must be developed to deal with this potential for citizen participation on a large scale. One major strategy is to introduce a single authoritarian party to contain, direct, and mobilize citizens under government control. The other is to permit competing parties that mobilize citizens behind leaders representing different goods and strategies. We refer to the first of these strategies as authoritarian and to the second as democratic. Within these major classifications, we further classify systems by the conservatism of their policy, the degree to which they limit the role of the political system in relation to the economy. This approach, then, distinguishes these varieties of political systems:

- I. Industrial nations
 - A. Democratic
 - 1. Conservative Democratic
 - 2. Social Democratic
 - B. Authoritarian
 - 1. Conservative
 - 2. Radical
- II. Preindustrial nations
 - A. Neotraditional
 - B. Populist Democratic
 - C. Authoritarian
 - 1. Technocratic
 - 2. Technocratic-distributive
 - 3. Technocratic-mobilizational

Industrialized Democratic Nations The industrialized democratic nations must reconcile pressures to maintain or increase government services and personal income with the need to accumulate resources for investment in economic growth. In varying degrees all contemporary

democratic industrial nations suffer from unemployment, powerful inflationary tendencies, and relatively slow rates of growth. The classic capital-labor confrontation in these countries has been complicated by the emergence of the environment as a salient issue. Industrial pollution of air and water, the problem of the disposal of nuclear and toxic waste, divides nations differently, with a substantial part of the middle classes opposing growth that does not take into careful account environmental consequences, and a substantial part of the working classes favoring growth and employment even at the cost of some environmental danger.

These dilemmas—both the old classical capital and labor issues, and the newer environmental issues facing all industrial democracies—may be dealt with conservatively as in the United States in the Reagan-Bush era or in social democratic fashion as in Norway and Sweden, where social programs have been maintained and the environment largely protected. But as we have shown above, in both types of democratic regimes in the last decades levels of taxation and welfare expenditure have declined. The environmental issue tends to divide both conservative and left parties. In some European countries “Green,” ecologically oriented, parties have emerged, which typically form coalitions with the larger social democratic movements.

Industrialized Authoritarian Nations It is possible to classify industrial authoritarian nations into radical and conservative varieties. Prior to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe such regimes as the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were examples of the radical variety of industrialized authoritarian regime. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary are now in transition, moving in the direction of market economies and democratic polities. If disappointment and failure should undermine their recently established and still fragile democratic institutions, it is unlikely that these regimes would return to their socialist pasts. What is more likely is a resort to a technocratic authoritarian approach with the containment of popular pressure and protest by repressive means, and the management of investment and distribution in the interest of economic growth. For Russia and the other republics of the former Soviet Union, however, we cannot rule out the possibility that given the continuation of ethno-national disintegration and economic failure, the groups controlling the old coercive institutions and organizations may have sufficient vitality to reinstitute the repressive politics and preserve much of the *command economy* of the pre-1989 era.

Franco's Spain, the Greece of the colonels, perhaps the Chile of Pinochet, and the Brazil of the generals are examples of the second, conservative variety of authoritarianism, although the last two were at a lower level of industrialization. The military authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America of the 1960s and 1970s followed policies of suppressing popular political organization, controlling welfare

expenditure, and granting considerable freedom to private enterprise, in the interest of fostering economic growth, though at the expense of increasing inequality of wealth and income. In general, and across the board without regard to regime type, the credibility of socialism and of high welfare expenditures has declined in the last decades, while that of capitalism and democracy has risen. It would be wrong, however, to assume that this is more than the move of a pendulum. A decade of conservative democratic policy in the United States has accentuated inequality and has produced a growing stratum of "children in poverty," the neglect of a deteriorating infrastructure (roads, bridges, public buildings, schools), and the like. The democratization of the Latin American and Eastern European countries will be held hostage to the success of efforts to free and vitalize their economies. Thus, while the category of the industrialized, authoritarian regime in both its radical and conservative varieties is relatively empty at the moment, it would be a mistake to discard the category as no longer relevant.

Preindustrial Nations The preindustrial nations face common problems posed by the challenge of modernization. We classify these nations by the strategy they adopt to meet these challenges. *Neotraditional political systems* emphasize the system good of stability. Many of the regimes of sub-Saharan Africa are in this category. These mainly static systems are characterized by low growth rates, low literacy, and low rates of industrialization. They have survived into the modern era with their traditional social structures and cultures mostly unchanged. Their primary modern development has been modern military institutions and technology, which in many cases has enabled groups of officers to seize and keep power. Where these systems stabilize, the elite maintains cohesion through a system of police suppression, patronage, spoils, and privileges distributed through urban interest groups and ethnic elites. A good many systems that began as democracies have reverted to this strategy of merely maintaining their power and privileges, with generally low productivity.¹⁷

In the early years of colonial emancipation, in the 1950s and early 1960s, a kind of *populist democracy* was established in many of the new nations of Asia and Africa, as well as in Latin America. The tremendous strains of competitive politics in a preindustrial setting soon became apparent. With the emergence, sooner or later, of leaders appealing to the poorest members of the society, policy demands for more equitable material distribution, as well as for growth, became difficult to resist. Conflicts between growth and equity became difficult to resolve, and also, once participation was mobilized, ethnic differences came to the fore. Such ethnic conflicts are difficult to manage stably even in industrial systems, but with the limited resources of preindustrialized societies the problems are more severe. The result has been that the postcolonial, democratic systems have disappeared. The African populist regimes fell in the 1960s,

either to military coups or to one-party machines, themselves often swept away later by coups. In Latin America the much older democratic systems in Uruguay and Chile were also overwhelmed by internal pressures for welfare under conditions of low growth and high inflation. Many of the countries that turned authoritarian in the 1960s and 1970s have now reverted to democracy, but still must stand the test of effective economic and social policy.

The other three categories of preindustrial nations reflect various authoritarian strategies. They sacrifice competitive participation, to greater or lesser degree, in trying to achieve stability and economic growth. The authoritarian *technocratic* approach was successful in part in Brazil, where a coalition of military and civilian technocrats and middle-class business interests suppressed participation and kept distribution unequal. Income inequality increased markedly, but economic growth was rapid. South Korea followed an authoritarian technocratic-distributive strategy which suppressed participation but encouraged some income distribution along with growth. Early land reforms, rapid development of education, labor-intensive, export-oriented industrialization, and substantial American advice, support, and pressure have marked the Korean experiment. Its economic success seems to be leading to effective democratization.

The last category, the authoritarian technocratic-mobilizational strategy, has been exemplified primarily by preindustrial communist countries, and in a less aggressively mobilizing form in such countries as Taiwan, Tanzania, and Mexico. This approach is distinguished by a single political party mobilizing and involving citizens in the political process. Competitive participation is suppressed or limited. This category has rapidly emptied in the last few years as the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries have rejected Marxism-Leninism in favor of more democratic free-market strategies. China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba are the last remaining communist societies, dominated by single mobilizing political parties.

The noncommunist mobilizational systems vary substantially in success and in their emphasis on growth and distribution. Taiwan has been successful in combining growth and distributive equity under the domination of the Kuomintang (KMT) party. In recent years the monopoly of the KMT party has been challenged, and politics has become increasingly competitive. Mexico has been dominated by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) which incorporated the major interest groups of labor, business, and agriculture into its internal structure and governed the Mexican economy in a relatively effective and stable way until the collapse of oil prices. There is a threat to the domination of the PRI both from the right and left, and a more competitive party system may emerge in the next few years.

Tanzania is at the very beginning of economic development. The Tanzania African National Union (now known by its Swahili name Chama

Cha Mapinduzi) (CCM) controls political competition; after 25 years of sponsoring multiple-candidate elections to the Parliament under a single party, CCM is apparently on the verge of returning the country to a multiparty system. It is also returning to a market approach to the modernization of the economy. Government intervention has not been successful, and there has been a return to private agriculture. However, growth has been very slow.

The problems of the preindustrial nations are so different and formidable that no one strategy is sure to achieve even the goals of growth. One tragic aspect of efforts to increase productivity is that a nation can sacrifice liberty and competition but still not achieve even the goals of growth or equity. South Korea and Taiwan are examples of Third World nations that have achieved the goals of growth and distribution by authoritarian political means and that are now in process of democratizing. But they are still exceptional cases.

TRADEOFFS AND OPPORTUNITY COSTS

One of the hard facts about political goods is that all are desirable but cannot be pursued simultaneously. A political system has to trade off one value to obtain another. Spending funds on education is giving up the opportunity to spend them on welfare, or to leave them in the hands of consumers for their own use. These *tradeoffs* and *opportunity costs* are found not only in simple decisions about giving up education for better health care, but also in complicated decisions about investment for the future as opposed to consumption today. Even more difficult are the tradeoffs between security and liberty, or stability and adaptation, where the very concepts imply giving up some of the one for some of the other. The extreme of liberty, wherein each person is totally free to act, would make a highly insecure world where the strong would bully the weak and it would be difficult to arrange collective action. Yet, without some liberty to act, security is of little value, as the prisoner is too well aware.

Not only do goods have negative tradeoffs, but the tradeoffs are not the same under all circumstances. Under some conditions increasing liberty somewhat will also increase security, because riots against censorship will end. Under some conditions investment in education will be paid back many times in health and welfare, because trained citizens can care better for themselves and work more productively. One of the important tasks of social science is to discover the conditions under which positive and negative tradeoffs occur. If a system beset with coups and violence, disease and physical suffering, suppression and arbitrary rule can be replaced with a more stable, more participatory system that makes some progress in economic development, few will doubt that the tradeoff is positive.

We stress, however, that analogies from economics are no more than

analogies. Political science has no way of converting units of liberty into units of safety and welfare. And because politics may involve violence on a large scale, we must acknowledge that we can never calculate the value of a political outcome gained at the cost of human life. People act as though they know how to make such conversions, but political scientists can only point to values that people have emphasized at different times and places, and indicate the range and variety of values considered. The weight given to various goods will vary in different cultures and contexts. The advantage of a clear-cut ideology is that it provides people with logical schemes for telling how much one value should be traded against another, and thus offers orderly sequences of action leading to the outcome that is viewed as best. Such schemes may be invaluable for those pressed to action in the terrible circumstances of war, revolution, and famine. However, there is no ideology, just as there is no political science, that can solve all these problems objectively.

KEY TERMS

central government revenues	outputs and outcomes
command economy	political performance
direct taxes	populist democracy
distributive performance	progressive taxes
distributive policies	public policies
extractive performance	regressive taxes
extractive policies	regulative performance
gross domestic product (GDP)	regulative policies
gross national product (GNP)	symbolic performance
indirect taxes	symbolic policies
neotraditional political system	technocratic
OECD	tradeoff
opportunity cost	welfare state

END NOTES

1. See, among others, Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1981); Arnold Heidenheimer, Hugh Heclo, and Carolyn Teich Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). See

- also Francis G. Castles, *The Comparative History of Public Policy* (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1989).
2. See, for example, Samuel Brittan, *The Economic Consequences of Democracy* (London: Temple Smith, 1977); Michael Boskin, *The Crisis in Social Security* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1978); Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982).
 3. See, for example, Philippe Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch, eds., *Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979); Suzanne Berger, ed., *Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); John Goldthorpe, ed., *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism: Studies in the Political Economy of Western European Nations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); Peter Katzenstein, *Small States in World Markets* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); Heidenheimer, Hecló, and Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, p. 360.
 4. See Heidenheimer, Hecló, and Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, p. 198.
 5. World Bank, *World Development Report* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 226–227.
 6. See Heidenheimer, Hecló, and Adams, *Comparative Public Policy*, p. 198. (For an in-depth discussion of Japanese extractive and distributive patterns, see Bradley M. Richardson and Scott C. Flanagan, *Politics in Japan* (New York: HarperCollins, 1984).
 7. Heidenheimer et al., pp. 196–197.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
 9. Harold Wilensky, *The Welfare State and Equality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); also Harold Wilensky, Gregory Luebbert, Susan Hahn, and Adrienne Jamieson, *Comparative Social Policy: Theories, Methods, Findings* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, 1985).
 10. Fredrick L. Pryor, *Property and Industrial Organization in Communist and Capitalist Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), pp. 46–47.
 11. For an excellent discussion on all aspects of regulation in the United States, see James Q. Wilson, ed., *The Politics of Regulation* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
 12. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures, 1987–88* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1991), p. 47.
 13. Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Equality," *American Economic Review*, 45 (1955), pp. 1–28; Hollis Chenery et al., *Redistribution with Growth* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 17 ff.
 14. U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 48.
 15. Peter Gourevitch, *Politics in Hard Times* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).
 16. Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, p. 28.
 17. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

Index

- Accommodative party systems, 117, 118
Adams, Carolyn Teich, 159
Adjudication, 11
Agents of political socialization, 46, 49–55
Agriculture, labor force in, 6, 28
Albania, 23–24
Algeria, 51
Almond, Gabriel A., 55
Amendments, constitutional, 138–139
Angola, 40
Anomic interest groups, 88–90, 102
Apartheid, 30, 50
Argentina, 37, 123, 126, 140
Aristotle, 3
Armenia, 30
Arms control, 32–33
Articles of Confederation, 135, 136
Ash, Timothy Garton, 103–104
Assemblies. *See* Legislatures
Associational interest groups, 91–92, 95, 102, 103, 110
Australia, 140
Austria, 93, 94, 102, 110, 159
 party system in, 117, 118–119
Authoritarian systems. *See also* Communist system; *specific country*
 citizen participation in, 57–58, 75
 decline of, 125–127
 elite recruitment in, 81
 government bureaucracies in, 74, 152
 government powers in, 136–137
 industrialized, 181–182
 interest aggregation in, 108, 120–125, 127
 interest groups in, 91, 95, 103
 patronage networks in, 88
 political party, 110, 120–123, 127, 128
 political structures of, 82–84
 preindustrial, 183
 symbolic role-playing in, 75
Azerbaijan, 30

Babangida, Ibrahim, 67, 80
Banfield, Edward, 103
Bangladesh, 29, 158, 171
Belgium, 35, 98, 117, 139, 144
 political parties in, 54
 strikes in, 100
Berlin Wall, 33

Bicameralism, 139, 143
Blacks, 55
Brazil, 29, 37, 95, 123, 126, 140, 171, 181
Britain, 5, 6, 27, 28, 29, 35, 59, 165
 anomic political behavior in, 89–90
 citizen participation in, 70, 71, 73
 civil service in, 148–149
 crime rate in, 174
 economic depressions and, 175
 economy of, 167, 168, 169, 170
 elite recruitment in, 77, 78, 79, 81
 geographic location and, 26
 government powers in, 134, 135, 139
 government spending of, 160, 161, 162
 income distribution in, 30
 interest aggregation structures in, 110
 interest groups in, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 100, 102, 110
 legislature in, 9, 141, 142, 143, 144
 monarchy in, 8, 145, 146–147
 political parties in, 9, 54, 73, 77, 97, 98, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116–117, 118, 144
 political socialization in, 50, 52
 political structure of, 8–9, 83, 97
 prime minister in, 8, 145–146
 taxation in, 157, 159
 voter participation in, 65–66
 in warfare, 175
Bulgaria, 23, 33
Bureaucracies. *See* Government bureaucracies
Burma, 127
Bush, George, 148

Caloric intake, 168, 170
Cambodia, 40
Canada, 6, 93
Cardenas, Lazaro, 122
Cartel, 37–38
Ceaurescu, Nicolae, 33
Central government revenues, 156–158
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 162
Ceremonial executives, 145, 146–147
Channels of political access, 95–101
Chile, 100, 119, 123, 126, 140, 181, 183
China, 5, 6, 25, 27, 28, 74, 95, 140, 145, 146, 165, 166
 economy of, 168, 169, 170

- China (*continued*)
 elite recruitment in, 78, 79, 80
 government powers in, 135, 136
 government spending of, 162, 163
 interest aggregation structures in, 110
 and international relations, 32, 176
 legislature in, 141, 142
 literacy in, 172
 political structure of, 8, 9, 83
 totalitarian party in, 120, 121
 in warfare, 175
- Churchill, Winston, 166
- Citizen attitudes, 55–56
- Citizen participation, 56–58, 68–77
- Citizens' rights, 138
- Civic associations, 53
- Civil liberties, 165–166, 179
- Civil service. *See* Government bureaucracies
- Class system, as agent of political socialization, 52
- Coalition, party, 115, 116
- Coercive access channels, 95, 96, 99–101
- Colonial empires, 23
- Command economy, 181
- Committee systems, 144
- Communications. *See* Media
- Communist system. *See also specific country*
 elite recruitment in, 77–78
 interest groups in, 91, 92, 95, 97
 political structure in, 9, 12, 15
- Comparative political analysis, 3–21
 structural-functional approach to, 7–20
 system-environment approach to, 4–7
- Competitive party systems, 54, 72, 78, 110, 111–120, 127, 128
- Confederal systems, 135, 136
- Conflictual party systems, 117, 118
- Conflictual political culture, 59
- Consensual party systems, 117, 118, 119, 139
- Consensual political culture, 59
- Consociational party systems, 118, 119
- Constitutional council, 138
- Constitutional regimes, 138
- Constitutions
 amending, 138–139
 judicial review and, 138
 making, 133–135
 rigid and flexible, 139
- Controlled interest group systems, 95
- Courts, judicial review powers of, 138
- Crime rate, 173–174
- Cuba, 74, 95, 120, 121, 140
- Cultural heterogeneity, 30–31
- Cultural Revolution, 78
- Czechoslovakia, 24, 33, 89, 173, 181
- Dahl, Robert, 3, 75–76
- Debt, 37
- Decision rules, 133–140
- Defense spending. *See* Military, spending
- De Gaulle, Charles, 16, 19
- Democratic corporatist interest group systems, 93, 94–95, 110–111
- Democratic presidential regime, 137
- Democratic systems. *See also* Parliamentary system; Presidential system
 citizen participation in, 57, 58, 69–70, 72
 classification of, 56–58
 elite recruitment in, 77, 78–80, 81–82
 government powers in, 136, 137–139
 interest aggregation in, 108
 limits of participation, 75–77
 majoritarian and consensual, 117, 118, 119, 139
 policy strategies in, 180–181
 political structures of, 82–84
 postcolonial, 182–183
 terrorism and, 101
 trend toward, 84, 125–127, 140
 welfare state and, 155
- Democratic trend, 84, 125–127
- Denmark, 35, 93, 94, 139
- Depressions, 174–175
- Diamond, Larry, 140
- Direct taxes, 74, 158
- Distributive performance, 159–163
- Eastern Europe, 25, 74, 120. *See also specific country*
 anomic political behavior in, 89
 change in political culture, 62–63
 constitutions of, 135
 government expenditures in, 163
 independence from Soviet Union, 7, 33
 interest groups in, 92, 95, 97, 100, 103–104
 political socialization in, 52–53
- East Germany. *See also* Germany
 anomic political behavior in, 89
 political socialization in, 47, 48–49
 political structure of, 83
- Economic development, 28, 29
- Economic interdependence, 34–38
- Education
 as agent of political socialization, 50
 as characteristic of industrialized countries, 28
 government expenditures on, 161, 162, 163
 policy outcomes, 20, 169, 172–173
- Effective executives, 144–146
- Egypt, 27, 28, 83, 89, 110, 136, 140, 172, 173
 economy of, 168, 169, 170
 in warfare, 175
- Elections
 in competitive systems, 72, 112–114
 of elite policymakers, 78–80
 voter participation in, 65–68, 72
- Elite recruitment

- assembly role in, 142
- class bias in, 77–78
- control and, 81–82
- executive role in, 147
- selection process in, 78–80
- England. *See* Britain
- Environmentalism, 62, 181
- Estonia, 24
- Ethnicity
 - nonassociational groups and, 90
 - political socialization and, 53
 - political subcultures and, 60
 - threat to national security, 33
- Europe
 - legislatures in, 141–143
 - nation formation in, 23–24, 25
 - political culture in, 62
 - political parties in, 72
- European Community, 34–37, 134, 136
- Exclusive governing party, 120, 121
- Executives
 - effective versus ceremonial, 144–147
 - functions of, 147–148
- Extractive performance, 156–159
- Family, as agent of political socialization, 49
- Federal systems, 135–136, 143
- Feminism, 49
- Feudalism, 109
- Finland, 24, 116
- Foreign trade. *See* Trade
- France, 5, 6, 27, 28, 29, 35, 37, 59, 60, 148, 149, 159, 165
 - anomic political behavior in, 89–90
 - citizen participation in, 70–71
 - constitution of, 134, 137
 - crime rate in, 174
 - economic depressions and, 175
 - economy of, 167, 168, 169
 - elite recruitment in, 77, 78, 79
 - government powers in, 135, 136, 137
 - government spending of, 162
 - interest aggregation structures in, 110
 - interest groups in, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102
 - legislature in, 16, 141, 143, 144
 - political parties in, 19, 77, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 119
 - political system in (Fourth/Fifth Republics), 15–19
 - in warfare, 175
- Free industrial society, political participation in, 58
- Functions, 5, 9–11
- Fundamentalism, religious, 33, 51
- Gender equality, 49
- Geographic location of nations, 25–26
- Germany, 5, 6, 28, 29, 35, 37, 59, 70, 71, 141, 144, 165, 181
 - constitution of, 134, 138
 - crime rate in, 174
 - economic depressions and, 175
 - economic dominance of, 31–32
 - economy of, 167, 168, 169
 - elite recruitment in, 78, 79, 81
 - executive in, 146
 - government powers in, 135, 136
 - government spending of, 160, 161, 162
 - interest aggregation structures in, 110
 - interest groups in, 93, 94, 97, 105
 - political culture in, 47
 - political parties in, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 128
 - political socialization of, 46, 47–49, 52
 - political structures of, 83
 - reunification of, 33
 - taxation in, 157, 159
 - voter participation in, 65, 66
 - in warfare, 175, 176
- Ghana, 121, 123, 158
- Glasnost*, 12, 15
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, 12, 32, 56, 80, 135
- Gourevitch, Peter, 174
- Government. *See* Executives; Government bureaucracies; Government power; Legislatures
- Government bureaucracies
 - as access channels, 97–98
 - as agent of political socialization, 54–55
 - control of, 151–153
- France, 19
 - functions of, 149–151
 - interest aggregation and, 111
 - regulation by, 74
 - structure of, 148–149
- Government expenditure, 159–163
- Government power
 - constitution making and, 133–135
 - geographic distribution of, 135–136
 - limitations on, 138–140
 - separation of, 136–138
- Great Britain. *See* Britain
- Greece, 23, 35, 59, 115, 181
- Green movement, 105, 181
- Gross domestic product (GDP), 170
- Gross national product (GNP), 26, 27, 28
 - expenditure as percent of, 160–161, 172
 - per capita, 167, 168–169, 170, 171
 - taxes as percent of, 156–158
- Guinea, 123
- Gulf War, 135, 176–177
- Gurr, Ted Robert, 99
- Haiti, 123, 126
- Health
 - government expenditures on, 162, 163
 - policy outcomes, 168, 170–171
- Heclo, Hugh, 159
- Hegemony, 31
- Heidenheimer, Arnold, 159
- Higher civil service, 149

- Hungary, 29, 33, 89, 173, 181
 economy of, 167, 168, 169, 170
 government expenditures in, 160
 income distribution in, 171
 interest groups in, 104
 taxation in, 156–157, 158–159
- Hussein, Saddam, 33
- Implementation, 11
Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington Are Dashed in Oakland, 151
- Implementation studies, 151
- Inclusive authoritarian systems, 121, 122–123
- Inclusiveness, 104
- Income distribution
 citizen participation and, 73
 inequality, 28–30, 159, 171, 183
 taxation and, 159
- Incumbents, 54
- India, 27, 28, 29, 51, 79, 83, 109, 135, 136, 158, 173
 citizen participation in, 58
 cultural heterogeneity of, 30
 economy of, 168, 169, 170, 171
 interest aggregation in, 110
 literacy in, 172
 in warfare, 175
- Indirect taxes, 158
- Individual contactors, 88
- Indonesia, 100, 109, 123
- Industrialized nations
 authoritarian, 181–182
 democratic, 180–181
 income distribution and, 28, 29
 policy strategies of, 180–182
 political culture and, 61–62
 political socialization and, 52
- Industry
 multinational, 34, 36
 regulation of, 164–165
- Infant mortality, 168, 170
- Inglehart, Ronald, 103
- Inkeles, Alex, 61
- Inputs, 5–6, 20
- Institutional interest groups, 90–91, 102, 111
- Interdependence, 6, 31–40
- Interest aggregation, 10, 11, 142
 authoritarian party systems and, 120–123, 127
 bureaucratic role in, 150
 citizen participation and, 69, 71, 72
 competitive party systems and, 111–120, 127
 democratic trend and, 125–127
 interest groups and, 109–111
 military and, 110, 111, 123–125
 significance of, 127–128
- Interest articulation, 10, 11, 87, 142. *See also* Interest groups
 citizen participation and, 68–69, 71
- Interest groups
 access channels of, 95–101
 as agent of political socialization, 53
 citizen participation in, 69
 development of, 102–105
 interest aggregation and, 109–111
 policy perspectives on, 101–102
 political parties and, 110, 112
 systems of, 93–95
 types of, 87–92, 102
- International Monetary Fund (IMF), 38
- International relations, policy outcomes in, 174–177
- Iran, 33–34, 51
- Iraq, 136, 140, 165, 166
 -Iran war, 33–34
 Kuwait invasion, 32, 40, 176–177
- Ireland, 35, 141
- Israel, 6, 51, 140, 157
 government spending in, 160, 161
 political rights/civil liberties in, 165, 166
- Italy, 27, 35, 37, 55, 59, 60, 100, 117, 148, 159
 elite recruitment in, 79
 interest groups in, 90, 91, 95, 103
 legislature in, 141–142, 144
 political parties in, 113, 114, 119, 128
- Ivory Coast, 29, 121, 171
- Japan, 5, 6, 26, 27, 28, 29, 79, 109, 140, 165, 166, 173
 economic dominance of, 32
 economy of, 167, 168, 169, 170
 and European Community, 36
 government powers in, 135, 136, 138
 government spending of, 160, 161, 162
 interest aggregation in, 110
 interest groups in, 94, 95
 minority group in, 31
 taxation in, 157, 158, 159
 trade, 32, 37, 38
 in warfare, 175
- Jefferson, Thomas, 133
- Judicial review, 138
- Kennedy, John F., 178–179
- Kenya, 121, 122, 126
- Khomeini, Ayatollah, 33
- Khrushchev, Nikita, 80, 88
- King, Martin Luther, Jr., 89
- King, Rodney, 99
- Kohl, Helmut, 81
- Kuwait, 32, 34, 40
- Kuznets, Simon, 171
- Kuznets curve, 171
- Labor force
 agricultural, 6, 28
 in postindustrial society, 6, 52
- Labor unions. *See* Trade unions

- Latvia, 24
 Lebanon, 40, 51, 60, 119
 Legislatures, 140–141
 as access channel, 97
 bicameral, 139, 143
 functions of, 141–142
 political parties in, 115–117
 in political structure, 9, 12, 15, 16, 19
 structure of, 142–144
 Legitimacy, 4, 55–56, 61, 62–63
 Legitimate access channels, 95–99
 Libya, 140
 Life expectancy, 28, 168, 170
 Lijphart, Arend, 118, 139, 140
 Literacy, 28, 169, 172, 173
 Lithuania, 24
 Luxembourg, 25, 35
- Major, John, 115
 Majoritarian party systems, 117, 118, 139
 Malawi, 126
 Malaysia, 29, 171
 March, James G., 134
 Mass media. *See* Media
 Media
 as access channel, 96–97
 as agent of political socialization, 52–53
 executive communications to, 147
 industrialized nations and, 28
 internationalization of, 39
 leaking information to, 150
 Mexico, 5, 6, 27, 28, 29, 37, 55, 90, 95,
 97, 102, 140, 165
 crime rate in, 173–174
 economy of, 168, 169, 170, 171, 183
 elections in, 67
 elite recruitment in, 78, 79–80
 government powers in, 136
 government spending of, 160, 161,
 162–163
 interest aggregation structures in, 110
 political parties in, 78, 79, 122–123, 183
 taxation in, 157, 158, 159
 in warfare, 175
 Military
 coups, 80, 84, 91, 111, 128, 183
 interest aggregation and, 110, 111,
 123–125, 126
 national security and, 32–34
 policy strategies of, 181–182
 spending, 21, 161, 162, 163, 177
 Mixed parliamentary-presidential regime,
 137
 Modernization, 29, 62
 and interest group development,
 102–103
 stages in, 171
 Moi, Daniel Arap, 122, 126
 Monarchy, 8, 144, 145, 146–147
 Multinational companies, 34, 36
 Multi-party systems, 117–118, 119–120
- Nade, Mark, 151
 Napoleonic Wars, 176
 National security, 32–34
 National separation, 23–25
 Nations
 constraints of interdependence, 38–39
 cultural heterogeneity within, 30–31
 economic inequality within, 28–30
 formation of, 23–25
 interdependence of, 6, 31–40
 location of, 25–26
 size of, 25
 wealth of, 26–28
 Neotraditional political systems, 182
 Netherlands, 35, 93, 98, 110, 116, 117,
 119, 139, 141, 159
 New Zealand, 93, 117, 138–139, 140
 Nigeria, 28, 51, 61–62, 83, 102, 136, 173
 economy of, 168, 169, 170
 elite recruitment in, 79, 80
 government spending of, 160, 161, 162,
 163
 interest aggregation in, 110
 literacy in, 172
 military in, 123
 political rights/civil liberties in, 165, 166
 political structure of, 83, 84
 taxation in, 157, 158
 voter participation in, 67
 Nixon, Richard, 82, 150
 Nkrumah, Kwame, 121, 123
Nomenklatura, 81
 Nonassociational interest groups, 90, 102
 North, Oliver, 150
 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 (NATO), 32
 Northern Ireland, 60–61, 101, 174
 North Korea, 25, 74, 95, 120
 Norway, 93, 94, 117, 118, 139, 144, 159
 Nuclear weapons, 176
- Obstructions, 100
 Occupational groups, 53
 Oil cartel, 37–38
 Olsen, Johann P., 134
 Ombudsman, 152
 Opportunity costs, 184
 Organization for Economic Cooperation
 and Development (OECD), 159
 Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 Countries (OPEC), 37–38
 Outcomes, 20–21, 167–177
 Outputs, 6, 20, 156–167
- Pakistan, 51, 123
 Paraguay, 123
 Parliamentary system, 9, 16, 19, 116, 143
 access channels in, 97
 committees in, 144
 elite recruitment in, 78–79, 81
 executive in, 145–146

- Parliamentary system (*continued*)
 - government powers in, 136, 137
 - political parties in, 144
- Parochials, 57
- Participant activities, 68
- Participant democracy, limits of, 75–77
- Participants, 57
- Party. *See* Political parties
- Party coalitions, 115, 116
- Party-electoral aggregation, 114
- Patron-client networks, 88, 109–110
- Payne, James, 100
- Peer group, as agent of political socialization, 51–52
- Perestroika*, 12
- Performance, 9
- Personal connections, 96
- Personal interest contacts, 68
- Peru, 84, 100, 101, 104, 126
- Philippines, 83, 100, 109
- Pluralist interest group systems, 93
- Poland, 24, 29, 33, 102, 104, 173, 181
 - foreign debt of, 37
 - income distribution in, 171
 - political socialization in, 51
- Polarization, 127–128
- Policy functions, 11
- Polymaking, 132–153
 - assembly role in, 140–144
 - authoritative, 11
 - bureaucratic role in, 148–153
 - citizen participation in, 69, 70
 - decision rules for, 133–140
 - elite recruitment for, 78–80
 - executive role in, 144–148
 - interest articulation in, 101–102
 - political culture and, 58–59
 - preferences. *See* Interest aggregation
 - process functions and, 10–11
- Politboro, China, 9
- Political action committees, 97
- Political communication, 11
- Political culture
 - change in, 61–63
 - consensual versus conflictual, 59–61
 - defined, 55
 - in Germany, 47
 - policy propensities and, 58–59
 - process propensities and, 56–58
 - system propensities and, 55–56
- Political goods
 - levels of, 177–179
 - strategies for producing, 179–184
- Political parties
 - as access channel, 97
 - as agent of political socialization, 53–54
 - authoritarian systems, 110, 120–123, 127, 128
 - citizen participation in, 72–73
 - competitive systems, 54, 78, 110, 111–120, 127, 128
 - functions of, 108–109
 - interest aggregation and, 110, 111–123, 127
 - in parliamentary versus presidential systems, 143–144
 - political structures and, 9
 - social change and, 6
- Political performance, outcomes of, 167–177
- Political recruitment, 11
 - citizen participation and, 68–75
 - of elites, 77–84
 - in participant democracy, 75–77
 - voter participation and, 65–68, 72
- Political rights, 165–166
- Political self, 45
- Political socialization, 11
 - agents of, 46, 49–55, 142
 - defined, 45–46
 - direct and indirect, 46
 - executive role and, 147
 - resocialization, 46, 47–49
- Political structure
 - democratic versus authoritarian, 82–84
 - function and, 9–20
 - types of, 7–9, 65
- Political subcultures, 59–61
- Political systems
 - environment of, 5–7, 23–40
 - evaluation of, 20–21, 177
 - functions of, 4–5
 - productivity of, 177–179
 - tradeoffs in, 184–185
 - typology of, 179–184
- Political terror tactics, 100–101
- Politics* (Aristotle), 3
- Portugal, 35
- Postindustrial societies, 6, 52
- Preindustrial societies, 28, 82
 - institutional interest groups in, 91
 - military governments in, 80, 84, 91
 - policy strategies of, 182–184
- Presidential system, 16, 19
 - committees in, 144
 - elite recruitment in, 78
 - executive powers in, 145
 - government powers in, 136, 137
 - political parties in, 143–144
- Prime minister, 8, 145–146
- Process functions, 10–11
- Process goods, 178–179
- Progressive taxes, 158
- Protest demonstrations
 - as access channel, 98–99
 - participants in, 70–71
 - violent, 100
- Public policy, 155–177
 - distributive, 159–163
 - extractive, 156–159
 - outcomes of, 20–21, 167–177
 - regulative, 164–166

- symbolic, 166–167
- welfare state and, 155–156
- Putnam, Robert, 103
- Reagan, Ronald, 32
- Regressive taxes, 158
- Regulative performance, 74, 164–166
- Relative deprivation, 99–100
- Religion
 - as agent of political socialization, 51
 - institutional interest groups and, 91
 - political subcultures and, 60–61
- Resource extraction, 156–159
- Riots, 99–100, 173, 174
- Roman Catholic Church, interest groups
 - and, 91, 95
- Romania, 33
- Rourke, Francis, 151
- Saudi Arabia, 6, 102, 136, 145
- Schmidt, Helmut, 81
- Separation of powers, 136–138, 139, 143, 148
- Shining Path, 101
- Sierra Leone, 126
- Singer, J. David, 175
- Small, Melvin, 175
- Smith, David, 61
- Socialization, 45. *See also* Political socialization
- Social security
 - expenditures, 163
 - tax, 158, 159
- South Africa, 102, 104
 - anomic political behavior in, 90
 - constitution of, 135
 - cultural heterogeneity in, 30–31
 - political socialization in, 50
 - voter participation in, 66–67
- South Korea, 6, 25, 183
 - government spending in, 160, 161
 - taxation in, 157, 158, 159
- Soviet Union/Soviet Union, former, 5, 6, 25, 27, 28, 74, 165
 - citizen participation in, 70, 71
 - constitution of, 135, 137
 - cultural heterogeneity of, 30, 90
 - dissolution of Soviet Union, 4, 12, 15, 25, 56, 60, 83
 - and Eastern Europe, 7, 33
 - elite recruitment in, 77, 79, 80, 109
 - government bureaucracies in, 149
 - government powers in, 136, 137–138
 - government spending of, 162
 - interest aggregation structures in, 110
 - interest groups in, 88, 95, 97, 102
 - and international relations, 32, 176
 - legitimacy problems in, 56
 - national security of, 32–33
 - new nations, 25
 - political system of (1987/1992), 12–15
 - totalitarian party in, 120, 121
 - voter participation in, 67–68, 72
 - in warfare, 175
- Spain, 27, 35, 95, 181
- Strikes, 98, 100
- Subject activities, 68
- Subject role, 57, 73–75
- Supreme Soviet, 12, 15
- Surinam, 126
- Sweden, 93, 94, 117, 118, 139, 141, 144, 149
 - government spending of, 160, 161
 - taxation in, 157, 159
- Switzerland, 139, 146
- Symbolic performance, 166–167
- Symbolic role-playing, 75
- Syria, 123, 157, 158, 160, 161
- System, 4
- System functions, 11
- System goods, 178
- Taiwan, 183
- Tanzania, 26, 27, 28, 83, 121, 136
 - cultural heterogeneity of, 30
 - economy of, 167, 168, 169
 - interest aggregation structures in, 110
 - literacy in, 172, 173
 - political parties in, 183–184
 - in warfare, 175
- Taxation
 - citizen resistance to, 73–74, 155
 - defined, 156
 - revenue as proportion of GNP, 156–158
 - sources of revenue, 74, 158–159
 - state/local revenue, 157
- Technocratic approach, 183
- Terrorism, 100–101
- Thailand, 109
- Thatcher, Margaret, 81, 115, 148, 170
- Third World
 - constraints of interdependence, 38
 - debt in, 37
 - industrialization in, 171
- Tocqueville, Alexis de, 3
- Totalitarian party, 120–121
- Trade
 - in European Community, 34–37
 - interdependence, 6, 34
 - oil cartel, 37–38
 - surplus/deficit, 37
- Tradeoffs, 184–185
- Trade unions, 53, 77
 - interest aggregation and, 110
 - interest group systems of, 93–95
 - strikes, 98, 100
- Trust, 103
- Uganda, 158
- Unitary systems, 135–136, 143
- United Arab Emirates, 26, 27

- United Kingdom. *See* Britain
- United Nations, 32
 new nations in, 25
 peacekeeping role of, 39–40, 176
- United States, 5, 25, 51, 59
 anomic political behavior in, 89
 citizen participation in, 70, 71–73
 constitution of, 135, 138, 139
 crime rate in, 173–174
 cultural heterogeneity in, 31
 as dominant nation, 32
 economy of, 167, 168, 169, 170
 elite recruitment in, 78, 79, 81–82, 109
 and European Community, 36
 executive in, 145, 146
 geographic location and, 26
 government bureaucracy in, 149
 government expenditures in, 160, 161–162, 163
 government powers in, 135, 136, 138, 139
 and Gulf War, 176–177
 income distribution in, 29, 30
 interest aggregation structures in, 110
 interest groups in, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98, 102
 labor force composition in, 6
 legislature in, 141, 142, 143, 144
 national security of, 32, 34
 policy outcomes in, 20–21
 political culture in, 62
 political parties in, 6, 54, 97, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118
 political rights/civil liberties in, 165, 166
 political socialization in, 52–53
 political subcultures in, 60
 regulation in, 164–165
 taxation in, 74, 157, 159
 trade, 32, 37, 38
 violence in, 99–100
 voter participation in, 65, 66, 72
 in warfare, 175
 wealth of, 26, 27, 28
- Uruguay, 126, 183
- Venezuela, 27, 102, 136, 140
- Verba, Sidney, 55
- Vietnam, 74, 120
- Vietnam War, 32
- Violence
 crime, 174
 relative deprivation and, 99–100
- Voter participation, 65–68, 72
- Warfare, 175–177
- Warsaw Pact, 32, 33
- Watergate scandal, 150
- Wealth
 income inequality and, 28–30
 measures of, 26–28
- Welfare policy
 expenditures, 6, 155, 161, 162, 163
 outcomes of, 167–173
- Welfare states, 155
- West Germany. *See also* Germany
 political socialization in, 47–48
- Wilensky, Harold, 163
- Wilner, Ann, 100
- Wilson, F. M. G., 148–149
- Women, education of, 169, 172
- Workforce. *See* Labor force
- World Bank, 38
- World Development Report*, 162
- Yeltsin, Boris, 12, 15, 68, 80, 137–138
- Youth culture, 52
- Yugoslavia, 24, 25, 29, 40, 140
 authoritarian party system in, 122
 ethnic conflict in, 33, 60
 income distribution in, 171
- Zaire, 123
- Zambia, 126

COMPARATIVE POLITICS

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK


Gabriel A. Almond G. Bingham Powell, Jr. Robert J. Mundt



As the world grows smaller, the need to understand the world's governments grows bigger. In *Comparative Politics Today*, one of the most influential comparative government texts ever published, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., pioneered a "functional approach"—examining *system, process, and policy*—to understand government. This three-pronged analytic structure allows the reader to move easily and logically from institution to institution and process to process, without losing the essential thread of connection and meaning.

The volume you now hold, *Comparative Politics: A Theoretical Framework*, was created in response to demands for a brief version of the parent text. It offers the theoretical framework only, consisting of the revised and updated chapters from Parts I and II of the big book, along with an increased focus on the worldwide process of democratization that is currently unfolding.


This text also functions as a multidisciplinary interface for politics and public policy, lending real meaning and significance to the study of politics and the choices it holds out to humanity. It's the perfect tool for learning how to make sense of today's rapidly changing world governmental systems.



9780673522825

01/12/2017 11:40-3

22



9 780673 522825